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Reflections on Vicos

Anthropology, the Cold War, and the


7
Idea of Peasant Conservatism

ERIC B. ROSS

W HEN GEORGE FOSTER, doyen of applied anthropology and postwar


director of the Smithsonian's Institute of Social Anthropology
(ISA), published his classic work on the Mexican peasant vil-
lage of Tzintzuntzan,,, he was still writing, in the traditional anthropological
fashion, of rural Mexico's "folk economy" (Foster 1948; cf. Lewis 1955,
145). Although such a perspective was fairly common, in retrospect it
hardly seems to presage the rapid emergence of peasant society as a focus
of anthropological attention over the next few decades. The discipline's
growing concern with peasants, of which the Vicos Project was a notable
example, was, however, less a reflection of new theoretical insights or of
the demise of its classic subjects than of the increasingly urgent demands
of the Cold War, which affected the agenda not only of anthropology but
of a broad spectrum of U.S. academic thought (see Nader 1997; Latham
2000; Price 2004; S. Rosen 1968; Gough 1968).
As such, it was closely associated with "modernization theory," a highly
influential body of writing through which Western academics and policy
makers described certain goals-and the way to achieve them-as desirable
for the developing world (cf Latham 2000; Gendzier 1985). That the aca-
demic heartland of modernization theory, MIT's Center for International
Studies (CENIS), was under the directorship of Max Millikan, a former as-
sistant to the director of the CIA (Needell1993, 415-16; G. Rosen 1985,
28; Bird 1998, 139) and had as its "ultimate aim ... the production of
an alternative to Marxism" (G. Rosen 1985, 27-29), clearly situates such
conceptual leanings within the framework ofU.S. Cold War policy.

129
130 ERIC B. ROSS
REFLECTIONS ON VICOS 131

The paradox confronting the West was that, while it regarded develop- U.S. intelligence community (Ross 1998a, 144-48), rapidly expanded its
ment-in its own image-as a general and universal goal, it considered it, activities to the point where they overshadowed all its other programs out-
at the same time, as a source of social instability and political discontent. side the United States (Caldwell and Caldwell 1986, 4); and that CENIS,
The central challenge, as Millikan's deputy, Walt Rostow, proclaimed, with Ford support, chose to focus much of its own attention (Millikan
was for the West to use the modernization process for its own geopolitical 1962, 9). It was also where the community development paradigm was first
advantage, while minimizing the opportunities it afforded for the advance seriously implemented, in the Etawah district of Uttar Pradesh (then called
of communism (Latham 2000, 167-68), or to manage it "peacefully," in United Provinces) (Mayer et al. 1958).
the words of noted agricultural economist Wolf Ladejinsky, "before the It is important to understand why. Uttar Pradesh was the home of a
peasants take the law into their own hands and set the countryside ablaze" long succession of peasant uprisings and in 1925 had been the setting for
(Walinsky 1977, 132). If, as Cornell anthropologists would later write, the the founding of the Communist Party of India (Taraqqi 2000). So, in
Cornell-Peru Project at the Andean hacienda ofVicos came to be regarded the volatile early years of independence, the region was clearly a strategic
as "a paradigm for international development in the third world in the choice as the site for India's first experiments in community develop-
decade of the 196D-70's" (Cornell University 2005-2006), this must be ment. When, in 1947, a pilot project was initiated in Etawah, its appeal, as
understood in the context of the U.S. Cold War. CENIS economist George Rosen observed, was that it met "the political
need of the Congress [Party] to do something to improve conditions in
the rural areas" (1985, 49), which were then marked by great unrest. "If
The Emergence of Community Development: it was successful," he continued, "it would serve as a model for meeting
Etawah, Cornell, and Beyond the revolutionary threats from left-wing and communist peasant move-
The public justification for outsiders to intervene in the course of rural ments demanding basic social reforms in agriculture" (1985, 49). By the
change in the Third World was the view, which came to the fore in the early 1950s, the so-called Etawah Project, in which Cornell's Morris Opler
late 1940s, that "the social organization of a peasant society is ill-adapted played a decisive role, seemed so effective that Paul Hoffman, head of the
to the achievement of [the] high technological proficiency" on which Ford Foundation (and former director of the Marshall Plan), grandly, if
modernization was presumed to depend (Notestein 1953, 26). This no- unrealistically, pr~claimed, "There is no reason why all 500,000 of India's
tion, which was consistent with the main tenets of dominant moderniza- villages could not make a similar advance" (quoted in G. Rosen 1985, 11).
tion theory (c Lerner 1958 and Hagen 1962), would energize the new The Ford and the Rockefeller foundations offered to sponsor a nationwide
community development paradigm that emerged during that period as an community development program modeled on Etawah (G. Rosen 1985,
alternative to the kind of change that Ladejinsky and others feared might 50), because "it was feared that rapidly increasing population pressure in
take place beyond the control of Western strategists and their local allies. relation to food supplies in South and Southeast Asia would result in the
Anthropology would play an important role in the emergence of this new developing countries falling into the Communist camp" (Chandler 1992,
paradigm by helping to foster the myth that peasants-though regarded as 5). Eventually, the U.S. government and Ford would provide more than
a reservoir of radical political transformation-were somehow too con- $100 million for such programs during the course oflndia's First and Sec-
servative in their cultural values to be reliable agents of the kind of rural ond Plans in the 1950s (Brown 1971, 4), and U.S. anthropologists would
change that the West advocated. Moderate agrarian change, it was there- play an important role in many of these programs.
fore argued, had to be guided by outsiders, working within the framework
of"community development" to change (that is, westernize) "traditional"
attitudes and values. Community Development as
After the success of Chinese revolutionaries in 1949, Western policy "Controlled/Directed Change"
makers thought that communism was most likely to advance next in India. Cornell's India Project under Morris Opler was, in fact, one of a number
For that reason, it was there that the Rockefeller and Ford foundations of interconnected activities that came together to form "an ambitious
devoted much of their attention; that Ford, then closely associated with the worldwide anthropological undertaking" by Cornell's anthropologists to
132 ERIC B. ROSS REFLECTIONS ON VICOS 133

study "an accelerated process of global change" (Doughty 1977, 144) in The Cornell project was equally consistent with the emergence of the
India, Thailand, and Peru and on the Navajo reservation in the United new subfield of applied anthropology, which similarly tended to reflect
States (Keyes 1994). A manifestation of postwar anthropologists' commit- the modernization paradigm with its explicit promotion of Western val-
ment to proving the strategic and professional relevance of their discipline ues and goals. This is readily seen in the work of applied anthropologist
in the early years of the Cold War, it was funded by the Carnegie Corpora- Charles Erasmus, who fervently proclaimed in his well-known book Man
tion (Cornell University Library 2008). Takes Control: Cultural Development and American Aid, "Even in countries
One of the leading figures in this cross-cultural project was Lauriston that have not yet had land reforms, I do not think that the major problem
Sharp. He had joined the Cornell economics department in 1936 (Bowen is who owns the land or how large the holdings are" (1961, 326). While
2004, 388) and soon became chair of the new Sociology and Anthropology such a view was certainly at odds with the mounting experience of the
Department. At the end ofWodd War II, during which he had worked (in UN Economic Commission for Latin America (1968) and oflater writers
1945) for the State Department's Division ofSoutheast Asian Affairs (Bowen on peasant economy such as Keith Griffin ([1974] 1979), Terry Byres and
2004, 388), Sharp hired psychiatrist Alexander Leighton, who had not only Ben Crow (1988) and, above all, contradicted the understanding of peas-
worked for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Office of War ants themselves, Erasmus, like so many of his colleagues, subscribed to the
Information (OWl) during the conflict (Simpson 1994, 26) but, as chief of values of an era that held that developing countries would be far better
the Morale Analysis Division for the U.S. Navy Medical Corps, had con- off if they could only be refashioned in the image of the United States.
ducted research on Japanese Americans in the internment camp run by the The Cold War helped to define the whole point of development for such
War Relocation Authority (WRA) at Poston, Arizona (Davis 2001, 321-22; writers. But, beyond that, a significant number of anthropologists who
Tremblay 2004, 7-8). As it happened, his Cornell colleague, Morris Opler, worked for government agencies, directly or indirectly, such as Erasmus
had also worked for the WRA (at the Manzanar camp) and for the OWl and George Foster, who often did so under the rubric of "applied anthro-
(Unrau 1996; Price 2002, 18; Webster and Rushforth 2000, 328). Out of pology" (the society for which had been established in 1941), effectively
such wartime backgrounds, Leighton, Sharp, and Opler developed a grand aligned themselves with the implicit objectives of U.S. government policy.
scheme to study and direct culture change in the postwar world. According Without seeming to feel a need to criticize the aims of such policy, they
to Leighton, the new program "addressed the question of facilitating the sought simply to,demonstrate how anthropology could help to make such
introduction of modern agriculture, industry, and medicine to areas that are policy more effective. The main problem, in Erasmus's view, was only for
deficient in those technologies" (quoted in Davis 2001, 323). It attempted to the United States to "make sure that we are providing sufficient incen-
do so without evoking "hostility towards the innovator" (Davis 2001, 323). tive for those best qualified to help win the race for free society" against
This was very much in keeping with the lessons learned through Cornell's what he called "coercive society," an obvious allusion to communism and
prior association with agricultural missionaries (Ross 1998a, 140-44) and was socialism (Erasmus 1961, 331). It was not a position conducive to an ob-
one of the key features of the new community development framework. jective appraisal either of the contradictions of contemporary development
Characterized by a rather uncritical confidence in the benefits of Western or of the realities of peasant livelihoods. It was, however, advantageous for
technological innovation (Davis 2001, 327) and reflecting, as it did, the the professionalization of anthropology, a goal then on the minds of many
imperatives of the new modernization paradigm, this approach ensured of its leading practitioners, who were eager to demonstrate their relevance
that Cornell was a credible and influential partner of Washington policy to the concerns and agenda of the U.S. political elite.
makers and of major U.S. foundations through the Cold War years (Ross This was certainly the import of the address to the Twenty-Third An-
1998a; 116-17), a period during which one of the university's presidents, nual Meeting of the Society of Applied Anthropology in 1962 by Ward
James A. Perkins, variously occupied positions as vice president of the Goodenough, author of Cooperation in Change: An Anthropological Approach
Carnegie Corporation, director of the Rockefeller family's Chase Manhat- to Community Development (1963), when he noted that anthropologists
tan Bank, trustee of the Ford-sponsored RAND Corporation, and trustee could meet a growing demand by government for the behavioral sciences,
of the Council on Foreign Relations (Ross 1998a, 117; Colby and Den- but doing so required the discipline to be more operational if it was really
nett 1995, 474, 784-86; Council on Foreign Relations 2005). to fulfill what he openly called the "intelligence-gathering function" that
REFLECTIONS ON VICOS 135
134 ERIC B. ROSS

he believed applied anthropology did so well (1962, 174). Goodenough World War II and succeeded Dollard as the foundation's president in 1955,
specifically regarded the U.S. Army as a notable "potential market for the serving in that role until 1965, when he became Lyndon B. Johnson's
ethnographic skills of anthropologists" (1962, 174). 1 His timing was note- secretary of health, education and welfare (Smith 1972, 29; Social Security
worthy. As I have suggested, peasant insurgency had dominated the minds Online 2005). With such affinities, Carnegie's backing of the Vicos Project
of Western policy makers ever since the dramatic victory of the Chinese underscores again the need to examine the work of the Cornell anthro-
Co:nununists in 1949. But events moved quickly after that. In 1954, the pologists within the framework of the Cold War.
Vietnamese victory at Dien Bien Phu coincided with the election ofJacobo
Arbenz as president of Guatemala and the beginning of one of the most im-
portant land reforms that Latin America had ever witnessed, a development Vicos, Carnegie, and the Cold War
that the United States opposed and eventually subverted through military The Vicos Project, run by Cornell University in the Peruvian highlands,
intervention. By 1959, the Cuban Revolution had taken place, and just initially under the leadership of Allan Holmberg, achieved near-legendary
a few years later, when Goodenough gave his talk, the United States was status as anthropologists became the managers of a hacienda owned and
committing growing numbers of troops to a massive counterinsurgency war rented out by a public benefit society (sociedad de beniftcencia), located in the
in Southeast Asia (Gettleman et al. 1995). Goodenough's view that anthro- town of Huaraz, the capital of the Andean department of Ancash2 (Stein
pology could make a notable contribution to intelligence gathering at this 1985, 233-36; Murra 1984, 133).
point can therefore hardly be misconstrued; nor, obviously, was it meant to George Foster would write that "the history of the project tells much
be. "The successful conduct of modem guerrilla warfare," he wrote, "ob- about the problems of development and modernization of a traditional
viously requires both extensive and intensive ethnographic intelligence. At community" (1969, 30), but perhaps not surprisingly he never asked what
present, it is impossible to say what requests, if any, for our ethnographic it told us about postwar anthropology, specifically, about how anthropol-
services may emerge from government agencies, but there are straws in the ogy, during the decades of the Cold War, helped to develop arguments
wind suggesting that we may be called upon" (1962, 175). that denied the role of peasant-driven, radical agrarian transformation and
By the time that Goodenough made these remarks, the Carnegie Cor- how, within the accepted framework of modernization theory, it gave
poration, like the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, had already begun to stature to an al!emative, gradual process of what the Vi cos personnel liked
explore the value of anthropologists as agents of national Cold War policy. to call "controlled change."
Carnegie, the chief funder of the Vi cos Project, had long been a source of Latin America had, of course, long been a prime concern of U.S.
funding for projects of interest to the U.S. ruling class (Trumpbour 1989, strategists, but World War II intensified this. So, between 1943, when it
66) to the extent that, as Martin Oppenheimer notes, it "was not entirely was established, and 1952, when it ceased to exist, the Washington-based
a dispassionate funder of educational and scientific projects" (1997). Chris- Institute of Social Anthropology, where Foster had embarked on his career
topher Simpson goes further and concludes, "The social science programs in applied anthropology, had as one of its principal aims "to keep Latin
at Carnegie and the Department of Defense were not conducted in isola- America within the U.S. political orbit" (Adams 1964, 2). When it was
tion from one another. The substantial overlap of key personnel, funding disbanded, most of the anthropologists working there went to the Inter-
priorities, and data sources strongly suggests that the two programs were national Cooperation Agency (ICA), the predecessor of the U.S. Agency
in reality coordinated and complementary to one another, at least insofar for International Development (USAID). The ICA-like its successor,
as the two organizations shared similar conceptions concerning the role USAID-was closely connected with the CIA, and as Richard Adams
of the social sciences in national security research" (1994, 59-60). This observes, "Within the ICA, anthropologists in Bolivia and southern Peru
was virtually ensured by the individuals who dominated Carnegie in the were, I presume, more than coincidentally, utilized in areas where there
postwar period. They included its president, psychologist Charles Dollard, were thought to be serious problems of communist agitation" (1964, 2).
who sat on the board of trustees of the RAND Corporation, initially set up Among the anthropologists in this region during and just after World War
as a think tank for the U.S. Air Force (RAND 2005; Simpson 1994, 58), II was Allan Holmberg, a Yale contemporary of Goodenough and one of
and John Gardner, who served in the OSS (precursor of the CIA) during George Peter Murdock's assistants in the creation of the Human Relations
136 ERIC B. ROSS
REFLECTIONS ON VICOS 137

Area Files (HRAF) (Doughty, personal communication). As the HRAF During July, 1948, in collaboration with eight students and one professor
had emerged out of an association between Yale's Institute of Human Re- from the Institute of Ethnology of the University of San Marcos in Lima,
lations and the U.S. government, which was interested in anthropological I made an ethnological survey of Callejon de Huaylas, a natural corridor
knowledge in order to set up military governments on Pacific islands during that runs parallel to the north coast of Peru between the Cordillera Blanca
and immediately after World War II (Carnegie Corporation 1955; Nader and the Cordillera Negra, the two great ranges of the Andes in this area.
1997, 123), Holmberg's anthropological career began with governmental This corridor or valley is about 80 miles in length, of varying width, and
associations and continued in that vein. Although he spent most of World about 8000 feet above sea level. ... This valley, because of an abundance
War II in the Bolivian tropical lowlands, at first studying the indigenous of water for irrigation the year around, is one of the largest and most pro-
ductive agricultural areas on the coast of Peru .... The Callejon, or upper
Sirion6 (Holmberg 1950, 1-3), for which he would become well-known,
valley, [also] contains a population of over a million inhabitants.
after the U.S. entry into the war he remained in the region, working for
Because of its natural resources, its labor supply, its proximity to the
the U.S. Army's Rubber Development Corporation (Steward 1963, xxv; coast, and its industrial importance for the future of Peru, Callejon de
Browman 1999), for which "he spent the next three years organizing the Huaylas would seem to be an excellent place to initiate a project in the
production of wild rubber in eastern Bolivia" (Steward 1946). Holmberg field of technology and culture change. (Holmberg 1948, 1-2)
returned to Yale in 1945, where he finished his doctoral dissertation two
years later (under the direction ofJohn Dollard, brother of the president of There is no way of knowing precisely why Holmberg imagined that the
Carnegie), and then returned almost immediately to Peru for the ISA, as Callej6n was destined for such development, but, in any event, his idea of
the ethnologist on Gordon Willey's Viru Valley Project, an archaeological how to study social change in the area was seriously flawed. Twenty-five
survey on Peru's north coast that had been developed by Willey, Wendell years later, in a report on the project for USAID, Barbara Lynch would
Bennett, and Julian Steward, who had been director of the ISA until 1946 underscore this by pointing out that Holmberg and his Cornell colleagues
when he was succeeded by Foster (Laurenzo 2005; Manners 1996, 327). ' persistently regarded Vicos "as a medieval society, isolated from, rather
In Peru, Holmberg also taught at the University of San Marcos in Lima than a product of' the larger world (1982, 22). But Holmberg's charac-
(Doughty 1977, 144; Murra 1984, 132). During this time, the idea of con- terization ofVicosinos was, from the start, even more backward than that.
ducting a study in an Andean community took shape-though the actual One of the reasons that he proposed to center his study on the village
impetus for it remains unclear-even before he had formally joined the of Marcara wa; that, about three miles away, there was "an Indian farm
new anthropology program at Cornell. That opportunity came when Hol- (Vi cos) where the natives can be studied under aboriginal conditions." He
mberg was still a fairly young, unpublished, and relatively undistinguished seemed to think that he was still among the Sirion6, even though their
scholar, but one whose Yale connections had brought him to the atten- "aboriginal" nature has itself been seriously questioned (Isaac 1977). Yet,
tion of an influential circle of senior anthropologists-who, in fact, would there is no hint that anyone at Cornell considered Holmberg's perspective
never even complete the work he owed the Viru Project and whom Foster faulty, so the proposed work at Vicos became a central part of the existing
would still be asking for a manuscript years after Holmberg had left the ISA Cornell study of comparative technological and social change.
(Foster 1951). Yet, despite that, Sharp wrote to Holmberg in May 1948, The Vicos strand of that study always had its own logic, however, as it
inviting him, "sight unseen" (Sharp's words), to join the Cornell group was embedded in the Peruvian political and institutional context, begin-
of anthropologists and to assume the substantial responsibility of adding a ning with the fact that the project was a cooperative effort of Cornell and
Latin American dimension (possibly associated with Rockefeller efforts in the Institute Indigenista Peruano (IIP), that the latter included army gener-
Mexico or Venezuela) to their ongoing cross-cultural project on "the dif- als on its executive board, and that the project began shortly after Peru had
fusion of modem technologies from the North Atlantic cultures to other, been taken over by a military coup. In 1945, a coalition ofliberal and leftist
less industrially developed areas of the world" (Sharp 1948). parties, including the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA),
By the following November, Holmberg had submitted a proposal to had elected Jose Luis Bustamante y Rivero as president (1894-1989).
the Carnegie Corporation, the principal funder of the Cornell project, into Bustamante instituted numerous liberal reforms, and certain dictatorial
which he hoped to insert his own work. He wrote, powers of the presidency were abolished by constitutional amendment. In
REFLECTIONS ON VICOS 13'1
138 ERIC B. ROSS

October 1948, however, rightist revolutionary leaders led by Gen. Manuel led by Hugo Blanco (Lastarria-Cornhiel 1989, 136; Colby and Dennett
Odria unseated Bustamante, seized the government, and outlawed APRA. 1995, 469). There is no doubt that Holmberg, his Cornell colleagues, and
While this was happening, Holmberg had begun to define the project that, their Peruvian partners were well aware of the potential consequences of
he told Carnegie, "would tie in very well with the area research program such developments, for in a 1962 paper, they noted that in the depart-
now underway here at Cornell" (1948). mental capital of Huaraz, there was resistance to the Vicos Project from
Cornell officially states that its "intervention in the northern Andean the Communist Party, "which appears to recognize that every success of
community ofVicos, Peru [began] in 1952" when Cornell and liP jointly the project diminishes by that much their chances of fomenting a violent
rented "Hacienda Vi cos and its 1800 peons for the going rate of $500 per revolution" (Dobyns, Monge, and Vasquez 1962, 112-13). That this was
year" (Doughty 1977, 144; Cornell University Library 2008). This was perceived early on to be a major virtue of the Vicos Project is clear from
two years after Odria was elected president (without any effective opposi- the research proposal that the Cornell Anthropology Department submit-
tion). In this problematical and contentious political climate, Holmberg's ted through Sharp (then the department chair) to Carnegie Vice President
ostensible aim was, nevertheless, to develop Vicos as a model whose John Gardner on April19, 1951, in which it was observed that
"anticipated results," according to William Mangin, could be "diffused the hope of the Andean countries as a whole lies in the mountain regions
throughout Peru and the world" (1979, 67). Once again, he betrayed a where their masses of hard-working Indians live, and unless these are soon
superficial grasp of Andean realities that was congenial to the imperatives given opportunities and assistance in changing and improving their lot
of contemporary U.S. policy. considerably, present conditions of unrest and dissatisfaction are apt to lead
How did Holmberg and his Cornell associates ever imagine that Vicos to more and bloodier revolutions within the next few years .... We would
could really provide such a model? Mter all, quite apart from the general like, therefore, to attempt to change these conditions in as controlled a
conditions that prevailed across the Peruvian highlands, the sublease of the manner as possible. (Sharp 1951)
hacienda to Cornell by the Public Benefit Society, which "represented the
regional elite" (Lynch 1982, 16), required existing relations of production This certainly accorded with the subsequent advice from Gardner, who
to be maintained. Under such circumstances, the stated aspirations of the wrote to Sharp in June,
Cornell anthropologists would seem to have been rather detached from If native people are to be taught to take their fate in their own hands, then
objective Peruvian conditions. But, beyond that, there was an interesting they had better be educated as to the various ways in which they can be
lack of analytical curiosity, of which Paul Doughty would later give further gulled by unscrupulous leaders. This means, I should think, fairly intensive
indication when he wrote, "Just why the conservative Odria dictatorship indoctrination in local forms of "democratic" group action with strong
would permit such a project to begin with was often conjectured by the emphasis upon active and realistic political participation. It seems to me
CPP personnel, but plausible reasons or policy have never been identified" that without this, the whole effort to raise the status of backward peoples
(1987 a, 441). Yet, Doughty also gave part of the answer when he himself may be the greatest device ever invented for playing into the hands of
pointed out, "In 1960, Indian communities and haciendas' serf populations unscrupulous demagogues. (Gardner 1951, 2)
were increasingly pressuring the government to take action on land re-
form. The government response was invariably hostile to these efforts and There is little doubt that Washington power brokers, whom Gardner
on the adjacent hacienda of Huapra, Vicosinos and CPP personnel were knew very well, were aware of the possibilities inherent in the commu-
witness to a political massacre of serfs who were attempting to construct a nity development model that Vicos embodied and its capacity to control
school 'like Vicos"' (Doughty 1987a, 444). the direction and pace of rural change in the developing world. Though
In fact, land reform in Peru had been a political issue since the period the West was still inclined to back a more direct and forceful approach to
immediately after World War I. It had been tenaciously resisted by the what it perceived as the threat from popular movements (and would never
ruling oligarchy (Lastarria-Cornhiel 1989, 127), and the lack of any effec- relinquish that option), there was a growing realization that the CIA-
tive democratization of land distribution in the highlands eventually gave backed coup that overthrew the progressive, elected government ofJacobo
birth to an era of peasant mobilizations, the most notable of which was Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954 would not be replicable indefinitely. Seven
140 ERIC 13. ROSS REFLECTIONS ON VICOS 141

years later, after the failure of a similar U.S.-backed armed intervention at As such, it was not just represented as offering a real hope to the campesinos
the Bay of Pigs, the Vicos model grew in importance. of the Peruvian highlands. As time went on, the Cornell anthropologists
John Gillin (1951, v), one of the leading figures in applied anthropol- actually implied that it was the really radical option in more global terms.
ogy, was among those who learned the lesson from Guatemala, where he Doughty not only described the project, in the Peruvian context, as "noth-
had worked through the 1940s. In 1954, he had watched as the United ing less than revolutionary" (1977, 144), but he and Henry Dobyns called
States backed the overthrow of Arbenz, and in a 1960 work published by Holmberg "a truly revolutionary anthropologist" and equated him with
the Council on Foreign Relations, Social Change in Latin America Today, Jomo Kenyatta, the leader of Kenya's Mau Mau uprising (Adams 1973,
he had effectively endorsed that coup as a necessary response to the fact 444). Considering that the latter was a true peasant insurrection (cf. Furedi
that the Arbenz government had been a "Communist-dominated regime" 1989), it is not hard to understand that even Adams, a supporter of the
(Adams 1960, 270, 274). U.S. role in Guatemala, found this claim hard to entertain (Adams 1973).
This argument had been tactically constructed for the purposes of That Vicos was regarded as a way to reclaim political gro~nd that the
Washington policy makers by the council itself, under the leadership of United States had lost in some of the potentially most volatile regions of
John]. McCloy, David Rockefeller, and Allen Dulles, all of whom had Latin America does not seem surprising. The fact, however, that Doughty
a powerful interest in the outcome of any political process in Guatemala (1987b ) and others ever seriously thought that the Cornell project at Vicos
(Ross 1998b, 481). The study group on "Political Unrest in Latin Amer- might become a genuine model for land reform across that vast, complex
ica" that the council had called in response to Arbenz's land-reform efforts region, let alone throughout the Third W odd, suggests a degree of wish-
was, accordingly, led by Spruille Braden, the son of a cQpper magnate ful thinking that surpasses anything that emerged from Etawah. Never-
who had spent most of his life representing the interests of multinational theless, backed by Carnegie, Vicos was elevated to paradigmatic status in
corporations (Cockcroft 1989; Braden 1971) and had been a spokesperson the West's Cold War strategy of "community development," where the
for the United Fruit Company, whose corporate interests in Guatemala- "fairly intensive indoctrination" that Gardner had called for was reflected
where it was the largest single landowner, possessing more land than half in the more academic jargon of the Cornell anthropologists and their col-
the country's population (Melville and Melville 1971, 61 )-were really the laborators in the concept of "directed value accumulation" (Lasswell and
main issue at the heart of the U.S. hostility to the Arbenz reforms. 3 Holmberg 1969).
Although the Council on Foreign Relations volume of 1960, to which
Gillin and Adams (and Allan Holmberg) contributed, had been planned
earlier, it was the Cuban Revolution that ultimately brought it to fruition Harold Lasswell Goes to Vicos
(Adams 1964, 2). In his essay, Gillin not only reflected the dominant Cold One sign of the significance of Vicos in the Cold War era and of its
War perspective that had impelled and countenanced the overthrow of Ar- embodiment of the general tenets of modernization thinking was that it
benz but also showed that he understood the kind of problems the United eventually attracted the attention and support of such an eminent figure
States faced as a result of its intervention against the Arbenz government as Harold Lasswell. In the late 1920s, Lasswell had been one of the undis-
when he wrote that "it is still widely believed throughout Latin America puted pioneers not just of the nascent field of public relations but of the
that the U.S. government or its agents engineered and financed this 'lib- techniques of propaganda and, as it was sometimes called, "psychologi-
eraci6n,' and this belief has been exploited so successfully by Communist cal warfare" (Simpson 1994, 16, 43-44). 4 By the 1950s, he was working
and other antagonists of the United States that the 'Yankee Colossus' has closely with one of his former students, Nathan Leites, of the Air Force
suffered a severe loss of prestige" (1960, 17-18). We know now, from think tank, the RAND Corporation, for which Lasswell was a "permanent
the CIA's own revelations, that this widespread belief was actually well consultant" for over a quarter of a century (Oren 2000, 553), and CENIS's
founded-that the coup was the outcome of a CIA operation called PB- Daniel Lerner, a former member of the army's Psychological Warfare
SUCCESS (Cullather 1994). The point, however, was obviously to devise Division, who was "a fixture at Pentagon-sponsored conferences on U.S.
forms of intervention that were not only subtler but would seem, on the psychological warfare in the Third World during the 1960s and 1970s"
surface, beyond reproach. The Vicos Project was certainly one of these. (Simpson 1994, 84).
142 EIUC B. ROSS REFLECTIONS ON VICOS 143

If Lerner's The Passing cif Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East add up to anything and will provide a basis for wider generalizations" (1955,
(1958) was one of the preeminent texts of modernization theory, and if 4). In his reaction to the Holmberg-Lasswell proposal of 1955, Marvel
the extensive collaboration between Lerner and Lasswell that began to- noted that he had "spent only three days at Vicos last summer, but I am
ward the end of World War II and stretched over the next three decades yet to be convinced that this is likely to be the scene of the major break-
(c Lasswell and Lerner 1951; Lasswell and Lerner 1965; Lasswell, Lerner, through in the social sciences in this decade" (1955, 1). Observing that the
and Montgomery 1976; Lasswell, Lerner, and Speier 1979) highlights the proposal seemed "more a playing with words than a playing with concepts
degree to which Lasswell was a key figure in the shaping of _the mod- or ideas," he went on to say, "This is another chapter in the history of the
ernization paradigm, then his involvement with Vicos clearly situates :h.e famed Cornell project where the principals seem ready to ask for new and
Cornell-Peru Project firmly within the modernization framework. But 1t 1s larger money before they have delivered anything in the way of written or
crucial to remember that this was a framework with strategic interests and published results on the money already given them" (1955, 1).
that Lasswell reflected them as much in his activities as in his writings. As Nonetheless, Lasswell (1962) had begun seriously to address the implica-
a member of the influential Council for Foreign Relations and a member tions of Vicos for his own work. He did some research at Vicos (Dobyns,
of the planning committee that directed the disbursement ?f a sub~tantial Doughty, and Lasswell [1964] 1971, 237) and collaborated with Holmberg
Ford Foundation grant for CENIS's communication stud1es-wh1ch,. as on a "general theory of directed value accumulation and international devel-
Simpson observes, "were from their inception closely bound up w1th opment" (Lasswell and Holmberg 1969), something that was very much in
both overt and covert aspects ofU.S. national security strategy of the day" the CENIS vein and, by the mid-1960s, such an intimate part of the Vicos
(1994, 82-83)-Lasswell connected Vicos to a web of geopolitical initi~ group, linking it to his own history of psychological and policy studies, that
tives that stretched from Stanford and RAND in the West to CENIS m he coedited one of its most important products, Peasants, Power, and Applied
the East. Social Change: Vicos As a Model ([1964] 1971), along with Henry Dobyns and
In the 1920s and 1930s, Lasswell had been involved in studies of the Paul Doughty, two of the project's foremost anthropological members.
relationship between politics, power, and personality (Almond 1987, By the early 1950s, Lasswell-who would use Vicos to shape his no-
253-57), which brought him into contact with a number of notable tion of the "policy sciences," that is, of social sciences that could mean-
anthropologists, including Edward Sapir, with whom he _collaborated at ingfully contribute to the formulation of policy-had already developed
Chicago until Sapir moved to Yale in 1931 (Darnell and Irvme n.d.). Some his concept of the "continuing policy (or decision) seminar," which was
fifteen years later, Lasswell also took up an appointment at Yale (Almond "concerned with working out the implications of the contextual, problem-
1987, 261) and may have come into contact with Allan Holmb~rg, w~o oriented, multi-method approach" as a means of informing and guiding
completed his doctoral dissertation there a year later. But Lasswell s ofli.oal the direction of an ongoing project. While Vicos played a major role in
interest in Vicos per se "dates from his contact with Allan R. Holmberg his elaboration of this technique, his method was also clearly meant to
when both were Fellows of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behav- sharpen the role of the project. "One of the earliest explicit seminars was
ioral Sciences [at Palo Alto] in 1954-55" (Dobyns, Doughty, and Lasswell installed at Stanford in 1954-55," Lasswell wrote, "as a means of aiding
[1964] 1971, 237). 5 Holmberg in his reassessment of the project as a whole. Cooperating with
By late 1955, Holmberg and Lasswell, joined by several others, had Holmberg were a political scientist, a psychologist, and an economist.
submitted a grant proposal to Ford and Carnegie, which intended to tu~n They met regularly for the academic year in the same environment and
Vicos into a veritable laboratory for the behavioral sciences. Carnegie, developed a chart room to provide an auxiliary to recall and to effect the
however, was unimpressed and seems to have been tiring of the ':"hole concept of systematic study" (1971, 191). While this all sounds highly
Cornell approach. A year earlier, the foundation's William Ma~el (h1~self academic-and culminated in the research proposal that Marvel (1955,
a member of the Council on Foreign Relations) had even wntten m an 2) thought reduced Vicosinos to the status of lab rats-Lasswell's own
internal memorandum, "I assume that our interest now is in determining career, his centrality in the emergence of modernization theory, and the
what the prospects are that the comparative analysis of which the Cornell diverse interests of the Carnegie Corporation do underscore that there was
group has spoken so often, so volubly, and so unspecifically, will actually more going on here than neutral social science. As developed at CENIS,
144 ERIC ll. ROSS REFLECTIONS ON VICOS 145

where it was sponsored by the Ford Foundation and the CIA, moderniza- integration, has, of course, to be seen in relationship to the peasant mobili-
tion theory played an important role in the U.S. strategy of dealing with the zations that were gaining importance in the highlands at the time of the ar-
nature of change in the developing world from the perspective of its social rival of the Peace Corps (Bernstein 2002, 436). If, according to one of the
and economic elite. As such, it was also closely allied with communications Peace Corp's promotional brochures, research by Cornell anthropologists
theory-long patronized by the Rockefeller, Ford, and Carnegie founda- had concluded "that young Americans fresh out of college with only three
tions-which itself evolved in close association with U.S. Army interests in months of training can have a significant and lasting impact on develop-
propaganda and psychological warfare as part of a multifaceted strategy to ing societies" (quoted in Latham 2000, 129), it was not because they had
control the course of change in Third World societies. This, as Gardner's come to Peru to promote anything as fundamental as land reform as a part
own words reveal, was an implicit aim of Carnegie in its support of Cornell's of that development process, and certainly not at Vicos. The community
applied anthropology projects. That it was also closely linked to the general remained under the close scrutiny ofPeruvian authorities, and Cornell staff
concept of "community development" requires that this approach-and continued to play a central role in a process of ongoing development that,
anthropology's role in it-be set within a wider field of critical inquiry. through the presence of the Peace Corps, helped to ensure that social or
If anything brought together the ideas of Rostow, Lasswell, Gillin, economic change remained safely within the framework of Western aims
and Holmberg about the development process in the context of the Cold and interests, as Gardner had advised.
War and reflected the "prototype" that Lasswell had in mind, it was cer-
tainly the Peace Corps. Created by the Kennedy and Johnson administra-
tions (Gardner served as secretary of health, education and"'welfare under Conclusion
Lyndon Johnson), the Peace Corps embodied many of the most salient Vicos was not simply a model, in Lasswell's words, for "integrating com-
concepts of modernization thinking. According to Michael Latham (2000, munities into more inclusive systems" (Lasswell 1962). Its real value, dur-
119-20), instructors assigned recruits-who went through a thorough ing the Cold War, was that it offered a seemingly benign way to counter
course of intellectual preparation-readings such as Eugene Staley's The opposition to Third World incorporation into the Western capitalist sys-
Future of Underdeveloped Countries: Political Implications cif Economic Develop- tem. As Lasswell wrote, in his disarmingly objective prose, it threw "light
ment (1954) and Walt Rostow's The Stages cif Economic Growth: A Non- upon the strategies open to advanced industrial Nation States possessed of
Communist Manifesto (1960). Above all, training centered on "an image of democratic ideology whose members act unofficially to assist other less
the 'traditional' peasant or lower-class urban worker that stressed both pas- modernized states whose body politic is divided by heterogeneous ide-
sivity and malleability" (Latham 2000, 124)-precisely the view Holmberg ologies and techniques that interfere with integration, modernization, and
and his colleagues had highlighted-and placed the Peace Corps volunteer democratization" (1962, 116). For Lasswell, the integration of rural com-
in much the same position as Cornell anthropologists at Vicos: the seem- munities into national systems was an intrinsic and necessary part of the
ingly benevolent source of Western values and innovations. modernization process, which was seen as threatened by "heterogeneous
Not surprisingly, then, even as Cornell's overt management of Vicos [read, noncapitalist] ideologies and techniques." Holmberg had been even
came to an end, the university became an important Peace Corps training more pragmatic and to the point when he had described integration in
center, and volunteers were actually placed in Vicos itsel When they ar- terms of the tapping of a sierra labor reserve. If, however, after all was
rived there in October 1962, shortly after another military coup (Doughty said and done, this was one of the main intended outcomes of the Cornell
1966, 223), "Their jobs involved close collaboration with the development project, then its relationship to the interests and role of the Peruvian state,
and research program initiated there in 1952 by the Cornell-Peru Project" rather than to the interests and needs of the Vicosinos themselves, seems
(Doughty 1966, 233-34). Since 1957, the development program on the fairly clear. By the early 1960s, such integration was seen not just as an ab-
hacienda had come under the direction of the Peruvian Ministry of Labor stract component of modernization, or even as a profitable source of cheap
and Indian Affairs and its agency, the National Plan for Integrating the Ab- labor, but as an urgent alternative to the mounting conflict between land-
original Population (Doughty 1966, 233-34). The aim ofthis plan, which poor peasants and a privileged landlord class whose well-being was allied,
was wholly consistent with Holmberg and Lasswell's own ideas about at the national level, with the geopolitical interests of the West.
146 ERIC B. ROSS
REFLECTIONS ON VICOS 147

Beyond that, of course, there was always the question of whether Vi cos experiment in the Vicos project" (1977, 282). If so, however, this raises
really provided a more compelling or replicable model for social change the question of why, in the tumultuous postwar years, anthropology's ho-
than the experiment at Etawah. Certainly William Foote Whyte-who listic perspective-and its application to the development process-failed
was intimately associated with the project-and Giorgio Alberti came to so consistently, in practice or theory, to consider any systematic articula-
the conclusion that "provocative as the Vicos case is, it hardly provides an tion between local communities and the wider framework of national and
intervention model that can be widely used. There just are not enough international political economy.
available people or institutions with money to invest in taking over haci- The answer, in part, is that anthropology's sense of holism was a safe,
endas for the purpose of transforming them into progressive, democratic limited, and highly localized one that rarely questioned the Western devel-
communities" (1976, 247). That realization, at policy levels, had inspired opment model with its emphasis on controlled change at the community
the transformation of the community development model beyond Vicos level. As a result, peasant aspirations for systemic change were not the
into the idea of the Peace Corps. But, Whyte and Alberti did not feel that starting point for most anthropological analysis. Had they been, anthro-
that let social scientists off the hook. It would be far better, they thought, pologists, as Gerrit Huizer noted (and as Whyte and Alberti suggested),
for the outsider to "help organize the peasants against the hacendado and might have "come to help [local people] to struggle against the repressive
link them with other outsiders in this struggle. In other words, he must system, rather than with minor improvement schemes" (1972, 53). Most,
become a leader or supporter of a peasant movement" (1976, 247). Besides however, tended to adopt the CENIS view of modernization, the prevail-
that the hacienda communities scarcely needed more integration. By the ing development paradigm at a time when one ofWashington's chief stra-
late '1940s, when the Cornell project at Vicos began, the people of the tegic goals was to produce self-sustaining economic growth in the Third
Peruvian highlands were already far from the isolated or "traditional" way World to help immunize developing countries against agrarian insurgency
oflife that modernization thinking, or Holmberg, presumed. Thus, Lynch and communism (Packenham 1973, 61--65) by promoting the shift of a
concluded that the evidence from Vicos actually supported a very different potentially volatile rural population "surplus" into industrial urban centers
view: "Prior to the project, Vicos had not been a highly stable, traditional (c Ross 2003).
society, but a society constantly adapting to the changing consequences of To the extent that anthropologists like Holmberg subscribed to such a
its integration into Peruvian national society on extremely unequal terms" view of the development process, it certainly "increased [their] employment
(1982, 75). If Vicosinos seemed "conservative" and resistant to change, possibilities" (Bonfil Batalia 1966, 91), as focus on communities-and on
they were just, in fact, pragmatic. Their resistance was dictated more by the shifting of values and lifeways toward a Western standard-rather than
economic factors and experience than by cultural values (Lynch 1982, 78). on their structural context, undoubtedly gave anthropologists a unique
More broadly, as Gunder Frank (1967) once pointed out, much of the vantage point that ensured them a professional role in the burgeoning,
apparent "backwardness" of such communities was the product of a his- foundation-supported community development field. It just did little to
torical process of underdevelopment and social marginalization that, by the place anthropological expertise at the service of the dispossessed (c Stein
1940s and 1950s, at the commencement of the Vicos Project, was giving 1985, 249).
rise to peasant mobilizations from Bolivia to the Philippines. That this was According to William Stein, who was close to the Cornell project, the
effectively obscured by the Cornell anthropologists contrasts starkly with emphasis on cultural values meant that researchers regarded Vicos society
their self-congratulatory view that "Vicos was one of the few programs of "in terms of pluralism and cultural dimorphism, not as a whole, which led
planned change which set about to employ a truly holistic, anthropologi- us to justify existing conditions and, in large part, to ignore the significance
cal approach" (Doughty 1977, 145). By then, this seems to have become of exploitation" (1985, 238). Lynch, in her comprehensive summary of
the consensus about Vicos within anthropology in general. When, for the project, went further when she drew the conclusion that, by working
example, Susan Almy, then at the Rockefeller Foundation, noted that within the dominant framework of Peruvian institutions, the project had
"anthropologists ... because of their holistic emphasis, should have much actually "acted as a brake on social change" (1982, 99). The papers of the
to offer [to integrated rural development]," she felt compelled to observe Carnegie Corporation, which she never consulted, support the view that
that they "have already provided at least one important development that was the foundation's expectation.
148 ERIC IJ. ROSS REFLECTIONS ON VICOS 149

That being the case, it is surely worthwhile to ask what the project was anthropology. It lay in the fact that "the anthropologists ... were project
actually able to give to Vicosinos. Unfortunately, the answer is problem- administrators, with authority to make and execute decisions as well as to
atical at best. The project's central aim of integrating Vicosinos into the carry out research" (Foster 1969, 30). But this, of course, was just part of a
national economy entailed certain interventions that actually promoted a larger story that involved the interests and aims that led to those decisions,
general process of differentiation among the peasants of Vi cos. One of the the premises and assumptions that justified them, and what anthropologists
most far-reaching was an initiative that was closely related to Cornell's did, as individuals or as a discipline, to give credibility to such assumptions
active engagement in Green Revolution efforts elsewhere in the world and, therefore, to the broad Cold War concerns of the United States that
and that reflected the widespread view in Western development policy underpinned them.
circles that there were relatively simple technical solutions to complex so- Far from challenging such assumptions, anthropology did a great deal
cioeconomic and historical problems. (Recall that Cornell's cross-cultural to enhance them. It gave legitimacy to the dominant Western view of
project, of which Vi cos was a part, focused, from its inception, on Western development by emphasizing the community as a unit of analysis or, even
technological innovation in the Third World.) It was the introduction of more, as in the case of Vicos, as the unit of change and, in the process,
"improved" potato varieties. Thus, Lynch's 1982 report observed that, by helped to reduce the prospects for more fundamental, systemic economic
1954, Vicos had become the region's largest potato producer. But, as with and social transformation that might have better served the people ofVicos
the Green Revolution elsewhere, whether the crop was potatoes, rice, or (and elsewhere). Its notion of "peasant conservatism" was essential to the
wheat, the technology required was never "scale-neutral," as its advocates viability of the community development paradigm as an integral feature
always promised. As the means to develop such potatoes ''was available of modernization and as an alternative to more radical forms of agrarian
only to wealthy and middle class Vicosinos," the relative position of small- change. But, perhaps above all, the discipline's reverent treatment of Hol-
holders declined (Lynch 1982, iii). Even more generally, "men were the mberg and of the Vicos Project has given that approach a credibility that
targets of modernization and women were affected only indirectly in ways has been far more productive for the discipline (and its need for profes-
which have been largely ignored in the Vicos literature .... The male bias sional status) than it has been-and should have been-for those it studied.
of Western social science and community development programs is clear
in the Vicos Project" (Babb 1985, 172). In general, an emphasis on men in Notes
the process of agricultural innovation in regard to cash crops was accom- This chapter was first presented at the annual meeting of the American Anthro-
panied by a tendency for women to be relegated to a more domestic role pological Association (AAA), Chicago, November 19-22, 2003, and, shortly
(Babb 1985, 173-87). Thus, the project actually intensified the dependent thereafter in the seminar series "Global Development, Population and Rural
status of women. Livelihoods" at the Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague. It subsequently
In the end, Lynch concluded that "the successes of the project were appeared as an ISS working paper under the present title. I am grateful to Dustin
qualified. The project was constrained by regional and national economic, Wax for inviting me to present the paper at the AAA session, which he organized,
social and political structure .... Integration into the national society re- and for support of various kinds over the ensuing years from William Mitchell,
sulted in the reproduction of inequalities in the local society" (1982, iv). Helen Hintjens, Haroon Akram-Lodhi, Janice Harper, David Barkin, and David
Yet, if integration had been a major aim of Holmberg and his associates, Price. I am grateful to Paul Doughty for his generous responses to my questions
about the Vicos Project, of which he was a prominent member, and especially
then either something had gone seriously wrong, the analytical vision of
to William Stein for his gracious and invaluable critical insights into the work of
Holmberg and his colleagues was seriously flawed, or the professed goals
the Cornell anthropologists. My thanks go as well to Columbia University's Rare
of the Vicos Project were quite different from the real agenda. If the Books and Manuscript Library for access to the papers of the Carnegie Corpora-
latter, then when Foster wrote that the project informed us about "the tion of New York and to the National Anthropology Archives for access to the
problems of development and modernization of a traditional community" papers of the Institute of Social Anthropology.
(1969, 30), he was right, but not in the way he probably meant. Foster, 1. This is perhaps not surprising considering that, just after World War II,
in line with what I suggested earlier, seems to have regarded much of the Goodenough had participated, along with George Peter Murdock, in a U.S.
significance of Vicos in terms of what it signaled about the potential for Navy-sponsored project of the National Research Council, one of the largest in
REFLECTIONS ON VICOS 151
150 ERIC B. ROSS

Almy, Susan
which anthropologists had ever engaged. Known as the Coordinated Investigation
1977 Anthropologists and Development Agencies. American Anthropologist 79,
of Micronesian Anthropology, it was run by the Pacific Science Board, which was
no. 2: 280-92.
chaired by Murdock. Like the Human Relations Area Files, it was intended to
help the United States manage its new Pacific island possessions. Goodenough's
Babb, Florence
research on Truk (Chuuk) land ownership apparently proved of immense value to
1985 Women and Men in Vicos, Peru: A Case of Unequal Development. In Pe-
U.S. authorities concerned about managing social tensions among the indigenous
ruvian Contexts of Change (William Stein, ed.), 163-210. New Brunswick,
inhabitants (Kroll 2003, 35).
NJ: Transaction Books.
2. Much ofHuaraz was destroyed by an earthquake in 1970 (Stein 1985, 234).
3. In fact, the Arbenz land-reform program was a relatively modest one in
Bernstein, Henry
which "only uncultivated land could be expropriated and then only from large
farms" and that never even sought to eliminate private property per se (Thiesen-
2002 Land Reform: Taking a Long(er) View. Journal of Agrarian Change 2, no.
4: 433-63.
husen 1995, 76; Handy 1994, 87-89; Dunkerley 1988, 148).
4. Lasswell's PhD dissertation, published in 1927, was entitled "Propaganda
Bird, Kai
Technique in the World War" (Almond 1987, 269).
1998 The Color of Truth: McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy: Brothers in Arms.
5. Considering that Holmberg was still a fairly young scholar, his fellowship
New York: Simon and Schuster.
at the center during its first operational year was quite extraordinary, especially
considering that the center was, from its inception, an important node in the
Bonfil Batalia, Guillermo
network of the academic/policy elite. When it was established in 1954 with an
1966 Conservative Thought in Applied Anthropology: A Critique. Human Or-
enormous grant from the Ford Foundation, one of its founding members was Dr.
ganization 25, no. 2: 89-92.
Frank Stanton (who also served as one of the center's trustees between 1953 and
1971), the president of the Columbia Broadcasting System from 1946 to 1971
Bowen, John
(Ford Foundation 1954, 51-53). Stanton was also the chair of the RAND Cor-
2004 The Development of Southeast Asian Studies in the United States. In The
poration from 1961 to 1967 and one of its trustees from 1957 to 1978 he also
Politics if Knowledge: Area Studies and the Disciplines (David L. Szanton, ed.),
served as a trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation during part of this tim~ (Public
386-425. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Agenda 2005).
Braden, Spruille
1971 Diplomats and Demagogues: The Memoirs if Spruille Braden. New Rochelle,
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