Sonderdrud aus ‘Nich im Handel NIETZSCHE-STUDIEN Internationales Jahrbuch fiir die Nietzsche-Forschung Herausgegeben von Mazzino Montinari - Wolfgang Miiller-Lauter Heinz Wenzel Band 5 - 1976 1976 Walter de Gruyter « Berlin » New York(Carnenine Zuceenr, Casusvon Contsce NATURE, HISTORY AND THE SELF: FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE'S UNTIMELY CONSIDERATIONS Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy begins, he says, in his Untimely Con- siderations.! We are interested in this beginning not as a biographical fact, but because Nietzsche's philosophy begins with his identifying the central problem in modern philosophy. Since Nietzsche does not appear to have settled his own problem to his own satisfaction — he has no single, con- clusive doctrine! — the problem remains for later students; and a swudy of Nietzsche's first and most accessible statement of this problem may help us understand its dimensions better. Although Nietesche’s early essays appear to be devoted to varied, even random subjects — a review of David Strauss’ last book, The Old Faith and the New, the use of history, Schopen- hhauer as an educator, and Wagner at Bayreuth — they all in fact constitute arguments for the need for modern men to come to know themselves. In the following analysis of the arguments of the two thematic Untimely Considerations, “OF the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life,” and "Schopenhauer as Educator,” I intend to show that the “use” of history Nietzsche describes in the first essay isto gain self-knowledge and that che knowledge of self he seeks with the aid of Schopenhauer becomes possible conly on the basis of historical criticism. The arguments of the separate "tn the preface e added to Hamnamall-t0-Human If in 1886, Nietzsche test ‘hilrophy Begins in his Untinely Consideratione eventhough Birth of Tragedy pee {cede them chronologically I cranslate Betracboungem as “considerations” rather han “meditations” a5 Waler Kaufman does, because “meditations” suggests 2 philosophic tradition Beginning with Descartes and hse 2 more tecnical meaning which Nietche Aloe noe som 19 intend. Edmund Husel doer not, for example, ure Betradiangen t0 translite “meditation” in bis Cartesianicbe Meditetionen. Citations in ths paper ate to Friedrich Nictste, Werke in Drei Bénden, Karl Sled, ed. (Mine! Hlaner, ea). CCE Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche (Pfllingen, Gier Neshe, 1961), 1, 26—88, 473— St6, The more rect debate between Arthur Danto, Nitsiche cs Philowopber (New York: Macmillan 1968), and Richard Stach, .Nieusche and. Niklsm,” Journal of be History of Pilosophy, Vol IX, No.1 (January, 1973), pp. 614, is as song 351s on both sides because both authors ae able to support thei respective claims that Nictsce was 3 complete relaivise and that be was nor nist with numerous ‘quotations from Nictsche, Also Kal Jaspers, Nietshe (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1947).56 catherine Zuskere cssays not only complement each others they also form parts of a larger argument to the effect that man's “self™ must be understood in new terms. ‘There is, of course, nothing new about man’s search for knowledge of himself or the central position of the problem in philosophy. Socrates had urged the need for philosophers to seck self-knowledge first and foremost. Both morality and knowledge depend upon self-knowledge. In order to say what the good life is, one must say what the limitations and potential of human nature are. In order to establish one’s knowledge, one must ex plain the access of the intellect to the things as well as the character of the things themselves. But the meaning of the search for self-knowledge changed ‘when thinkers, following the lead of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, denied that there were natural species. If there was no essential difference, by nature, beeween men and animals, could man know what was distine- tively human? If there was nothing distinctively human, was there any foundation for morality, for determining ether the obligations of one man to others or standards of human excellence besides faith? And if there were no order intelligible in nature itself, could one account for man’s perception cor manufacture of order(s) outside himself? These are the questions with which Nietzsche begins. Nietzsche is by no means the first to sce the problematic foundations of both morality and knowledge in modern philosophy. Nor is he first to see that history may provide a notion of the distinctively human which does not entail a belief in natural species. He pointed out, however, the serious difficulties inherent in defining “man” by his history. He observed hae men who defined themselves as historical products act differently from those who are not conscious of their historicity. The way in which men ‘define their lives affects their life as liveds i.e, the claim to understand or know something (especially the “human”), affects the thing “known.” IF the claim to know what is human itself changes the human, there is always {a.sap between what it claimed tobe known to be “the human” and what ‘men in fact do. Historically conscious thinkers argue that this was the case before men became conscious of their historicity. Nietesche adds that it remains the ease after they have become historically conscious. If human actions change as a result of modern man’s historical consciousness, history itself changes and with history, “man,” since our conception of human possibilities is itself historical. In order either to know themselves or to understand history, for if man isa historical product, the two are the same, modern men must first recognize that their historical consciousness changes ‘history and then seek an understanding of history which enables them to do \consciously what men have done unconsciously in the past. That is, indeed, the only way they will understand what past men have sought t0 accom- Natuee, History andthe Sel Pa plish. Nietesche states, therefore, in the foreword to “Of the Use and Dis- advantage of History for Life” that hs time’ historical education consti tutes both its major virtue and its major vice. Modern historical “science is a vice insofar as its claims to present complete and “objective” know- ledge of Bory prevnt men from understanding ether hitory or them selves; but it isa virtue insofar as ie epreents the first step to complete historical self-consefousnes. ° “en Nietzsche begins his essay on the uses of history by admitting that he does not believe that there isa fundamental difference by nature between men and animals? Men and animals have the same desires; men merely have longer memories. This mere difference in degree produces a qualitative difference in action, however. Man's ability to remember and connect past experience to present sensation produces both the intensification of senti- ment into passion and man’s ability to act with intention. When man acts intentionally, he lives in a constant state of dissatisfaction because he is constantly looking forward to realizing hie purpose in the future. As his memory expands, he comes to see that past actions have not had their intended effects and he begins to despair of the possibility of achieving a life beter than his own dissatisfied one. The attempt to find meaning in his existence is distinctively human but, Nietzsche suggests, the despair resulting from man’s inability to find a reason for his suffering threatens to destroy the human by destroying all incentive to continue the attempt to find a metaphysical or, as Niewsche calls it, “superhistorical” reason for human striving In the face of his despair, Nietzsche urges: “We must know the right time to forget as well as the right time to remember, and instinctively see when iis necessary to feel historically and when unhistorically.”* 1's cue that man frst becomes man through limiting that unkstorcal element in thinking r-considering, comparing, distinguishing and con- cluding ..», through the strength to wie the past for life and to make Hisory agala out of what has happened® ‘The reader might conclude that with “historial” Nietzsche refers to the logical processes of comparing and distinguishing and the resulting ability ‘0 act with intention, all depending on man's memory, whereas by “unhis- + Friedrich Niecsche, "Vom Nutzen und Nadel der Historie fir das Leben 1211 “ Nieuache ses co change the meaning of ruperhstoccal™ when in seiion 10 of the essay he speaks of are and religion (p. 281), whersat inaction 1 (p. 21), be speaks of ston. In both casts he is vefrtng to dhe desire Falilled ot feurated) to give oman ie a mening which extends Beyond she epoca snd other Hains of he 5 "Horie p. 204 9 ibid p2538 Catherine Zucker torical” he means the momentary desires he attributes to animal existence. Nietzsche's understanding of the human would then roughly correspond to the traditional definition of the “rational animal.” Nietzsche's description of the “unhistorical” leads the reader to a different conclusion, however. In order to understand what he means by unhistorical, Nietzsche asks his reader to imagine a man towed about and driven forth by a strong passion for a ‘woman of for a great thought: how his world is changed ... All values ave changed and devalued; he can no longer treasure #9 much because hie can hardly perceive it any longer ... It is the most unjust condition in the world, narrow, ungrateful to the past, blind to danger, deaf 19 ‘warning. and yet thie 8 the condition —unhistricl, ant-historieal through and throvgh — which isthe cradle not only of unjst action, but of every just action inthe world.” Unhistorical sensation correspond to passion, and this passion as opposed to the momentary attractions and aversions Nietzsche ascribes to animal life requires memory in order to build up its concentration and intensity. [Nietzsche's point is that unhistorieal and historical are equally human and that they are inevitably mixed. In fact, unhistorical passion depends upon previous comparing and distinguishing for its concentration, and historical caleulation depends for the standards by which it compares and distinguishes upon unhistorical passion, because comparing and distinguishing in themselves provide no standard by which to compare and distinguish. Not only the “objects” of historical intention but the very standards embodied in the process of think~ ing are thus, according to Nietzsche, products of unistorical passion. The problem with which Nietzsche concludes his description of the “un historical” is that no one object deserves such elevation; no standard is, according to this analysis, rue. Comparisons and distinctions as well as the resulting conclusions are, therfore, based on error and blindness. There is no “historical” knowledge free of “unhistorical” passion, because there is no real knowledge in or of a faculty of calculating the means to ends independent of knowledge of the end. One cannot calculate the way to an impossible ends calculation is not a means to some ends, such as Christian salvation; and calculation does not incorporate its own end. If, on the one hhand, concentration on an end is necessary to provide the calculator with 1 standard, that concentration, on the other hand, prevents the calculator from seeing and properly weighing all relevant factors. As a result an individual eannot anticipate all the effects of his actions and his actions do not fulfill his intentions. Once men discover this dependency of the * ibid, pp. 215216. "Nature, History andthe Self 39 rational on the irrational, as Nietasthe believes his “supethistorical” con- ‘emporaries have, they come to a point of crisis. They can no longer believe in cither the rationality oye effectiveness of human action, so they can no longer proceed as before Nietzsche then shares the “superhistorical” insight into the passionate basis of historical action, but he does not accept che “superhistorical” conclusion that historical action is useless because itis based on error and blindness and thus never has the intended effect. Rather he turns to discuss the uses of history. This turn should not surprise the reader because Nietz- sche has proposed a fundamentally historical view of man in the first section of his essay where he has deseribed men as the products of a gradual development of a peculiar faculty (memory) which affects, indleed-funda- mentally historical xiew-of man in-che-tist-section-of his-emeey-where he hasdeseribed-men-as the products of a-gradual development-ofapetuliar faculeyfmemory)_suhich affects, indeed fundamentally changes man's original “animal” nature in the course of its development. Nietzsche sur- passes the “superhistorical” insight into the passionate basis of historical action by adding an insight into the “historical” basi of passion. The “super- historical” men see only error repeated; they do not perceive important, indeed essential differences in historical goals, because they do not see the historical foundations of passion in previous comparisons. As a result they do not see the promise history offers beyond the disillusionment history records. “History,” according to Nietzsche, “belongs to living men in three ways: in relation to his acting and striving, his conserving and revering, his suffering and his desire for deliverance."* Men who seek a better life than that of their contemporaries look back to monumental history to find examples and comfort in the fact that men have lived better. So, they conclude, men may live better again. But in this conclusion, Nietasche argues, they err, because the circumstances are never the same and s0 4 hhuman life ean never simply be repeated.” Insofar as monumental history puts forth past leaders simply as examples for present men, it abstracts from the truth. Monumental history, Nictzsche states, teaches one and only ‘one truth: “That his life is the fairest who thinks least about it."!® Because they dedicate ther lives solely to creating something better than themselves, monumental men openly and visibly oppose the ruling thought and desire ‘of common men — the desire for self-preservation; and as a result they boring upon themselves the ire of all their contemporaries who wish, if not ibid, 9.219, tb p 222. dba, p 221© (Catherine Zasker to destroy the monumental men, at least to forget them.!! “One thing will live, the sign of their inmost being, the rare flash of light, the deed, the ‘reation; because posterity cannot do without it." Posterity cannot do withoue the works of the monumental men who are the founders of the ‘orders which govern the lives of succeeding generations. When later gene- rations honor these men as founders, they in effect honor themselves. They forget” that the founders were different, that instead of desiring pre- servation, their founders desired destruction and change. The founders themselves encourage this “forgetfulnes,” because they wish all else but their work to be forgotten.” Thus the “founders” overestimate the value of their object — they act on the basis of “unkistorical” passion — and underestimate themselves. Monumental history as ordinarily recorded is, therefore, not only untrue but dangerous. Because monumental history records effects, abstracted from their causes, it encourages “effects” — the destruction of political or cultural orders — without sufficient cause, Yet ‘Nietzsche suggests, he who reads monumental history out of his dissatis- faction and dese for a better form of life will recognize the truth of rmonumental history when he perceives in his own dissatisfaction and desire the cause of past action as well. The reader of monumental history does not seek to duplicate or preserve the deeds of past men. His dissatisfaction ‘with present life in fact constitutes an implicit critique of past achieve- iments, but in chat dissatisfaction he preserves the cause and purpose of past deeds — “to extend the concept ‘man’ and give it fairer content."# ‘There is, therefore, a distinction to be drawn between the lesson of mon- mental history and its content. Monumental men in the past have not understood themselves in the general way Nietzsche describes. They have devoted themselves to specific deeds. None of these deeds has the value or the effect its author supposed; each specific “work” is based on an abstrac- 4 ibid, pp, 220-221. Bid, p22. 1 In bs Fest Untimely Consideration, "David Straus: Der Bekenner und der Séhrif- tiller? I, 141149, Niece tried ro expote the erort of hie contemporacier who lnsined on seeing preat German arsss and thinkers such ar Beethoven and Lessing at founderr of 2 German culture rather than seekers of 3 beter way of fe. There “Bit