ACTA UNIVERSITATIS STOCKHOLMIENSIS

STOCKHOLM STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 24

THE LOGIC OF LIFE

HEIDEGGER'S RETRIEVAL OF

ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF LOGOS

CHARLOTTA WEIGELT
ACTA UNIVERSITA TIS STOCKHOLMIENSIS
STOCKHOLM STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 24

THE LOGlC OF LIFE

Heidegger's Retrieval of
Aristotle' s Concept of Logos

CHARLOTTA WEIGELT

ALMQVIST & WIKSELL INTERNATIONAL

Doctoral dissertati on
Department of Philosophy
Stockholm University
S- 106 91 Stockholm

ABSTRACT

ln the work of Martin Heidegger, the quesl for the proper philosophical beginni ng is
motivated by an awareness of the "historicaI" nature of thought: ilS dependency upon
the be gin ni ng of philosophy in the historica! sense. This study explores the early
Heidegger's attempt to provide philosophy with a new beginning by explicitly
addressi ng the legacy of Aristotle, regarded as Ille philosophical origin, which
ph ilosophy cannat avoid to confront without remaining naive with respect ta ilS own
foundation. Heidegger 's projeci is here considered with respect to how it conceives
of the question of human reasan, and it is taken to be d riven by the ambiti on ta corne
to grips with a traditional logical and theoret ical ideal of cognition. Turning to
Aristotle as the alleged originatar of this ideal, Heidegger focuses on the concept of
logos, taking as his point of departure Aristotle's classica! detinition of man as zoioll
logon echoll, commonly rendered as "the rational animal". The stud y explores
Heidegger' s retri eval of Aristotle's concept of logos . In this pursuit, Heidegger tS
guided by the assumption that this concept must be traced back ta Aristot le 's
understandi ng of life and praxis, since it is based upon an experience of speech as the
basic trait of human cognition. 11 is shawn how Heidegger on the basis of his
interpretation of Aristotle tries ta develop a notion of a speaking or discursive reason.
Thereby , he hopes to overcome an idea also present in Aristotle: that the supreme
form of knowledge is cOlltained in the simple apprehension of nous . lt is argued (hat
the point in revealing the "practical" foundation of Aristotle's notion of logos is
essenti a!ly to find out what it means for philosophy to be a fonn of praxis. The reby ,
the aim is to show that Heidegger affirms Aristotle's idea that philosophy as theory,
theoria, is the supreme mode of praxis. For this reason, the therne of logos is situated
w ithin the comex! of Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's teleology. A guidi ng
assumpti on is that Heidegger think s that the concept of killesis, change, provides us
with the ontological background to Aristotle's inquiry inlo logos. lt is shawn how
Heidegger argues Ihat Aristotle conceives of logos as a kind of kinesis. Yet he also
s hows that Ari stot le was not able to fully affirm {his because of his assumption that.
being in the true sense is not kinesis but entelecheia, unchanging, complete activity,
wh ich belongs not ta logos but to nOlis.

Key words: Heidegge r, Aristotle, logos, kinesis, phenornenology, teleology,

assertion, sunthess, dihai resis, theory, praxis, everydayness.

2002 Charlotta Weigelt

ISBN 91-22-01996-0
ISSN 0491-0877
Printed by Akadem itryck AB Edsbruk 2002
1Il.\ 11I' II I III/1'(lllI uIIOIi
1Il PllIl ll1 l' ill lI l Pl dJu'iophy
NIUI k!lIll l1l 1J III VI.i I ~d l y
S 11111 'I I Sl<\e, 110ltll
CONTENTS

ABSTR ACT

ln 111 1.: work or Martin Il eid cgge r, th e quest for the proper philoso phi ca l beginning is ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS viii
1i1OIivntcd by un Hwa rcness of the "hi stori eal " Ilnture of Ihought: ils dependeney lIpon
Ihe bl.:gi ll ning o f phil oso phy in the historien! se nse. This study explores the early
II cideggc r's Ht lCll1 pt 10 provide philosophy with a new beginnin g by explicitly
oddrcssi ng th e legacy of Aristotl e, regarded as Ih e philosophical origin, which IN TRODUCTION
philosop hy cann ot avoid to confront withoul rernaining naive with respect to ils own 1. 'l'Ile clnri ficalion of logos as a central philosophical task
fUlI l1dnl ion . Hcidegge r's project is here considered \Vith respect to how il coneeives 7
2. ;\ lm and structure of the present study
or Ille questi on of human reason, and it is taken ta be driven by the ambition to come
10 HI'i[)S wilh a !rad itional logica l and theoret ical ideal of cognition. Turning ta 1. ;\ survey of previous literature 12
AdKhll lc 11$ th e alleged originator of this ideal, Heidegger focuses on the concept of
l''WI\, l uk! lI ~ liS his point of departure Aristotle's c1assical definit ion of man as zoioll CHAPTER ONE: HEIDEGGER'S PROJECT AND
l'';,fnll 1'1' 1t0 1/, co mJn only rendered as "the rational an imal". The study exp lores
Iii Ii h\ ~~N'H rct r' it! val of Aristotle's concept of logos. Tn this pursuit, Heidegger is ITS RELATION TO ARlSTOTLE
.!ld. Il lIy Ille IISSlunpt ion that [his concept must be traced back ta Aristot le's 1. Th e ph ilosop:ly of facticallife 20
uwh. IIII HIIII J!\ o f life and praxis, since il is based upon an experience of speech as the 2. Th e phil osophy of logos: phenomenology, logic and hermeneutics 26
1111 Il lIull of' hu tl1l.l 1l cognition. It s shawn how Heidegger on the basis of his
IIlh 1 plItullol1 of' A ris lotl e tries Lo develop a notion of a speaking or discursive reason.
1. Qnlo logy and teleology 32
1111 11 111), ho hopt.:s l a overcome an idea also present in Aristotle: that the supreme 'I. Th e nolion of a firs! phi losophy 38
I lIlIn lit ~ ' I owh.: d g is contained in the simple appl'ehens ion of nOlis . Il is argued that ~ , 1Icid egger 's critique of ethics 44
11 11 l'p lil t 111 fr.:v caling the "praclical " foundation of Aristotle's notion of logos is
(J . Jlhil osophy as historical knowledge 49
l "~ I\ lld l1 l l y Il' lilld out what it means for philosophy to be a fonn of praxis. Thereby,
Ih ~\ 11h11 ls 10 show that Heidegger affirms Aristotle's idea Ihat philosophy as theory, -" Ili stori cal inlcrpretation and systematic philosophy 54
"" 'III'/fI , is Ih l! supreme mode of praxis. For Ihis reason, the the me of logos is situated
I\Il lh l" Ille context of Heidegger's inte rpretation of Aristotle's teleo logy. A guiding CI-IAPTER TWO: THE EPISTEM IC LOGOS
I I K ~ II II ) pt i on is that Heidegger thinks Ihat the concept of kinesis, change, provides us
wll h 11lt.: onlolog ica l background to Aristotle 's inquiry into logos. lt is shown how 1. o'n lhe task of qu estioning a Iraditional interpre tation of logos 60
1 hllduggcr argues Ihat Aristotle conceives of logos as a kind of kinesis . Yet he also 2.. Sl/IllI,esis and dihairesis as the bas ic constituents of the assertion 64
show s Ih at Aristotle was not able to fully affirm this becallse of bis assumption that 68
1. 'l'he lingui sti c and the olltologicallevel of sunthesis and dilwiresis
bci ng in th e truc sense is not kinesis but enteiecheia, unchanging, complete aclivity ,
wll ich be!ongs not ta logos but to nous. II. Th e as-s tructure 73
~, 'l'l'ulh and apopJ/tIl1sis 78
Key wo rd s: Heidegger, Arist otl e, logos, kines is, phenomenology, tel eolo gy, (,. 'l'ho l1 ect.!ss it y of co ntcx lualising the asse rti on 82
!1 ~ s c l'ti o n , slllllhesis, dihairesis, thcory, praxi s, cve rydayness.
J. l'Il!,; u ss~ l'li o ll as found ed 0 11 a change in c:veryda y cOlll po rtlll enl 89
@ 2002 Charl otta Wcige ll K, 1he probl el11 \V ith Ihe l'C cluclion in assc rl ori c speec h 9'1
'l, 'Ille p,'oblcill \V ilh Ih" "piSIClllic idcal 98
ISII N 91220199 0
10, {'Otlcluding l'cillil l'ks 101
ISSN 049 10877
JlI'ill lcd by Akrldcllli ll ,Yt' k Alli Il,,111111 1110 1
 CHAPTER THREE: THE EVERYDA y LOGOS
1. Eve rydayness as a phi losophical themc 103
2. He idegger' s reading of the Nicomachean Ethics 106
3. Everyday speech as the basis of Aristotle' s concept of logos 108
4. Techne and concern. The poietic perspective of everyday life 113
5. Phronesis and care Ils
6. The discurs ive nat ure of ac tion 125
7. Truth as disclosedness and nous 13 0
8. Logos as kinesis 134
9. Logos as fall and empty speech 139
10. Concluding remarks 140

CHAPTER FOUR: TI-lE PI-I ILOSOPHICAL LOGOS

1. Philosophy as an orig inal possibi lity for logos 147
2. The raIe of interruption in the genes is of philosophy 150
3. Anxiety and reduction 155
4. The limited scope of dialectic 159
5. The theoreticallife 165
6. The moment oftruth in vision:nOlis and AlIgenblick 171
7. Philosophy as counter-move ment and rctrieval 177
8. The formai indication 182
9. Concluding remarks 188

CHAPTER FIV E: LOGOS AND BEING

1. From logos to being 190
2. Being as manifold and unity. Aristotlc's critique'ofthe Eleatics 194
3. The princi ples of change and their teleological interpretation 199
4. Change ana lysed into poiesis and pathesis 202
5. The common foundation of logos and kinesis 206
6. The pri macy of the assertion and the question ofbeing 210
7. The question of the meaning ofbeing. Logos as the uni ty of bein g 2 15
8. Temporality as the unity of being 2 19

CO NCLUS ION 224

I.IST 0 1: WO I{KS C I1' I;I) 22')

 I\C KNOWLEDG EM ENTS
A Ilumber of people at the Departmellt of Philosophy ill Siockhoim
have been important for the genesis of this thesis. First of ail, 1 would
like ta thank Staffan Carlshamre and Hans Ruill, \vho have supervised
it. r am particularly grateful to Staffan for his encouragement in times of
crisis, of which there have been quite a few. His broad philosophieal
outloak has also becn a source of inspiration. 1 am deepJy indebted to
Hans for the philosophieal guicbnce that he has granted to me for
severn l years by now. No one cise has bcen 50 important for Illy
intellectual development.
Dag Pra witz and Gunnar Svensson have contributed to crenting a
still1ulating milieu at the department. 1 am also grateful to Anna
Ahlstrll1S oeh Ellen Terseru, Stinelse for tillalleial support.
r woulcl like to thank the following persans for stil1lulating scminars
on phenomcnology and ancienl philosophy: Gosta Gromoos, Jim
Jakobsson, Per-Erik Malmnjs, Per Martin-Lof, A lexander Orlowski,
Nicholas Smith and Karl Weigelt. Amollg these, 1 am indebted 10 Karl
in particular for intellectual as weil as emotioll.:J 1 in spiration. F inall y,
cJuring ail thi s time, 1 ha ve bellefited from Jim's ca l'efu l, often critica l
reading of my tcxt, without which this thesi s wou/cl probably Ilot klve
rcached complction. What is more important, he aJ so provided my work
wi th its guiding idea when he asked me whether l hac! p;'lid any attention
ta Heidegger's statement that logos is a fOrln ofkinesis.
1 dedieate this book to my mother.
INTRODUCTION
1. The clarification oflogos as a central philosophiealtask
" II might be that the beginning is the greatest part of everything",
Aristotl e says, and he continues, "and therefore it is the most difficu[t
pari as we il ; and the mightier it is in power, the tinier it is in magnitude,
and as such the beginning is also whal is Illst di fficult ta see .,,1 The
idca that Aristtle himsel f reprcsents such a powerful but yet elusive
beginning, which is still waiting to be unders tood, was of fundall1ental
importance to the development of Heidegger' s philosophieal projeet, in
particular wh en it was still in its bcginning. In his early lecture courses,
Heidegger returns time and again to Aristotle 's works, seeking to reveal
what he takes to be their as yel hidden possibilities. In this pursuit,
however, Heidegger is not out ta simply restore some kind of
Aristotelian doctrine, but his primary aim is to exp lore Arislotle ' s
thought precisely as a philosophieal beginning and to understand the
nature of ils legacy. In this projeet, he is driven by the conviction that
cvery attempt to begin anew in philosophy must proeeed by way of a
confrontation with the Aristotclian beginning, sinee it by and large has
circumscribed the scope and nalure of philosophieal work as a who le. In
this sense, then, Aristotle is to Heidegger Ilot just one innuential
philosopher among others but simply the Philosopher. However,
Ileidegger thinks that in spitc of the de cisive influence that Aristotle has
exerted on the subsequent philosophieal tradition, he nevertheless
constitutes a lost or " unseen " origin. Accordingly, Heidegger
simultaneusly wants ta use his interpretatiol1 of Al'istatle in arder to
lurn Aristotle against a tradition that assumes his philsophy as a basis,
1 Sophistical Re illfa/ions, 183b22-25: "I-IylO'1:0V yp 10'w pX~ lraVtOC;, ... 01(:' Kal
XC.E 7tOHatO V 0(1<1) yp KpatlO''tov 1:fj ouval-lEl, 'toO'o\mp 1l1Kprrawv OV HP IlEY6El
XCl t.errw'W1'6v an v 6$O~vw ." Ail translation s, also of Heidegger 's works, are ru)'
Qw n. Dy \\Iu y of cnnvcni ion, wllen rc fcrring ta the works of Aristotle, J u~e
IIbbrevitHCd l'nrlll '! or the !,nlin titl es for page refercnces. Sophistical Refutations Will
occonlillHly he I Cllll ll' d In" l( ".\'(l/ Ilt M .".
 IN IlW I) [Je li O N
IN 11) llt l'l'ION

Hnd accuses il of nol rca lly knowing what il is doin g. In l!l b \\Illy. Ih e
Ih corcti cflll y biuscd ami Ihu s redu ctive view On rationality, thi s ideal
reinterpretation ofAristotie eonlronts Heidegger with no less " t", k than
assumes tl di chotomy bctwecn theory and praxi s, the consequence of
that of rethinking the philosophieal tradition as a whole.
wh ich is that Ilot only theory but also human understanding in general is
According ta Heidegger's OWIl testimony, it was his early encounter
rcgardcd as something essentiall y different trom life and action. But
with Brentano's dissertation Von den mannigfchen Bedeutung des
with the help of phenomenology, Heioegger hoped ta be able to uncover
Seienden nach Aristote/es that initiated his "first elumsy attempts to
th e origin of this ideal, and this in such a way as ta get at the
penetra te into philosophy", eonfronting him for the first time \Vith the
cxperiences that once led ta those concepts of theOl'y and knowledge
question which was to become the focal point of his entire philosophical
which are now entrenched in the philosophical vocabulary.
endeavour: the question posed in the Metaphysics concerning being as
2 The search for this origin eventually led Heidegger ta Aristotle . One
being Eve ntuall y, Heidegger would get to the point where he cou ld
might perhaps think that the beginning of Western rationality should be
launch his own Ihesis on "the mani fald meaning of being": the poi nt
loeated in Parmenides or Plata rather than in Aristotle, but Heidegger
wh en he presented his project of fundamental ontology in his main early
puts emphasis on what he regards as a decisive breakthrough or
\York Sein und Zef!. By that lime , however, Heidegger had bccome
development in Aristotle. Heidegger thus approaches Aristotle as the
convinced that, when thus raising ane\\' the question of being, he \Vas
culmination of previous Greek thought, and of Plata in particular,
actually reawakenin g a question long forgotten , which had becn
c laimi ng that Aristotle's achievements essentially consist in a "more
"reduced ta silence" after the time of Plato and Aristotle 3
radica l and scientific" elaboration of Plato's thought' Not oilly has
But even though the ontologieal perspective is present in Heidegger's
Aristotle inquired further into the nature of rationality th an hi s
1V0rk from the start, the lecture courses that precede the publication of
predecessors, but this inquiry might itself be said to be of a more
Sein und Zeit display a slightly st ronger focus on the tapie of reason or
" rational " kind than before. The camp Iain! made in the Sophist, that the
rationality. There Heidegger devotes himself ta the task of developing
carly philosophers "seem ta tell us a story, muthos , as if \\le were
an ontology of life, thereby trying ta modify the thematic field of
children"', is aftirmed more strongly by Aristotle than what Plato
phenomenology and to steer the phenomenologieal projeet in another
himse lf could do, his suspicion of myth and poetry notwithstanding.
direction than what Husserl had done. Early on , Heidegger was
Ari stotle takes the decisive step a\Vay from myths and spec ulative
eonvinced of the need 10 challenge the ep istel11ol og iea l and tao
di scourse, tOlVards a more "con crete" and scientific philosophy, in
Cartesian orientation of Husserlian phenomcnology, with its focus on
whi ch it is no longer lIluthos that articulates the order of the world, but
consciousness and subjectivity. The ambition to come to grips with his
logos.
Qwn mast immediate philosophical background and heritage gave
Il is also precisely the concept of logos that stands at the centre of
Heidegger an impetus ta refleet upon the nature of philosophy as s uch
Il eidegger's interpretation of Aristotle as a thinker of rationality,
and to reconsider not only its basic questions and concepts, but also its
notab ly with respect ta Aristotle's definition of man as a being endowed
very aim and direction. In parti cu lar, Heidegger wanted to reconsider
wi th logos. This has become the classical definition of man as a rational
the notion of philosophy as theory, notably with respect to how it fits
bc in g, not Jeast because of its Latin translation , animal rationale.
into a modern scien tific and logical ideal concerning cognition as a
Il o wc vc r, in Heidegger's view, what this definition really says about the
whole. Nearly ail of Heidegger's early writings involve a critique ofthis
nature o f rati ollalit y has actually been lost in the tradition aCter Aristotle,
idea!. This critique stems From his belicf that, apart from entailing a
t" ough il mi ght wei l be the case th at Ari stotle himself did not fully

2 "Mein Weg in die Phanomenologie", pp. 8190 n Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 81. ~ "/(11011" Sophistes (110. 19 in Ille Gasomlollsgobe, whi ch hence forlh is referred to as
) Sein I/nd Zeit ("SZ"), p. 2. "UA"), pp. 11 - 12.
, SrJ/IIIII", 242ct-: rr.

2
 IN 1I{()I)LJ " li ON
rea lise ail its implications. Wh ile he does not di spule Ili lIt " d Nto ll e's
der.nition concerns man as a rational being, Heidegger wa nl s 10 siress
that this definition proposes as the basic characteristic of man not plain
reason but rather speech. Speech is the key ta the question of reason,
because, and thi s is the crucial point, speech is the basic constituent of
human action or act ivity as such . For in virt ue of its power of
distinguishing between different things, speech lets man have a world
and share it with olhers. Il is thus the experienee of speech, or sa at least
Heidegger claim s, that Illakes up the foundation of Aristotl e's
concept ion of rationality. As Aris totl e hilllself puts il in the ramous
passage in the Politics:
Why man is a soc ial an im a l in <l higher degree than <.Iny bec or
any grega rio us an imal is clear. For, as wc say, nature does
nothing in vain, and man a!o ne alllong animais possesses speec h.
The Illcre sound or voice can 110 doubt ind ical e pain flild plcasure,
and therefore, il belongs 10 the ot her an im aI s .:l. S weil ... , but
spee ch is for the sa ke of revea lin g the advanl agcOLJS a nd Ihe
harmfu l, an d Iherefore nlso the j ust and the unjusl; l'or thi s is
proper ta man as compa red wi th the olhc r anim ais , namcly la
alone have perception of good and bad and jusI and unj ust and
other such tbings, and it is joint participati on in Ihese things thal
makes a househo ld and a corn munity. 6
The present study exp lo res th e way in which Heidegger seeks to
retr ieve and evaluate thi s defin iti on of man , both as re ga rd s its
implications for the nature of reason, and its idea concernin g the right
approach to this tapie. More precisely, it wi II be shown how Heidegger
attempts to develop Aris totle 's notion of a di sc ursive, "speaking"
reason . Heidegger hil11self does not use the tenn "disc urs ive"; as a rul e
he simply talks about "speech" (Rede), since one of his major points is
that speec h or articulat ion is no thin g extenial to th e act of
understanding, but on th e contrary constitu tes its reali sation or
6 Po/itics (" P ol. "), 1253a7-18: "olon o 1tO/.ltIKv (, avep JlTOS 00v ncLOllS
!-U::/d"ttl1S KOl lTfNts YEa.ou sebou 110ov, O~ov . ouStv yap , ms $OIlV . l-l at l1 V ~
$UO"lS lTOtEt Oyov o !-l OVOV av9pwlToS xe l "HV 0wv ~ )1V ouv $wv~ w
urr 'lPO Ka t ~OS EOtl cr ll~lEiOV, OlO Kat ws a).olS urrclpXE I s00ls ... , 6 o
6yo b '!Cp OIlOV tan 1 aWI$pov Ka t 10 ~ap:pov, WOtE KC TO iKOiOV Ka t
T alKOV wm yp rrps t Qa s0a "toS vOpwlTolS Hhov, -r ~16vov yaOo
Ka i 1<"CtKO\l KC cnKoio"U KOt ciiKOU Kai "tWV (i),J,wv oi:08llOiv XElV ~ :. tO"lJtwv
KQ L\iWvia rr l e. oi l< i av I<ai ltI V. "
4 5
INTR l) l) " l'I ON
CII Ht: IIIl CIII . ln Ih e litcraLurc on Al'i slotlc, however, Ihe concept oflogos
is on en rcgard cd as a notion of discursive reason and interpreted as the
cupa city fo r reasolling or making inferences. Logos in this sense is
opposed ta nOliS, " intuition", which has access to those premises from
whi ch an inferenee starts and which must be taken for granted by the
in fe rcnce it se lf. But He idegger emphasises anothe r aspect of the
l'istote lian logos: that it is const ituted by combination and separation,
.\'fll1lh esis and dihairesis. Thi s structure, Heid egger arg ues, is what
rnakes it possible for us ta understand someth ing as something, in a
particular regard or in a specifie sense. On account of this structure,
logos to Heidegger displays the not ion of a finite reason, in contras! ta
an idea l ofknow ledge as simple, ullmed iated "seeing", which he thinks
is ex prcssed \Vith the concept OrnaI/s.
ln retrieving Aristot le 's concept of logos, Heid egger seeks ta
preserve what he regards as Aristotl e' s most important insight in thi s
context, namely that the inquiry into reason or rationality must bc
situated with in an analys is of human praxis or existence. However,
Il cidegger thinks, or at lenst suspects, that Aristotle was not reall y ab le
la do justice to this insight. For even though Heidegger is not w illing ta
simply subscribe to th e rather common view on Aristotle and on Greek
th ought as a whole as essentiall y naive with respect ta language, he
suspects that there is a celiain confl ict in Aristotle's thinking between a
phenomenologieal mod e of ill quiry on th e one hand, and his
Illetaphysical or ontological assumptio ns on the other. As a consequence
of Ihis, Aristotl e \Vas not fully able to themat ise or reflect upon hi s own
di scoveries. As wc will see in the course of this st udy, the idea of an
ambi guity in Aristotle's thought makes Heidegger somewhat hesitant as
to how far he can follow Aristo tl e in his OWIl project, wavering between
ft criti ca l an d an approving stance, as it were. But it seems that
Il eidegger at last becomes more or less certain that the metaphysical
tcndency in Aristotle 's thought finally triurnphs, and that thi s tr iumph
Illakes up the fou ndati oll of the logiea l and theoretical ideal of
rn li onality.
III th e lec lu re course Platon: Sophistes, de li vered in 1924/25,
Il cidegger gives the fo ll owing diagnosis of the fate of the Greek
ulldcrstandill g of logos:
 INTRODUCTION
'l'he clnrilicn lioll of logos \Vas to the Greeks aflllulamelltal:ask,
/l ild 1l1l1rCOVCr such a one, in which they only \Vith difficulty and
slowl y could ndvancc and where they to sorne extent remained
sluck , if one llwy designate as this point tha wllich has been
hand cd clown as the Aristote li an lagie, traditionally speaking.
InilSlllu!.:h as the tcac hin g of logos among th e Greeks fina lly \Vas
dcvelopcd in a thcorc tial se nse, the pri1}/ary phenomenoll of
logos \Va s (h e sentenc e , Ihe th eore /I cal asser tion about
7
sorneth ing.
In his attcmpt to make the clari fication of logos into a task of his OWI1 )
Heidegger wants to challenge thi s "theoretical development" 01 logos,
insofar as it has led to the beliel that the assertion, or to use Aristot le's
term, logos apopltantikos, can be regarded as the basic mode or speech,
in the sense of being the mst fundamental clement of truth and
knowlcdge. But even more important to Heidegger is to question the
logico-grammatical approach to language IVhich the foeus on the
assertion eventua ll y entai led. For the consequence of this is that
lan gua ge is expe lled From the domain of human praxis , and so are
theory and knowledge. Thus the aim is not to do away with theory or
logic, but to restore ta it its original and proper place as a form of Iife or
action. On Heidegger's view, this aim can only be fu Ifi lied by means of
an investigation of speech. For if the presently prevailin g view on
rationality is based upon a certain interpretation of speech, th en the
attempt to challenge this view must apparently proceed by way of a
reinterpretation of speech. And if it is precisely Aristotle's interpretation
of speech that - albeit in a round about way - makes up the loundation
of the modern view on rationality, then the ~ci nt erpretation of speech
must equally involve a confrontation \Vith Aristot lc.
This reinterpretation should be of a phenomenological kind, but it
wi ll al so in its tu rn contributc to a cl ari lcation of th e nature of
phenomenology itself, since it is the task of phenomenology ta present
"the lo gos of the phenomena" and thus to give them their proper
7 GA 19, p. 252: "Die Aufklarung des yo war fOr die Griechen eine Gnmdallfgabe
und dazu cine solche , bei der sic nur sc hwer und langsam voran karncn und
gewissermalJen stecken blieben, wenn man ai s dicSCIl Punk t do s hC/ci chl1cn k ,~nn,
wns aIs die aristotelische Logik, traditionell gesp l'ol.: hcll , nbcl'lldclt 151. ~ o lt.:rn
n{l mlich di c Le hre vorn Myo bei den Gri cchcll ICII.:lich ill cinl"11l IlIl'lIl\\tlsc hcli Sinll \.:
ausgcbildct wu rde, WOI' das prillic/f e f!I/ Il OIlI C' 1I dc ,~ .Y\li,f d"1 Sr lf ", dl/ Ih l'Il I'I" dllJ
AII.\'.wgc: Obel' cIWflS."
INTRODUCTION
nrlh.: ulation . Phenomenology means, on Heidegger 's definition,
"(JjJophaines /hai ta phainomena: to let that which shows itscl r be seen
l'rom itself SllClt as it shows itself [rom itsel!'.'" Hence the nced to
clu cidate the nature of logos and in thi s lVay to make clear the
conditions of possibility of letting something be se en "as" somcthing.
Ilut when analysing "phenomenology" in terrns of apopltaineslhai,
Il ' idcgger has simultaneously established a connection with that notion
01' logos which constitutes the target of hi s critique, namely logos as
lop.os apophantikos, which rerers to a form of speech which in virtue or
Ils unpophantic" nature precisely lets something be seen. ]n this way,
Ih' Iflsk of conrrontin g Aristotle's understanding of logos is embedded
in Ihe very term "phenomenology" .
l Ailll QI/d slnlc/ur e of/he present study
1li ' [lim 01 this study is to show how Heidegger pursues hi s criti cal
, 'Il' cvnl 01 Aristotle 's notion of discursive reason by bestolVin g upo n it
nn onlo log ica l interpretation, which seeks ta challenge the logico-
HI'UIIl1r\uli a l pe rspective on speech and reason. On He ide gger's
1It.'l'Otllll , Ihe ontological approach is already present in Aristolle. th ough
1" l' lulent or undeveloped way. More precisely, Heidegger believes that
Ihe lllli ological basis of Aristotle's conception of logos can be made
VINlh lc iflhis conception is brought together with Aristotle 's teleology,
I1lI d 111 parli cular with his notion of praxis, action. Thus wh en claiming
II UII lI u.: Hll!:llysis of rationality or logos cannot do without an inqui ry into
IIIOII IHI/Jr"xis , Il ei degger's point is al so that Aristotle 's conception of
, ,,1 ,,,,,,Iii)' Illust be interpreted in the light of his understanding of
1"1/\ l" , I\usicll ll y, what Heidegger discovers in Aristotle's teleological
!11h 1pl 'I/ltion O
1 r li fe as a whole is an idea of the directedness of action
"11, 1 IIIIIlI ght Ih at is less mcntali stic than Husserl 's notion of
11I1I"III'lllIliIY. Il owcver, Il eidegger is silllultaneously convinced that the
""I,, II' ~ "llOli whi ch Arislotl e's teleology is based is an ontology of
IIH 1 la \1, 1\ Cl) lI ~cqllcn cc of whi ch is that Ari stolle tends to regard
11111111111 I I \, 11011 liS ~ lI ch . including the activit y of logos, frol11 th e point of
1 \1 ,01 Il ,, lsh 'd, il 'rli,:cled bci " g. Bul j" his II lt empl 10 q"esli oll Ih is
Il t t " PIl IiIIOlllt\IHl lnHIr: !t11HI (lUllII ; t'mO/lift! VI'OO(I1 r QfUl V6 p1 1 \'lA : I)ns WO ~, sich
r INL ,ri Will ,'<j ~ k li VOII 111 111 8 11 1b ~ 1 li N I d.!!. VOI1 111111 ~ clh:lI II CI' selle Il 1 f1 ~sC II , My
Ililll li
 INTRODUCTION
ideal , Heidegger nonetheless draws on Aristotle's teleology, ta the
extent that he argues that logos must be eonceived of as a form of
kinesis, a kind of movement which involves differcnce and therefore is
open ta change. With this c\aim, Heidegger th us wants ta retrieve an
idea already present in Aristotle, while at the same time transforming it,
in that he does not subsume kinesis under the model of complete and
terminated movernent.
1t is a major thesis of this work that this ontological or tcleological
interpretation of logos not only lets Heidegger inquire further into the
constitution of understanding and articulation as compared with a
traditional logical and theoretical perspective, but that it in fact also
gives bim the possibility of re-establishing the primaey of theoretical
knowledge. This might perhaps seem like a somewhat paradoxieal
claim, but the point is 1hal the meaning of "theory" will be substantially
modified, once it is realised that its origin and foundation must be
loeated in life or action. Thus Heidegger ' s elaboration of the
Aristotelian logos is equally an attempt at questioning the traditional
distinction between theory and praxis, and a1so, as wc will sec, the idea
that Aristotle is the originator of this distinction. Aeeordingly, when
trying to retrieve a genuine sense of theory, Heidegger in a sense
rehabilitates the traditional view on Aristotle as a proponent of the
primaey oftheory. Heidegger's point is thus not that this view is plainly
false but that it is based upon a misguided interpretation of Aristotle's
notion of theoey; therefore, one has not been able ta understand what
this primaey of the theoretical really amounts ta.
Heidegger's preoccupation with the question of logos could be
described as a prelude ta the project of fundamental ontology, inquiring
into how we speak about being, in order ta tinally get at the meaning of
being as such. This more far-reaehing ontologieal perspeetive will
however only be briefly explored in this study, though the relation
between Heidegger's inquiry into logos and his ontological project is
discussed at the end. When treating the problem of logos as intimately
conneeted with ontologieal and teleologieal issues, one incvitably
eomes aeross the question of time or temporalit y in Il eidegger and
Aristotle, not least when eonsidering Heid egger 's s uspi c ion lh al
Ari stotl e's concepti on ofratiOl1[1lity as Cl wh olc IIllly uitilil ll i 'Iy he trn ccd
bock 10 th l,: as~ urnpti o ll thal bl: lI g in nu.; tru c N ~\ II !1t.' IN PI \"W II I , nld sll 'd
INTRODUCTION
bcing. Throughout this study, 1 will toueh upon the temporal
implications of Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle, but 1 will not
address temporality as a theme in its oIVn right until in the last chapter.
This is not a comparative slUdy, whieh is not to say that eomparisons
will be wholly absent, but as my primary aim is ta explore I-Ieidegger' s
th o ught , Aristotle is [rom the beginlling situated within the context of
Il eidegger's philosophy. The scope of the study is more or less
rcs tricted to Heidegger's \Yorks lroH! the twenties, since al11105t ail of
hi s lectures on Aristotle as a whole belong ta this decade. Praetieally ail
o r I-lcidegger's lecture courses du ring this period to a greater or 1esser
cx te nt involve a con frontation with Aristotle, and the presence of
A ri s to tle can be felt even in those works where he is no1 explicitly
In entioned. For this reason, the study covers nearly ail Heidegger's
writ in gs from tbis period. But of particular importance are the two
ex tens ive courses Platon: Sophistes from 1924/25 and the reeently
publi shed Grundbegriffe der oris/oteUsehen Philosophie from the
prcv ious semester,9 Whereas the former work puts focus on the
discuss ion in the Nicomacheal1 Ethics of the intetlectual virtues and
th eir re lation ta action and production, the latter brings together
" l'i stotl e ' s understanding of logos with his teleologyW The overall
IlI'lC tltlltion of bath these courses is to explore Aristotlc's works as
phellomenological investigations into different aspects of life, but also
to draw out their ontological presuppositions. The same strategy ean be
1,\1 111(\ in what is known as the Aristotle Introduction written in 1922,
" 1'll fl l1o mcnologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der
il '1l1lcncuti schen Situation)"I1, whieh is the first text Heidegger devoted
"x pli clt Iy to Aristotle. The interpretation of the concept of logos is also
111 (' cClltl'nl iss ue of Logik: die Frage naeh der Wahrheit (1925/26), and
Il ,Idegge r retuills ta it in Sein und Zeit (1 n7), Grundprobleme der
Il 1; j 18 , 1 also mnke use of a texi th at has not yel bcen published,
l'//lI/lf11111'I/Olo}llsche III/e1)/'era /ionell ZII Aris/old e,\', Oll/ologie II/Id Logik, which was
Ih II Vtl l N I 111 1922, Th is lectu re course prcsc nt s the sa ill e bfls ic tcnd ency as
II I Idt\l!f-1t' l ',II otlter CC1urscs 0 11 Aristollc duri llg thi s pcr iod, sinec it 100 . tri cs 10 make
h'lu IIp w Arltl h) I IC'S 0111010UY is rCh\lCd 10 his undcrSlllndin g or li re, Th is co urse is
j11t+ 1"c ll'd I l ~ 11 0, 62 ort he (/IJSl1I11WU.W//) tr Iwd il will he l'cfcl'l'cd 10 Wilh ;]11 uSleri sk
,dtl r llc(' VO lll tll C lIlullbcr,
lU I c\ l t'l do~\y 1." nll1l) lhe l'C ll tr , tI lhl'Il\co f ArI,\/f//I'/('S , A'I(,/ofJh)',dk I . j , VOII lVe'scn
11111' Il li Atll'!tkclr r/4'" Al'f /fi ( 1() t l , (lA 11),
1 111111"'1' .I11/whl/ch (, ( 191N), nI' , 2172/IK , I l l' llu' lllt lh rdllrrl.'d 10 1111 ""A",
 INTRODUCTION
Ph iil/Olll enologie (1927) and GrundbegrifJe der Metaphysik. Well -
Endlichkeil - Einsamkeit (1929/1930).12 Final ly, the main source for
Heidegger' s interpretation of Aristolle 's underslanding of lheorelical
life is Einleitung in die Philosophie (1928/1929).'3
Accordingly, my interpretation primarily conccrns Heideggcr's
encounter with Aristotle du ring this period, when the project of
fundamental ontology is being devcloped, and it is not my intention to
exhaust ail the views lhat Heidegger ever held on Aristotle. However,
sinee it is not my aitn to give a chronologica l exposition of Heidegger 's
thought, i.e. to trace a development or perhaps a change in Heidegger's
attitude towards Aristotle, 1 use later lexts whenever they are bene/ici al
to my argument or seem to throw light on Heidegger's earlier position,
th us assuming that the later works are not opposed to lhe earlier ones to
such an extent that lhey musl be kept slriclly apart. '" For the truth is that
wh en it cornes to Heidegger's understanding of Aristotle , it is not
entirely easy to delimit a hOll1ogeneous "early" view that cou Id be
contrasted with a "Iater" position. The ambiguity lhal Heidegger wants
to locate in Aristotle is retlected in Heidegger's interpretation, causing
it to point in at least t\Va directions: one which puts emphasis on what
Heidegger regards as Aristotle's metaphysics of presence and the
primacy of propositional thought, seeing this as the final target of the
destruction of the history of ontology and [agie ; and another which
concentrates on the phenomcnological character of Arstotle's thought,
receiving from it the very means to pursue this destruction.
In Chapter One, 1 give a survey of the relation between Heidegger and
Aristotle in order 10 loeate the place of Aristotle wit hin Heidegger's
philosophical project, and also in order to indicate the background to the
question of logos as a philosophical theme in Ileidegger. This chapter
thus has a somewhat introductory character. The three following
chapters deal with each of the three levels of logos that Heidegger
regards as most important: theory or science, everydayness and
12 GA 21) GA 24 and GA 29/30 respectively. References to Sein und Zei! are !lot to
the Gesamtausgabe but 10 the Niemeyer edition.
Il GA 27.
).1 As regll!~ls Heidegger' s interprctation of Ari stot!e, il is nbovc nll one IrHor 1exI fhM
is of interest, as il is co ncc rn cd with the 11 0tion of" lCi VIlOtrt: " VOtll WCIit1 tl und Ilcgrilf
der <l)UOl ~. AriS[OIU!cS, Phys ik n, l" ( 1939), P[1 . 23 9-1 01 III Il '1')'IIIIIIA,',, (f ,', / 1'1 ,
INTRODUCTION
philosophy. Each chapter is organised around thrcc points. Bcginning
with "the given", that is, logos as >t is first of ail accessible or with
respect to how it has been interpreted tradilionally, the investigation
Ihen proceeds to an analysis of the structures that are constitutive of the
mode of speech under consideration. Finall y, on the basis of this
a nalysis, it is asked what kind of access to being and truth is admitted
by that particular mode of speech. To some extent this is also the order
o r th e Huee main chapters, so that each of them represents one of the
Ihrce points enumerated above. .
Accordingly, Chapter Two centres on Heidegger's encounter wlth
w hat is in his view the tradition al or cornmon conception of logos.
Il owcver, Heidegger is not entirely prepared to aseribe this conception
ln Aristotle hill1self, since he thinks that it has its origin in a specifie -
IInd in sufficient - interpretation of Aristotle. That is to say, in the tirst
Hltl ge o f his inquiry into logos, Heidegger cannot direct ly tum to
MiSIOlle himself, for Aristotle' s philosophy of logos is accessible only
Ilil Ihe basis of a confrontation with the received view on this topic. On
titi s v ic w, Aristotle is, if not the originator, then at least a major
pl'o poncnt of a theoretical, or as 1 will cali it, an epistemic ideal of
\'OHl);ti o ll , according to which the assertion is the primary mode of
~p ce~ h , since it is the basic element of truth and knowledge. The overall
nl ll' 01' Ihis chapter is to show how Heidegger tries to question this view
Il ti n inl erpretation of Aristot le. His basic argument is that, wh en
11 11 1t! ~ ill g th e assertion in tenns of sunthesis and dihairesis, Aristotle
ItUN IImnagcd to point out a basic feature of hum an understanding as
1I\'h, tHllI1 e ly its discursivity or "as-structure". On the basis of this
\ 1111 111, Il uidcggcr argues that assertoric speech as theoretical articulation
PIl\t( IJpp oSes an unthematic mode of understanding and articulation
,, 11I1'1i Ihu ~ is Ihought to make up a more basic level of man's
d l" ,1I'Mlv il y or logos.
' 1 'hh.:ggcl" s preoccupati on with the pre-theoretical, everyday logos is
Ihr Ill ple (J I' 'lltlpl e r Threc. Il will be shown how Heidegger makes use
II I hl'i 111 l1 l1 ys is or cverydayncss in ord er to reveal precisely the
" ~'" tl Il Y", phenOlllenal basis 01' AriSloll e's phi losophy 01' logos, which
1 Mlo l le lii," scll' s upp o secll y w ns nol ab le 10 th ell1/lli se, and
11111 11 111 11 '(luNly Il11'n$ 10 t\ l'i s l ~ ltl c (ClI' Il 'Ir> in thi s fllH:ll yR i ~. The qu esti on
I d hl U,1Ii1 will hCI'c I II Il HI' III e x lc ill he I I' '/lI ed ftS fi ql1 c:-: li o l1 COl1 cl;rnil1 g
 INTRODUCTION
th e discursive nature of action , regarded as a sHent mod e o f arti c ulation.
For this reason, this chapter focuses on Heidegger's interprctation of
Aristotle's analysis of praxis and its mode of understanding,
deliberation. Wh en bringing together logos and action, it becomes
possible not only ta regard action as a form of logos or articulation, but
also ta conceive of logos in its tUrll along th e lines of action, that is, ta
estab lish a teleological or ontological perspectiv e on logos, interpretin g
it in terms of kinesis.
Wh en the nature of logos thus has been furth er elucidated , it is
possible to approach anew the question concerning the theoretical and
its mode of discourse, this time from th e perspective o f teleology. This
is the task of Chapter Four. Here 1 focus on Ar istotle ' s and I-Ieidegger's
respective understanding of philosophy, sug gest ing that He idegger
actually affirms the Aristotelian notion of th eory as th e supreme fonn of
praxis, though he is convinced that it must be given a new foundation.
Basieally, H eidegger's way ta retd eve Ari stotle 's noti on of Ihcoria is ta
emphasise its discursive nature, thereby questionin g the tr adition al
su premacy of noetic, "intuitive" thought.
ln Chapter Five, 1 explore the relation between ontology and " Iog ic"
in Heidegger and Aristotle. Beginning with Heidegger 's idea that the
tendeney in Aristotle to identify speech as such with assertoric speech is
intimately connected with his understanding of being as presence, 1
show how Heidegger's attempt at trans form ing Aris totle's ontology
must be seen against the background of hi s re interpretation of
Aristolle's concept oflogos.
3. A survey ofprevious literalure
ln spite of th eir polemi c tone, Heidegger 's lectures on Aristotl e very
seldom involve an explicit confrontation with rivaliing interpretations of
Aristotle . .Iaeger and Ross, the most famous Aristotle scholars around
the tum of the last century, are only mentioned oeeasionally, and for the
most part with respect to philologieal matters. This is perhaps not sa
surprising, for Heidegger's main target of criticism in this connect ion is
c1early not a particular interpretation of Aristotle, but an entire trad ition
whic h, as _ he sees il , ultimately points ba ck to th e scholasti c
interp retat ioll of !\ristotl e. Heidegger's proj eci o f" Iibel'lllill l' Aristotl e
Ij'om 8choiasti ciS Il1 has givcn wa y 10 fi rH.:W Ir'lI ditilll1 of' \V tll'k on
INTRODUCTION
l'istotl c, as several ofllis students eventually became Aristotle scholars
ln tll eir own right. 15 Among these, Gadamer should be mentioned in
pluti eular, sinee, as wc will see below, his interpretation of Aristotl e has
III its lurn had considerable impact on the contemporary view on the
,. I"ti on between Heidegger and A ristotle.
Il owcver, though the Iiterature on Heidegger's philosophy as a whole
h Il QW has become immense, th cre are sti ll co mp aratively few stud ics
thcm!lti s in g the relation to Aristotle in particular, though tllere are of
((lIII~C 'l ui te a few thattouch upon this issue. The reason why it used to
Iltlruct rclative ly little intere st is, in part at Jeast, that the lecture courses
J II,,' ltl\,;ggcr devoted to Aristotle during the twenti es were for a long lim e
lUll e '\,;ssiblc to ail but a few scholars . Broadly speak in g, the tendency of
lI u,: "\.I lli er'! lit erature on Heidegger and Aristotle is to emphasise w hat is
as fundamental differences between the two thinkcrs, in
I l,'14(1 I'(I \,;d
Plllil eular w ith respect ta ontology. Heidegger's ontological proj ect is
,.~" liS " profound critique of Aristotelian metaphysics, which seeks to
l hu1l ell ge il S basic assumptions. This is the central idea of Werner
tvllllX'S by now elassical work Heidegger und die Tradition (J 961).
II1I HI~ h Marx discusses other thinkers in the tradition in addition to
Il totl e (l11uinly Hegel), the overall aim of his work is to argue that in
,",k, to und erstand Heidegger's notion of being and essence, it is
II<'I' NSllry to approaeh it as an attempt ta overcome Aristotle. A kindred
, 0 1 k III thi s respect is David Starr 's Entity and Existence. An
(}Ololll,ltl('ol Investigalion of Arislotle and Heidegger (1975 ), which
, 1' 1\1 1CS th e dimculties of what the author des ignates as Aristot/e's
11<1,,1-,, ,$0 11" on tology of ousia, arguin g that the means to solve these
dl ll l, tdli es ar e prov ided by He idegger's alleged "fi l'st-persan"
pll l 01 H11 'IH.dogy, However, there is also a recent study on Heidegger
ll l1t! Ad' Iotl e dcalin g wit h th e tapie of ontolo gy, namely Ted Sadler's
1 r 1( , n oc hlll , Das C /'IlII dlegcnde III/d das Weselllfiche: 21.1 Aristote/es'
","tlm'h"'H "{jIN /' dCl:i S'eill III/d das Sc icllde" (Metaphys ik Z) (196 5); W. Brcker,
' ,h/ll lcl/,'I ( 1t>1 5); Il. ~ 1. Gn dl1l11 cr, "Prnk ti sc hcs Wi ssc n" ( 1930), Wahrh eil lil/d
H, ,h"d., ( 19(,0), pp, 3 1 7~329; " Di e hCl'llI cll euli sc hc I\ ktualitilt Ari stoleles "; E.
III 1 01111 111, J'I 1\11'1'11 T1NOS" Hil/ e UIII '"I',\'IIG"lIIIIIR zu SirI/krill' III/d Urspnmx
,1/ IH"/I,/hl/ll' " (,'l' lmdh t'grilfu ( 195H): r, Wiplingcr, Physis /Ill e! Logos: Zl/lll
t..,I1/I,,/I/" '/I /J /J// '/I 11/ ,l'I'I' H'I' !kr/I' lI fl/lI.'! / 111' rlell Ul',\'/)I /J/I ~ rlv/' Mel(lphy!" ik bei
I l'\I,'IIt.'~ (If} / I ), h~1 Il ~ lI r vcy \)r !I I ~' cfII'ly ,'ccepl ion of' Il ciclcl:\l;Cf'S lectu res on
11 1111 111 , III' '1 S I I ~lJ l l lll l . " ll u ld ~m.\l: r 'H Illll' rpn:tfl l\{\l1 of Art stOl le: /)y l/ o /ll ;,\' ancl
l" /~tlf\ , ! t Il' J 1), 1(. IIUI! III"l.'()r Il , "II uldcH~I; I" Il 1)c"!IIIC1Iull o f 111\ri}!ICS !S" ( 19H9).
 INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

Heidegger and Aristotle. The Question of Being (1996). Sadiel' tak es

h ll ve bccll initially made possible by the circulation of stud e nt notes of
into "ccount the carly lecture courses (though not the unpublished Ih e hy th en still unpublished "Sophist lect ures,, ? 1 However, more
ones), but is no less convinced of Heidegger's essentially negati ve Imp ortant for the debate that was to follow was no doubl th e discovery
attitude towards Aristotle, suggesting that he only bothe red to read III 1989 of a text that long had been considered losl: Heidegge r 's
Aristotle because " he was followin g the dictum, ' know thy enemy ,,,.16
IIItl'oducti on to his projected book on Ari stotle (which never appeared),
A mong th ese ontologically oriented studi es one may also cou nt
\V l' llen in 1922. 25 The discuss ion in th e writings just cited of the
Catriona Hanley's Being and God in Aristolie and Heidegger: the Raie
1111 pol'tal1ce of Aristotle's thought to Heidegger's philosophy dra ws on
of Method in Thinking the Infinite (2000). T hi s work raises the question
11lcsc Iwo texts in particular.
concerning the place and role of gro und or reaSOn in He id egge r and
As already indicated, th e rel1ewed interest in Heidegger and A ri stotl e
Aristotle, and evaluates its implications for their respective ontological
il ns beel1 caused by the belief that Aristotle ' s Nicomachean Ethics has
proj ects. Eve n though it docs not display Heidegger as sa one-sidedl y
lu,,1 H decisive influence on th e existential ontology of Sein und Zeit, in
critical of A ri stotle as the above-mentioned wo rk s, its aitn is
pli ri iCtd"r as this is worked out in ilS tirst division. In brier, what above
neverthel ess to contrast Heidegger 's project w ith A ri stotl e's, showi ng
11 11 h"s attracted attention is what has been acknowledged as a striking
how hi s phenomcno[ogy does 11 0t ask for gro und s or reasons in th e
HIIl,; larit y between the concepts with which Heidegger articulates the
same way as Ar istotle and therefore has no need of Gad as a t-ina l or
!\1l1t! tllll cnta l trai ts of man's everyday dealings and those used by
firs t princip le.
A1'is to tl c in connection \Vi th his analysis of poiesis and praxis,
The idea that it is abo ve ail ontology that makes up the basic albeit
" produ ction" and "action" in the Ethics. Accordin gly, the discussion has
negativ e point of contact betwecn He idegger and Ar isto tl e has been
f.I.' tllred on th e question of the place and function of th ese 1\\'0
questi o ned during the last two decades. According to Robert
A!'! Nlo lc li an co ncepts in He idegger's existe nt ial analytic, though
Bernasconi '5 testimony, in the middl e of th e eigh ti es "a number of
1lt,,' I( lcgger himself, as Bernasconi points out, devotes more space to his
schol ars, wo rking largely independ entl y of each other, began to
IlIt crprclnt ioll of the forms ofunderstanding that are commonly thought
discover Aristotle 's Eth ics in Being and Time"IJ, the scholars bein g,
ln /l ccompa ny action and production, namely phronesis and tee/me,
among others, Walter Brogan," Theodore Kisiel,l9 Thomas Sheehan,2o
" pl'lId c IlCC" or "practical understanding" and " art" or "know-h ow"
Jacques Taminia ux,21 John van Buren 22 and Franco Volpi 23 . The
I Wl p ' ' li vc ly,26 There s thus a consensus as regards the importance of
"discovery" of Ari stotl e's pos itive influence on He idegge r seems to
th l'~i.! co nce pts for Heidegger's existential analytic. O r more prec isely,
16 P. 17. !lIll/li Cl' li cs see m to agree that what Heidegger found in Aristotle '.\'3S
17 R. Bernasconi, "Heidegger's Destruction ofPhronesis" (1989), p. 129. ,d)\ \V (\ 11 an an. lysis of human life and its relation to truth and
18 (ln the following, 1 also incJude 5uch lexIs on Heidegger and the Ethics that were
no! yel pub li shed wh en Bernasconi wrale his arti cle.) W. Brogan, "A Response to tll llle rstHlldin g th at docs not red uee these phenomena to an alleged
Robert Bernasconi 's 'Heidegger's Destruction of Phronesis " , ( 1989); "Heidegger Ill lllll1l'y model of th eo reti ca l cogniti on. Still, there is no general
and Aristotlc: Oase in and the Question of practical Life" (1990); "The place of
Aristo tle in the developm ent of I-Ieidegger's phenomenology " ( 1994).
19 T. Kisiel, The Genesis o/Heidegger's Seing and Time (1993) .
!. ; Il 19, For thi s info rm ati on, sec Bern asconi ' s " Heidegger 's Destructio:1 of
'hHII H.'1ls" , p. 11\ 5, nOIe 12. . . .
20 T. Sheehan, "Hermeneia and Apophansis: The early Heidegger on Aristotle"
( 1988).
!, l' t. I.'m infol'lnati oll llbOll1 thc gcncs is ofl his tex!, sec Gadamer's IIHroduclion to It
211. Taminiaux, Lectures de J'ontologiefondamentale. Essais sur Heidegger (1989) ; hl /.1I1111'I i... lo/i,./Jllc!J 6 ( 1989). pp. 228-23 4. . .
' ft It 1l f.' l no ~co ni , " 1h,:idcggcr 's I)CS11'\lC1O II of Phrollcs l s", p. ~ 30. On hls a cc~u nl.
Le thtre des philasophes (1995).
Ihl " dl it'f.' rIJ I1 Cc.: 111 j(.;lIs is pI'(lbuhly dlle 10 l he i nf1l1 !.! ncc 0 1 11. Arcl.ld1. S t1'l cl ~ y
22 1. van Buren, "The Young Heidegger, Arislotl e, Elhi es" ( 1992),
' j 'I!l I I II H. htl WCVCI', tIOI'III1 'lC()I1I ','1 clnin l 11H11 II C i (! q~g r w ou.lcl bIc more Illl c,rcsl cd 111
23 F . Vo lpi , "D ase ill COlllm e Pr ax is: L 'llss illl i lrlli ofl cl ln md icI'l li s111ion
Illjlfl\lI l n l ~ 111 1(1 Itl X \l llt hn ll l ll 1tp a~ l ~
fi ne! Itol q I ~ l S tru or (,11 1J only, I II ,C,II 18, he
heid cggc riGllne de la phi loso phi e pnt t ique cl ' Ari stole" ( 1988): " lIolll,if tl/lf l 'f'illle : 1\
jlll y. IIHII(\ 1\ !l ~' l l l lolI tu Ihe lutt f.'r ]1r\h' (If cu ncept !! hut Ihl s I ctme sen es wns of
' Tra l1 ~ l a l i o l1 ' of the Nicol/loc!Jelll/ Et/lies?" (199/1),
1 PI I I III \~ IIUl
yUI Il vllll llt1lc w ill'Il thr: nhovf., .. 1\1cllt h)lll't! dllhrll f.' \ ook pince,
 INTRODUCTION
agreement concerning hm\' exactly the relation betwecn Heidegger and
Aristotle shou ld be understood. 27 However, one basic tendency can be
extracted from nearly ail the available texts on this topic, and that is the
idea that Heidegger's interpretation of the Ethics is a kind of
"ontologisation" of Aristotle's practical philosophy,28 By contrast, th e
question whether it rnight be th e other way round , 50 to speak, that is if
the influence of the Et/1l'cs on I-Ieidegger's work suggests that there
might be an cthical dimension lo Hc idegger's ontological
investigations, has not been discussed to any great exten!. Basically,
what the "ontologisation" is supposed to amount to is that Heidegger
translated into the domain of existential ontology an ana lysis of man
tha t in Aristot!e's Ethics is thought to concern on ly the ethica l
dimension ofhuman existence, th us neutralis ing the eth ical st ructures 50
that they cou Id be applied to man's being as such .
One of the consequences of this focus on Heidegger 's preoccupation
with Aristotie's "practical" philosophy is that the question conccrning
the relation between Heidegger's and Ar istot le 's ontology has been
pushed into the background, and most of the above-mentioned sc holars
are more or less silen! on this topic. Still, one might ask if the idea of an
ontologisation does not at least imply an assumption to the effeet that
Heidegger eould not make use of Aristotle 's ontology because of its
metaphysical presuppositions, and so had to turn to his praetieal works
29
instead. ln this connection, Gadamer's work has apparently been a
source of inspiration . Gadamer has on a Ilumbe r of occasions called
attention to what he regards as the dialectic between universality and
particularity in phronesis. Therefore, he thinks that phronesis may be
regarded as a hermeneutic concept of understanding that can be of help
in the attempt to challenge modern scientilic methodology30 But ev en
27 Apan from the authors who took part in the debate at the beginn ing of the last
decade, one ma)' also mention W. McNeil!'s \York The Glanee afthe Eye. Heidegger,
Aristotle, and Ihe Ends of Theory (1999), which also puts emphasis on Aristotle as a
thinker of praxis ratller than of being.
28 This view is ta ken by Bernasconi in his above-mentioned article, by F. Volpi,
"Seing and Time: A 'Translation' of the Nicomach ean Ethic.I'?" , as \vell as by J. van
Buren, "The Young Heidegger, A ri stotle, Ethics" and T. Ki sicl, 'l'he Gcmesis al
Heidegger 's Being and Time, p. 537, noie 15.
29 Thi s view is cxpli ciUy sta tcd by J. van Buren, "The YOllllll Il c!d c~Mt!r, Arsloll c,
Blhi es", p. 171.
weI". abovc, p. 13, nnlu 15.
INTRODUCTION
1hough Gadamer would always reeognise his indebtedness to Heidegger
\l/l Ihis point, he did Ilot, in contras.! to the scholars mentioned above,
thil1k that it was Heidegger's aim to appropriate Aristotle' s practical
phi loso phy. Instead Gadamer emphasised Heidegger's theological
])IIckground. On his view, Heidegger's aim was in fact uitimately to
liherate theology ti'om Aristotle, but since this would lirst require that
Ari s!otle in his turn was liberated from scholasticism, it was no! entirely
31
.,;usy to sec the critical ambitions of Heidegger's interpretation. Even
l''oll gh 1 do no! share this view on Heidegger, 1 believe that Gadamer
W II S right in thinking that he wanted to do something different with
M islolle as compared to Heidegger. This is seldom recognised in the
Ill t,; I'Hture on Heidegger and Aristotle, the consequence of which is, 1
Ih ill k. thal one tends 10 mistake Gadamer' s interpretation of ArislOtle
101' Il cidegger's own views. But as 1 will argue in the course of thi s
, tu<l y, lI e idegger could not Iike Gadamer look upon phronesis as a
IIl mlel for philosophical knowledge, not least beeause of the ontological
<l11I,,:ns iol1 ofhis projee!.
Il owcver, the focus on practical philosophy in connection \Vith
Il 'I<lcgger and Aristotie is perhaps about to diminish, as the las! few
)I.I II '~ sccm to testify to a renewed interest in I-Ieideggcr's encounter
\Vl lh ri stotle's ontology. Apart from the works of Sadler and Hal1ley
IIH\l1l iollCd above, there are a few articles that seek to give a more
1'" Iti vc cvaluation of Heidegger's attitude towards Aristotle on thi s
]Illl llt , notnbl y with respect to the topies of teleology and temporality.
l ", . ~ 1 wQ uld like to mention in particular Walter Brogan 's article
' 11 "1 ,, 'Hge r 's Interpretation of Aristotle on the Privative Charaeter of
1 Iltl" ,,"d th e Twofoldness of Being" (2000) and Thomas Sheehan's
\l It! ' 1 tex t " ll eidegger's Interpretation of Aristotle: Dynamis and
1 , "1,'I,,I,\''' ( 1977) 32 Both th ese authors suggest that the concept of
il 'l'l' " lI cl ucggc l" s ' lh eolog isc he' Jugend sc hrift " (1989) and "Die Marburger
Il,, "IUfll." (196<1).
1 11 11 III CII1 C o f t ln poml il y in Il cid cggc r and Ari stotle has recently been
H f tlll ~l d l' l l' d 111 T. CI1S1tUer, " Il cid eggc r's Ulld erstandin g of the Aristotelian Concept
Id 111111''' (/ O()() III Id in.l. n ll is, " l h; idcggCf, Ari slotl c, r1lld Tim e in Basic Problems
lu' t lf UIO ). III Il li s cOllll celi rll l, one co ui c! Ill so menli on A . Vi go's work Zeil 11l1d
t'",d, " .,1 AI'I,I'lme/I',I' 1)1(' Nik()JII(/ (' Iii.~/(! l:.'tldk /ll/ d die zeil-oI/IOloS-{ischen
' l'' HI/I H" III/Hf' ll (/c',\' l'{' rllllll/~.I~( ',\ I I ' " tI'((' 1 1 1hllldd ll .\ ( 1996), whi ch ilrg ll e.~ Ihat
Il . '11111, 1111'' Il killd of " cxIKlent llll" C(lI1C(.' pIOII ('l I' 1!lll e in the h'1!lic.\, ln P8fll clI lar
lIu1l!lp h hlli Ilu l lOIi \1 1 "w li \m" (nu rl) ,
 INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION

d lll/wllis wOlild have provided Heidegger with the means 10 think the " vcrcorne, the idea that Heidegger develops his own notion oftheory or
liniwde and temporalily of being, and in particular Sheehan maintains Ih w reti ca] speech as the supreme [orm.of action makes it possible to
Iha t this involves an attempllo challenge Aristolle 's notion of being as t1111 into question the view that Heidegger's in terpretati on of Aristotle
energeia or actuality w ith the help of Aristotl e himself. 80th these texts l''sumes a distinction between a [ruitful practical philosophy on the one
ha ve been im portant to the interpretati on given in this stlld y o f I", uct and a metap hysically bi.sed ontology and logic o n th e oth er.
Heidegger ' s und erstanding of kinesis. Sheehan' s arti cle is also one of t t",vever, it also gives cause for reconsidering the relation between
few studies that deals with the relation between Ileidegger's plli losophy of life and ontology in Heidegger ' s own project. In other
rein terpretation of logos and his e lab orati on ofAristo tl e' s on tol ogy .33 \\lo rd s, the id ea is that th e perspective of logos and praxis mak es it
For in spite oflhe inlerest in Aristotle as a thinker of life and in how poss ib le to see th e re lation between He id egger 's and A ri sto tl e's
it might have affecled [-Ieidegger' s philosophy, th ere has not been much " 'sJlcctive ontological projects in a different li ght, as compared to how
atte ntion paid to the logos or speech of li fe. Excep ti ons to this are il hus been conceived of in th e earlier literature on this topi c. For now
A nas tas ia Tzavaras-Dimou, Phiinom en% g ie der Al/ssage. Eine I",th of these projects are taken to share the same ontic foundat ion,
Unters lichung Heideggers exiSlential-on/olog ischel' Interpretation
Zll II II IIJ oly the analysis of logos, and, moreover, to have the ir basic
der Aristote/ischen logos apophan tikos ( t 992), and Franco Volpi ' s ll H'li va ti on in the idea that the possibility of ontology presupposes a
art icle o n th e same topic." A stlldy on He idegger' s und erstandi ng of rl t.: is ioll 10 realise one of th e poss ibilities for the enactment of logos,
speech, which focuses o n Heidegger ' s interpretati o n of Aristotle' s III "OI 'jtl ,
Rhetorie in the lecture course Grundbegriffe der aris tote/isch e n
Philosophie, is Christopher Smith, Th e Herm ene uties of Original
Arg ument. Demonstration, Dialectic, Rhetoric ( 1998). T his wor k
discusses the connection bctween ac ti on and speech, although it does
not dea l \V ith any notion of a di scursive nature of action but puts
emphasis on how the basic aim of rhetori ca l speech is ac ti on. Finally,
there is a more independent study, though insp ired by Heidcgger, of th e
concept of logos in Aristotle, Barbara Cass in' s Aristote et le logos .
Contes de la phnomnologie ordinaire (1997).
fn relation to this set o f wrks , whic h hav.e callcd attention to
Heidegger' s reappropriation of Aristotle's philosophy ofli fe and praxis,
the present study seeks to take a step that does not seem to have been
taken so far, at lea st not in a systemat ic lfIanntr, na me ly that of
re conciling th eo ret ical and pract ica l rea son o r lo go s in He idegger.
Thereby, th e study aims to show what it means fo r Heidegger to also
conceive of philosophy, theoretical activity, as a form of praxis. Since
Aristotle ' s notion of theoria is commonl y regarded as based lI pon
precisely that metaph ys ics of presence which Heidegger wan ts to

Jl Thi s is al so thc thcmc orhis "Il cid eggcr, Ari stotl e and Pll l.:ll ol11('lluluHY" ( 1975 ),
,,\ "La qucs tiOl1 dll IO{(os dn ns l'm't cll lat iOIl de 1:1 rncll{'it t' 11H11 1\' h\lIIlt' 1hl idcggcl',
IcCI l! IH' d' Al'islnlo" ( 1996),

Chapter One
HEIDEGGER'S PROJECT
AND TTS RELATION TO ARISTOTLE
l, The philosophy offaclicallife
Heidegger's phi losop hieal beginnings are marked by an ae ut e
awareness of the need to provide philosophy with a new foundation,
The idea that philosophy in our time has reached its fina l stage is often
assoc iated with Heidegger' s later thought, but as early as in 1923 , he
dec lared phi losophy as it had been traditi onally pursued to be over,
c la irn ing that the lime had come to face entirely new tas ks . 1 The task
Ihal Il cidegger initia lly sets himself is that of developing a philosophy
oC"!;,cli ca lli f,," (jklisches Leben).' Thus li fe should now conslitute the
l(lII lldnlion o l'phil osophy, and, more precisely, li fe in its facticity, thal is
10 say \Vith res pect to how it is aclually Iived and experienccd within a
L:OII CrClc, dctcfmi nate situation. However, when introducing thi s
conccpl ion of philosophy, He idegger do es not envisage a total break
wilh the IradiLi on, but tries to return to something old in a new way, For
in iLs overall outline at least, Heidegger' s proj ecL repeats, though Irom a
modified pers pective, the tum towards th e worl d "here and now" that
1 Ejnf!j'lrIlII~ in d ie phnomen.o'ogische Forsclll/Ilg (GA 17), p. 1. And al ready in one
of , h ls earh esl courses, He idegger env isages a n "e nl irely new co n: eption o f
phll osophy", ZlIr Bestimm ung der Philosophie (GA 56/57), p. I I. See al sa
Phal/om en%gie der Anschauung ulld des AlIsdrllcks. n /corie der philosophischcn
Begriffsbildllllg (GA 59), L.
~,Ge n~r~~ ly spea king, .the expression "l ire" is lIs~d unl il 1923, when il is rep laced by
DasclIl , tho ugh HeIdegger uses these terms mte rcha nge ab ly for a wh ile. In his
? u rv~y. of th~ genesis an d development af Heidegger's co nceptualIY in this respect,
r. Kl slel pOlnl S ta tbe course Ontologie (Hermellelil ik der Faktizildt) (G A 63 ), p. 7,
?S the tirs: acc,~rrence of " Dasein" as a techni ca l term , thaugh he notes that a lready
ln the revl.e w . Ant~erku.ngen zu Karl Jaspers Psychologie der We/wlIscl/CI lIIlIIgen"
(pp, 1-44 111 GA 9), wblch was conceived in 1919- 1921 , Heid egge r spcnks nbout
" being !here" (Da .sein, p. 13) as an essential charac tc ri sti c or life , Sec Ki s icl's The
Gemtsis ofNeiclegger's Sein g and T illl c, pp . 14 1- 142,274,491 ,
20
(' II " I'TER ON I;
I dd l ll ~ tl pl! y loo k \V ilh A ri s to ll e wh c ll hc reactcd a ga inst \Vha t he
1. 1'~lI d r d liS Pl nto 's und uc pos itn g o f idcas or essences existing apart
f Hl lII III\: il" IIlA ll if'cslali ons in the world of individual, sensible objects~
, ",, l ' " ~ '' cd Ihal Lhis world is cnough to ccount for Ihe nature of reali t},
~ I II'" p' 'ciscly, in t\ri stotle's vicw, it is onl y along these lines that it is
l'" . Ihl ' lill' p"i losophy to fulfil its principal task, which is to do juslice
h' ' II ' ""l'li eulur, concrele thing, the Iode li or the "this here", precisely
Il Il '' , cs " CC I 10 il s part icularity, in stead of exp laining it alVay by
111 11I ll ll [\ it 1 a mcre illstantiation ofa uni versal id ea.
III il 'II. nlldin g u new beginning from philosophy, Heidcgger's aim is
LII " '11 1 'vc and elaborate the critique that Aristotle directed against
1'111 '" , L"')lI gh 101' Heidegger, the target is not Plato but Husserl. Thus,
111'<1 ,1< '' l'i sloll e's philosaphy ta a great extent is moLivated by his
,,",lIlillll' 10 challenge Plata's thought, Heidegger cansiders it essential
III ""'1<' LO grips with his predecessor. This parall el is not merely a
IIln ll l' l of' hi storical circu mstances, but as we will see later on,
III ",,"pflcr rccognises it and emplays it in order to indicate the aim and
,1111 '\ lion uf hi s own proj ect.
III Ih ls clHlpl Cf , 1 w ill present this projecl in broad ou tlin e and
1111 111 Ill e Ille l'o lc Ihat Arislotle plays in it. Thereby, 1 w ill put particular
1 tl lp ll l1 "i IS on ll cidegger ' s lecture courses from the earliest twenties, sa
Il III ,~ h ()1V how and for what l'easons Aristotle first entel'ed into
1II ' ltI 'f\~cl" S project. Apart from indicating what Heidegger actually
,"" III'cr'cd in M istollc, 1 will also discuss Heidegger ' s own views on
Il li 111 11111' (.: or Ihis " discove ry" : how he looks upon hi s own interpretation
,,,,,1 "'" bO"fl Li on of Aristolle's work and what this says about his views
"" 'h., cO lldiLi ons or philosophieal work as such, notably as far as its
., 111 11 00 ' n Lhe Iradilion is concerned ,
IlI r phil l~!-:o phi c a l programme that H eidegger la un ches at the beginning
III II Il' " ""elliies centre s on the q ues ti o n co ncern in g th e be in g of li fe.
Il''lVl'W '', IV hcn ",aking lire into a ph ilosophi ea l theme, Heidegger does
nll l Inlpl y Inkc il 10 co nsllu tc ail o bj ec t of investigation. The idea is
Il,,.LIl ,,, 1I 11lo,'C o l'philosophy ilscLf c,," only bc propcrly understood if i!
1 1\\HllI l h.'d il S h ll Vi ll g ils Ill oti vatiotl Hnd o ri g in in lite, wh ich mcans that
tilt lI uw! tl o u!'l tlnd ctlll ccpl s o f phil o~o p hy fl rc 10 be led hack to life as
il Il " IIII III"lI c SO ll" CC 11 11 (1 fOulldnli oo, 10 lIii s Wlly, Ihe philosophy of life
)1
 CII A I''I'ER ONE
is jus! as mu ch Iife's philosoph y, a ph ilosoph y Ihat, bc illg il scll" a
specifie mode of life, springs from life and is conscious of Ihis .'
Aceordingly, ail philosophical issues should be approached by w ay of
an expl oralion inlo the nature of life, and fo r thi s reason, Heidegger
does not inlend the an alys is o f life 10 be onl y a speeiali sed discipline,
but, as wc w ill sec below, conceives of it along the Iines o f Husserl ' s
nOlion of philoso phy as a "primordial science" (Unvissenschaft)
Wh en thus IUI'nin g lowards life as Ihe supposedl y proper foundation
ofphilosophy, Heidegger siluates himself, themali cally at least, within
wh at is at this time a major philosophieallrend. Indeed, aecording ta his
own tes timony : "The problems of contemporary philosophy centre on
life as a primordial p henomenon ... ",4 ln these lectures [rom the earliest
twenti es, Heidegger critieall y examines bas ically two differcnt and by
then current approaches to life . Apart fro m th e Lebensphilosophie
advanced by such thinkers as Dilthey, Spengler, Bergson and Scheler,
he also, and to an even greater extent, explores th e neo-Kantian position
o n Ih is lo pi c, nota bl y the work o f Ri ckert and Na lo rp .' When
co nfro nlin g Ih ese Ihinkers, Heidegger is guided by Ihe qu es tion
co nce rnin g Ihe poss ibilily o f attainin g the proper aecess la life. Most
spee ili ea lly, hc wa nls to know what the stalcment that life as Ihe realm
o f experi ence is somelhin g "given" ta philosophieal anal ys is is rea lly
supposed ta me.n o This question is particularly urge nt to him because
o f hi s idea Ihal philosophy in a w ay bath is and is not identical wilh its
theme. For on the one hand, phi losophy is a specifie " how" o f life,
which means that the inquiry ioto Iife must be rega rded as a realisa tion
of that whi ch constitutes its own theme. But on the other hand, as a
lSee e.g. P A, p. 23 9; Grundprobleme der Phtinomenologie (GA 58), p. 174;
Phanomeno logische Interpr eta/jof/en ZIl A ristote/es. E infllnmg in d ie
phal1omenologische Forschllllg (GA 6 1), p. 80.
~ GA 59, p. 15: "Die Problematik der gegenwarli gen Philosophie st um das Leben ais
Urphdnomen zentriert. "
5GA 59, pp. 15ff. Here He ide gge r di fferentia tes between these IwO sch ools of
thought by describing the latter (neo-Kant ian ism) as K II /(I/rphilosoph ie, because il
lo dks upon life as a m a nifesta tio n of cul ture and va lues. By contrast,
Leb en sp hilos oph ie has il th e al her way round and regards eve rything as a
manifestati on of life. For J-1ei degger's discuss ion of these phi losophical positi ons, see
also GA 56/57; GA 58.
6 ln GA 56/57, pp. 111-112, Heid egger ex presses di ssati sfact ion with the notion of
the given, as he suspects it of irn plyi ng a divi sion between a bject and kn ow ledge,
which does not do j Jslice 10 the way in whi ch ph ilosophy encounters lire .
22
l'II AI'"I HH ON I;
Iii. ",,'Ikll l p"rs" il, phil osophy brill gs li fe 10 a coneeptuallevcl which is
li lt! IIlt l lns i ' 10 il , a l I Cl~ 1 Ilot as nu' as th e degree of explicitness is
1'''" "l lIcd. More prec isely, Ihe problem as Heidegger sees it is that, at
It III(lNt blls ic or f"Llndam ental leyel , life is non-theoretical, non-
IIhll'I' ti l"y in g cx pe ri e nee, but w h en th eoreticall y arti cula tin g and
i IIIU' c..' plililli s in g thi s cx pe ri e nc e , one runs the risk precis ely of
II h k 111)l lI g il an d lhe re by of concealin g its truc nature.7 A nd in
hllllll l ",'SI poss ihl e tcrm s, th e verdi ct t'hat H eidegger passes upon ail the
Ildilk ' l'S II1clltioncd above is that they have not yet given a satis factory
8
l UI " \\I ' 1 10 th e qu estion o f how life could be properl y cx plicated. Thus
1111' ~ n ll c lLi s io li thal Heidegge r draws from the confrontation wilh his
\ 11111 '1I1 po ra ri es is in essen ce th al life has not yel been anal ysed and
lUII~ IIl nl(,:t! in cat egories and concepts proper to it. 9
Il IIl1s beon poinled out Ihat, from the po int ofview of Se in und Zeil,
1I I' Id ' ~ge r would eventually be criti eal even of hi s own inilial version
.11 III' philosophy, for the re as on that it had not yet made life inlo an
11111,,1"lliell l problem w Thi s is true, but one need not look as fa r as to
1,' /11 IIlIrI Zeil to find thi s shift o f perspective, for th e ontol ogieal
l'ri pcclivc o n lire em erges a lready in the earliest courses o n A ri s totle ,
ll
11111 1 !l oI l'o r accidentaI rea so ns . O ne way to explain why H e idegger
Iliid ' II ly begins to devote sa much time and effort to Aristotle wou ld be
JI"'I'ls ' Iy by re rerring to hi s foregoing preoccupation with modern
l'lililisophy o f life." ln this conneetion, it would be possible to argu e
" '< IiIl 56/57, 15, 17 .
1hl" vl: l'di cl Illay be abstracted from Heidegge r's discussio n of li re and its
11I111~~ l bl l il y as CI whole. Sec 1:11 50 note 7 .
Cln Ihl 'i point, Heidegge r is criti cal even of Dilthey: al though hc shou ld be credited
1'11 1!llVlng assessed the import ance of exp lori ng hUlllan life and hi story, he \Vas too
.nw Il wl th in the co nfines of psyehology and 3nthropolo gy and 50 could not help bllt
1'1I1'u.ppo:d ll g the bei ng of life; see " Wil helm Dilt heys Forsc hungsarbeit und der
.'1W,l'!l wlll tigc Kampr UIll cine his tori schc Weltanschauung", Dilthey-Jahrbuch 8
( 1'1I12/ 1993 ),pp . 143- 177 and GA 17, pp. 11 2- 11 3.
III I l I{ul tl , Hll iglllfltic Origins. TraciJ/g the Th eme of Histority through Heidegger 's
Il fl/kI, p. 47. Sec nlso D. r. Krell , Daimoll Life. Heidegger and Life-Philosophy, pp.
PI ~ 2 J, Orcisch hns suggcstcd lhr\1 Heidegge r wou ld even be crit ical of ontology in
III ,. \'H I'l It' ~ 1 C llrSes; " La ' 1apisse ri e de la vic' , le phnom ne de la vi e ct ses
hill' II'I IInlo lis dons le (inmd"roblcme der l'htmomen%gie ( 1919/ 1920) de Mart in
li t hl"' "HCI", p. 152.
Il ( 1, Iwlo\V, Sl:cllon 1.
Il Ait Il .. 11' the /1v/1i lnblc tex ts (Ut.: c(lIlccrncd, thc nppcarance of Aristot le in 1922 in
JI I lltlll UA 62+ {n nd tn SOI1l C cx tCll t ill (ill 6 1) does scem quite suddcn, since the
 '1lA l' TER ONE
that Heidegger turned to Aristotle in order to show how modern
philosophy of life, like the philosophical tradition in general, ultimately
leans on Aristotelian concepts and categories , but that these are
inapplicable to life, since not derived l'rom life itself, but from the
region of "objective" being D But even though one sholiid not overlook
the critical motives behind Heidegger's turn to Aristotle, il is, at least in
my view, c1ear that Heidegger - albeit contrary to his own intentions -
discovers a philosophical compatriot in Arstotle. Having concluded his
discussion with modern philosophy of life , Heidegger now
provocatively stales that Aristotle was not only the first philosopher to
give an explication of "natural lire consciousness" (natrl iches
Lebensbewuj3tsein), but that he was in tct ev en the last to recognise
this as a philosophical task." This claim does of course not exclude the
possibility that Heidegger's aim in connection with Aristotle
nevertheless was critica!. The point Heidegger wants to make is not that
Aristotle necessarily has the correct "theory" of life or even that his
conceptuality is entirely appropriate for this phenomenon, but more
imporl antl y that Aristotle has raised the being of life as a problem in a
way Ih at modern philosophy is unable 10." Heidegger does indeed take
a crilieal stance on Aristotle's conceptuality, but not simply in order ta
di smiss it as unsliitabl e for the articulation of life, but because he
cO li sid ers it 10 be a principal lask for philosophy to question the
concepl s it has inherited from the past and in this way try to make lhem
16
speak again, to the present age. As Heidegger tells his sludents on one
occasion: one should not read Aristotle just in arder to learn how to use
earlier courses hardly contain any referenccs at ail to Aristotle. However, sinee
Heidegger evidently \Vas already planning a book on Aristotle when he began to
focus his attention on him in public, the history of I-Ieidegger's assessrnent of
Aris\otle's philosophy must apparently have an carlier beginning than what the
textual mate rial implies .
13 See PA, p. 263, where Heidegger daims Iha! the theological trad ition has borrowed
ils categories From Aristotle, but that these are alien to ilS "fjeld of being" (Seinsfeld).
This passage no doubt speaks in favour of Gadamer's yiew, noted in the
Introduction, that the ultimate aim of Heidegger's Interpretation of Aristot!e as a
whole \Vas to retrieve a genuine sense of Christianity through a destruction of ilS
Aristotelian foundation.
"GA 62', pp. 3-4.
15 See GA 18, p. 21.
16 See GA 18, 12, where Heidegger introduces the topie of Ihis course, which is
precisely Aristotle'g conceptuality, and explains his motives behind this choice.
24
' 11 t\ I"I ' '' I ~ ONI\
hl IlI lh 1\1'1'1 or
(I r to co ll ~ t knowlcd gc what he has said, but in arder ta
III Il l 1 1 ~ \ III l' 'peu t f'or ollCscl r his In ode o f research, 50 thal one may " see
j llllllk l ~' l l lI l l1 th e thin g with the saille originality and genuineness."17
Wh ' 11 Ilyill g 10 c luril y how Ari stotle " saw" life, Heidegger uses
\ 1\ Ih, lI l" s ex pli cati on o r life as materi~l for his own phenomenological
IlIl pd l Il1t o lilc, thu s appl y in g a phenomenological perspective on
Id. llIl l " s WOl'k s, at th e same lime as he approaches Aristotle as a
1'1111111 111 ' nnlog ical thinker in his own right. For on the one hand,
I ii I d "M~ r w" nlS 10 show that Aristtle's conceptuality may not only be
1 pltd ll cd hy rcfc rcnce to the way in which Aristotle has experienced
1111 . 1"'1 Ih ul il lIlay ullimately be traced back to (Greek) life's pre-
Ilin",'I! 'II I ex pri ences ofitselfand its world. But on the other hanel, he
IllInk . 111 111 il rislotle 's investigation into life in its turn is conducted
\l 111111 Il phc no mcnological perspective, inasmuch as Aristotle has
II ld l (Id tlte importance of trying to explicate Iife from within, so to
l" 11 1\1 II l1d to take into account th e way in which life is given to itself,
18
pl hl, tu ull y th co rctical articulation of it. Accordingly, in rereading
il 111 11 ~ I1 S (l phenomenologist, Heidegger simultaneously hopes to be
,,1111' Iii l' 'illterprel phenomenology with the help of Aristotle.
tH 11IIrllClllnr importance in this connection is Heidegger's idea that
tI 'dO ll c' s Ic lco lo gical interpretation of life conveys an experience of
1111 !I,r tl\,,:u l, s iluation-bound nature of Iife, which Heidegger wants to
" 1 ln J\l'der 10 challenge an ideal of cognition that he thinks elsewhere
1 H" V" l1Jill g Ari stolle ' s thought. This is the idea that truc knowledge,
'/!/\(f'llIl '. Ilccessarily concerns the universal , sinee the particular is
11I111' lllIlte and in exhaustible; an ideal which has had considerable
1l1I1'1l!.-' 1 0 11 the vicw on knowledge in the subsequent tradition, and which
lllil\' ul ll llluh.: ly rcs ult. n'om the inDuence ofPlato. Because ofthis Ideal,
lili IIIMk Ih at il ri stotl e initially ascribes to ontology - ta explain
1Il Ji Il Itll ltd 0 1' l'act ica l be ing - proves to pose serious , perhaps
I II I~ nl vlt hl' di rri cuhi es lo him whcn inquiring into the ousia or
nhNllI lIlI nlit y" or bc in gs, so that., contrary to his own intentions, he
lIill th l'i sk or subsumin g the fode fi und er a notion of universal being.
I l H ld l n ~~ l y , 10 c h A II ~n gc 1his noti on o rknowl edge and to show how it
I ii 1 1~ , p. 1S: .. ... die Sache i l) dcrselbcn Ursprllngli chkc il und Echth eit lU sehen
Wil l 1I1l111111tUI IlC11." The wholc pn ~ s ogc is itn liciscd illileidegger's tcxt.
If Il d,. dl/illilt tllfnt,t-!Y is Ill fUlifcs t nhove 011 in GA 18.
2\

is in fact possible to have knowledge of the pa rt iclI lar Is 011 ' ni th ' 1I10st
important tasks for the philosophy of facticalli fe. And as wc will see in
the course of th is st udy, Heidegger's interpretation of Ari stolle as a
whole largely aims at spelling out the confl ict in Aristotle ' s thou ght
between these two approaches to life and being.
2. The philosophy of logos: phenomenology, logie and hermeneuties
He idegger makcs use of several te rms in order to specify w hat the
phi losophy of factical Iife in vo lves. ln the A ristotle Introd uction, he
describes il in the ro llowin g \Vay :
The probJerns of phiJosophy co nccrn the being of fac ti caJ life
wilh res pec t to how il is add resscd and cxpl icatcd in each
part icuJar case. Thal is 10 say. as ontology o f facticty, philosophy
is simliitaneously ca lego rial interp retat ion of add ress an d
explicat ion, Ihat is, logic. Ontology and la gie are 10 be brought
back to the orig inal unit y of the problern s of fa cticity and l a be
understood as the dscharges of Ihat fundamental research which
may be des ignated as the phenomenological h erm e ll e lllic~' or
racti city.19
Wh a t thi s den se passage implies for Heidcgger 's conception of
o l1tolo gy w ill be discussed in th e next secti on. Hc re 1 w ill t'oc us on the
inte rre la ti on between phenomenology, logie and hermenculics. Wi lh
thes e term s, Heidegger dis tin guishes between different, though
intimately connected approaches to li fe, ail of which shoul d serve to
answer the question concerning the bein g of life, as weil as to give
directives for how life can properly be made accessible . To assess
Heidegger's un derstanding of these "branches" of philosop hy, aIl of
which he sceks to redefine in accord a nce w ith hi s own agen d a , is
naturally no small task. Here these concepts will be treated mainly w ith
a view to showing how Heidegger emp loys them to capture different
aspects of the problem of logos, and to demonstrate thal Heidegger ' s
19 PA , pp. 246-247 : " Die Prob lematik der Philosophie betrirrt das Se ill des faktische n
Lcbens im jewei ligen Wie des An gesprochen- und Au sgelegtseins. Das heif3t, die
Philosophie ist ais Ontologie der J7akt izi HH zuglei eh katego ria le Interpretation des
Anspreehens und Ausl egens, das heif3t Logik. Ontologie und Logi k sind in die
Ursp rungseinhe it der Fakt iziHitsprobl ematik zurUekzunehmen und zu ve rstehen ais
die Ausladungen der prinzipie ll en Forsch ung, die s ich bezei chnen Ili/3t a is die
phanomellologische Hermeneu/ik der Faktizitat."
26
t' li AI' 1ER ON Ii
l,hl III IIp ll \ 1 Il''1 Il pl\L: no l11 t,; ll o log ica l inquiry into life or existence
1111 Il 11111 11 11 1)' hl: ,'c lo rnw la tcd as a phil osop hy of logos , and more
l"" l'II , ,,1 III ~ Arislo icliail logos.
l "dll\ , w ll ~ 1l 11 III10st a il of Ileidegger's early lecture courses have
l, , " pllh ll _lI ed, il is naturall y much easier th an before to see how
, "Ilil l A+i sttll lc ' s concept o f logos was to the deve lopment of
I II 1111 ~l~ 1 ~~ pl'(~i ec t , und a lso 10 und erSland why the older Iiterature on
II I Il h ~ II I ~ h o\Vs l'clali ve ly little interest in thi s concept, not to say in
III 111'11"" 0 1 specch (llede) as sllch." This might otherwise seem a bit
"It" 1 IIIM' . llIec Il cidcgger a rtel' ail dennes phenomenology in Sein ulld
/1 plI'd "c ly wilh re le rence 10 Aristotle 's concept of logos, and also
1111111 IIII'N Ih ll t Ihe mcanin g of phenomenology wi ll become clear only
1.. Il Ihe Ili cil il ing of lo gos as speech has been s uffi ciently
11111111 ,,,h 'd.21 T hu s wh en Heidegger ana lyses the not io n
1lllIlIlIlI ll' ll o 1o g y" in te rm s of logos and phainomenon, o ne m ust not
'"I 111 1 1 Ihi s fo r a lI1erc allempt at tracin g the etymo logical roots of a
Jo 1111 11 11 \V hat Il c idegger is doin g here is actually to reaclivate what
, ,"ld III' "" ll cd a G rcck (Ari stotelian) sense of phenomenology ." Of
1111 1 li pl1c ll o mc no lo gy in that sense has to be tran s for m ed by
I I I l, II loI~\~' I" sincc hi s project a lso, a nd e ssentiall y, in volves a
1t ,1I1 ~ ~ II tl ' lIl l1l perspective. Still , il is noteworthy (hat in these secti ons
' " I pll<' " o lll cil ology, Heidegger, at least initially, suspend s th e
Il " II 'l' Ild clillIl pcrspecti ve, to gether w ith the modern notion of
~l utlllnll y, Ir l cOlln ~c tiol1 \Vith th e topie of hermcneuties in Heideg ger, on which
III l' III IIf Il IllIm be!' of stud ies , thi s thcm e surfaces con stant ly. But as far as 1 can
1'1n h \JI logos hns scldolll been scell as a therne in ils own righl, or as a basic
l,Il, tltllnrtl() l o~icn l concept in I-Ici dcgger's philosophy, in terms ofw hi ch he tries to
t~111 1IIIIIr tl ll! IIl OS! brls ic trait of hum an reason. If this had been reeogni sed earl ier, il
11111.1 !ull d ly h flVC bee n poss ible to mi sinterpret Heidegger's attitud e towards the
,h l oli~ II J1 Il logos tlte \Vay T. A. Fay has donc in hi s Heidegger: Th e Critique of
1. Il Il ~ , ll c re Ile idegger is supposcd to have criticised Aristotle' s defini ti on of
111')11 ln h \ l lll 'l of' logos roI' bc ing inndequate wh ile regarding man as a rational animal,
III Il Il 1" III filct the L:lt in tra nslat ion of Aristotl e' s de finit ion that is the target of
Il. Idl)II'''' 'S cd tici sl1l (S2, p. 165). The sa ill e in terpretat ion retu rns in D. F. Krell ,
,. OIl/.lII 1 I/'f Illf lrle~Re /' and Life-Pll ilosoplty, p. 51.
l "II' S/., 7(J , in pMtj eulnr p. 32. Th e ro ll owin g discussion of I-I eidegger ' s
wli ii i It lll tl h l~1 ofplt cllQlll cnology drnws ol1lhe whole of 7.
llil, 1111 Il 1lI1ljol' pol ili in T. Sltcl!hul\'s " Il cideggc r's Interpretat ion of Ari stotle:
"ltl,III/1r und ld.\(lI". Il e nrgucs Ihut il \Vas pnl'tly ll ei dcgger's allempt 10 redefi ne
Illtt ,j'tlil 1I0lu l:o\Y \Y lth the lu.: lp o r Arislotle thlll made him break with Husserl ' s
l" 1111111 111 111(': pp. 2K728R.
27
ph t;IIOfll cnology, Hnd instcud work !"-i out Ids OWIl !,. \III\ \Ipl il l ph '11\)llH.;n0I1
on th e bas is of an illt crprct atiOIl or th e Gl'cck 1I 0t!OIl/Jllflhw m CII QI'J. In
do in g so, he emphas ises that phainomenon mus t bc 1I11dcrsl ood as
something thal appears or shows itself of ils OWI1 ac cord , and that the
Greeks therefore sometimes simply identified phainomenon with being
(ta on). But if, as Heidegger indicates in thi s and the following section,
the very notion phainomenon as understood by the Greeks implies that
there is someone, namely a being endowed with logos, whose nature it
is ta let beings be phenomena, i.e. show themselves, th en there is a kind
of "phenomenal ogy" embedded in Greek thought itself. Moreover, this
is a phenomcnology intimately connccted w ith ontolo gy, and thi s is
someth in g that Heidegger draws on in order to distance himse lf l'rom
Husserl.
Phenomenology should reveal throu gh logos that which in some
sense and ta some extent already was accessible or man ifest throu gh
logos. But among th e phenomena is of co urse al so lhat which lets the
phenomena be seen: human li fe. Life is philosop hicall y accessible in
virtue of its logos, that is, because it articu lates itself and in this way
becomes "visible" . However, this is also the way in which life has
aeeess ta itself; in Heidegger's view, self-understanding on ly cames
through articulation. And in arliculating itself or taking a stand on itself,
life relates to its world of coneern. ln other words, self-unders tand ing is,
for the most part at least, mediated by the understand ing of the world 2 J
As Heidegger puts it on one occasion: "Factieal life ... also speaks the
language of the world, as soon as it speaks ta itself. ,,24 Ta Heidegger,
this means tha t, even though ontology shou ld be based upon a
philosophy of li fe, philosophy must also proeeed in the opposite
direction and show how th e being of li fe is in its turn constituted by its
relation ta intrawo rldl y bei ngs. Therefore, life must be caught in the
23 Whereas this is an important point of Heidcgger's as far as everyday existence is
concerned, he seems 10 en tertain the idea of a possibi!l ty of breaking the "worldly
bond" in connection \Vith his notion of authentic existence. ln his essay "Refraining
form Dialect ic: Heidegger's Interpretation ofPlato in the Sophist Lectures" , G . Figal
suggests that, in sp ite of his critique of the Gree k concept of vo, Heidegger has not
completely abandoned the ideaJ of intuition as something that is free [rom (linguisti c)
mediat ion; pp. 102-104. Th is discussion is taken up in greater detail in Chapter Four
orthe present thes is.
24 PA, p. 243: "Das faktische Leben ... spricht auch die Sprache der Welt, sooft es
mit sich se lbst sp ri cht."
28
Inl d 1 0 1 It ~ nct l vi li ..:s w it hill , und in relll ii on 10 fi wOl'ld , 'il ds \Vil S
'1I IIrthln t\. 1h.:idgscl' fll' gUL:S, th at Ari stoll c and th e Grceks saw, th anks
III Ilw Olli niogicai and 14 wo rl dlyll orientation of' thcir phi losophy. Oui
tl, ], p ' rspc cti ve has been lost in modern epistemology , in eluding
1111 I'l'liu ll phcllolll cno logy, bccausc of the turn towards subj ectivity
111,,1\,'I)l1sciousncss. 25
hll lh cl', w hcl1 brin g ing together apophainesthai \Vith lo gos,
1h Iii 'gger seeks ta attaek what he regards as a trad itional notion of
, ,. 11 111 u::; th e prim ary se ns e for the acquisition of knowledge, w hi ch in
1'1"' IIIHll c no logy is ex pressed wi th th e con cept of " intuiti on"
1 11/1'dwl/lIl/g). One wo uld perhaps expect sueh a chall enge ta invol ve
/1 0 ex puls ion of vision for the sake of hearing, but this is something
1h; lcgge r does only in part. He eertainly repeatedly stresses that th e
l'lI plICily fo r speech is equally a eapacity for hearing, but th en he is - for
Iii ' IIl ost part - talking about speech in a concrete sense." To extend th e
IIOI ion of speech so that it also in vo lves non~v e rbal articulation,
Il cldcgger necds a model of address and response, accord ing ta whic h
1111111 acldresses beings and they respond by showing themselves in some
IVlly . Besides, th ere is in th e trad ition, not least in Aristotle, a notion of
nn important connecti on between speech and vision, i.e. betwecn logos
und apophansis, and Heidegger wants ta find a \Vay to account for thi s
\"'tH1 J1 Cc tion withi n the framework of h is own proj ect. Th is is al least
wll at he seems to be say ing in the following passage : "In arder ta
preserve the connection with it [the tradition ], one may formalise sight
11I1 seei ng to such an cxtenl that one th ereby achieves a universal term ,
wlli ch characterises every access to bein gs and ta be ing as acceS5 as
~ Ucll . ,,27
The motives bchind l-leidegger 's suspicion of th e v iew on knowl eclge
in terms of vision are complex. In this eonnection, it might su!TIee to
IIl cntion Heidegger's idea th at this idea l has led to the belief th at the
, \ III GA 17, He idegge r discusses extensive1y Ihis thematic shi ft from wo rld to
IJonsc iousness; sec in particula r p. 56.
l~ E.g. SZ, p. 161; GA 18, pp. 44, I 04~I06. l-Iowever, the point in connect ing speech
wi th the capac ity fo r heari ng is al50 to ind icate that logos is both passive and active .
The rel ati on between passi vity and activity is discussed in Chapter Three, Section 8.
1.7 SZ, p. 147: "Um den Zusammenhang mit ihr zu \vahren, kann man Sicht und Sehen
so weit formalisie ren, daB damit ein uni versa 1er Term inus gewonnen wird, der jeden
Zugang zu Seiendem und zu Sein ais Zugang Oberhaupt charakterisiert."
29
 ( 'II AI'II ' H(I NI
u"~clI l(} 1l is Ille mS I promin cnt t'onn of speech, as 1t hU:-I h 'CII IhtHI hl
Ih ll l ll nl y the asserti on makes thin gs l'ull y vis ibl e. '1'0 questio n
Ih '
Imd iti onal loc us on the asserti on, Heidegger has to show thal "bcin
gs
urc saiel in many ways'\ to use Aristotle's famou s expression, not only
in the assertoric mode. 1'0 Heidegger, thi s is nothing but the task
of
chall engin g the eotire traditio n of logie, in sofar as this has been
eoneern ed with " sentence logie" (Satzlog ik). But even though it
was
Aristot le who initially made possibl e the develo pment of logie,
Heidegger wa nt s 10 emphasise that \Vhat we know as lagie
to A ri stotl e
\Vas only one direction - lhough no doubt a decisive one
- in which he
eonducted hi s investig at ions inta logos ." Thus in go in g back
to
Aristotle, Heideg ger hopes to retrieve a possibility of reinterpreting
logic, and thereby to give that "eatego rial interpretat ion o f address
and
explica ti on" which he talked abo ut above.
Th is task requires logos itself to be made into a phenomenon . That
is
to say, logos must be pennitt ed 10 show itself in ils diverse modes
of
address, in arder to clari fy, from there on, the conditions
of poss ibility
for address ing and exp li cating beings in different ways and in differen
t the overriding perspec tive or " meaning" of Aristot le' s philoso phy,
senses. To Heidegger, this is eq ui va lent to clarifying the "as-nes s"
of
logos, which he also declares to be the basic charaeter of logos in
hi s
first attempt at delining it." 1'0 determine the as-struc ture of logos
and
thereby to expia in wh at makes it poss ible to understand or address
someth ing as someth ing is a task that Heideg ger ascribe s
to
hermeneutics. In short, hermen eutics reveals the circular movement
of
underst anding by show in g how underst anding , in realising certain
presuppositions as it directs itselfto wards some object, also turns back
upon itself and thereby e ither confinn s or challen ges th
ose
presupp ositions from which it set out. In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger
will
describe this condition in terms of a " fore-structure" (Vorslr llktllr)
of
lIl1derstanding, wh ich is anal ysed as a threefold advance
possess ion of
meanin g context, conceptuality and perspective. 3o
J~ GII 19, pp. 252-253.
lU /JII, p. 256.
IQ S/" pp. 150 1'. The clements of th e
VOl's/ruktur are thus Vorhabe (o f mean ing),
VOI'R/'iff (o f Il conccptu ality) an d Vorsich / (o f a perspective). The
idea of a fore-
MOlct ur c of undrsta ndi ng is already in place in the Ari stotle Introduc
tion, thou gh it
1'1 c .>; prc ~ .. cd wilh 1\ sli ght ly diffcrclll terminology.
JO
II APTER ONE
Il was argued above that Heideg ger found someth ing like
a
phenomenolog ical approach in Aristotle, However, it migh( seem more
dub ious that he could have fou nd a hermeneutics prefigured there.
Th is
is of course not to deny that Aristot le ' s work actually proceed
s
hermeneutically. Indeed it should, if there is any truth to the repeate
d
daim that Heidegger, in contras t to hi s predece ssors in thi s area,
conceives of hermeneutics not primarily as an art of interpretati on but
as a basic condition for expli cation and understanding as SUCh. 11
. In the Ari stotle Introducti on, which is olso one of Heidegger's first
texts explic itly devoted to hermeneuti cs, Heidegger sets himself the
task
prec ise! y o[ revca ling th e hermeneuti c situ ation in Ari stotle's
philosophy , thou gh he begins by clai ming that th e herm eneutic
situation
of modern philosophy must be made clcar for us to be able
to interpret
Aristot le properly 32 Lcav in g as ide He idegger 's own hermen eutic
situat ion for the moment , one should note that one
of his more
important ams in thi s conn ection is to point to the neccss ity
of
revealing the " as what" of Ari stotle 's work. That is to say, by explori
ng
He idegger hopes to be ab le to see \Vhat k inds of logo; or modes
of
address are possible wilh in the eontext of Aristot elian thought. More
speeificall y, howeve r, he w ants to know what kind of logos or address
eventuall y led Aristotle to establish a primaey of propositional speech
and thought. For only when redueing this address to its presupp ositions
wi ll it be possibl e to reall y understand how it eou ld become
so
power fui , and onl y then will it be possible to deeide what it cou Id meon
to questio n or transfo nn it. In thi s way, ArislOt le 's logic -
and
eventually speech or logos as sueh - is brought back to its hermen eutic
foundation.
The steps involved in the phil osophy of logos are thus as follows: by
approac hin g logos phenome no logicall y, one w ill see that there
are
different ways in which world and Iife come to express ion. 1'0 reveal
the foundation and possibility ofthis diversity of "speeches", one has
to
JI See e.g. J. Risser, "Phi losophica l Hermeneutics and the Question
ofComm unity",
p. 22 ; P. C. Smith, The Hermelle ulies of Original Argumel
ll. Dem o~l sfra'io /1,
Dia/ec /ie. RhelOric , p. 2. But Heidegger does daim that the Rhetol'ie
may ln a sense
be regarded as a henneneulic <l na lys s of speech. Th is point is
developed in Chapters
Two ilnd Four.
12 PA, pp . 237-238.

I.! hu.:: idIlI U the constitution of " as- ness" as slich. On the basis or suc!! on
c luc idation, o ne may categorise logos, di v iding it into diffe rent basic
poss ibiliti es for speech. Th is route is also in accordance with th e task
that Heidegger envisages for himself, which is
... for onee to grasp rogie more radiea ll y than the Greeks courd,
a nd in th e sa me \Vay si multaneously to work out a more rad ica l
understanding of language itself and thereby also of lingui slCS. H
Heidegger's "more radical understanding of log ic" enabled him to
recogn ise three basic modes of speech, whi ch in this study are described
as the cpistemic, the t:vt:ryday and the philosophi ca ll ogos respective ly .
3. On/a/ogy and /e/ea/ogy
ln spite of the tUfll towards life as the bas ic th eme and foundati on of
philosophy, I-Ieidegger's project has an ontological amb iti on more or
less from the beginning, that is, also be fore he explicitly poses the
question of the m eaning of bcing as sllch, as il is fonnuJated in Se in und
34
Zei/. ln th e Aristotle Introducti on, when Heidegger has declared that
philosophy is concerned \V ith th e be ing of fac ti cal li fc, he goes on to
state that :
Philosophy in this respect is fu ndamc ntal [prillzipie/le l ontology,
and Ih is in s'.I ch a \Vay Ihat the speci fi e panieular worldly regiona l
ontologies receive both the foundation and the 1lleaning of their
proble1lls from the ontology of facticity ,1S
Heidegger does Ilot only envisage it as a future tas k to work out
different regional ontologies, he also, more importalltl y, thinks that
phi losophy should develop somethillg like a gellera l onto logy, the aim
of which wo uld be to lay bare th e onto logica l structures of beings in
general, or, as he himself pUIS il, to arliculate the :'princ iple" (Prinzip)
33 GA J 9. p, 253: " ... ci ie Logik e inmal viel radikaler zu Cassen, ais es den Griechen
gelang, und au f dcmse lben Wege zugle ic h ein radikalercs Versliind nis der Sprache
selbst und damit auch der Sprach wissenschaften auszuarbc iten," T he whole passage
is itali cised in Heidegger's lex!.
l< SZ, p. 1.
35 PA, p. 246: "Die Problematik der Philosophie betrifft das Sein des fakt ischen
Leb~ns . Philosophi e ist in dieser Hinsicht prinzi pielle Ontologie, 50 zwar, daO die
bes tllnm ten einzelnen weltha ft en reg ionalen Ontol og ic n von der Onto loD"ie der
FaktiziUit her Proble1llgrund und Problems inn emptungen." 0
32
:t tA P't bR ONH
or bci ll gs, that is Ih e Illcanin g 01" sense o f Iheil" bein g (Seinssin n).36 To
th e best of my kn owledge, th e noti on of a "meaning of being" (Sil1l1 des
Seins) turns up for the first time in Heidegger 's lectures on Aristotle,37
and it seems that th e need for such a notion originally grew upon
I-Ieidegger in connectio n w'ith his read ing of Aristotle, as demanded by
hi s interpretation. That is, apart from the rathe r ap parent fact tluu
I-Ieidegger was influenced by Aristotle 's onto logical project and its
questi on concerning being as being, it seem s lhat his idea of a unif"i ed
meaning of being was not merely conceived on the basis of hi s
understanding of Aristotle 's ontology, but that he found such an idea
necessary to be ab le to work out a unitied interpreta/ion of Aristotle 's
philosophy as a who le, notjust his ontology. The mem1ing ofbeing th at
Heidegger thinks is govern in g Aristotl e's thou ght is fini shed or
produced being: Fer/igsein or J-/erges/elL/sein 3 '
In Chapter Five, 1 will disc uss holV Heidegge r rel ates his project of
fund a me nl al ontology and its questi on of th e meani ng of bein g to
Aristotle 's ontology. I-Iere 1 basically restrict myself ID ind icatin g holV
Heidegger's ontology of life involves a con frontation w ith Aristotle 's
teleology. Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle 's teleology is complex
and ambi guous, as 1 will develop in greater detail in Chapter Three.
Broadly speaking, one mi ght say th at, even thou gh il is crucial to
I-Ieidegger to qu estion the not ion of Fer/lgsein as the unified meanin g of
being, he hopes to find a possibility to batlle th is notion fromwithin the
teleological perspective itself.
Before further elucidating He idegger's in terpretation of Aristotle 's
teleology, we should have a look at Aristotl e's ow n description of this.
T hough th e natural reference in thi s res pect wou ld be Book IX of the
Me/aphysics, I have chosen to point to a passage in De Anima, where
Aristotle gives a condensed version of th e bas ic tenets of teleology.
Here Aristotle asks us to distin gui sh betlVee n two kinds of potentiality
or capacity (dun amis) in connect iol1 \V ith knowledge. Man can have th e
36 Sec GA 61, Part Il. Ch. 28 .
J7 PA, p. 267; GA 62*, p, 45. , ,
18 The express ions Hergesfellfseil/ and Ferligsein lurn up for the first tl/ne II~ PA, pp.
253 and 260 respectively. At Ihis stage, Heidegger has th us not yel f~m.ed lm I~ otl on
of presence in the sense of Allwesenheir, though the term Anwesendsem IS used 111 GA
19, p, 178, ln GA 18, He idegger ta lks instead abo LiI Gegellll'drligse in, p, 93. T he
rela ti on bct'l-vecn these ICrln s is di scussed in C llnpter Five.
:13
 CI IA PTER ONE
eapaeity for know ledge in a formai sense, that is, only in virtuc of bcillg
human, sinee knowledge is a distinetly human property. Bul we also
say, Aristotle notes, that man has the eapac it y for know in g, or is
potentially knowing, when he has aequired s uch a capacity thro ugh
learn ing and practi ce, with out mak ing use of il for lhe moment. Finally,
man can natu rall y also be said to possess (the capacity for) know ledge
when he is making use of il. We may lhus draw the followin g threefold
distinction:
Each of them ha s the capac ily , but in differc nt ways; the one in
Ihat his gCllllS is sllch , Ihat is, hi s l1latter, the olher beca use he is
capa bl e of think ing if he wants to, . .. But lthi rd ly] th e one who is
thi nking is in a slate of actua lity and he is knowi ng in the
stron gesl sense, e. g. Ihat particula r A. Th us Ihe fi fSI Iwo are
pOle ntia ll y knowing, bu t whereas the one cha nges th rough
instruction and, for the most part, through tra ns fo rmati on l'r o m
the opposite condi tion, the way in wh ich the ot her passes fro m
th e mere hav ing of [e.g.] sensation or gram mur wi lhollt exercise,
to actually exercising il, is di ffe rent.39
Whereas the transition from fo rmai to ac ti ve ly acq uired capacity is a
process invo lving chan ge, a kinesis, th e realisalon of know lcdgc Lhal
one a lready possessed is a form of energeia or ente lecheia, and th is
activi ty in volves no change, since the knowl edge, as we il as the person
who knows, remai ns the same. 40 In other wa rds, where as a kin eti c
process is a means to an end (leloS) eventually to be ac hi evcd, whi ch in
this way is externa l to the act ivity in quest ion, the acti vity of energeia is
)9 De Anima ("De An." ), 4l7a26~417b2 : "KtltepO 1:0UTW V o TOV a 'rov 1:ponov
S\JVUT 01:l V, )..;r (, Ilv on TO yvo 't010TOV KUt Ti \)ll, 6 o' 01 1 PO\J)..llOei.
S\JVOl'O gewpv, ... . 6 l) ilS.., Oewpwv, VTe),exe it OOV Ka l K\Jpi w 1tt.Ota)levo
tBE tO A. )lQtEPOI )l.v ov oi. npwmt Kor uva~lt v 1tlot~lJ.o VEC;, ci"),,),,' 6 )lv
t 1l 0a~OEU:X; ci'A.OlWlEi Kat 1to'A.aKl va vri a ~I E1Opaci)V Ero, (, D K
tO XE IV 'l"T)v a !olllot\' il ti)v YPOIl)l On KTtV, )lit VEpYElV s' Ei C; 1"0 VEPYEl v ov
'l"pnov. " 1 have fo ll owed Hicks' emendat ion of the text, Ihough nOI his translat ion;
see his edition of De Anima, pp. 73, 3 5 4 ~ 35 6 .
40 That is. the change is only from inact ivity to activity. For the distinction between
KIVll01l; and V PYE lO, see Met. IX. 6. Though Aristotle states (Mel. l 0 47 a30 ~3 1 )
that VPYElO has the connotation of VtEXELO, "co mplete actua lity", i.e., as the
expression literally reads, "hav ing the end within", he also uses vpye lO to speak
abou t rea lisatio n in general and then he characteris es KtVl10l as an vp yetCI
Ct'tEI\; see e.g. Physics ("Phys." 201 b 3 1~32 ) Wh en [ speak abo ut vp-ye w wit hou t
fur lher qu,lliti cation , 1 use il \Vi th th e limited se nse in minci, Ih at is , as dilTcrillH ""0111
K' ivl"lOI.
34
CI IA PTER ONE
itself' iLS ow n end , which is th us fulfi ll cd already al the outsel, since it is
nOlhing di fferent from the activily itself41
Eve n though energeia or 8nlelecheia represents the ideal mode of
being in Ari stotle's teleology, whereas k ines is is re garded as an
imperfect activity, Hei degger thi nks that kinesis is in fac t the basic
concepl of Aristolle 's te leology, and, more preeisely, kinesis in the fOrln
o f poiesis, production. That is to say, Aristolle's notions of energe ia and
enrelecheia are onl y possi ble to understand on th e bas is of an analys is
of th e concept of kinesis. This is precise ly the idea behind Heidegger 's
express ions Hergestelltsein and Ferligse in: what characte ri ses "actual"
being is that it does nol need to be produ ced, since it is already fini shed
and complete. With these notio ns, Heidegger thus wants to emphas ise
th at Aristotle does not have a neutra l concept of being and presence.
This is also the assumption that governs his interpretation of ousia.
Accord ing to He idegger, ol/sia, the basic concept in Aristotle 's
ontology, refl ects an onti cal as weil as an ontological sense : it is a being
in lhe specific "how" of its being." Ousia is not only to Aristotle bUI to
the Greeks in general that which is Grst of ail "there".43 And the way in
whi ch it is there, its " how", is its be in g fini shed. Even though
Heidegger' s lectures on Aristot le does not display any simple continuity
as rar as hi s attitu de towards Aristotl e is concern ed, one may
nevertheless see how Heidegger aroun d the midd le of the twenties
becomes more and more certain thal wh a! di slin guishes him [rom
ArislotJ e and the Greeks is that they cou Id not or did not re fl ect upon
lhe Found ation of thi s "how" . In this res pect, the Sophisl lectures are
somelhi ng of a crescendo. Here Heidegger descri bes the Greek
und ersta nd ing of being as Herges telltsein in the following way:
This is a natmal and naive expl icati on, becau se Ih is meani ng of
bci ng moreover - that s preci se ly the ma rk of navet - s taken
ns the absolute mean ing of being as sllch. But that shows that the
Grccks \Vere not explicitly conscious of the natura t ori gin of the
concepl or be ing, thus had no in sight into that speci fi e field From
whi ch lhey aCluul1y derivcd the mcaning of being, . 44
~I /IICf . 1048b 1~ 43 6.
~~ "E in Sci cndcns im Wi c seines Sein s", GA 18, p. 24.
"' 5,,, GA 18. pp. 30-31.
4~ (,'11 19. p. 270: "Gs ili l CIiI C Illl Wrli cln: A lI ~ l cg lJ n g. weil diese l" Sinn vo n Se in
~ II H I l'k ll dfl'~ chnrnklcdslcl'I chen di Nlll vl!111 II ls nbl:> oIU!I;I' Sinn von Se i n
Il
 ' IIAPTER ONli
CI lA l'TER ONE

The "natural origin" of the concept of being is the everyday e ' Ihat lIel"ge ia or actuality is depri ved of ils former priority.4& This might
of th' 'h' h xpenencc
h mgs wH ln t e world as products, as ava ilable for use, Thus we can ind ccd scem to be the case w h en one considcrs th at Heidegger is critical
, cre sec why Heidegger must be ab le to show how the understanding of of Ar istotle's concept of nous, insofar as nous represenls a kind of
::::rt~~rldly be,ln g s 15 constituti ve for understanding in ge neral , s imple seeing, which does not involve any change or diffcrence, s ince it
u mg one s self-understand ing, For thi s explains 1 does not take its abject as something, Thereby, it disp lays the supreme
Herges/e/l/s~in, originally a determination of non-human beings, c:u;~ 1'0n11 of acccss to rea lity as actuality or energeia, whereas logos, in
be ~mparted mto the human sphere in Greek th ought. virluc of its as-structure, involves the poss ibi lity of change and
Eventually Heidcgg ' l ' thcrerore is a form of kin esis. But as already indicated, as Heidegger
. ' . er \\ 1 envIsage an ontolagicaI project that, on
the basts O,f ~n ana lysis of lime, will detcrmine the "how" Ilot onl of sees it, the problem with Aristot lc's teleology does not n:a ll y li e in the
human Dascm, but also of other bCings, Thereby it should reveal ;hat conccpt of energeia but in kinesis, in that it tends to be identified with
temporal horizon within which presence cmerges ~s . 'Ii ' production, Therefore, Heidegger cannat sim ply replace energeia with
d 1 h' a speci IC tcmporal
mo e: n t IS ~5ay, it could res tore to Herges/ell/seill its proper kinesis as the supposedly proper model for the interpretation of the
dehmlted place, But during the years leading up to Se in und Z ,/ bei ng of li fe, but has ta reinterpret il. In other words, the question that
Heldegger's focus is mainly on the being of Iife or Dasein B e/ , Hcidegger has to confront is: how might il be possible to conceive of
Dasem, that which lets there be a " th ere" th 1 : y posmg Ihe being of life and its logos in terms of movement or change but
e n h' ,as e onto oglcally basic
n 1 y, ta W Ich aIl ot11er phenomclla arc ta be relatcd f-fe'I(l egg'" 1 wil hout reducing it ta a model of production?
ta be bl t d ' , , , lopes
,a e a elermme Ihe conslilulion of the "how" of th b' , What kind of answer Heidegger gives ta this queslion wi ll be
Dasem frOl 'th' D e emg of
.. ' ' " ", WI m ~!ein ilsel f, and in this way to cha llenge the explored in the course of this study; here 1 have just wanted to indicale
pOletIc notIOn of man, ln doin g so, however, Heidegger will also ask the problematic withi n which Heidegger situates his projec!. Brielly put,
hll11self whether Anstotle mi ght not actuall h Heidegger follo\Vs Aristotle in describing life in terlns of movemellt, as
Ih' " ' y ave pavcd thc way for
IS rel~telpretatl.on of man, sinee he himself cJaims that il' is not bcing on the way towards something and th us bcing outside itself; what
productIOn but actlOll,praxis, Ihat is Ihe essellce ofl ife." Heidegger, especia ll y in his earliest courses, te!lns as the " mobility"
Il IS sometimes , thought Ihat in Heidegger's analys is of human (Beweg/heit) of life,49 When taking su ch an approach ta life and its
eXlstence, Anstot le s teleology is tllfllcd lIpside-down , so 10 speak, in logos, the logico-grammatical perspective is regarded as in sufficient,
s in ce il does Ilot take into aCCQunt the concrete rea lisation of speech or
schlechthin genOlllmen wird. Das zei t aber d '. .
BewuJJtsein von dem natOrlichen U~ ;lln ' d aJJ dl~ Gnec~~n kem ausd rOckliches ex plica ti on . But as opposed to the model of production, Heidegger
Einsicht in das bestimmte Feld aus d P . g. es ~e msbegn.ffes hatten, also keine !hin ks that the te/os towards which li fe directs itse lf is not so much a
... " , em sie cigenthch den SIOn von Sei n schopften
prod uct as a possibility of man 's being and understanding, However,
45This view is also prapaunded b J T '. '
.(rll~an:~male. Ess~i!,.su/" Heidegger, pp. ~ 6' ~ 162~1ll1 niaux, Leel ures de {Ot/l%gie thi s is th e point at wh ich Heidegger tums to Aristotle's analysis of
1 h~l~ "Iso DasclIl IS a "bei ng in the how f' '" ' . praxis , in the hope ta find th ere precisely such a conception of telos,
meanmg of"Dasein" is nat captu rcd ciO 0, Ils b.em g '. Bu.! '.llIS onlle~-onlalogical
"there-being" or somethi ng ]ike Ihat 1~r W]1:11 trans lall.ng Il mlo Engllsh (i.e. with
"Dasein" is a normal German nouo) 0' ~r t ~s e~pr~sslon obscu res the fael Ihat 4, Tite 1I0/ioll ofafirsl philosophy
gives the impression that "Da .".' r W en eepmg Il un trans lated, for this a/ most
d . sem IS a proper name sa that 't be We have secn thal lI eidegger thinks that th e basic questions of
esrgnation only. For Ihis reason l seld k' . 1 seems to an ontical
"human existence" etc thou h th om ma e. use ofth ls term, but prefer "Iife" or ph iloso rhy III LI st be Icd bac k ta lire as th e ir origin, and more
ei ther, si nce they t~o m"ight gi~e th es~ expre~slons are not. wholly unproblematic
inquiry into man as e.g. a PSYChologicael'omPb~esls lo.n t1hbat. what IS a stake is an amica l
47 Tl " 1 . r 10 aglca elng ~ . W. MM,X, lIe id cmNr /ln d die 'Ii'(ldilio/l, pp. 11 8 120; C. I lanlcy, 8 eing and Gad ill
li S Ilcme IS explorcd fur!her in Chapler Thrce. . ,,,l''(,\'rorh' (lI/d IIl'fclcgy,c".' /h l' Nole of !\lfe/h ml in "/1n"//ki",C!. ,h c l"finirc, pp. 28, 104.
" Ii. ~ , l'II, pp , 2401'1', C; II 60, pp, Il il- 11 71'r. ,

36
17
 CIII \ I'II ' R <lN I '
spcc ilica ll y, that th e onlo logica l
stru ctu res 3rl lcu llit 'li \1)' pldh llHlp
ultim a le ly consl illiled by Ihe inle hy ure
rp rela live ene o unl er belIVecli III
~ (l nd
wor ld . T hal is why spee ch or logo
s is Ihe key 10 on lolo gy : 10 in,!u
nto the natu re of be in g is to ire
explore the con diti ons of o ur
way s of exp lica ting or add ress d i I
l'c rent
ing bein g. Lale r on, Hei deg ger
desi gna te hi s analys is of lire or Das 1V0u id
ein as prep arat o ry. as the first stag
in th e proj ect of fund ame nta l e ion of
ont ology. But in Ihe begi nnin g
twe nt ies, it seem 5 that Ihe inve sti of the
gati on of life, and mor e precisel
y, into
the logo s of Iife, is thollght to be
esse nlia lly the sam e thin g as onto
the " logo s of bein g". In view of l ogy ,
this char acte risa tion o f phil osop hy,
cou ld say thal the inqu iry into one
li re and ilS poss ibili ties o f spee ch
Hei deg ger a kind of first phi loso is to
phy, thou gh he seld om uses exac
exp ress ion to desc ri be his phi loso tly Ihis
phic al proj ec!. 50 Still , a com pari
w ith Aris totl e's noti on of a first son
phil osop hy (prote philosophia)
is no
dou bt poss ible , to som c exte nt
at leas t, si nce Hei deg ger co nsid
kind of phil oso phic al inve sti gali ers th e
ons he is purs uin g as mor e basi
prim ary in rela tion not on ly ta c or
eve ry kind o f spe cial phil oso phie
al
disc ipli ne but also ta th e pos itive
sciences . In this way , he seems to
on to a rath er trad ition al view on ho ld
Ihe rela tion betw een phil osop hy
and
pos iti ve scie nce , wh ich is also end
ors cd by Hus serl. Thi s is how eve
the sam e tim e a point on whi ch Hei r at
deg ger seve rely crit icise s Hus serl,
as
he thin ks that HusserL' s phil oso
phy is gov ern ed by a scie ntific
kno w led ge that date s bac k la the idea l of
age of sc ienti fic revo lutio ns, and
in
part icul ar to Des cartes' phil osop
hy.51
The tirst phil osop hy or onlo logy
in Ari sto ll e's sens e cen tres on lhe
qu estion con cern ing bein g as bein
g, whi ch rece ives ils answ er w it
h the
a rti c ul atio n of th e lirsl prin cipl
es and cau ses (G/'chai kai aitia
bein gs,52 By co ntrast, the oth er i) of
scie nce s "co n cern them selv es with
a ntte s,
spec ific bei ng, that is, with som
e spec ifie gen us, w hi ch th ey [jrst
circ ulTIscrib hav e
ed, but not with being unq uali
ficd , nor as bei ng".53
Acc ordi ng ly, a part ic ul ar scie nce
or epis /eme can nat a sce rtain the
trut h
of its Qwn basic principles. Aris tot
le states, for in arde r ta do ths ,
one
~o An exception to this is GA 27, p.
19.
~ 1 This critic ism is exte n5vely
elabo rated in GA 17 Chap ter Two .
52 SccM el. IV. I,V I.I.
' 2 9/3 0, 1, 4: GA 56/57 : " Die
53 Met. 1025b8 - IO: "Itep i
oV 'H Kat yvo 1:\ ltEptYPCtI.llO:).l EVcn
rrpaY J.lme ov'W \, aU' ovxi TrEpl vro cntf> o Uav".
1tepi. 'tou'tou
'11 Al'l ' ll R ON E
Il 'cds ucccss 10 slich pl'ncipl es
w hich arc cO tnn\On l a il scie nces
Ih lll holo ngs 1O li rst philoso phy. , and
Ana logo usly , Heideg ger thin ks that
the
" li rst" or Illos i fu nda me ntal lask
o f phil osop hy is to eluc idat e the
or our undc rstandi ng of bein g, whi natu re
ch the othe r scie nces silentl y assu
and thu s also to reve al the poss m e,
ibili ty and natu re of the artic ulat
Ihe pri ncip les of bei n gs.
.
How eve r, i f onto logy is base d on
an anal ys is o f a mod e of bC\11g th
is pcc lIlia r to a spec ifie bei n g, this at
mea ns that onto logy ncc cssa rily
an onti cal fo und at ion. 54 On Hei has
deg ger' s acco llnt, this is true a
Ari stot le 's onto logy : not only bec lso of
ause Aris totle transfor ms his que
of bein g into a que stio n con cern sti on
ing ausia, but also on acco unt
view that th e first phil oso phy of his
is a th eolo gy, sinc e God prov
co nsti tute the prim ary prin cipl es ta
e and ca use of rea lity .55 How
Heideg ger also sugg ests , nota bly eve r,
in his rcad ing of the Nic oma che
an
Ethics, that ther e is ano ther onti
eal foun d atio n in Ari sto!le ' s \Yor
nam ely hmn an prax is, and th at k,
th ese two pers pec tive s, i.e. the
and the hum an, are in con flict in di vine
Ari stotl e. S6 As we wi ll see late r
on in
thi s stud y, this con flie t is one
betw een nou s and logo s, betwe~
unm ed ia ted, " intu itiv e" reas on n
and fini te, di sc urs ive reas on . For
ln
Illaki ng first phil oso phy into theo
logy, Aris totle con cciv es of Gad
merel y as th e obj ect ofk now ledg not
e but also as its sub jeet ." l n thi
s way
o ne co uld say that to Aris totl
e too, the questi o n of be in g
co ncer ns bein g as give n , that is, in fact
as give n to the divi ne nou s , th
ough
poss ibly also to the hum an logo s.
.
Heide gge r argu es for the orig i
nali ty or fund ame ntal stat us o f
proj ect prim aril y by dem arca ting hts
il agai nst pos iti ve scie nce and wor
ld-
v iew (Weltanschauung). But as
rem arke d above, tn . th l y twe '
e ear
S4 GA 24, p. 26.
~s Thus Heid egge r alwa ys insists
that Aristotl e's God has noth .mg . .1
the C hristian God ; il is simp ly a III com mon wl t 1
name for eternal bei ng or pure prese
19, pp. 22 1-22 4 . nce; sec e.g. GA
~ This point 1S slres sed by D. E.
Stan, Elllity and Existence . An Onl% .
Inves tigation of Aristotle alld Heid g/ca l
egger, pp. 72-73, 78-80.
" Met. 983n5- 10.
SlI Thi s di cho\ orny Is di sclIs
scd abov e all in GA 24, 2-3; in
the who le of GA 27; GA
Id ee de r P~lilos~phi e und das Welt
prob l c m" (w he n rc rc rrin g 10 anscha uungs -
para grnphs III Ihls cour se, 1
nbbrc vintl on "GA 56/5 7:1" ), h~reane r .use the
1-2 . Heidegge r's critiq ue of the notio
Il '' worl d-vi w is ex plore d bclo n ofph lloso phy
w , Section S.
1<)
 CII AP'J'ER ONE Ci rA l'TER ONE

of kllowlcdgc. But such a reflection is also mol vated by the broader task
Heideg ger nonetheless describes his philosophiea l proj eet as a kill(l
phi losophy in o f' e1ucidating the nature ofkno wledge and understanding as such, since
science , namely as a "primo rd ial science".59 B ri etly put,
ng
as to sc icntific knowle dge makes up one, specifie mode of unders tandi
thi s sense shou ld precede the positiv e sc iences in slich a way
di se lose the "primordial " level of reality or intellig ibility wh ich
is Hmong others. Third ly, if phil~sophical work in th is respect bas ically
fi c
suppos ed to be inaccess ibl e to the other sc iences whil e necessa rily consist s in a transce ndenta l refleetion on the conditi ons of scienti
lly give any
60 knowledge, th en il might seem that philosophy cannot rca
presupposed by them Thus even though Heideg ger at this stage does
not hes itate to ca li philoso phy a sc ience, he is simultaneously try ing
to positi ve contribu tion to science, and Heidegger also states that science
stingu ishes cannot and shou ld not "wait for philosophy" .61 However, even though
work out a concep tion of philoso phy that clearly di
s phi losophy is not positive in the way science is, but interpre ts on the
phil osophy fro m science, as he lh inks that the scientilic pursuit involve ry,
of theory and onto logical level that which in science is an ontical discove
or rests up on certain assumptions as regards the nature tation eventua lly can
if Heideg ger still seems to think that this Interpre
theoreti cal know ledge, which he wants to cha ll enge. Accord ingly,
phy is not theoret ical give a contribution 10 science, at least to the sciences of man, in virtue
theot-y is the same as positive science, then phi/oso
know ledge. of ils determ ination and concep tualisat ion of the being of human
is,
However, in Heidegger 's view, those who deny that phi losophy is
a Dasein ." ln the following, 1 focus on the first of these points, that
shou ld not imitate positiv e
(theoretical) science tend instead to reduce it to some kind of"prac tica l" why philoso phy in Heideg ger's view
. 63
undertaking, arguing tha t philosophy should provide man with norms SCience.
the For the most part, Heidegger speaks rather generally about science ,
and va lues and to be of li se to man 's life in gencra l. In alher wards,
alternative ta philoso ph y as science seems to be ph ilosop hy as world- but it seems elear that he primari ly has the natu ra l and mathematical
has
view. Thus Heid egger's att emp t to demarcate ph il osophy frol11
sc ience science s in mind, and that he is usi ng "scienc e" in a sense it
ger is careful to
involve s th e task ta c ome to grips \\'th th e questio n concern
ing the acquired in modern times. In his later wri tings, Heideg
,
relation between the theo retical and the practica!. More precise
ly, di stingui sh between different stages in the dcvelopment of science
Heideg ger wants to escape From these two alternatives by revealin
g a wh ich has resulted in the age of technology, as he calls il. This he takes
ed
more original sense or(phi losophi cal) rcsearch and knowledge, which
is to involve quite a different experie nce of nature and reality as compar
not conceivable in term s of cither practi cal- moral or scien
ti fi c condu et. not only to the ancient era, but also to the age of seientific brcakthrough
not
[n this pursuit , however, Heideg ger simulta neously hopes to be ab le
to in the modern sense." By contras !, in the earl y wo rks, while
t and change in the
redefine the nature of science itself and eventu all y also the concep
t of dcnying that there has been substantial develop men
bein g in
world- view. course of hi story as regards the concept ion of nature and
e
Heideg ger' s discuss ion of science might be said to toueh on three genera l, Heidegger claims 1ha1 the Greek noti on of science as epistem
ic,
basic issues. Fifst, Heideg ger wants to Come 10 grips wilh a scientif
not SZ, p. 5 1.
"ep istemic " idea l of kn ow ledge, and to show why thi s should
61
psychology of
ry 62 See SZ, 10, where Heidegger accuses anthro pology and
govern philoso phical research. Secondly, to achieve this, it is necessa prcs uppos ing an essenti ally Ca rtesian notion of man.
of scientific J Thi s is onc of the Illore important points
in 1. J. Kocke lmans, Heidegger alld
to reflect upon the constitu tion and the pres uppositions
Sciel/cc. Sec in parti culal' pp. 1 4 ~ 18.
M See e.g. <;Dic Ze il des Wcltbild es", pp. 75 ~96
in Holzweg e (GA 5); "Gelasse nheit",
56/57: J
S?The notion of a primord ia l sci ence or Urwissenschaft is developed in GA pp . 9 ~ 28 in (ic /cl.\'s ellltcil; " Di e Fl1lge na ch der Tec hnik", pp . 940 in Vorrrdge und
as ar;
2, 18-2? ln GA 58, Heidegger nstead spea ks about ph ilosophy AII/sti /ze; Urcmcr III/d Freibllrg er Vorlrtige (GA 79 ). The
later Heidegg er's
UrspI' /lIlgswlssellschafl. scicnce is Ireli tcd by E. Richt er, Heidegg ers Frage nach dem
utldCr.' H lIlIdillij of
~ More precise /y, il shouJd disclose the Ur-etwas . theconstitut
"primordial somethin g", wllich
ive or wOI'hl: GA ~ M57 C/(III'III"'('lIllvlI 1/I1f{ die rroklel/ lV.w.!1Is c:luiftell, who al so de voles considerable space
15 "prc- world ly" (vo/"ll'elt/ich) in the sense of bcing
pp. JI 'I- 117,
. 10 Il con lpnrl so ll hC1WCCll KfI!lll1 11d 1lcidcggcr in ll1is l'CS pCCI.

<II
<10
 ( 'li A 1'1 1;1{ ONh
is slili I>OVCill llI g lhc vicw on know ledge of' lhe prescili dll y, Wilh Ihi ~
idcn, he docs nOlmC!l nlO suggesllhat there is a conceplion or seiellec in
G"cck l11 0 ll g hl that would have sorne modern equivalenl. 65 On the
co nl l'lII'y , in vicw o r Aristotle's tripartite divis ion between the
" Iheorcl ical phil osophies" (phifo sophiai theoretikai) of theo logy,
physics and malhemalics, Heidegger argues that it is important to nOie
thal whereas the Greeks regarded the sciences as different kinds of
philosophy, the modern view has it the olher way round. 66 Bul in spite
of this difference, Heidegger thinks thal th e nolion of epis telile
rightfully might be said to display an ideal of know ledge lhat has
bearings upon the modern view on philosophy and science alike. Thi s is
the idea, mentioned above, that true knowl edge coneerns the un iversal
and lhe immulable and moreover has a deductive structure. 67 And on his
view, thi s is thc reason why one has looked to preci se ly Ihe
mat hematical sciences for a mode l for know ledge as SUCh . 68
Just as Ari stotle thinks that ep isf eme ca l1 oil ly presuppose ilS own
basic princip les, Heidegger argues lhat science necessarily is blind to ilS
own foundati on and possibilily, fol' lhi s is accessible to philosophy only.
ln a way not dissimilar to Thomas Kuhn, Heidegger thin ks lhat the
possibilily of scientiCic progress requ ires periods of "normal science",
during wh ich the princi ples, crileria, methods elc . upon which lhe
sCentific work rests, are nol put into question . Since this involves a
certain naivet, Heidegger thinks th al lrul y fruil[u! scientific \York
happens in limes of cr isis, wh en it becomes urgenl 10 sc ienti sls
themselves to re fl ect upon their basic concepls, logic, epislemology
etc. 69 However, even though thi s kind of fou ndational research invol ves
a transformation in lhe underslandin g of being, il cannot be idenlical 10
philosophical reflection, for it wi ll never be the task of science ta rai se
the fundamental questions concerning trulh and being, nor to approac h
sc ience as a possibil ity fo r human ex istence, i.e. as a parti cular form of
life. But s ince this is, or su He id egger argues, prccise ly the proper
philosophical per5peclive on science, as it is lhe ri ght approach 10
65 GA 62*, p. 21.
66 GA 24, p. 24; GA 27, pp. 18- 19. Aristotle m.ke, hi, divi , ion in Met. 1026.18-19.
67 Cf. GA 19, p. 34. 'EItU:nT1I1'l is further discussed in the next chapter.
68 See GA 17, pp. 81- 83.
69 S2. p. 9 ; GA 24, p. (: 67.
42
t' II AP rE l ON I;
knowkdgc and und crslandin g as such, phil osophy is ab le to understand
th e nature o f sc ientillc conduel in a way that is ina ccessib le to the
scienline perspecti ve ilselr. For this reason , philosophy should not try to
imil ale sciencc, lhough this is exactly what has happened in philosophy.
Arislolle's characterisation of the difference between first philosophy
and lhe olher sciences is to some extent, though certainly in a differenl
way, preserved in Heidegger. As noted above, He idegger describes
science as an ontical inquiry which deals witll a specifie region of
be ings, whereas phi losophy as ontology, although it has an ontical
foundation, does not in the same way con cern ilself wilh a demarcaled
field of research, as it has the capacily to ask with respect to anything
what and how it is. This is also Heidegger's position prior to the
introduction of the projecl of fundamental ontology, since life' s access
to its world must be anal ysed without prejudices as to what different
kinds of entities there are. In this sen se, philosophieal refleclion cannol
be "positing" or objectifying: il must reach a leve l o f meaning more
basic than thi s, parti y in arder 10 be ab le to understand prec isely how
the scientific disciplines are con stituted. For the demarcation of a
particular region ofbeings is rooted in an objectity in g act, which makes
it possible to approach beings as e.g. phys ical obj ects . In this way , as
science circumscribes ilS fie ld of research, il adopts a certain "attitude"
(Einstellung). Thereby it estab lishes and res tri clS th e ways in which
beings can be given and known , as il assumes a specifie kind o f
knowledge and a particular mode of givenness. 70 Bul philosophy cannol
restrict itself to a single position or atlilude, sinee ils task is to gel allhe
gi venness of beings as such, prior to any di vision into di fferent kinds of
beings; correlatively, it seeks to uncover the fundam ental characlerislics
orman's access to beings, whether scientific, practical, etc.
ln Heidegger 's view, this kind ofphilosoph ical inquiry should make
it possible to see how both philosophy and science have their origin and
poss ibility in the constitution of Dasein, in its understanding of being,
which is the condition o f possibilily of human aClivity as such. But
since science is restricted in the way JUS! outlined, it do es not cnact ils
unde rstan ding o f bCll g as fu ll y as philosophy, wh ich has access to th e
nature o r undcrstanding prior to the specification imposed by sc ience.
70 For Ihe cUllce pl nf !','1I11/d/llll};. ~cc (,hupler Four, in paJ'li cular Section 3.
. 11
 C' II AI" I'I 1( (lN I
'
\'01' Ihi s t'cuson, what sc ience is in part , philoso pll y 1" ni !t il t () I il S
Il " ideggcr puts it o n olle occas ion, phi losop hy il1 thls '"'IN 1., ,, tllll ll y
mo rc scic ntilic than science itsclf. 71
5. Heidegger's critique of ethies
Philosophy should not be a theoreti cal discipline in the same sense as
science, b ut nor should it be " praetical", if that is taken to mean that
philosophy sh ould artieulate a world-view or be an ethi es. Heidegger's
relation to clhics. and to practical phi losophy in ge neral, becomes a
particul arly urgent malter in connection \Vith Ari stotl e, s ince Heidegger
has turn ed precisely to Aristot lc's " practical philosophy ", hi ~ Poli/les,
Rhetorie and not least th e Nieomachean Ethies, in o rder to find a
testimony of A ri stotl e 's ins igh t into th e fact ieity of life and it s
experien ces. Of parti cul ar impo rt ance in thi s co nnectio n is Ihat the
Ethies does not encompass a scientifte methodo logy, wh ich to Ari stotl e
means that ethics does not 50 tnuch ask "why" human co nd llet is as il is,
reducing il to certai n bas ic princip les and causes, but rather seeks to
make clear " that" il is of suc h and such a nature, thus tak ing a nOI1-
reducti ve view on life. However, one of th e most stri king features of
Heidegger 's interpretation of the Ethics is that he does not read illi ke a
wo rk on ethics in the co rnrnon sense, but regards it as an analys is of
human existenc e as a who le, prior to th e divi sio n between the
theoretical and the practi cal, or belween whal is and w hat should be. 72
But considerin g that Heidegger's ow n work ha rd ly is " neutral" in to ne
b ut c learly permeated by the co nvi cti on that there is an au th entic
possibili ty for human existence - to ta ke ho ld of one's ow n ex iste nce
and to deeide in favou r of the truth - his stated suspicion of eth ies might
seern a bit surprisi ng. It becomes unde rsta ndab le, however, w hen
related to hi s understanding of the notion of ph ilosophy as wo rld- view,
in connecti on w ith whi ch Heidegger tri cs to show that to questi on a
traditiona ll y theoreti eal approac h to life does not have to lead to a
7i
reduction of the theoretical to tht: prac lical.
71GA 27, p. 2 t9.
72 Heidegger's in terpretation o f the Eth ics is discussed in Chapter T hree .
1] Heidegger deals with the not ion o f philosophy as world -view primari ly in
connection with the ph iJosop hy of va lue (Wertphil osophie) of the neo-Kan ti ans
Windelband and Ricken, and also w ith respect to Lotze. These thinkers a re discussed
ex tensive ly in the who le first part of GA 56/57: l, and a s im ilar disc uss ion takes up
44
Aceord ili S 10 Il cid cgge r, cven th ough th e not ion of ph il osophy as
worlel -v icw m ighl scem diametrical ly opposed to the idea that
phi loso ph y should be mode lled a fter th e positive sciences, both v iews
an..: in nlet th e Qutco me of a rcsignat ion concerning the tas k and worth
or phil osop hy. They both stom from the belief that phi losophy must try
to j usti fy its existence by referring to sorne kind of "practical" utility."
Aga ins t thi s, Heidegger wants to retrieve w hat he regards as the tru e
spirit ofGreek philosophy: philosophy as pure Saehforschung, as a kinel
of resea rch which is eoneern ed w ith the fundam ent al quest ions of
phil osoph y and wh ic h reali ses th at thesc qu est ions are worth pursuing
for their own sake and not because of ther re leva nce to " practica l"
mauers. 75
Now ethi cs does not necessaril y have to be norm ative in kind, in
other words, it does not have to endorse certain valu es on the basis of
wh ich it is possible to distingu ish belween mora lly jllstifi ed and
unjustifi ed behaviour ~ it can also be cri t ical, th at is, investigate the
fOllndatio n of val uation, the reason why we eonsider some thi ngs to be
good and others not, etc. According to Heidegger, however, phi loso phy
should affirm neither ofthese alternati ves.
First, w h y cou Id philosophy not be a cr itieal ana lys is of the
phenomenon of va lue and va luati on? ln fact, l-leideggcr 's criti cisl11 of
the philosophy of va lue propounded by the neo- Kantians ean be secn as
a contri bution to such an analys is, insofar as thi s c ri ticism ail11s at
showi n g th at these thinkers fai l to see th e phenomenon o f va lue since
they are still movin g within the opposition of what is and what should
be (Sein and Sollen), objectivity and subj ecli v ity, th eory and practice,
etc. T hey have j ust reversed the tradi t iona l priority and th us take th e
most of Heidegger's li me in the olhe r course con tain cd in th is volume:
" Phanomenologie und transzendenta le We rt philosophie" (GA 56/57:2). See also GA
58, 2.
N Cf. GA 29/30 , p. 3.
?5 The ward "p ractical" is Heidegger's own, GA 19, pp . 254 255 . There Heidegge r
c laims !hat it is cha ractcristic of our time that even the most sc icntifica!ly oriented
ph ilosophy can nol res ist from appeal ing to "the practical" for its j ustification, since it
is anxious to show that its otherwise " theoretical" results have a determinate value ta
the extent thal they cOlllribut e 10 the formati on of a worl d-view. ln Ihis lectu re,
ll e id eggcr accuses Ch ri stia nity for this deve lopment, arguin g that because of the
innucnce or C hristianity on phi losophy, phi losop hy was put on a par with literature,
nlusic, Ci e. , i.c. \Vi th c ullurn l ph c nonl e ll~ in general, wh ich we re thought ta be of use
in so fu r as tlley cOlitriIJut !.!d 10 tl le education o r a soc iety <.md its mcmbers .
,45

primaey of praet ieal reason fo r grantcd as thcy try to ex pl "l " tlie stfttu s
of objecti ve, transpersonal va lidity traditionall y ascribed \0 thenry an d
sci ence in tc rOl s of a will to truth as va lue (where the va lu t.: lhu::; is
objectivity)76 ln thi s way, this phil osophy is mundane an d as such
na ve, wh ereas phenomenol ogy, insofar as it s task is to inves ti gate w hat
il means to be given, moves beyond these oppos itions in order to be
able to understand the ir genesis, i.e. how it is th at they can make up
forms of give nness.
Thus, eve n though one mi g ht thin k tha t Il ei degger has somct hing in
COlll1l10n with (h is fonn of "practica l" philosophy, since he has shawn
that for exampl e th e pursuit of knowledge cannot be un ders tood in
isolation fro m th e sphere of fee li ng, desire, will , etc. , he would still
insist that he is doing somethin g eompletely different from th e neo-
Kantians. For one thin g, Heidegger argues, even though these thi nke rs
want to round theory upon practica l reaso n, they sti ll val ue the fo rm er
more hi ghly, in th at th ey think th at va lues and nonns pertaining to
scientific conduet (s uch as c .g. truth) have a more uni ve rsa l character
than those belongin g to ethi cs and aestheti cs. In thi s way, they are thus
still holding on to the tradit ional csteem for the theoreti cal. Agai nst this,
Heidegger for mulates his own view th us:
Th is predo minance of the theoretical must be broken , certa inl y
not in SI/ch a way that one proclairns a pri may or the practical,
and not in arder to for once br ing rorward someth in g else wh ich
disp lays the proble rn from a new point of view, bu t becausc the
theoreticrl l tsc lf lInd as such points back into somethi ng prc~
17
theorct ica l.
As this sho uld make clear, one of the reasons why phil osoph y as
Heidegger conceives of it cann ot be eth ics is th at it cannot be divided
into special branches, for to do so is to bestow upon philoso phy a
dete rmin ate sphere o f obj e cts, w hosc mo de of be in g is m ore or Jess
taken for gran ted. l n this way, phil osophy bccom cs LI disciplin e of
" GA 56/57 , tO, see atso p. 143.
77 GA 56/ 57, p. 59; "Diese V orherrschaft des T heoretischen mul3 gebrochen werden,
zwar nicht in der Weise, dal3 man ei nen Pri mat des Praktischen prok lam iert, und
nicht deshalb, urn nun mal etwas anderes zu bringen, was die Prob leme vo n einer
neuen Se ite ze igt, sondern wei l das Theoretische se lbst und ais so lehes in cin
Vorth eoreti schcs zurUt:kwci st. "
46
' 11 i\I'TER ONE
cssc ntiall y th e saill e kind as the pos iti ve sc iences and is thus fro m the
bcg inni ng prevent ed rrom be in g o ntology o r phenomeno logy .78 Further~
phil osophy ne ither should nor can give guidance fo r action in the sense
o r rul es or norms. It should n ot, since its truc aim is not to be producti ve
("poieti c"), but to enaet a parti cular "how" . That is to say, the essence
of philosophy is its ve ry activity, or, in other words, " Phi loso phy is
philosophi sing and nothin g else".79 This is nOlhing but He idegger 's
inlerpretalio n of th e A ristotelian id ea th at phil osoph y sho uld be
rega rde d as a farm of praxis, actio n.
The reason wh y philosophy cannot at ail preserib e ways of li fe to
oth ers is di scussed at great length in a lecture co urse from 1928/29,
Einlei/u/lg in die Philosophie'o Here Heideggcr suggests that if we take
"world -v iew" in ilS literaI sense, i.e. as a \Vay o f seein g the world , th en
it e mes cl ose to w hat th e Greeks expressed with th e co ncept o f elhos.
T his is a \V ay of inhabitin g th e wo rld in th e sense of occup yi ng a
partieu lar "stance" (Hal /ul1g) w ithin it; it can thus be compared to
l-le idcgge r 's own noti on o f being in the worl d." In thi s sense,
Heidegger claims, philosophy is actually foun ded on a particular world-
view, and exactl y for that reason it cannot be the task of philosophy to
develop a worl d-view and to " distri bute this buil ding as a ho me fo r
everyone"." That is to say, inso far as ph ilosophy is a for111 of life, a
\Vay of being in the worl d, which involves a perso nal commi tment - as
A ri stotle says, to save the truth ,83 o r in He idegger's words, to assume
rcspo nsibility for the und erstanding of man - philosophy does indeed
necessaril y imply somethi ng like an ethiea l dec ision or convicti on.
Morcover, in ass uming thi s responsibility, the phi losopher can be said
to act a5 a kind of ideal (Vorbild), though not in th e moral sense, but by
84
disclosing his elhos as a possibility for human existence. But prec isely
beca use phil osophy is ethi cal in this sense, in volving a choice of a
'" cr. GA 59, p. 172, GA 27, p. 10.
79G A 21, p. JO; "Philosophie ist Philosophieren und nichts we iter." See also GA
29130, p. 6.
HO GA 27.
lit It OOe; rn ca ns both "place" and "home" as weil as "charaCler" and "c ustom".
Il cid eggcr translat es il as lIall /lllg throughou i G A 18 and GA 27 (among ot her
wCll'k s).
III (iA 27, p. 379.
~) eN. 1096u\4 - 16.
~I (1 1127 , p. 7.
,17
 ' 1 IAP11 ~ R ON I'
'1l A PTER ONE
particular good, il ca nnot be cthi ca l in th e oth er SC II 1'IC. 1. "
Nlluw w llll i il could use to seill e moral questio ns, one vi olatcs the idca of philoso
means to be good in genera l. In enac tin g a parti cu lal" r~) I' 1ll or phy
lill!, '" phcnollleno logy and ra di cal questi oni ng. There w ill always be
philoso phy delimit s itsel f, leavin g other poss ibilitics behind, and a gap
"ann ot bclwee n a ph ilosophi cal analys is of th e bas ic po ssibili ties fo r
sh ow in the same way what it wou Id mean to lead these other lives. hum an
existence o n the one hand and the ind ividual 's eo nerete enactm
T he reaso n w hy thi s de limi ta ti on preve nts phil osop hy fr ent o f
om th ese poss ibilities on the oth er; no th eory ea n close this gap, but
articula ting a them)' on ethi cs is, in Heidegger's view, lhat an indiv thi s is
idual brOlight abo ut on ly as th e indiv idual decides in fav our o f a parti
decisio n cann ot be a direct co nseque nce of a th eory, since it necessa e ul ar
rily \Vay of life, thereby bestow ing deterrninate content upon an otherw
in vo lves somethin g mo re th an what a (heory can say. O f cou rse, ise
th is formaI or "empty " poss ibility.
holds for a th eory of knowle dge as weil, so il is not reall y ethi cs as
such Accordingl y, an important as pect of He id egger's concepti on
that is imposs ible in Heidegger's view; but first o f ail , he rejects of
every phil osophy is hi s co nv iction th at phil oso ph y must a fft rm its
kind of "calculative" clhics, Le. the idea lhat it could be possibl own
e to rac ti eit y, and not fo rget that its sll pposedl y univers a l c1 aim
es tabli s h beforehand the co nseque nces and content o f s are
act io n. u ltimate ly found ed upo n a parti eu lar expe ri ence w ithin an equ
Accord in gly, th e task of ph il osophy as regard s ethies must be eonfine all y
d parti cular situati on. ln lIe idegge r's v iew, howeve r, th e fae ti
to being a thinking o f elhos, o f what it means to be situated in th e c ity of
world philoso phy is o ften forgo tlen, an d to forget this is also to be blind
as human and what this implies eoneernin g th e poss ibili ties for to
man 's one's historie al origin .
understandin g of bein g. COllccived of in {his \Vay, cthi cs is an inquiry
into the essence of l11 a l1 .1;5 Insofar as lhis inquiry draws a dist inction
6. Philosophy as hisloriea! kllolV!ed ge
betwec n authentic and inauthe nt ic enactm cn l of the essence of man,
it is As a speci fi c " how" of li fe, philoso ph y shares th e basic he rm enelltie
not neutral as regards man's possibilities of existence but in vo lves
a condi tion o f Iife outline d above . In oth er w ords, it belon gs
ki nd of imperati ve, callin g upon man to exist in accordanee with to th e
his fact icity of phil osop hy th at it has to take its departu re [rom
Qwn nature . Importa nt to Heidegger is that this im perat ive callnot pre-
be establis hed concep ts, ques ti ons, etc., w hieh it moreov er can never
just an ideal, but must be eonfirm ed by life itse l[ as an ac fully
tual d ischarge, as H eidegge r states in the earl y manusc npt
poss ibility. That is to say, life itself must testi fy to the possibi . on A mta' IIe. 87
lity o r
authent icity. A nd as we w ill see in Chapter Three, on Heideg ger's Wit h this idea, he wa nts ta chall en ge the ideal o f a philoso
view, ph ieal
Aristol le records such a lest imony in his Ethics. Howev er, philoso beginnin g wi thollt pres up positions, emana ting From Descart es an
phy d still
ean only " formall y indicate " this possibi lity, w hereas its exact content prevale nt in Husserl. For as Heideg ge r recalls in an autobio graphie
al
or meani ng must be left undetermi ned." T his mea ns th at if one sketch wr itten late in life, th e lesson he leam ed fro m Husser
reads l, th at
th is inquiry into elhos as if il provide d us with fif{n principl es which fliifilling th e phenam enologiealmot to to gel to " the thin gs themse
wc lves"
requires a radi cal bracketing of the traditi on, soon came ta have
a
8S This is how Heidegge r \Vil! [orm u! ate hi s idea
dirferen t mea nin g for him. He discove red that ph enomen a logy d
of an "ori gi na l ethi cs" in "Brief LIber id not
den Humanismus", pp. 145~194 in GA 9, p. 187. But in t hi ~ lex l, I-Ic-idegs 50 much rree him From the hurden of trad ition as rather
er seem s 10 make him sense
have cha nged his attitude towards Ari stotle's eth ics, as he daims lhat th e need to .go ever deeper into it, and into Ar istotle' s th ink
the h\qo- \Vith in g in
which his "elh ies" supposed ly would be conccrned, is preservc d in a
more or igi nal particul ar:
way (anfdnglicher) in the traged ies of Sophocles Ihan in Arislot le's
Ethics; p. 184.
However, W. McNei ll has argued th at th is statement does not have ta
be read as a Husse rl 's leaehing was eonducled in the form of a s le p~by- s tep
deprecialio n of Aristo tl e; "A 'scarcely pondered ward'. The place
of tragedy: prac lice in phenom enologica l "seeing", wllich requ ired that one
Heidegger, Aristotle, Sophocles".
86 The idea that clhics only can be form
alJy in dicated is propounded by J. van Buren, rct'raincd from Illakin g lise of philosophical know ledge wit~out
"The Young Heidegger, Ari stolle, Et hi es", p. 178. The notion of formai
indi cnlion
(fo/"l/1ale Anzeige) i.'i discussed in Chapter Four, Sect ion 8 of this study.
17 PA , p. 2'18,

48
 Cll AP l' I( ON I'
tcs ling il, but al so (hat one gave up bringing the authUill y ni 111(1
great th ink ers int o the discuss ion. Ho\Vc vc r. 1 \V as CVCII 1t:1l1j
capabl e to pari l'rom A ri stotle and the oth er Greek th ill kc l'!I the
clearer il became to me how my growing ramiliarity \Vith the
phenomenological seeing ferti li sed t he explication of I ll e
Aristotelian leXIS . Ta be sure, 1 was not yet able to direct!y
foresee what decisive consequences the renewed turn to Ari stot le
would entai l. 88
The phenomenologieal seeing did not on ly clear the way to Aristotle's
philosophy but it also made Heidegger awa re of the impo rtance of
reOecting lIpon the way in which philosophy , perhaps neeessaril y,
assumes Ari stotl e' s thought as a rou nd ation. For only agai nst the
background of such a re flection will it be poss ible to decide what it
eo uld mean to give a proper response to this foundati on. The name
Heidegger gives to this reflection is " destruction" (Deslrukl ion). For al
this stage at least, the goal of destruction is to make precisely Aristotle -
and no one cise - accessible." Even though we still lea n on Aristotle
and make use of his conceptuality, Heidegger rem arks, th e traces of
Aristotle are today almost imp oss ib le ta see, sin ce th e modern
philosophieal framewo rk is not directly derived from A ri stolle, but
relates to him only in a roundabou t way, through a traditi on of
interpretations and transformations of hi s thought. This tradi lion has
also brought w ith it a fo rgetfu lness of the facticity of Aristotle 's
thought. That is to say, we have lost track or the hermc neutic situat ion
of Aristot le's philosophy, which gave hi s thought its specifie direction.
With this loss goes the risk of app lying Aristotle's concepts to things for
88 "Mei n Weg in die PhH nomenologie", p. 86: " Husse rls Belehrung gescha h in de r
Form ei ner schrittweiscn Einbung des phanomcnologischen 'Sehens', das zugleich
citl A bsehen vom ungcprLiften Gebrauch ph ilasophischer Kenntnisse verla r.gtc, aber
auch den Verziclll , die Autorilal der gro/3cn Dcnker ills Gesprach ZlI bringen. Indes
konnl e ich mich von Aristoteles un d den anderen griechisc hen Denkern utn sa
wen iger trennen, je deu/ lic her mi r clie wClchscnde Vertrautheil m il dem
phanomenologischcn Seben die Auslegung der Arislu leli schell Slo;llri ften befruchtctc.
Zwar konnte ic h noch nicht sogleich bc rsehen, welche entscheidendcn Fa lgen die
erncute Zuwendung zu Aristote les bringen sollte. "
3'1 See PA, pp. 248-249. G. Fi gal has stressed that with the proj ect of fundamenta l
ontology, H eidegge r's notion of destructi on is transformed: al this stage, He idegger
can no longer hope la base his work on a ret rieval of hidden possibi lit ies in A rislolle,
but must now turn to everyday, pre-ph ilosophical life as the source for orig ina l
experience; see Marrill Heidegger ZIII" Eifljllrllllg, pp. 60 , 74. In Chapter Three, 1
will try to show that these Iwo perspectives CIre not incompat ible .
50
'1lA l'TER O NE
which tll ey \Vc rc Ilot al ail in tc ndcd in the first place. Thus, the goa l of
destructi on is to ma ke clear th e " phenomenal" basis of Arislotle ' s
ph il osophy, an d iflhi s is an inlegral part ofphilosophy, then philosophy
90
lI1i ght ri ghtl ll y be called "historieal" knowl edge.
/\ecordin gly , deslruction"in Heidegger ' s sense does not have a
ne galive aim: it is not pursued for the sake of poinling out mistakes
made in the past, but it seeks to uncover the truth lhat is embedded in
th e tra diti on, albeit in a disguised form . Thererore, it will always be
more directed towards the present than lhe past, whieh means that
philosophy, in sofar as it is conscioll s of ilS own historical foundati on,
intends to criticise itse l f as il critieiscs the past, namely for relying on
lhis pa st without understand ing either the scope or nature of (his
predicament. 91 As Heidegger puis it: the crili que does not eoneem the
92
facllhal we stand in a traditi on but how we do it.
ln undertaking this kind of hislorical reflection, Heidegger is not
mere ly try in g to make his Qwn s ituation tran sparent in relat ion to
Aristotl e , but he is in fact rct rieving Aristotle's view on philosophica l
research precisely in order Lo understand what is invol ved in such a
retlection. However, this re(rieval might in its tum be regarded as a part
of I-Ieidegger's clarification of his own historieal, hermeneutie situation
\Vith respect 10 Aristotle, since Heidegger, as we wil l see in the next
sect io n, wa nts to cha llenge the dichotomy between hi story and
systemat;cs in philoso phy. That is, if th e " thing" (Sache) to whi ch
phenomenology supposedly should direcl its attenti on, does nol exist
independently of its interpretations, then inquiring into e.g. the nature o f
ph ilosoph ieal research is not essential ly different fro m exp lorin g
Aristoll e's understanding o f il.
An importan t reason w hy Heidegger can turn with approval to
Aristotle in th is conneclion is that Aristotle does not have any idea of a
phi losophical beginning without presuppositions in the modern sense.
I lcidcgger otTen emphasises that, in Aristotle's view, philosophy in its
beginnin g must endorse already estab!i shed doxa, the op inions of th e
wi se and th e many; an idea which has resulted in hi s fam o us
mC lh odo Jog ica l dictulll that wc must "stal1 wi th that which is inte ll igib le
Q(I l'I I. p. 249.
9' r. GA t9, p. t 1.
ql PA, p. 251.
51

10 US, in order 10 procccd 10 Ihal whi ch is inl c lli gl!> I,> hy 11111111''': '',93
Accordin gly, Arislollc almosl always begins hi s discussions \V ilh Cl
statement of the cunent opinions of the matter at hand , und he is also
Ihe first la write something like a history of philosophy, No t because he
thinks we should re main there or assumes that doxa represents the trutll,
but because he is convinced that the hi gher form s of knowledge grow
out of less elaborated modes of understanding, and th at opinions, even
ifthey are confused, nonetheless contain some element of truth, insofar
as they are developed in contacl w ith the things whose nature he is
about to explore, ln ather \Yord s, doxa is, al th e QutseL at least, w hat
provides philosophy wilh an aim and direction, Initially, Ihe phi losopher
cannol deliberate on the opinions of the past, but must take his stat'tin g-
point from Ihem, ass uming that traditional phi losoph ieal questions are
meaningf111 and worth posing,
Thi s principle is put to work al the beginn ing of th e Metaphy sics,
where A ri stotle introduces his inquiry inta th e nature of philosoph y or
wisdom , He noies that it is gene rally assumed that w isdom is
knowledge of primary causes and principl es; accordin gly, Aristotle
declares this opinion to be the point of depa rture for his discuss ion ,"
The dependency on doxa does nol end Ihere, however, for since there is
no simple access to Ihese principles and causes - they are supposed to
represent the ullimate level of explanat ion - Aristotle concludes that the
best thing is to begin by questioning the common opinions about Ihe
wise man, When we know what is peculiar 10 him, we wi ll , hopefully,
be clear abo ut the nature of wi sdom itse! f, and eventuall y be ab le to
reveal the nature of Ihose prineiples and causes the knowledge of whi eh
is precisely wisdom," At this poi nt, Arislotle has finall y achieved the
in itiall y stated las k of developing his own form u,lation of the essence of
philosophieal work, and Ihe resu lt of his inte rro gations proves 10 be that
the search for the primary causes and principles is in tct the same thing
as the quest ion conce rning bein g as bc in g .96 Hence Aristotle is now in a
93 E.g . E. N. l095b2 -4, PI/ys. 184a I 6- 18; M el. I029b l O-13 . In GA 62*, Hei degger
discusses at length how Aristot le in the Melaphysics achieves his concept o f cro$ia
Ihrough an examination of the cornillon op inions concern ing il; see in particul ar p.
II.
., Met. 981 b27-29,
'.15 Met. 1.2.
96 Mel . J003a21- 32 .
52
' II AI''J' I-'I{ NI:l
positi on 10 say th al the philosophers of the pa Si have been posing the
same question he is posing now, though Ihey were not fu lly aware o f
what they actuall y were seekin g, since they were not ab le to art icu late
their question as the question,concerning being as being,
As these chaplers in the Metaphysics make c1ear, Aristotl e turns to
doxa not onl y in order to find out whal the causes and principles o f
beings are, but also in order to discover thal they eons!i!ute the theme of
philosophy, What is the moti ve behind this mode of inq uiry? Accord ing
to Aristot le, ifwe do not pay altcnton to such diffieu lti es pertaining to
th e tap ie ta be discussed that have been st~tect in th e tradition, wc w ill
not be able to do a\Vay w ilh the problems, since we will not know what
Ihe difficullies consist in , Wc will be, as he says, like men who do not
know where they are headin g, for the te/os of our research will remain
concealed to us, Hence, even Ihe ab ility to pose philosophieal questions
in th e right way requires a e lear view o f the way in which the th ink ers
, 97
orthe past used to pose tllese questlOll s.
He idegger hardi y eve r uses the word "destru ction" itself in
connection with Aristotl e, but he often emphasises that Aristotle ' s
philosophy proceeds as a critique of its predecessors," On this view,
Aristotle wo uld thus have a ffirm ed Ihat on the one hand, philosophy
must receive its tasks throu gh an cncounter w ith th e tradition, but that
on the olher hand, this tradi li on is o nl y lru ly accessible to the person
who has a lready begull to engage in philosophical q uest ions, that is,
who has succeeded in seeing through the surface of doxa and reached
behind il. Heidegger' s idea thal Ari stotle pursues his ph ilosophieal
in vesti gations as a critique of hi s predecessors is imp ortant to keep in
mi nd in connection w ith the ques tion about what ki nd of origin
Aristotle is to Heidegger. For Heide gge r occasionall y seems to th in k
that the reason why philoso phy must in volve a confrontation with
A ri stot.l e is that hi s work represents th e "natmal" views on the world,
w hich arc no t achieved throu gh an encounter w ith the tradit ion as is th e
case wilh later phi loso phy , ln thi s way, Aristotle would Ihus be
re lati vely "simple" or unmediated origin,99 But in view of his emphasis
on the aspect of eri!ique in Aristotle's work, it is c lear that He idegger
9J M el. 99 5 a 2 4 ~ b4.
'lMGA 18. pp. 2 8 5 ~ 2 8 6 . PA , p. 264.
fi') Sec hnpter T hrcc, Sec tion 1.
51
 l'liAI' Il ' 1( ON I'
lhinks th at such a vicw on I\ristolle is lOO simpl e. t\l'I slotl ,1 ,"1 wOlk is lIl\
origin not 50 much on account of ils "carly" and imml.!dint.~ CIHll'lIc tc.:l",
but above ail because of its philosophieal power. And it is a rdlccled
origin, as it is based upon a confrontation with carlier thought. In other
words, Ar istotle had 10 "destruct" hi s tradition no less than Heidegger.
7. Historical interpretation and systematic philosophy
We have seen that the destruction oflhe tradition necessari ly in volves a
retum to Aristotle, which should make us reali se not on ly that his
thOll ght has heen concealed by th e tradition, but also that our present
situation is constitutcd by this concea lm ent. ln relation to this
predicament, Heidegger envisages the following task: "ln accordanec
wilh our position, the original posilion should be developed anew, that
is, thi s position is aecording to Ihe changed historical situation
something different but still the same.,,100 Historical relleetion should
not only enable us to understand ourselves, but also make it poss ibl e to
understand the past, i.e. Aristotle, in su eh a way that we release him
from the tradition W I But the task of Iiberaling Arislotle's "original
position" is pursued not simply for the sake of bcing able to reinterprel
his philosophy against its tradition al reeeption, but above ail in order to
make his philosophical position or situation accessible again, 50 as to
undersland his mode of questioning. 102
The idea that Aristotle too was forced to develop his philosophy
Ihrou gh a critique of his predecessors, and in parlieular of Plato, is
occasionally employed by Heidegger in order to compare his own
philosophical situation to Aristotle 's. For just as Aristotle is the c10sesl
heir to the legacy of Plato, so is Heidegger 10 Ihal of Husserl.
Accordingly, Heidegger hop es Ihal, by lurninglo Aristotle, he could
bring out the true meaning of Husserl's phenomenology in the sa me
way Ihal Aristotle had radicalised Plato.
This self-interpretation constitutes the background to Heidegger's
leclure course Sophistes, where Heidegger suggests thal, when Husserl
100 GA 63, p. 76: "Entsprechend unserer Stellung ist die lJrsprnglich e Stellung
wieder neu auszubilden, d.h., sie ist entsprechend der getinderten historschen Lage
etwas anderes und doch dasselbe."
101 GA 19, pp. 4 13.41 4.
J02 Cf. GA 62*) p. 2, and above, pp. 24-25.
54
fram cd hi s noti on o r intcntiona lity, he in faet redi scovered an idea
whi l.:h had long bcen lost, but which \Vas realised already by Plata when
he claimcd that specch is a'ways about something, it always ha s the
fonn of logos linos. 103 Thus the philosophy of Plato and in some sense
also Husserl represenls somthing new in Ihe history of phi losophy ; but
being new, their thinkin g was also vaeillating and unfulfilled, It had to
be brought to completion by their fo ll owers: Aristotl e and Heidegger.
For if il was Plato's (Husserl' s) achievemcnt to discover intentionality,
it was Aristotle 's (Heidegger's) merit 10 gi ve il its true signification by
showin g that it must be situated within an ontology of human li fe,
which is nol developed in Plato (Husserl). Hence, when Heidegger says
that "There is no scientifie underslallding, i.e. historieal return to Plato,
without a passage thal goes Ihrough Aristotle.,,'04, he wants to imply
that on ly through his OIV II philosophy can Husserl 's thinking be
understood, just as Aristotle ' s philosophy sheds new light on Plato.
Plato is more difficult to uilderstand th an Aristotle, because his ideas
and queslions are nol yC I fu ll y developed and point in many direclions,
whereas in Aristotle thcy are "worked out in a more radical and
scientific way".105 With the names substituted , this means that
Heidegger has fulfilled certain possib ilities which no doubt were
inherent in Husserl 's thinkil1g but which were hidden to Husserl
himself. In Ihis way, Heidegger has nol on ly radiealised Husserl's
philosophy and taken it a slep further, bui he has also artieulated a new
horizon with in which to interpret it, in that he has inv it ed into
I-Iusserlian phenomenology the onlologieo-te leo logica l dimension ,
whieh he has received From Aristotle.
Precisely on this point, however, it becomes elear how Aristotle's
histori eal situation differs [rom that inhabited by Heidegger. Heidegger
understands his own philosophy to be reintroducing the question of
being 10 philosophy, thereby breaking wilh an epistemologieallradilion
wilhin philosophy and reawakening a tradition of ontologica l work that
J03 GA 19, p. 598. In the Sophisl, 262eS6, Plato says: "It is nccessary that a se ntence,
if il tS 10 be a sentence, is about somethi ng; without thts someth ing it is impossib le."
r'A6yov vayKalov, owv1tep~. nvoc; Elval Myov, 11~ of: nv ,suvawv.")
0.1 G A 19, p. 189: "Es gibt kcin wissenschart liches VersUind nis , d.h. hi storisches
Z urOckgchc l1 zu [)talo aime Durchgc hen durch Ar istotc les." Whole se ntence
ita lic iscd by lI eidegger.
105GA 19.pp. II - 12.
55

was at il s ms t powerl'ul during th e anc ie nl CI'U. ' lI llIll~1 1111 Il I d l."~gc r 's
acco unt, w ith Aris totl e and fo ll owed by an incrcasin g Inl\;1c~ 1 in th e
nature of know ledge in stead of bein g) whi ch, as wc saw abovc. is OIlC o f
Heid egger 's charges aga inst Husserl. This mea ns th al Il eidegge r 's
histori cal position is marked by th e need lO crilicise the history not only
bec a use of its for ge tfulness o f bein g, but a lso beca use of its
forgetfuln ess of A ri stotl e, insofa r as it has es tablished what in
Hei degger 's view is a far too one-s id cd pict ure of hi s thin kin g.
Consequ entl y, Heidegge r 's cri tique has to be two fo ld: il must be
directed against the traditi on so as to re lease the true Aristotl e, who w ill
provide Heidegger with th e phil oso phi eal lools w ith whi eh to criLieise
the trad iti o n, an d w ho the reby partakes in th e trans format io n o f
pheno menology call ed for by Heidegger. Bul eve ntu all y, lhe criti que
against the tradition will encompass A ri stotle as w eil. Thus the " tru c"
A ristotle has seve ra l faces, and o ne of th e maj or moti ves behin d
He id egger's interpre tatio n o f Aristotl e is to ass ert prcc ise ly Ihi s
ambi guity, s in ce it indica tes th at A ristot le is do in g fo undali o nal
philosophica l work an d has not go t stuc k in establishe d pos itions or
"standpoints" .
Aeeordin gly, the pl ace of Ar istotle in Heidegger's projeet revea ls
how importa nt it was fo r him to overcome th e distin clion between
historie al an d systemal ie phil osoph y, O n He id egger's acco unt,
systemat ic philosophi s in g and hi storiea l in terprelatioll do Ilo l o nl y
represen t two compalib le e nd cavo urs, but w ill ind eed turn ouI
unsuceessful if pursued in isol ation from eaeh other. The atte mpt to do
away w ith this di stin cti on is re flected ciearl y in th e lect ure course
Phiinomen%gische /nfelprefationen ZIl Aristote/es , 106 ln this wo rk, as
in many others, Heidegg er see ms la never aeco mplish the init iall y
state d tas k; instead he spends lhe entire lime OIi preparato ry \Yo rk,107
Ari stat le is hardl y menti oned at ail , but Heidegge r, seemingly preparing
himself for th e in ter pretati o n, onl y presen ts lo hi s audien ce an
"" GA 6 1. See al 50 GA 56/57, p, 132,
107O lhe r examp lcs arc GA 19, wh ich was to be a course on Plato 's Sophist, but
Heidegger devoled half of iL to Aristotle; and "Ei nle itung in die Phnomenologie der
Rel igi on", Phtillo men'Jlogie des religi6sen Lebens (GA 60), whe re H eidegger \Vas
supposed to speak about Christ ian ity, but spent 50 mu ch time on the introduc tion,
whic h \Vas itself a discussion about the very meaning of introduction, that the
studen ls complained.
56
:I IA I''I'ER ONE
ex p li cn ti oll o f fac ti ea l liI'c, A s th is clearl y s hows, preparatio n or
clarificali ol1 or lh e situa tio n peculiar to philosophica l in terpretation is of
ccnlru l importancc to Heidegger. This k ind of methodological rell ection
sho ulcl not o nl y enab le us to avo id incorrect interpretati ons, but also
help us to und ersta nd what it means p ursue philosophy and what
happens whe n one reads a ph ilosophieal tex!. However, as he himself
says:
The re is no point in methodological speculat ions when there is no
Ihing [Sache} behind Ihcm. We wanl !i rsl of ail Lo pursue concretc
Interp retations and Icave the " quest ion of method" bch ind. Ta be
sure this question involves more than the wo rd indi catcs; it is
, "111 lts turn a rcscarc h mto
namely ' th'Illgs thcmse 1ves. 10.
Meth odology is a justified end eavour to th e exle nl that it belongs to the
ana lyti c of human li fe or ex iste nce, w hose mode of bei ng is prec isely
interpretati on or exp licat io n. But just as a theory of int erpretati on wi ll
be uninformative if it fails to aeknowledge th e to som e exlent unique
character of every ind iv idual aet o f expli cati on, met hodo log ieal
spec ul ati ons must go together w ilh actua l phil osophiea l interprclati on,
for if they are pursued w ithout a specifie context, th ey will be devoid o f
con tent and too general to be of use to the indi v idua l case, Or rath er,
methodology eannot but be dependent upon actual philosophical work,
for even he w ho claims to undertake methodological qu est ions w ill onl y
be shaw n lO ha ve framed his meth odology on th e bas is of hi s
ex pcr ienccs of sorne specifi e situati ons of int erpretat ion, whi c h he
cove rll y has turn ed inlo a general model. Accord in gly, as Heidegger
remarks in th e above- mentioned course on Ari stotle, we should not
believe th at lhe preparatory work eould be regarded as th e systematic,
tnd y philosophieal part whi le the follo wing interpretati on of Ar istotl e is
j usl a hi storiea l exegesis, Co nversely, we mu st n ot thi nk th at the
introducti on is arbitrary, as if it would be nothi ng but the express ion of
the author 's pre fe re nces, while the ex plicat ion o f Ar istotl e is wh al is
objecti vc ly lrue, l09
108 G Il 19, p. 62: "Mcthodische Spckul al ioll cn haben ja we ni ~ Sinn,. werm kejt~e
Su c!1c dnhinlcr stcht. Wir wo Ucn zlltlllchst kOllkrele l ntcpreta tl on trelben und dIe
'Mclh oden rragc' 7urOck stcll cll. Frc ilich is t dicsc dann mehr, ais das Won besagl; sie
ist ll!hnli ch se lbst wieder Sachforschung."
Ill') (}A 61, p. I IO .
57
 '11 i\ I'TER ONE

On Il c id egger's accoun l, w ilhin pl1iluso plll c nl UI. II\!/ Iy nl l'I 1$ no t\ r S10ll c w il l! hil11 in Ihi s . Thi s lll cant that he had to make a genuine

such thing as history of philosophy in th e sense o f ti O lll Cll dll ~ \;xlcl'llal to fl UClllpt lO undc rSland the doxa laid down in Aristotl e's works , 50 as to
the systematic pursui!. Il is not only the case Ih at a " prcpura lory" be ab le to lake a step beyond hi s horizon, thereby receiving the
analysis of factical life will pave the way for a proper eneollnler wi th poss ibility ofrevealing the inherent but perhaps unfulfilled possibilities
Aristotle, but this preparation is itself prepared by a reading of Aristotle. in Arislotle. ln accordanee with this view, Heidegger coneeives of his
The philosophy of letieallife eould not work as a proper preparation to philosophy as a retrieval (Wiederholung) of Aris totle: it projects itself
Aristotle if it was not from the beginning projeeted in the light of an towards possibilities that are contained in A ristotle 's work, but these
interpretalion of the nature and aim of the philosophieal problematie in poss ibilities are truly accessible only on the bas is of a crit iq ue that is
2
direeted ogainsl some of their implications and presuppositions.11 In
Aristolle. That is to say, the aim ofthe reading of Aris tolle is not merely
to achi eve a heig hte nerl awareness of wha t presuppositions one wi ll
lhi s way, one eould say that Heidegger's aim is to develop a philosophy
enaet when approaehing the "thing itselF', for 10 Ihis "Ihin g" belongs Ihat both was and was not articulated by Aristotle himsc1f.
Aristotle's interpretations of it. In other words, if the task of philosophy
is ta let li fe and ils logos be expressed, one way to do sa is prec isely to
make visible Aristolle' s logos. For if philosophy is a speeili e mode of
life, of its own theme, then the philosophieal explicati ons of life may be
investigated as an int egra l part of lire itse lf Por thi s reason , the inquiry
into logos must involve an inqu iry into Ari stotle's "speech" on logos.
And al! the di fferences belween Heidegger and A ri sto tl e
notwithstanding, one might in faet say that it was Aristotle who initiated
or at least prepared such a view on philosophieal wo rk. For as we saw
earli er, Aristotle claims that the suecess or fa ilure of philosophieal
investigations depends upon th e ab ility to encounter doxa in the right
way. This means on th e one hand that the sys tematic pursuit cannot do
without historieal investi gations, but on the other lhat the fruitfulness of
our interpretations of doxa requires a systematie ambition from us. Il
requires that we have ta ken a step beyond the leve l of opinions,
othenvise we wi ll not be able to get a clear v iew of them, "For on every
subjeet the earliest philosophy is like one who fa lters, while being new
and in its beginning. " 11O Beeause of this interdependence of historieal
and systematie research, Aristotle th inks that hi s own philosophieal
results cao be described as saying something that in a way both has and
has not been articulated before. l l l
Heidegger did not think of Aristotle as faltering. His aim was no
doubt to formulate his own philosophieal agenda, but he wanted to take

~,1O M~l. 993a,15 -1 ~: . "If~t~o~uivtl yp OtKEV h 1tpdrrll $t ooo$ia 1tEPl rrcivn:ov,

O't VEa tE Kat Kt apxa 01)00."
I II Mel. 993al 1-15 . II ~ Sec ( iA HI p. 270.
1

58 ,9

Chapter Two
THE EPISTEMIC LOGOS
1. On the task ofquestioning a traditional intetpretation oflogos
Following his own dictum that phi losophy is possible only as critique,
Heidegger's shifting approaches to logos as a ph il osophieal theme ail
have one thing in common. [f yet with various degrees of explicitness,
they involve a confrontation with that conception of speech which he
regards as altogether dominant in the history of philosophy, l10tably so
far as the development of logic is concerned. This is the view that the
declarative scntence or the assertion (die Aussage) is the locus of trulh
and knowledge.' A decisive step in this direction was ta ken by Aristotle
when he singled out th e assertion as a form of speech particularly
worthy of interest, which must be investigated separately, since its basic
characteristics are not shared by the other modes of speech. [n De
Interpretatione, he deelares that:
Every sentence is meaningful, though not as an instrument but, as
wc said, by convention. Not every sentence is an assertion
though, bUl only thase in which trulh and falsity are present.
There is not truth and falsity in every sentence; for example r:
prayer is a sentence, but il is neither true, !l Of false. 2
l "Assertion" is the common translation of Heidegger's tcrm Aussage. It may pcrhaps
seem at b it awkward to speak about a "negative assertion", but as Heidegger does not
make uny distinction bctwccn affirming and Ilcgat ing sta te ments as far thei r
assertoric force is concerned; to deny that something is the case is no Jess an
assertion than ta affirm this . The meaning of "assertion" will undergo change as the
analysis proceeds, but init ially, it refers ta the indicative, whose basic runction is ta
state or assert "something abOLIt something", tt Kal"c1 'tl voS, lO use Ar istotle's
expression (see e.g. De An. 430b26). Though for the most part! wil l use the tenn
"assertion", J will occasionally also speak about "statement" or "propositional
speech", but without any difference in meaning.
2 De lnlerpretatione ("De [III."), 16b33- 17a4: "crtl yo Cl7tCl ,I v Olll l ()V"t 1K6C;.
auX w op-yQVOV M, ",),: W01l:Ep ep r)1:CH KC11 cr\JVe l; KllV. nO$CLv't"I ~o " 8t\
60
Clli\PTER TW O
On th e bas is o f this dcJinition of the assertion or logos apophantikos,
Aristolle was able to dismiss the non-positing modes of speech from his
" Iogical " investigations. Since they cannat be true or false, their
investigation belongs to the disciplines of rhetoric and poeties 3 ln doing
this, he at the same time cleared the way for instituting th e judgement as
a model for genuine cognition, since the judgement is the kind of
knowledge that finds its proper expression in the assertion and thus can
be true or false. 4
The critique that Heidegger directs against this conception of logos
does 110t primarily aim at showing that other modes of speech th an the
assertion, su ch as questions, imperatives, etc ., are also of interest in
connection with truth and knowledge. Rather, it seeks to challenge the
very category of indicative speech itself, Illaking lhe assumption that
this i5 not a homogeneous phenomenon when taken beyond its formai
or logical context. Heidegger does not dispute that there is a particular
form of knowledge and truth peculiar to the assertion, and the point of
departure for his inquiry is the conviction that one must take seriously
the ciaims made for the primacy of the assertion in this respect. What he
does criticise is a treatment of the assertion, and of language in general,
as something that can be investigated in isolation, without reference to
ils role withio human understanding and action. In other ward s, the
target of Heidegger's attack is above ail a philosophieal interpretation of
the assertion that he regards as too limited or one-sided in that it has
discarded the context of speech as something external to the meaning
and nature of speech. This has resulted in a static conception of speech
that docs not pay attention to the activity of speaking but only ta its
result, i.e. preciscly the assertion.
For this reason, the task that Heidegger sets himself is not merely to
show why the inquiry into logos must refrain from looking upon the
assert ion as a basic model for speech, but a1so and equally to question
v (~ tO a ll8euElv il \!/E.ueo8co UnapXEl" OUl(
ci n' V onCIal U1tCiPXl, OlOV l',
exn M-yo pv, u).; Ot' OAllOnS O1:E: 'VEUOr')S."
J /Je. 111f. 17a4 -7.
.1 And silice A ri s toll c [!link s [hal the pos itive judgc lll cnt g ives more knowledge th an
Ih e tlcgal ivc, Ile dcc lnrc s the fi fSl sy ll ogisttl 10 bc the 1ll 0S 1 sc iell tific one . Tt is the
0\1 n(ic;, ol1fy sy ll ol:\ ism Ihll l is hOlh pos iti ve rl nd l.lni vc rsal. Sec PO.l"lerior Ana /ylies ("An.
j 'ost.") 1.1 '1. 25.
(JI
 '11 1\1''1 1,1{ '1 W()
the formai or logica l app roach to lan guage 1'01' th " hcnc l1t o f "
phenomenologieal interpretation. ln order to revea l the nUlur" of the
assertion, and of speech in genera l, th e forma i ana lys is is not cnou gh,
insofar as it focuses on the logico-grammatica l, "slatie" [eatures of
speech, for in order for something to qualify as an asserti on, a special
kind of situation must obtain. Since this condi tion is shared by ail
modes of speech, whieh means that speec h reee ives its specifie
character or differentiation - sueh as assertoric force - on ly within a
g iven contex t, it was wrong to sup pose th at the asser ti on should be
s ing led out merely on th e bas is of Hs grammar and lag le. As an
a lternative to this kiml of Iinguistic analysi s, Heidegger proposes to
seek the foundation not just of propositiona l speech but 31so of uttered,
"concrete" speech as such in a more primordial discursivity belonging
to man. Wh en reach ing th is more [undamental level of th e constitution
of speech, wc will have the opportunity to sec what reatures are pecu liar
preeisely to the assertion. furt her, if it sho uld turn out - and it w ill -
that there are forms of understand ing that arc not propositional in kind
and therefore cannot be coneeived of \V ith the assertion as a model, but
yet make up the foundation of propositiona l speech and thought, then
we cannottruly comprehend the nature of the assertion itself un less wc
c1arify these other forms ofunderstanding.
It should thus be no ted that l-Ieidegge r's inquiry in to the assertion
will eventua ll y lead to a tra nsfo rm ati on of th e ent iJ'e problcmatic.
Initi ally, he goes along with the form ai perspective on language, and
affirms what he takes to be th c cOl11mon meanin g of "assertion ",
aceording to whieh it refers td an ullered or pronounced statement - der
ausgesprochene Satz, as he puts it. s But eventua lly, tbe assertio n w ill be
regarded as a speci fi e mode of access to the \vorld. Par th is reaso n, a
central question for the phenomenologica l analys is concerns wha t kind
of k.nowledge is involved in assertoric speech. But of equal importance
is the quest ion of what kind of ideal of kn ow ledge goes along \Vi th the
focus on the asserti on in philosophy. Th is is, on Heidegger's account, a
theoretical ideal of knowledge, what 1 will cali the "epistemic" ideal of
cognition, thereby referring to that kind of knowledge which Aristotle
designates as epis/eme. Fin ally, Heidegger (hinks that to fu ll y
' CA 2 1, p. 1;,10.
62
llltde rstand why th e a ssertion ha s been granted this specia l
cpistemological status requircs ultimately that one should also examine
the ontolog ica l assum pt ions that organ ise such a view on speech. In this
chapter, however, 1 wi ll - on ly touch brie fly upon that aspect of
Heidegger's anal ysis.
ln th is connection, Aristotle is initially approached as the ori gi nator
of the for maI or logical approach to language, together \V ith its
elllp hasis on assertoric speech, which He id egger thus wa nts to
c hall enge. But w he n tracing thi s int erpretat ion of lo gos back to
Ar istotle, Heidegger l'i nd s that Ar istotle's understand in g of
propos itional speech is in ilS turn based upon a braader notion of
speech, even though Aristotle may not have been entire ly clear about
this himself. In virtue of this double tendency in his thou ght, he can
show the way forward to a beller understandi ng of the essence of
speech. Thus on the one hand, Aristotle is the target of Heidegger 's
" destruction" of the history of the philosophy of language: he is the sti ll
not accurately explicated origin of that which in this context first of ail
"shows itself' , that which is primaril y given ta the investi gatio n of
logos, namely the notion that language and thought are essenti all y
invested w ith a propositional structure. Here it should be noted that
Heidegger regards Aristot/e as the origin of this notion of language not
because he takes this to be an obvious fact, but because this has become
the common view on Aristotle. In other wards, the po int of departure
for I-Ieidegger's inquiry into logos is not simply Aristotle himse lf, but
rather a traditiona l in terpretation of Aristot le.
Accordingly, the first task that Heidegger sets himself is that of
exploring Aristotle 's understanding of the assertion. More specificall y,
he secks to revea l the structure which in Aristotle's view constitutes the
possibil ity o fm aking an assertion. This is the structure of sun/hesis and
dihairesis. In do in g so, however, He id egger fin ds that A ri sto Ll e 's
ana lysis or thesc concepts, albc it too limited in its approach sin ce
Aristotle Feil short of inquiring into their existential foundat ion, may
ncvertheless be extended beyond the sphere of propositional speech, to
th e domain of human undcrstandin g as such, co nceived of at a deeper
level than that of concrete speech.
Within the lirst stll ge or the illqlliry into logos, that is, before he
bl.:gins clnhonllin g hi s OWIl vicws , Il cidcggl:1' (h us thin ks il necessary to
l
 '11 Al'llm 1 Wt)
de vo le SOJl1C c lTOrl to jU Sl li slcning 10 ri Sloli c !lnd 1\1 w lHlI Ill' h!l' ln !'l lly
abou t the meaning and nature of logos. A s he put s il, hc hu . Il'llmin g
ally new conception of logos and ilS relation to truth and knowlcd gc, wc
must first try to get behind the history of logic, down to its origin, and
listen to Aristotle's own Collegium logicum. 6
2. Sunth esis and dihairesis as the basic constituents o/the assertion
ln the 1925/26 lecture course Logik, whi ch the fo llowing discussion
primarily draws upon, Heidegger sets out to discuss what logic is,
describing il in a preliminary \Vay as a discipline Ihat in vcst igates
speech, logos, insofar as il ean be truc and ral se. 7 Thus tb e question of
logos is from the beginning formulated as a question concerning the
nature of truth. In the lectures that fo llow, Heidegger devotes mueh time
to a carefll l serutiny of different modern views on the relation between
truth and speech, notably with respect to Husserl and Lotze, eventuall y
working himselfback to A ri stotl e' s work as thcir supposcd ori gi n.
Since Aristotle states that "Truth and fa lsity are a matter of
combination and separation"S, the initi al task must be to exami ne the
meaning of comb inati on and separation , sunthes is and dihairesis.
Heidegger' s interpretation of these concepts puts focus on what he will
later state to be one of three basic features of the assertion, namely
predication, by which he understands the dctcrm ination (Bestimmen) of
the subject by means of the predicate.' According to a common view,
sunthesis and dihairesis are related to affirmation and denial, kataphasis
and apophasis, in such a way that sUl1thesis and kataphasis fonn one
pair, and dihairesis and apophasis makc up another. The ensui ng result
is that to make an affirmation, for in stance that "man is white" is to
combine the two concepts "man)' and "white", whereas to deny the
same thing would be to separate them from each other. lo One could thus
' GA 2 1, p. 25.
'GA2 1,p. 6.
3 De In/ . 16a I 2-13 : ''n:Epi. yp OU9EOlV K(.Il wi peoi v ou tO o/eooo:; 'tE KUl1
,~a."
9 GA 2 t, p. 133 . The other two characterist cs are "mani fest ation" or "showing"
(Aufze ig ung) and communication. These are treated be low.
10 See e. g. 1. DOring, Arisfoteles . DarsteiiuIIg und Interp r etatio n seines Denkens, p.
66 ; W. D. Ross, Aristotle, p. 26; E. Tugendhal, "Der Wahrheilsbegr iff bei
Ari stoteles", p. 252.
64
say thut SlIlIfltes is and dihair es is explain what is involved in making an
affi rmative and a negative judgement respectively.
Il eidegger, however, rejects this interpretation and argues instead
Ihal denial and affirmation alike involve both combination and
separation. Whether you affirm or deny that man is whi te, you bring
logether or "synthesise" "man" and '\vh ite", and th is implies at the
same time a form of separation, not only in the sense that "man" and
"white" are kept apart in the assert ion , but al 50 that, in making the
assertion, the property "white" is singlcd out among other possib le
properties. 11 This interpretative move is very important to Heidegger; in
fact, it settles the horizon for his interpretation of the Aristotelian logos
as such, and it also provides him with a background to his own project.
The reason is that this interpretation opens the possibility of taking the
struct ure of sunthesis and dihairesis beyond the context of predication
On the propositional leve!. Granted that dihairesis represents the act of
" spelling out" or separati ng subject from predicate in the assertion, it
can be understood as a kind of apprehension that, insofar as it singles
out that qual ity which is to stand as prcdicate in the assertion, may fun
ahead of and be constituti ve of predication. Hence, there are two claims
involved in Heidegger's interpretation: first, to make an assertion means
both to combine subject and predicate and to separate them from each
other. Secondl y, predication (s unthesis ) is based upon a foregoing
separation, which gives you access to an object in a particlliar regard .
As an interpretation of Aristotle, Heidegger seems to be confident in the
appropriateness of the tirst claim, but hesitates as regards the secon d,
for whereas the former still moves within a formai concepti on of th e
asserti on, the latter indicates someth ing about its foundation. But even
though Heidegger in the end wi ll conc illde that s untllesis and dihairesis
as portrayed by Aristotle are too formai to capture what he himself is
after - namely a synthet ic-dihairetic nature pertaining not only to
propositiona l speech and thought but to man 's very existence, as weil as
to the givenness ofbeings as such - he is not prepared to tie Aristot le to
an entirely logical conception of this structure.12 Heidegger's hesitation
in thi s connection is to some extent caused by an ambiguity on the part
IIGi I 2 1. p. t39;SZ. p. 159.
~2 (iA 2 t. p. t 68.

or i\rislotle, who does IlOl al\Vays stale cxplici tl y \V hoth e, ho ls lIsi ll!;
the concepts o f sl/nth esis and dihairesis \Vith an o nto logica \ or togical
meaning in milld . However, Heidegger does not co nsidcr this ambi guity
only as a problem, but thinks that it is also w hat is tru ly fru itfu l in
A ri stotie's conception of sun/hesis and dihairesis . [ wi ll returo to th is
point below.
But tirst so mething more must be said abo ut the notions of
kalaphasis and apophasis, su ch as they are und crstood by Ar istotle. In
De Interpretatione, th ey are defincd as follow s : "A ffirmation is an
asse rti on predicating one th ing of anoth er, and negoti on is an assertion
deny ing one thing of another." l) Note is that it is not a (grammatical)
predicate that is amrmed or den ied of a (gramm a ti cal) subj ee t, but a
quality of a thin g. ln this way, th e assertion by its nature "aims at", and
is guidcd by things. Ifwc look ta the Categories, wc ftnd the following
distinction between the assert ion and its object:
T hat w hic h falls u nd e r a ffirmatio n and nega lion is no t itse lf
a ffi rmation or ncgat io n, fo r a ffir mat ion is an aftirming speech ,
and negation is a negati ng speech, bu i Ihat wh ic h rai ls under
14
affirmat io n and negali on is not speech.
How are wc now ta understand sun/hesis and dihairesis in this context?
As stated ab ove, Heidegger's idea is that to eve ry asserti on, regardless
of whet her it affirms or de ni es sOl11cthing, thcre belongs a sy nthetic-
dihairetic structure. The cruc ial text for He idegger in thi s conn ection is
De Anima. F irst, as He idegger notes, Ar istot le states th at s lll1thesis is
necessa ry if falsity is to be possib le, an d s ince negatin g assertions
apparentiy also can be fals e, thi s seems to impl y th at sunthesis belongs
to apophasis as we il. " Aristotie explains why th is is 50 : "For cve n if
[one were to say that] w hite is not white, one hs brought [wh ite and ]
not- w hite into a combi nation ."" And he add s: " lt is equall y possible to
13 De lm. J7a25-26: " lm'[41am anv arro41a vm Tl voS Ka-t l i vo, clnoQacrt<;
E.o nv cm$avol 'tlVO mo 'tlVOs."
14 Categories ("Cal ." ), J2b5 -JO: "o ille a n o OOE. tO \mo -t~v Kara$am v Kal
arr$am v Ka'ta$am.; Kat orr$am ' ~ Ilv yp Ka-tcjlacrt 010 Eo'tt Kataq,aUKo
Kal ~ cbt$am yo cmocjlan K6. tmv Of:. {m 'tTW Ka'ta$am v li nq,aow O8v
Ean )'6yo."
15 De An. 430bl -2; GA 21 , p. 136. See also Mel. I027b I8-20.
16 De Ali. 430b2-3: "Ket! yp v t I,e\JKov 1-1." euKov [$~. t E\JK'OV KCt II '1'0 Pll
EUKOV a\Jv9rtKEV ." The wa rds in brackcts are a recon structi on by W, n , I{O')5 in
66
' ll l\l''l'ER TWO
cn l! a il thi s di vis ion .,, 17 I\ s far as 1 kn o\\', thi s is the cnly place in
Ar istot lcs works that can really be taken as contirmin g Heidegger's
interpretation. On th e other hand th ough , 1 can not see that Aristotle ever
18
says a nylhing that con tra dicts Heidegger on th is point. And as we w ill
see shortly, Heidegger points to precisely thi s passage in De Anima as a
k ind of tuming-point as far as the inq uiry into logos is coneerned : it
makes up the end-point of Ari stotle's a nalys is of logos, a nd thereby, it
marks th e limit of the traditional inquiry into logos as such. For this
reaso n, it also provides Heidegger \Vi th the startin g-point for his attempt
ta take the analysis ur logos a step rurth cr than what Aristotle himself
did.
But so far _ the preliminary co nclusion that Heidegger draws is that,
once we realise that dihaires is cann ot be ide ntitied with denial and
slm/hesis with amrmation, we see not on ly that every asserti on has a
sy ntheti c-dihairetic stru cture, b ut a lso th at thi s is a more bas ic
pheno menon than affi rm atio n a nd denial : "Combination and separation
precede affirmation and deni" l as th e condition of their possibility and
as the condition of possibility or conceal ing and uncovering.,,19 With
sun /hesis and dihairesis, we thus seem to have found th e basic structure
of lo gos as assertion. T he next question for H eidegger is how far
the Oxford Class ic al Texts edi tion. See also De lnl . 16b23-25, where A ri stotle
remarks that not only the word bcing (El vat) bul nl so " no t-bei ng" (!l~ dvat) implics
a ouvgeOl <; when regarded in iso lation.
II De. An. 430b3-4: "Evxetm o KC OWiPECHV ~ civat 1ttV'tCl ."
18 ln hi s ed itian of De Anima , pp. 5 1 4~515 , Hicks interprets thi s passage in a way
rath c r si mi lar to Heidegger. Heideggc r's Interpretati o n seems to get further
con firmati on From the faet that Aristot le not o l1ly di sc usses OUV8EOt and oWlpeal
in co nn ection with his analys is of the asse rti on, but also speaks about them as
fea tures of think ing; see De ln/. 16a 1 3~ 14; De Ali. 430a26~27. A t least in the case o r
lO i peau;, thi s seems to be the most common sense of the te nn, and Aristot le makes
ex tens ive use of it, both in the non~techn i cal sense of disti nguishing between things,
and to designate a philosophical method ; sce e.g. Cal. 10[116- 19, 14b34-35, Priol"
Alla/ylies ("Ail. Pr.") 46a31 -34, An. Post. 9t bt2- t5, Phys. 184a21 -24, De Ail.
402a 19-20. As regards ov9cot, it is o r course truc that Aristot le has the expression
6yo ou\.8Eto, speech composed of severa! assertions (De 111/. 17a2 1-22), and that
he, as rerr.arked above, says that being and not -being l11ply a crUV9Ol. But for the
mos! part, w hen talking about the sentence as com posed o f parts, he uses the !e rm
OWl1tOK~ (e.g. Cat. l aI6 ~17, b25ff.; De 1111 . 2 Ia5). On !his poi nt , one sho uld also
nOie Ihe absence of a discussion of ovOeal<; and oWlpe<n in De Interprelatiolle,
whosc expl ic it intention is to investigate the assertion (l7a6~ 7).
t9 GA 2 1. p. 140: " Verbind e n und Trenne n li egt ja abe r vor Zusprechen und
Absprccll cn ai s Bcd in lALtl1 g ihrc r Mogl ichke ilund a is Bcdingung der Moglichkeit von
V:rdcckctl und Entd cckctl."
67
 'liA!''! lm '! wo
Aristo tl c has int errogatcd into thi s stmcLurc, o r in ollier WOI d .... w hal is
the scope of s Ull lhesis and dihairesis.
3. The Linguistic and the ontologicallevel of sunthesis and dihaires is
A ristotl e speaks about combination and separation at the onto logical
level as weil. For example, if we look ta the Me/op"ysics , wc read that
" The true has on the o ne hand affirmatio n of that which is com bined,
and on the other hand deni al of that which is separated, but the fa lse has
the contrary arrangcmcnt. ,,20 Heidegge r does Ilot to any great extent
discliss how exact ly the rel at ion betwecn the ontologica l an d the
linguistic or logicallevel of sun/hesis and dihairesis in Aristotl e should
be unde rstood, though he notes the amb igu ity in A ri stotle, cspecially in
connection with the concept of slllllh esis. He remark s, however, that
this seemi ng lack of clarit y as regard s th e rel at ion between the
ontological and the logical shou ld not sim ply be explained in term s of
confusion on the part of Ar istotl e . Il mu st be recogni sed as
philosophically prod uctive, for it implies that Aristotle has se nsed the
close affinity bctween th ese two spheres."
But in a rder ta see w hat Heidegger w illmake of th e relation between
these two levels, SQ me re marks on Ar isto tl e's v iev\/s o n this matter a re
needed, th ough il is not en ti rcly easy to sort th em oul. As nl r as 1 can
tell, to Aristotl e, combination and separation at the o ntological level -
representing the case when a property belongs ta an a bj ect and wh en it
does not re spec ti ve ly - constitute lhe most bas ic instance of this
distinction, inso far as they determine whal is true and fa lse ta think or
say. Accordin gly, when a property belongs la an abj ect it is correct ta
affinn the com mun ion, and when il does not it is correct ta de ny il. The
qu esti on is whelher these two possible ontological situations are ta be
22
identified wi th sUl1lhesis and dihairesis as hith erto outlincd. While it is
20 Met. l 027b21 -23 : "t )lv )'p rtf'I1Gb; 't"~v Ko't"cHpacn v bd 't"c9 crtlyK q.l v(fl8Xt,
'Ct1V 0' lto$aO"lv ltl. tc{! OtDPll].lVqJ, 'Co 8 'l'eoo; 'CoutOU "tO\) ].l ep t("~lo tt1V
avtt$acnv"
21 GA 21, p. 168. The charge that Ari slotle con fu ses the onto logical with the
linguisti c Jevel has been put forward by E, Tugendhat , " Der Wah rheitsbegriff bei
Aristoteles", p. 252.
22 When talk ing abou t combination and sepa rati on on the onto logical level, Ar istotle
uses the passive form s of Otatpe v and OUV1" i ElI1].lt , as in the quotat ion abovc. See
a1 50 Met. [X. I0. Aristot[e talks about ouvgeou; a[ so as an onto[ogi ca l stale, bUI Ih en
il is nol a question of a property Ihat be[ongs to an abject, but th e very ol>j l..:CI itsdl"
6X
C IIAPTER T WO
clca r th al a ncgatin g statemcnt co rresponds ta ontologica l sepa ration,
and a n affirmative stat ement to ontological combinat ion, it is not easy ta
dccide whethe r Aristotle also thinks that, when passi n g e.g. a negative
judge ment on somethin g th at is dihairemenol1 we are only Cllactin g a
d ihairesis and not a s lll1/h esis - unless we take the ab ove quotations
From De Anima as evidence in favou r of Heidegger 's interpretation. Or
rat he r, it seems suffi cie ntly clear that Ar istotlc at least occas ionall y
thinks that sunthesis is pred ication, whelher affirmati ve or negative, but
it is more doubtful whether he has also enl ertained th e idea th at thi s
sUllth esis must be a\;l.;ompanied by a dihairesis . As mentioned above,
one problem in this co nn ecti on is that Ari sto tl e is not so careful in
distinguishin g between th e linguisti c and th e ontological level (that is,
the meanin g of a stale ment a l'firmin g or denying that a quality belongs
to a n abject and th e obj ect' s mode o f existence respective ly). More
precisely, A ri stotle does not always specify exaclly what kind of
co mbination or separati on he has in mind; that is up to the read er to
understand from th e contex!.
But in view of Heidegger 's claim that Aristotle has a not ion of a
synthetic-dihairetic structure belonging ta the asserti on as l uch, whelher
it is an affirming or negating assertion, it seems that a di stinction must
be drawn between separation al the object ive and al th e linguisti c level
respecti ve ly. For if th e dihairesis of speech represen ts th e di scernment
of one predicate amon g others, it is appli cable not only ta the situation
where we hav e a separat ion at the objective level, but also ta the one
where we have a combin ation. The reverse also holds, of course. Thal is
to say, we combin e th e tenn s in speech or lhou ght ev en w h en th eir
ontological counterparts are di vorced from each othe r.
What should one think of thi s seeming ease w ith wh ich A ri stotl e
moves between th e onlological and the logical or lingui sti c level?
Among Ari stotl e scholars the opi nion is rathe r w idespread that he, and
the Greeks in general, had a somewhat nalve co nception of language, or
more precisely that th ey were sa thorou ghly at home in their lan guage
that has a composi te na tu re ( in contras! to the incomposite, crv9cta, substan c~s).
E.g. in De Allima, whc n Aristot le discusses (and rejects) the idea that the soul IS a
o vO e o t " of con lrnri es (407b27-408a I8), and below, when he remarks that the
clClllCtHS COllSl llll c tll ill H" in virtn c ar " a partic u[ ar formul a and sy nthesis" O..6'YC!l tl Vl
KCl I 01)\'0""0 1 1) , 111(1n l . ,
 '1lA 1''1 I,R 1 WII
that they wert! nol abl e la rellcclupon il. t\ccordil1 gly. Hlldull u ( 'ussn
has designatcd Aristot le's phil osophy as a "happy phcIlOlll cllology",
referring to the view that Aristotle sees no problems co nneetcd with the
transition from the perception of a thing to its Iinguistie express ion ."
Heidegger has olso put forward the idea that the Greeks were "fall en to"
and absorbed by language. Indeed, he claims, the Greeks were in a
sense in love wi th 10gos.24 And because Greek life to such a great extent
was centred on speech, in their society the greatest threat 10 a lire of
knowledge and truth came prec isc ly fro m la nguage, th e c learest
c,;xprc,;ssioll ofwhich is th e emcrgence ofsoph ism. 25 But Ihi s on ly s hows
the immense effort Ihat \Vas demandcd from Pl ato and Aristot le to seize
the possibi li ties of lan guage so as to frame a new philosophi cal
conceptuality and to devclop a science o f logos. And, Heidegger
continues, \Vhat is truly extraord inary is that in this pursuit, Plata and
A ri stotl e did not look for a gu id ing ci lie elsewhere, ou tside G reek
soc iety, but managed to retrieve th e possibi lity of a scientilic att it ude
towards speech trom wit hin Greek life itself: "They made good the
possibilities of speaking. Thal is the origin of logic, the tcaching of
logos,,,26
Still, the emergence of a criti ca l re tlection on logos in Aristotle is
somethin g that H ei degger considers 10 be at the sa m e time both fruit fui
and problemati c. As he sees il, it is in part prcc isely because Ar istot le
did not completely trust in language but saw that ail form s of speech are
Iimited in differen t ways as far as th eir power of arti culation is
concerned, that he reali sed the need to distinguish between different
kinds of speech which admit of dilferent kinds of access to the world. ln
particu lar, He idegger argues, il mad e A ri s tot le awa re of the difference
23 Aristote et le logos. Contes de la phnomnologie o;'dinaire, p. 4. See also the
cssays "La charte de la phnomnologie" and "De "objet de la sensation au sujet de
la phrase" in the same work. Cassin herself, while beginning her own work \Vith Ihis
characteri sation of Aristotlc's philosophy und ta sorne extent affirming it,
nevertheless seeks to question il as being tao one-sided. ln this connection, one migh t
also mention R. Mortley, who bas traced the history of a growing mis trust of
language. He thinks that it originates in Plata and is st ronger in him than in Aristotle.
See From Ward to Silence 1. The rise al/dfall oflogos, pp. 1 1Off.
" GA \8, pp. 262 -263.
2.> GA t 8, p. t 08.
26 GA 18, p. 109: "Sie machten Ernst mil den Moglichkeiten des Sprechens. Dns ist
der Ur.~pf'lmgder Logik, der Leine vom 'Yo. Sec also GA 17, p. 18; G/127, pp. 5 7 ~
58.
70
'\ IAI''Il;J\ '1 WO
bctwccn thcorctical and cvcryday speech.27 But al the same lime, when
th us mak ill g logos, and in particular logos apophantikos , into a theme of
its own, Aristotle made possible the subsequent divorce of language
from lh e ontological domailj, as weil as pavin g the \Vay for the notion
that not only human thinkin g in its essence is propositional, but ev en
being itsel r.
But on the other hand, to the extent that Aristotle' s logic remains
intimately connected w ith ontology, which makes Aristotle extend the
app li cation of sun/hes is and dihairesis beyond th e context of
propositiollal s peech, thi s is also somct hin g th nt Heidegger beth
endorses and questions. Heidegger too wants to use these concepts with
such a broad application, since he believes, just as Aristotle, lhat the
ways in which beings are given are constitut ive or our ways of thi nkin g
and speakin g, and that one shou ld therefore seek to find something like
a cerum en structure to th ese do mains. But as indi cated , in Ari stotl e. the
Iinguistic (i.e. predicat ive) and the o nto logicall eve l are often fused . and
thi s Heidegger wants to avoid , since he thinks that th e result of thi s
fusion is that bath being and language are in th e end common ly
assigned a propositional nature. ln this way, the seeming lack of a
re fl ection on logos prod uces essentia ll y the same outcome as its
contrary, the Hlogical" attitude outlined ab ove. For as Heidegger sees it,
even though Aristotle saw that th cre are di ffe rent levels or aspects or
slln/hesis and dihairesis, he did not manage to fu lly elucidate the
relation between them. As a consequence, Aristotle was too vague about
the foundation of the assertion, sa that thi s analys is of logos to some
extent remained fixed on the level of proposition al speech. This idea of
Heidegger' s is parti cularly important to keep in mind when readin g his
interpretation of Aristot le's discussion of sunthesis and dihairesis, for it
explains hi s vacillating stance towards Ari stotle on thi s point. More
precisely , Heidegger does not vacill ate as regards the ambiguity in
Ari sto tl e himself, but because Aristotle's thinking in this context poi nts
in two direction s, He id egger hesitates as to w hether he should grant
Aristotl e ail understandin g of the w ider ontological impl ications of
sunlhesis and dihairesis.
27' Cf. (,lI nplUl' " hl'cc. Scclh1ll 2.
71
 CII APTEI{ TWO

ta
CHAPT ER TWO

aSSCI1S. il is oil ly on the basis of a more far-reac hin g inquiry inta

logos
1
l-lowev er, Heideg ger' s respons e ta thi s prediea ment is not j ust and what Aristot le actually
e that one wi ll be in a position to underst
separat e the ontologieal From the linguistie level, aseribin g ta languag
have no meant by this Uvague indicati.on" concern ing sunlhes is and dihairesis.
its Qwn struct ure of sunthe sis and dihaire sis which would
equivalence in the things themse lves. Instead he takes this structur e 10 a
the bounda ry 4. The as-structure
deeper level of speech Ihan that of Ihe asserlio n, where e the
Ihat The next stage in Heidegger's analys is of logos is th us la continu
between languag e and being can be dissolved anew, in such a way ion
retic structur e. In this investigation into sunthesis and dihairesis sa as to reach the foundat
Ihey are both discove red la have a synthet ic-dihai sets from someth in g
mcanin g of of the assertion. Where should he begin? He Ollt
\Vay , one ca n say that Heidegger tries to bring out the truc he gave
wh ich he takes ta be problcmatic in A ri stotle, the fa cl that
100
Aristot le's attitude towards the re lation between language and being,
by
him
di sti nc ti on much priority ta Ihe synthet ic element in speech, for this made
showin g th at A risto tle indccd \Vas ri ght in blurrin g the the cast of other
ll y attach undue impo11a nce la the aspect of predica tion at
between Ihe two, althoug h it shou ld be done at anoth er, onlologica as
prior leve l. feature s of speech. Even sa, Aristotle's concep tion of predica tion
ta
Thus at the end of hi s discuss ion of sunlhes is and dihairesis
in sunlhe sis contain s an insight o f great importa nce, namel y that
Aristotle, when Heideg ger raises anew the questio n of where one sholiid predica tion belongs an "as-structure". Th is is , Heidegger argues,
the
look in arder ta get a cilie as to what conslilules the basic struct ure
of Aristotle's great achieve ment over agai nst Plata. Wherea s Plato in
Sophisl discovered th at every propos ition is always about someth ing,29
logos as assertion, he states that:
as
Aristotle took one step further in determining the Slructure of speech
Apart from an esse ntial , though agai n tao vague indica ti on, Heideg ger interpre ts this
li kala tinos: "something about someth ing".30
Aristotle himself decJines to answer. He and the Greeks - and the as saying that to pred icate an attribut c of a thing means to display il,
and
ensuing tradit ion as a who le - have neg lected to interrogate Ihis
structural ph enomenan in it s own right. Co mb ination anu thereby to see it, in a specifie regard; ta see il as (ais) some thing, rather
than as anoth er. Ta interpret li kola linos in thi s \Vay means of course
l 31
separa tion are the struclUre s by means of \\Ih ich, and as the fina
stage, the assert ion, the judgell1 ent, is clarilled, ... 1'0 rema in with
ta have already taken a step outside a strictly linguistic sphere, for
if
A ristotle him self, he could not Iiberate himsclf from his n
orientation tow ard s language - for the Greeks so met hin
g "saying as" pertains to a "seeing as~', wc are faced with a questio
That is, wc have
imposs ible - and as wi ll be shaw n, in him, the struct ures concerning th e nature of this kind of access ta beings.
sUlllhes s and dihairesis and their relations ta truc Jnd false 1l0W encountered a level of meaning prior
to that of predication: to be
karaphas is and apopha sis are not at ail so tran sparent as qua lity, one must understand il as
28 ab le to as sert that a thin g has a certain
compared to how they were elaborate d abovc.
being of such a quality.
's
This Hvague indicat ian is, 1 take it, the passage in De Anima
on Thi s s hould thus serve as a further elucida tion of Heideg ger
H

ately interpre tation of sun/hesis and dihairesis discuss ed above. Predi cation
slln/hes is and dihairesis diseussed above. And, Heidegger immedi
thi s
as sunrhesis mean s to say something about something, and
zu unbestimmten of a foregoi ng dihaire sis ,
28 GA 21, pp . 141- 142: "Von einer wesent lichen, abe r doch wieder cOInbination is only possible on the basis
die Auskunf t. Er und die Grieche n- al speech
whi ch cannot, consequ entl y, be said ta reside in proposition
Anwei sung abgese hen, versagt Arstotel es selbst
unt erlassen , diesem
und die weitere Tr adition berhaupt - haben es the
Strukturphan omen noch ci gens nachzufragen. Verbinden und
Trennen sind die o nl y" but must rather be recogn ised as an acti vity that precedes
St~ukt~re n, mit denen aIs einem Letzten die Aussage , das Urtei l gekHirl
\V ird, ... UIll
propos itio na l level. In thi s sense, th e momen t of app rehensi on, when
zu bleiben, so ist er nicht von der Oricnt icfung fille! der Sprnche
be l Anstoteles selbst
Slcll 110.;; 11 :tC ig/l
l o~gek~m m e,~ .- fLlr .die Griechcn c.ine Unm oglichkcit - uli d wl c 21J (' f. hnpl c,. One, p. 55.
bel Ihl11 elle Strukture n O\)\,OCOI ; und lh a ipcou; 1I1ld IlIl l' Jl l" lr lll UlHcli " '
wlrd, smd ln th' 1111 . ! 702 1Ir.
OItO$U01 k c i ll csWCH~ 11111 "II dIUI'I Htl\.'ht IH
Il ,,'/.. p. J ~() . 1hll ~ J Icld l.:"Hl'1's III , is /\ , i ~ t o IJ c's l~.
II lIdl
Wahr llnd Falsc ll 1(mc):$ucu c; lil le!
'
\V ic sic obclI herausgcarbclcl wlIrdcn."

Il
 'II A!,'II ' I{ '1 W()
you takc notice of a n a bject in a certai n regard , und h ' Ill''"' "" ill ~ ll' out" a
parti cul ar featu re of il, is as much in vcsted wi th th e as~sll lI!;t lll !.! liS is th e
e nsuing predi cation. Of course, th is m uch A ri stotl" 100 \Vou Id agrcc
upon; i.e, th at ta predication there belongs a foregoin g apprehcnsion,
where you pay attention ta a particular feature of the abj ect in question,
but the point Heidegger wants ta make is th at this dihairetic "seeing as"
ca nnot be conceived aft cr th e m ode) of predi cati on, s ince it does not
belong exclusively to propos iti onal speech (and tho ught) but to man 's
very existence. Pu t in another \Vay, ma n 's most funda me nt aJ way of
be ing in the wor ld is mark ed by an as-st ructu re of it s ow n, an d thi s
means th at his ex isten ce is essenti all y co nstituled by exp liction
(A IIslegllng).
The articu l<1t ioll of that which is undcrstood. as a bei ng is brought
close in an exp licatio n \V it h the "somethi ng as somelhing" as a
cl ue, li es te/ore the thematic assertion aboli t iL The "as" docs not
tum up for the lirst lime in Ihi s assertion, but is JUS! cxpresscd for
the fifS! limc in il, and Ih is is possib le only beause il lies bcforc
us as someth ing expressib le. The fact thal the explicitness of
assert ion can be abse nt whe n wc j ust look al so meth ing does not
make il jllstified to de ny suc h Illere sce ing eve ry k ind of
art icu lating expl ication, and hencc to dcny il ilS as-structure. 32
ln und erstandi ng somelhing as so methi ng. i. e. w hcn performi ng a
dihairesis, one is not only direcLed to th e ind iv id ual th ing, but one a lso
understands (in ad vance) a mean ing (Bedeu fung), in terms ofwhich one
has access ta th e Ihing in qu estion . The relation betw ee n meani ng and
thing also proves la be one of sunlhesis and dihairesis. In olher ward s,
th e dih airet ic " unders tandi ng as" is s imultaneous ly a sunlhesis.
Heidegger ex plains:
Thal out of wllich the interpretation takes place must be broughl
or put togcthcr with the "wh at" 01" Ihe interprelation - slIlIlhesis,
in wll ose bring ing a nd putting toge lher it is al the sa me lime
imp lied that bath of llit:l1l, tht: "Ulil ur which" o f interpretation as
32SZ, p. 149: "Die Al1ikulat ion des Verstandenen in de r auslcgenden Niihe rung des
Scienden am Le itfade n des ' Etwas aIs etwas' liegt vor der thematischen Aussage
dar ber. In dieser tauc ht das 'Ais' nicht zuers t a u f, so ndern wird nur e rst
ausgesprochen, was al1e in so mgl ich ist, dal3 es ais Aussprechbares vorliegl. DaO im
sch li ch ten Hi nsehen die Ausd rcklichkeit eines Aussagens fe hl en ka nn, berechtigt
nicht dazu, d iesem sc hlichten Sehen jede artikuliere nde Auslegung. milhin di e Als-
Stru ktll r abzusprechen."
74
'II A I''J'EK TWO
we il aS 11H11 whi ch is 10 be intcrprcted itsclf, are taken apart and
. 33
must be ke pt aparl in the cnactme nt 0 f t1le mterpretatlon.
Ta e ncounte r a n ind ividua l thing, one must have a preconception of th e
eidas - ta use Aristotl e's term - of the thin g, whi ch one accordin gly
mllst "brin g to ge th er" \V ith the individual thin g to perform an act of
un derstandi ng. Howeve r, i f th e ei d as, th e "o ut of w hi ch" of
und erstandin g, is to fulfil ilS fu nc tion. il can nol be idcntical or coincide
w ith the indi vidual th in g; it is general and is thus somethin g " more"
th an the indi v idual (conversely, the indi vi dual is somethin g more and
th us othcr than the general kind under wh ich it fa ll s). T hat is why the
34
general and the particular must be kept apart in a dihaires is.
B ut just as an indiv idual th ing is not und ersta nd able in isolation, its
" general" meaning does not appear by itself either, but is involved in a
nexus of meaning, w hi ch determines what can occur together at ail. We
a re thus w itnessing a yet more fund amental sunlhesis that belongs ta
bein gs th emsel ves, and which gives ri se ta a preconcepti on on our part
ofwhal is possible ta encounler together. In Logik, Heidegger gives an
example o f what he thinks is the most basic forl11 of seeing " as": ta see
a bush d urin g a wa lk in th e forest but beJiev ing that it is a deer. The
possibility o f this m istake is determined by an a nticipat ion o f w hat is at
ail possible ta encounter in such a context. By contrast, H eidegger add s,
one w ill surel y nol expect ta meet the Shah o f Persia in th e fo rest,
th ough il is o f course poss ible th at he wo ul d turn up th ere. Howeve r,
whereas it is possible 10 mect a deer in the fo res1 - and in a sense also
the Shah - il is cJearl y not possible ta come upon the third root of 69 in
the fore st. This poss ibility of encounter is an expressio n of th e
33 GA 2 1, pp. 14 8- 149: "Das, von wo aus gedeutet wird , mul3 mit dem \Va s der
De ulu ng zllsammengebrac ht, zusammengeselzl. we~den - crUV.OEO"I, in weI cher
Zusflllllnenbringung und Zusalll lllCnSclzllng zuglelch Ilegt, daO beld ~, das Woher des
Dc utcns und das Zll Deutende sclbst, auseinandergenommen sind und im Vol1zug der
Deut ung ausei nandergehalten werden mss en. " ~ote the pro?lem with translaling
Delltllllg as " interpretfltion " ; it must no: be taken tn. any tecl1 ~ l ~a l ~t: flS~. T.he reason
why Il eidcgge r i5 using D elllll1Jg he re IS that he thillks that JI IS consti tutI ve of Ihe
I)ede lllllllgen of words.
J., Il is ha rd ly innocent ta speak abou t "the genera l" and "the particu lar" in
cOllnl::ction \Vi th Il eidcgger, s ince he has tried, on the basis of a n interpretation of
IlIcaJli ng (Dec/eu/lIl1g) as possibi lity, to show that the mea nin~ of the parti.cu~ar cannot
in any si mpl e way bc rega rclee! as an instance of the unlvers.a l, as It IS a~ways
spcc Hi<..'"<.I accor<.ling to the Sil\l!ui oll . St ill , He idegger cannot do w ltnollt some killd of
.!loti oll (If' Il rc pcatnb lc Illcu nillg. hi s poiO! is trclltcd in Chtlpt crs Titree and Four.
7~
 ' 1lA 1''1 lm '1WI)
possibility or th e most original sUllt!resi,\', IltIlIl Cl y 111 11 1, ln thl'l cuse,
forest an d dcer, but not rorest and the th ird root of 69, ": 1I1l OCC lU". i.e. be
together. 35
ln brief terms, predication (which does 110t cons ist of a suu/hesis o nl y
but also o f a dihairesis, to the extent that it divorces predicate From
s ubject in the assertion) is made possib le by an understanding
dihairesis, where you pay attention to the parlicular thin g as bei ng o f a
specifie kind, and this understanding is al the saille lime a sUlIlhesis of
the particu lar thing and that in terms of wh ich il is understood. J6 Ta
distingui sh bctween these two forms of sunthesis and diha ires/s,
Hcidegger tenns the former an "apophanli c", i.e, assertiori c "as" and
the lattcr a "hermencuti c 'as,,,.37 The henneneuti c apprehension is in ils
lurn founded on a pre-given, "synthet ic" con tcxt o f the lhin gs that can
be together, and, although Heidegger does not say 50 himself, this
context may also be call ed a dihaires is , si nce it excludes such thin gs
that do not belong to il. Fin all y, as th e last fo unda li on stands a
foregoing disc losedness of being as such, which shou ld not, 1 thin k, be
analysed in terms ofslIn!hesis and dihairesis 38
Ail thi s makes clear, Heidegger says, tha t th e rea l work of
understanding docs not take place on thc level of prcd ication, but
precedes and founds il. This insight was however lost on Aristotle, since
he conceived of the structure of sunlhesis and dihairesis basicall y in
terms of propositional thought. This contention does no! aim at reducing
the importance of Ari stotle's work, but it im pli es that, in order to truly
understand th e nature of Ihe as sertion , one must take notice of that
disclosive activi ty which constitutes its foundation. For this, Heidegger
l5 GA 21 , pp. 187-188.
36 On thi s po int , one may pe rhaps com pare \Vit h Ka lH's understanding of the
di stinction betwccn sy nt hcs is and analysis. According to hi m, synthesis is a basic
fca ture of the spontanei ty of our understand ing (i.e. the Versla nd) and il consists in a
bringing logether of our prese nta tions (Vo/'s/ellllJ/gen) given in in tuition. Thi s
"subject ive" sy nt hesis is the cond it ion of possibility of observi ng feat ures com bined
in an abject. A nd il is also a prerequ isite of analysis, i.e. of the possibility of
disintegrati ng the presentations again, and therefore also of pred ication. See Krilik
der reinen Ve/'l1unfl , 15 in the "T ranszendcnta le Oedu ktion der reinen
Verstandcsbegriffe (B)".
" SZ, p. 158.
38 For, as 1 will discuss in Chapter Three, Heidegger see ms to think that th is
primordial disclosedness is of a similar nature as that of the Ari stotclian vou, i.e.
non-discursive.
76
CII A I' Il ', 1{ 'l'WO
39
Or in other ward s, the
fu'gUS, dctc fmill cs th e asscrti on's fUllction.
c larificulion of the as-structure hinges on the possibility of givin g a
propcr exp li cat ion of the phenomena of understand ing and
interpretat ion (Bedeutlll1g).40
Out \Vhen making this ITTove From assertion to a supposed ly more
basic level of (pre-proposition al) interpretation, Heidegger does not
merely take a step fu rther in his inquiry into the asserti on but actual ly
transfortns the inquiry itself. For the discovery of a pre-propositional
level of the as-structure motivates Heidegger to explore the domain of
th e pre-theoretical as such, on the basis of which the question of the
nature of the assertion has to be raiscd anew, [rom another perspective.
ln briefterms, the change is this: 50 far it seems - not least on aCCQunt
of the above quotation from Sein und Zeir - that the assertion only puts
to words what has already been un derstood: there is an articulation or
expl ication (Auslegung) that " lies before" the asserti on, yet becomes
expressed by it. Hence the necess ity of elu c idat ing the pre-pred icative
foundation of the assertion ; thi s is w here wc must locale the
ll ild erstanding or interpretative effort. But once lhi s is estab li shed,
Heidegger will ask himself whether assertion in the proper sense mi ght
not involve a theoretical altitude towards its object, wh ich in its tum
presupposes a "practical", hermeneutic fami li arity with the worl d. Thus
here the perspective changes: the assertion is no longer regarded as a
mcre verba l or lin gui sti c express ion, or as just a "man ifestat ion"
(Aufzeigung) of something previously understood, but it is thou ght to
involve its Qwn mode of access to the world. The rema ining parts of the
present chapter are mainly concerned \Vith the implications of this
rcnewed approach. As we will see, the result of this approach is that the
relation between the hermeneutic and the apophanti c level of logos is
s hown 10 be mu ch more complex in comparison with how it has been
outl ined so far.
lQGA 21, pp. 140- 142. E. Tugendhat has in Tl KATA TlNO~. Eill.e Unr~/'s.lIchllng :lIr
Sll'lIkl/ll' /liu/ Urspnlllg arislolelisclter Grundbegriffe cJallned ln a sJl11llar fa shlOn
that the as-slructure cannot bc laken to bc of a gra mmatical or log;cal nature only. He
[II'Sucs instcad Ihat it has ils ori gn in Ihe t\Vo fold structure of being. ilself, and - bc in g
pcrhnl)S more conced ng lowards A ristolle in Ihi s contex! than Heidegger - suggests
Ihnt thi s is clca rl y rccogni scd by ri stotle himself. However, cf. above, p. 68, note
21.
'~ (iA 21. p. 152.
77
 C I 11\1' Il ' 1{ 1WI 1
5. Tr1llh and apophansis
As indicated al the beginning of this chapter, Ileidcggcr th inks !hat in
arder to understand not only the nature of predication and d ~ daJ'alive
speech but speech as such, it is necessary to c1arifY the nature of truth.
ln this sense, truth is a more basic or broader concept than speech,
which is not ta say that truth could be explored without reference to
speech. Still, the re lative priority of truth over speech is, as wc will sec
shortly, of fundamental imporlance to Ileidegger 's interpretation of
Aristotl e's concept oftruth.
Heidcgger's undcrstanding of trllth, his atlcmpt to I11Qve beyond the
confi nes ara "theoretical" notion oCt ruth, is certainly a comp lex matter.
]n the following, it is not my intention to givc an outline ofHeidegger's
struggle wit h the problem of truth in its entircty, but only to deal with
hi s attitude towards that kind of lruth that is supposcd to bclong to
assertoric speech. Common ta ail of Heidegger's attempts to rcveal the
essence of truth is that he on ly takes into consideration one concept of
Iruth, and that is the correspondence-Iheory of Iruth. At the time of Sein
und Zeit Heidegger often begins hi s discussion of truth by summarising
what he regards as the basic assumptions in thi s con nection : the "seat"
(Ort) of truth is logos in the sense of assertion, truth consists in a
correspondence between thinking and bcings, or between a judgement
and its object, and, tinally, these two views have Aristotle as their
4 At thi s point, Heidegger turns to Aristotle ' s expression logos
originator \ But even though Heidegger sets out to criticise these views,
describing them as "since long prevailing prejudices"," he actually ends
up - as usual , one is almost tempted to say - affirming them, though on
the basis of a reinterprctation of thcir mcaning.'13 Logos is indeed the
"seat" of truth, provided that the meaning of the word "logos" is not
restricted to propos itional speec h, and the critique of the
correspondence-theory does not aim to replace it \Vith anolher model for
truth, but ta reinterpret the very notion of Hcorrespondence". Finally, on
the basis of this reinterpretation, it is possible to attribute to Aristotle a
kind of modified correspondence-theory of truth .
"sz, p. 214, GA 21, pp. 128-129.
42 GA 21, p. 128. Sec also PA, p. 256.
4 ) This is pointed out by A. Vigo, "Wahrheit, Logos und Praxis: Die Transrormation
der aristotel ischen Wahrhcitskonzeption durch Heidegger", p. 75.
C II I\(" II ,R l WO
t\ccordin g 10 !\riSIOll c's c1assical formulation oftruth, "Ta say about
thal whi ch is that it is not, or about that which is not that it is, is fa lse,
but to say aboul that which is that it is, and about that which is not that
it is not, is true."" The point of departure of Heidegger's discussion of
truth as a whole is the convition that this notion of truth can hardly be
rcjccted. There is something fundamentall y "true", if this term may be
allowed in the present context, about this definition which has to be
preserve d in any account of truth. The crucial question here is how to
lIt1derstand legein and ils relation to that of wh lch Il . speak~. ~n
I-Ieidegger' s account, the problem wi th unders tand~ng thls. relation JO
teI111S of correspondence is that this might give the Im preSSIOn Ihat the
assertion or the judgement could somehow be understood in isolation
from th at about which it is su pposed to be true, so that it relates to its
obiect only by representing or imitating il. Once such a perspective is
es;ab lished, there is nothing to prevent the suspicion that the jud gement
Illi ght aner all not relate to th e object it self. but rather to a
representation of it, for how could there be a correspondence between
such different things as a judgement and a thing? Heidegger remarks:
" But knowledge should 'give' the thing such as it is. The
'correspondence' has the relalional character of 'such - as' .,,45 Thus
correspondence can only be made sense of by refcrence to the as-
structure, and therefore, to clarify the latter is necessary in order to
understand the nature oftruth.
apophantikos, cOI1lJ11only identifi ed with the declarative sentence or the
assertion. Literall y , however, the adjective apophantikos means
something like "manifesting" or "show in g". and its cognales
apophansis and apophasis46 can both mean speech and assertion, as
weil as manifestation. These etymological connotations of "showing",
" displaying", etc., are important to Heidegger insofar as they serve as a
poin\ of deparlure for hi s philosophical elucidation of logos
apophalllikos. First, Heidegger points to the fact that Anstotle sJl1gles
40\ Me. t. IOllb26.27: "'(0 11 v 'Yp :YElV tO V I.lTJ E\VCH 1\ tO ~il v ElvOl 'l'EOO, tO
"(o~dvcu KctltO pil Vl111 E!veu cl I10 .". " .. ,
01 1 S Z, p. 216: " Aber EJ'kenntl1l~ sol1 doch dlc Sache.s,o" geben, WIC Sie ISt. Die
'berein slillllllung' hOI den Relallonscharakter.: 'S? - W~e . "
~t, Not to he cOllruscd wil h Ille 611:641001<; WhlCh 1$ denved rrolll the verb 01toQOVot
II nd w ili c lll l' t:ll1 \ ~ "dcllinl",
79

out logos apopl/anlikos w ilh re fc rcncc to il s pmlN illllll y tif Il IlI g InlCo;
and fa Ise, th at is, th at he in fact detines logos wilh the hclJl oJ'I" lIlh, not
the other way round," This implies, Heidegger argues, Il'''1 il was by no
means obvious to Aristotle that tru th necessarily is " propcrly of
assertions onl y," And if the assertion is determined by rcfcrence to its
possibility of being true and false, the clarification of truth wi ll in its
tum provide us with a c lue to the nature of the asse rti on, Indeed,
apophansis is to Heidegger the key to both truth and pro positional
speech."
Heidegger interprets apophanlikos as " Iett ing be seen by showing
forth " (aufw eisen d se hen lass en d): ta make an assert ion about
something is to make it maniresl in a specitlc way by ascribing a
50
determinate prope,1y ta it. ln thi s way the thin g in question becomes
v isible in a certa in regard, that is, it is made express ly access ible by the
51
assert ion. The meanin g of propos ili onal "as-ness" is thus furlher
determ incd in tcrms of a "show ing forth" (Aufteigung) of somethi ng as
somethin g. This is the second o f th e Ihree senses of "assertion "
enumerated above, lhough in I-Ie idegge r 's view Ihe primary."
Heidegger noIes:
If onc has understood this basic st ructure of legeill , then it is by
no means possib le to find somct hing in th is deterlllination of
beng true and false that co uld make one take tru th to be a
representation or imitation of bei ngs in consciousness in the sense
of a remeasuring correspondence. The showing forth is according
to ils sense already with the beings Ihemse lves, . 53
41 Cf. above, p. 60 .
48 H eidegger ' s interpretation of A rstot le's broadcr notion of truth is treated in
Chapters T hree and Four. .
49 T h s ide nti ficat ion of the esse nce of th e asserti on \V ith its truth s of course
problematic, and H eidegger later criticised himse lf for not hav ing taken enough
account of fal sity and decept ion in his deterrn ination of the essence of the assertion;
GA 29/30, p. 488.
50 GA 21, pp. 121ff.
"GA 21, p. 133.
" SZ, pp. 154-155.
53 GA 21, p. 163: " Hat man diese Grundstruktur des YEl V verstanden, dann ist es
gar nicht mogli ch, in dieser B estimmung von Wahr und Falschsein etwas zu finden,
was Anhalt gabe, W ahrhei t ai s Abb ildung und N achbi ld ung von Scicnde m im
Bewul3tsein im Sin n einer nachmesse nden bere instim mu ng zu fa sscn. Das
Aufweisen ist j a schon seinet11 Sinn nach beim Sc ienden selbs t, .
80
t' li AI' 1 HI( '1 WO
S peeclt Hl ld Ih o ughl have in vi rtu c orlh c ir vcry nalure a "re lation" to
Iheir objects: Ihe 3sscrt ioll docs not imitate its object bul, as He id egger
s4
stalcs in e ill und Zeil , Ullcovers (emdeckt) it. Thus here we can see
how Il cidcgger approaches lhe asscrti on from a differen t perspective
Ihan be l'orc, as the assertion now is said to be one way in which man
un covers beings, rather tha n an expression of somethin g already
un covcred. One reason why Heidegger takes this perspective here is
pro bably that he wants 10 draw on Hu sserl ' s notion of truth as
identi fi cation. 55 Heidegger's favourite examp le in thi s connect ion is a
pcrson making the assertion: "The painting on the wall hangs askcw'\
whil e not seeing th e paintin g itself. What happe,lS, Heidegger asks,
when one tUfilS around and sees the painting? "The being which was
intcnded shows itself such as il is in itself, th at is, it shows thai il is, in
ilS selfsameness, such as the assertion displays, uncovers il as being."s6
Th is situation could also be described as follows: wh en making the
assertion about the painting, one addresses the painting in a particular
way, namely as han ging askew and not as e,g, ugly. The assertion turns
out 10 be true if the painting responds ta this address by showing itself
as actu all y hang in g askew. In other words, the assertion is true if th e
"as" of th e assertion "corresponds" to (proves to be the same as) the
" as" of the givenness of its abject.
ln this way, the trutlt of the assertion is conceived of along the lines
of accomplishment, as it is located in the activi ty of speaking. Thi s is
imporl ant to Heidegger for two reas ons: first because he thinks thal
trulh primaril y belongs to man or Dasein J and only in a secondary sense
10 thin gs. Th is idea is worked out into a notion of Dasein's
discloscdness (Erschlossenheil) of being as the prima ry phenomenon of
trLl th, on th e basis of which trulh in the sense of uncovering of bein gs is
10 bc e luc idated . Secondly, the basic problem \V ith the traditiona l
nl crpretati on of the asserti on is th at it neglccts the context of speak in g,
th e aclual e nac tm ent of the asserti on, and tends in stead to approach the
nsscl'tion as an isolatcd entity. T'hi s point is discusscd fllrther below.
'~sz. p. 2 18.
" Sec i id.. whcrc Ilcidcggcr refcrs prcciscly to this notion. . .
'b Sl, p. 2 18: " Das gCll1clItc Seiclld c sdbsi zcigl sich so, lI'ie cs an Ihm selbst Ist, das
heiflt, cloU cs in Sl:l hi gket so ist, ais wic sc icnd es in de r Aussage aufgeze igt,
Cil ldt.:cki wlrd ."
HI
 (' II AI'TI ':R WI 1
What res ult has Ihe present investi gation given th uS 1,,1"/ ' 1110 es,cnec o f
the asserti on is ta make things manifest as being of li pari ieulli r ki nd, by
way of separating and then bringing together subject and predi catc. [n
Heidegger's view, the assertion ' s nature of making manifest is the
57
foundation of il S synthetic-dihairetic structure. Thi s mean s that the
assertion 's ontological role is more fundame ntal than ilS structures or
elements. That is ta say, the latter can on ly be understood on the basis
of the former. J-lowever, wh en wc abandon the inlerpretation of
s unthes is and dihairesis as just grammatical features, and explicate
them in lenus or Oleir role of disp laying "somelhing as something", they
preci sely take on onto logical meaning and must be said to Conn an
integral part o f the assert ion 's uncovcring nature . But evcn if th e
in vesti gati on has moved beyond a purely lag ica-g rammatical
understanding of the assertion, it has 50 rar given onl y a very genera l
determination of il. Il is therefore lime la ask whether these basic
characteristi cs as hitherto spelled out allow for different kinds of
asse11ions.
6. The neeessity of eon/exlualising the assertion
SA far, Heidegger' s interrogation into the nalure of the assertion has not,
but for a few exceptions, taken into accollnt th e co nlext within which
assertions arc lIttered. Il has not considered wh ethcr the assertion's
function varies w ith the form of givenness pertaining to the things wc
make assertions about, or if our intention s play any part here, etc. Even
though Heidegger' s interpretation of Aristotle's understanding of logos
apophan/ikos repcatedly has bcen forced ta tran sgress the limits of the
fo rma I approac h, and al so al a number o f occasion s has pointed to the
pre -propositi onal foundation of the assert ion, with the charactcrisation
o f trllth as unco ve ring. the nced to Illove beyond th e initia l perspective
becom es partic ularl y urgent. For granled th at il is pecu liar to the
assertion to uilcover beings such as they are in themsel ves, the question
of the possibility and genesis of this uncoverin g arises. Ta be able ta
reveal thi s, il is necessary to look at the situation of speech.
" SZ, p. 33.
R2
C II A l' Il ' R 1WO
T it e l'I.! /l SQIl why th e perspec ti ve hus becn thu s limiled is parll y that
the fln a lys is IIp to now has ma inly f'oll owed the Ar islOtle of D e
IlIterpreta/iolle, where he does not in vesti gate the situation of speech,
but is exclusively coneern ed with reveal ing the structures of the
asse rtion. I-I owever, il wi ll 50011 become clear that the re is yet "another"
Aristotle available ta LIS, who ean serve as a guide for the present task of
cx pli cati ng the situation of speech. This is the Aristotle ofthe Rhetorie.
We thus once more eneounter an oscillation in Aristotle' s thinking.
Ile i. not ollly the father of logie but also a phenomenologieal thinker:
hc has managed ta point out th e primary phenomenon of speech ,
bcca use he has seen how it is in faet enacted. Heidegger remarks on this
double nature of Aristotle 's thinking:
When we said that the history of logic in the West, and thereby
Ihe sc ience of langua ges in ge neral, is determined by the Greek
theory of logos as asse rtion, il must at the same lime neverthe ~ ess
oe mentio ned that the very Ari stotle, who ... for the fi rsl lime
reached an insight into the sentence-structure, in hi s Rhetoric also
rec ogni scd and grasped the grandiose task of interpreling the
ki nd s and fo rm at ions of non-post ing speech. Ta be su re, for
di frerentreasons the power o f logic \Va s tao strong to Icave open
j8
to this pursuit ilS own possibility of development.
ln an earli er course, Crundbegriffe der aris/o/elischen Philosophie,
Ilcidcgger ca ll s on precisely the Rhetorie for assistance in the seareh for
Ih e rundam c ntal characteri stics of non -positing speech. thus tryin g to
take on that grandiose task which Ari stotle once recognised. Indeed, the
Rhe/oric is here characterised as Aristotle ' s "hermeneutics ofDasein",
where Dasein ' s everyday self-explication is made explicit.'9 This might
at lirst glallce seem like a somewhat speculative claim; it is, however,
nothin g but the natural consequence of the idea mentioned above, that
)8 GA 29130, p. 439: "Wenn \Vi r sagten, daf3 die Geschichte der Logik i ~ Abe~ld land
V(lil der gricchisc hen Theorie des ).,010<; lm Si nne des Aussages atzes bestlmm l lst ~nd
V01l do nus die Wi sscnschafl von den Sprachcll Obcrhaupt, dann muB doch zugl: lch
crw'll1l1l wcrden dafl dcrscl be Aristotcles, der . . . ZUtll crsten Mal vordran g zu clner
Ei .,~ i chl in di e Struktu r des Sal zes, auch in seiner Rhetorik die, grand i~se Aufgabe
crkonlli c und in An gri ff ll tl hm , die Formen und Bi ldungen der mchl thetlsch en Re~e
cille.' Interpretation ZlL ullt crwcrfen. Frei lich, a ~s v~rschi edene.n Grnd e~. v.:ar dl~
M nchl (h~l' Logik zu stark, um dicsem Versuch CIIlC cIgcne Enl wl cklungsm oghchkelt
l1ffcn 'lU[ossen."
':1( ;A 18. p. 11 0.
K'I
 l' li A I' Il ' 1( '1 Wt)
the wo rk of A ri s t o ll ~ and PlalO clllcrgcd lhr'ou" h Il l.'IlilllIlIl l l1 l lon
sophism. Thal is to say , what Heidegge r wa nls 10 1'0111110 hCI c. ls slI1ply
Ihat to the Greeks, the everyday , common mode of s peech \Vus prcci scly
rhetoric. and not only on account of the existence of sophislIl , but in
general because of the central raie that public speech played in their
society 60 For this reason, we sho uld not read the Rhetorie as if it just
\Vere concerned \Vith so rne specifie "arf ' (techne) of speaking, for in
this work, A ristotl e actually tri cs to come to grips \Vith an absolutely
basic and di stinct phenomenon within Greek life. Of co urse, this is not
ta claim that when oullinin g th e s ituation of rh etarical speech, Aristat le
thinks that he has a lso laid bare the fundamental structures of speech as
such, But whatever Aristotle's own views on the statu s of his analys is
of rhetoric rnight be, Heidegger is conv inced that th is ana lys is is in fact
app licable ta the cantex t or speech as such, and thu s must be brought
into the discussion of"theoretica l" speech (the assertion) as wel1. 61
First, in order ta avo id the idea that th e Rhetorie is just an " art", as
works on rheto ric were generally called in the ancient era , Heidegger
points to Ar istotl e's ow n characlerisati on of rhetoric as " the power
(dunamis) to sec the poss ibl e ways of convincing in rcference to any
sin gle tapi e whatsocvcr."o2 Such a conception ofrhetoric paves th e \Vay
for the fallawing definition of its consti tution : " [rhetari cal] speech is
camposed o f three parts: the speaker, th e tap ie of which he speaks, and
the persan ta wharn th e speech is addressed and to whom the end also is
related; 1 mean th e hea rer. ,,63 T hese three elements constitu te the
situation of rhetorical speech, and that means that they are indispensable
for an understanding of rhetoric. ror it m akes no sense to speak about
convi cti on w ithout anyone be ing conv inced; ta see ho w conviction
6IJIbid.
61 Haweve r, in his work on rhetaric, whi ch ta a great exlent is devoled 10 Heidegger's
inlerprclalion of Arislotle ' s Rlte/orie, P. C. Smith argues Ihat even thaugh theoretical
discourse must be understood on Ihe basis of an ana lys is of rhetorical speech, il
pres upposes a suspension of rhetorical speech, the im pe rativc. For whereas the latter
bas action for ils aim, the fo rmer has only a fa ct-stating funct ion; The Hermenewics
o[Originaf Argument: Demonstration, Dialectic, Rhetoric, p. 16.
6 Rltetoric ("Rltet."), 1355b25-26: "VEatw o~ '" petopuOl val-W; nepi. KCXOtoV m
9EOOPlcrca ta eVEX!lEVOV m9avov." Noted by Heidegger on p. 114 in GA 18.
63 Rhel. 1358a37-b2: "crUyKE1Wl )lV yp EK 'TplOOV Cl oyo, K tE 'to YOV'to Kcli
rtEp t ou ].YEl Kat np ov, Ka t t 'to 1tp '[Ot OV e onv, yw O -rv
Kpoaniv. "
84
'li A I' Il ' I( WO
\Vi th COIll CS II hOnl ltud \V hut it look s likc, wC Illu s t intro du ce th e no ti o n or u
s pc nk c l' und puy ull c nlion to hi s mo ti ves; and fin a ll y , th e na.Lu re ?r lhe
nrgllme nl s lIsccI dcpends upon th at abOlit whi ch the speaker IS try m g ta
convinec th e hea rcrs M 1'herc l'ore, Heidegger says, th e Rhelorle IS mllch
more va luab lc to us Ih3n is "IIlY philasaphy of language; here Aristatle is
65
approa chin g speech as a way of being or actin g toward s other people.
But for thi s "t ri ang le" w hi ch Aristat le h as es tablish ed ta be
appra pri ate l'o r He idegger's purpases, it must be sli ghtly madified, For
c ve n th ough Heidegger probabl y would not deny that the ambItIOn ta
con vince people is often an important aspect of speech, he does not
scem ta rega rd it as absolutely central. More important is that the
Rhetorie operates \Vith a tele olagical notion of speech, accardin g to
whi ch speech is governed by an anticipated end (telo s). The result of
Il eidegger' s modili cation is as foll ows: lirst, the nature of speec h
ca nn at be reac hed without taking notice of the speaker and his interests.
Sccondly, one must alsa consider the hea rer, to whom the speech is
direcl ed for the anticipated end, or th e effect of the speech on the
hcare r i ~ co-const itutive of th e motives behind the speech. Besides, the
c flect ~ f speech depc nds nat only on the speaker's intentions but also on
how speech is und erstood, Lastly, we must not di sregard that w h lch the
speaker talks about. 1t affects the nature of the speech insofar as the way
in whi ch th e object is g ive n ta th e speaker has bea rin gs on th e rcason
why (a nd thereby on lhe nalure) or his speeCh." .
ln brier tCrIn s, what has been revealed as important const ltue nts of
spcech arc th e speaker's interest or the anticipated end of speech and the
mode o f givenncss belonging ta the thing in question. A lthough
Il eid egger states co mmunica tion as the last of the tluee major
(,1ccordin g ta Ari stotlc, rhetorica l speech can take ,on t1~ree. d.ifferent form ~ : it ca n
be de libcrati vc or "con sultati ve" (ow!30ueUtlKo), ~ udt C I ~1 (1KCI.V1KO; ) or
"i11ustrative" (bUOE1Ktl KO). In the !i rst case, the e~d (u:o) IS to declde \\helher
sOlll clhi ng is benefi cial or harmful , and so consultat ive speech p~oc.eeds by wa.y o~
app cnl or dissuflsi on. In j ud icial speech the end ~once~n s what IS Just and .UllJ.US.t,
'Iccord in gly its fonn is either derence or accusatlll. FlIlal ly, the end of epldelctlc
~ pccch is th~ hOllounlblc and the shamefu l, and 50 ilS fa rm is praise and blame. Rhet.,
1358b6-29. l, is thllS ta be noled Ihat the end of rhetorical spc~ch .o~l ~ evcllIll.ally
CO ll siSIS in f\ course of lcti on on the part of the hearer, as Ils Imtlal end IS a
conviilclll g (kl11 onstrati on of 50lll cthin g as being o f a certain kind; nam ely of 5uch a
kind as Ihe ural or wanls il to seem,
b~(jA 18, p. 11 7.
:" Sec (;1/ 1R, t 18- t 24 fr.
 l' III\I' ""1 Wt)
1 ' t t I\ I'TI ~ R 'l'WO
charaCLeri slics of assertions , th e notion ora IIClI l r II 1111 lIl it HII
nol abso lut ely essent ial 10 him. He ascribes 11l ~ illh'!I':mhJl.'c tl vc unI un.:
speech tirst of ail to ;'the one" (do s Man), i.e. Ih l: puhli c II1cHIln g-
context or "explicatedness" (Ausgelegtheit) in tcrm s of wlti!.:!t wc have
access to th e world. Since sentence-meaning in th is way is cOl1stituted
by this public rncaning-co ntext, speech is in its essence intersubjective,
cven when a persan juS! speaks to himsel f, w ithout anyone cise being
around. Consequently , when purs uing the different iation of the
assertion, Heidegger foc uses on th e situation in which a speaker relates
ta a thing only and not to a person in rcference to a thing.
If it is true, as the Rhetarie tells us, that speech must be determined
by refercllce to ilS end, then apparently, the lagieal or grammatical
perspective on propositional speech mu st be, if not put aside, then at
least not regarded as th e most important one. for rhetorieal arguments
may obviously consist of assertions in thc grammatical sense, but they
may be uttered \Vith a number of differen t emls or purposes in mind.
More precisely, th eir end is not merely to show that something is the
case, or to communicatc a faet, but also to brin g about an effeet, and in
this way eventually to cause action. Thi s id ea is al so taken up by
Heidegger.
ln Logik, Heidegger asks us to distinguish betwee n three forms of
assertion, which display shifl in g de grees of detachment as regards the
relation between the assertion and its object. The first is an assertion
made in the service of some kind of performance, for example if one
remarks while writing on the blackboard that the chalk is too hard. In
this case, the assertion is made Ollt of one's present circumstances,
wherc the chalk ofIers resistuilce to being used, and the assertion is
intimately connected \Vith the actua l way of relating 10 th e chalk; it
works as a kind of explication or one's present' involvemcnt. A more
distanced way of speak in g is to make an assertion in th e form of a
descript ion of the environment. Heidegger is not really concerned about
th is stage, but th e point is probably that in this case, the assertion is still
bound by a particular context in wh ich one is not completely detached
from concernful dealings. The third form of the assertion, finally, is the
one that consists in a determination of th in gs that arc present as objccts.
Here, we are no more li ving in an understanding that is directcd towards
something which is to be don e, but have taken a stcp back Ii'om th e
86
pCl'son is I!l ing ti r;; 0 lIt c ns il and , look in g away l'rom it s rc lational structure, wc
or rega rd it o nly as an objcct is cndowed with a certain property.67
i\ ccordin g to Il cidcgger, it is really only the last of these examples
th flt <llIa li{ies ror th e des i g~ati on "asseI1ion", for it is only here that the
overridin g intention behind the proposition is to attribute a property to a
thin g, while disregarding the living comportment within which it is
prilll ari ly given. With this view, Heidegger thus wants to challenge the
((mna l perspective for th e sake of phenomenological anal ys is : the
llsse rtion cannot be identified with the indicative. This is se ldom
l'ccogllised in the li terat ure on Heidegger, but as 1 w ill show in the
l'o ll ow ing section s, il is crucial to the question of the relation between
the apophantlc . an d t he hermeneu t IC
' " as ,,68
.
But before proceedin g ta that point, one might ask what the challenge
o f the gramm atica l perspective implies fo r Heidegger's view on the
grammatica l distinctions between different kinds of moods. Heidegger
occasionally discllsses Aristotle's remarks on the prayer, namely th at it
is ne ilher true , nor fai se. According to Heidegger's interpretation of
Irulh, Ihis wo uld mean lhat the prayer, as weil as other non-assertoric
modes or speech, lacks the function of showing forth an abject so th at it
beeo mes accessible in its determination. In Sein und Zeit Heidegger
says that the pray cr has its Qwn way of making manifest, but he does
Il o t<Ii scllss this any further. 69 ln anather text, however, he observes thal
Ih e d iscriminating point between theoretical assertions and other modes
of" s peech is the desire for knowl edge and for communicating this
kn owledgc to others. When asking for something, 1 am not looking to
in c reasc th e otheT persan 's knowledge, nor am 1 asserting that 1 wish
sOl1lcthin g. That is, 1 am not making a statement about the object of my
wish, but 1 am di splaying myself as a person who WIS . hes someth'mg. 70
ln this way, 1 am no doubt making myself manifest to another person
whcn asking him or her for something, and therefore, it seems that the
prayer also discloses its object, thou gh as something desired.
(,1 GA 2t, pp. 156- 158.
6~Excepli olls (Ire O. 0, l)aI11 5Iro111, Dtls logische Vorur leil. UlIlersllch ungel1 Zllr
W"hrhei lslhcorie desfriih cn IIeidegJ;er. pp . 145- 153 ; A. Vigo, "Wahrheit, Logos
und I)rt\xi s: Die T ransrol'l1l(l ti oll der artistotelischen Wahrheilskonzeption durch
t Iciclcggcr", (l . 92.
t,i) S%, p. 32.
/Il GA 29/30, pp. 011 7, 448 .
WI
 CI 11\1''1 l' I{ 1W()
Does this mean Ihat Heidegger himsell' lIlI" . SIIIIHI , III/ l"l'Ilt s or
speech on the bas is of the assertion? Thi s lIli ghl 'CC II ' 10 be Ih c
consequence if ail forms of speech are marked by Ihe charllelcrislic or
mak ing man ifesl, since this was established as the essence o r the
assertion . As far as [ can see, Heidegger thinks o f the assertion as the
most common form of speech in the grammatical sense, but, as [ have
said carli er, to Heidegger the grammatica l struct ure is not very
inleresting in this connection, sinee it is not enough ta defi ne what he
means by "assertion"." The reason why Heid egger can talk about
speech in general as of a displaying nature is his idea that man 's \Vay of
relating to bein gs neeessarily involves di se los ure, i. e. is always a tarm
of trllth. I-Ience, even if apophansis interpreted as "making manifest" is
reserved for the assertion only, aIl kinds of speech, inso far as they arc
human act ivi ti es, revea l something, albeit in d i ffcrcnt ways.
According ly, in discussing the prayer, Ile ideggcr 's aim is Ilot to
show thal th e struct ures o f J1l oods th at dirrer l'ro m th e ind icati ve are
equiprimordial or perhaps evcn more " original" . Il e lises this example
in arder ta say somethin g abou t everyday speech regardless of its
grammatical structures. He wa nts ta make clear that speech is usually
not enacled simply for lhe sake of estab lishing a fact, or in arder to
make somethi ng access ibl e to others; su ch in tentions are always
directed by other pUl'poses, such as to eonv incc, deceive, communieate,
make an impression, and sa forth ." This was clearly displayed in the
Rhetoric, for whereas rhetorieal speech can ccrtainly consist in
assertions in the gram matical sense, Hs final end is not to reveal a faet,
but to convince the hearers that something is a faet.
Acco rdin gly, the assertion in the proper sense is, in Heidegger's
view, guided by something like a theoretical attitude towards the world
71 Sec GA 29/30, pp. 438-440; GA 24, p. 299.
72 Bere one might want la compare Heidegger ta J. L, Austin , who c1aimed Ihal
s peech as 5uch must be characterised in te rms of a " Ioc uti onary act " (utteri ng a
sentence \V ith a certain mem1ng), an " ill ocut ionary aet" (perfo rming an action 5uch
as ordcring, \Varning, etc.), and a " perlocutionary aet" (bringing about an effeel 5uch
as persuading, deceiving, e tc ,); see HolV to do Things IVth Words. Apparently,
Austin thought that he \Vas the first one to put fo rward a theory of speech as action;
however, one has late\y aeknowledged the existence of such a theory about 50 years
earli e r in the so~called Munich phenomeno logy, where Iwo of ils !l1 cmbers, Reinach
and A. Pfander, shou ld be mentioned in parti c u lar. Sec K, Schuhmanll , " Di e
Entwicklung der $ prcchakttheoric in der Milnchcncr Phllnolllc noloBie".
88
CI 11\ 1'11\1< TW O
/lnd pI'C~ lI ppOSCS H chan ge in our comporlmcnt towards beings. In arder
to ulldcl'stund thi s, il is ncecssary lo have a look at its genesis within
cvcrydoy, " practica l" lifc.
7, The assertion as jolll1ded*on a change in evelyday comportmenl
When describ in g the genesis of the assertion, Heidegger simultaneously
wanls to rcveal an essential, though not exhaustive, prerequisile of the
gCll csis of lh eory and sc ience: the emergence of a certain detaehment
l'rom everyday, "absorbed" life. Thus here we come across th e
im port an t qu estion of I~I e id egger's view on th e relation between the
Ih coreti ea l and the praetieal: does Heidegger take theoretieal activity,
including asserloric speech, to be essentially parasitic upon everyday,
" praeli cal" li fe, or does he think that theory has its aIVn possibility of
ori ginal diselosure?" On thi s point, there is no daubt a tension in
Il eidegger ' s work, whieh J will try ta resolve on ly in Chapter Four,
where 1 will argue for the latter of the two altematives just stated. Most
spee ifically, [ will show how Heidegger, partly by means of his
ili lerpretation of Aristotle, tries to Qvercome the very distnction
bClween the theoretieal and the praetieal. Some remarks in this direction
will ho\Vever be given already in Ihi s chapter, in arder ta indicate what
such an at tempt implies for Heidegger's conception of the assertion. But
befa re addressing that point, 1 give an outline of what seems ta be
Il cidcggcr's argument again st the notion that the assertion cou ld
invo lvc gcnuinc diselosure.
Whon Il.u bert Dreyrus suggested that Heidegger wou ld locate the
constit uti on o r meanin g entirely on the level of everyday life , he drew
prilllari ly on Sein ulld Zeit, whieh at that time was still the major source
li)r Il eidcgger's conception of theory and praxis. In particular in the
pnrn grap hs on Dasein 's evcryday \Vay of being in the world, Heidegger
.sCCl'ns indecd to dri ve al the point that knowledge and theory are simply
lh; d v {\1ivc rorms o f' conduet, and that cvcryday li fe essentially consists
ill IIllrc n cctiv~ dea lings \:vilh lhi ngs. More precisely, when describin g
cveryda y COlllporllllcnt, Heidegger emphasises the aspect of use of
lilin gs J'o r Ih e purpose o r mak in g something, whereas he hardl y
1\ '1li t: liJ lln c r vic\V is tnkc n by 1L Dr'cy rus, IJ e ill~~ it H " (!~ Wo rld. A COlllmenlQ/y 011
1I1 ' 1rI( 1){~.W I' ',,'
fleing fl ntl T iIIlC, /)(\llslolI J, p, 12 1,
 t' li A 1''1 l' I( '1 WI 1
mcnLions such JOI'Il1S o r con clue l whi ch, Oll e J1 li~11I tllln"' . lU CUI1I1l10 1l to
both everyd ay Iife and th eo reti eal in vest iga ti o ns, Ilk llbscrvin g,
ealeulatin g, inspeeting, etc. I-Iowever, as Robert OCl1lflsconi has pointcd
out, when readin g th ese sections o f Sein und Zeil wilh Il cid cgger 's
Interpretati on of Aristotle in mind, il beeomes clear that Ilcidegger is
not simply presenting his own views on the natu re of everyday eonduet.
He is just as much invo lved in a destruction of traditional ontology, and
more precisely of th e Greek notion ofpoiesis, which in the lectures on
Ari stotl e is regarded as so methin g of a paradigm fo r the G reek
und ers tanding of bein g. 74 Later on, Heidegger w ill also state this
ex plic itl y, re mark in g Ihat bcca use of the impurtan ce of th e episleme
poielike for the G reck und e rstandin g of the world , he considered his
task in Sein und Zeit LO be to clarify the relation between man and work
in tenn s of hi s dealings with equipment or too ls, and "not in ordcr to
correct Marx or 10 put forwa rd a new politieal economy".75
For thi s reason, one must regard He idegger's descriptions in Sein und
Zeit of the theorctieal and Ihc praetiea l as prcli minary genera lisations;
obviously, there is a wide ran ge of d ifferent activities between abslraet
analysis on the one hand and use fo r th e sake of produeing something
on the other. As Heidegger explains a few years later:
... in Sein und Zeit 1 attempted an ini tial characteri sation of the
world-phenomelloll through an interpretation of the way in wllich
we proximally and for tlze masl part !/love daily in our wor/d. ln
Ihis conllection, 1 set out from what is da ily availab le 10 us, wha!
we use and undertake, and Ihi s in such a way Ihat we do not know
of the pecu li arity ofthis co nduct, and, when we are ta describe il,
ill isconstrue it a l once by usi ng concepts and quest ions which
have thcir origi n clsewhere. This, which is enti re ly close and
eve ry day fam ili ar, is at bouom already th orough ly di sta nt and
incomprel:e nsible 10 us . ... I-Iowever, it has never OCCU fred 10 me
10 want ta maintai n and prove, by way of Ihi s Interpretation, that
the essence o f Ill a n consists in us ing a spoon a nd fo rk a nd
travell ing on the tramway. 76
74 R. l3ernascon i, "H eidegger's Destruction of Ph ro nesi s' . A simil ar line of reasoni ng
is co ntain ed in W. Brogan , " Heidegger and Aristotle: Dase in and the Question of
Practica l Life", pp. 137-138.
7S GA 33, p. t 37.
76 GA 29/30, pp. 262~263: " ... versuchte ich in Sein und Zeit ei ne ers le
Kennze ic hnung des Weltphanomens durch eine Interpretation der Art, wie wir !/I lS
zunachst Iwd zumeist alltaglich in unserer IYelt bewegen. Hi\!rbci gin!:; icll nus von
90
(' 1lA 1''1 ER 1 WO
Eve n th ough Il cidegger inilially seellls to dislinguish between everyday,
" praeti ca l" lifc and th eoreti eal work by claimin g that the former is
llIarkcd by in vo lved preoccu pation wi th things while th e latter consists
in dis intercstcd looking at or inspeeting things, this is in the end not the
point. 77 Rath er, w hal he is tryin g to get at here are th e bas ic
c harac lcri stics o r man 's "world ly" existence in general, so as to be ab le,
on th e bas is of this determination, to eircumse rib e different modes of
ulld crstandin g, sueh as e.g. the theoretieal and the praetiea!. In his ow n
word s: ''' Practieal ' dea li ngs have their OlVn ways of tarrying. And just
as praxis has its own specifie kind of sight ('theory '), lheorelical
rcsearch is not witho ut its own praxis."" Heidegger's major target o f
eriticislll here is the belief that it is possible ta learn what knowledge is
wi th out tak ing notice of its human context. That is, not only praet ical
in vo lvcment, but also Iheoretieal inves tigations are eonstituted by -
l mong other thin gs - their specifie concerns, interests, purposes, etc. In
ot her words, every kind of "attitude" towards the world must be seen as
a detcrmna le fOrln oflife whieh for He idegger means a specifie form of
CO ll ce rn (Besorgen) or dealings (Umgang): "Use is ju st a proxim ale
mode o f the bas ic sense as il belongs to the being lowards the world, 10
concern.,,79 But as he himself notes, "If only it were not plain [rom this
Ir ivia li tv th at it is by no means obv ious where the ontological boundary
hel wec;l ' lhco retical' and ' athcoretical ' conduct rcally run s! "so
ln Sein /lnd Zeit, Heidegger tries to arti culale this boundary part ly by
rn ca ns or th e di stinction between Vorhan.denheit and Zuhandenheit .
dCJl1, \Vas uns all tagli ch zuhand en ist, \Vas wir gebrauchen .und b~lreiben, und zwar
SO, daf.\ wir von der Ei gentmlichkeit dieses Gebarens gar Il1c hl w [ssen. und es, wel~n
\Vi .. cs besc hreiben so lle n, a lsba ld mi l Begriffe n und Fragen md3de~ten, ~ , e
fl ilderswo hc r Wltllll1 Cll . Dieses uns ganz Nahe und jeden Tag Verstandl iche 1St un s. lm
Grunde sc hOll relll und un versUind lich .... Es ist mir aber n ie eingefallen, durch dlese
Interpretation beha uplcn und bewei se~ zu woHen, das Wesen des ~ens,7hcn bestehe
dnl' in , dnB cr mi l Lffe l und Gabe l hantler1 und auf der Stralknbahn fhrt.
17 C h:a .. 1) slaled in SZ, p. 69. . .
11 S'l, p. 35 8: "Der ' pra ktisc he' Umgang hat seine. eige~Jell Wel s~n d~s Verwel,lens.
Und \V ic der Praxis ihrc spezifischc Sicht (' Theofl e ') cigne!, 50 tst dIe theoretl sc he
Forschung niehl ohne ihre cigelle Praxis." .
1(1 GA 21, p. 14 3: "Gcbrau ch ist nur c in na hel iegender Modus des Grundslllnes aIs
des Seins ZUI" Weil, des Bcsorgens." .
"0 SZ, p. 358: " WCtlll nicht lin di eser Triv ialiUU dcutlich w(i rde, daB es ke ~neswegs am
'J'H g l i c~ t , wo clc tltl m ll l cigcnt!ich die onlologische Grenzc zWlschen dem
' tI U'!("Ifctisc llcn' Vcrlml tcn lttld dcm 'ilthcorcti.schctt' vcrIUufl !"
91
 ' 1I AI'TI m '1W(l
Heidegger uses thcsc concepts in scvcm\ diflrCl1l ~ t.: Il 'lC~ . II l1 tl cspccinlly
Vorhandenheil is a rather ambi guous lcrm , but al Iculi t III Iile bcginnin g
of Sein und Zeit, in connection with th e analy sis of' th e \Vorl d Hnd man 's
way of being in the world, they are described as follo ws . ZU!J{[l1denheit
is an unobtrusive mode of being of things when available to concernful
dealings, whereas the experience of thin gs as vorhanden in volves a kind
o f explicit awaren ess of the thi ng which is absent in the former case,
where one in stead is directed lowards th e end of the acti vity one is
occupied with "1 Accordingl y, in ord er [or something to count as an
assertion in Heideggcr's sense, its object must be vorhanden, wh ereas in
non-assertoric speech, beings are for the most part available or
zuhanden. 82 1'0 account for the cxpcrience of things as vo rh anden or as
present at hand, Heidegger introduces the notion of interruption. When
our everyday preoccupat ion with thill gs in sorne way goes wrong, sa
that the thin g in question is no longer avai lable for use, it passes into the
first mode of Vorhandenheil, which is thus to be understood as a kind of
negation of availabili ty. Now the thing just lies there as something
unavailable, and it is for the first time really seen as such. In this
situation, He idegger s ugges ts, o ur relati on to th e thing loses its
immediate, un complicated character and becomes instead marked by
distance. This distancc in relalion to the thin g, which is here described
only with respect 10 its initial stage, ma y then be developed into
different degrces of " purity", where the last stage would thus be an
altitude towards things as mere ly present objects or as th oroughly
vorhanden 83
Apparently, this experience changes the way in which th ings concern
us. When describing everyday life, I-I eidegger puts emphas is on its self-
re lati onal structure: w hen wc are preocc upied \V ith some thing or
another, wc are al th e same tim e di rected tow ards our own ex istence.
This is to say that we usually act, make, inspect, etc. , from out of our
present situat ion, in relation to our past experiences, with a vi ew lu our
nlture existence, and so forth. In this way, ail that we do and think add
81For a discuss ion of the di fferent senses of Vorhandenheit , see J. P. Feil , "The
Fami li ar and the Strange: on the Lim ils of Praxis in the early H eidegger". Feil al so
questions the alleged pri ority of Zuhan denheit in H eidegger, emphasis ing that Ihis
rriority be longs to everyday ex istence only .
2 S2, 1S.
" 52, 16.
92
CII i\ l'l'ER l'Wc)
11 11 10 who wc arc and how wc understand ourselves; and in this respect,
onc can say that ail our acti vitics are for the sake of ourselves. But in
Ih c case or th eoretica l in ves ti gations, or when making assertions -
ullh ough, as human aC1i v it i~s, lhey obviously also contribute to our self-
lIndcrstandin g - this immediate "personal" or existential concern is
noncth clcss transform ed into another kind of concern, namely that of
knowledge for the sake of kn owledge itself. This is because in the
th eoretica l attitud e, one does not relate to the thin g in question as
meallingful to one 's awn existence in an unthematic and unprablem atic
v.,T ay, but one deals w ith it as an abject of investigalion - lhis is nuw lhe
horizon that furni shes it with meaning, Thi s at least is what Heidegger
sec ms ta be saying, but l nonetheless think th al, in the end, it is difficull
to draw a sharp line between these forms of concern.
Il eidegger also describes this change of perspecti ve as a transiti on
li'om VII/sehen to Hinsehen: instead of looki ng around oneself for the
I11 can s with which ta realise whatever it is one is aCter, in the mode of
/l insehen , one looks away From the "living" sphere ofmeaning in wh ich
thin gs arc ordinarily givcn and looks af them from a certain them atic
perspccti ve." And it is on ly on this level th at the " thin g" trul y becomes
an o bject, divorced from the knowing subjec!. For with this Hinsehen,
the thin g, whi ch was form erly gi ven as meaningful in some parlicular
\Vay and/or as a means to an end, is reduced to th al about which we
make an assertion ,85 As Heidegger puts it, it passes from being that with
whi ch (!vOmi/) we have to do to that about wh ich (worber) we make an
asserti on. Thus when the everyday context has been expelled in thi s
way, the poss ibility of a pure making manifest is given, as the object
c ircu\l1scribed by the assert ion is there in full presence, as itself,
libera led From its former context-dependence.
Now o ne Illay ask what the intentions behind Heidegger's description
o r this scenario are; where and when is thi s pure predication supposed
to l''ippcn? One suggestion is of course that this picture would represent
dctached scicntifi c discourse or perhaps philosophy, in which beings are
_1'1hi s concept is discussed al grcal Icnglh in GA 62*, The context is the ti rs! lwo
chl'l plcrs or Ille M efapltysics, and Il cidegger argues that Arislot le's description of the
dlrrcrcnl lcv cls of know lcdgc roun d in s en sc~ p c l'ccp t i o n (al Oa"crt ), ex pcricnce
(1' II Trf' lplrl ), nrt (t exvl\) und ph ilosophical wisdom (oo41 ia) respectively, conveys an
Ill Hllysis orllt\\v Ihe theol'cti cnl llu\Ildc can <I rise OUi or evcryday inlcll igibility,
WI. UA 2 1, p. 15'1.

given ln the mode of full objective presence. Il''1 Ihls is 11 0 1 rcu ll y
Heidegger' s principal idea. W hat he is aller is ra lher 10 show Ihat the
fOfm of speech just outlined is an extreme case: speech as a sl,,;ries of
theorelical assertions may stand as an ideal of theoretical discourse, but
it seldom looks like that. 86 ln other words, a purely theoretical attitude is
in rea li ty somethi ng of a limiting case. Of co urse, as compared ta
everyday speech, w here the speech act is re lated ta other thin gs,
persa ns, ends, etc., and thus pointing beyond ilself, th eorctical speec h
differs insofar as ils predominant interest is to di sp lay thin gs such as
they are, ta convey their nature. ln other words, it seems that the making
manifest of beings in th eory has no ex terna l end but is enacted so lely
for the sake of itself. This is not th e case in everyday speech, since there
one always has a further purposc, c.g. 10 con vince a persa n. This means
that apaphansis reac hes its hi ghest possibi lity in theoty. That is what
Heidegger has in mind when he says that the onl y form of proposition
that deserves th e name " assertion" is the one in wh ich a pure making
manifest takes place. However, since il is doubtful whet her one can
really imagine a sc ientitic end cavour w ho ll y deprived o f any further
intentions or purposes that organise the theoretica l work, the boundary
between theoretical and everyday d iscou rse is not absolutc.
8. The elemenl alreduclian il1 Gsserloric sp eech
Il is often emp hasised that Heidegger th inks that the transition outlined
above, whereby a thin g becomes an abject of the assertion, in volves a
1055 of mea ning, a " levelling" (Nivelliel'ung), as Heidegger himself puts
s7
it. Wh en the " with which" of our involvement is transformed inta the
" about which" of th e assertion, the henn eneutic "as" is reduced ta an
apophantic " as", whieh wo uld th us in some way distort or caver up its
own fo undation. ln this section, 1 will argue that Heidegger's view on
thi s malter is not that simple. Thereby 1 w ill also questi on the idea
occasionall y put forward in thi s con nection , that hecause of th is
86GA 24, p. 299.
87G A 21 , pp. 153 ff. The derivative nature of the assert ion is stressed by J.
Tamin iaux, " Les ' recherches logiques' du Manin Heidegger, de la thorie du
juge ment la vrit de l' tre", p. 26; F. Vo lpi , "La quest ion du logos dan s
l'articulation de la fact icit chez le jeune Heidegger, lecteur d' Aristot e", in particular
p. 41; T. A. Kell y, Language and Transce/l dellce. A Study ill th e Philosophy of
Martin Heidegger (ll/d Km'!~ O((o Apel, p. 811.
94
(' 11 1\ t' I im TWO
conce ption o f' nsscrtor ic spece h Ile idegger wou ld be susp ie iolls of
III II gUl1 gC us slIch, hopin g 10 be ab le to escape into a pre-lingui st ic
SI' 1I ~ rc . ns .Il were. "
ln Gl'llIIdprobleme der Phot/omena/ogie, Heidegger di scusses what
Iwppcns 10 Ihc mcaning of1Jein g in the asseltion and seems to suggest
11 H11 Ihe 1l1 can ill g of " is" loses whatever specifie, differentiated eharacter
it had in pre-propos itional understanding:
Th e " is" in the propos ition can, as il we re, affo rd Ih is
indelerminacy of ilS meaning because, as expressed, il springs
l'rom th e Dasein who is expressing itse lf and who a!ready
undcrstands in one sense or another the being intended in the "is".
/Jefore being expressed in the propos ition, the "is" has already
89
rece ived ilS different iation in factical understanding.
Conseq uentl y, Heidegger says, this " indiffe rence" of the " is" does not
s ignify an y kind of deficieney on the part of the assertion, but onl y
indi cates its deri vative nature as regards our access ta the wor ld, as
cOll1parcd w ith our " li ving" understanding of il. In this sense then, it
SCCIl1 S as if it does no! really matter that this levelling of being takes
place in th e assert ion, sinee our primary access to the wor ld is already
di rfe rentiated. 9o But o n this account, does it not look as if the asserti on
ilas no task ta fulm at ail except putting into words that w hich is already
ut1d crstood? I f 50 , waS it not preeisely stlch an und erstandin g o f
langua ge that Heidegger in the end wauted ta dispose of? And we have
secn earli er that th e (theoretical) assertion not only has its own specifie
U Suggcs ted by G . Fi gal, "Refraining from Dialect ic: He id~g~er's Interpretati on .of
Pl uto in the Suphisl lectures", though he also states that thl s lS really al odds wlth
Il eid cgger's concept ion of understand ing, p. 104; M. Ruggen ini , " La fin itude de
l'ex istence ct la question de la vr it: Heidegger 1925-1 929", pp. 159-160; F. Volpi ,
'ILn ques ti on du logos dans J' articulation de la facticit chez le jeune Heidegger,
lecleur d' Aristote", p. 56. By contrast, P. C. Smith accuses Heidegger of betrayi ng
his discovery that the original mode of speech is rhetoric or hermeneutics, inso far as
111': in hi s OIVIl work privil eges apophantic discourse. This is no doubt to sorne extent
llcccssnry, but in any C<lse, the consequence of this is Ihal hi s phenomenology almasl
loses it s chat'nctcr of bc in g a hcnnencutics of facticity; Th e Hennel1eufics of Original
1I 1'~ 1/1/I C:l lt. Delllom.'lrC/lioll, Dia/cc/ie, Rhetoric, pp. 314-31 S, note 5.
M'I (lA 2 4 , p. 30 1: " D~ s ' ist' im Satz kann sich diese Unbest immtheit sei ne r
Ilcdctll \1tlg glcichsum leisten, weil cs aI s ausgcs prochenes dem s ich aussprechenden
Duscin s lltspri ngt, dlls schOll das im ' ist' gemei nte Sein 50 oder so versteht. Das ' i ~t'
hlLI schOlL VO l' sc inclll Ausgcsprochcnse in im Satze seine Differenzie rung lm
IILktlscllcn Vc r s l c l l~ Ll c rlllll t ~ II , "
~ I ( ,'/1 24, pp. 100-30 1.
 '111\1' l'J cl{ '1W()
way of uncove ring be ings, but indced is the hi glicSI lUi 111 of 1Ilicovc
rin g,
sinee it is guided by no furt her moti ves th an thal of' lI1"king bci
ngs
manifes t such as they tru ly are. T his seems on the oth er hand to
imply
that in arder ta aceomp lish this superio r form of mak in g mani
test,
speech must liberate itself from the everyda y eontext, sinee this
is not
condue ted by the aim of display ing Ihe truth of thin gs. But why
must
Ihis go toget her wi th a levelli ng ofbein g?
ln our everyday, unthematic understanding of being, "isll has a
de tcrmina te Il1 caning, since wc are always mov in g wit
hin a specifie
context, whic h diffc rcn tates "is" in ulle respect or anothe r. This
is an
aspect of th e as-structure of our existence. In thi s connection, howeve
r,
Heideg ger's con cern is no lo nger ta show that thi s cveryd
ay
underst an din g of bein g is not proposi ti ona!. What he wants ta say is
that
in thi s understanding, even in slich cases w hen il is proposi
tiollal , as for
exampl e whe n wc express it in speech , His" is noneth e less furnish
cd
with a dctenninate mcanin g. This is becaus e our asserti ons arc
intimately con nected with the present cirelll11 stances, wh ich "tic" the
sentence-meaning and in th is way proteet it From becomin g amb iguous.
[fthis is sa, if the " li vi ng" speech does not cntai l a levellin g of being:
' Ihe grammati cal sense. lt has been argued that Heideg ger wou ld
then theoretical di scoursc does not necessa rily reduce the meanin g
of
being either, since it has il S Qwn praxis, i.e. ilS own context, within
which the meaning of being is determined in some specifie sense.
As th eoretical, the asserti on is a dcrivat ive fo nn of discourse in the
sense of presupposing an unthem ati c familia rity with the world. That
is
ta say, theoretical discourse would not be poss ible were it not for
our
pre-propositional, "herme neutie' acccss to the world. Of course, it
is
also the case that cvery assertio n, wheth cr th eoret ical or not, has
a hcrm cneutic character of understanding is precise ly that to see a
fo undatio n in the herm eneutic fo re-struc tu re of underst anding, but
that
hold s for every kind of exp li cation. Even though H eidegg
er
occasio nally describes the asserti on as fo llowin g upon a foregoi ng
pre-
predicalivt: understanding, l thnk that one nevcrtheless has to say Ihat,
in the concrete situati on, these t\Vo clements cannat be separated
as
c\early as they were initially, in Section 4: when making an asserti
on
about someth ing and th us address ing it as somethin g, we do not simp
ly
express something already understood, but realise this und crstandin
g for
91 Sec GA 24, p. 303.
'111\ 1'11\1{ 'J'WO
th t.; fina ti me, j\lst lik c in th e case or prc-propositional explication. For
this rcaSOI1, th cre is no clear hierarc hy in the relation between the
IIcllneneu lic and th e apophantic: the latter is itself a realisat ion of
th e
rormcr. 92 O nc must thus disfingui sh betwee n the notion that th eoretiea
l
kllow ledge in general requires a "practical'" pre-predicati ve access
to
Ihc wo rl el , anel Ihe idea that theoret ical expli cation - li ke ail forms
of
expli cati on _ enacts a forego ing underst anding, which however it
is
onl y insofar as it gets explicated.
Bul if the assertion, no less than pre-pro positiona l explication, has
its
own hcrmencutic praxis, what is then the problem here? l mention
ed
nbove the idea that the assertion would cover up its own origin, that
it
cannot of its own accord make visib le ilS foundation, and that this
would render it ambigu ous or bestow upon it an indifferent meanin
g.
Il owcvcr, as wc saw earl ier, this is not the case when actuall y mak ing
Ille asserti on : the speaker as we il as th e hearer understands what is
said
in fi spccific sense in accorda nce with the situation. The meanin g
of an
asse rt io n can become ambiguous only when it is deprived of its contex!
.
Na tura ll y, this holds for uttered speech as such, not only assertio
ns in
think
Ihat theo retical predi cation in volves an exp ul sion of the everyd
ay
" re rercnlia l whole" (Verweisungsgal1zheit) , in terms of which we
are
"b ic ta encoun ter a particu lar thing as endowe d with meanin g,
and
Ihcre forc wou ld be without context." Th is mi ght perhaps seem
ta be
confirm ed by Heidegger's notion that the assertio n should determ ine
its
ohjcct solcly on the basis of this abject itself, and thus, it might seem,
not with respect ta an ything else. 94 But th e point of the notion of
the
th ing
os il is " in itsc!P' would be impossiblc withou t the fore -structure
of ail
'xpli ca tio n, and thi s struct ure necessaril y endow s (theore ti cal)
l!xpli ca ti on \V ith 11 specifie context.
Finall y, cvcnlh ough Heidegger's work as a whole to a great extent is
" "' rked by an awa rcness of the diffi culty of ph ilosophicall y art icul
at ing
~l I>oinlcd oui by J. D. Ca pulo, Radical lIermel/el//ics. Repetitio
n, Decans/rI/clion.
(I//(I ,h e IfcrlllC/I(!/Ilic prnjeci. pp. 73-76; H. Ru in, Enigmal
ic Orig1S. Tracing th e
1h(' I1/(' ol ll/slOI'id ly Ihrol/RIt lI(!idej:u~ (!r's Works, p. 96.
~t Sec M. Okl'ctll. llI'it/cgg el"s l'raR /l/ olism. Ullders /(II/dillg. Being,
al/d Ihe Critique
tli MI/(I/J"y\'iO.
Q (,'/I2 1, p. 155.
l(J
 CI 11\ l'TER 1 W()
th e pre-p re dica ti ve Icvel of und e rsta ndin g, sili ce Il.l Oi nrl il.!tdati o n
necessarily has to maye on the level o f asse rtori l.: sp..:c\.: h, this is l'l ot 10
say that th e fo rmer level is completely free from lin guisti c Il1 cd iuti ol1.
On the con trary , s ince thi s leve l too in volves articulation, it is
dependent upon - among oth er thin gs - an existing conceptuality.
Moreover, th e fa et that language is public and therefore in saIlle sense
anonymolls is 1101 in He idegger's v iew just an obstac le 10 ge nuin e
und ersta nd ing but also what makes thi s possi ble . The prob le m ar ises
w hen speech is experienc ed not in the for m of legein , but as legomenon,
that is, not in the concrete situation of speaking but as an entity, as an
iso lated state ment. When rc gard cd lhus, the speci fi e, situati on-bo und
characte r of speech is 10st, and 50 is the foundation of speech. However,
this loss is not intrinsic to the asse rt ion itself, but is a conseque nce of a
particular way of relatin g to speec h, whi c h assumes lhat speec h and
asserti ons could be suffi cientl y understood in iso lat ion. A nd on
Heidegger 's acco unt, it is suc h an att ilude towards speech that has
become dominant in the philosophi cal tradition.
9. The problem lVith the epistemic Ideal
Regarding Heidegger 's attitud e lowa rd s Ar istotl e 's conception of
episleme, same remarks were given in the previous chapter, w here it
was notcd lhat Heidegger calls atte nt ion 10 the fact that this kind of
knowledge is said lo con cern th e uni ve rsa l, w hi c h moreover is
immutable. As Ari stotle has il, "That abo ut which one has know ledge
cannat be otherwi se.,,95 T his is th e "what" as we il as the " wh y" of
reality. If applied 10 the traditiona l lreatment of la nguage as Heidegger
understands this, olle cou ld say that th e consequence of this view on
knowledge is tha t onc has ana lyscd la nguage in general , and its
predication-structure in particular, in an indifferent way, tha1 is, one has
asked " whaC' the constitutive clements of language are, but not " how"
they are. In this way , one has objectified language, trcaled it as static.
On Heidegger 's view, the ri se of the assertion to its position as the
superior mode of speech has affec led not onl y o ur conception of
95 An. Pos t . 74b6: "0 )'p 1tlO'[OOtCH, o uVO'[OV cD.wC; xct v". On the
episte mologica l superiority of the uni versa l ("ro KaOO\) as com pilred \Vith th e
ind ividua l (t KO' KOOW) sec An POSI , 1. 24 . The "w llat " (ri ro C! ) (Ilia the "w hy"
(t otan) are both ex tcnsively disc usscd in the wholc work of Iho 11/1111,,(/('.\',
' 11 1\ 1"1 "1{ '1 WO
lunguu gc und thou ghl, bul alsa ou r comprehensio n of being. The reason
why lhis cou ld happcn is thal being was understood with the formula "S
1" P" us a clue, whi ch rc sulted in the degradatioll of being into cop ula.
III Ihi s way, th e an to logicai problem "was forced as ide into logic,,96 and
Ille qu esti on o f'bein g \Vas l'cduccd ta a question of sentence-structure.
Thc prob lem is not necessarily that one has tri ed to understand be ing
0 11 Ihe bas is of lhe assert ion, bu t that one has been mi staken about the
nature of the assertion itself:
Rego rded naive ly, an assertion offers itse lr as an obj ectively
prl.!sen t complex of spoken words that are thern se lves present as
a bjects . ... If an objectively present comp lex of sin gle words is
thus given, the question ari ses: What is the bond that establishes
the un it y of Ihi s interconneclion? The quest ion of a comhination,
97
a copula, arises.
Whcn lh e assertion is und erstood as a series of words, the access to lhe
ontological question of being is occluded from the start. The tho ught is
fi llnili ar by now: wh en th e assertion is re garded as a kind of "entity"
und the way in which it is enacted is dismissed as being somethin g
"cxterna l" to its essence, we do not only fail to grasp the essence of the
Hssc rli on , but meet with the more seri ou s conseq uence of be in g
prcvcnled from posing the question ofbeing in the right way.
When being is unde rstood as copula its meaning gets redu ced or
kvcll ed; it is, as in Kant 's famous saying, " not a real predicate", it does
98
1101. add a ny thin g to th e concept of which it is predicated. This
IIndc rstandin g of th e copula dates back to Aristotl e, who, in the passage
10 which 1 have referred carlier, says that
ncither "ta be" nor "not ta be" signifies a thing, nor does "being"
when uttcred in isola tion. Then taken by themselves they are
l1 ol hin g, but they c o~ s ignify a syn th es is, which cannat he
99
cOllcc ived wilhollt the things that are corn bined.
QI, (;1/ 24, p. 252.
III UII 24, p . 292: "Eine Aussage gibt sich fr den n<liven Btick ali ein vorhanden er
i'. lI 'i ul~ll1I cn h[lll g gcs prochcncr vorhandcner Worte . Wenn sa cin vorhandener
/ .II'!:flllll ll cnhnng vo n Wrtcrn gegcbcil ist, cntsteht d ie Frage: Welches ist das die
!,: llIhclt d il.:scs Zusamrn cnlu\I1gs slinendc Band? Es ent springl die Frage nach eiller
VCI!>IHhlll g, nflch ciller Kopuln ."
Il" '':l'frit deI' l'(! lt ll! /I V(!/'II/I/!fl, A 59RIB 626.
I,.l Ik II/r . 16b 22 ~ 25: "o yp to l' IvOI i\ l' I~ elv(!I cr q)l (,'i6v o n '[O\) rrpaY)1oto;. o'
,\v ( l~ 'Iv dlt\l<t Il,{ ).OV . (j ,'lra IIPv yrlp O\Jrv pany. rtpocro lll.lO lVC I O cruvOEO IV
1)<)

So conceived, the meaning of being is levellcd d01Y1l in Ih " asscrtion
and hence is undifferentialed; Ihe only function il perlo nns is that of
sy nthesising words. This means that wh eu being (Sein) is rega rd ed as
copula, it is taken to be nothi ng more th an a partieular being (Seiende).
That IS to say, as cop ul a, being gets separated l'rom beings, as it is
spell ed out as a predi cate, di ffe rent from the s ubj eet, so Ihat one does
not see that beings "are" nothin g in isolatio n from the ir being.
The problem of the copula is th us essen tiall y a philosoph ical
problcm, namcly that what is ultimately an onto logie::!l question has
been tran s Cormcd in to a que stion of log ic. 8ecau se of thi s
transformation, one has not becn ab le 10 sec that bcing as copu la, Le. as
synthes is, is on ly possible because of a more fundamcntal syn lhesis that
belongs to (he things themselves. Th is mcans thaL"js" ean work as a
copul a and combine words to an assertion because il is itself '"directed"
to beings and thus determined by an ontalagica l synthes is. 100 So
~oneeived, be in g has been reduccd 10 copu la merely in ph ilosophi ca l
InvestIgatIons, whl ch me ans Ihat Ihe cop ula sho ul d be interragaled only
In order to evade thls philosophical mistake, not 10 reveal something
about how we actuall y speak, for in actua l di scourse Ihis levelling of
being does in tct not lake place.
However, as indicated in the former section, the nature of asscI10ric
speech still p oses a prob lem to ph il osop hy . The task of phil osophy, at
least as HeIdegger eoncei ves of il, is to reveal how things are given,
how they show th emselves, whi ch is Ihe same thing as to disclose the
ditTerent forms ofbeing. But ifbein g "is" Ilot ofa slati e nature, then the
philosophica l di sco urse is traub led by a serious prob lemalic for it .
~ery
d.rr.
1 lCult 10
' IS
poin t ou t chan ge and faeti city and to preserve it as it is
~n langll~ge. More precisely, w h en an ex peri en ce of being is expressed
In assertlOns "abOlit" being, it is almost impossible ta avoid the risk that
being is d!splayed as ifit were an enti ,y with a stati e nature, and so the
dan ger an ses Ihat th e philosophieal discourse will be misunderstood
This is also exacll y what has happened to Heidegger hi mself, notably a~
nVG: flv aveu .1CV OUYICElJ.u~.vwv 01>IC on voijOOl." As copula, bcing is thus on ly
pred~ cated a~cldenta ll.y (](~1a aUllPePlllC) . T his s not the case whe n being is
p~ed lcated \~lth. an eXistent/ai mean ing; see De. 1111. 2 1a2 5-32. I-Ierc 1 Je.wc out tI t
ktnd of predicatIOn.
' 00 GA 24, pp. 302,303.
100
CII i\ I'TER 1 WO
l'cg u rd ~ th e rccc pii on or Sein Ill/d Zeil. Perh ap s due to the ail too
syslcmali c o utl oo k o f Ihat work, togeth er with its somewhat rigid
COllcc ptualily , th e slruclures of Dasein were, at least according to
Il c ideggcr him self, 'o, un derstoo d as es tab li shed and indifferent
properlies instead of as d ifferent aspects of man ' s existence, whose
bcing depends upon how it is enacted in a concrete situation.
10. Conclud ing remarks
Thi s chapter has fo ll owed Ihe first steps of H eidegger's a((e mpt to
challenge th e noti on that the assertion constitu tes the basic element of
Irul h and knowledge. Tracing thi s noti on to ils alleged ori gin in
A ri stot le, H eidegger showed that in Aristotle, the assertion is in fact not
Iho ught to display Ihe bas ic element of tru th and kn o\Vledge, for the
assert ion is in ilS tum resolved into sll17lhes is and dihairesis. And w ith
Ihcse concepts, Aristotle has not only articul ated the essential elements
of lIssert oric speech but poi nted to the essence of discurs ivity or logos
liS such , that is ilS as-stru cture, even though he himself m ay tend to
Ihcmali se it primarily with respect 10 ils propo siti ol1al lcvel. Thus, just
us Il cidegger \~'ants 10 con front the epistemic ideal of cogn ition and its
pri vileging ofpropositional speech in arder to approach the questi on of'
logos in an at least comparatively unprejudiced \Vay, he cons iders it
ncccssary to question Ihe rece ived view on Aristotl e in arder to be ab le
lu see Ih at Ari stot le has a broader notion of logos than logos
afJophanlikos . [n Ihis way , Heidegger's interprelalion of Ar istotl e ' s
lI1lll lysis of logos apophalllikos has paved the way not Gnly for a new
lI pproach to the question of logos but also for a renewed interpretation
o f Aristotle ' s understanding ofthis question.
This new approach to the ques ti on of logos sets out [rom Ihe
disco vcry of a pre-predicative mode of discours e, which was shown to
he cndo wccl with an as-s tructure on ils OWI1 , but w hi ch nevertheless was
snid to consttu te th e foundation o[ the assertion, conceived of as a
Ihco reli cal mode o f co ncluct. I-Iowever, this mode of speech is not
IIcccssaril y pre-predicati ve, bu t ils ba sic charactcri sti c is that it is pre-
Ih !.: orctica l, that is, th al il is Ilot conduclcd I11 crely for the sake of
fI/Joplta llsis, for th e sak e or making th ings l11anircs t. To expl ore this,
la
'''1 Sec (il ' 29/30, pp. ~ 22,'l l l.
10 1
Heidegger turns to evcryday life and il s logos, !lIlli In o l'l,; nrcciscly, to
Aristotle's explication of this phenomenon. The inqury int o cvcryday
speech should thus make manifest something likc the proximate mode Chapter Three
of speech, that is, a supposedly morc basic or common mode or logos as
compared with the apophantic logos.
THE EVERYDA y LOGOS

1. Evelyday ness as a philosophical theme

III Sein und Zeil, the theme of everydayness is introduced together with
Ihe question of the right aceess ta Dasein, as Heidegger thinks that
phil osophy has tended to interpret Dasein with inappropriate categories:

The mode of access and explication must rather be chosen in such

fi \Vay that this being can show itself in itself and From itself. And
ta bc more precise, it should be shown with respect to how it is
p /'Oximafly and for rhe mos! part, in its average evnydayness. l

Olll y wh en the proper access ta everyday life has been secured is it

poss ible ta see that its understanding is not theoretiea!. That it is not
Ihcoreti cal means, among other things, that for the most part, everyday
lif~ does not relate to the "things" it conccnlS itselfwith as objccts. That
is to say, wh ether or not the understanding of everyday life is
vc rbali sed, its articulation, unlike the assertion, do es not involve
obj eetilieation. Aeeordingly, everyday speech should not be analysed
wi th the assertion as a model. However, everyday speech ean of course
he propositiollal in the grammatical sense. Thus the investigation of
'vcrydayncss encompasses the twofold task of accounting for both pre-
predi cative and predicative articulation.
Even thoLlgh everydayness displays a partieular mode of existence,
Ihe point or subj eetin g it to philosophieal analysis is "to exhibit not
fH'bilra ry or accidentaI but essential structures! which, as determinative
n i' Ih " be in g or Dasei n, pcrsi st in every mode of being of factieal

18/., p. 16: " Die Zug<l l1 gs- und Au slcgu ngsart !lluf3 vi elrn chr dergestalt gewahlt sein,
dtl cli c..;\.:s Seicndc sich nn ihm se lbst von ihm ~c lb s t ber zeigcn kann. Und zwar soli
.'Ile da 'l Scicndc in dt.:ll1 Zl..!igcll, wic cs ZllI/ aellsl II/ ICI Z lIl/I e sl ist, in seiner
{hu cllSclHl ill li cl1 m1 AII!Ii~lich keil."

102 101
 CII AI''I I,R IIIHI 1
Dascin" ? ln Ihis sense, then , evcrycla y liI'c c OIi SIiIUI C'i H kind of
beginning for phenomenolog ieal analys is, Iholl gll l'rom \1 philosoph iea
l
perspective that is not what is given allhe bcginning, sincc Illis is rather
certain theories and opinions concerning the nature of lire.
On Heideg ger's account, ev en though phi losophy must try to let
everyda y lire explica te itself, as it were, this require s a certain distanc
e.
Everyday explica tion cannot be properly interpreted if the analysi
s of
t:
remains on the same level as the explication itsel though it must begin
there. Thus in workin g out hi s in terp re tation of everyd ayness
,
Heidegger has to con front the common, "every day" interpretation
of
everydayness. Even th ough one shou ld be carefu l with
the tcrm
"everyday ness" in eonnee tion with philoso phy and theory, since it
is
primarily intencled to refer to pre-theoretieal activity, philosophy cou
lcl
be said to have ilS OWI1 everyda y mode, Il ot least as far as its relation
ta
Ar is totl c is co nce rnee! , fo r prox im all y and fo r the most
pari",
philoso p hy Jeans on Aristotl e w ithou l confront ing him as ilS ori gi 3
n. Fo r
this reason, Aristotl e plays a comp lex role in Heidegger's anal ysis
of
everydayness. When dec laring everyda y unclerstanding 10 be th e basis
of phi losophy and theory, it might seem that Heidegger's projeet
of
destruc tion has undergo ne a transformat io n: the aim can no longer
be ta
retrev e a Gree k or Ar isloteli an origin , for morc origina l
th an
phi losophy is everyday, pre-philosophicalli fe 4
Still, in his analysis of everyday life, Heidegger does not simply tum
to this li fe " itseIC', but rather to Aristotle's explication of il. This he can
do because of his question ing of th e "every day" interpretation
of
Aristot le, such as thi s was eluciclated in the previous chapter
. one' , life as a whole. Both leclme and phrol1esis are by Aristotle saicl
Accordin gly, Heidegger 's ai m is not merely to let everyday life come
forward on ils Own tenns, but also to let Aristotle "show himsel f t'rom
him self', that is, before his views are subjet ed to critieism 5 ln thi
s nOl ion of pre-propositional discursivity in Aristot le, which he had been
2 SZ. pp. 16~ 17: "An dieser sollen nicht beliebige und zutllige , sondern
wesenha ft en
Strukture n heralJsge stetlt \Verden, die in jeder Sc insart des faktisc!u:
seinsbest imm ende durchhal ten ,"
n Dase ins sich ais
J Cf. GA 19, p. 10, where Heidegg er remarks
that the legacy of Plata and Aristotle
nowaday s is something ailliiglich , something we no longer are able
to see.
J Cf. Chapter One, p. 50, note 88. But even thougll Heidegger had not introduce
d the
notion of everydayness when he initially worked out his conception of
destruction,
he thought already al this stage tha t Aristotle's conceptuality in its
turn has an
importan t relation to pretheoret ical understandi ng, see PA , p. 253.
5 This strategy is manifest notably in GA 19.
104
VII A!,'II ,' \( 'J 1110 ]1,
pli isuil , Il cilh.:ggc l' Onell sccrns 10 regard Ari slolle as a forerun ner,
IIppl'ouching him aS somconc who has managed to affirm everyda y, pre-
Ih corelic al li fc as a phi losophi cal beginning. Occasi onally, howeve
r,
Il eidggcr secms to imply that Aristotle's interpretation or everyday li
fe
is in I\.ct itsclf " everyday"; that is, rooted in everyday life itself, so that
il mainly just gives vo ice ta the "natura l" views on life and world which
tire embeddecl in everyday li fe itsel f. On this aecount, the analysis
cvcrydayness would essentially be the same lhing as an imerpretation
of
Arislot le's ana lysis of everyd ayness , but it wo uld require a non-
i\ristote li an perspective, since the philosophical interpretation cannot
simply go along with everyday li fe but has to distance itself from it to
a
cCrlan extent. But ta make things even more compli cated, this
"non-
Aristotclian" perspective will in fact be retrieved from Aristo!l e hi mself.
Again , thi s waveri ng attitude toward s A ri stot le has to d o
w ith
Il eidcggcr' s hesitanee concerning what kind of origin Aristotle really
is,
wilethe r he is a "simple" or an already reflected, critical origin .
ln tlli s chapter, 1 will show how Heidegger, mainly on the basis of his
inlerprelation of the Nicoma chean Elhics, argues that Aristot le has
lIrli culated the perspective of everyday life - which Aristot le himsel
f
thus may o r may not be entang led in - by means of his concep ts
of
!,o ies is, produc tion, and techne, art or know- how, which Heideg
ger
di,cusses under the heading of"concern" (Eesorgen). In order to furt her
eluciclate th e nature of concern, Hei degger introduces the concept
of
"carc" (Sorge) , wh ieh he finds prefigured in Aristot le's notion ofactio
n
(praxis ) govern ed by phrol1esis , the underst anding of what is good
for
to
he lII ela logo" , di scursive, but they are neither theoret ical , nor
necessa rily propositional in kind. Thus here, Heidegger has found that
lookin g for. On Ille basis of his inte rpretat ion of Aristotle's idea ofhow
th is di scurs ive structur e works in praxis, Heideg ger can go on to
nrgue
th ot, as was indi cated already in the prev io us chapter , one cannat
'oi llprchcnd lhe nature of speech if one takes it to be something distinct
fi'oll1 tilinkillg, sincc the discurs ive structur e of speech is constitu
tive of
illlrnan 1I1lderslal1di ng as slIch. Moreov cr, speech or logos does not
heloll S cxclusivcly to the domain of rcaSQn c ither, bUl must rather
be
lucntcd in Ilc tnn 0 1' praxis. In other \Vol'ds, \ove will sec how He idegger
105
 C II AI' II 'I( 1111111

,11'I"lI MIh" poss ibilily of inl "rprclin g I n !l"~ Il' il' \l h '~ l l ,,lI y, in l"
r111S of ln whnt mi ght SC" 'll to resist Il e idcgger 's linc o f interpr etation
kll I['S{s, 50 that it is regarde d as an activit y in v lll v in ~ difle rcnce ,
and " d stotl e c lai",s th at his e thi es is of " practica l" lItility. He asserts
ciuIIl ge. Finall y, on the basis of th e elucidati on of th e bnsic co thal ItS
nstituti on nil11 is nol 50 l1luch knowle dge as acti on, for th e inquiry should
or logos, [ disc uss Heideg ger' s underst anding of how thi , comes
to liS tO rcoll y be good and npt only to kn ow the good in an abstrac
enabl;
express ion precisel y within everyda y speech. t way.
'J'herdo re, it should be use fui to tho se who want to bring the lr actIOns
10
" ccorda nce w ith logos . Further , the Ethics po ints Ollt what vlrtuoli
2. Heidegger 's reading of the Nicoma chean Ethics S
hcllll viour is, nan1cly the ab ility to hit the me an while avoi~ing /
Since thi s chapte r centres on Heideg ger's rather unorth he
od ox 'X II'CIllCS, and he also g ives con crete exampl es of
such b ehavlOu r. In
Interpre tat ion of the Eth;cs, so me remark s on thi s Interpre tation lh is \Vay , the seope of the Ethics appear s quite d iffe re nt
are from
ca lied for already at the out set. As mentio ned in the In troduct II t,; idcggcr 's existcntial analytic. IIowever, Aristotle also makes It clear
ion, the
literatu re on Heideg ge r and Ari stotl e has I,n' ge ly becn devoted Ihut wh en it eomes to ethics, one must be content if one succeed
to s in
H eidcgge r's "appropri ation" o f the EffIies ta hi s existcntial
analytic , and ind icatin g th e truth in broad outline, and this is also ail that the audienc
there is a lairly widespread vicw that this appropriation consists in e
a should e xpect from his in vesti gation. ' For the human good is of
sllch a
kind of " ontolog isation" of A ri stotle 's ethics. This is co rrec t insofar
as cllUngcab le nature " that il might seem to be determ ined by eustom
Hei degger does not take th e Ethics to be eoncern ed wi th e thi onl y
es o r nlld not by nature". JO Virtue is situation-bound , and therefore, the
moralit y in a n<lrrw sense, but in sists lIpon approac
hin g it as an 111 "!1ll ing or content of the ability to hit tbe mean must be seuled
analysi s of th e bcin g of human Dasein, the ai m of whi ch is to lIncove by th e
r circums lances. Aceord ingly , it is not possibl e to give lInqllalified
the possibilities for rliles
man~s access to truth. This tendene)' is charactcrislc I(lr action, but onl y to point o ut what elem ents are constitu
also o fHeid egger's re.ding of Aristotl e 's other " praetieal " work ti ve of
s, such (s ucccss flll) acti on. In thi s way , Ar istotle at Jeast renoun
as th e Rhetorie and th e Politie s. In wha t follow s, l restricl Illyse ces the
lf to possibi lit y o f ail ethi cs th at calcula les the conseq uences of aclion,
Heidcgger's interpretati on of the Ethics . th us
nnt icipatin g Heideg ger's view on th e limits ofphiJo ~Ophlcal exphc.a
The motives bchind Heideg ger's approac h to lhe Ethics are partly lion.
be found in his conv iction that philoso phy ncither sholiid nor
to or cqual importa nce to Heideg ger's interpre tatlon lS that An stotJ e
can be ncbi cves his concep t of v irtlle through co ncrete phenom enolog
ethi cs as a special discipline. What it can do is to inquire into leal
man's wnrk . ror th e virtlles, as they are dea ll with by Aristot le, are
ethos, hi s " habituai" way of being si tu aled in the world, whieh admits Ilot
of IIl1posc d on man " frol11 above", i. e. the y are n o~ go ver
differen t forrns of access to truth. This is also how Heideg ger reads n~d by
the pl'cdctennined , etcrnal va lues. For virtue in the Aristotehan sense l5 ~rs
Ethics. At th e ee nlre of thi s interpr etation stands Heideg ger t
's ora ll a matle!" of Hviability", the capacity to live one's life in a sensible
underst anding of Arislotl e 's noti on of the good (/0 aga/hon). Heideg
ger \\Illy, in accordance with human nature. On this view, life itsel fprovid
is a nx iolls to point out that Aristot le is the 'first to aehieve a es
strictly us w ith th e fOllnclation o f virt lles, whi ch means that the aim o f ethi es, as
ontolog ieal underst a ndin g of the good, in accorda nce wi th whieh
the opposcd 10 thal or the sc iences, is to clarify the "that"
good is Ilot 50 much conceived of as a moral property or as some (o f vlrtuous,
kind I\cli oll) nl1hcr Ih an the " why" .ll The key to ths nt erconne
ction 0 1
of va lue, but rather as limit and end, that which determi nes and delimit
s virtucs and the capacity 10 exist is Aristot le's notion of the good.
human activity as sueh For only on the basis of this interpre tation
ean
Heideg ger claim that the Ethics is not restriet ed to the "ethical "
aspects
of human con duc!. , ti N. 109505-6, 10- tl.
I~ N. nook I V.
" /,' N lOI)4h 19-2J. ,
111 Jo' N. 10911h1 6: .. ... i~<Hr 50l\cv \.6pQ) p6\'o\' chol ,
' GA 18, p. 43 ; GA 19, p. t23. $~C l St'! P1l:" ,
Il f N I lJ'J~ b.7. St.;t.; 01s() 11 c idllo~l!r's COllllllC1l1 '\ on
tllis possog,c In G A 18, p. 77 .

106 t ll l
 ' 11 1\1''1'1\1( ' 1111( 1' 1'
Ta Aristo tl e, the Elhics as an inquiry into Ihe nature of th t..: gaod, or
more specificall y inta the nature or the good li re, is simultancously an
investi gation of li fe as such, since il is peculiar to life as slich 10 Hil11 al
somethin g good, as the first sentence of lhe Elhics le ll s us." Thal is
why Aristotle thinks that ta live a good life is ta be lhat wh ich one
already is and lhus la fulfil human nature. Accord ingly, he considers the
task of elhics to be to nnd out wh8t is pecul iar (idion) to man as man, in
arder ta From the re on unco ver lhe dirferenl poss ibilities for human
action and thinking. 'l These poss ibilili es constitute dirferent l'orms of
virtue, and on Aristot!e 's accounl, lo be virtliOllS , i. e. lu trul y t:Ilal:l
Oll C'S own nature, whether this takes place in specu lativ e lhinking or in
interaction \Vith other people, is to attain the truth. Thus Aristotle's
conception of virtue does not know of any divi sion bctwcen "practical"
or "thcoretica l" conduct, but virtue is (or rather can bel peculiar ta
human act ivity in general, since to be virtuous is ta be in truth, and truth
is a fun dament al characteristic of human existence as such . Thus wc can
see the legitimacy of tak ing the nOlion of truth as a guicling clue when
reading the Ethics, nslead of approaching il as a work on the nature of
virluous or morally juslified action.
This is not to say lhal Aristotle's nOlions o f virlue and the good are
wholly neutral, or unrelated to good and bad in the comlTIon sense. The
point is that Aristotle's understanding of thcse phenomena is not based
upon a dichotomy ofwhat is and whal shoulcl be, in Heidegger's words,
between Sein and Sollen. Ethics as Aristotl e conceives of it ean never be
a separate discipline, divorced l'rom an ana lys is of the being of man, and
this is precisely what Heidegger is out ta show. l4
3. Everyday speech as the basis of Aristotle 's concept oflogos
When explicat ing everyday Iife through or wilh the help of Aristotle,
Heidegger frequentl y begins wi th a discussion of logos as speech in the
concrete sense, i.e. as communication. ln Ihis way, communication is
regarded as a basic phenomenon not only for the analys is of logos bUl
a lso for lhe analys is of life as such. Heidegger is o ft en accused of not
taking enough notice of the intersubjecti ve nature of human existence,
"EN. 1094.1 -3.
Il E.N. 1097bJ4ff.
14 Cf. Heid egger's rClllarks 0 11 the ELllics in GA 18, pp. 179- 180.
IOX
l'lilI in Ihe courses 011 Al'istOl lc, he dcv01CS Il1l1ch effort in showin g that
to th \! Grccks, the primary sense or logos is preci sely communication
wi lh others, and that thi s is prescrved in Ari stotle ' s conceptio n of
rnliona lit)' .' j That is ta say, il \Vas onl)' on the basis ofh is understandi ng
of Ihe Grcck experi ence of speech as the locus of social intercourse that
1\ rislotl e evenluall y coul d press forward ta his notion of a speaking,
di scursive reason. Thereby , however, he moved beyond the everyday
IInd c rstanding of logos, s in ce \Vith th is step, logos is no longer
idcnlifl ccl with concrete speech, but with the as-s tructure. Accordingly,
10 c lu c id atc Aristotlc's definitiol1 of man as a bcing endowed with
logos, il is necessary \0 relate il ta hi s concep ti on of everyday speech.
This is a task that Heidegger now takes on, notably in the Sophist
leclures and in Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosoph ie. ln th e
lall er course, Heidegger calls upon the Ethics, the Po/ilics and the
IIhetoric in arder ta c1arify what it means that man is a zoion lagon
cellon, in the sense of a speaking being, The ultimate purpose of the
cou rse, however, is to understand the nature of scient ific \\'ork, and in
partic ular, th e scie ntifi c logos or conceptu alily. More preci sely,
Ilcidcgger wants ta poin t out that if theory is a poss ibi li ty for hUlllan
ex islence, then every theorelical conceptuality, whether sc ienlific or
phil oso phical , must ta some extent be prepared fo r in life's own
expli cations o f itself and its world: "If the conceptualit)' is rooted in
Duscin it sc lf, Dasein itselfmust in sa me sense be this conceplllality.,,16
'1'0 s ub stantiale this claim , Heide gger investigates Ar islotl e's
concepluali ty - wi th the help o f Aristotle himself. Thus on the one
hnnd, Il eidegger tries ta explain the nature of theoretical articulation by
Irac in g il back la everyday speech, and in thi s pursuit, he turns ta
t\r istotl e's acco unt of th eir in terre lation. But on the ather hand, he
silll uilancously app lies Ari stotle ' s account ta Aristotle 's own work, in
l' This charge has becn put Forward with respect to Heidegger's interpretat ion of
,lh,.oll es i. by J. Tamin iaux , Le thtre des philosophes, pp~ 174- 175; Lecture de
l 'o/l w logic fondamelltale. Essais S Ill' Heidegger, pp. 172ff; J. Risser, "Philosophie al
1k l'llIcncliti cs and the Question of Commllnity", pp. 22ff. In their arti cle" Aristotle
"'Id Il ddcggc r on EmOlion and Rhcloric . Questions of Time an.d Space", M. Hyde
und C. Smilh urglle Ihal Heidegger could not approve oF rhetonc because he cou td
Ilot clllcnuin tll e id ea of ail liuthCl1li c "llley" - thus Ihey npparcntly confuse das Man
Wltll MII,\'(." . Sec also nbovc, p. 94 , not e 86 .
I ~ UA 1H, p. 27 1: "WeIHl di c Bcgrin1ichkcit Ill t)nscill se lbst bodenstandi g ist, lill/fi
rlo.\' f)os";/I se lhsi dit, Ik j.(I'ljjlichkcil ll/ ~ i'lIIis.\('/' H'ci.\'(.! sein."
10')
 Cll ll l'Tl ' l(lllO 1
:II II PTlR T IIR t;E

arder t show how his conccplllHlity in ils 1111'11 IN plu'll y buscd

upon H'SCI"l iOIlS12 Hut if speech is thus ex pcricnc ed already in everyda y
everyda y speech. In this way, Heidegger lets Aristotl c pcrl"orm a kind Iife,
of Ihen A l'i sloll c's dClcrminati oll orth e asserti on as logos apopha
self-analysis: with and through Aristotle, it should be possible ta " Iisten ntikos is
I"llnled in evcryda y lire itself. Again, Heideg ger' s point is not
in ta" everyd ay speech , and From there on eventua lly ta rcach that
the A l"i sl otl c's Icac hin g of logos is a mere conti nuation of
essential features of language and speech. 17 the "naive"
ullclcrstanding o f speech, but that il has a phenomenal basis.
I-Iowev er, Heideg ger emphas ises that Aristot le himsel f has tried Whcn clabor[lti ng his interpretat ion of Aristot le' s understand ing
ta of
thus " Iisten in" ta everyd ay life, in arder ta put his phi losophy l! vcryday speech, He idegger focues above aH on the Rhetoric,
on a since, as
"sol id foot ingH . 18 Regarded in th is way, Heidegger argues, we can wC ha ve secn earlier, he thinks that this work may be regarded as
in an
faet say that there is no other tendenc y in Aristotl e th an la make
clear ex pli cation of everyday Iife as such. Indeed, he c\aims, when correctl
the meanin g of endoxa , commo n ly accepted opinion s, but th is y
is often inl crpreted , one sees that the Rhetarie not only lets the " pecul
what is most difticult of al\. 19 ln accorda nce with Ihis view, Heideg iar
ger domain" of cvcryda yness show itself, but that it also contain s a hi
s uggests that the definiti on of man as zoioll lagon echon
ghly
shou ld dcvc lo ped concep tuali ty for the explica tion of everyd ayness 23
primari ly be regarded as an articu lation afa sclf-und crstanding intrins Il owever , apart from arguing that Aristotl e in the Rhetol"ic has manage
ic
to Groek li fe itsel": d
la letlife explica te itself on its own terms, Heideg ger wants to show
that
L ege ill , speakin g, is the bas ic con stitu tion of huma n Dasei on the bas is of the expl ication of everyd ay speech , Aristotl e
n. has
When spcakin g, il arti cul ates ilselj; in such a \Vay Ihal il
spea ks IIchieve d cerlain preliminary determ inations of logos, which recur in
the
about something, about the world . Th is lege ill \Vas for the Grecks
nnalysis of the logos of action, though in a differe nt sense." Thus,
somethi ng 50 persist ent an d evcryday , thal "' th respect 10 thi
s Il cidegger argues, we see that Aristot le's conceptuality both preserv
phenoll1 cnon and on th e basis of it Illey achieved the defin itio n es
of
man and detcrmined man as 20 iOl l lagon ecl/Ol1. 20 und transforms the experie nces that are embedd ed in everyday speech,
in Ih at it has sharpened and brough t ta explicit arti culation what is
The notion of man as a speaking bcing is connec ted wit h the idea only
that ll lllhiguo usly articulated there."
speech is the proximate mode of aletheuein, of our access to the worid,
As far as Ari stotle 's understandin g of rh etoric is concern
which, however, as we will see in the next chapter, is not to say Ihat ed , the
it is cOllcep ts that receive most attentio n from Heideg ger are doxa,
the ultimat e mode of uncovering. 21 Recall ing the context of Aristotl ta
e's (/)!.f/ th ol1 and pathos. In doxa - to which 1 will return at the end of
definiti on of man in the Po/itic s , the pur pose of speech is ta reveal thi s
chapter _ Heideg ger sees the basic or everyday phenomenon of logos:
(de/mm ) va ri olls di stinctio ns, e.g . betwcc n good and bad
. In speech in th e fOl"m of establis hed and publicl y accessi ble
Heideg ger' s v iew, de/mm is just another na me for apopha inestha op inions
i, to 'onccrnin g variotl s th in gs that govern everyday action wh
ile prov idi ll g
uncove r in the sense of making mani fesl. Accordin gly, apopha nsis il \V ith an aim and dire cti on. For Heidegger emphas ises that
is even
now rega rd ed as the basic feature of speech as such, not only Ihough rh etori c
of has action as its aim, il !eads to action only insofar as it
pl'OdllcCS H convincing op inion, a doxa piston . Therefore, one
may s~y
17 See GA 18, p. 41. I hul Ihe pritnary aim o f rh etoric is ta let people see what
speaks III
"GA 18, p. 37.
"GA 18, p. 45.
20 GA 19, p. 17: "Das Y El v, Sprechen , ist di e
u ~ec Ci,11 8 . p p . 17 . 1 9; G A 19, p. 18.
Grun dverfass ung des menschlichen
Dase ins. lm Sprechen spricht es sicll aus, in der We ise, daf3 es ber etwas, JI UII 18. p. 136. . . ' l '
ber di e /4 l ld s Id cn is pnrlicularly clent" in GA 18, wherc HeIdegg er tirs! d lscl~sses An slot e.s
Welt , spricht. Dieses -YEIV \Var fUr di e Griechcn etwas so Au fdri ll l1d crsto ndi llg of evcrydny speech fi S C011l1l111ni cnti on in connec~i
nglicbes und oll wlth ~he Rhe ron c
All Uigliches , daf3 sie mit Bezug auf dieses Phn omen un d von ihm hr
di e Delini tion und the r ol/rit:.\', Md Ih ell procecds 10 Aristolle's accOlln! of
the relall on bctween
des Mensche n gewannen und ihm bestimm ten ais wov yov xov
" h lHOti (lI \d ncti oll il1111C 1~IItIc:s .
"GA 19, pp. 17,25. . ' J\ UA 1M, Il 2i!,

11 0 t Il
 t' li AI' Il ' 1( 11110 1

1~lvo ur of 1:1 particular opinion, so thui (bey 1li: CIII Il . cOllvin ccd
of ilS
11I
ru ,. '6'1"0 be convll1
. cll1g,
. geolls
hOIVever, Ihe Oral or has 10 cvokc " specifie
pathos in hi s audience. That is ta say, he has 10 aileci his aud ience
in
such a way that they confide in his doxa and Ihen (let in accorda
nce with
their convict ion. Heideg ger devotes conside rab le lime 10 thi
s notion
which is hardly surprising on acco unt of the imporlance he elsewhe
r~
ascribes to man's pathos or Stimmu ng (mood) wi th respect to
the
conslilution ofunde rstandi ng. 27 Here J would only like to point to one
aspect of Heidegger's interpretati on of pathos, since it is of fundamental
imporlan ce for hi s analysi s of logos. This is his idea Ihat, if logos
is
constltu ted by pathos , the rhetoric al situation of speech indi cates
that
sp eec h invol ves an interpla y betwcen activily and passivit y, poiein
and
paschein: what the speaker says affects the hearers 50 as ta bring about
a response, an ac tion. Wc will see later on how Heidegger makes use of
this notion ofpass ivity and activity in conneclion wi th his disclission
of
logos as discurs iv ity, so that th e as-struc tu re itselr is analyse d
in tenns
of address and response.
Ali kinds of rhetorical speech concern the good. One of them is
sumbouleutikos , "cons ultati ve", di stingui shi ng what is advanta geous
(swnpheron) l'rom what is harmful (blaberon). Whereas Heidegger does
not ~o any grea t .exte nt discuss this rorm of speech , he
devote s
conside rable a ttentIOn to the distinct ion bClwee n the harmfu l
and the
advanlageous, which Ari slol le also employ s in his characterisalion
of
logos in lhe Politic s. This distinclion occupies a prominenl place
in
Heldeg ger's interpre tation because he thinks thal il indicate s
how the
good is experic nced in everyda y life, namely as that w hi ch is benetic
28
ial
10 .one ' s conce rn s. This undcrst anding of the good is thus what
Aflslot le has deve loped inlo his ontologieal concepl of the good
, _/. '\'cchne and COllcern. The poieNc perspective of everyday fife
accord mg 10 whlch Ihe good is Ihal which conslillltCS the lelos of aclion.
26
. or Il'd
F
. el egger ,S .Interpretation of O Cl, see GA 18, 16. In (bi s (,;onneCl
Heidegger nl so kan s on the Tapies and the Metaphy sics . on
,.
" SZ, 30, 40.
T. Plum h.as devoted a sludy to Aristotle 's analy ses of different
kinds of public
speech, argumg,that for the ~ost part, lo~o~ is. more i~ the service of
efficacy th an
truth, a~d on hl~ account.' thls charactenstlc IS constitut ive of speech
in genera l;
Wahr~lelf u~d Wlrksamkell des Logos. Aristoteles ber Sprache, Sprechen
Ulld das
Sehrelbe n uberzeugender Texte fr den Gebrauch ;'1 der Schule, im
dem Markplatz. Th ea/el' III/d ail'
'J
Il o\V\';VCI', th e c illph us is on th e di stin c ti on bdwcc n th e advanta
lI iid lire Ir nrmfu l nllows Il cid cggcr 10 nol on ly con nect the Rhetorie and
lire l'otities , bul al so invile Ihe Etliies into hi s analysis of (Aristo tle's
Ilil erprelati on of) cveryd? yness, something that in its turn will make
poss ib le Ihe tran s iti on l'rom logos as concret e speech ta lo gos as
the as-
~ Il tl cturc. For jusi as one may take council to gether (sumbo uleuest
hai)
!rI order to rcach a conclus ion concern in g the best course of action, one
11l11 Y nlso c1clibcratc (bou/eues/liai) on how ta act
in private, as it were.
And preci sely deliberation is the mark of two forms of underst anding
IlInl are c1iscu.c;.c;ed in th e Ethics: teclme and phrone sis.
1n the famous passage in the beginn ing of the
sixth book of the
h'/hies, which Heideg ger di scusses on a number of occasio ns, Aristot
le
slutes th at , to gelher with sophia , episteme and nous , techn
e and
liliroll esis are ways in which the soul attains the truth, ail of which
cxccpl nous are discursive, me/a logou 29 But whereas sophia and
l'Ilis teme are epis/em onikon , contemplating such things th al are not
suhjecl 10 change , phronesis and teclme are logistikon, deliberating
on
wlllil should be done and thus concer ned with that which can
be
nlhcrlVise. Accordingly, with phrollesis and teclme , Arisloi le has
!loinlcd out two modes of underst anding that are not theoretical but
yet
d iscursiv e. I-Iowever, before exploring the discurs ivity of fechne
and
Illtro nesis, il is necessa ry to point out their role in Heideg ger 's thought
il\ more general tenns, as this has been a point of mu ch debate in
the
lil cI1lture . On the one hand, scholars have agreed upon Iheir inOuen
ce
on 1tcidcgger' s existenlial analylic, but on the other hand they have
disugrced about their role in the analysis of everydayness.
III Ar; stotl c ' s view, produc tion is an inferio r activity compar
ed to
lIeli on. T hi s v icw has expericnced a strong reviva l in modern
phil osophy, duc 10 a growing critique orthe modern era a5 the epoch
of
'
Icehn olngy; li criliqu e th al is onen inf1uenced by the analyse s
of
Icchnolo gy providcd by Heidegger in his later writings. On this point,
11 11lll1nh Arendt has al so bccn an .Importa nt source f'n
JO T 0 111 uence.
J>I h'. N. VU .
'I ht!
lU II I /(1/1// ( 11/ ('o ll(/i l irJII , site argues Ihnllllnn has always had ri tcndency, Ilot
least
pi\ lltlclnllll , If) l.:l1 Co urngc produ ctio1l inslcnd of II cl ion. sil\cc th e former \Vay
of

11 2
II I
 'liAI' Il ' 1{ IIIIU 1
CIIAI''I loR 'III RUE
M islol/ 1/ b ' ,
, C: le e mg 01 poiesis is illljJcrfccl pdll llll'lly Ibl' leleo log ie'll
reasons: ItS Illovement 's . l " ' lili s COllncctioll, Il cidcggcr is occasiona lly regarded as someone who
. ' . 1 1l1COmp ete and Hs end IS cXlcl'lml 10 il , since il
IS a proeess lllvolvlllg cha T d IIIIS ovcrCOlllC thc "poiet ic" noti on or man by showing how this idea has
literatu re relatin to . n ge. 0 ~y, hO WCVC l", cs pcciall y in the
\t s l'OOts in man 's everyday existence, Against this, Heidegger has
', , g HeIdegger and Anslotle, the moral impli cal ion s of
th e d ISlmctlOn between prod t' d ' jltli nt cd out the poss ibili ty o r authen tie existence, which is action
. uc IOn an actIOn are cmphasised more
stronglY, Even If one does not identify poiesis with production of works M!lVcrned by phrollesis, the authentie understanding of one's own self]]
b ut takes It ln the wide ' ' f b' , 1bere is one probl em with this view, thou gh, and this is that Heidegger
' . r sense 0 nnglng somcthing abOlit, it is still a
mall er of achlevlng a result, something of use, The idea is that th' Wll llt , - indeed by rererring to Aristotle - to articulate a basic situation
mlodel hl as become decisive ta our way of relati ng not just to things bt:~ or hUI11f11l ex istence, in terms of wh ich not onl y everydayness but a lso
a SO 10 lU mans But 50 it is a g d " uHthcnticity ca n be understood. If one ident ifi es everydayness with
" r lie ,pOIeSIS and teclme a re inappropriate
~odels for our behaviour to\Vards and understallding of humans ~or prod uction, whil e reserving action for authenticity, it is difficult to see
t cy make us regard humans as means, as so mething \V hi ch c ' b how the latter eould be a modification of the former, Thus the question
con tro ll ed and calculated upon instead o f as li d . an e is Ilot prim aril y whether poiesis and techne belong within the domain of
. " , ree an unpre dl c lable
age l~t s,' ,whosc Inl eraction is a 'wa ys oll e of cha ll enge and c han JC cvc ryday life, but whether this phenomenon can be accounted for
ThcICJ.OIC, hum an bchaviour must be understoocl' t f ,g , wi lhout the help of phronesis and praxis, The answer is no: if techne
h. . 111 crrns 0 praxis and
l! 1one~'ls. where the former is more or Jess identifi ed with human l'eprescnts an understanding of how to bring things about and phronesis
IllteractlOn, and the latter is regardcd as a kl'nd f' If d ' Ihe ability to see what is good ror one 's lire, they are bath needed to
h' J ( a se -un crslandmg
w I C 1 cames through such interaction TI t ' expla in the form of conduct that is characteristic of everydayness,
. . . H) 18 to say thraugh
~nteract lOn: on e d~velops an unders la nding of whal il- m e~ns 10 be Grantcd that techne and phronesis are two di stinct form s of
uma n, whl ch then tS retlected bac k on one 's sel f-underslan din g. J 1 undcrsta nding which belong to everyday life, what about the distinction
. However, one has also sensed the diffi culties in co nce ivin g of aCli hc lween poiesis and praxis? ln Sein und Zeit, Heidegger seems to draw
Wlthout recourse to producti on, not least sinee it has been thoug~t th:~ IlpOIl both lee/me and poiesis, since he describes ho w man in his
A n stotle hllnself tended to d d " ' cvcryday dea lin gs makes thin g \Vith a view to an external end, whi ch is
un erstan praXiS ln tenns o f poiesis .32 In
the basie trait of poies;s,)' But as noted in the previous chapter, when
re/ating 10 Ih e wor/d is eas ier and ad mit s of f . Kiv in g thi s description, Heidegger is out to question the Greek
A nd she beljeves that this te d . nOie control o ver humans Ihan the latter
n ency [s present a lrend . A' l' ' In terpreta ti on of man 's existence preci sely in terms of poies is. Thi s
~mderstood aClion in tenns of produclion 1'0 A r Y, III , rrstol et Le. I hat he
mteraction and the poss ib ility of ta l..:' " end t: aC ll o n IS the sarne as hurn an J1 1c il l1 S th at cvcn th ough he no doubt uses poiesis and fechne to i1 lustrate
\~hereas production represents a fon~~l~/ct r vc pa rt ln the constit~tion of society, wll a! conce rn is, tbi s is still within the perspective not Ollly or G reek
dlfficu!ti es inherent in pol iti cal lit'", A 'd~sc~pe from Ihe uncertalnly and aH the
involving an affinnation of thc 1~~ra~cOJ Ing ~b.~.he understands the vita activa as IhOllght but of everyday lire itself. Thus Heidegger 's point is that, even
membcr of (he sociely , responsl 1 lIy one has towards olhe rs as a Ih,," glt it certainly can be said that we engage in poietic conduct in
l" <
~ A ~roponent of Ihis vie\\' is J. Tamini au:>.: Lectllr e d ~ / ' , ovc ryday li le , \Vhat is important is that this olso affects the \Vay in which
EssG/s slIr Heidegger see also F VI ' "D". s e omo/agie fondamellta/e .
radical isation heidegg~rienne-de I ~ PhO' IP', h ~'I'(W' ~u1llme praxis: L'assimilation et la wc cx pcri c ncc o urse lvcs and o ur conduct. ln this way, poiesis or
32 Th' . . . I OSOp le prat ique d'Ari stote"
, [S pOint IS dlscussed by R. Bernasc . fi. . . ' .
EXlsting, pp, 2-24. S Broad ie Etl i ' h OllJ ,. eldegger III QuestIon The Art of
Cf, nbovc. nOlc 32.
although A ri stotle w~s not as' COI~f~~:~lIab:,,:s:~I/ed.ha. s s~ggested (Ch. 4. III) that
Il

q,pOVTlcJu; as one usually has claimed he tende~ to t~' ~tl~C~OI1 ,between tXV'l and
~enns of the 't' of 't'XV 'l and th~ re fo h ~. lm 0 t e TEO of ~p6v'lO't<; in
Le. that errpa ia we ll-perfornled l' re le ar/ed 10 s,ee tllat the fo rmer is emp ly
Il t" ae Ion, las no specJ fie t t' .
we -perrormed act io n in generaJ. 1 retllrn 1 B' r " ' . ' con enl , I.or Il concerns
a l oae Je s o bJ l!ctlon belo w, III ~cc li oll 5.
14 SIlice l! e idcggcr does 1101 likc Ar istot le makc a distinction between understanding
111l(l OCli vit y. Il is onccpt o r lJesorge/J cn!l bc compa red to both 'tXVll an d 1tOlllO'l,
lu'" II ke Sm'~( ' cnptures aspec ts or bath $p6 V110I Hnd 1Cp6t, dcpending upon what
' pel Np 'Clive Olle lokcs . WIJe r! Il cideggcr 's roc us is o n Ihc aspect o f unders tandi ng, 1
dlli W 1\ pltr'ull e l lo 'trXY1l rmd I\1p 6v"o l ~ . but whc n il ;s f\ question or the tc lcolog;cal
II lrUCl l ll C of' I)(',WII'.I.:(' II und Sm'111.', 1 compnro Ihes!.: con ecpts 10 7tOI'lO'l and n:p \.

Il '1
Il ~
 '1IIII'T13R 'IIIRI ' I '
cOl1cern is taken to be what is primarily gi VCll 10 Ill e plu':'/l o l11 cno log ica l
inquiry, serving as a name for life's own self-explicalion. Bul once Ihis
has been established, everyday life must be further elucida led , with the
help of praxis.
Heidegger is convinced that Aristotle has seen that poiesis is the
dominating perspective in everyday life, and that the truth about life
requires the perspective of praxis. However, he also indicates that
Aristotle was not eompletely able to free himself from the perspective
of poiesis, but tended to understand being as Hergestelltsein. Il is
agaillst thi s bac kground that th e followi ng statemcnt s hould be rcad:
The Grc:ks had ail appropriate term for "things": pragmata, i.e.
th at whl ch on e has ta do with in one's concernful dea lings
(pr:iS) . But ontologically, they le ft in obscurity precisel y the
speclfically "pragmatic" cha racter of pragmafa <l nd determined
them "proximally" as "mcre things". 35
The Greeks tended to reduce beings to "mere Ihings", for sinee it was sa
natural for them to rega rd beings as prodllc ts, they failcd to see that thi s
is only one form of givenness and 50 did not see the phenomenon of
gi~enness as SUCh.
36
Thus if Aristotle's uncl e rstanding of being
ultlmalely must be re [erred to his notion ot' poiesis, his philosophy is
essentially j us t the natural elaborali on of everyday intelligibi lity.
On Heidegger's aCCollnt, in accordance with th e poi e tic view on the
world, when things are experienced as equipment, they are also la ken to
be invested with a teleological structure, that of "in order to" (Um-zu)
and "for what" (Wo zu), as they are regarded as means to do something.
Th at IS ta say, the logos of concern ad dresses beings in tenns of their
te/os , as ava il ab le for thi s or that. In contrast to the epistemic logo s, the
end of everyday speech in this sense is not simply the apophansis itself
but a work. From here on, however, Heidegger wants to show that the
sphere of teleological relations between intraworldly beings also
IIlcludes man. For things available fo r us e do not only refer to other
such things, but also to a possible use and thereby to a possible user:
35 ~z, p. 68:. "Die Grie~hen hatt~n einen angemessen Term inus fr die 'Dinge';
~paYJ.lma, d.l . das, W?01n man es lm besorgend en Umgang (1tpu;) zu tun hat. Sie
l l e~en ab~r ontologlsch gerade den spezifisch 'pragma ti sc hen' Charak ler der
~faYJ.law ln DunkJen und bestimmten sie 'zlIIichs!' ais 'b lof3e Dinge'."
GA 19, pp. 269-272.
11 6
(; 11 11 1'1'101( T II Rl m
The work tlHl l is produccd docs not oilly refcr to the "for what" of
its Ilsability and Ihe "of \Vhat" of wllich it consists; in plain artisan
circlllllstances il also has an assignlllent to the person who is to
wea r or use il. The v..'ork is cut to his figure; he " is" there along
\Vith th e emergi ng work . Th us along wi th the work, we
cncount er not only beings that are ava ilable, but also be in gs that
have the mode of be ing peculiar to humans - beings for which the
product becomes av ai lable in their concern; and logether with
these we encounter the world in which wearers and users live,
which is at the same lime our world .37
ln Ihi s way Heidegger conneets our dealings with things with our ways
or re lating to human s . In so doing, he wants to bring together man 's
und crslanding of things with his self-understanding, As he puts it,
Dasc in is the primary "for what" illsofar as it is a "for the sake of
whi ch". That is to say, our use of things is ultimately for the sake of
o urse lves, s ince human existence in virtue of its very nature has a self-
38
rc lati o nal structure ; in every activity , its own being is an issue for it .
0 1' in oth er words , "As concern, Dasein is care for itself, for th e most
part o nl y implici tly.,,39 As man becomes dispersed in his occupation
w ith things, h e understand s h~s own b e ing [rom out of thi s conduct, and
Ih is mea ns that his self-understanding (phrone sis) tends to become
dOll1inated by his con cern (techne), ln this way, even though teehne and
/) //l'onesis are two forms of understanding in their own right, they are
dcpe ndent on our perspective, insofar as it is peculiar to everyday Iife
Il ''' 1 Ihe self-relational aspecl of understanding is more or less concealed
l'n,. Ihe benefil of an object-directed concern. But ta aecount for this
possibility one must use preeisely the notion ofself-unders tanding. That
is 1.0 say, the co ncern w ith things is only comprehens ible against the
ba c k g round o f the m o re bas ic structure of man's relatio n to his own
Il S'Z, pp. 70 -71: " Oas hergesle llte Werk verwe ist ni cht nur au f das Wozu seiner
VCl'wc ndbarkc it und das Worau s seines Besle hen s, in ein fa cheTi halldw erk li chen
ZustU mlcn liegt in ihm zlig leich die Verweisung auf den Trager und Benutzer. Das
Wcrk wird ih m au f den Lcib zugeschnitten, cr 'ist' im Entstehen des Werkes mit
dnhci. ... Mit dem Werk begeg nel delll nac h nicht a ll ein Seiendes, das zuhanden ist,
tl ollCh.l I" \ jl\lch Scicnd cs von der Se insart des Menschen, dem das Hergestellte in
li ln("11 l3 !.!sol'gen zuhllndcn wird; in oins dal1lit begegnet die \VeIt, in der die Trager
Iiml Vcrhrnllcl H.:r !cben. di c zuglcich die unscrc ist."
lM ,....';., p. 8il.
lU Cr' JI I ~ . p. 180 : " f) (I ,e l n (II,\' lJe'\"ol'xolI i.l'I Sor ge 11111 sich sel bsl, zumeist
UIHIII'HhOcklich."
11 7

being, for it is hi s self-understanding lhat g ivcs hls conc..: rn a spec ifie
direction, that makes him choose some poss ibil ilics fol' poiesis and
leave others behind, The logos of con cern th us has ft twofold direction :
when addressing a being in terms of its end, i,e, the work 10 be done,
man is simultaneously directed towards his own existence, in terms of
which he interprets his situation, Therefore, concern is only intelligible
within the framework of care. A nd as already indi ca ted , even though
Heidegger suspects that Aristotl e's philosophy has a poietic basis, he
thinks that Aristotle himselfhas paved the way for its overcoming, as he
has show n 1hat not poiesis but praxis is the esscnce of li re.
5. Phrones is and care
l-Ieidegger's inlerpr ctati on o f phronesis an d p r ax is has attracted
co ns ide ra ble a tt en t io n in th e lilcraturc. Whercas sOllle think th at
Heidegger uses phronesis and praxis 1'0 point out ce rtain fu nd ament al
features of everyday life, others beli cve that Ih ese concepts ex press
40
authentic ex istence in He idegge r's se nse. Finally , il ha s been
s uggested lhal Heidegger h ere has ro und a model for his Qw n
philosophieal project. 41 These suggestions are not as disparate as they
might perhaps seem, for they ail set out from one and the same
assumption, This is that Heidegger has discovered that, when presenting
hi s notion of ac tion gove rned by phronesis, Aristotle appears to
challen ge hi s own metaphys ical assum p tions, th e ideal of ete rnal ,
unchan gea ble being, whic h is th e domain of episleme and sophia. For in
Aristotle's view, ac ti on is what it is only wit hin a spcci fi c situation, and
therefore, if phl'oll esis is to make action possible, it has to be an
understand in g of particular, changeable be ing. Thus here, it would
seem, Heidegger has found a not ion of facticity in Aristotle, by means
of whi ch he can question the equally Aristolelian idea that kn owled ge
necessarily cOllcerns the uni versal.
~o The former view is taken by R. Bernasco ni , " Heid egger' s Destruction of
Phronesis" , p. 142; R. Mak kreel, "The genesis of Heidegger's phenomeno logical
hermeneutics and the red iscovered 'A ri slotle introductio n' of 1922", p. 315. For the
latter view, see above, p. 116, note 32; W. Brogan, "Heidegger and Aristotle: Dasein
and the Quest ion of Pract ical Life", p. 138; C. Han ley, Being and God in Aristotle
Glld Heidegger, p. 28 ; W. MeNeill, Th e Glance of the Eye, pp. I04~I05; A. Vigo
"Wahrheit, Logos und Praxis", pp. 86~88.
41 D. Starr, Entjty and Exislence, p. 95; G. Figal , "Refra in ing l'rom Ointeclic", p. t04 .
11 8
(' 11 1\ 1"1 1',1( l'IliUm
11 0wuvl:r, il is seldom Il oted Ihat already in th e 1922 man uscript on
Mistot lc, Il cidegger claims tha t there is an ambigui ty in the concept of
III/I'ollesis, Whil c not dc nyin g th at Aris totle has managed to capture life
ill its cOllcrete situati on wi tl' hi s discussion of phl'Ollesis, Heidegger
Ihillks that, when describing that \Vith which phrollesis coneerns itself
li S tha t whi ch can be ot herw ise, Aristot le fa ils to give thi s a posit ive
cll arac lc ri sa ti o n. Fo r thi s deter mination is only achie ved through a
llcgali on of unchangeable being,42 Even though th is statement dO,es not
neccssarily have to be regarded as Heidegger 's final verdict on
"ltrollesis, il should not be negl ected. For if H eidegger suspec.ts that th e
nnti on of un changeable being makes up th e ideal ev en in Aristotl e's
" pract ical" philoso phy, then the idea that He idegger co uld somehow
" nppropriate" or "ontologise" it certainly becomes more complicated.
For the moment, however, 1 postpone any [urther comments on the
ilupli cations of Heidegger's crilical attitude towards Aristotle onthis
point, and focus on what after ail seems to be somethin g hke a pOSitive
,'ctr ieval of phronesis on the part of Heidegger. As noted ab ove, one
questi on in this connection has been whether phrol1esis in Heidegger's
vic\\' displays an everyday or an authentic mode of existence, The truth
is, 1 think , that both alternatives are correct. To make this clear, we
should lirst have a look at Aristotl e's own charactcrisation ofphronesis:
It seellls as if the person who is phrollimos has the powe r to
dc\iberate on that which is good for himsel f and beneflcial to him,
and th is not in a single part of hi s li fe, e.g.
, .
as regards his
43
hcalth or
strength, but in what concerns the good II fe as a whole.
I\ccordin g to Aristotle, the capability to see what is good for one's life
is dependent up on practice, ln this sense, it would thus not belon g to
I W III as man , w hi ch mi ght seem like a problem for the attempt to
illi e rprcl cvc ryday life in te rm s of phron.esis. Hmv ever, Aristotl e' s
descripti on o r Ihe sensibl e or "carefu l" man certainly recalls the
'hnl'octcri sati on o r logos as the abi lity to di stinguish between the
lId vllnlagcous and the harmful, etc, Logos is delinitely something that
Il l 'A. p. 260. AriSlotlc's ex prcssion is t.vc.x.oj.levov o.w XE lV, E.N... 1140a l.,
nI\' N. 1 1 11 025~28: "50Ke t 51) $POVip O\1 dvat 1:0 OUVClOOat Ka~(c; po,\),"~u~oeat
' 10 pl trI U r41 yaOt Ka t O' \Jp $l~ r OVW. ou 1(Ct!r1 prpor;. olov 1t01O npoc; uylewv,
I\!H\1f 10x.\.I\'. ej . n:o w n:pb 10 It rlV6U~."
Il Il
 belong s la man as man, but in arder tO fullil il s Ili ~ k it has
to be
develop ed, and th is seems ta be appl icable to p/ll'ollr sis il S we il
' " For
phrone sis is a virtue and , as wc saw abave, virluc in Ihe G rcek sense
is
tirst of ail an abi lity to live one's life in a sens ible wny. Accord
ingly,
Aristot le remarks that one can even say of some anima is that they
are
phronimos, namel y those that have the power of foresight or precaut
ion,
w hich lets th em see what is good for their lives"
Sa conceived, unders tanding of the good is cam mo n ta ail men,
th ough it can be more or less perfect. In this way, there is in Aristot
le a
vacill ati on belwee n pllrone sis as that un derstandi ng whieh guides
our
li ves by necessi ty, and as someth in g which only belongs to sensibl
e ta th e
men. T his vacillation is present also in Heideg ger's interpre tation
of
phrone sis , and that is why one can sec similar ities betwee n il a nd bath
everyd ayness and aut hcnl ic ity, as Heideg ger conceiv es of lhem.
But
even though Olle find s mu ch in Hcideg ger 's interpre tation of phrone
sis
and other Aristote lian concep ts that elsewhere is put rorward as his
own
philoso phy, one must be earefu l wh en trying to identi fy comple
te
matche s between Aristot le' s concep ts and those used by Heideg
ger"
Heideg ger has not copied Aristot lc's concep tua li ty but affi rmed
SOllle of
its bas ic trait s and tried to deve lop them furth er. Inso far as phrone
sis
repre se nts a n unthem atic underst and in g of the good that
can be
interpr eted as a ki nd of sel f-under stand in g o n the part of the
agent
wh ich makes act io n poss ible, it is no do ubt useful ta Heideg
ger 's
explica tion of care in its everyda y mode . Howev er, the concep
ti on of
phrone sis ad mits of a more "authen tic" fo nn of und erstand
ing as
compar ed w ith w hat Heideg ger terms the inauthe nti c adh erence
ta the
p ubl ic explica ted ness susta ined by "the one" (das Man).
Phronesis stands out from other fo rms of underst anding because of
its relation to the virtues of character. Aristot lc suggest s that one way
ta
describ e the relation bctwee n phrane sis and th esc virtues is
that th e
latter make one see the right end of action, wherea s the former lets
one
4,1 ln E.N. 1143b6-13 Aristotle seems to da
im that $pOVllou; is a gi ft of nature_ In
Pof. 1334b15 18 il is stated that logos and vos make up the
ends of our nature;
therefore , our habils must be regulated with a view to them. An
undevelo ped logos
may be found in the slave: he has il, but in a deficient way; 1259b281260aI4
. UlIlcc pt nf CUI'C. Sec also abovc, ~. 11 6, noie 39, : vhere He
45 EN. 114 t a26-28.
46 For such an attempt, see F. Volpi , "Beil1g
Nicomacheall Elhics?"
or
and Tim e: a ' T ran slati on '
120
~ t,;C th l; 1l1 1.;11 1l ~.'17 For th e virtucs are a k incl of disposi tio ns (hexeis) whieh
let uS ori ent Olllseives in th e wor ld in accorda nce with what is proper
ta
li S, but the virtlles onl y fll ncti on in th is way insofar
as they listen ta the
prope!' (or ,IIas) logos, and th!s is the work of phronesis. Thus the vi
rtu es
ILre Ilo l poss ib le wit holl t phrone sis , and that is why, Afl stotle
remark s,
0111.: o rten _ wrong ty - believe s that all virtu
es are the same as
!'//l'alles;s. I-Icnce on Aristotl e 's aceoun t, alth ough m an's charact
er c~n
he regarde d as so methin g he has in virtue of his nature, fo
r tht s
characl cr to be develop ed into a truc virtue, phronesis is req uired. 48
ln wha t way mi gh t A ri stotle's discuss ion of phron
es is hav e
ill ll ll enccd Heideg ger's notion of care? Does he ever testify
possibility of lInderstandin g phronesis in this way? At the beginni
ng of
l'li s d iscussio n of care in Sein und Zeit, Heideg ger remarks that
The way in which "care" is viewed in the foregoin g existe nl i~1
anal ytic of Dase in is one which grcw upon the. a.ut hor. Lil
con nection \V ith bis attem pts to interpret the Augustll llan - I. e.
"G reek.Christian" - anthropo logy \Vith regard to the princ ipal
foundat ions that were achieved in Aristotle's ontology.49
ln his " own" writing s, Heideg ger hardly ever uses the term " action"
(llandl llng), which is probab ly due to his effort ta overco me
the
di chotomy of action and th inking. The concep t of cnre is intende
d to
cu pllll'C bOlh these aspects of hum an existen ce in such a way as to make
il imposs ible to conce ive ofthem in isolatio n from each other. 50 This
is
IIlso re flected in I-Ieideg ger's discuss ion of phrone sis , to the extent
that
he Ireatsp hl'onesis as vi rtu ally insepar able frompraxis.
T he aspect of phl'Ollesis that recci ves most ofHeid cgger's attentio
n is
lts sclf-relational structur e. As we saw above, the one who is phronim
os
4 1 /~N. 1144aI7 - l9 .
" Ii N. t 144b I4-2 1, 3 t -32. . . . .
~~ .....Z. p. 199 , note 1: "Die in der vorstehc nden eXlstenzl ale~l Analytlk des Dase ms
hc t'olglc Bli ck ri chtung auf die 'Sarge' .e~wllchs dem V:rf. 1l;t Z~samme
VeaslLchc einer Interpretation de r augus\\Im chen - das hed~t gr1ech, .nh~ng der
sch-\m~th~hen ~
tltlu'opol og ic mit Rlicksi cht <luf di e grundsfit zlichen Fundam
en:e, die .In der
()Il\{lh)gc dS Arislolclcs crr~ i chl wll~den." .Sec al~o G~ 62"', p .
2~, where Heidegger
!II ~\\lCS for (he Il CCcsS l y of 1tllcrprellng Anstolll!
S phlloso~hy \VIth the help of the
idegger speaks about the
1lll l,1 !1'clfitiOll of cnrc f1 nd CQ l1ccrn wlIh respect to rrpau;.
the \ 0 Accord in gly. lI eidegger elllphasiscs Iiml
the not ion of cure does nol ex press a
pl cvnlcncc ( Ir the " pt'lIcI!cn l" OVI.!I' the "Iheo rclku l", SZ. p. 193.
121
knows what is good for himse lr. In cOl1trusl 10 {(' ' //1/ (', Ihe ab il ily to
produce works, phronesis is Ilot primaril y cOllccrn cd \V ith things
different from man . What it '"produces'\ the poss ibi lily to aet, is a
possibility for man 's own existence. Thus even thou gh action has social
aspects, Aristot le 's focus concerns the way in which aclion affects the
agent himself by developing his character a nd habits. On th is view, man
can be said to act fo r the sake of him self, not to achieve some extemal
re sult. This is also emphasised by Heidegger: "What phronesis
delibcratcs upon is not that whereby a praxis l'caches ils end. A result is
Il ot co nstitutive of the bcing of action, but only th e eu, the 'how , ."SI T he
te/os of actio n is eupraxia, successfu l action. One tnight think that this
depend s upon the \Vay action relates to other people, and Aristotle states
this as one of the constituents of action." But Heidegger is more
interes ted in showing that Ar istotle 's co nception of phronesis and
praxis indicates that he regard s man as th e ultimate for Ihe sake of
which o f his Qwn ex istence, as il is a fUlldamental tra it of man that his
own existence is al ways at iss ue. Wh en thus conceived, praxis is not a
particular activity as opposed to poiesis, but s imply ou r existence, i.e.
care, which however may be enacted in different ways. 53 But illsofar as
Aristotle's aceount of praxis (and of phronesis) a lso shows what it
means for man ta act or ta take a stand on hi s own existence on the
basis of an understanding of himself and nol o f thin gs, it comes close to
He idegger's nolion of authentic care.
The notion of action as an end in itself is thus of Fundamcntal
importance to both Aristotle and H eidegger. But what does it really
mean ? As noted above, Sarah Broadie has objected to Aristotle's
characterisat ion of phronesis as the ability to de liberate on that which
conduces to Ihe good life as a whole. She claims that this life cannot
form the objeet of deliberation, for Ihis object must be a si ngle good.
She therefore eoncludes that phronesis lacks a specific te/os, and that it
is jusl an ab il ity lu behave sensibly in genera l. S4 This objection
apparenlly rests on a conflation ofphronesis as an understanding of the
51 GA 19, p. 51: "Und was die $PVll0t<; Oberlegt, ist nicht das, wobei ei ne ltpl zu
Ende kommt. Ein Resultat ist I1icht konstituti v f r das Sein des Handel ns, sondern
lediglich das e, das Wie."
"E.N. 1IIIa3-5.
" GA 18, pp. 188-1 89.
34 Etlll'cs \Vith Aristot/e, p. 198.
122
l-i ood li re as s uch, w hi ch is an undcrstanding of telos , and phronesis as
dcli bcralioll, which is cOllcerned with the ITIeans of action.~5 However,
IIroad ie' s o bj ccl ion touc hes upo n another important point in this
co nll ecli on , nam ely th e di fticu It y of i llust rating the nature of
dcli bc ratio n on how to act without transforming this action into an
cXHmplc of production. 56 For if deliberation is to make action poss ible,
Ihcn its end musl be a particular end, but when the end is thus specifi ed,
Ihe aclion scems to be transformed into an instance of production.
Il is evident from the Ethics that action is al ways the enactment of a
v irlue , otherwi se it would not be desirable in itsdf. Accord ingly, an
nclion coun ts as an action only when it is regarded in this way; e.g. to
sove so meone from drowning is an action when it is regarded as (e.g.) a
brave action, bec au se then il is desirable in itself, and the end (to act
hru vely) is fu lfilled in evely moment of the action, being intrinsic ta the
Helio n. lIowever, if this action is Ilot re ga rd ed thus, but just as the
p"rti cular act ion of saving someone from drowning, then it is not an
nClion but production, for the end is the savi ng and this is not fulfilled
II ntil the activ ity is fini shed. Of course it is poss ible ta say that one
1'I HVS somcone in order ta be brave, that is, prod uces something in arder
10 aet. S1 This is still not satisfaetory, sinee here, the saving is the means,
hlll il scems that the saving is in mueh more need of dcliberation than
th e action insofar as it is brave. That is, ev en if the former is a
possibilily to achieve the latter, one still has to deliberate on how to
~l lITy il QUt. This in volves asking what things one needs in arder ta calTy
" '11H11 I\lPOV IlGU; has aeeess to both the ll1eans and ends of actio,n is emph.asise? by
(ln do1llcr, Wahrheit und Methode, pp. 326-327 , Thus when. $povT\Gl IS ldent lfi ed
wlt h truc delibe ration, epoUAt a , it is a fonn of understandmg of more or less ~he
~(l ll\C kind as 'tlixvl\. But $pOVT\Ol could not be an abi lity to deliberate on that whlch
conduccs to the good life as a who le, were it Ilot an understand ing of the ends of
Ilcli on in Ihe rorm of an ab ility to distinguish bet\Vcen good and bad ends, For even
IIHl llgh the virt ucs le i the agcllt .dctect particul ar ~Ilds for his actions? the power of
dI vision is nOI granted [hcm, SIIH; t: Ille y do not mvolve logos but ilst~n to ,logos.
Accordingly, QPOVf\CH <; in Ih is conlcxt is Ilot idcntical \Vith lh~ act of delt~eratlon (of
huw to Ilchicvc a good life in gCl1cral), bul is an understandmg o,f wha~ IS good :or
u lle' s lire ilS sl1ch, of eatpovia , whi ch is a particular rorm of hfe. Il IS the chOlce
o f' slIc h ri lile !hn! ul limatc1 y go verns one's co mprehcnsion or whatends ar~ good for
1I1ll"/t lire fw d who! cncls lIrc bac! . ln Ih i s way, $p6v1lcrl<; as self-understandmg can be
Iwl ll ~\l'VC rn t rXV1l,j usllIs CiH'C govcr1l,s c.oncern. . . .,
'ft le n ClI lfl sconi CVCll cinillls Iha! II 15 11 0 1 Olll y dlfri Clllt bul m faet nn poss lble,
IIlf fdt'1;gl'I' ;1I {llll'stioll , pp , 8-9,
" 1': N. 11 1?n15. tI J9h I.
121

out the action. But in ArisLolle's vicw, a lhin g CUU llt S us li n instrument
of action only if the use re sults in noth ing bllt in th e lise itsclf," an d
here it does result in something else, namely in the sav in g.
One might perhaps think that on this view, one pllshes th e distinction
betwecn po iesis and praxis too far, but as wc will see in the next
chapte r, this is what Aristotl e h imself w ill do in order to argue fo r th e
supremacy of theoria over against every other kind of praxis . For now,
however, what is important is preeisely to see th e problems th at arise
wh en eonceiving of the distinction between poiesis and praxis in th is
\Vay , as an "objective" di stin cti on. In other word s, the point is that,
eventually, Ari slotle will abandon hi s discovery lh at the distinction
between production and action must bt:: conceived of as a difference in
p ers pect ive, though one co uld no do ubt wish th at Aristotle had
expressed hi mse lf more c1early alrcady in this contex\. St ill, given that
Aristotl e ' s ent ire mode of thinki ng rests on the ins ight th at evcrythin g
depend s on how, as what, one addresses thin gs, the mst plausible
interpretation must be that Aristotlc thinks that it is our perspective that
determines whether an acti vity is 1.0 be countcd as action or production
~ at least as long as he do cs not bri ng in theoria in to the discuss ion.
Thus even if it is " more intelli g ible to us" to regard the above-
mentioned saving as an instance of production, once wc have managed
to reach the level of that whieh is " intelli gible in itself', we see that th is
activity can on ly be comprehended in tcnns of action. For to detcrmine
the natu re of thi s action is to cxp lain why it should be co unted as
precisely brave by referri ng to the time it was performed, what persons
it invo lved, its mode of enactment, the things uscd, etc. Hence, what
eharae terises th e virtuous man is that he is ca pable of understanding his
concluct as an end in itselfand not merely as production.
Thi s is not to say that poiesis and tecl1l1e represen t a fa lse
perspective, but they only depi ct one level of human conduct, when this
is regarded as being directed towards and eoncerncd with things that
tran scend il. To th is model, praxis and phronesis add another level, in
accordance with which man 's acti vities are conce ived of as self-
relational, and wh ich displays man as concerned with his Qwn life.
Analogous ly, Heidegger 's ana lys is of every day ness begins w ith a
" Pol. 1253b23-1254a8.
124
'li AI' l'ER 'l'II R''E
descl'iptioli orilUlllun cx !oilCl1cc from the po int of view of con cern, since
Ihis cor responds to th e perspecti ve of everyday life itself, b ut th en
procccds to th e levcl of carc, showing that w ith thi s step is the truth of
I1l1rnan ex istence un covere~.
6. TIre discursive nature of ac/ion
Iloth lechl7e and phronesis involve deliberation , \,,'hi ch is discursive,
me/fi logou. l n hi s inlerpretation of deliberation, Heidegger's chief aim
is to show what it means to regard not only reason taken by itse lf but
hllm an action as such as discursive. ln what fo ll ows, "action" wi ll be
lIscd to refer to acti v ity in ge neral , whereas ils difference from
production wi ll be left as ide for the most parI.
ln order to make c1ea r the basic traits o f th e logos of action, it is
necessary to get at least a brief overview of Aristotl e's conception of
action. As he sees it, action has th e following constitutive elements: its
lirst stage is a conception (logos) and a des ire (orexis) of that for th e
sake ofwhich the action is to be performed. This is th e ruling principle
Or ori gin (arche) ofone' s choicc ofa specifie course of action, in such a
lVay that, given th e rea son why of action, one deliberates on how to
pcrform it. 59 Eventua ll y, the deliberati on terminates in a co nclus ion
concernin g how the action should be performed. When we have reached
this conclusion, our desire is in accordance \V ith the dcliberation, and
thi s govem s our choice. The choiee (prohairesis) is th us th e outcome o f
Ih e deli berating process from unfound ed to fo unded des ire, and
i\ristotl e delines it accordingly as "deliberate desire" .60 On his account,
Ihe choiee must then in its turn be regarded as the origi n of action as th e
origin of its movemcnt. As this makes c1ear, il is not primarily the end
61
or ac tion that is chosen, but rather the "how" ofits enactment.
III hi s discussion of action, Heidegger ca lls attention to the questi on
or how to und erstand th e re lation between the "actual" course of action
1I 1Il! the dcli bcratin g net thut mnkes il possible. This is becausc he wants
10 fin cl a way to acco llnt for human co ndu et without establishing a
divi sion bctwccn acti on and thinking, and he bcl ieves that Aristotle's
concep tion o f action is prccise ly \Vhat is nceded. For even though
\fI Sec Il N. 11 39n3 1-33.
"' llo uP U"<I\ pC~I . t,.N. 111 3010-11.
", ti.N. 11 39035-36.
1 2~
 CI It\ JlII ' I( 1111( 11
Arislot le makes a co nceptual distill ct(,1l hl.itwcu li li 'lion and Ihinking
(e.g. between praxis and boulellsis), he nevCI' libslrllcls li'oll1 Ihe aspect
ofunderstanding when discussing action. Convcrsc ly, he .!lmOSl always
applies a genetic perspective on thinking, regardin g il as an aClivity.
This implies that Aristolle wants ta show that Ih cre is bath a
"subjective" and an "objective" side to action. Thal is, in order to
understand the nature of action, it is not enough to aCCQunt for the
agent's understanding. Action musl also be regarded as a process or as a
"real" occurrence in the world, which is accessible to others in the [orm
of the agent's behaviour.62
Sinee il is imporlant lor Heidegger to show that Ihe s itualion of
action canoot be strictly divided into the deliberatioll and its conclusion
as if they were understandable in isolation t'rom elch other, he mus~
show that the latter is actually included in the former. On Arislolle's
view, in deliberation, the agent sets out from a given end and deliberates
until he reaches the lirst principle of aclion, which he leads back to
himself in order 10 make clear Ihat the end is possible for him. Hence
\Vith this principle, which concludes the deliberating act, the action
. 63 1-1 'ct
begms. . of" possible courses of action, which means that he has to ehoose one of
el eggcr mterprets thi s situation as follows:
Th is houleuesthai, the thorough deliberaLion, is enacted as
iogizesthai in such a \Vay that a context of speech is anilllated
thereby, a speaking-together or con-versation, suliogizesthai,
sullogismos, superficial!y designa ted as "infercllce". Every
delllonstration has a conclusion, sllmperasma. The conclusion of
bOIl/euesthai is the action ilsell; il is not SOllle kind of sentence
nor a J'ind of knowledge, but the breaking Joose of the agellt a;
such.
62 This distinction is drawn by E. W. Orth in order to criticise the way in which one
speaks about 'theor;,'" and "pra~is" in contemporary philosophy . On his view, these
terrns .\~ork nawadays <l.s operat lve concepts, and this is wha! has made possible the
OPP~:1tlOn be.lw.een. actIOn and thinking; "Einleitung: Philnomenologie und Praxis".
A ~Jtfer~nt distinction between the 1wo aspects of action is drawll by D. Charles,
A~lstotle s PhJ!os~phy of Ac/ion, who argues that Aristolle's analysis of action is a
plefer~ble a1tc~natlve ta modern theory of action, which is based either primarily on
causalJly (DavIdson, P:acock, Pea~s) or on teleology and knowledge (von Wright,
6inscombe), whereas Anstotle combmes the two perspectives.
E.N. 1112aI8-1113aI4.
64GA 19, p. 150: "~ie~es POUEEOOcn, das Durchberlegen, wird aIs OyiEoOW so
vOllzogen, daf3 da~el em Zusammenhang des Sprechens lebendig ist, eill Zusamlllcn-
sprec~en, au).J.o~lE(jeal, O"UJ\).OYlO"~, iiul1erlich bezeichnel ais 'Schlllf3'. Jcder
Bewclsgang hat clnen Schlul1satz, cru~ttrpClapo. Dcr Sc hlu/lsiltz der (3oUElu;:aOo l ist
12G
C II t\I''J' lm '1'1110 cl;
t\c li o ll is 1101 int e lli g ib le w hn a bs tracting [rom ilS moment of
dc1 ibernti o n, in v rtuc oC whi c h the agent structures the situation of
,,~ti o ll. COll vcrsc ly, the deliberation is not complete if it does not
nvo lve articu lation , a " oncillsion" in the form of a chosen action.
t\cco rdingly , the teleologieal notion of action does not only prevent us
rrOIll co nccivin g of action as mere behaviour, without recourse 10 the
agent 's motives and understanding, but it also commends us to regard
' k'mg as ac t Ion,
'
1l 1111 65
Fven though Heidegger w<trns us against believing thal: the
co nclusion of Ihe deliberation is some kind of statement, one can to
s Ollle extent compare lhis inference with the apodeictic syllogism. For
ju sl as the latter is a course of thinking which consists in several
'co nsecutive steps that result in an assertion, the deliberation results in
lin action which is surely not an assertion but which may nonetheless be
rega rded as an act of at1iculation. The task of deliberation is ta make the
s ilumion of action accessible. Initially, the agent is faced with a number
Ih em 50 as to transform the initiall y inarticulate or unsettled si tuation
llto a determinate possibility. This demarcation involves the work of
,wJJfhes is and dihairesis. In the previous chapter, three levels of
slIn/hesis and dihairesis were distinguished: belonging to articulation or
Ill e assertion, ta the act ofhermeneutic understanding, and finally , ta the
conlexl of beings themselves. However, wh en applying this model to
Ille s ituation of action, it becomes more complex; not because we move
frolll asse rtion to action , but because of the teleological perspective, For
whal one regards as th e basic object of action depends upon whether
one takes a poietic or "practical" perspective, as we shall SOOI1 see.
d ie Ilmld lung sc lbst; er st nich t irgendein Satz, irgend~ine Erkenntnis, sondern das
1().\'/)rec hen des Hallde/llelen ais so/chen." Th us HeIdegger does no! make any
tlistil lCli on bctwecn the praclica l syllogism and the de!iberation. For the idea th~t
IlliCh fi di stincti on must be drawn, see J. M. Cooper, Reason and Hl/man Good /II
ArI.~ I O l/c , Chapter One, Secti on 2. . . . .
Il' Thu s 1Icid cgger slat es Ihat (GA 24, p. 393): "U nd erstandlng as self-projection lS
th e b/ls ie 1'01"111 of the happening 01" Dasc n. It is, as we also Illay say, the proper
111 clll ilng o f acri on." (" Du s Vc rstchcJl ai s Sichcntwer fcn ist .die ~rund~rt des
(,'{'.\'cll/ ,/lell.\ etes l)l\soi ns. I ~ s ist, wic \Vj l' [\ \lc l1 sngcll kl1l1en, der elgcnlllche Sm n des
Il lllldcllls,")
127
 CI/ I\ I' Il ' 1< III UI 1
'1I I\ PT"lt 1'1m l'; "
as ~~~~::;c ~!;r~:'I:~I~:~'~~;Or\:11 :Cid~g;CI'
llesC I il~~:
Il le ""l'Id ot conccrn
"IOII H!thln g. 11 crc wc cOllle across th e hc rm cne ut ic " as" . Ta put il briefl y,
a nd ends s tl t , a Ions e twccII tltll c!'cll t ki nds of' means
usability 0' r Of l,a Tour obJect of concern is undc!'stnod in teJ'ms of its tu ll y Oll the basis of il fo rcgoin g access to meanin g is it possible ta direct
e os, a use Heldegge ' onescll' ,o a n e nd as m ca nin gful in a concrete s ituation, That is, the
a ha mmer as bei ng too heavy th '~fis own example, when cxperien cing
. , ' e rom out ofwhl ch" of interp t r- pllrtie ul"r e nd receives its specific c haracter when it is sy nthesised with
IS not an Indifferent property but the " for what" (W ) h re a IOn (hu t s imulta neo us ly divorc ed From ) the " cantext of involve ments",
66
hammer. In this ca ' . ozu, tete/os, of the
belween th e hammer a~e~ i:~~ synthellc-dlhaireti c relation thus holds
IlI c rcby becomin g a fac tical end, Properly speaking, this does not o nl y
IIp pl y 10 th e " ir', the end, for the fu ll scheme of " if-the n", th e act ion
the lelos itself? H 'd elos, But w ha! a bout Our understandi ng of
, el egger presents us with the l llowing sugges tion : II lIti cipated in its cntirety, receives specifie content from the context.
S ince wc are here moving on th e leve l of con cern or poies;s , the
To bring the e nvironm ent d oser in ci rcull lS " . .
has Ihe exi sl.e llti nl I1lcaning of a k" ' pCCllve de li bera/Io n s ituatio n of action is regarded as an env iron ment consisting in th ings
dc l 1'beration is to be ab le 1 ' If/a. mg. presel/ t . " . 8!U J' /' [le
1
II vai lable for use, which makes acti on possible by gl'antin g the agent an
then" 0 move wtl hlll the schem e or the " if
, concern mus! a lready undcrsland . - undc rstanding of the mcans with which to perform the desired acti on ,
in a "s uJ'vcy-li ke" W'ly TI '! l ' 1 . il contex! of 1l1 Vo!vem cllts
'. la w li e 1 JS addrcss'd ' t f
" if" must a lrcady be underSIOod , , Il " 1 l ' ~7 ln e/'l1ls 0 the '1'0 th is conception one must add the level of praxis and to approach the
l, lM ane (laI .
c nd o f action in tenns of man ' s self-understandin g, As Heidegger puts
Deliberati on " makes prese nt" th e " " il : WrIte survey which ilIumi nates one 's concern receives its ' li ght' from
a determinate end in thi s cont ~tPPo!lunk'ty to acl by dll'ectm g itsclf to
, ex a wor ' T he net ot' k' I)asein' s potentiality for bein g,Jor Ihe sake oJwhich concem exists as
terminates in the "co '1 . " ., ma mg present
Il e USlOn o f Ih e dclibe t' 1 earc,,,69 Th e end o f action is also understood in tenns of one's self-
action is Icd back to the ag ~ t ' ra 1011 , as 1 l e fi rst stage of
. ' l:11 S presen t capabi litics . Thus in act ion J unde rstanding, A nd insofar as ac ti on is regarded as a poss ibility for
mo~e~t of arlI cul ation is th e concluding cho ice whi ch takes ho ld of ~~e onc's own existence, it involves a concept ion of the re lation betwcen
posslbJ!!ty or end, leaving others behi nd, Thal' t e diflerent aspects ofone's own self. That is to say, to grasp of the end of
prohairein is to "take" a . ' b'l' lS 0 say, ta chaase,
, " passi 1 Ity or end " before" tI th II ction is to proj ect towards of one's own future self, w hat one can be,
do 50 l11eans ta " take int o j " '. ', ' 1e 0 e rs, and to
POSSibilit:\~~~:n' t1~/~~;~:;:~~I~~ ~:~s~'t s i~uali on,
T hi s proj ect ion is governed by a conception of one' s past self, which in
distin guishin g one Ih is connection could be rega rded as a kind of backgrou nd context,
SII11ultaneously a sunthesis ' wh en er~ . . ,IS C Dlce IS T hus, the sel Fis co ntinually crea ted (anew) in the syn thetic-dihairet ic
relates it to th ' " P orml!1g a course of action one
e present sIluat!on, as the la tter e ' process oF encou nterin g th e future in tenns of th e past and v ice versa,
de te rminate poss ibility If act' '1 g ts tra nsformed mto a
, , Ion IS t lUS regarded a' f Just as 1 see a thing as something because of m y foregoing access to
artIculation based up on the d l 'b ' > an act 0
" e l eratl on th en as l-Ieid ' r IlIca nin g, 1 und ers tan d what 1 in each instance can be in terms of Ill y
111 the quotation above th d "d ' " egger m!orms us
;::-:-:-::-:-:_ _ _ _ _,__e eSlJe end must already be understood as pllst sel f; whi ch ca nnot be exhausted by any fu ture possibility oF action,
66 For He idegger' d. . Wc have seen that man und erstands the abjects o f his con cern as
67 ~z, "D!sU~a~:~~~i~J:10::~~~~:~:ts.
p. ,3 59: td.o, see,
GA, 18, pp. 93, 300.
exrstenzmlen Si nn eiller Gegenwdrti 1/11 t III der ~n rsldlfl~en .!-lberlegllng ha! den
avai lablc for a work, and that he understands th e work in its tum as a
poss ibility tOI' his own existence. BUl on H eidegger 's account, these two
Sc hema des ' werln-so' sol! bewege~, k~: .. , Damrt aber die Ube rlegung s ich im
Bewand tniszus31llmenhang 'Obe rs' 1 J' o~l,ncn, muO das Besorgen schon cinen ~y n th cli c- dih a ir e ti c re lati ons arc not e nou gh ta account for the
2pgesprochen wird, mul3 schon aIs da~c ltd~ verste hen. Was mit dem ' Wenn ' u11dc rsta nd ing in vo lved here. roI' whcther one concei ves of action fro m
" Th us A,ristotl e explains the meani n u~f n as ~erstanden se in."
g Ih e pe rspec ti ve or sc lC-und ers tandin g or whet her one puts focus on the
The chalce is di scursive and govern d b PO~PE(H as foll ows (E.N. 1112aJ 5-17)'
ind ic ate that something is takell be~ e y lI,n, erstanding, Even the Ilame Scems to'
, li' " o r e Sornet l lll g " ( " . , p ,
Kat tavow. UTcOO"lllWivEI V ' Ol1 ' ,. " ~ ya , npoatpecrt pe't'O: oyou
Kat -rOUVOjJ (.( w ov 1t'pO ;-rpwv a ipetv.") ,~, S%, p, 359: " Di e dO!l Bcsol'gc n crhcJlcndc bcrsicht crnpnin gt ihr ' Li cht' aus dem
~c1 nk ~I1 I1 C rl det:; D:l'1ci tl'l. Il'0/ 1111/\111111:11 das UC'Iorgcn :lI s Sarge cxistiert."

/28
' 2'1
 CIIAI"I I' I( Il \lU 1
relation betwccn si tuation and end, the undcl'stunlJhl ij ill vo lvc ill action
presupposes a " light" . T hi s " li g ht" is Dasei n 's " isc lose"ncss o fb e in g.
7. Truth as disclosedness and nous
ln Sein und Zeil, di sclosedness (Erschlossenheil), the onto logical level
of our understa ndin g, is said to display th e most original phenomenon
of truth , since it is a condition of ontical truth , that is, truth in the sense
of un coverin g.'o Apart trom a rgu ing th at it mu st be permil1ed to
desig natc as truth that which mak cs poss ibl e truth as unco ve ring,
Heidegger motivates his termillology by taki ng Ar islOtle as his w itness.
Fo r Aristot le tao has s uggcsted that there is a truth that is presupposed
by truth in the ordinary sense. This is the truth of nOlis:
Evcry saying th at sta tes sO lll cthi ng about someth in g, like an
affi rm ative aSSCl1 iOIl, is always true or rai sc. Bu l as regards nOliS,
this is Ilot ahvays the case, fo r when ilS a bj ect is the "whal" in the
sense of esse nce, il is [aJ ways] tru e and does 110t involvc
"som eth ing as somelh ing". Bul jusl like the seeing of the proper
abject s [a!way s} true, whereas il is nol ahvays !rue wth respect
to the quest ion whet hcr or not that whi te object is a man , so it is
wit h that which is without matter. 71
No us is thus , at least wh en il co mes lo simple, in composite being, w hat
provides logos wi th an object. ln thi s way, flOUS, be ing itself j ust true, is
the condition of lo gos and thereby of truth and fal sity . ln the literature
on Heidegger, one se ld o m pays any attent ion to hi s interpre tati o n of
nous. To the extent tha t one does di sc uss il, il is primarily in connectioll
with Hcidegge r's concept of und ersta nd ing (Verslehell), where both
nous and Versteh en are s uppo sed to in volve an as-struc ture which
prece des the levcl o f llill arti culati on." Thi s compariso n is no doubt
" 52, pp. 220 221.
71 De Ali. 43 0b26-31: "cr1\ 0' 11 Jlv $aO"lt; 1\ K01 1\VOt;, oomu:p il Kcna4locrtt;. !Cct!.
lla~t; il o/Euoh :rcro' 0 o vo ov n, '" 0 , O ,i cr, l KaT , -ri ~v Elvat lite CS>cnce of a concrcte th ing, in whi ch case it works together with a'i0:8no:t, or
0:).119 t'ts. lI:O t 0' .. \. KCl1:c1 n vo' o.).).' 0501t fJ "lI.) op v 'tO i{ ou cD,Tj8e, El 0'
av8pw1tot; , EUKOV 11 1ln, OK ll8e El, o{),oo ocra aveu Ilt;. " See also Mer. concrclc abjects, Der /3egrifJ des Im eflekrs (nous) bei Aristote/es, pp, 4 3~44 , 58, 83-
IOSlb22-28; De Ali. 430.26ff.
72 This is, 1 take it, because on e id entifies logos with the assertion. On this view, there
is no other concept !eft but vo with which one cou ld compare Heidegger' s notion
of pre-propos iti onal discursive understanding (Vers/ehen). Sec W. Brogan, "Th e
Place of ArislOtle in the De velopment of Heidegger's Phenom enology "; M.
Ruggenin i, "La finitude de l'existence et la question de la vrit: Heidegger 1925-
1929". F. Volp i also wa nls to disti ngui sb Vers /ehen from logos, bul he docs not
130
possible . sincc Il c idcggcr al so CI1lcrtain s the idea o f a d iscurs ive nous.
nul il! [h is c ase, IIOIIS is nothin g dirfe ren l l'rom logos . T h erefore, thi s
;l1l c rprcl:J li o n or Il c idegger s till leaves unans wered the qu estion
t.:o l1 ccrning hi s attit.ud e toward s non-di scursive nous.
'l'he idea to be presented here is that H eidegger thi nks that hi s own
""1io n o fdi sclosedn ess is prefigured in the A risto!elian nous. But ifthis
is tru c, th en 11eidegge r in fact implies that A ristotl e is not sa far from a
no tion o f a tran scend ental conditi on of understanding as one usually
Ih inks. 7J Firs! il mu st be no!ed that Heidegger spe ak s a bout
di sc losedne ss in di ffe rent res pects. As constituted by understanding,
s pch and stat e-of-mind (Befindlichkeit), it is di sc ursive, involving an
ull coverin g of a specifi e bein g, and admits of truth and fa ls ity.74
1towever, H e idegger also speaks ab out di sclosedncss as an openness ta,
o r as a " hav ing" of meanin g and being as such, w hi ch is presupposed by
di scurs ive lh o ught. In this sense, di sclosedness gives expression to th e
I() re-s tru ct ure of understand in g, poi nting to the fac t that understa ndin g
li S logos is poss ibl e only on the basis of a foregoing having of meaning.
T hu s co nceived. it does not seem to mak e sense ta speak about fa lsity
wi lh respect to d isclosedness . Just as in the case of nous, " fal s it y" is
co mpare it to nOlis; "La question du logos dans l'artic ulat ion de la factici t chez le
Jeunc ll eidegger, lecteur d'Aristote". On th is p~int, o.ne 1eal~ s on G.A 29/30, pp. 4 52-
456, where Heidegger indeed does speak of a dIscurSI ve voue; that lS pr,csupposed by
logos as asscrtion in a \Vay Ihat he did not do in his earl ie r courses, slnce Ihere, he
dcs ignated Ihis understanding too as logos. _ ..
11 Wllctller or nol Ari stotle ever has entcrlained an ide a of VOUt; as a co ndItion of
lugos as such is no doubt very difficult to decide, no~ I~ast since he does not seem to
he thn t int.crcs lcd in ils role in ord inary know ledge, If Il has any, but rather wants 10
nnd OUI wllal il must look like if il is to do justice to the supreme aspects of reality.
hl ord er 10 seil le Ihi s questi on, it is nece ssary ta eluc idate the rel atio n belween ~o<;
IlIld (I.\OOl,cr\ <; , sa as 10 decide whet her il is 0 1: 0:81'\0\<; atone that grants o~dmary
cx pcri cnce ilS ca pac ly to disl in guish what a thing is, and .10 appr~hend Ih at, d1fferent
11I11lBs ail are of one ki nd, or if vO' is needed a!so for thl S capac~ty. H. S.e ldl seems
10 argue in fa vour of the latter alternative, as he suggests that vou can elther gras p
L'I1H!lHC in morc abstract Ihinking, contemplating the essence in full isol ati on from
K5. On thi s poi nt , he 1S in agreement with C, Kahn, "Aristotle on Th ink ing" p. 37 ~ .
I\y co ntrAS1, M. Frcd e, who ha s traced the developme nt or the concept of re~so n ln
Ch eck ttlOu ghl in gcneral , notnb ly \V ith res pect la Socrales, Plata and Anstotle,
j.I H"C'I lItut to Ari stotlc , vo is Il hi ghcr intetlectun[ power wlli ch has to be developed
tHI. or ot llel' f'o r'rlI S of uIHJ ers\{1lldin g; seC his Introdu cti on 10 Ratiollaliry in Greek
n Ul/lghl.
'" SI, p. [11.
t1 1
 C I 11\\,'11,' 1( 1111( 1' 1

here a matt er ofnot hav ing.75 This is (\ problclI Hlll c poi nt. howcyc
r. For
H eidegge r states tha t disclos edn ess in vo lvcs ils ow n counlc rparl,
a
concealment ( Verschlossenhe it), which is attribu ted to Dasein 's
t llin g
(Verlallen) to th e public explicati on of thin gs, w hi ch makes o ri
g inal
experi c nce superflu ous . As an alternat ive to this, Heideg ger introdu
ces
th e noti on o f aUl hentic di sclosedness," But fa\Jing seems precise
ly ta
presupp ose discJos edn ess, no less th an authentic disclos edness
, The
on ly way to make sense of this situati on is by regardi ng f lling not
as a
mark of fals ity o r ina ulh enti city, but s impl y as Ihe finit ude
of
di sc losedne ss. whi ch mcans that, whethe r a uthenLi c or inauth e nti
c, o ur
disclos edness is essentia lly limi ted in sc ope, since it is 110 1 div ine.
77
T he distin cti on betwee n two as pects of di sclosedn ess rec urs
in
H eidegge r's inlerpre tation of nous . H e di slingui shes between nOliS
as an
underslanding of somethin g as somethin g, in whi ch case he re fers
to the
term dianoein in order LO emphas ise ils d iscursive stru cture, and nous
as
a conditi o n of dianoe in.7'6 Heideg ger paralle ls this d istin ction
to the
di v ision between nOliS poietiko s and nOliS pathelikos, acti ve and
passive
reason . This di v is ion is made in De Anima, w he re Ari stotl e co
mpares
the act ive or produc ti ve reason ta light, since it makes ail
thin gs
knowable JU S! like light makes ail thi ngs vis ible. By contraS!, passive
reaSQn can be said to becoll'lC ail thin gs, sin ce it co nsists in the capac
ity
to receive thcir fo rm s or essences. 7? Man y o f Arista tle ' s reade
rs have
found it difficu lt ta decide what the rel ati on betwee n these two kinds
of
reason looks like. One way to so lve this diffi cul ty is to cJaim that
active
reason belongs 10 God on ly.80 But as already indicate d, He idegger
suggcs ts ,tnstca ct t1lU t actl've rcaSOll should be ta ke n to co nsti tute th e
co nd iti on o f possibi lity or passive rcason:
Noeill is in SOlll e sense a path os, a beillg -aflected by the world.
T hi s kind of bei ng in the worl d, characte rised by tl~e
ullcovcred ness of li a I/ S, is only poss ible insofar as the world. IS
disdosed as SllCh, illsofar as nOlis is determined by a nOl/s wInch
Ullcove rs the worl d in genera l. 1 can intend someth ing only
illsofar as this th inkable something is disclosed as such. No us
palli elikos is only poss ib le on the basis of nOLIs poieliko s, on the
bas is of a lIoeill wlli ch uncovers Ihe wortd. 81
Il owcver, even though Heide gger docs not cali nous poielikos di vine,
he
:-:ccrn s to think that divine rcaSQn has been th e model for nous poietiko
s.
For he states th at in Aristotle ' s v iew, prod uctive rcason is not
strictl y
hUl1l an, but e xceeds hum an reason , 50 th at th e latter is regard
ed as a
possible instanc e o f the form er." This is no do ubt someth ing
that
Il c idcggc r conside rs as problem ati c, as we "vBI see in the n c~t chapte
r,
in co nnccti o n w ith the qu estion concern in g the philosophlcal
nous.
Nc ve rlh e less H eidegge r seems ta affirm one o f th e co nsequ ences
of
l!lis noti on ~f reason , a nd th at is th at huma n reason onl y has
thi s
primordi al openn ess - in H eidegge r 's words, di scloscdn ess - in 50
fa r as
il rc trieves it, and th at is ta say enacts it in arti cul ati on. 83 Therefo
re,
cvcn lhough nous precede s and makes possible logos, it is only through
logos that /l OUS is accessible . ln Heideg ger' s words, this means th
at our
disclosedness o f being onl y is what it is as an uncove rin g of bemgs
that
lakes place in logos,

75 Alel. IOS2a l -4.

76 SZ, pp. 22 l-222. 1 return to the notion of falli ng in Section 9.
71 For this po int , see also H. Ruin, Enigma! tClllIS orthe IwO modes of actual ily; Der Begriffdes lnlellekl s (no us)
ic Orig ins" pp. 23 1-232, who th inks that, he; Aristote/s,
when disti nguish ing between two levels of disclosed ness, Hei degger fac
es a proble m 1111,2.3, 117- 11 9. . ' . .
which he does not sol ve in Sein und Zei!. For if falli ng belongs to disclosed l i GA 18, )). 326: " Oas voe:t V st ;n ge wlssem S lll ~e elll1ttl eoo:; ,.e~ . d .W 1
ness, it n vo n el e. t
seems that one has 10 pose an independent correlate, to wll ich di sclosedn "'I~':~ {/ li gellll' erc".!JI. Di eses S o - in - der-~elt - Se l n, . charakte ns lert
ess would durc h dIe
relate in a more or res.c; correc t \Vay, but it was precisery l'nldcckt hc il des vO' <;, ist Il ur dadurt: 1i Ing lll;h , ual3 dIe Welt Uberhaup
suc h a pre- t erschlossen
ph enomeno log ical noti on of truth that Heidegg er wanted to escape. h l, d [\ l~ der vO> bcstmmt st du rch einen vO<;'"der die Weil berhaup
Howeve r, if ~ entdeckt. l: h
falting is interpreted as the inner fi ni tude of di sclosedn ess, there is no klll ill ll ur vct'l ll eincn, weil Il diescs Dcnkbarc uberhau pt ersc~losse~
nced fo r such a ISt. D~r vou
correl ate. For this problem, sec also E. Tugendh at, Der Wa hr" e itsbegr It((O l\ fn:6 ist 1lur mglich durch den vo 7tOlll'tU:O, durch em VOEIV,
~fJ bei Husserl das dI e Welt
und Heidegge r, pp. 295-298, 328-330, 356362. ( !!l deekt."
" See GA 18, pp. 279-28 1; GA t 9, p. 179. l UA I R, p. 200. II I De AI/ima a l Icas\, Ari stoll e l:cver
.
.desc n b.es r~ason as hum an,
79 De An. 430a I4- 17. See al so De An. 111.4 . IhOll gll he: di l:cusscs Ihc conseq ucnces of rCilson bemg Slluated 111 man,
RO See M. Frede, "On Arstot le's Concept
namc\ y th~t,
ion of the Soul"; W. McNeil l, Th e Glonce of !'V\lll lhOll gh' rcason ilsc r!' is illl lll ortni Illld pcrree l, man's n tcll cctua
l powers wll l
Th e Eye, p. 29. H. Seid r argues instead Ihat active and pass ive renson
mu st nOI be d l lllh l L~h illl hnc. slncc Ill llil is ll lOl'w l. l)..,: Ali . 408b I 8-29.
regarded as t\Vo dirrerenl l'casons or capait ics, bu l thn! they ure tO be Il C:/I 1H, p. 202,
cOllcc ivccl in

132 1 1
 '111\1''1 1' 1< 'IIIIU ' I
8. Logos as kinesi s.
Having present ed his interpr ctation of the re lution bctwce n
poietikos and nOlis pathetikos, Heidegger states that:
nOliS
The determinations of poiesis and patllesis reach into the
aClual
centre of the Greek concepti on of world and lire. This means that
ail und erslandin g of how the Greeks have app rehended being
depends lIpon the \Vay in which one understands kil1esis. 84
That the concept of kinesis is determinat ive of the Greek or Aristot
elian
conception of life and world means, among other thin gs, that Aristotl
e wlti ch lelos is th ought to be constitutive of the being of movement
unde rstands logos in tenns of kinesis, and 1hat is to say, as an
inte rp lay
of poiesis and pathesis . Th is is al Jea st ll eidegge r's view o f th
e matter,
the impli cations or which are to be dea lt w ith here. The
main sources
for J-Jeidegger's interpre tation of Aristolle 's teleology are Grllndb egriffe
der aris/o/elisehen Philosophie and Aris/ote/es, Metaphysik IX 1-3:
Von
Wesen und Wirkliehkeit der Kraft from 1931 . 1 have chosen to focu
s on
the earlier course, sin ce il is more in Iinc with He idcgger's
attitude
towards Aristotle in ge nera l durin g the Iwentics. fo r cven though
these
courses are perhaps not incompatible, they dirfer quite sign ifi ca
ntly
from each other. The basic difference is that wherea s the earlier course
above ail [ocuses on the noti on of realisat ion or enactm ent, i. e.
on
energeia and kinesis, the latter is more co ncern ed \Vith th e mean
in g of
dunamis .85 A s noted in Chapt er One, during the urst hal f of
th e
twenti es, He id egger becom es more and more convi nced
th at ta
A rist otle, the meaning of being is energe ia or enle/echeia in the sense
of Fertigsein: fini shed and complete being. This conviction makes
him
somew hat hesitant re ga rdin g the questio n wh ether or not Aristot le
was
rea ll y able ta do justice to dunamis ; a hes jt~nce that does Ilot seem
10 be
present in th e latter course. Becaus e of the comp lexity of Heideg
ger' s
interpretalion of Aristot le 's te leo logy, 1 w ill not dea l \Vith
it in its
e nl irety at this sta ge but mai nly reslrict myse lfto Heideg ger's
retrieva l
14 GA 18, p. 326: "D ie Besti mmungen der
1toi 110"l and m:i8110"l reichen hinein in dus
cigent liche Zentrum der griechischen Welt- und Lebensbetrach tung.
Darin liegt, daO
alles Verstiindnis dessen, wie di e Griechen das Sein aufgefaBI haben,
daran hangt,
\Vie man die KtVl1<Ju; versteht." For the di stinction between 1tOlllOt
and 1tciel1<H , sec
Phys . 202a2 Iff.
a~ Moreover, in GA 33 , Heidegge r's understand in g of logos has begun
to change, and
he re fers ta his ear li er treatment of logos in GA 19 \V ith the rC1l1ark
"insu f(i cient ", p.
5.
114
CII I\ PTER l'lIR EE
01' kill esis \Vi lh n.:spcc l
tO th e conce pt of logos .8fl Howev er, most o f tl:c
'ssentiul aspects of th e co nnecti on bctwee n logos and ~inesis
ha~e l.n
rllc t nlready been cstabli shed. For the point in makin g thls connectlOn
IS
h,,,icall y to show that only kines is capture s the differen ce that be longs
10 logos, the diffcrence bctween beings and being. In
other words, It IS a
1I\I111 er oCassertin g the transce ndence in volved in logos
III; idcggcr's int erpreta tion o f Aristol le's teleol og~ as ~ ",ho le la.rge y
l.
centres on the co ncept of te/os. His basic argume nt lt1 thlS conncc
tlOn. I S
Il lU t Ari stotl e has an ontolog ica l conception of te/o s, in accorda
nce w lth
~nd
IIetio n. For as the end (Ende) or Fertigk eit of action, it makes ~ctton
10ss ib le by gove rning or affeetin g it in every momen t, "mec
It IS that
~'I"t..)I"n which the acti on receive s its specifie direction. Thereby, the e nd
clin bc said to delimit the action, to restrict its scope, and therefo re,
the
basic meanin g of te/os is end in the sense of limi! (peras )." And,
Ilc idegger adds, it is only because this is the basic sense of tdos that
It
II1 ny also mean " goal,,'8 In this way, Heideg ger wants to obJect to
the
idea that Aristotelian teleology necessaril y involve s ascnb mg to nature
Il goal or design, as if everyth ing that happen s
would do 50 accordm g to
some plan. We must be care ful with the ward "teleology", Helde gg
;;
SlIyS , for Aristotle did not in fa et have any teleologl cal wo rld- vlew.
Instcad , the basic idea of his teleology is th at 9~0 be IS ta be It m
lted,
wl\e rcas what is unlimited borders on non-bcl11g.
.
W c have seen that A ristotle takes action, praxis , to be
an end .JO
il self. I\s such, it is not a form of ki/les is , since kinesis does Ilot have
';~
clld itnmane ntly, but has the mode ofbein g of energeia or ente/~ehe/Q.
IIlIt apparently, insofar as action in volves deliberation~ It IS 111 fact
a
l"'I'1ll of kinesis , though it is possible fo r us ta regard It as an end
m
Itsc \l'. ln kin es is, we are '~outsi de" ourse lvcs , direc ted towards
an e nd
~'I III hnplcr FOll r, 1 will consider \Vhat Heidegger re gard s as the ~robl
el1lati c
1IlIlscqucilces of Ari slotle's tel eology in .whal co n.cerns the
questi on of .th e
p\lllosop lli ca l logos. In CI:apter Fi ~e, 1 wil! dea\ wlth the broader
ontologlcal
Implicmions of I lcideggcr's 1Jlterpretatlon of Anslotle s teleology.
I l Sec Mel . V.l ?
U (i,ll 1S, pp . 39, R2.
1" U,II 1R, p. 82.
.,I Scc( iA 18, I>p. 1, H-3 9.
VI J"ul' Ille In cnllill~ of Ihcsc ' Cri n s, scc (, h:lplcr ~ 1 1 1
One, Sewon 3 \'or 11C I( ea t 1at
n I IIJ~I ~ III tlll..\ l1ropcI' sc no;c CIIIlI IOI be Il fonn of Ki VI\CJl C;, sec 0150 li (el . 1048b 18-27
1 1~
 'II AI'TI\I( 1111( 1'1
that we do not yet possess. This is clcarl y the CIISe wi lh dcl iberat ion,
si nce the deli berating agent has to "reach OUl" 10 th !.! ullticiputcd end as
somelhin g that can be realised in different ways. In oth er \\lo rd s, since
the end of action is successful action and in thi s way is dcte rmined by
its "how", the end cannat be fulfilled already at the outset, and that is
why act ion is in need of deliberat ion. Thus conceived, ac tion involves
bath poiesis and pathesis, tOI' to act is to " cffcet", to bring about a
course of action, and th is is possible on ly because we have been
affected by an end, an end that appears as somethin g desirable.
Moreover, even though (1 bas ic trait of energeia is that it in no way
affects the dunamis wh ich it exercises, since it only changes from
inactivity to activ ity , in th e Ethics, i\ristotle repea tedly claims that our
acti ons (energeiai) do in fact affec t our d ispos it ions (dunClmeis).92 But
thi s m ea ns that th e end of act ion ca n be regarded as a dtmamis , as a
eapacity or poss ibili ty. For if act ion is the enactment of a virtue or
capacity, which in its tum is atTected by the action, thcn action seems to
be a movem cnl rrom one dunamis to another dUl1amis , and that is
precisely the mark o f kinesis. Thus evc n th o ugh Aristoll e wants praxis
to be a forlll of energeia, si nc e he l'c ars that, otherwise, th e differcnce
between praxis and poiesis will collapse, he has actually shawn how
action can be a form o f kinesis and still not have a work but a
potentiality or capacity as its end, And even though Heidegger suspects
that Aristotle's conception of dunamis is go ve rned by the ideal of
Fertigsein, so that possibility in th e proper sen se is a " fillished ",
complete possibility, whieh does not admit of any further development,
he thin ks he can retrieve anoth er sense of possibility from Aristotle's
teleology.
ln Sein und Ze it, Heidegger pursues his ana lysis of possibility as an
inquiry into the fin itude of human existence, a nd he takes the same tine
o f approa ch in the course now un der con si deration. He begins by
pointing to Aristotle's own remark that " In a tran sfcn ed sense, onc al:so
speaks about death as an end, sinee they are both something ultimate.
For also the ultimate ' for the sake of whic h' is an end."" Heidegger
remarks: "With this transference, te/e ion, te/os shows itself as a
~ E.N.I!. I, 1105b9-I O, 1114 b21 -2S.
93Met . 102 J b28-29: "Sl !(eLi. il tEelYt~ KotO ],I e-ra$op J..ye1"Ut to. 6-r1
crxam . Tl,o t. K'Ctt t ou VEKa f::OXCHOV." See GA 18, p. 82.
136
' li A1' 11 ',1( '1II1WE
l ll1l1uctcr uf J)USCiIl .',94 Fo r if th e bas ic rUllclion o f e nds is to make our
I1cli vili cs poss ibl e, th cn when regarding death as such an end the
I1lelll1ing of le/o s is in some sense lost, since death as te/os annihilates
" "" cxistence. Therefore, the _a nalysis of death "throws us back" to the
'xpli cat ioll of li fe." For withinlife, death exists or has meaning only as
l'oss ibi li t.y. That is why, on Heidegger' s view, the possibility o f death
,evcals particularl y elearly the mean ing of possibility as such. More
l'l'eciscly, it shows that ends make action possible precisely in virtue of
tltcir po tcntia lit y, that is, illsofar as they are not ac tuahsed ~ut
IlIIli c ipated as possibili ties. 96 Thus the point in bringing up our relatIOn
10 UUI' own death in this context is to show that act ion, and hum an
I1cti vity as sueh, presupposes a difference between end and activity.
MOI'cover, if man essentially relates to an unful filled end or posslblhty,
i.e. dcath, th is implies that his understanding of him self equall y
llivolvcs an understand in g ofwhat he is not, wh ich is constitutive ofhis
,oa.:) r~ lIndcrstanding, in that il too delimits his exi stence. ln other word s,
III ne t Jll ca ns to re late Ilot on ly to the ends that we choose, but also to the
clilis that we do not choose. 97 ln thi s way, we are outside ourselves in
killesis not only because we relate ta an external end but also because
Ihi s end in its turn points beyond itself, to a context of other possible
",Is. in which it has its place,
On one occasion, Heidegger states that on the basis o f kinesis, and
more. precisely with respect to Hs relation to krinein, determination , il is
possible to understand not only what it means to be in the world but also
Ill e II1caning of hermeneuein. 98 The reason why 1-1 el'd egger men t'Ions
li l'cciscly krinein in connection with kinesis here is that he wants t~ refer
II I th e cha racteri sat ion o f the so ul in De Anima, where Afl stotl e
, . UA 18, p. 87: " Mi l dieser bertragu ng zeigt s ieh 'tEtOV , 'tJ~oo; ais e in
1)'It:lc llscharak ter."
ij, (iA 18, p. 90.
"cr. SZ, pp . 248-249 . . ' d' 1. .
QI hl lht..: lule r CDurse 0 11 Ari stDlle 's Icleology, H ~ldeg~er w lll 1S ~US~ t 11S pDtnt
' Xlc nsivc\y, in eo nlle ctioll \Vit h Aristotl e's expressIon .uvClll t ~le'to, ),oyou . Every
I:llfl!H.: il y wlli c h is ~I el )..6yo\l necessa ri ly admit s of It.S con trary. For 7x.a~ple, a
1I(1~' I ol' is cllpnhl e of producing not o nly health b~ll a lso d lsease: Thus p.asslb lhlles .ar~
ulwuys poss ib le in sOllle spec ifi e way . ,and t hcre f ~re, they req mre a dell~,era~e eholc~ ,
/111 '1. I047b3S- I048n 13. T hi s poi nt 15 c mphas lsed b~ W. Braga n, He idegger s
1tl l<:1prctn lon of Aristotlc on lht..: Privat ive C h<lraetcr of l' o ree and the Twofoldness of
ci~I$W Il, 1''1(. pp, 12 1rr.
"1 UA 1H , p. lit! .
117
 C' II AI'II ' I( IIII U I
jU\IUPOSCS thcsc Iwo term s?) KI';/lC;1I is how 'vel IIOlllill g dlffcl'cnt frOlll
logos . Kinesis prov ides us \Vi th a clul.! 10 th e nuture of hermeneuein
sin..:!;! il Il ot.onl y preserves th e di fferencc in logos hCl wCl1 th e a bj ec t o~
understandmg and that out of which thi s Obj ccl is lIllderslood, bu t also
revea ls th e nature ofthei r interrelati on. Bas ieall y, this re lation is one of
address and response: to speak or to think about something is to address
it in one of its aspects, whereupon the thing answers by showing itself
III so rne specifie way.'OO
We have seen that the disc losedn ess of be in g is determined by a
Vors truktur, w hi ch de limits in advance th e scope and direction of
t~ o u ght and action, But as an clement of discursive underslanding, our
cltsclosedness is realised only inso far as logos directs itsel f towards
some object, and if to understand somethin g is to understand it in terms
o f its te/os, logos directs itse lf towa rds its object wi th res pect to a
SpCC ill C poss ibility, whil e leaving oth ers behind . There fore, ou r
undcrstand ing is finite in several respec ts. First, insofar as wc
necessarily address things as somclhing, the possibility always remains
that th e thin g in ques ti o n has to be approached anew, fro m another
directi on. In oth er words, beca use of th e difference in logos, there
cannot be a ful l idenlity between thought and its object, as there would
be if thi nki ng hacl th e mode of bein g of ene rgeia. Furth er, when
enactin g our di se losedness in an aet of uneoverin g, the response of the
thin g whi ch has been uncoverecl will always in so rn e sense atfect the
di sc loseclness itself; wh ether by confirmati on or chall enge. Therefore
th e address of logos does not lead to a fi nal end or Ferligkeit . Wh en w~
have rcali sed a poss ibility, we stand in a new situation with new
poss i bilili es o f und ers tandin g. ln thi s way, logos di splays an
II1terreJatlO1l of po iesis and p a thesis, or, olle ould also say, it is itself a
dunalllis, since its nature is to be able to effect by addressing a thing, as
we il as to be affected by the response. As sueh, logos is th e possibility
of change. 10 1
Logos displays the mo vement of li re, in v irtue of whi ch life is
ou ts ide ilself, directecl towards an end, which it does not possess in any
s"n ple way. As such, logos is finite, and there fore, it is not only what
99De An. 427aI7- 19.
"" GA 18, p. 212.
10l Sec GA 18, pp. 238, 248, 325~326.
UN
III ' 1111111 CXpc l' CIl CC Irulh in undcrslandin g somcthing, but it is a1so a
,,'II IIII(H1 0 1' iil lsity. For s inee logos as kinesis is not self-sufficient but
III\nlvcs Il'unsccndcl1cc, it makes it possible for man ta fall away from
1I1111. ctf. Lo possib il ities whi ch are nol his oIVn. This is what Heidegger
.J.-<IH'lUtcs as li l'e 's tendency towards " falling" (Ve /Jallen ), which is to
lu' ~ l lI e i cla t ccl in the fo llowing section. ln the next chapter, however, wc
" II I sec how ll e idegger also thinks th at the kinetic nature o f logos
11i 11Itil ' o r th e poss ibil ity of countcri ng this tendency towards falli ng.
IJ I ,(),,,o,~' as jctl/ Gild empty speech
AM we saw al lhe beginning of lhis chapter, Heidegger introduces
l' vc l'yday ness as a methodologica l co ncept, indicating that th e
phcllomcnologica l analysis must begin with Dasein 's existence sueh as
Il CO II H':S la expression "proximall y and for the most part", in its average
IUOdl; of ex istence. 102 As such, everydayness has nothing to do with the
Ili'11inction between authenticity and inauthenticity. However, it seems
llll' Iha t Hei degger thinks that, ev en th o ugh il is not necessary,
Itlllllthen ti c ity is in faet the most co rn mon mode of existence. That is ta
Il)1 . "proxi mally and for the mos1 part", we are not rcally ourselves,
11I11"l lll uch as wc rcly on what lIane" says is meaningful ta do and to
11l 11lk , cte. ' D) For authentie existence, as Heidegger often points out, is
\H ll y poss ible as a react ion against inauthenticity,
When eoncludin g hi s analys is of di sclosedn ess in Se in und Zeit,
Il eldcggcr remark s that he has in a sense lost sight of precisely th e
\'vcl'Yday mode of disclosedness. 104 This is because the analysis has not
yc l Inken inlo accounl Dasein 's falling (Verfalle n), As noted earlier, th e
\'IIIICCpl of fallin g is ambi guous in Heidegger, as he sometimes speaks
IIhout it just in th e sense of finitude, and sometimes seems to think th at
il Is somcthing that can be overcome. In the former case, fallin g is
lIolhill g but kinesis, sinee finitud e is an aspect of kinesis, as wc saw
uhnve. " ro avoid confusion, 1 will speak about falling as a mark of
1IIIIII titenti c everyday ex istence, where il however plays an important
1Il le ns regards the constituti on of mcaning and understanding.
,.. , SI., pp. 42 43, 53. . .
Il' I ,....'/., p. 129 : "Proximull y. [)nsc in is likc onc. is lIn'.1 ror the :~lOst part, 11 remams that
\\IllY," (i', lll llIcllst iSl das Onsc in Mfln und ZUII1C lst bl ed)1 es 50. )
IIltSI, PI), 166_167 .
119
 C II A PTI \!( 1111( 1' 1 ( '11 1\ 1' l'l ' II 1 11111', 1'

, " . t Il al l'e/ll ce o mca ns, among o th er

The fall is a recu rrenl lheme in Il cllI'ly Idl 0 1' Il c idcsger's leclures Ily lllnlogiclI l d cla tl ~ Oll e lllay JusillO C l >' Heidegge r
from the period preceding Sein und Ze it , Ouri ng lhis lime, Il eidegge r is 11 , to ~ lllil
' C b'lck"
( , '111C
( I th is is also th e !11 (;:al11n g ..
1 1 I\ H~,' " , l 'Id in such a way that It IS
continuously changing and modifyin g Ihe Icnns w ilh w hi ch he lri es 10 lll lllhil les 10 ile/uzel/z: Ide ," rall en l~, 11~ W01 ich me ans that its self-
give expression to this phenomenon, There is hardl y any olher concept '1II II lninaletl " by th al whl ch Il con ron s, w 11 d
' 1 tl' vay Reluzenz can be compare
in Heidegger's philosophy at this time which rec eives su ch a thorough IIndel'Slllndin g is not immcdlate, n liS \ 'h 't outlined earlier
and diverse explication as the fall. This is because Heidegger is anxious and concern suc as 1 was ,
III lite rellilion belween care , d' 'd 1 acts of concern are
to make clear why philosophy has been unable to do justice to human I n~llfill' uS lhi s outline showed tha\ the In 'V I lua Heidegger thus
existence, This predicament must thus be led back to Iife itself ' 05 In l 'g the wor d Re uzenz,
\ 1I1l gtituli vc of care. n USII1, I.n that its source is nat so mu ch
particular at the beginning of the lwenties, the fall is treated within the dIH I(lCll (CS lhe IUlIlen na/urale, Imp yi g Id r concern,
conlext of th e investigation uf the 1110vemcnt of life, or, as Heidegger ' , " . k by itself as rather the wor 0
,""HOII or subJ cCli vIly ta en l' 'If but in everyday life al
also calls il, ils mobilily (Bewegtheit), The idea lhat mobilily is lhe basic Mu n d ocs Ilo t have .111lI1lcdl a.te acces~ ta l~mse ':re-illuminated", by way
trait of liCe is developed l10tably in two texts from the earl iest twenties: l 'lISI, his existence lS accessible to hlm on y ~ou h Reluzenz represents
the Aristot le-Imroduction and Phdnomenologische Intetpretationen zu ui' Iti s co ncern for the world, Hence ev en , g, d 't If,108
Aristote/es, Here Heidegger argues that only on lhe basis of mobility are ' 1 f Iife in its encounter-Iaden directIOn towar sise ,'
we in a position to undcrstand the olhcr existential structures, since it is
" II~C l110vemcn 0 a fall ta the world, This means thal man IS
Ih lS lhrccuon comc.s abOli: as uch a wa as to simultancously turn away
l110bility that: decides how life " has" these structures . This is also the d \rcc tcd towa rds hl11l self ln S Y h' rr "[all into
time when the concept of care makes its debut, since care is needed in ur li
,, (, Il 0 1'(" From him self, w hich , in its turn makes IS 1 e
arder la design"te the kind of mobilily that is characteristic of factieal " . " d' spersel l (zers treuen) Itself.
Iife, as il shows thal life does not move in an indifferent way but by
rw..:On
ccs
,or 1
Heidcgger 's account, whereas
R i z is das zerstreuende, that
e uzen.. . .1
caring for itselfand the world , , l'~ ' that it illunllnates Il retrospectl ve y,
wlli ch scatters or disperses 1 e In "t f dispersion which thus is
Among Heidegger 's many experimenta l expositions of the , '1 rstrcuen the actlvl y 0 ,
1)/'o cS fl' l.Ik/lon 15 (; as ze , .' fR 1 This comes ta
phenomenon offalling, one may mention in particular the one contained d 1 . re-illummatton 0 e uzenz.
I.'o nslitulcd by the ISC OSlve ' t h e world of concern and
in the latter of the Iwo courses referred to above, which is not only the , t 'n way of structunng
cx prc::;S lon as a cer al "beforehand)) and
'0 '1 If '09 Praestl'uo means both to arrange
most power fui accou nt of lhe fall but certainl y the most peculiar as 1
Iltcrcby Il e 1 se ' d b th fthes e senses
weil. In this text, Heidegger works with a number of different terms (for " 10 bu il d up in front" , and Praes/ruktion allu es to 0 0 , f lh '
, d bt reminiscent of the notlOn a e
this once borrowed from L atin 106) , ncarly ail of which are introduced 'l'Il e l erm Praestruktion IS no ou ' d" 1 rays to
, d wi th whi ch our understan mg 15 a \\
here 101' the first lime and lhen never taken up again, Some of these Von lr/lklur III accor an ce h' y tl1e
concepts stand out tram Heidegger's subsequent terms for falling in that
" enl sett led or "arrange d" b e f 0 l'eh and . In t IS ..
wa ,
so mc eX I , ' , " t''' ' it "bui/ds" life, it is conslltullve of lhe
they emphasise particularly slrongly the in terre lation of the constitutive }>,.aestrukl/O/7 IS a construc Ion ' l ~ .
and the concealing function ofthe fall, weys in w hi ch life has or relates to itself, But since Ide IS re-
, ' If in terlns of ils pre-organISe or pre-
In this course, Heidegger states that the basic categories of ill lIlllin alcd, address lllg Its e , 't If for its dealings
movement, which are simultaneously the primordial structures of '( blocks Its access ta 1 se ,
1'I 1I'uc tlll cd occ upatio ns, 1 . .. . ltaneouslv a
~
factic ity , are Reluzenz and Praestruktion ,'07 Without going into :-l tund in th e way. \\() Thu s th e co n5tructlOI1 IS Slmu

105 This is particularly clear in GA 17, where Heidegger tries to show that Husserl 's IIIK ( ;A 6 1. p. 120: " B CWCg llll g des fak lischen Le b ens .ln d e r begegnishafte n Richtung
rrhiJosophy is in fact based upon fallin g. huf cS sc lbsl. "
06 Probably due ta the course on Augustine the preceding se lll ester; GA 60. 10'1 cr. ( !A 61. p. 13 1.
I07 GA61 , pp.11 7,13 1. 1 III UA 6 l , pp. 1 1 9 ~ 120,

140 14 1
 '1I AI'I I ' 11 111I1I1 l' li A!''! ER 'IIII \ EI',

Hdcstructi on" , thou gh not only in th

e seml!,; o ! I,.' llUl tllg un ob stac
le to an , " . , v..'th o ut ha v in g m ade o
ima gine d self-tran spar ency on Ihe 11111 \II HI ' !'}; Io nd w ll al 15 nes e lr the
S d I C. l '
pari o f lile , '1h ' dcSl1'uc li on indi
cale s ' k ' Il) th e I aun eall on s o l' Ol)ini ons a shar ed wor ld
111'1 h: IH; C}; 1lHlt 111,1
fini tude a lso in the sens e that life C l J 1 ' ,
as it CO IlSll'lIclS ilsc lr s imu hall coll
s ly , ,' bl' Il But thl. s 15 a 5 0 th e mas t prab lem allc
'
destroys that which il \Vas and 8150 Il Il,, ld Il\lI he l'0SS I
wha t il co uic! be. 111 c. . f' b
To fail lo the wor /d is to fa ll to
, "
plll' 1l 0ll1 CIHl ll 0 l CV ~I y(h( y li re or eca us
e of its falli ng, Ii fe te nds to
' li'ca dy esta IS he d opi ni ons 50 th at the
the pub lic exp l icati on oft hin gs. , bl '
is to say, in eve ryd ay lire , wc Tha t li t, 't llll C "~ Il \rt n g 1c d " \1\ d ,
are " illu min ated " or ach ieve ," " ' ann ihila ted,
und erst and ing thro u gh our acce ss our 1" ", lhil II Y 0 1 chan ge, o f see . in g th1l1gs \11 a new way , 15
ta al read y esta blished opin ions , , , l 'C mak es act Ion . 'ble by prov idin g the agen t
Thu s here we return ta the poinl doxa . ANwc saW car l ICI, C OX l
pOSS I
at whi ch this cha pter bega n: dox , '
, h d r: iti on of rhet oric as
the
basic phe nom eno n of eve ryd ay a as \\ \\ 1\ uim and ehrcC \l on, Acc ordt n g ta t e eill1
life. As stated the n, wh en exp 1 " ' 'ble ta convinc e the
lori ng l' IIWC I' 10 sec t l e tll can~
hy whl ch It IS pOSS I aim of
Aris tot le's und e rsta ndi ng of dox , , 1 h con vinc ing argu men
'
a, Hei deg ger is not mer ely out 1Il ..' 101 ie is la crca1e op m!O ts, In orde r to
establish the basi c trait s of evcr yda to os thrOl g
y life, but he a lso wan ts ta kno w . h or gen erally con trol the
Aris totl e's con cept of logo s is rela how III hieve th " , the spea kc r nlU st try to can ge
1 k
ted to (Ar isto tle's und erst and in g
al)
. . 1
""It lldcs 01 hls leal.ers.. How eve r tle spea e r is not prim aril y out to
eve ry day spee ch. Of part icul ar . ' h th'n
imp orta nce in this con nect ion is
to see ,11, COl Ihe " Ite ntlo , f h 's aud ienc e ta t e l g itsel f but rath er to let
how A ri stot le co nce ives of n 0 1 f ,
th e re la ti on be twe en eve ryd ay Ilu,' 1I1 sec W 11d' t spe, . aks in favour 0 a ce rt al'n attit ude tow .rds th e thin g.
them et ical spee c h. Fo r cvc n thou and ,
g h ll eide gge r thin ks tha t Ar isto d' '1
s not pnm an Y see the thin g but a cert a1l1
,
a ffirm cd c/oxa as a form of uncl tle cco rdin gly, the .all lenc e doe nd so rhet oric al spee ch is characte
crsta ndin g in its ow n ri ght, he ri sed by
th at Aris tot !e's att itud e tow a rds susp ects 1111 'rpr etat lon o t It, a doxo, a
c/oxa is gov erne d by hi s noti on
of I I ~ Cll re l'or opin ions and not for h h ' them selv es . W hen this
theo ry in part ic ular and by his t e t mgs
onto logica l ass llmp tion s in gen hllpp cns, " e rnpt y spee ch" , Gerede, anse
Bas ical ly, Hei deg ger 's idea is th era /. s:
at Aris totl e cou Id not find the limi
peros, in eve ryda y Iife. For doxa t, the s ecch whic h has the facti cit)'
to
is itse lf imp erfe ct, w hil e bein
g
l.oXos is :Irst of ail emp \y ~ dev'e lo a certa in contentment,not
inca pab le of hor iz ein , of deli mit ICI the thlllgs be seen , but: P to
ing il S abj ect 50 stri ctly as ta . d' that whl eh one tilUsays The dom inati on of
defi nitio n, since it on ly says w hat be a rcnHlI1l stan mg bY b' S, ,
thin gs are " more or less " , Mor cov r. Dase in and mak es tt
the th in gs of eve ryd ay con ce rn er, emp\y speec'11 pree1'sely conc eal s emgs Lor , . ,
bl ind la lhat whic h has been unc da ld al 50 10 the P05Slbt hl Y
arc a lso imp erfe ct, sinc e th ey avere 1
are
cha nge able. lI2 T his idea of theo
retic al spee c h as horizein, as com or ,
Ullco vcn ng, 11 4
dem arca tion , is som eth in g that Hei pl ete
deg ger can nat just take ove r, sinc e nds tow .rds emp ty spee ch, it spea
be liev es, agai n, that thi s idea e he tll, o rur a S evcryda y spee ch t ks not so
is root ed in the noti on of bein h'
1 t 'eall y sec so met mg, b t mor e for the s ake of
Fertigsein. Sti ll , in spit e of his hesi g as IIiile h III 0 1'( el' 0 1 U
th 'lt IS for the sa k e 0 f spee ch itself. In this way ,
tanc e o n th is poin t, He idegger .
. .'
thin ks, as was also note d abo ve, Il 'vcl opll lg a pmiO ns, ( ,
that Ari sto tl e's dia gno s is of do
xo ilile cou l(l say l1a i t logo s tend s 10 ta k e. t h e p lace of pra xis in eve ryda y
dep icts essential aspe cts of ever yda , 1 r as we wi ll see in th e
y Iife, incl udin g its shor tcom ings 1lre..:, Thi s is a lso wha t, hapl~ens 1~1 ncx l
Of parti eula r imp orta nce to Hei . t 1e o Yt'
deg ger is to emp hasise that li fe , , 'ay For in emp ty spee ch ,
in 15
,'l1 l1 l't CI', bul hc re It lapp e l . 111 an mau t hen l e v. '
dox a is a lit dom inated by assertio . ther words one 's spee ch
ns , th at is, spee ch inso far as it has Ull e sl1caks wi tb oul gcn
uine d lsc\o sure , or 111 a
bec ome sep arat ed from th e very ,
acti vity of spea king . To som e exte
wc alw ays rcm ain dep end ent upo nt,
n doxa in thi s sens e, for if one
co uld
11'(iA 19 pp 25-27 ,
,,
I II See H, Rui n, "Think ing in Ruin s -
Life, Deat h and Dest ructi on in I-Ie ideg
II I ( lA 19 1; 197: " Dcr )"6 yo isl ZlIII11d lSI 1 G'l'cde d'ts di e Fakt iziit hat, die
(l.I~"111Ce c i o~nl'm l iche Genil gsam ke it
" ' .
Sn chen n; cht s e hc lI l.lI l n s~'C il so n(l c rn "
Ear ly Wr iting s", whe re this des ger's " b
truc tio n is expl i cate d in te rms
of Ruinanz, the ,
nU I(,ub ildclI , be l dcm sic' 1' 1 bl Clbc n WIIS 1\Hl I 150 'SI\ot Oic ll e rrschaft des Gere des
" nJ jnous" mov emen t of Iife, lCI! ~)l , I~S Scicndc undbmac '
d gege n da s
,
See GA 18, pp, 132, 139-1 40 , v" I!lchll cll t cnl de rtl1: tl as ~SC~ II hl also blln
112
" uf~~e dcck l c lIl1d InOijll CllC iil dcckcn, .( ..

142
1'11
 (' II AI'I I' I( 111101
rcmain s an Hemply significH tioll", ~I halls III ,"Illy. i, is nol l'lI lfillcd by ail
uncoverin g of the thin gs thernsclvl,,;S, bu t " Ill y conlinncd by ongo in g
speech, as one 's op inions are taken IIp by Olh c l's who co nlinu e to speak
about Ihe opinions which have been ullercd. In Ih i, way, Ihe resull of
ongoing speech is that the assertions are eventually cul off tram the acls
of uncovering that once were their origin, This leads in its turn ta the
sedimentation of assertions: they gain a kind ofself-sufficiency, insofar
as Ih e speech that is conducted so lcly for the sake of speak in g
contmuously sustams them . In this way, logos as doxa becomes bath the
origin and th e dri ving force of speakin g with one anoth er, that is, it
becornes the ultimate te/os of everyday speech. l 15
What happens when esta blished op in io ns gel the lIpper hand aver
th e activ ity of s peakin g? O ur cx periences become anony mou s and
seemingly ava il able to everyone but in reali ty to no one, since no one
bothers to make Ihe experiences for himsclf when th ere are alread
available expli cat ions of them. Thus hav in g an opini on means that on~
does not hav c to seek anymore; tbi s is the cssential fcature of doxa as
Aristotle co nceives or it , w hi c h lets him di stingui sh doxa From
d I"b . 11 6
el eratlOn . In thlS way, th e activity o f speech find s Hs end in doxa:
the speaker takes hold of that which is souled instead of deciding or
choosmg for hllnself. I-Iowever, thi s stability only intensifies the
restlessncss, for, as Heidegger says, it is characteristic of doxa that one
always can cont inu e ta speak about il, in other words, it is implied in il
Ihat the Ihin gs about whi ch it speaks can alwa ys be dirferen!.l"
Accordingly, living in doxa gives ri se to a ccrtain kind of instability, it
causes one to be on the move, to continue the speech, Since the stability
of oplll ions IS dlusory, the discussion is continuously no urished by a
constant des ire for rest.
. Howev er, empty s peech is not primaril~ a problem ta everyday life
Itself, From its point o f vie\v; for obvious ly , th cre are a number of
dea lin gs in everyday Ii fe in con ne.ction with w hi ch il would be pointless
t? ask for a more genuine form of uncovering than that which ju st
f~lI ows whal "one" says is Ihe right thing ta do. The real problem arises
1t phdosophy rcmains nai ve in its relation to everyday speech or ta
: :~ GA 18, p. i 5!.
E.N. i142b6-1 S. See also He idegger ' comment in GA 18 pp 137- 138.
117 GA 18, p. 59. ' .
144
'1IAI''1I\H '1'I1 HI\Il
1\ I l yduy lire nS [1 \V holc, thal is, irphil osophy is unablc to move beyond
11 1\ l' ~l1lnlH.~Snr
CVCl'yda yness and inslead lets it constitute its standard.
1 III 1" \VUS indi catcd alrcady in the previous chapter, Heidegger thinks
11 1111 It is beca usc 0 1' philosophy's fa ii to doxa that speech has been
IlIlll 'l'slood in tenll S 0 1' iegomelloll rather th an legeill, so that the
"" " li "l1 has been considered to be of greater philosophical importance
11 11111 Ihe ac ti vily of speaking. This has had two consequences, which are
Illllli li lll' 10 uS by now: one has objectified speech, believ ing that it has a
Il Il Hic 0 1' bcing simil ar 1O that o f things; thus one has lhought that
h\l\w 1U gC can be used as a tool, Ilot seeing that its essenc,e lS un covenn~.
\' l'{) lIdl y, o ne has come to beli eve that th e q uestion of ~ruth IS
1 llUlleetcd \Vith the assertion, and not \Vith the activity of speakmg, and
II lhc idca oftrulh as correspondence has arisen, ln this way, Heideger
III ~]lCS, Ihe phil osophical care for legomenoll has obstructed its access to
Il ',tWill.ll~
If) ('o /lcludillg remarks
Whut task rcmuins arter the explication of everyday li fe? lnsofar as an
"'"Cli li ai aspect of everyday life is that it is fa llen to the wo rld of
IlIlI ccm , whi ch it moreover understands in terms of a public
l' ' pliealcdness, th e task still remains to account for the nature of
IHllh c nt ic understandin g, that is, such understandi n g tha1 is able to
\])lIl1l er Ihc fal lin g of everyday li fe, However, this has to some extent
I,,'cli l'ulfi lled by means of the di scussion of ph/'ollesis . To be sure, the
1CIi SOIl why ph/'olles is has been treated in this chap ter is that, wh en
IIl c'lll'cting ph/'onesis as self-understanding, Heidegger paves the way
I tll' n co nceptio n of phronesis in accord an ce w ith wh ich th is for111 of
tllld ersllIlld in g is regard cd a s ail integral part o f human exis te nce as
l'I ueh, be il in ils authenli c or illauthenti c mode. But insofar as pltronesis
\." 111 ulso be rcgardcd as authentic selr-understanding, it points. t~\~ards.
III ' " eXl chapler. FrI a bOlh Aristotlc ""d Heidegger, Ihe possJlll hl y 01
ph il o~o ph y is foundcd on phrollesis, th" t is, 0 11 an illsight int o \V hat IS
~lIod roI' oncscl r.
III . l'ill III/ri Ze i!. 1h.:idcgg [' says ubo ut hi s ana lys is th at l' Il w ill torn
to Dus 'i n's di Slillcti vc il nd most rar-reachin g possibili tics of disclosul'c.
II I Scc( ;A II), pp. 26-27.
 C' II A J'II ' I( 111 1\ 11

in ord er lo get information lbout [hi ~ bcl ug " tif) TI

Il'0 111 Il lcs' '
far-rea '1 ' 'b'j " , ,0, lC 111 05 t
c "ng pOSSl 1 lly 01 dlsc los urc i5 no [ f' l
[ 0 ") ' '
t e O UIl ( ln tee me Or
1
concern. H owever nor is it not xl 1b
. h' . ' e, l uuslcc y pllroll e.~i.\ i n th e sense o f
aut entIc care for one' s j ' jC' l ' Chapter Four
, own !te. nstead, It be lon gs 10 philosophy as
ontologleal knowledge, which not only breaks with everyday eoncem
but also moves beyond the confines of self-understanding, Therefore, to
tllln ta the phllosophleal logos is, at Jeast as Heidegger sees it to tum to THE PI-lILOSOPI-lICAL LOGOS
the most onglllai possibility of logos. '

1 I>/ii/usophy as an uriginal pussibi/ity fur lugos

Wli cil [ul'I1ing to Heidegger' s understanding of the philosophieal logos,
[II i, siudy retums to the question coneerning the nature oftheory, with
whi ch the inquiry into logos originally began, though from a new
J1 ~ rs J1ec li ve, ln the meantime we have followed Heidegger's attempt to
cSltl bli sh a connection between logos and kinesis, according to which it
I.~ Il ot. onl y th e case that human activity as such is invested \Vith a
di sc ursive structure, but logos must in its tum be conceived ofalong the
ll ,, ~s of action, Against this background, the task remains to determine
wllll l il could mean to regard even philosophy as a form of action, and
1'1'0 111 th ere on to make clear \Vhat directives issue From such a
co nce pti on of philosophy for the question concerning the scope and
!l nl ure o f th e philosophical logos. A s indicated at the end of the
j1I'cv iolis chapter, one way to motivate the shift from everydayness to
philosophy is to point to the necessity of exploring the most "far-
l'~nchin g and di stinctive" possibility of diselosure, which is authenticity,
111 whi ch lire becomes truly itself or eigen, as opposed to inauthentic,
Uil Oll y ll1 0 US lire . In thi s chapter, however, authenticity will be
eonsidercd as itself a possibility for philosophy, More speeifieally, it is
1\ IllOllcr of sho wing what it could mean, from Heidegger's point of

vicw, 10 stand in an authentic relation ta the tradition, and, one could

pCl'haps say , to have an authentic Mitsein with Aristotle.
0 11 Il cid eggcr's account, wh en tracing the most far-reaching or
(H iginal possibilily of logos, we will simultaneously encounter its limits.

III ~hi s way, Ih e sca rch fo r an authcnlic logos should make it possible to
'09
SZ, pp. 1 39~ 140: "Und sic wird sich an d" . 'l n.alll 1.'H.:r ibl.: ~hc phenomcllon or l ogos as a whol c. And the most far-
ErschlieJ3ungsmoglichkeilen
.
des Dase 'lns [[ Je ausgezelchnete n weittragendsten
la ten llm vo ' [ [
Selenden entgegcnzuneh1ll en. " ! n 11Ilen (cn Au rschl uf3 dicscs l' 'lichilig possibili[)' or logos is, in Hcidcggcr's view all east, lo be found
IH'\.:cil'l.:ly in !\ ri sloll c' s work und il S com.:cpll HlIil y, on account o f the

146
1117
 CII I\ I'II ' I( HII II(
innuencc it has cxerl ed on ph il osoph y and 0 11 Weslern Ih oughl as s uch,
Accordin gly, granted that philoso ph y ncccssaril y rema ins tied to its
Aristotelian beginning, the attempt to revca l th e limts of Ar istotle 's
logos at th e same lime aim s at dem ons trat in g th e limits of th e
philosop hieal pursuit as sueh.
We have a lready seen how Heidegger, in trying to let Aristotle's
logos exp lieate itself, has touched upon th e limits of Aristotle 's project
on several occasions. But now th is logos must be illterrogated with
r~s~ect 10 il s own mOSI original o r far-reac hing possib ility , where ilS
!lIl1ll S supposed ly should be particlil arl y vis ible. And on Heidegger 's
account, it is precisely in connection with Aristotle 's conception of
philosophy thal we can rea ll y see the power as weil as the limits of
Aristotle 's projeet. When try ing to cireumscribe the scope and nalure of
Aristotl e's philosophy, howe vcr, Heidegger does not s imply go behi nd
Anstotle 's back, as il were, but int errogatcs Aristol le himseJf with
respect to what he takes to be the most origina l possibility of logos, and
thlS lS precise ly philosophy. In Aristotle 's words: philosophy as theory,
theorlG, lS the supreme form o f praxis.
This chapter centres on I-Ieidegger' s interpretation of thi s idea. r wi ll
argue that Heidegger in faci also adheres to Ihis view of philosophy,
though he belteves that it has to be transformed. For 0 11 the one hand
\V ith the notion of theOJ'ia as supreme praxis, Heidegger hopes to b~
able to reconci le th e theoreti ca l and the practical and th us al so ta
overcome Ihat epistemic conception o f logos which has led to the
primacy of assertorie speech. Bul on the other hand, he Ihinks that the
way in which Aristoll e conce ives of theoria explains why Aristotle
hlmself evenluall y eSlablished logos apophal7likos as the primary mode
01 speech . For even though theoria is regarded as a fonn of action il
simultaneol1s1y gives expression ta an idea l of knowl edge as visi~n,
nous , rather Ihan speech, logos. And logos apophantikos is that mode of
speech which has the pmver o f making th ings visible, though not ill the
same degree as vision or nous tse lf.
To help theoria be that which it was intended to be, namely the
ultlm,ate form of praxis, Heidegger has to show that also philosophy as
a seemg of the ultimate principles is a discursive mode of thinking, To
achIeve thls, he has to come ta grips \Vith Aristotle's notion of nous. As
we saw in the prevous chapter, Heidegger think s thal il is possible to
148
' 11 1\ 1' Ii m l'OUI(
n:p,lu.d Ihe non.discursive di sc loscdncss of 110 /IS as a condition of logos,
Iholl gh il is Il cc essaril y cnac ted through logos. But in this chapter, wc
\V iII see how Aristoll e, due to hi s suspicion of the limited scope of
logos, trics ta liberate n'lus from its un ion with logos . Th is point
l'eceives fairly extensive treatment by Heidegger, since he thIIlks that,
\V ilh th e concept of nous and the concomitant view on theoria as a kind
(lI' vision, Aristotle has not only eneountered the limits of logos but also
pointeo out the limits of his own view on logos. In the end, he could not
ul'fi nn Lhat speech rather than vision is the most original posslblhty for
!/l'ax is fiS thcOI'ia. , '
S in ee there are reasons to be li eve that the role of non-dIscurs Ive
Iho ught in philosophy constitutes a div iding line between He idegger
!l nd Adstotle, this notion is accorded a central place in this chapter.
Il owever I-leidegger's philosophy itself bears witness to a suspicion of
di scurs iv~ reasoning, notably in hi s idea that philosophy involves a
fn clical break with speech as such, whatever [orm it may have, At lcast
(ln th e face of it, he scems to have tried to conceive of a specifie kind of
cxpcrience that would be somewhat similar to th e noetic experience
"" li ed for by Aristotle. This is the idea of the Augenblick, "the wink of
the eye", which i s simultaneously a mom ent of truth. ,WLthout
II l1licipating too much of the subsequent discussion, one I11.ay Just note
Ihat one of the reasons why it is possible to see a eo nnectIOn between
110 ilS and the Augenblick is that none of them is a mode of reasoning.
I\ nd Heidegger uses the notion of Augenblick atleast partia ll y in order
10 complicate the relation between experience and linguistic expression,
os he seems to imply that this kind of momentary, singular expen ence lS
Ilot entire ly expressible . Further, since the Augellblick is o ne of
Il e idcgger ' s morC important tem poral concepts, designat ing an
HUlhcntic presence, it plays an important role in hi s attempt to c~me to
grips w ith the Ar istotelian con cept of time in ge neral and wIth _the
noti on of presence involved in the concept of nous ln partlcu lar. rhe
juxtapos ition of nOliS and the A ugenblick thus also brings us into th e
lieurt of the quest ion coneerning the nature of temporality.
The chapter begins with an exposit ion of Heidegger 's and Aristotle's
res pecti ve views 0 11 Ihe gcnes is of philosophy, w ith partieular foc us on
tlie idea th at th e poss ihilit y o r phil osophy requ ires an interruptron of
cvcrycla y speech. 1 w ill Irsl cxpl nrc J Icidcggcr's claim that thi s idea
 '111\1'11 ' 1( HHII<
makes Aristotl e develop hi s concept o f prllxis i" such a way as ta
guarantee the possibility of non-disc urs ive vis ion, whi ch is Ihought to
completely surpass everyday, discursive conduet and thus ta preserve
the initial break away from il. Then 1 w ill show how Heidegger, turnin g
to the very same concept of praxis, sees another possibility for
philosophieal vis ion, the Augenblick, which lets him frame his idea of
philosophieal aetiv ity as counter-movement and retrievaJ. With this
notion, he seeks ta affirm the di scursive nature of philosophical praxis
whil e s imulta neous ly revealing il S finit ude. r'' inally, 1 will discuss the
consequences of this idca for the question of th e poss ibilities and
limitati ons nherent in philosophical speech or articulation .
2. The l'ole of interruption in the genesis ofphilosophy
How docs philosophy ari se, how ca n il be Illotivated [rom with in the
perspective of eve rl'day life? This questi on seems to be particu larly
worth posing when exp loring th e lradition al estecl11 for philosophy as
metaphys ics, as proie philosophla, which places philosophy at the top
of the hierarchical order of knowl edge. This view is ollen accompanied
by the idea th at philoso phy not only makes up a particularly far-
reaching or compreh ens ive form of knowledge, bu t that it is also
something exceptionaJ and extraordinary, so mething which cannot be
conceived of simply as a continuation of our everyday understanding of
the world . For the ri se of phi losophy is not only concomitant with but
indeed dependent upon a negligence of everyday concerns - which
however does not prevent p hil osop hy from aspiring ta possess the
ultimatc truth even abo ut that everyday life on whic h it has tumed its
back.
This is how Aristotle sees it, and even more sa Plata. In th eir view, it
is not bec au se philosophical w isdom is especially useful to us that il can
Jay claim ta superiority , but becau se its abjects constitute the most
ad mirab le and overwhelmillg aspects of rea lity. And it is possibl e ta
uncover the truth about th ese things but yet be ignorant in "practicaJ'"
everyday matters, as Plata has brought out most cJearly in Theaeleilis.
Here Socrates portrays the philosopher as a man who, because of a total
lack of interest, is sa completely ignorant of his neighbour that he does
not even know whether he is a human being at ail or pcrhaps so mc other
creature, But whal a human be ing is, thi s he is intercs h.: d in and sccks to
150
'11 1\ 1"1 HR l'OU R
lIudcrstu nd . 1 i\ ri stot lc expresses a similar view in the Ethics, as he
dl Me lisses SOlll e or th e di fferences betv,'cen phronesis and sophia, notin g
Ih l1t pcople co mm only think that men Iike Anaxagoras and Thales are
wise (sopllol) )'et unabl e t~ see what is good for their lives (they are not
/1111'0 111111 01) , and that people " say that they [Anaxagoras and Thales]
kllOw that wh ich is exceptionaJ , wonderfuJ, difficult and divine , but not
IIIlything lIseflll , for they do not e xp lore the human good,,,2
1n th e Me fQphyslcs, Aristotle suggests that the sciences th at do not
ni lll at utilit y co uld arise only when such arts that provide man with the
I1 ccess iti es of li fe had been developed, as th is for the tirst time enabled
IIlen ta have lei sure 3 Only when it was not necessary ta be continuously
" ccllpied with hllman affairs was it possible ta tum the attention away
Ii'om thin gs of immediate concern and to direct it towards more abstract
tliings. This is particularly true of philosophy as sophia, as Aristotle
Stll tcs in th e famou s passage in the Metaphyslcs:
That il [philosophy] i5 not product ive is clear also from thase wl~o
fifst phi losophised, For il is through wonder lhat men now beglll
and originall y began 10 philosophise, wondering first al common
perplexities, and th en by gradu ai progression being perple xed by
greater thin gs as weil , ." , He who is perplexed and wanders
thinks that he is ignorant ( .. .); hence if il was to escape ignorance
that men began to philosophise, il is obvious that Ihey pursued
science for the sake of knowledge, and not for the sake of
4
uny thing useful.
l'liiloso phy ari ses out of wonder (ta thaumazein), from a feeling that the
wo rld is no longer familiar but on the contrary more or less obscure and
Ilvc rwh e lmin g. Here we can see how Aristotl e co nfirms th e v icw
cx pl ored in the previolls chapter, that the ordinar)' perspective on li fc is
Iwodu cti ve or poictic, wh ich makes us pursue our act ions for th e sa ke o f
l 'JlIcoefeIIlS, 174b l M6,
J H N, 11 41b6 . 8: "Kat Tt pu't'o jJ v Kat 9alJjJ.OCHIl Ka t xa4Tt<l K'ni 8CII]l 6v l (.
I,\rvc.u aU'tO q,om v, aXPllOW '. on ou 1 <lvOpwru va <lyoO 1\10m v,"
, Mel . 98 t b20-25.
~ Afl't, 982b 112 1: "on 5' o n:Ol llt l KIl, i\)'ov Kal K' nv n:ptimv lI t oooI\l IlO'(.IvtfllV'
~dj "((.cp 'to OaWHici\' 01. avOpolltO I Kat vv K'ai 'to '!tpnov i,p~ovto. cl" .OOUI\II' 1v,, I\~
j" PX IIC; I.II" V 'til np6xc l po 'tlV c:in6pwv O~uJlcioav'tc, d"ta lw tCl ~ " K'PV (~{)t\ll
npof ovf" C; ,.;'(.1\ rtTp \ 1fJV !-I r l 6v(Qv ta ~o Pl\aclV:n:~ .... " 6 ~, unopfllv 1\:(.(\ OUl)lIft~tIlV
of " t(,lI <li'vociv ( .,, )' olar' drt"(J 8lrt t6 qfc\.ryr tv 't 1)V (1'y\lO IOV rcjl l .ooq,f lOf{V,
$HvrrHlv o't\ 816 t6 1' 1 I~ V(J t t p rdowaOcn rB ulKoV K'((\ ou XP1\Ol' tC; !1vu,",
/'Vt' I\ P V,"
1~ 1
 (' 11 1'1 1''1 l' R 1,( li III
somclh in g cise, ror an ex tcrnal end . Uy 'tlil ll'USI , 10 engage in
phi losop hical activ ity j usl for the sa ke oF altai ning kno wlcgc is
not a
COO1m OI1 thin g but somct.h ing rathe r ex trao rdin ary.
In ord er fo r such a
shift of perspec ti ve to lake pl ace, th e world must thus display itse lft
o us
in a new way, which shakes our ordin ary fa miliarit y with it; onl y
th en
do we begin to wonder at it. When appearin g as wonderful , the
world
interrupts man 's ordinary, uncomplicated \Vay of address ing il, as tself
an overwh c lming address to whic h th ere rca ll y is no co rrespon
ding
rep ly . In stead il places man in sil ent aw c. B ut precise ly by interrup
tin g
man's concern , it grants him the possibility of a new mode of speech
, th e
and the possibility of ad dressin g beings in a new way .
Traces of this tradi tional view o r the relati on betwee n philosophy and
ordina ry life can be fou nd in Heideg ger as weil . He too thinks
th at
philoso p hy is fo und ed on an interrupti on of everyday li fe, and th e
way
in which he conceiv es of this is not entirely different fro m Aristot
l e 's
v iew of tha umaze in. A t the same lim e , howev er, He idegge
r is
conv inced that already the no ti on of wonde r harb ours a tende
ncy
toward s seeing and he lps paving th e way for the idea of know ledge
5 as
v is ion . Even though he does no t say so ex plic itly himself, the
reason
seems to be th at th e experience of wo nder gi ves ri se to the idea
th at
th ere must be a fonn of know ledge th at is ab le to corresp ond to
the
wo rl d in its wond erfu l appeara nce, and lhat can fU!1h erm ore be
a proper
res ponse to th e expe ri e nc e of wo nder. The expec tations
of suc h
knowle dge can th en onl y be fult,lI ed by (no n-discurs ive) vision. One
of
the more im portant aspects of Heideg ge r's concept ion of philosophy
is
that il ca ll s thi s all eged corrcspondcnc e in questi on. To ach ieve
thi s, he
has ta cha ll enge Ar istot le 's concepti on of th e relati on betw
een
phronesis and sophia, since he suspects it ta be based lIpon the idea
that
th e sllprem e form of kno wledge is non-dis urs ive in kind . T hereby
it
con tain s th e germ o f the sharp oppos ition belwee n theory and
action
1hat wa s to fo ll ow upon A ri sto tl e. I-I owever, in spite o f his
efforts ta
bring p hronesis and sophia cl oser togeth er, Heideg ger seems to
agree
with Ari stotle (a nd Plato) th at philosophy is in conflic t \Vith commo
n
sense.
'GA 19, p.1 26.
152
Il ' cxc laillls on OIlC occasion: Hl3ut phi losophy is l10thin g
but li
Il ugg lc against C0l111ll 0n sensc!" Whal , thell, is re quir
cd fro m
philosDphy if it is 10 bc ab le to li ght thi s struggle aga inst commo
n
l'Iense'l III w hat \Vay and ~o what extent' must phil osophy distanc
e it sel f
r,'0 1l 1 cvcryda y li fe in order 10 sec that which is hidden
From it?' And
\V IIII I can th is te ll us about the philoso phical logos, ilS speciflc way
of
f1 t1drcssing Ihe world? ln Heidegger, these kinds of questions are largely
IIlotivaled by his desire ta un derstan d how philosophy might be able
to
superse de the inl ell igibilit y of eve ryd ay Iife without los in g
1,I'i,elld igkeif or faclicity of everyday experie nce'
.
l n th e previo us chapter , it was pointed out th at Heideg ger,
draw mg
IIpon Arislotl e's noti on of poiesis, argues that the underst andin g
th at
~II i d cs everyda y life and its various activitie s simulta neously makes
life
I\dl o ff fi'om itselt; towards its objects of eoncern . This is beeause
the
p(J ieti c perspec ti ve on th e wo rld re quires th at we look away not
on ly
Il'( 11) the thin gs \Vith whi ch wc occupY ourselv es but also from the
very
Ilcl ivity we are enactin g, w hite directin g ourse lve s to the work
that is to
he done. Such a perspec tive no doubt forms our self-und erstan ding,
but
11 form s it by turning us away from ourse lves. rn one lectu re co urse,
li ci degger tri es to ca pture this aspect of li fe by argu in g th at life
is
1I1 uI'ked by "self-su l1ciency" (Selbstg eniigsa mkeit). At a first glanee,
thi s tcrm scems to be dirccted agai nst Husser l's not ion
of reductlOn,
silice lIe idegger cl aims that sel f-sufficiency mea ns tltat life does
no t
hfl vc la move beyo nd itse lf in order to br in g its te ndencie
s ta
rul fl llllent.' T hat is, th ere is no need for a philoso phieal redu cti on
that
prouuccs a perspecti ve From which wc are abl e to uncovc
r t.h e ~rulh
/1 bo ul lire rrom abave , 50 to speak, but wc must inqu ire how
h fe ttse lf
IIlighl conta in the mo ti ves for th e genesis of philoso phyW Ho wever,
Il cidcggel' also indicates that self-suffi ciency refers to life's tendene
y to
NItul itsel f up, to get entangled in one perspective. In this sense, th e
self-
~ lIf'fi ci cn cy oflife is also the foundati on ofi ts falling. I-Iav ing no
need ta
" (i A 60, p. 136: " Abe r die Ph ilosophi e 1S1 nichts aIs ei n Kampf
gegcn den gesunden
MOllschCllvcrstfl nd!" Sec also GA 24, p. [9; GA 33, p. 82.
, IIO!' Ihis POilll, see GA 18, p. 32; GA 58 , pp. 29, 101, 203; GA 60, p.
269.
1( 'r. C' hnplcrO nc,Scclion 1.
f I IIIs i'l how J. Orcich IIlIdcrSlI1n ds il, sec "Ln 'tapisse ri e de la vic''' , pp.
137rr.
III (Ill ';8, pp. 1 1t 1711 175.
1~1
 l' II I\ I'II 'I< I II I II{
dislance ilsel f Ii'um ilscll; life docs no l 1I 1I 1I) lI g C ln Hcl ho /d uf ilse /f."
Thus it seems Ihal iL is in tact evcryday lire Ihal is murked by dista nce.
. ,This implies, a~ Heidegger will later forlllu laic il . !hal in eve ryday
IIfe , w e a re ontlca ll y cIoses t to but onto logica ll y l'a r lhest From
ourse1yeso 12 Th IS
' 15. truc not on ly of our re lat ion ta our own being bul
also of our lInderstanding o f Ihe bei ng of bein gs in general, s ince no
art icul ate ont% gica / knowledge is reqll ired in arder ta be able ta cape
wlth ll1traworld ly beings. On this account, then, philosophy must seek
ta Iransform th e ontical proximity of everydayness in ta an ont%giea/
one. Recalling wha t was sa id a baye, thi s ontological proxim ity is to be
achieved thru ugh an act of d istancing, al /cast wi th res pect la the ontieal
perspective, but prec isely thereby wi ll il be able to co unler Ihe
onlologica l di stanc e pec u/iar to eve ryday li re . How mi ght such a
t:ans forlll a t j~n come abou t? For jf il is Ilot oil ly the case tha l everyday
IIfe ea n do wlthout ontological knowledgc, but jf, moreover, philosophy
takes a view on thin gs that is mre or less d islorted from th e perspective
of everydayness, then the poss ibi/ity of philoso ph iea l thinking is not
something Ihat man is in camp /cie mas lery of. /n arder for Ihe everyday
understandltlg to be threalened, somethin g must happen w ilh us which
forces us to see th e wo rld in a new ,vay.
!t is at this po int th at He idegger can tu rn \V ith some approva l to
Anstotlc's notion o f t/wumazein. For in his v iew, thi s no tio n gives
testimony to the idea Ihat underst an din g is constituted by pathos. As
indi cated in th e previolls chapler, Heidegge r thinks Ihat lhe noti on of
pathos explains Ihe possibi/ity of change (Umschlag). As such , it can
both deslroy and rescue our und ersta ndi ng, as it were, name ly w hen it
destrYs our ordinary speech for th e benelil of another, superior logos. Il
To bnng about s uch a change is Ihus the tas k of thaumazein .1 4
Moreover, s ince moods are supposed to represent Ihe passive aspect of
coglllilon, ln Ihat they determ ine how the world concerns man prior to
every kincl o f "activ e" conceptualisat ion, the concept of thaumazeill
Il Sec GA 58, pp. 27, 29.
" SZ, p.16; GA 24, p. 220.
IJ See GA 18, pp. 196-1 97.
14 F
or H'd
: 1 egger ' s understand.i ng O~eaU~cllV, see GA 19, 16b; GA 62"', pp. 8-9,
1 9-~ 1. 1 he .Illost t h~rough ~Iscuss l on of the rela tion between ecm~t{iEI v and the
noti on ~~ Sfll~~mllng IS c,?ntamed ,in the lectu re coursc Grulldfragell der Philosophie,
Ausgeil ah /le Probleme d(! r Loglk (GA 45) rrolll 1937/38, 36~3 8 .
/ 54
'I/ I\ I"/ I',R l'OU /(
woul d Icsliry to ail ill sight on Ar istot le ' s part that phil osophy is more
lliun " malter o f changing pe rspecti ves. It requ ires a more pro fo und
It'Ilns fo rm ati on, which is not completely at man 's disp osa!. During the
Iwenl ies, and even more dur ing th e foll owing decade, Heidegger
ux p /ores different kinds df moods, but anxiety (Angst) is of particu /ar
impo rlan ce in Ihis connection, since it represents He idegger's most
cln bnraled atte mpt at explicating th e place ofreduction in phil osophy.
J. Anxiety and reduction ...
ln hapter T\Vo, we came across He idegger's idca that th e pO~Slhlh ty of
li thcoretical attitude requ ires a kind o r di slurbance of everyday conce rn.
When this happens, however, the rcsult is not only that the a bj ect o f
CQncern loses ilS availab ility and enlers th e mode of Vorhandenheit, but
Ihal the entire s ituali on changes . T he conlext of Ihe wo rk w hi ch
/o rmerly went unnoticed becomes more obtrusive and is pu shed into the
roreground. We cxperience a di stance between ourselves and our work
whi ch gives us a clearer v icw of our situation , of what wc had ~cen
do in g ail along. Instead of be ing oriented towards the work, that \s, a
/lIlure end we are drawn back into the present, so to speak, and are now
IIb le to s:e w hat th e object of concern had becn ava ilable fo r. This,
/I eidegger argues, is the first step towa rds an undcrstanding of the
object's mode of being. More important, ho wever, is that the
wilhd rawal of the work lets th e world announce itscl f, though al lIlIs
sta ge onl y as a context of invo lvements wh ich enab led us 10 work w ith
11
di n'e rent things.
Insofar as this disturbance of everyday activity may give \Vay ta a
Iheoretical H insehen , it invo lves reduction but it also lets a new end
present itself, that o f pure uneovering, which lets beings be rnanifest
just as th ey are, as apposed ta the un coveri n g of everyd ay concern,
'which is guided by some further end ." Thereby, Heidegger says, this
" S2, 16. . ' . '.
1" ln Th e Glal/ce of Ihe Eye. pp. 89-90, W. McNe11l tfles to explam th ~ o~tologl~a l
gCllcs is or theory, arglling Ihal thi s is dependent lIpon an. act.of tem?orahsatlon Whl C~l
hrin gs nbout a killd of "bsent future, i.e. a fut lire that .IS gl~e n as abse nt or empt) ,
s ilice Ihe theorelical pe rs pect ive ari ses as one stops be lllg dlrected t?wa rd s a ~uture
end Ihal is \0 be nchicvcd nnd instcnd turns towards the pre.sem, .I. e. the obJects,
whic h fOl'lllC rl y were nol llOli ccd as such bC~rlLlSe of the o~lenl~tlOn to~vards th ~
ril lurc. Il owcvc rl Ihis vicw d e~ Ilot full y eX plaltl lhe tcmporaill y or thcoretlca l work ,
 C I III!' Il ' 1( 1 (11 111
new fOfl11 of seei ng counters the CUri OLI S scci n lhn l o rten gui des
everyday life, in that, inslead of just loo kin g f~lrtll cl' Hway, towan.ls th e
new , t makes a haIt and le ts itse lf be cxposcd to the presence 01'
beings, l7 However, w hereas this view of th e ge nesis o f lheo ry is present
in Heidegger 's work m ore or less from the start, hi s earli est writin gs
seem to contain a suspicion o f the noti on o f a phi losophical reduction,
probably du e ta h is belief th at, in Husserli an ph enomenology, the res ult
o f the redu ction is that one loses s ighl of li fe in ils COller et e enactment. 18
A nd ev en th ou gh Heidegger soon begin s to spea k about th e need for
some kind of di stance in philosophy \V ith respect to everyday Iife, it is
o nl y in Se in und Z ef! th at a n otion o f a redu cti on th a t di ffers
s ignifi cantly From the theoreti cal reducti on is c1carl y arti cul ated. This
noti on must expl ain th e possibility of an und e rstandin g th at is not
objectifyin g in the sam e way as Hinsehen. For whereas this rem ai ns
ontical in ils approach, as il is guid ed by a foregoing delimitation o f a
specifie fi eld of abj ects, whic h is Ilo t transpa re nt 10 the ael o f Hinsehen
itself, a philoso phieal redu cti on must not onl y enabl e us to look at
th ings in a new way but also let us tum our gaze towa rds th eir being.
Th e possibility of sueh an anal ysis hin ges on th e poss ibility o f a more
comp reh ensive k ind of d isturb a nce, whe re th e wo rl d as mea ning-
hori zon can full y appea r. Th at is, th e di stu rb ance at th e ontieal level
must be replaced by a brea kdown at the onto logieal leve!. T hat sueh a
breakdown is possible is co nArmed by the phenomenon of anxiety.19
The experiencc of anx iety as Heidegger descri bes it is constituti ve of
the " most ori ginal" poss ibili ty of d isc losure.2o On his view, the radical
trans format ion of man ' s way of being re lated to his world that takes
place in anx iety is of such a kind th at it more than di stu rbs , it in faet
destroys the world o f concern . A nd as intrawo rldl y bein gs lose their
gra nl ed Ihal this is a mod ifi cation of e veryday existence, il 100 is ruture-or iented
whi ch mak es il loo k as if Ih is "absent fut ure" is an initi al and trans ito ry statc t ha~
canna t last. Sec below, Secti UII 8.
"GA 62*, pp. 15- 17.
IS ln th e ea rl ies! courses, Hei degger emphasises Ihat philosophy must itself be an
enactmenl of life ra l h~r Ihan a theory "about" il; PA , pp. 239,246; GA 56/57, pp. 5,
~3; GA 6 1, p. 80. But 10 GA 58, p. l OI, he notes th at ph ilos ophy cannot be described
Just .as the .enactment of experience, as it is the task of phi losophy to understand
~ re clse l y thlS. Cf. Chapter One, Section 1.
' See SZ, 40.
20 SZ, p. 182.
156
' 11 11 1' Il , R l'OU R
lllvo lvell1c nl , Ihe worl d aS th e hori zon by means o f w hi ch we ordin arily
II d elll oUl'sclvcs appca rs. B ul it appears as a hori zo n that no longer
11l1l k 's sense, and sa ail onc ca n do is ta be appalled by it, to wonder at
l '1hOll gh pc rhaps o nc should say that the experience of anx iety is fa r
II 1(1I'C distl'css in g lhan wO~l der, not least sinee there is an element of
Itthlli ration in wonder. S inee it is peculi ar to the e xperi enee of an xiety
Ihll l il has no a bject, it is possible to regard the analysis of an xiety as an
IIll clIlpt ta la y b are t he conditi o ns o f p o ss ibilit y of Husse rl ' s
plle nome no logiea l redu ction, Le. th e move from th e obJ ect-dlr~cte~
'x pc ricnccs c haracteristic of the natura l att itude to th e level ~t w~lch 11
1. Ihe expe ri enees themselves that constitute the a bjects and 111 thls w ay
li re givc n to phenome no lo gieal re flection. H owever, He ide gger IS
III IXious to point out that " reducti on'\ has anoth er meanm g for hlm:
I n~tcad o f leadin g ta pure conseiousness it moves fro m the grasp of
lleings to a n unde rstand ing of their being-" The exp eri enee o f an xiety
\' 111 1 brin g about sueh a rcd uction beca use, one co uld perhaps say, I ~ IS an
\.'x pc rcnce th at b ord ers on pure di sclosedncss, du c ta th e suspensIO n o f
. 22 Idl " th ..
Ihe aCli v ity of uncovenn g or concern . Here, a \Vor ess cre or
tl isc losed ness is revealed as the presuppos iti on of that d isc urs ive
di ~c l osed ness whi ch belon gs to our " \Vor ldl y" b em
' g. 21
Uut in what way mi ght it be poss ible for philosophy ta respo nd to
Ibi s rcd uc tive an d, as it seems, rath er extre me experience on whic~ it
rests? T hat is to say, how could it be possible ta properly coneeptualtse
Il (iA 24, p. 29. Still, it is an important aspect of the analysis of anxiety th.at it reveal s
wh/ll 15 proper (eigc II ) to Dasein, j ust as Husse rl wants to show \Vhat lS proper. to
CU ll.'\ciousness. But whereas he laullches his thought-experi ment with the d.estrucll Oll
ur Ille worl d for th is purpose, Heidegger wants to S~)o\V that the destruction .0.: the
wn dd is not merely accessi ble in tho ught-expe n ments but can be .concn,;~ely
. d f'o r l' usse rl's destructio n oF world , see Ideen zu CIII Cf i' (J /l H! 1I
l'xpc n ence . " . '
l'hrillomellolog ie /I/ld phti/l ome/l ologische/l Ph tiosopille, 49. " 1
Il 111 " Wn s i5t MClaphys ik?", p. 11 2, Hei degge r ca ll s it a "p ure. belll 1!-l he~'c" (. 0,1
I(l ///(: Da-seill ) . Howevcr, the above portrayal of anxi ety. ol~ l y dCplcts Ihe e.(.' ,I /C/l fI(':'
~'n lldi t ion o r phi losophy (and 50 does Aristo\l e's desc npllon o ~ won~ cr~, 111. \l lll~ I ~
11I)\Y li ns shown how a disturbanee cano lei Ihe .warlel ~how ltself ll~ I ~ S l c l n ll ~e
IIUlhingncss. The cx istcntial genesis of plulosophy IS expl al1led only ~vhC I1 11 Ims bcc li
1\1(IIcd in Dnsein's being, and to do Ihi s, Heidegger shows Ihllt allx~cly cnll nlise 111
I)n'{cin bcc:l usc, bric lly pul, Dnscil1 's bcing is il sc lfpenncated?y Il.Olllll1 g1ICSS.
II Ilcidcggcr nHlkes precisely IhlS di stinction bclween our belil g 1Il,Ihe wo rld nnd ,I~~
"worldl css" condit ion in COllncCli on wl lh Ihe IwO se nses of vo \.)~: (lA 1H: I~. 279, Se~
I
\11it O J,
~" I I '" l 'lI of the ll1'iodl y or 1I0rlWIllhm ll Cl't ovcr tllhClIlciCIIII(!11 III fIlI Xlc\y,
.. S Il C . . l 'd "
" 1hl' fn 1\lilinf nntl Ihe lillllll"l': \1111111.' 11I11 i\1I ot'prm: ls ln thc carly 1 CI Cl-W.C l ,
1 ~7
 t' li A 1''1 hi( H Il III

this experie nce, in which th e di sc loscd ncss of bc in g "p pears

as a I r phil o so ph y , as il \Va s fo nnul alcd above, is founde d on
condition of every kind of understanding of bcin gs? 1l' philoso phy an
is to " ove l"whe lmi n g ad drcss", to which il ean only respond aft~rwards,
corres pond to this "onto logica l proxim ity", must il. not preserv th en
e the It canna I in any simpl e way hold itself steadily at that 11Igher level
ontical di stan ce brough t about by the reducti on? But then il l'uns of
the risk intclli gibi lity which the reduction has opened up . But th ls predl cament
of res ulling in Entlebu ng and to destroy the "living " experi ence
of Is not recogni sed as long as one conceives of philosophy as Slmply
beings as it distances itself from it in order to conceptualise it," This a
ki nd of attitude . Accordingly, Heidegger states lhat "The questIOn
s uggests that philoso phy, eve n if it is found ed on reduction, must IS If
not
shut itself up in a specific altitude (Einste llung); a tenn that tums up
th e theoreti cal does not have a more origina l form , and not an
att.it~~e
in !ik c eha rac ter. If one succee ds in unders tanding this posslbl
Husser l 's express ion th e " natura l attitude ", as we il as in conne hty
cti on ori ginall y, one has ach ieved enough. ,,29 Th e first step t~wards
with his notion of ph enomcn o lo gica l re fl ec ti on. 25 This is From such. an
the start und ersta ndin g is ta realise lhat ph ilosoph y, like theory m g~ncral
Olle of th e m ost importa nt points on which He idegger feel s , t S ,a
h e mu st l'o rm of li fe or, in other words, of action. Only when plllioso phy
tran s fo rm I-Iusscrl 's phenom eno lo gy. For " Philoso phy as a ttitude IS
is llp proache d in this way is il possib le ta reveal the nalure of
dev iation from ilS proper sense.,, 26 I-Icidcg ger's crit ique o f thi th e
s notion phi losophical response ta the cali ofbeing .
works on two leve ls: first, if ph ilosophy is conducted \V ithin a specific .
Even though anxiety and wonder are supposed to work as an Impetus
auitude , this indicatc s lhat its ran ge of vis ion, 50 ta speak, is limi
ted to a l'or phi losophy and not to guide it in its entirety , both Heideg ger
de finit e point ofv iew, which onl y lets thin gs appea r l'rom out o f and
a sin gle tuistoll e seem to think that phi losophy continually needs to be mforme
perspecti ve. Thus to be trapped with in an attitude is more or less d
the by an experience that at least is kindred to th~ one that ori ginally gave
same thing as to be "self-sufficient" in the way outlined above."
ri sc ta il. In Heideg ger, thi s is expressed as an Idea that phtloso phy
Heideg ger's main point, howeve r, is that the philosophical pursuit n~ust
bc open ta the possibility of an experience that calls il into questIO
cannot be properl y unders tood whcn it is describ ed in terms of n,
attitude, thus interrupting its prevailing mode of discourse. In Anstotle, there
for this notion does nOl capture ail aspects o f philosophical work. IS
In the view that philosophical understanding in its suprem e form, as noetlc
particular, it impli es thal philoso phieal re fl ection is only a matter
of vision exceed s speech alloget her. The question is how these
shiftin g perspec tives. But the reductio n or change af focus Irom beings two
uspect~ of philosophical activity might be reconcilable, that is, how the
to their being cannot be regarded as a purely intellectual act or merel
y notion of redu clion or interruption agrees with the Idea of phllosophy
as a shift of altitude , since it presupposes a tra nsform ation of one's as
.. tOll Basieally thi5 is th e question caneern ing the relation bet ween
de 1 . ,
ex istence - that is why philoso phy is not something that we can si mply 1I0l/S and logos, concernin g the place of non-dis
, .
cursive expenence 111
" eely choose to perfarm , alternatively abstain from performing. 28
di scursiv e action . In the next section , 1 try to determine furlher
the
background to the desire for nOliS or vision by tuming to the questIO
n of
~: For the notion of E/llleblll1g, see GA 57/57, pp . 85 fT. ; GA 60, p. 48. the place of dia lectic in philoso phical work.
I,n !deel!, Husserl talks about "die phanome nolog ische Eir. slellung
" in the
bcgmnln g ( ~ 32-3 3) of his discu ss ion or the phenome nologica
l F.1Toxl\, which is
thouglJl lU make Ihe sphere o f purc conscious ness accessible; p. .J. The Iimited scope of dia/ectie
59.
26 G A 59, pp. 142 -143 : "Phi losophie ai s Einstcllu
ng ist Abdrang un g vo n ihrem ln his attemp t to demarcate philosophy from dialectic and sophism
~jgenen Sinn." ~ee a1 5.0 GA 56/5 7, p. 216; .GA 60, p. 62. ,
Sec GA 17, 111 partl cu lar 46-50. ThIS sense of attitude is manifest
above ail in Aristotl e states thal:
Hei degger's cri tique of Husserl, in suc h a way that Heid egger charges
Husserl with
be ing entangle d in his epi stemo log ical interests, in hi s "care
for ac knowled ged
knowled ge" (die Sorge wn erkannte Erkcllntnis), and thus unable " C. 1 S9 14 4 ' "F s iSI chen di c Frage , ob das Theo retisc he nicht
ta pose the ci ne
~uesti o n of being. ,p, .
IIl"spr llllg1i chcrc Gcs lnl! 11' 01 h/\\I , tll.c l\l wC lllSlcll
1 / ' n Ch kt 'Sl Wenn es
2 See e.g. GA 57/5 7, p. 110. ungS!11f1IJlg<:11 arfl . ers. 1 ' "
I;tl.:li ngt, u rsprtlll Hllch (lIc'IC Ml\l1 li chkc il o'lI verslchen , dann lsi genug
crreLcht.

158
 (' 111\1'11 I( 1 (1111 1 ( 111\ 1' 11 1/ 1111111

Sophi Stn li nd di al!.:clc (U'C COII Cel!) - 1

philosophy bu t I)hil osollhy ,l ' l'l'
~U,'1WCI':.j, T I H! I"CrO l'c. h l: ";1 111111'1 1\\' Il l 1H 111.'I.I 111 1, 11'4 l'CSCI1 1'c h fI S th e.!
phi losopher, who is sccki ll ~ tll.: \1\11\1 hll hl\l\ :-Iclt', und lI~ncc docs
. l,ct wlth lhu /( 11 11 10 :lubJccl ns
'
Ils power and from the' <' 1 crs 10111 th Il l! 1 1
lorm er III li S choie ' 1 01 Il t le tHlI1U'C o f
."
rnt' ' . Il ot
makes an atternpt at that \vl, ' ' 1 1' 1 cO C. 1'01' dmlccti c
\II . about how to arran ge a dll1 lugllC, H 'Ibus illsof'al' as il is peculia
lClpl l osophy k ' ' r to
seems 10 be philosop hy b ' JO nows. ami SOphlSIl1 dlH lcclic that il rcmuin s dCpe.! lIdclll upon elle/oxa , which Arislot
, ut 15 not. le
II p\1l1J'ently thinks, dialccl e is 11 01 enough l'or the require ments of
ln spite of his claim that the
philosophy at least when th P owerkS 0,fdtalectt ' , , ,
c are mfenor to those of Ilhilosophy,
. . ' 15 15 ta 'en ln the sen
It IS clear Ihat Aristotle th ' k h f . ln his interpretation of Aristot le's understanding of dialect
ic,
. .. ' , se a proIe phtlosophia
1I11tlai stage, For he sayIn S t h at dlalectlc is fi l ' Il oidegge r emphasises lhat it is the ideal of (heoria as viSion that makes
,
'
s, w en Il emes ta use u ta phllosophy in its'
princip les of a sc' , t bl ' l ' i\t'istotle suspicious of dialecti c, However, Heideg ger is to some extenl
, Icnee, one has no alter t' esba IS lIng "the basic Nympalhetic la Arislotle's attitude lOwards dialect ic as he understands
di scuss ion of the genera ll na Ive ut ta begm wlth a it,
, y acccpte d api ' ' Ihough he believe s it necessary 10 uni\\' a conclusion differen
pnncip les, since they are prim ' , nions concernll1g these t from
cannat be cxplain ed in t ' ar y 111 relation ta everything e1se and M istO lle's as far as the raie of speech in philoso phy is concern ed,
Al
clms 0 f anyth ll1g cise 31 Ad'
thus
own work essentially is . l11is stage, 1 will not deal wilh Heidegger's critique of Aristotle's notion
l ' Il smce Amtot le 's
the first princip les anda ~ro edgomenon, seeking not only to establis
h
,,l' '''eoria, but focus on what seems to be an affirma tion on the part of
la un atlOns of real't b Il cidegger of Aristot le's insight into the limited scope of dialeetic,
understand wh.t such a pursuit illvolve s ' , 1 Y ut first of ail to
sueh a need for dia1ectic in Ihe 1' " Wilh one exception, Heidegger never, 10 lhe best of my knowle dg e
, ' Il secms to testl fy to precisely ,
lt IS equally clea 1 II st Slage ofph " o" l' l' " J' l'cfcrs to dialectie in order to characterise his own philosophical work,
, op lIca mqu trles,'
enough to guarantee the possi~ility of a hie ,t llI1.'S t1~at .dlalect
,f, loweve r thal Ar istotl l' k . nnd on one occasio n at least, he demarcates his own
ic is not project by
\~:~~h~~li
cxplicit ly opposing il to dialecti c. 35 The exception is the lecture course
bey?nd opinions and theorie s to lhe lru;h
dlsttngulShes betwee n philoso phy and dial : us mthe Toplcs,
lI1S1 ght that ~,oves UI'/I/ldbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie, Here Heidegger refers to
he
ectlc ~Y c1all11lng that the
former deals with the problems in l\J'i slotle's division betwee n dialectic, philosophy and sophism in order
'
latter with a view to 0 . . 33 ac~ordance w lth the truth, but ln point to what seems to be a decisive difference belween himsel f
pllllon. Il1so lar as tl d' 1 .. the and
opinions, he is dcpendent on the form of ~e la ectlClan examin es I\ ristotle regarding their respective aims and methods - at least as
l!lis course is concerned, For, Heidegger states, in this course, his aim
far as
person s that partake in it: how the flll.le dialogue .as wei l as on is
y Ot ll1ulate thelr questions and the
Ilot to frame a new philosophy, but he will confine himsel fto philolo
gy,
30 pJ'ov ided that th is is the same as "passio n for knowl edg e of that whi
ch
Ol~e,IC't
Mel. 10004b2226: "1tf:P l j.lv yp 10 " .
lIC~ 1l} $lOOO$lr,t, ci:U, OLa~ :tV~? YE:'OS ?1pe,$EW
,
l Tt OOQ10UKTt KOi. ~ 1111 5 becn said [dos AuSgesprochene]",J6 Therefo re,
in lhis course he wi ll
10U PlOU 'TI npowpEoel' Eon o: Tt S ~) 11<; ~ev '[(P
r,v~p,anK>i,;\ O ao$laHK~ ~wvo~v~ otaK:~~" ,~~,paonK~
'tramp TI\<; 15uvcl)lew<;. 'tiis olll y pursue a dialectical inquiry, which mcans that hi s ail11 is ta
~nopi OOV $l oao$ia
",11lI1 IS meanl by speech, and 1110re speci[ieally , by Aristotlc' s specch
sec
n op. 101a34-b2. o~, ,"
, Most specifically, Aristot lc onen secms t ' 1'0 jud ge from Ar istotle' s O\VIl notion of di
his description of d~ ~egl.n
". alectic, thi s I11 c '-\n s 11H11
a .way that accords \Vith ~IS phtlosophlc.al.Investigations in Il cidcggc l' is out to reveal the presupposition s and consequ ences
dla lectic begins with a controversial quest' la ectlc ,m the Topies . Thcre
he states that or
p or not?" (IOlb32-33) Wllen d's
,
. Ion, a ltPOp 111l 0 , which has the form "Is S I\ l'istotlc 's logoS.38 One of the reasons why Heidegger hcrc dl,;sc
l'ihcs
' 1 cussmg the prob!
premlses conslst of propos iti ons which hav b e:n, one uses arguments whose
32), and which give expressi on t e een put ln Ihe fonn "ls S pT' (lO lb30-
example is the rrpopT\1l0 of the fir~ ~~n~ra~y acce~ted opinions, vSol;a.
50 for
the sou1 is in motion and in Ihe PI ,0 1 De Amma the question " I""p. 15S b7rr.
whether or nol 1 ~ S'l, p. 25.
r ~r ~ot emg lS one
. . . ' lyS/CS W lethe
opm lons whlch are then examined are h b "
~rspectively, which are refuted as lhey ~rea~~he soul hlS 111 motion and that. The common
being is one
ln GA 18, p. 4.

Top, l05b30-JI. own to ave untenable consequences. l' ( i l! I S. p. ?

" Scc 'f'op, IOSllt 6. 1K

160 1(( 1
 (' II"I 'II ' I( 1 tllll (
CI t",, 'I1 ' (( 1'Oli R
his Qwn age nd a thu s is appan.:
ntl y t!l ll! Il ' Wl lIll s to lI tt ack
(liu sserl?) who fai l ta see that phi th ose JI 'cch in tlle sense of sophl.stll or G" l'" Thu s Heidegger thinks that
loso phy wi ll romuin " clplessly naiv e, el e. t'"
if it does not come ta grip s \Vi th e .
l'tllto ulso co ncc l v~s a r k' Il ow. C ledg e \Il term s a VISIOn and that this
il S Dwn Il'i:HJiti oll .39 i\ga inst thi tly the task of dialectic is ta
s t\lw t.; r!l q hi s view 01 ~!al
background , it seem s that dialecti
e could be rega rd ed as that kind
of
cCtlC . . ,~nse~~~~ al~d to cou nter the disguise
phi losophy whi eh is pursued with 11I1I Ilch an altack ag,all1s t s.Ophlst s
a historiea l awareness or, in othe lC sp 'ne commu nication, whi ch
r
words, as destruction. tl lltI lricks of sophl sm
by means of Ig:~u~ut this is pree
Nli ows how thin gs tru ly are III isely what it
On this aeeount, it might look as if
Heid egger wou ld want to indicate h
them se v.
h it intro duc es a mod e a spee e f h ~hic h differs
~;I~'~li~C~~~I~v;r:,:, ~~!
that philoso phy in hi s sen se dirf \
pec~liar
ers signifi can tl y from Ari stot le's
underst anding of philosophy. How
the idea. 1 think one must take seri
ever , th is does not really seem ta
be
emp ty talk
, bl of fulfillin g that which is
to the SOPI~\sts~oi~~~o~~~
its dnv lllg force, nam
fi wh ich is that it rematns Y
ous ly Heidegger 's claim that he has, Cllp ll C
to somc exte nt at Icast, put aside bcin gs in thcir truth , the ,reaso or n ln the sphere
his own philoso phical ambitions
the moment and primarily wants for . .' Thu s as HeIdegger sees l't, the difference between Plato and
ta let Aristotle's logos come forw ~r:~~~: ~n:~ th is point is that Aristotle has spe lled
(Ir ;his view and realised that it is only theO/'ia out the consequel;e~~
on ilS o\vn tCrIns . Whe n translat ard
ing a part of the pass age from
the
Melaphysics quoted abave, he
makes an int eres tin g addition: ''' that IS p~te nt enoug 1 .
dialektike on ly makes th e attcmpt The , 'ilch the things themselv es. 43 An'. d H . deg ger emphaslses the way III
' to exp eri enc e wha l could be "1 . lecti c' and thearia
by the logoi, ... ,,40 As already indi mea nt
cate d, Hei deg ger' s aim in this cou whi eh Ari stot le conceives of the rela
uohn betw een lds lsauperi or ta speech.
is preei sely ta revea l the experie rse b r d to l11s Idea \ al VIsIon
nces that mak e up the foundation ":':\I\I1,o t, merel~Se ley r~r~::~t le'S
Aris totle 's logos or con cep tuality.
But as wc w ill see sho rtl y, su ch
of
l'or 11 1S precl
insight il1 to the natu re of speeCh,
, '
th~t has
an 1..:.1 him see the limited scop d to see thlS IS not
abil ity ta reve al the phe nom ena
l bas is of logo s is som ethi ng that e of dlalectlc~ ~n
IIcccssarily ta dep reciate dialectic ,
Heidegger is not prepared ta grant but ta grant lt ItS proper place.
ta dialectic.
Heidegger 's interpretation of Aris
partly intended as a criti cism of the
totl e's attitude towards dialectic is Only out of a positfi V~ ~n~er~::~'::~o~ictl~idJ~~~~~:~~o~~~il~~;~I~';
withn life, as we )\1 lt 111
view that Aristotle wo uld depreciate "
basis on whic h he COlll? inl~rp~et, tely and
dial ecti c because he did not rcal
ly und erst and il. On the con trar
y, thercby see diale g e:5f hm mO le, s
l~ge:~!l~~: ~~\I:~o~~n;~~ld b; no
Hei deg ger claims, Aristotle had a
better understanding of dial ectic than , drag dialecllc down, S1l1CC 1a1r Yi,im di'llectic is in virtue of
1llcan s or " .
Plato, because '~ hi s mode of philosop l '
its meaning already down, 1laI 1 ~, a, epal"atol"y stage oftheorem,
hisin g was morc radical".41 Thi s pl" k ' d of cleve r
cJaim is in line with the idea that re ara tory stage
guides I-Ieidegger 's understanding and , as a, p P d thinking butIl in IS not some 111 , "
of virwe of ils mean 1l1g II IS
Aris tolle and Pl ata as a whole, i.e.
that they do not really repr esent two :~~\:~;:~~:~oa~ya~ will 10 ,see'in g, ins~;ar as logos has
diffe rent phi loso phical pos itions, the meaning
but that Aris totl e's phi loso phy mus of apophainesthai, of lettmg be seen
t ,
be regardcd as an elab oration of
the poss ibilities that are con tained
Plato 's thought. Ifthis is truc, then in
Aristotle's vicw on dialectic mus t
prcpared in Plato. And thi 5 bec omc be
s clear, Hei deg ger argues, onc e .) UA 19, pp. 197 198.
realise that the basic trait of Plat wc
o 's di alec tic is its tendency towards ~\ Ibid, ' i t i v e n Verslandnis des Phan
seei ng and making visibl e, whi ch
is mot ivat ed by the ex isten ce of ~,1 G A 19 pp. 199~200: "N ur aus e,mem omens des
.' lb . pos , se',ner R/letorik fin den,
).~)'e l v 11lne rha d es Lebe ns \VIe \Vlr es ln gewann
I\ ristotclcs den B~~en , das UYEOe~
" 1 anz konkret zu inter
pretieren und.dadurc h ,das
"Se e GA 18, 2, pp. 333-334. fllCJ?.yeoOol sC~lar,fc r ZU, sel~en,
~ toteles konnte also die Dialektlk gar mch
~ o GA 18, p. 7: '''D ie ota E"Kt ~~ nach schon unlen, d,h , eil1e Vorstufe l
lKtl machl bl of3 den Vers hCl'lIbziehen, well SIC fOr lhn II:r~1 des
was denn mit den MyO l gemeinl
sein konnte,. "
uch ', in Erfahrung LU bringen,
Or'ulp eV ist und aIs VorSI\lfc ll1
1l, :~ll~ein scharfsill niges Ope rieren und Denk
41 GA 19, p. 199. Sec C li :rgcn , S-'heoll'nllell
en,
also SZ, p. 25 . t'l Ond e rll ihrc1ll Sinll c nflch sofern der ),.oyoC; eben den
11111I1 CI' SC 10n Clll ,7
:-:1 1111 des rro$al\ppoOW hut , tlc~ Schc '
lll usscns,

. 162
11>1
 (' 11 1\ 1' Il ' I( 1 ( HII (
'11 1\ 1''1'1:1( FOU I{

Even lhough dialecli e is dri ven by n wi ll 10 seo IllI oli gli Ihe unrounded
11\lllI bl} by l'cvcaling th HI logos is consliluled by pathos . This means that
opinions of the many, it cloes not admit o r a 1'0(11 1,;111 t.;lIoll gh break with
endoxa but remains captured within th e sphc rc o f t.:s tabli slh.:d opinions, dlil i 'clic cannot l'ca ll y explain what it means that logos IS a form of
concepts, ways of speaking, etc. And whether Or not tbi s is a fair view liI'n",\', cvc n Ih ough il in fa ct treats of logos as a praxis, as dialectic
on Plata, Heidegger thinks that when discovering the limits of dialectic, "IICllol1" consisls in speeh and is conducted for the sake of speech
Aristotle simultaneously saw the limits of Plato's own project, namely Il ,c ll'. Thcrc fore, wc must leave dialectic and look elsewhere for an
l'xpl ll ilali on of the relation between speech and action. For only on the
that he could nOl, as Heidegger puts it, really sec the beings
45 hll ~ i :{ of an explication of praxis will we be in a position ta see the
themselves. Thus in ihis connection at Jenst, Heidegger interprets the
plI~s i b ilit y
o f the transformation from everyday ta philosophical speech ..
difference between dialectic and Ihearia as a difference between an
Il l('; semch for thi s explication teads Heidegger to Aristot!e's notion of
inquil)' into opinions on the one hand and a phenomenological seeing of
,hlIO/';O.
the tllings themselves on the other."
For Ihis reason, Heidegger suggests thal Aristotle's treatment of
\ , 'l'he thea reticallife
endoxa is in nlet not dialectical, for il does not simply speculate on the
As Il eidegger sees it, Aristotle's conception ofphilosophy points in two
consequences and presuppositions of opinions but measures them
I n rc~ti o n s . On the one hand, Aristotle does indeed tum to praxis in
against the lhings themselves . That is, Aristotle's dictulll that one must
IlI'dcr 10 accounl for the possibility and nature ofphilosophy, but on the
begin with what is intelligible to us and proceed to Ihat which is
OI hel' hand, he does not seem ta accept the consequences that follow
intelligible in ilsel!' cannot really be ta ken to say that one should move
11'0111 such an approach, that even philosophicalunderstanding must be
From one kind of opinion to anolher. Rather, il suggests that philosophy
(iiscursive in kind. The problem is thus not that Aristotle abandons his
must begin with an inquiry inlo beings stlch as they are given
Idcu lhat praxis is the essence of life, but that he makes philosophieal
"proximally and for the mo st part" and then proceed to the supreme
47 J1 cli vil.v , theorein , into such an extreme form of action that it is on the
mode of givenness. WhatHeidegger seems t be saying hcre is that in
ve rge' o f being transformed into the exact opposite of praxis. ln
dialectic, one does not ask how being is given in thase opinions which
Il eidcgger's view, because of this ambiguity in thearia, It IS pOSSible to
are under scrutiny, or how this givenness is determined. ln other wards,
"cgord A ristotle as the origin of the opposition between theory and
one does not investigate into the constitulion of speech. For this reason,
tl t..: li o ll . Thi s idea makes Heidegger's interpretation of theoria a bit
il seems that, on Heidegger's interpretalion, dialectic is insuffieient not
Illllhi g uOll S in ils turn, as he sometimes c1aims that theoria is Ilot a~ ail a
only as a philosophieal method or as a mode of discourse but also as an
1'01'111 of action , and sometimes insists vehemently upon the necess lty of
interpretation of logos. As we saw in the quotation ab ove, Heidegger
(lI'flw in g the opposite conclusion .48 For in spite of his hesitance on this
refers to lhe Rhelorie as a testimony to Aristotle's "positive
point , Il eidegger is convinced that il is highly problemallc to apply tlllS
understanding" of logos. And whal the rhetorical but not the dia leetieal
intel'pretation of logos shows is precise ly the constitution of speech,
~M ' I lle IHos t e laborate allempt at interpreting 8ffip.a as action is GA 27, 23-2~ ,
whl!rCI1S the a im of C A 19 is almost the exact opposite; see pp. 122- 125. "Yh~rea ~ 11
"GA 19, p. 198. III gc ncra ll y il c kno wled ge d Ihal Heidegger. wanted ~o cha},l el~g.e th~, d l stl~ctlon
46 ~ . Figal har sugge,sted Iha,' is Heidegger's understanding of phiJosophy as
!t Il ' I WCC ll thCOly and prax s by means of a notlO11 of ~ ktnd of ong.tnary pra~ls, o.ne
I ~ sc ldolll pre pa ree! to g ran t th is to Aristot) e. Th e re.tor~ , one assocJates e~{Op~(1 \VIth
sel,e nce that makes hnn SllSpiC10US of Plato's dialectie and makes him turn to
A,nstotle's notion of theory instead, even though he wil! criticise this notion as weIl. Ilrldcggc r's no ti o n of sc ie ntifi c kn owled ge ~f obJ ectIve,. vorhande ~ bemg, sec C.
Flga) argue.s th.at t~,ere .is ~, tensio~l in ~eidegger's ow~ work on this point, nam ely Illll lloy. /)uill~ alld God in Heidegger and An sfofle, 'p. 28, :V. ,McNetl ), ~he Glanee
between sClelltlfc seelllg and dlalectlcal, henneneutlc discourse, where the latt er fif 1tle, t:-, 1 F. VollJ , "!Jew and rime: A 'l ran slatlon of the Nleomaehean
.ye , p.o, ("0 . , ". t" 1"
would be more akin to $POVllQt<; than to 9E:(Opla; see "Refraini ng from Dia lecti c" lhfcst', pp. 201 -2 02. Bui t!li s vi cw ove rl oo ks J-Icld egge r s eXI.sten la ,
17 See GA 18, p. 37. . or
1t11l'o )ogic u) nlc rpl'c lli lio ll Or !IJpl C1, whi ch pu t ~ fo c us on holV O {pt~ enacts
P I f,' 'I!lcly Ihe "originlH'y" pr'il xLs 111 11 \Vll y I)Hll tl1 0kes II Illc suprcme forl11 of actl on.

164
1 6 ,~
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::i~~:~~~:~yba~~\~C~n il:'i:ory and aetio" lu Ad'lul l .',pl tl losophy, s in et il

Y
0pposilion bill, On Ih u COIIII"II'y by Ihe 'd 1 1 VI,.\ t y IIct Otl ill vo lvcs thillkin g, but when this is a form of deliberation,
th e essence of life '. r, J ca t 1(1!

this opposition intoo::i~~:t~el,: ~~~~ed in lhcory, 'J'here lo re, if we read o ICllds to un end ralh er than being an end in itself. In this case, it is
his views on this matter, nor will ~ewl~n:~~s;~~db:~::Cp~~il~~~e~tand poss ible to draw il coneeptua l distinction between the understanding
lilli i lIlakes acti on possib"!e and the action itself, as is shawn by the
BaslcalIy, theorza IS superior to ail other act' 'l' ' h P Y IS,
'rt f' IVI les 1I1 t ree respects' in distincti on between phrollesis and praxis, The difference bet\Veen
v~, ue Ils structure, which lets il fulfil the essence of life' because' 't
Ilcl ion and understanding, or between the "subjective" and "objective"
~e~~ct ,\~ o~ a perfect nature; and finally, in yirtue of its mov~ment 1 w:I~ t l ~.j p cct of action, is the reason why it is possible to understand one's
\VI l t ese pOints ln the indicated arder. .
,,,,,duct in di ffe renl ways, This means that, even though it is always
fWc ha~'~ se~n that Aristotle has it that the end towards whicl
orm of hIe directs ilself is somethin ) 1 every
po%ihlc to unaersta na one ' s activity as :m instance of praxis, ail forms
Ethies, il is slated that cveryone agreesglhgaOtOtdl ' ln Ihe first book of the III' virtuolls act ion can be regarded as means to further ends, and that is
l ' , le Supreme good' rD ' hl, ; ClIlISe lhey involve change. which makes them bring about a resul!.
lappmess or well-being (eudaimonia) 49 whicll' 't'II' U1 1 e IS
'fi , lnl la y 15 not glven an lilili is, even if the agent understands his action as an end in itself, his
s:eci IC content, but is only formally determined as an end above wh' ~
tlecd will produce a new situation of action and probably affect other
t ere IS no further end and which thus is desirnble i . l~
account it is c1ear Ihat th e natllre of li fe will be' fillfil~ ~tsel~ From thls people, etc,

:t~:h a.ccor~s \V,ilh eudaimonia. However, Ihere maye bell~:~:;a~c~~~~~ llut in philosophy thinking is itse lfthe activity and the end, since it is
lI u l a l a il manipulativc or deliberative, Thus only theoria fulfils th e
the ~iI~~,~a, Slilce the only crilcrion Ihat has becn established is that Slr'ucture ofpraxis because it alone is action bath From the "subjective"
the~i~e :~ I~ ~'dS 111 themselves, Thus what is settled so far is just that Hn d the " objective" point of view. It is the only activity that has no
, we . clI1g must be an instance of praxis not of ' . .
ISonly praxis that is endowed wilh this kind f t ' pOtes/s, for It 'x lcrn al result and thus has nothing to do with production,52 But thos e
1 th P r " . 0 au on omo us nature wlt o bclieve that action must involve a relation to other people, be
in n ,e Otlles, Anstotle says that since wcll-being can only be round
vis ible as physical behaviour, etc" of whom Aristolle spoke above, still
acti:~:,15~~h~nl~ewrol~g ta praise, inactivity (la apraktein) more than IInderstand action in terms of production, Unable to step out of their
goes on to specily what thls activity should look like: poict ic attitude, they cannot sec that something like pure contemplation
. . , if one should as ser t !hat Il b' , is act.ion in the truest sense. Put in another way, if the essence of life
. 1 . we . emg !S action then the best ]"fi
;~~i~i:l::~.ti~~I\ I~~'i~~tll~l;~tr J~~~I;;'e:~ast:a~i~ylle~;i~eIIY
.and fo r ev~r; cons isis in being directed towards something good in understanding,
as saille believ . re atlve to athers, plti losop hy llfils the essence of life, since it only thinks the go ad for
for the s[lk"" o~' nOlh arle .only those thoughts practical which are
, suc t ungs that result fro " b 11 10 sake of thinking it, not using its understanding for the sake of a
speculations [theoriai] and thoughts al' 111 ~cl!on , ut th,ose fl uther end,
whieh are end s in themselves and e mue more practlcaJ
tl 1 are enacted for the sake of The relati on between philosophy and the essence of life stands at the
k;~;soe/[le:;i:~r ac~ing weil is the end, and therefore, the end is a centre o f Heidegger's interpretation of theoria, notably in the lecture
~~~::~: ~~I;~:i~~~~i~~~;,~ (~I(~:S:O~h~C~~~e;~ ~1;~e;'~~lle:~I~~~
clvuytwiov e1vm rrp EtpOU, KCl9ltE:p o'ioV'ral 1:lve, ouM 'C; otavoia elVUl
Il va tCtu'ta npaK'CIKo tt tWV (l1Co~(J;Iv6vtwv XaplV y tyvollva K tou
" EN. 1095a 1820,
50
Itp6 nc lv , cL rro)" pD.ov 'tt Oto'tEet Kat 't autwv VKEV 8ropia Kat
"Pol. 1325a31-32, 51(AVo r'\OC lt;' il yop e\JIt'p a ~ i Cl t:o. (OCl'tE KCtI rrp~i n. p OtOW M Kat npcittetv
Pol. 1325bI423: "ri1v euoaliloviav d m ' , , t~ YOI I U I' K\Jp i u) Ka! 1"WV t ~l)nr p l lnl v 'rrpaCiQV to tCl olavoia t pX t tK'tova."
av d'Y] Kai Kae' KUcrroV apIG't'o Pio bU:pl~~t~~~~Ov,,~Kia~ K?lVn rtcrll ~oe) \J f:'or Ih t: di flCI1 CIl hc t\VCCIl Opl)lpiCl HIId ordi!\Hry np l o n Ihi s point, scc E.N.
"'), aA ~a TOV rrj)W<:tlKOV OUK 11 77/)1 '1.

166
1117
 (' 11111' I l'I( 1 (lI lit
CI III 1''1'1il( FOU R
CO UI'.'iC 1:.'In/eilll llg il/ die Philoso'J!ti<: 1
the idca Ihat the concep t of . / , .' Il 111 11'1 I C~.I . 1h.: ldcggL:r
rc turns (0 of w hich s
IIndcl'standi ll g of bci ng as Herges lelllsein, the express ion
as slIch and notjust t ~ p,a.\~.s g lvcs (:XPI'C.s~IOIl 10 Ih!.! nature of lit
cause and princip le, which
Ihlll Ihe suprcmc good , i .e. the good as
also along these lineso hae ortm ot ac ti hv it dis:~nct li'olll prod
y ucti on. It is
cS the object of theoria , is eternal and unchan geable, or, as
m erprets t eona F I . . \! ()IlSlitul
m ust not believe tha! theoria is a fo nn of r~s! . b le cmphas 0;,
lses, we I lcidcgg e r puts it, already fin is hed
60
W ith thi s remark , H eidegg er
eca use we mlstake ity of
acti on for produc ti on 54 lnst d ' JUS
ea , actI on should be d d . Indi ca tes th at, even though Ari stoll e wants to protect th e activ
.
transce ndence, as the "ha ~ . " f un erstoo In terms of l'' earia trom being mixed w ith poiesis, he cannot but regard Iheoria as
a
g has th e
form o f a move beyond bPePen mtg oh o ur under,standi n. , whi ch IIcgatio n of poiesis , so th at the d isti nguishin g feature o f liIeoria is
that it
mgs 0 t elr be mg ' TI '
sense o f ac ti on wherea s Il ' .' li S IS th e ontolog ical ls not prod ucti ve, since the supreme good is already produc ed. O nce
' ( le IIl1 erpretatlOl1 of action in t .
. rity of
p rodu ctIOn onl y captures its ontical sense 56 ' . erm s 01 Ihi s is recognised, it is poss ib le to see that even if th e superio
act ion, Heideg ger interpre ls theoria lhus:' On the basls oftlllS Vlew
of ,heoria 50 far has been expla incd in tenns of if s structu re, the per fection
o l'its slructur e is largely due to the perfec t nat ure of its object.
of
7reorein is indeed SUcJl an action 1 .
t .la~ as revea lmg only lets
T his idea is stated part icul arl y clearly at the end of the sixth book
unconcealment happen which . li sis and
br:ngs Dasei n to th a l \~hjch il 'C~~l lai ,H [ts,e lf, be longs ,10, Da~c in, th e EliIics, where Aristot le discuss es th e relation betwee n phr01le
the trulll, a possibility for the' c ssencebc,0 f"Dlsota,r ' ~/l l1 a eXJs~Jng IS in 61 te this re lation, Ar istot lc
asclIl . sophia. Not slll'pri singly, in order to illustra
brings
co mpares it to th e re lat ion betwee n med icine and hea lth . Sophia
Theori a on ly lets unconc ea lment ha ppen, fo r ils lelos is 10 nbout eudaimonia Just in virtue of being enacted, and s thus sm lar
to a
~lelhes, bemgs as true or un covercd. Thi s is the s . . fi on ~lOs be said
stale of health whi ch sustain s itse lf. By contras t, phrone sis can
in front of b . .upl eme arm of actlO11
ln thal it makcs a hait \Vith
ha . f e mgs w llhout slIbsu min g th to produe e sophia , sinee il involve s the abi lity to see th e mea ns
. e
ppen lllg 0 . un concealmen t un der any ot her end 58 H which it is possible to achieve a given end, fo r example sophia
as
rds to on hos al tl ' . owever , theorta IS
n ot dlfecled towa ul d exercis e
onia. Thi s is howeve r not to say th at phronesis wo
s a 62
specific realm of . e 7es pure and sImpl e, but toward elldaim
belllgs, na mely that wh ich ca nn ot be th ' . j ust as
. auth ority over sophia; it can only hel p sophia to come into being,
:~:lld~!ger often,. i~ ord er .ta cmphas isc the cann:ct~~\~lS:~t:h:~~ th e art of medi cine can pave the way for health
63
lt is natura l for
"Y y and t h ea l e t lca l prax/~" calls tl '
le Sllprem c goad . TIle ~Ound atlOn
of theoria says He idegg cr, .
(
. . . phronesis, being a care for th e good li fe, to devel op int o sophia, th e best
IS ItS on gll1al ae t' " ( U; 1 man,
, 1i Fe, whi ch cares not fo r the human but for the suprem e good . For
unth ematic projection toward s bein g that le<ts It ~n r w ndlung): an
le th ing in
delim ited rea lm of beings and th c eory tllrn toward s a as Aristotl e is anxious to poin t out , is not th e most admirab
must re main hidd fi h
. erc
'. .
lore en rom t e cos mos .
64
Si nce th e slipreme good is not of a changeabl e natu re , and
th eoretlca l act ivity itself Th 's
a bo ut theory." The orig; na/ ~roJect:.n IS what is genuine ly Iheoreli
of
cal thus is not somethi ng that man ca n produce , the th eoretica l ac tivity
ae 10 /1 w Ich !nakes Iheoria possible is its sophia cannot be produc tive but o nly contem plati ve." But on accoun
t
for us to
~J Cf. Chapter Thrce,.
'4 p 124 . of th e domin ance o f th e po ietic perspec t ive, it is no t easy
.
"GA 27. pp. 174-175. real se that thinkin g without alteration is the supreme form of action
GA 27, pp. 205-206. F I ' see
GA 24, p. 393. or t le Idea of understa nding as happening (Geschehen). It is at this point that tlzeoria secms ta lose il!) cUllnec ti on with praxis.
For as wc have seen earli er, acti on is a sceking , govern ed by a desire
"" GA 27 ' p. 206. for
GA 27, p. 176: "8ewpd v isr in der Tat .
machendes nur Offenbarkeit geschehen IM3l ~~ n solches Handeln, das
ais offenbar
,le:. S~ l bst ZUIn. Dasein gehorig, di eses M Cg. GA 19, p. 123.
zu dem bringt, was es se in kann sofern E.N. Book VI.Ch.12.
sr esensmglichkeit des Daseins;' es qua eXlst rerendes ln der Wahrneit ist cine (, 1

, (,l /IN. 1144n2- 9.

" GA 27, p. 183. '
1:>1 I~. N. 1145n6-9 .
GA 27. pp. 196-200, 2 12-213 . E.N. 11411\31 - h2 .
(, 4

l" GA 19.p . 1 2 ~ .

168
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, 1
sOIn !.!th ing w hich onc tacks. Hui C V~ II i r phllrHlophy in ils initial r 'II . ' t!tl,;.on.:ll cHI [1 ' \ v1Iy, M M ' II I cannOI cOl1tcm plale
sta g ' 1III I y li 11icunS 10 U I lei . , l
l
' Ihat he \s able ta pursue
can be describ ed as a carc to sec 111 0 re, as I lci dcggcl' says, Ihis , for II I ~ nol CI,\' "'I Ll m ~lJ)
Carc is w\l l\lHII interru ph on, . . , 1" ~ th at is to say reason .
out ta be satis fi ed and ta come ta rcst al il poinl wherc il is possibl , ' . o f sotll clhlng ul Vlne ,
e j usi Il,,'n''y b ut ln vlrtue ortality Aristotl e claims, but
ta take pleasure in the beauty of reality, 66 As Aristotl e puts it, we 1hel'd ore, wc muSt 11 01 succUlllb \0 our m ,
wanl
ta end in Ihe opposit e of thaumazein,67 tha! is, one coul d say, not t develo p our reason an d In ' this way try ta be
rcall y W ~. I\l USt do ail wc can 0 d Uit
,
w ould be stran ge If
in philoso phia but in sophia: not in love for wi sdom but in wi ,. alise our essence , an
sdol11 11\ IIIIori ai. For th ls IS ta re , 1 f other ,,70
,
itself. If phi losophy were ta desire ilS abject, it would suffer ch
ange 111\1': \Vere ta choose not one 5 own il fe but n at a an '
while Ihi nking il. If thinki ng were ta be altered, il could be sa
id la
produc e different aspects o f its a bject, and this would not be ta preserv " ' nouS al1d Augenb lick
e l 'l'he //I oment oft rut lm V /S IOI1 , If fli ' nt nature its k nowled ge
the di gnity o f th e suprem c good, Hence, if theoria is to be praxis " h' erfect se -su ICle
in the 1r thearia is ta have 1 IS P ,
' 1 t ' t sense sueh knowle dge is
s tro n ge ~ l sense, il must be identi cal \V it h ils o bj
ect. But, il seems, when , ' in kind l n t le s ne ,
,lIUst be non-d iscursiv e ') Aristotl e makes clear in Book
theoria has exclude d every kind o f differen ce or kinesis, it is entangled d'vine reason ( 110 1lS , as
tl ul y grante d to l ' A ' t tle ' s main concern is to Sh ow
in its ow n autono mous mo vement : a self-su rticient aetivity that
is X II of th e Metap 1lyS/CS ,
" ln thls texl n s a
' , ' 1'1 r eapacity a dunami s, As a
incap able of encoun ter ing anyth ing th at is differenl from or foreign , ' not be a potentl a 1 Ya , ,
ta il. 1I11I1 chy me reason can Id b ffeeled b y other Ihin gs, Ils
Still, Aristot le mot ivates Ihe sup eriority o f the theoret ica l life " d"' re ason w ou e a
referr ing to the bas ic c haracte ris tic of actio n, nam ely th al its
by ]Inlcntl ahty, Iv me
d
, d 'nee a potenti ality ,IS a r
trut h I t be contmu o us , an SI
1I10vem ent wou no ,
consists in a vo id ing the ha rm f'ul and purs u in g the p leasura ble. " ' d \Vould th mk not on 1y the good but a1so "
th e
'r
T he contrari es, dl vme mm , Id t be proper
theoretica l life is in fael the sup reme realisat ioll o f th is "practical" , ' mos whlch \Vou no ta iL Thus 1
truth, 11lfc rior th mgs m COS , .
h ld be concerned with \Vhat 15
for nothing can be pleasurable in Ihe same way as theory : (l ivine reason is the bes; lthin g and Shouk itself there is no difreren
' k 't If And as It t m S , cc
hest, it must tll1n 1 se . . ' h' h in Aristot le' s
We think that well bein g m ust involve pleas ure, and it
is k'ng and lts abject, w le vicw
generaUy agrecd Ihal Ihe mosl plcasura blc o f ail aCli vi s Iha l arc helween Ihe act a f 11u n 1" .
h'
1 d static, The abse nce 0 1
f Vlty 1S etern a an
enacted in accordan ce wilh som e virlue is Iha l activily which is
in ~lIa ra n l ees th al t 1S ac l , 1 b Il thinki ng and ilS objeel mu SI
acco rdan ce \V ilh w isdo m. At a Il c ve n ts il is thou ght Ihat ' 1 usly imphes t "'l at a 1 .
dirfercnce S ll11U tanco . . , '
philo so p hy ha s pf e as ure s th a t are wo nd e rful in pu rity a
nd , ' d' . bl (adlhw r eton ) na t ur e , for otherw ise. Ihll1 kll\ g
durati o n, and il is weil sa id Ihal Ihose who ha ve know ledge he or a s im ple, 1I1 IVISI e , h ks its obiCCl and th,,1 would
are h veral sleps as Il t III
dwc lli ng more pl cas urabl y than thase who are seeki ng it. 68 ",oulcl run throug se "
" If-think in g Ihou ghl , /l ol's l ,!
' 1 12 Th us on th ls vt ew , se
~ nl a ll c lan ge, , '" 'fulfilleci in every tI1 otl1 ~nt 111 "
Ihlll Il
Ph il osoph y is Ihe mosl pleasur able and durab le acti vity imagin , t mal actlvlly that IS l
able,
s ince it is not a forl11 of seeking and has no unfu lfi l! ed desire, and
f/oeseos , 15 an e e 1 t very rn om ent. Such f\ n I1 ctl"Vll y ,\ ~
50 , 't 1 los complete y a e
does not end or is interrup ted like other act ivities, There fo re, it is action
\l us its a bject, 1 s e, , , discurs ive in tlte ~CII ~C 0 1 n o l
' 1
{' Ilerge ia 111 t lC truCSt sense " and Il IS non- IiI bricOy Accon.II. I1 ~' 1y.
in the truesl sense, To be sure, since man is mortal, he canna t engage , lor
in iovolvm g any sta ges, 1 any d lffe rence, ta pu
d
'
ilS obj\,;ct 10 1 ' 1I H ~ I l
1
n5 nor docs Il un crs tand
.
theoria fo rever; that is only a divine possibility, As a human being, the , ,
di vine 110 US never rcaso , 1 f ' th e "'\S" docs 1101 \l lIve
philosophe r lII ust oecasionally rest, but th e l'est is never an end in sOlllcth ing cIse or in general as somel1ll1 g, 01
ilself, l ,

66 PA, p, 263: GA 19, p, 76,

61 Mel, 983,18ff. (,o) HN, 1176b3S 11 77al. ~ , ' 0 .t ~' i"\ "tva""to ll' ovipO ' 10 Uh.')..(I \ ' vu...
68 E. N. 1177a2227: "oLolle9 t 'tE liEi v ~oov~ v rrCtpa ll EIllX901 'tfj eliat~l.O 'Ii) r~' N. 1178f13 4 . "toJtOV O\W 'Y I VOI
viq: , "T Y.
~O icr't"ll li: "t"wv Kat' pE'1V VepyEHv il KCt't 'thv cro<j)lav
Oj1ooYOU]l vw e011 Y ' li).).ou,"
n
OOI(E1. YO"Y $l ),oao$t a 9cw ]lao"t noov XEIV Kalape l O'tl"ltl Kat
1c\) Be rlai l[J, 11 Mel. 1074hI5-15,
EOYOV o "toi e iOm "TOlV Sl1toV"T(J)v ~o i w "t~v ol (JYW'Y 'lV El Met , 107 5116 11.
va l. " Il

170 1/ 1
 (' li Ai' Il Il 1111 11(
( 'II A I'II Il I l Hill
any IllcH ni ng Iwn:, cl uc 10 Il '1 '
l I( cl ll ll y Ihlll hold'l I1clwcclI Ihe <.Ic i of'
thi nk in g and ils o ~j ect. III Il cidcggcl" s Vi ClV, Ihc' proh le'" wl lh Ari slO ll c's 110li oll of" pure
po~~t;a~~ttra;~, ~l~~nan reason. is defi,ned prcci~c1y as tl dilI/amis, as the ""liS is that it ilil plics a helie!' in Ihe poss ibi lity of thematising the
th ' k ' hY 73 DOle aIl thmgs wnh out thclr maller in the sense 0(' d,'(' peSI levcl of truth , Ih ll l is, OUI' diselosedness or bein g, without loss.
111 II1g t em
fi .'
Accordlllgly th r '
, e ac IVlly of hum an rcason is nOI 1 III Ihi, be lie f, the aecompl ishlllent of the phil osophical nous wo uld
per ect, as It moves between activity and in activi ty To J'ud C IIl1sist in a retum to and apprehension of that which always already had
A t Il ' l' ' ge 1ro m
d .~; 0 e s ~e of argument in the Melaphys;cs, this should also entail li h ' Cil ul1dcl'stood in an unthematic way . Now Heidegger too conceives
1 erence etlVeen the ac t of thin kin g and its obj ec t for ' ni pllilosophy as such a return which seeks ta conceptuali se the pre-
pOl entlalny reason is aITected by its object 74 H ' . ' as " n" leclive leve! of unde rstandin g, th e di sc losedn ess of be ing. Bul if
wh ' 1 . . . O\\ cver, 111 De Anuna
IC l contalllS Afl stotle's mSI clabora te accOUn! of the hu ' pld loso phy is d iscursive, il will Ilot be able t gras p thi s level as il is in
Ari stotl e does Ilot seem to be trou bled b th man nous ' IIGcJfor w ith out in som e sense objecti fy ing it. As wc have seen earli er,
w Id ~ Il fi Y e consequences which
Il ckh.:gger thinks that th ere are certain extrc me experi ences like anxiety
MOU 0 Ow rom the defin ition of nous as a dunam ;s according to the
it :;:~,;;:;~~. i~~ ~oesl obs~rve, howevcr that in its activity, that is, when IVlli eh have no abject, but precisely because of this lack, an xiety cannot
' cli lly be said ta involve any understanding at ail. Instead, Heidegger
. 75 n Ica Wl t lits a bjec t, reaSOn is s till a potentiality or
capac ny. IIlu ~ 1 find a poss ibility of a proper response to thi s experience, Thi s
From Il b . . J'cs ponse ca nn at be de libera ti o n ; no t olll y becau se de liberati on is
le egmnlllg of his engagement Wilh Aristotle H 'd
feels confident that nous in its pure fo rm is a natural c ' el egger drccle d towards its end in such a ,"vay as to d is regard th e p resent, but
Aristotl , . ' on sequence of II lso because the end is not grasped as such. But, Heidegger indicates,
es conceptIOn Of bcing and movement, for it alone can fu lfi l the
nature of movcmcnt as entelecheia 76 B {
. wc II ced not turn away From praxis ta fi nd this poss ibility, The
h H . . as wc saw III the previous
. li
capter, cldeggcr hes ltates as to whcther A ristotl e take poss ibility of a more far- reaching "v ision" which moves beyond the
be a hum an poss ibi lit o r if h . c s pure nous ta conli nes of everyday action is represented by Heidegger's concept of
. . . . y e lhm ks th a t hum an nOlis necessaril s
~,scur:~ve. For Heidegger thinks that the concept of nous cannot sin';;'ly llic A ilgenblick, which no doubt picks up certain traits of nous and the
e altri uted to An stolle's COmprehension of divine being, for it is also Idea l of vision, but simultaneously points beyond such an ideal. 18
motl vated by Ills mSl ght into the pre-predicati ve level of understa ndin This concept should serve to explain what it means to have a
and h" d;;;covery that there arc other poss ibilitics for logos than th! qUll lified access ta the situation of action. Therefore, the Augenblick
assel tlon. 1f th,s IS correct, Aristotle does indeed have a n t' f wi ght sec m to bel ong to p hronesis rath er th al1 ta phil oso phy, and
predi cat' b ' 0 Ion 0 pre- I lc.idegger also di scllsses the Augenblick in conn ection \Vith phronesis.
79
. '" ve ut ye t discursi ve apprehension. We will see shortly that il
IS preelsely along these lines that Heidegger interp rets the f Il owever, as an aspect of auth enti c understandi ng as such, thi s co ncept
ac tion. nous a !l lUst give directi ves fo r the nature of philosophi eal understanding as
wcl l. For in arder to thematise properly the Augenblick of phronesis,
" D~ Ali . 4.29a2 / -22 .
14
pliil osophy must itsel f be in its "moment",'O
SIIII, Anstolle insiSls Iha! reason is OnCle' .
o.e An. 429a/ 5- / 6. See a!so the discussion ~~' ~~~ba;~~~~'othough recept iv: of ~onns,
dlffrculty that to thi nk is 10 be aet d . . a9, where he ralses Il as a
ln nIe Glal1ce of the Eye, x, W. McNei ll a/so suggests that Hcidegger's concept o r
ill1pass ive natu re. The notion of rea:onu;son, sm~e !h1s. does not agree with reason's
1W
the AlIgenblick both fu/fils and breaks \Vith the pri macy of vis ion in ph iloso phy,
10 this prob lem , fo r Ihis means Ihat rea P?tentlallty JS Ihere presented as a solu tio n
Ihough he does not to any greal extent discuss Ihi s in connecl ion wi th vo.
~p Ihat ils transition from inaclivly 10 ac:~~t JO. a sel"se a /ways a/ready has ilS objects ,
De Ali . 42 9b5-8 Y mvo ves 110 real change. " Scc GA 19, pp. 164- t 65; PA , pp. 259-260.
" .
"PA, p. 263; GA 62', pp. 25-26.
Nil The not ion of Il "ph i!oso phi ca l moment", as indi cative of the pro per phi loso phie:ll

Cf. below, Section 8. fl nitllde. is exp loJ'cd by /1. Ru in, who cmphasises the conncction bctwccn the
AlIgellbfick Olle! the co nce pt o f K'o t p6: sec Enigmal ic Origill.f, CIHlplcr Pive, in
pnl'li cular Section 2,

172
 t' 11 "1' 11 ' ll 1 1 Il III
l'li A I' Ii m l'OUR
Ir th e; Aug el/blick is in tcrp rClcd us
" th u WI II ~ ul li n cyc"
the notion ofk now lcd ge as vision pres il conserves ,, t 'xclu ~ i vcly basc d 0 11 an
inte rpre tatio n of Aris totle, .but
ent iJl l\l'I s l olh;'~ concep t oCnous . HI iii. l ln ll 1:-< 110 C, 1 k
..
Bul since it also has a temporal mea ,1 " 84 ln the fo llow mg,
ning, dcs igllatillg a ki nd of moment, n ll hi s \l1\(h.!fst llndin g o f Chn stwl1
t 11n m g. t th Aris totle
il ca n also be rega rded as hllw .... vc l.. 1 w ill limit mys c lf" 10
Hei deg ger 's resp o nse 10 Ar istOlle I-Iei de gge r's eng age men WI
kair os . "op port unit y" or " the figh ' s co nccp l
t mom ent" , whi ch in the Eth ics li n Ihl'l poi nt.
desc rib ed as one of the con stituti ve is ,.
111 .)t ", 1117 .
d Z ., Hei. deg ger eha ract ens .
es
the A uge l1bl ick as an
elem ents of succ essful acti on." el ,
ln 85 th " l ' "the pres e nt
his inte rpre tatio n of kair os, Hei deg
ger argues that, as the prop er time 1Il lllIc " ti c pres ent , as . e Possi bility to enact or Ive
o f th futu re wh ich is sup pos ed to
acti on, il is not a tem pora l concept \\ Ih o ul lo~in g .onesel f 1~ th
in the ord inary sens e. For it refe
rs e past .or . e a \Va ~hat it usually
not to a spec ifie poinl of ti me but nillk e Ihe situatio n of actIOn acce~slb is ilOt. In
ta the circ ums tanc es of acti on.
ln this .
le. In y d t tlle past and th e
sens e, kair os is not a " qu an tit
at ive" noti o n of lime but the lh lMse lise, th e mom ent 1$ no t a " now " as opp ose 0
s ituation of act ion as a w ho lc. prop er l"t f our exis tenc e is m od ified
liltU I'C. l'o r in th e mom ent,
Acc ordin gly, l-Ieideg gt: r sug gest th e tem pora t Y 0 h held toge ther or
kair os cons titut es th e end of action, s th at lit .. Ieh li \Vay thal the tem pora l stru
for the des ired end of deli bera tion ctur es are som e ow t
is ' b ' dt 1ined or give n spec ifie
preeisely the prop er resp ons e to Ihe 1\l ll liet!, in that lhey are emg con ten .
situ atio n o f action 8 2 e e tn . H'd
The vi cw of kair os as a 'tqu alita Il is at this poin t that nau s ente 's ana lys is for
ti ve" rat her than as a " qua ntita tive rs mto et egg,~r '6 ' th
con cep t of time is part and parcel " Ill' 'ortlin g to Ari slotl e, it
of He ideg ge r 's a((e mpt to reth ink is the wor k of the " prae ttcal /10U
the S 10 see e
natu re o f li m e, no t Jeas t th e not \.lrc tll1l5tanc es o f act ion:
ion of the " no w", due ta hi s id ca
trad ition al prio rity of th e pres ent. of the
As sllch , I-kid egg er 's inte rpre tatio
n of has to do with the ultimate on both
ka iras evo kes the q ues tion o
f hi s atti tude low ards Ar isto Rca son (1I0~S). . sides
n Il ot reasoning that is concerne d(ofwith an
und erst and ing of time as a who le. tl e's inrcrence) ..For 1\ IS reas~ 'and the
The de finition of tim e in Ihe Phy ult ima'te. That (reasOI:) which
is e lsew here rega rd cd as th e sics both the P::,~:~~~e:~~~~~a~io ns
grasps the immutab le an? primary
pri me exa mp le of the eve ry 11::Is to do
qua ntita tive noti on of tim e whi ch day , concepts that W h'JC h has to do \Vi th acti on grasps the uhl1nate, the
ca nn a t do justice to our exp erie nce , . . . These thin . . t . tl e
tim e or of ours elve s as tem pora
l bein gs . A ltho ugh Heideg ger
of poss ibl~, ~l:~gn~~na~r f::~~~ss:ke of which gsoneareacls,pnnc lp es III 1
very sense 0 el for From these
.
seld om discusse s how " kairo logi
eal" and "qu anti tativ e" time are particu iars the univ ers.a l t5 \dVOI"l: Th articular s must be
rela led n . ese P Thus reaso n is
to eaeh other in Aris to tl e, he seem app rehen ded bY percepllo ' &jan t 1S IS reaso n....
s to thin k Ihat Aris totle had a broa both a bcginning and an end.
und erst and in g of lime than w hat der
the Phy sics su ggests, thou gh he
una bl e to go far eno ugh in th is dire was
c tion. 8J What furlh er com plie ates . . disc uss
the . , NoHlb ly Hl GA 60, HeId the early 5tians a~d thcir
pict ure is that Heideg ger 's und erst
andin g of the A uge nbli ck as the egger d 1 es 0 01' 0 whicChri
time IIl ldcrstanclt.ng 0 ft le i al of the Lor
arn v ne n ap u ,
h Heidegger 111terprets
. d' f terms of "\Vhe n" but only .
81 ln the begin ni ng of
Il'' Il moment which cannot
be conc~lve 0 JO \Vith respect
the Ethics, Aris totle says tha! one . 1 a i. a bsen
prese nt as f t ,t sa to speak ' that is, as an
speaks about the good is with respe of the senses in whic h one 10 " how ", 111 that {le 1ta~ou IS
ct to Kat p, r096a23-27. When disc . 26 ln his book on Heidegger and . T
llIllClcnn inat c bul yet ~ert~tn Ihrea t,
relati on between Kmpr; and the Auge
nblick, Heidegger rega rds them bath
uss ing the
~nd l cr fl rgues that Ib IS IS an esse
~tial i non_Ari stotelian sens e of tim An stotle, . .
e, whlch
of 'p!',l rat"er than of $povqm; GA as aspe
82 See GA 18, p. 171.
t8, pp. 179- 180, 189. See also PA, p. 259. cts .
Il ddc ger has taken over .\Il h1s understan mg 0 f t'nle
Y d'
l ,
and that this ;s one of the
.cl as pri mnri 1y n Chri stian , rathe r t h
ICllso ns \Vh~ one .must cHon~dlude that H el egge r w
Q
83 Mor e preci se ly, Heid an
egger u nd~rstands the definition 1111 I\rislotelHln th 1l1kcr, el d Ari slotle. T/Je Ques tion ofBeing, p.
219b 1-2, as pt 9)lo Kt V~OEWr; Kett of ti me, given in Phys . egger ail . 16.
't Itp(hc:po v Koi 10 01EpOV, 11' Pi"e lilliche Gege mva rf,
l1l ove ment \Vi lh respect to the prio "the measure of . .... S2,, p. 338: . D A 433a14 ff
r and the poste rior", as saying fhat .,. TI\e express ion 0 n:poKtI KOr; - used Hl
measure) must be interpreted in term
s of li me (as the prior and the poste
time (as
.7 H-N. 11 43a3S-b IO. "K (_O vou
1:
V ~\)r; . e 11.
'lt' $<'rte pa KC yp
tWV npol'tWV
ind icatcs , Heidegge r argues, that Ari rior), which '(~v e?~~,(1oV ~al ttl v Kat 't Ct1tOO el;EI
thou gh he was unable ta unde rstan
stotle has seen the original phenome
non of li me, , -
{lplV KU I 'tC))V eO)',u .1. .I."'rov vou Eon Kat ou ,,-oy
, n)j~
d ilS relat ion to the "natural" conc . , r
measure, GA 24, 19, especially pp. ept of tim e ~ s ...\ v.)'(IJ,)V OpOIV Ka l rtpUl'tlV, 0' v '((.t npaK tlKO 'tou- E?X0 "
10~ K _
al
340-342. See a1so Heidegge r's rema . . ' a' yp -co ou VEKO ouW t
re lation between "CHPO and vv in rks on the t\ v&r' xoll vou Km 1"lle; c., ,.. J. (oi pa np1 oacU1r; opX 1 EK 'toov
GA 24, p. 409. <;
O' "KCIO{Ct 'Ybf' d l ",p06)..o,, ' 1\J"f ~" OCl o'ioOqOlV. outI.. ." -
t V O\J" eXCI " l 0 EOH vou .
.....f~ 4'ho .. Ctl <'AI"'X.~ 10.:(1\ TI\)..t)
~. " Sec [dso Il t I2n2 5-)O.

174
 (' II AI'I I ' II 1 tll ill
Rca sonin g can onl y bcg in 011 Ihe
bt l sls 0 1 SIIII \ 'Ihin g give
provide Ihi s is the task of nous. In n, Hnd lO
this SCII S~, 11011,\' llitis t Il ot nccessa rily
be rega rded as non -di scu rsiv e
in any s ll'o ng sen se, but one co
interpret Aristolle as just say ing that
sccing what is propef here and now
is not a part of the process of deli
beration itse lf since it is pres upp oscd
by il. As the above quotation te lls
us, nous is here concerned with the
part icul ar, and il is l'his aspe ct whic h stan ds at th
e centre of Hei deg ger 's
intc rpre tati on. s ince he wan ts to
op pose il to th e phil osop hi cal nou
the apprehe nsion of esse nces, Thu s he conclud
s as
es that: "W hat we have
here are Iwo pos sibilities for nou
s: nous in ils ul/imale concretion
and
nou s in ifs ultim ale kath ololl, ilS
mos t gen eral gel1erality.,,~8
Nou s in ilS " ul timatc concret ion"
is thus an app rehe nsio n of the
particular, of the unique within a
mom ent or situ ation, Such a seei
can mak e up a startin g-po int of deli ng
bera tion , as it apprehends the telo
of action, But Heidegger is mor e con
ccrned wilh how nOli s works at the
end of the dcli bera tion , and he
desc ribe s il acco rdin gly as a "sim
gras p" (sch lichles Elfo ssen ) of delc
rm inat c circ um stances or of the
ple
bare
" faet" of the situation. For at the
89
point whe n the exact course of acti
pres ents itsel f and one decides wha on
t to do, the situ ation is settl ed and
there is no long er any question of
how to act or with what means: "ln
su ch noe in it is a mat ter of a pure
ma king pres ent o f the th in g itse
th at it speaks pur ely out of jlsel /, lf, 50
and th erc is no long er any nee d
of an
add ress or mak ing man ifes t on our
part.,,90 T hi s seeing is not sim ple
the sense of lackin g the as-structure in
, but, on the contrary, it grasps the
thin g in a delerm inale "as" , Thu
s on Hei deg ger 's interpre tatio n,
nOli s of acti on is really the
the
supreme express ion of logo s, sine
e it is in
virt ue of the sy nthetie-dihaireti e
structur e of logos Ihat we are able
to
und erstand thin gs in their part icul
arity, as thi s or that. On Heidegger'
view , however, norm all y wc do s H .d
Ilot rcall y see the particul
part icul arity, for we tend to interpre ar in Hs
t it in terms of establis hed con cep
ts,
opinions , etc, Acc ordin gly, it is only
the vision of the Aug enb liek that
SBGA 19, p. !63: " Wir habe n hier
zwei l"Jglichkeiten des vo: den
vac; in der
auJ3ersten Konk retio n und den
AlIg emei nhei/ ."
vo im (lujJers/en Ko9o).,.ou, in der
a(fge m e ills /ell
89 CA 19, p, 159,
90 G A 19, p. 161: "ln solc he
m voe v hand elt es s ich urn
Verg egen wartigens der Sach e 5e lbst, ei n sc hl ic ht cs
nicht mehr eines Besprechens, Au fzeig daO sie rein von ihr selh!"/ her spric i!t und cs
50
ens von uns aus bed.1rf."
176
l' II I\ I''I'I ; I{ l'OU Il
\'1111 11 , \l' th" pOSS I'b'\" l 1l10VC bcyond t1le cox / -0 of cveryday life and
'I ly 0 , 1 A
,
tll "rl' th tllln g as l'\se
, ll' ln tht s sense, 11e ug enb liek is the pos sibility
, " T
uic! ,,1 , hllil gC , of lInd crstandll1 g dl ' t\ Eve n thou gh it results from
el en Y ' ,
,
,il Ilhcruti on, it 1l11c rrupts t11e de l'be ratlon as It exp oses itse lf to the
l ,
11i1I11~lIlu r and the Utllq . ,r" of th e situat'100 - that 'IS the mea ning of
ue as " elf s eaks to US91 Hen ce, its
litlt lcggc r's ciaim ab ove that the
thm gt~: mo~,ent form s a unit ary
Iil , n u'sive nat ure notw tths tand
tng, b tween the situ ation of acti
on
,,1I ~' IH)ll1cn on , Clor tl1ere is no dlscrepancy e , '
, h"
, t 't in that t e as w a h l" of our inte rpretatlOn 15
Il ,1(1 the way wc mte rple l,
h
,I11 d ' 'ed by t e SI't ua t'1on l'tsel f instead of be in g
l'I<,pc"cl(OI 'by C'/01e : \~~,;~I~rdistorts the - .
ViIVCI'1I x ' part icularity of the situation,
1 l'ilil vsop hy as COlm te, .-move men ,
t Qnd retrieval
bl' k t f reso lve or dec isio n
s 1,I , of" r as the Auge n le tS a mom en 0
,n ' g the f t'Ion one cou Id say that it
(FIl ISch l"F ) concern m, " best course 0 ac ,
hoosin the phil osophica l life, just
~II,nls to man the poss tbIltty of C,, B gt to the cxtentt hat Aristotle 's
as
. ' ve \Vay to sop l1a,
I,h,.o ll es i s may gt ,
u .
, ' h' . base d upo n h is distinctton
,ll<t lllCllon b etween p hro nesls and sop ID 15
b l be ing phil oso phy 111 ,
11 ' l\Ve en C11an gea ble and unc h an gea e ,
, l ' l 'H1d not onti cal knowle dge
Il ri dcgger S sens e" that is as anto oglc a ( ,
, h d' ' t' on between P111'011 eSl'S al1d sop hia But this
doo s Ilot fit tOto te, Istm c 1
as is som etim es thought,' identify
Il lso sho ws why Heideg ger ~~nnot,
, t
, l 'th ?hrO nesl S, Tha t IS 0 s ay apa rt from mak ing
pbIi oso p 1y Wt 1 , ,
estion of self_unders tandin g, It
pliil oso phy tnto merely a qu, , wo uld
, f t 1 ical know ledge,
1 hy of its poss lbIit ty 0 on 0 og
dcpl'l vC P 11 oso p ' h is also in Heidegger' s view
Moreover, as ontology, phllOSO~ 1 the
Y st the idea ta be presented in this
Nllpre mc fonn of acti on, or that ,lS
a ea , 'th
~cctiOI1 , Wh at el egg er says m connecu on Wl theOl' ia hold s fo r his
as weil and that is that here, logo
s does not
I>WI1 noti on of phIioso phy ,
. . ' lf a praX '" the telos ofp hiloso phy is
olll y gov ern praX IS but IS ltse IS smc e
. ' b' g
Ih e prop er conceptua l , t' n of reali ty Of em .93 Tha l is to say , it
t 5 a 10
- - - -- --- --: -;- ,.
' hat il re resen ts the incalcu lable
iJ l Th is aspe ct o~' the AlIge
nb,fl
nclio n, is elllphas l sed br w. M~~e
C~ill .;il: Glanee ~fthe Eye, pp. 45-4~. aspect of
" ( ' f abo ve p. 120, note 4
l ' 1.\ 01h in Hcid egge r's sense
IS Il ot exha usted
. , ,
1. rhal p li OS 1 bY W B ogan "A
hy th e con ce pt of QPov,~a , o; .15 .sugg.csted y . r , , Response to Robe rt
' f Phro nes is''', p, 152 and by S dl
' ICIIHISCO Ill"' S. ' 1Icid c\l scr S Destru cti on 0 T , a el',
Ih' /dq ,{fJ,c rw ld llrif( ()/fc. pp . 1116- 11 7
1;1
1 .
~! St!c (;.4 18. pp , 2 17-2 I H.
 <..' 111\1' 11 Il 1 (11 11(

uddn.:sscs bc in g s in1pl y for th e sak e 01 Ih ' r'll"Opcr ud d rcss,

i.e. pl t' t\I ClIIlH.: nl is of course alt'cady inscrib~d
,in the noti:~di~S t:s~
cO ll ccp luality jtse lf. By con tr a sl, phl' o ll cs is or ilulhen
tic se l f- h~III1CII Cl1tic, and lhat is to say, kinetic constltutlOn of 10gO~, ake
undersl and ing is "'more in praxis than in logos'" for ils logos
or ,,11'LletLl l"c sinee this tells us that underst andll1 g necessa nly as ~o
m s
underst anding aims at a further end, which is to pursue a course liN' o f ~erta in presup po.silio ns w hen it addres
of ses somet m g a
action and in this way to achieve someth ing good. 94 For thi s reason,
the NIl IlIClhing . . .
philoso phical Augenb lick must involve a more far-reac hing sceing
than When discliss ing the hermen eutic circle ln Sem un d Z~ './, Heideg ger
. l
the Augenb lick pertain i ng to phrone sis. Althou gh it sh ares "'II ,:; tll'It wc must not mi stake it for somc k ind o,r o rblt that slInp
th e ,Y
di scursiv e nature of phronesis, il has to see more, and among ) , . h' . 1 the " most original kmd of knowle dge lS
other Ntl Sl 'lins itself, For In t lS circ e,
th ings precise ly the possibility and nature of phrone sis. And that
is to
lt i~I~Cn" provide d that we succeed in workin g out ;;,e fore- strtture 0 f
say, as we w ill see in th e next chapter, that philosop hy cannot merely '. ' f he thin gs thcmsclvcs", But ltl SO ar as we
1l1lll cr~ t alldlllg 111 telms 0 t
U' '
be . b i t "one" s ays our
in the momen t but has to see it as s uch , namely as th at unified ' II' C nor mally govern ed by dOXQ or Y w ,a
, . ' '..
te mporality which is the ulti mate horizon o f und ersta nding in general fr ntation betwee n Qur presuppOSltlOnS
. tllld ersland mg mvolve s no con 0 . l ' kind o f self-
During th e twe nties, Hcidegger slron gly emph as ises the possibi lity 1111(\ the thin gs thems elves , but mov es precise y ln a
of
change in connec tion wi lh philoso phy. This is hardly s urpri sum eient orbit. Howev er,
s ing,
cons idering that he und erstand s himsel f 10 be challen gin g an
en tire Wh 'l erydayne ss may seize upon the heritage, it happens thal
philoso phical traditio n, not least its inlerpre lalio n of Ari sto tl e. Still,
the Dasle~n el~as the possibility 10 tear the heritage from. e~ery~:~nes,s
focus on the beginn in g o f ph ilosop hy ra th er lhan on its end or b 't tO an original explicale dll ess, that IS, !t1 t <;; leX IS
res ults and to nn~ 1 OUi of everyday ness and agai nst it, the nature of
makes it a bit difti cult to decide how exactly Heidegger conceiv es to appropn are ,
of the conceptual ity [das BegrijJliche] in the proper sense.
98
"validity" of his own project. Howev er, as he himself says at the
end of
Sein und Zei/, whethe r the way one has chose n is the righl one can be day ('vicioU5 circle" of und ers tandin g, and to
'l'l\ stcp out 0 f th e every . ct
decided onl y in retrosp ect." ln other words, w helher one's logos tuality th at does not n1erely sustam an every ay ,
has tl cvclop a con cep
rea ll y mana ge d to address things su ch as Illey tful y are is a matter , .' ct o f a rcso lve th at turns
for illhcriled intellig ibility , phlloso phy IS IIlnee. ' bl on ly if il
further experie nce ta decide. .
ngain st lis ow n presu pp as, ition s , W hl Ch .15 passi e her hori
ln accorda nce wi th his emphas is on lhe aspect of challen ge
and ~ itl1l1ltaneously turns toward s somethin g, that IS to say anat, zon
~ 99
change in philoso ph y, Heideg ger occas ionally de scribes philoso phy
as a 'or meanin g in relation to wh ich one's presuppositi ons o ffer re;,st~~ce.
"counte r-m ove ment" (Gegellbeweglll1g) 96 Fi rst, insofar as Iife is
a fonn III this way, there is in the philoso ph ical resolve a kmd 0 co
ISlOI~
of movem ent or kinesis, philoso phy has to counter this movem ent, . t and future. As far as Heideg ger 's mterpre talton 0
since
it usua ll y involve s a fa iling to endoxa. ln t)lS sense, philoso phy
can be ~~ti~~~:~ i~a:oncerned, one could say that Heideg ger has to tur~. aga mst
sa id to move in the oppos ite direction as compar ed to everyda y li Ih e receive d v iew on Aristotl e, since it mak~s up 15
fe, for ow n
it returns to th at wh ich had always been und erstood instead of 't' and to direct himself lowards that hon zon by means of
losing prcs uppOSl IOns,
itse lf in intrawo rld ly beings and th eir commo n interprc tations, wh ich it is possibl e to liberate Aristotle from everyda yness.
w hi ch
only enact thi s underst anding. But the express ion "counle r-move
ment"
s imultan eously implies that philoso phy has no immedi ate access
to
ilsel f and ilS sphere o f intell igibil ilY bu t h as to take a detour. Q1 SZ, p, 153, .\ d Alita liche di e Erbsc haft an sich reiGe n kann , k~m01t es,
Thi s ~ GA 1S, p. ~77 : ," WC.' ,as . g . nUi lichkeit die Erbschaft zu entre1i3e,n und
dn ll dn s Dascl1l dl C Mogl! chkcll hal'/d~l A b ~
94 GA 19, p. 139. This expressio n refers 10 E. N. 1 t 41
b2 1~22 .
. .. ,/ ' ,,, 'II A/I ~ge l(!g l lell Zli nn g el1, d . h . aus der Allta,glichkelt und
1 \1 ClIlC,r I~"SPI"~I~~~ IC'I~' I\C\;,'irni chC illl eigen/lichen Simle
"
"SZ, p. 437. ~CgC ll SIC ln (Cl tI~\ ,,') Qllweigl1e,1.
Cl
%GA 19, p.98;GA61 , p. 153. GA 18, p. 272.

178 17<)
 'II I\I" II :I( 1,1HII(
To appropriale lhe pasl is in Il c id egge l"s wal'ds 10 rCll'icvc
(wiederholen) il or 10 lake il back . Thcl'cby . olle eo mes baek 10 and
takes aver that which one had always becn, \\Illich in ilS tmn is possible
only bec8use one is also on the \Vay or dirccled lowards oneself as
possibil ily.' OO Thal wh i ch philosophy has a lways bee n is
Arislolelian ism. Insofar as H eidegger does not want to formu late jusl
another version of Aristotelianism, it seems that even his attempt to
Iibcrate Aristotle from the tradition requires that he turns against
Aristotle as wei l and interprets hi s thou ght in the light of a conception
of being Ihal was supposed ly out of l'eac h for him. MOSI specifically, in
Ihis conneclion, wha( Heidegger has (0 COlliller is precisely Ihe idea lhat
phil osop hy would need no such countering, since it is self-sufficient and
complete. However, it is precisely this criti caJ assessmcnt of Aristotle
that granls ta Heidegger the possibility of appropriating Aristotle's
conceptuality " in ils truc sense" and thercby of seei ng that Aristotle in
fact has shown the way to another co nception of phil osophy by means
of hi s concepl of kinesis. 'o ,
ln lhis way, wh en direclin g ilself lowards
Arislotle's concepl of kines is as ilS proper sclf-expl icalion, philosophy
cornes to back to lhat whi ch il had always been: Aristotle.
Thus here we begin to see lhe conneclion between kinesis on the one
hand and temporality and historicity on lhe other. Insofar as philosophy
is kinetic, it has access to the presenl only by being directed towards a
future end. This is the conceptualisat ion of being, which philosophy
addresses in (erms of its past; il is however no longer taken for granted
but is criti call y enacted. Accordingly, Heidegger can describe th e
mcthod of phenomcno logy as reducton, construction and destruc tion :
the rcduction from beings to being in the present has meaning only in a
response, Ihat is, in a construction that projects a being upon ilS being,
and w hi ch in ils lum has gol its specifie direlion from a destru ction of
lradil ional ontology.'02 If th is is lhe structure of lhe phi losophical logos,
then it is apparen tly outside itself, directed towards a horizon wh ich lets
it address somelhing as somethin g but wh ich is nol exhausted in any
s in g le act of understanding. Indeed: " Thi s is precise ly w hat
SZ, pp. 325, 339.
'00
And in GA 18, pp. 272~273, Heidegger points to precisely this concept to show
11)1
what it means to frame a proper conceptuality.
Il)2 GA 24, pp. 29.30.
180
(11 1\ 1'11111 11 111
lhiitlSUphi sill g I1wk cs I1Hlllll co, I , ll\{ll lu.:l'I.': I1lUlI is 1111'0'""11 o ut l'rom and
I . . l ,,103 Wilh lhis
I H.~y olld hi msclr und is hy 110 III 'ons hls. OW11, ~) r~per Y',
vic\V th e se if-sliflic icncy of th e th corctlcal Ide 15 ovclcome, for tl~e
II\OV~ I11Cll t of philosophy is n O longer energeia but kin.esis, though .thlS
I ~ undcrstood withut recourse to the model of productlOn - or that IS at
ICli SI Ile idegger's intention. .
Il owcver man is beyond himsel f also in everyday understandlllg,
"Ince lhat i;the sense of transcendence, which makes possible ma~ 's
ulH.lcrstanding of being. But if this transcending, kinetic understandln g
o r bcin g makes up the essence of lire, then ph il osophy corresponds to
Ille essence of existence to a much greater extent than uther mo~es of
lire. For non-philosophieal Iife involves usin g the understandlllg of
hcin g [or the sake of some other end. As we saw ab ove, in Einleitul1g in
rI/e Philosophie, Heidegger argues lhal the transcendence, that IS, achon
o f' fh eo rein is not the mst origi nal one, in that it presupposes an
und crswnding of being which it cannat thematise. Then he goes on to
!-lay:
1f now transcendence makes up the bas ic es~el1ce o~ humal1
Dasei n in general, then in explic it tra nsc~nd\llg n?thLll g Jess
happens than that the essentially transcendll1g Dasem becOJ~l~s
essential in the explicit letting hap pen of transce nde nce . 1 ~l.S
becoming essential of Dasein in explic it tr~nscen~i~g, ~~e expl1cJt
question of being as such, is nothing but phllosoplllSJ1lg.
ln ph ilosophy, that which we already werc, our essence, is released,
whcreas normally, we enact our essence with some further end 10 Vlew,
nlld this end conceals OUf essence, and makes us turn away fr?m
o urselves. But in philosophy, we are lranscending and understandlilg
bcing or, to draw a paraliel to Aristolle, we are contemplating the good
juSI for the sake of these activities themselves. ln fact, Heidegger takes
Ill' G A 21, p. I l: " Denn das wird gel'ade (lS Philoso~hieren offenbar ~achen. daU
darin de r Mcnsch aus si ch sel.bst und o~er ,~i ch selbst h11lausgeworfe:l wlrd und ganz
IIml g uI' nichl das Eigcntum semer selbst ISt. . 1
1().1 (j 1 27 2lY " Wenn nun die Transzendenzdas Grundwesen des mensch hclen
1 )llsc~ns 'b~;haup't ausmacht, so gesch ieht im ausd rOck lichen ~ra~szendie~~n I~ichts
Gc'ringcrcs 'li s das da!} das wescnhaft tran szendierende Dasem un ~usdl'uckl!c~en
('I csCh chc nh~ sscn d ~r T rullS7.c nd cllz \~CSC lltli ch wird .. Di~scs Wesentl1chwerden ~~
l)[l ~ c ills im nuscll'llCklicltc ll T rn I\S7C~,(hcrcn.' das ,[~lLsdrockhche Fragen nach dem Sel!
Il l" sOlchcn, iSI 1lIChIS ondel'clI ni'! Phll osophLc rcn.
1K1
 'II APTI' I< l'()III<
one step further than Aristotle on this po int, liS h" stlltes Ihal philosophy
as expllelt transcendenee not only fll /fil s bUI in(/oed is the essence of
hfe; however, sin,ce this is norma ll y no! fui fi lIed or explicit, man is for
the mos! part not 111 accordance with his Own essenee.'Ol
ln this way, it seems that philoso phy, for Heidegger too, has
~omethll1 g IIke an aut~nom?us praxis - structure, having its end
Immancntly. For even If phiiosophicai th' k' . We have a efinition, not if the name and the accoulll des igncHe
. '. '. ' 111 mg 15 110t
filII s hed, It bnng~ thlS nnperfeet, this kinetic essence of Iife to its
supreme ~xp re sslO n. In oth er words, even thou gh philosophy on
H eIdegger s account wIll address being in clifferen! aspects, ilS addrcss
IS n everth e,less the supreme fOl"ln of speech, for exp licitly turning
towards bemg an d determmll1 g Il in its particularity is th e highest
change as eo mpared wilh eve ryday speech, whieh ca n only sec the
genera!. However, II1sofar as ph ilosophy only releases Our essence it has
no ,resu lt, and 111 thl s sense in vo lves no chan ge. It only lets us be th at
whlch we. already were. TI1US a Il th e diffcrences notwithstanding, it
looks as I~ one could nevertheless with so me justifi cal ion say that, on
HeIdegger s accollnt as we il, philosophy ca n be regarded as the most
mlense as weil as th e mos t tranquil aCl ivit y, just like Ar istotle's
theoretical lit.
9. The formaI indication
In the previous secti on, th e philosophical logos was to aim at the
t r' , proper
cO,ncep ua .lsa tlOn 01 being. It is 1l0W time to take a more careful look at
thlS pursult. In th e Melaphysics , as Aristotle discusses essence and
detinlllOn (llorisIllOs), he deela res that:
The .c!em~n's in a dc tinil ion musl form a unily, because the
defin ll l?1l IS fi rormu la [logos) which is One and concerns substance
50 t.hal lt must b~ a formula of one particu la r thin g; for the sub5tanc~
deslgnates one Ihmg and someth ing definite, as we say. 10li
Aristotle's primary task in this context is thus to explain how th e unit y
of the essence can be preserved in speech, grant ed that Ihe basic forrn of
lOS
106See GA 27, pp. 3, 214.
Met, I0 37b24 27: "oel 8 ye v etvOi oaa ev '"' ~"
-d O"nv et KC ouaia, wO"'te Ev6 nvo oei mh~4J OfLO"/li", 0 yap ~pla~lo oyo
v n Kal 'toSe n OTif.Lai VEL, Wc; $/lEV." V El Val oyov' KCIL yp il ouata
182
( 'II A !' II ' I HHII (
~p 'ccll is "soll1cr hing us sOlllcthill g", li kOffl fil/ os. ln other \Yord s, he
"us to Hnswcr Ihe qu eslio n why il is Ihat e.g. Ihe definition of man as
" hiJlcd an ima l" (zoioll dipolll1) can be regarded as a unity and not as a
107
nIH II rold, w hi ch wou ld I1ljlke man not one thi ng but several. T he
llllswcr is this:
perfect or
the sa ille (for then ail accounts would be de fi nitions; ... ), but
when the account concerns something pr imary . Such are ail
accounts which do not in volve the predication o f one thing of
another. J-Ience essence wi ll belong to nothing except spec ies o f a
genus, but to these only; for these do not secrn 10 be spoken of in
terms of participation or affection, nor as if Ihey were
accidents. lOS
T he fonn of speech that is proper to the definition, insotr as this should
capture th e thing as it is in itself, is not lege i n li kala linos, since this
o\.: pi cts the thing in terms o[ something cise, but logos ka th } hallto. This
ccrtainly art ic ulates the essence and in th is sense in vo lves a kind of
divis ion, but it nonetheless explicates wha t th e thing is, ra th er th an
predicates something ab out il. One co uld say that the definition, instead
0 [' attri buting some foreign fea ture to the thing, lets it co me 10
expression in its own words, il forms a unit y, cons isting of gcnus (e.g.
"ani mal") and differentia (e.g. "biped"), and th e gelllls has no existence
lIpart from the essenc e (or it exists onl y as potenliality).' 09 Being
107 This q uest ion is posed in Met. 1045a7 ff The discuss ion of the relat ion between
c<;scnce and defin ition as far as Ihei r unit y is concerned is 10 be found notably in Mel.
I ~ oo k VII, Ch. 12, Book Vlll , Ch . 6.
IOM Me t. 1030a714: "6p'\.cr)lo ' a1:.v O\H( av ovo)la "AO'f1J! WtO 011f.La\Vtl (nvte
'Y p av elEV oi "AOYOl opm' ... ), U.." EclV rrp()'tou 1:lVO 1;' "[ow'ra s' cr v ocra
)''fE'tCH /li! "[~ (io lm't' DJ.ou )"'fEcr9at. OK a'tal apa oSEvi 'twv ).lit 'fvou
",Icv \mapxov 'to li ~v Elven, /c totOt f.LOVOV (WllW 'fp OOKEi ou Kat
\IEtOxl1v iYEcrScn Kat miSo oS' ffi crUf.LPEPllKO)"
09 M e l. 103832 6. M. KeBler has suggested that the basic problematic in this
l:on ncction, that i5 to say, not only as regards lhe nature of delinition bu t a lso wit h
res pect to the nature of essence, is that Aristotle expel s the matter from the essence,
sa Ihat Ihis is thought to consist of forlll on ly, for the resul t ofthis is, he argues, that
IIl I.! ca nn ection betw ee n the particular thing an d its essence is broken, which is
cx acll y the problem Plata was racing and which Aristotle believcd he had overcom e.
l'he soluti on to th is probl em, as KeBl er sees it , is th us to invite the matter back into
Ill u essence ga in ;lIte! accordi ll gly in terpret the delinit ion's combinat ion ofgenus and
difrc rclll in ns idc llli cili 10 fi combinatio ll of militer a nd form; Aristote/es ' Lellre von
dt'I' '~lll/('il deI' Ik/JII IIII/II ., he Icx lU n' !> uppOr1 ror Ihi s Interpretation IS Illainly Mel.
IX1
 C I 11\ 1' Il ' 1( 1'111 11(
uni versal , the gentls must be delimitecl by Ihe dillc l'ellli u ill ord er to be
proper to the thin g or depict something dcfin ile ,
There are two ideas of Aristotle's concernin g the deJin ition whi ch arc
of parti culaI' im portance to Heidegger in this connectio n. Firslly thal Ihe
de finiti on cannot predicate anything of the thing, for th en it woulcl
annihil ate th e unit y of th e thin g, and seco ndly, that th e definiti on
captures the thing such as it is in itself by del imiting or circumscribin g
iL The latter aspect o f the dc finiti on means that il delimits ilS object and
thereby is abl e to show what th is rcall y is, thus being the sharpest
contrast to the indefi niteness of everyday speech, which onl y can say
how thin gs are " more or less" . This aspect is emphasised by Heidegger
in hi s di scuss ion o f A ri stotl e's co nception o f de finition in
Gr undbegl'/ffe der aristo telischen Philosophie." o E ve n though
Heidegger to some ex tent relrieves th e idea o f delimitati on in his own
notion o f phil osophi cal ex plicati on, he thinks that the belier in th e
possibility of a full delimitation is rooted in th e und erstandi ng of being
as presence, or more prec ise ly as Fe rtigse in. If being is regarded as
something that is fini shed and not on the way towards somethin g, it is
poss ible to delimit it without loss, sinee the de tinition leaves nothing
out. !ts aspect of limit has positi ve signification onl y, in that Ihe essence
des ignated by the de nniti on, alth ough not uni versal like th e genus, is
unrelated to th e contingent, particular state o f the th ing, i.e. to the
sumbebekos,
But when being is understood in tenns of parti cularity and facticity,
th e possibility of proper dclimitation becomcs a problem, since th e
re lati vely general character o f the de lini tion makes it incapable of
delimitin g the essence in iLS facti ca l particularity. For example, in Sein
und Ze il it is statcd that the essence ofDasein is ilS exi stence,111 and the
existence is th en explicated and differentia te d in its tum; but this
existence is a lways enaeled in a particul ar way, il always has a certain
meanin g, etc. , and this pa rti cul arity cann at be captured by the
philosophieal ex pl ication. Not only because thi s would be an endless
task, but al so because th e words and concepts that are used are
Book Vlll , Cl~. 6, whe,re Aristotl e indeed seems to suggest something similar, evc n
though he earher has reJected ma tter as a part orthe de fi nition.
l'' GA 18 5 8.
III
SZ, p. 42. ' 1 Il
184
I h l.: l n sc l vc~ gcncl'al. n ut il' the delinili on cannt do justice to facticity, it
'1 'cms that il S Hccount is Il ot onl y insurncicnt, as if il would just be a
ll Hl tt cr of cxtcndill g th e account, but that it in some sense says
sOlll cth ing l'a lsc, for in arti culatin g general structures , or in using
HOllnJi concepts, it speaks ab'out something which rea lly does not exist,
01' aS I\ ristotl e would say, which only has potential extstence. Thus tt
seems that Hcidegger here is facing qui te a different probl cmati c than
l\ J' istotl c. To Ari stotl e, the bas ic qu estion is how the de nnition can
lll'ti culatc the essence in its unit y without destroying ilS generality when
il eli vides and "particularises" it ioto genus and di fferentia, whereas to
Il cidegger, th e problem is that gen eral concepts cannot depi ct th e
eSsence in its particularity or factical enactment.
Il owcver, as Heidegger sees it, th e gen eral character of language
s ho uld still not be re ga rded as mere ly an obstacl e to ge nuin e
philosophisin g. The task of philosophy is after ail to say something that
is tJ'u c in principle and not just to account for the unique, whi ch
1Il0reover wo uld not be access ible, were it not for the existence of a
gcnerali ty or normality. As he puts il in one or his earliest lectures, just
as problematic as th e belief in the poss ibility of a general definiti on that
is suitable to everything is the idea th at philosophy onl y has to do with
11 2 h '
Ihe concrete, and that this cann ot be fonnali sed. As we ave seen 1I1
connecti on with his explication of the as-structure, Heidegger is tryin g -
and in this he is surely not the fi rst one - to find a way to overcome tb e
sha rp oppos ition betwee n the general and th e parti cular. Thus the
gcneral meaning or concept in terms of which wc understand somcthing
HS somethin g, albeit repetitive, is not thoughtto ever exist as completely
undiffcrentiated and uni versal , but to always be differenti ated inso far as
it forms a part of th e act of understandin g. T his view is not entirely
dissimilar to Aristot!e's notion of the genus as dunam is, as somethin g
Ihat has the poss ibility of being di fferenti ated and determined in
di fferent ways , although Heidegger would emphasise Ihat the d unamis
ilSclf is faeti cal and th erefore individualised. Thus one should perh al's
J'Hth er say th at th e dan ger of the generality of language is one o f
umbi guity and indefi niteness , whi ch comes about as concepts and
slHtclllcnlS are und erstood in isolati on from th eir co ntext of enaclment.
(i A 6 1. p. 2tt
I H~
 1 Il ,11 ' Il Il 1'1" 1/(
(' II II !,'II , /{ 1'() l! I(
uu, , ' /Il Il 1Il Illpl IH 1 tl lll! '
1Il'i tl" ",., 10 1 1 .
fi' il; IV III IIIIS proble, " is 10 sug u" ' 1
Ihlll ph lloNOI'/II "" 1 '1/1 1 ' 1 1
~ Il II I I ll ! rdll1ldd h l " J .. 1,1 rO I' -J'lIl Ilo t 10 regard phi loso phiea l texts as fi xed, general
, . ui
Illcll cali on" (ji'J1'1II0 /I ' IlN ..t' 1tfi':) 1111 Id , lC' llll t L: J'slood. as " fol'lll , IIIII IIS, bill to ac knowl cdge Ihei r faet icity, i, e, that they have
their
.
Heldeg ger 's leellires ," 'ior Il' \ '''1'11 lUI(1 Zeo 1,;;" OCC lIrs Ircqu e ntl y III " tI ~ 1 1l ln Il eo nc rele s ituation of enactm ent which
is nol altoget her
' '" ~ e l/ l ' ('-" ,
Ji e,degg er sets Out fi ' ' u ' dmll1g IhlS concel' I, In, u ll ll'''I I, , 17
. . 10m IIu ssc rl 's di s, ' .
lnt~ntj~n (Bedeutungsin lenlion )' and Ji JI , ,11J ~ t l?n~ bc!ween l11Canill J.( 1111..' rhnnal indicat ion ca lls upon us to real ise that language cannat be
whlch In briefte rms is a distin t' b I/1g 0 ' tull " ment (Ellllul/ ~) l,p 1lHwly ulldcrstood \v ithout a trans formati on of our existen ce.
Thal
. C IOn etween on Il h ' ,
. le One and intcndin u
Or meanm g someth ing Or h . g a conceptIOn
,avIn of h' "" " is to be underst ood require s that we leap into its proper
SOmet mg, and h avi n ~
, , or on
II present In experie nce or intuitio n 0I1 I1' ""5ioll , so to speak, so that il can be underst ood as it is in itself
regard the assert ions ofph" h (Al1schauul1g ) on the other. '14 1'0 li. I/ IV Il tcrm s , This seems to suggest that Heideg ger thinks th
at we must
1 osop y as formai i d' t'JOns ln '
, Il Ica He id egge,. ,~ respect ta the re lation betwee n
sense l S to reaJise that th " ' ,11 1(0 re-exam i ne the assertio n \V ith
th ", , ey can on ly Con vey me '
e It vl/1g" experi ences' l' h ,aOln g mtentlOns but nOI "hl 'cl IlIId predi cale, Il is one thing that, as a conseq uence of the notion
" fi l/ d" ln w lIC these lntent' nol
1 e . This means th at l'he COllee t cl IOns are enacted and .d 101'111111 ind icati on, assertio ns about truth, being, lime, etc., must
abOlit the ir theme in a s tra' h t' P s lise by phi/oso ph y cannot speak of a propert y to an object
b III' IlIkcn to ascribe a predica te in the sense
th d' . ' Ig l orward or direct ; bu t
e trectlOn ofa possible e.xpcncnc ' ' , way, ut only poim in IV lde h is suppo sed to have this property in an indiffer ent way
e or fu/film ent:
n
111"' co ver, it seems that Heideg ger too thinks that the re lat ion betwee
They are in dica tive , 1hal " of logos kath'
, 15 10 say the Ill e
d" '
.
allll1g Cantem of these . lI h jcel alld predica te sho uld be und erstood as a kind
concepts does Il ot den a te t let somethin g
re lati on 10 i l onl y . or I/'e.c tly say that wh ich if has a l/t lll/O, sa that th e assertio n is regarde d as an attemp t
.' g rves an IIldi ca f .
un erstandm g perSan is C'Cl Il ed upon by 11 .
d , Ion , a 'WH thal the \ tune ln ex press ion in ilS own words, N otably in his Iater works,
c nac! a Iransfonn ation o f hillls If .1 Ils COntex! of concepts to ions as "die Sprach e
e WII l respect 10 his Dasei n."j Il c/dcgge r uses such seemingly taulolog ieal express
Jiowev er th' , '1II'Ieil/" , "die Welt wellet", etc" whi ch can be interpre ted as sayi ng that,
not nothin g, the ronn' J ' . . nguage
Ir il w as possible, which it perhaps is nOl, phenom ena such as la
. , IS IS
' ,
HeIdeg ger points out for lvl,e,1 glvmg ,a mdlcatl On is not empty
ad' fi j
[ro m \vith in
. . .
Indlc,atIOn de limits the Poss ibilities . IrectIOn or ~mders tand
in g, th e ulld wo rld shou ld be articu lated in their own words and
w hich
of unders tandmg , il bes lows ,a
certam "form" upon il 11 6 St' II t1' e fom IlIci!' Qwn dimens ions and not be describ ed by mea ns of terms
, 1 l' d' 118
charact er and should accord' ; b , la m Ication has a prohibi tive hllve th eir origin elsew here.
ntl y
mg y e taken as a wam ing '' it c ommands us Ilut s ince th e nature of philoso ph ica l la ng uage is appare
be
d ' pcnd cnl upon the reader, on his or her awaren ess thal th is must
113
Sce
t42 GA 21, p, 410; GA 58, p, 3 GA 60 make
. .' GA 63 , p. 80. But [hi s [he m' so, pp. 63 -64 ;inGA 6 1, pp. 20, 28-34 6 s ly not possibl e to
. e IS ,al tak en up GA 29130 ' 1,141 _ ,",de rstood as a forma i ind ication, it is obviou
K IS1C J argues tJ:at \Vi th thi
' pP;, 42~.430 . T. ~ ul' C in ad va nce that the assertio ns of philoso phy
will be interpre ted
language which is a la s nOll on, HeIdegge r breaks \V ith Ari
indication is in line Wi!~g ~l~~ of full POssessio n. The idca os;~tJe
s oUslological" ing
a~gua ge as formaI cOITecll y, A s stated earlier, the danger ofmisin terpretati on is someth
being On the \Vay a ,, 1 el egger's understanding' of ma' n s eX istence as alway the receptio n of his
ge ' . ' s pu re dynarnis m" ilL" d!catlon formelle
ln de la f: '. s Ihll t 1 leidegg c r also has stressed in connec tion with
nese ctsa transformat ion" p 2 13 '
~~eS:~ar eIU.Hy exp/ored by D.'O.PDa hls~;~I~' 1~e not!olJ of forma I indicati~ ~t~~J ~ ~I:~ 0\\' 11 work , c laimi ng Lhat h is ana lys is of Dasei
n was misund erstood ,
s log/sehe Vorurteil, pp. 30! _31 3 tial
lU LoglSehe Unlersllchungen II/l 9 '
and 1//2, Chapter One, . s incc one conceiv ed of the relation betwee n Dasein and its existen
. G A 29/30, p. 430: "Sie sind "
. 119 Since il is always
dl eser Begriffe ' anZe lgend, darin ist ge D stru ctures as an ':object ual" (vorha nden) relation
ei ne Anzei ge m:~~~~n~~agt ':icht direkt das, worauf ~~g~ ;ch e~
B,e~eutun gsgeha!t
B egriffszusaml~enh a n IJlWeis darauf, da O der Vers teh eZle t, er gibl nur
von ~iese lll
Dasein zu vollziehen " g aufgeforderr ist, eine Verwan dhrng SC~nde l 111 das
'" cr. G1I 60, p, p, 64; GA 63, p, 80. nature of value, he
116 GA 6/ ' Iller selbs II ~ Alrcady in GA 56/5 7, howevc r, when Heidegger disclisse s the
, p, 33 ,
daI ms thut " dcr WC!'t Wet'tc l" , p, 46,
", GII 29/3 0, pp, '12542Q,

186
1 ~7
 (' II AI'I I ' I( HlI ll( 'li A I' 11 ,:1( HH JR

pos sibl e lhal ph il oso phie al spee ch 1hl s is pCl'hap s not n pal'ticularl y " " It
doe s not in hi s or her lum Iry
wi ll hc IllISlIlId crslood , il'
lh e rcad cl ' , surpnslIl g ! l,;$ U ,as far.as Hei deg ger
in raet th at this dese nptl n'IS mor e
"
to "' Iill " th e concept s but lets ' ,
1 ~ Ollci.:l'll cd. Il owcvcr, Il SCCI
th em n':J1luill 11S
in asta te ofambiguity and generalit
y, phi losophi ca l speech l'uns the l'is" , " .' l ' atti tud e to war ds l ogo s, suc h 't is
of bein g noth ing but Ger ede , that l'I' I"'ll pI'IlIte 10 1 A,ls tot e s I as 1
is, an exp lica tion that is s uita blc f Hei deg ger 's own view on thi
III ' ''llIu J'slo od by He ide gge r: t lan s
eve ryo ne and ther efor e to no one or l ' ' II we saw how Heideg
, Tha t is one of th e reas ons wh ' 1 b ger
con stan t task for philoso phy is to y " HHll l er, as Il HIS eCIl pres ente d here, mua y,
retrieve its own eon eept uali ty, 1 l 'LI ta co me to grip s \Vith A' 1 wou ld have a simp le
T hus the s ugg es tion tha l ph ilos the idea that n stot e
oph iea l arti cula tion sho uld he l , hantikos in the sen se of not . 't
und e rsto od as forma i indi cation ""l Io n o f log os apop sce lng ' s
is not 50 muc h an idea of how lan , ' The d H 'd r 's idea that Aris totl e
aetu a ll y wor ks, as if Hei deg ger gua ge jll esup poSltlOn S, . n we foll owe el egg e
was hop ing that it might be pos sib
le 10
d. b t onl y bec ause he saw its
esca pe obje etif ying lang uage, as "111 1<1 cert ainl y affi rm eve ryda y
rath er a cali to read phil osop h y oxa , u h ve seen how Hei deg ger
new way , That is to say, even thou
gh one mig ht tlr ink that it is only
in " II nl;I t;c\ scopc. ~ina l1y,. in this Ch~IPte;~r::d ~ introduce nouS as an
concepts rcfe rr ing to Dasc in that th e 111 ~U l!S th at Ans totl e even tua y H 'deg ger who
15
mus t be understood as formai , \Vas init iall y
indi ca tions, s ince the se concep ts 1I 11 c ,."allvC ta 1ogo s, By cont,rast ~ el ,
can not be objc ctify in g in the sens " 1 f logo s at leas t in its
terms designating "object ive bein e thal IIjl JlJ'oa ehe d as someOl le d efim tely en l lea 0 ,
g" can , 1 think it is clear that 1 then sho wn to argu e for the pOS SI'bT t of
notion of formai indicati on sho uld tht.: llico relic al form , but Wl0 was 11Y
be rcgarded as an exp ress , '
Il'' lI uthentie thou gh de rIml't e,d 10 gos JO " prae tlca 1<' ,
ion of ail 1" l'Ce has finally bec n
idea of how ta read phil oso p
hy as sue h, l2 oFo r i f ail form di spla yed as someon e who th mks h he life com plct ely dev oted to
s of t at t the
und erst and in g and exp lica tion
hav e th e eha raet er of dun ami
s, rI
I Cfdi sation 0 og as .
is in [aet the supreme one.
phi loso ph iea l texts sho uld not be
take n 10 eon s ist in fini shed , com
plel e But in spil e or thel r p OSSl"bl e d 'f~ ence s as regards thcir faith in
assertions , but in pos sibi litie s, and 1 er
to con ce ive of lhem thus is prec IngOs, Heid egg er and Aris totle hav 1 h t
e one thin g in eOn1l:100 , n~me Y
t t~e
to regard them as forma i indications. ise ly
lhey both agre e lhat the end of the
phil oso phle allo gos IS ooto Ogyl~sno
, t' l or " Iogi e" of being, lt is w
9, Concluding remarks COll ceptua l Isa lOI to thls proJeet we \V I
tul'11.
Wit h the inqui ry into th e phil osop
hieal logo s, the in vest igation of logo
as disc ursi vity is in som e sens e brou s
ght to an end, As the supr eme form
of acti on, that is, of kinesis, the phil
osophical logos does not only reve
the orig ina l poss ibil ity o f logo s, al
to unc ove r bcin gs just for the sake
the une ove rin g itselt; but it also o f
poin ts oui Ihe lim its of this purs
mea nin g is to be und erst ood in term uit. If
s ofp oss ibility or dunamis, and if
belo ngs to the natu re of dunall1is it
that it nece ssarily poin ts bey ond
and in th is way involves absence itse lf
, complete articu lat ion is not pos sibl
ln thi s way , one cou ld say that e.
lhe rout e the tlue e last chap t ers
trav elle d is one from a bcli ef in hav e
the unre stric ted pow ers of logo s
d isco very and affi rma tio n of its finit ta the
ude ,

l~O Sec GA 18 , p. 309, where Heidegge

r claim s th at Ari sto tle 's ca tego
formally indicate their objects. ri es on ly

188 1K')

Chapter Five
LOGOS AND BEING
1. From logos fa being
ln the preceding chapters, Heidegger's conception of the eonnection
between logos and being has reeurred continuously. For one thing, the
analysis of the as-structure has not only distinguished between different
levels of logos but also tri ed to circul11scribe \Vhat in Heidegger's view
are the basic ways in which il is possibl e to address reality, nam e ly
thase that have beell de s ignated as the epistemic, the everyday and th e
philosophical mode of speech respectively. In particular, however, the
question concerning the relation between logos and being has been
treated as a question concern in g the being of logos itself. In thi s
connection, it has been suggested th at Heidegger's conception of speech
and discursive reason iI1volves an interpretation ofman 's being in tcrm s
of kinesis which tries to put Aristotelian onto[ogy in ta question, insofar
as this ends up locating the supreme poss ibility for man 's existence in
energeia or entelecheia. In this chapter, 1 will develop further th e
eonnection between logos and bein g, and in doing so, 1 will spell out
more clearly the ontologieal implications of Heidegger's retrieva[ of
Aristotle's concept of logos, as it has been explicated thus far. In other
words, the overall aim is to clarify the way in which logic as the
investigation of logos is related to the topi c of ontology in both
Heidegger and Aristotle.
Returning to that view of logos [rom which this study origillally set
out, according to which speech and discursivity should be interpreted
after the model of logos apophantikos, the assertion, 1 will expl ain
Heidegger's idea that this conception of logos is inseparably bound up
with Aristotle's understanding of being as presence. Against thi s
background, 1 will show how Heidegge r 's e laborat io n of th e
Aristote lian logos ca me to be deci sive 11 0 \ on ly for hi s co nfrontati on
190
1 [[ .\ 1' 1111 IIV I
\Vi th A ri s t O ll c ' ~ onlOl ouy IllId lt ~ Hullnll II I hl.' l l1 ~ (IN PI'CSC II CC, but al.so
l'o r th e way in whle[) t t ' lrl ' ~l\CI I tHII IClll il~ tj ues ti ull o r th e mcanin g of
hcin g. Th is proj cct must u[1[lIt I'ellll y ill vo lve a chal lenge to Aristoll e's
undcrstandin g or tim e ..ll owcvcr, w l1 en dcvc lopin g hls a~lalys l s of
lcrnp orality , Heidegge r is in flIC! rctri cvin g, or 50 alleast 1 Will argue, a
lI ution of temporality th at is impli ed already in Arislotle's concept of
kill es is.
T he guiding idea of this chapter, which sim ultaneously is to be
cxamined by it, is the one indicated already at the beginning of thi s
stlldy, namely that in bath Heidegger and Aristotle, the phil~sophi ca l
pursuit is esscntially governed by their conception of l,agas. 1 hat 1$ ,to
say , it moves from logic to ontology, rather th an m th e op pos It e
direction. It is thus an implicit task of this chapter to justiry th e co urse
th at the the sis itself has taken, since it too has tried ta approach Ihe
questions of ontology by means of an investigation of logos. [ .w ill
devote the remaining part of this section to a brief survey 01 th e
dilTerent senses in wh ich 1 think this idea should be und erslOod .
Thereby, 1 wi ll rep eat some of what has been said alread y in Chap ter
One.
As stated in that chapter, there is in Heidegger's work already at tlt e
outset an awareness of the intimate connection between ontology an
[ogic, granted that the meaning of "Iogic" is not restricted ta th at fo rm ai
discip line which we normally knaw as logic, but can be taken 111 a \V ldel'
sense, designating the inquiry into speech as such. This is also th e sense
in which Heidegger speaks about logic for the most part , SO as 10
indicate that logic as il actually came to be devel oped docs not dis pl"y
th e on ly direction possible for the philosophi c".l inqu iry int o ,In gos"
Il cnce the necessity of developing alogie that dlsplays th e vU l'l cty 01
logo; in tenns of which man ad dresses re ality. Therewith, thi s [oglc
reveals the different senses of being and must according ly fOI'1I1 1111
intcgral part of ontology, The idea that the inquiry int o ~c ill g C~'~\lln , lin
w ithout an analysis of speech will co ntinu e to gUide Il c l(.l I.,j~)g l'
th roughout the twenli es, since il is part and parce l of !li s l'I oli oll 0 1'
phcnorn enolagy . Sti ll, the madilcation of Heidegger's prajeci tlt ut t t,l k~ s
pl ace dllrin g this period res ults in a shill o f fOClIS. I2ventu ull y, Il IS
co nc llldcd tltal th e phil nso phy o f li re is not altogeliter central bu t I,,,tltel'
preparaI ory . il! !Iult Il ~ h o tlld clcnr th !! \Vay l'or th e q u ~:-; Ii o ll (If' 111\."
19 t
 <' I/ A I'II ' I( l ' I V I '
I11 cHning of bcin g, Ihe scopc or wl1i ch is rh olJ ghr ro cX lcncl bcyo Jlcl the
existential analytic. J
Thus when surveying Heidegger's philoso phienl dcvelopment fi'oll1
the philosophy of factieal life 10 the project of fundamel1lal ontology,
one sees that the relation between logic and ontology in his work is not
merely a matter of philosophical method but characteristic of his DWJ1
philosophical path. Setting out from an investigation of the being of life,
whose essential trait is speech, he eventually presses forward to th e
question of being as such. Later on in this ehapter 1 will argue that this
is 1101 ollly charaeleristic of Heidegger's developmellt regarded
historically, but also of the projeel of fUlldamental ontology itself, sinee
its very possibility is dependellt upon the proper interpretation oflogos.
On his philosophieal path, Heidegger ullderstands himself to be
leallillg 011 Aristotle ill several ways, as we have seen throughout this
study. But wllOl has Ilot really becll explicitly dealt with thus far is that
Heidegger thillks that he is fOliowing an Aristotelian approaeh also in
ontologieal issues. This is because he is convinced that Aristotle's
investigation of beillg is essentially determined by his understanding of
logos, the ideal of non-discursive reason notwithstanding. 2 With this
claim, Heidegger docs not just wanL to eall attention to the rather
apparent fa ct that Aristotle repeatedly illvestigates speech in order 1'0
say something about being, Moreover, he l11eans to suggest that logos
guides Aristotle in a \Vay that was Ilot entirely transparent ta Aristotle
himself. Aecordingly, wh en Ictting his ontology be govemed by logos,
Heidegger is repe"ting an Aristotelian path at a level of rellection that
proved to be out of reaeh for Arislotle.
ln his attempt to Come to grips with Aristotle's ontology, Heidegger
must thus take logos as the guiding clue. If Aristotle's ontology is
governed by logos, then Heidcgger's confrontation with it cannot be
direct or unmediated, sa to speak. Apart from exploring the \Vay in
which Aristotle speaks about being, how his ontologieal conceptuality
grows out of and is motivuted by a specifie mode of address, this
confrontation has to proeeed by way of an interpretation of Aristotle 's
articulate notion of logos. That is why the question concerning the
~ See SZ, p, 1.
GA 19, p. 224.
192
t 'II A I' II 1( II VI
OI Cll llill g o r logos lins bcoli l:4IVl' lI tw cll tt l:l.!lItral place in Ileide gger's
l'lIgnge l11 ent. \V ith Mi stotl 's pliil osopliy Us a wh ole. .
1r Aristotle 's ontology is dcpcndc nt upon hls understandmg of logos,
Olle l11ust be a bit care rul w ith lh e idea oceasionally mdlcated by
Il cidegger, namely thal Ari stotle' s views of speech and reason could be
cx plain ed by means of traeing them baek ta thelr ontologlc~1
prcs up po SI't'lOns. TI,I'S must not be taken to mean that Anstotle ,s
IInderstanding of logos, his "Iogie", could somehow be reduced to hls
OJ1t ology, as if there were a simple route from logie to ontology m
Ari stotle. Their interrelation must rather be said to constttute a kmd of
circle. For as we have seen, a central tenet ofHeidegger's interpretatlOn
o r Aristotle as whole is his conviction lhat Aristotle's work IS ~ot
go verned by sorne speculative notion of being, nor captur~d m the~~les
li anded down by the tradition, but rests upon an expenenee of the
lhings thernselves", sinee Aristotle is a phenomenologie.1 thinker, and
Ilot merely in a naive way . Even though Heidegger tends ta eonclude
Il1at , in the end, Aristotle ' s ontlogy is more or le~s a .natural
continuation of the everyday understanding of being, th us JlnplYI~g that
it was only within Aristotle ' s power ta artieulate this ullderstandmg but
Ilot really ta refleet upon it, he does not seem ta think that the limlted
seope of Aristotle's ontology ean be aceounled for simply by refernng
to its pre-critical or nave character. Heidegger certamly ~~es 110t
as cribe to Aristotle any conception of transcendental condi t IOns of
L11l(1erstan dmg, but he indicales ( th"t Aristotle has realiscd the need ta
inves tigate both speech and reason in arder to be able to reveal the
nature of reality. As he puts it on one occasion:
Neither ancient nor medi evat onto logy is, as ,the c~mtn o n
ignorance holds, a purely objective onto[?g~ 1l1VO~vJng an
expulsion of consciousness, but what is pecul,mr IS preclsely that
consciousness and ego [lch] are taken to be ln the same wa~ as
the objective is taken to be , This is shawn by the fact !ha! ancl~nt
phitosophy orients its ontology towards logos and tI,lat one ,wlth
some justification cou!d say that ancient ontology 1$ a IOglC of
being, That is correct insofar ~s logos is the phenomenon that
should darify what being means,
) G A 24, p, 104: " Die anlik c 50 \'/ohl wic das mittelal,ter!ich,e O,ntologie sind, nich~,
wic cli c gc w hnli chc Unk cnntlli s me iJlt, cin,e re ~n ?bJek,tlve, ~ntolog l e mit
l\ussc lwllUn[\ dCI! n C IV II Jj I ~l\; i n $ , so ndc rn eliS Elge ntmll c he 15t gerade, daf3 das
t91
 '11 i\ I"II ' I( l ' I V I
What is problematic is llot sa Il1l1 ch Ihu~ I\ ri s lO ll c's ollla lag ica i
investigations are nave with respect to th e l'o le o f logos or, gencrally
speaking, as regards the question of access, bul rather that his
understanding ofJogos in hs tum is affected by his ontology. It is partly
because of this repercussion of his omology on the conception of logos
that Aristotle cannot help but cstablishing logos apophan/ikos as the
basic mode of speech. And as indicated by the passage just quoted,
Heidegger thinks this move by Aristotle proved ta be decisive not only
for ail future investigations of speech and therewith for the development
of logic as weil , but also for ontology, insofar as the model of logos
apophanlikos in its turn \Vas read back illla the na ture ofbeing, resulting
in a "logie ofbeing".
Accordingly, if, as Heidegger says, it is logos that should clarii)' the
meaning of being, it is necessary, in arder to get a guiding clue in this
pursuit, first of ail to Come ta understand why Aristotle was forced to
interpret discursivity in terms of the assertion. Gnly when this is made
clear are wc prepared to begin the inquiry in10 th e meaning ofbeing.
2. Being as manifold and uni/y. Aristot/e 's critique of/he Elea/ics
Ta Aristotle, and ta Heidegger as we il, the question of being is ta a
great extent a question concerning the relation between manifold and
unit y, that is ta say, concerning the possibility of framing a unified
concept of being, once the apparent manifold nature of being has been
recognised. This question is evoked not least by the experience of the
wor/d as changeable, as marked by kinesis, since change no doubt
seems ta imply that there are different modes of being. Aristotle seeks
this unit y in ousia, "substantial being", to which ail other senses of
being thus are ta be led back. In this way, ousi'a is not only what makes
it possible for other "things" to be, but it is also the presupposition of
logos, of the articulation of being. Therefore, the search for the unit y of
being is just as much an attempt to find the unit y of logos, which makes
il possible to say "something about something" and tl1US la speak about
B~wul3tsejn und Teh im sel ben Sinne sei end \V ie das Objektive aIs seiend genomm en
wlrd. Das bekundet si ch darin, daB die antike Philosophie ihre Ontologie auf den
oyo orientiert und man mit einem gewissern Recht sagen konnl e, di e ant ikc
Ol~~ologie ,sei eine Logik des Seins . Das ist n so fern ri chti g, ,ds der Logos da s
Phanomen lst, das aufk Wren soli , was Se in bedeu tet,"
194
hcing in a vari c ly or di m': I'~ llt ~CI1 t"C:)! ~ i n cc il is prcs llppose~ every time
we say that SOtll ethin g " is":' ln th e following, l will ,explore
Il cidegger' s idea that, in hi s seal'ch Jo r al/sia as unit y, Anstotle IS dnven
hy the hope of findin g a specific kind of presence, namely filllshed
hcin g or en/elecheia, which should make intelligible or explam an
oth erwise changeable and differentiated world. But 10 pursumg thls
int erpretation, Heidegger find s that Aristot! e 's understanding .of ~usia
as entelecheia in ilS tum points ta the concepts of logos and kmesls, so
th at it is onl)' on the basis of thcm that one can trul)' compr~hend
!\ ri stotle's notion of a unified sense of being. EvcIllually, we will see
how Heidegger not onl)' affirms this as an interpretatio~ of Arist~tle,
but also lets it guide his own se arch for the unit y of bemg. But slllce
Aristotle's understanding of logos is governed by his notion of being as
presence, Heidegger has to reinterpret logos in the light of renewed
conception oftime. . .
Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle 's understandmg of the relatton
bclween logos and being largely centres on the Physics, notably on the
part that is devoted to a critiqoe of Parmenides and M elissus. Heidegger
returns to this critique throughout his works, and eventually he will
even claim that "The Aristotelian Physics is the hidden and hence nev~~
sufficiently thought-out foundational work of Western phtlosophy.
The reasons why Heidegger ascribes such importance to the PhySlCS are
scveral. Most specifically, he is convinced that, in this work, Anstotle
comes ta grips with the basic problems that troubled his predecessors.
ln virlue of his understanding of the " Iogical" nature of bemg, he IS able
Il ot on1y ta bring out the truc meaning of Parmenides' thesls on the
unit y of being, but a1so ta account for the nature of ~lOV~l11ent ~nd
c hange in a way that surpasses the steps taken b)' Plato 111 thl s ar~a. ln
other words, because of his insight into the nature of kinesis, Anstotle
reaches a level of clarity in ontological issues that was out of reach for
hi s predecessors. For this reason, Heidegger emphasises that the PhySlCS
is a work on on toI ogy and thus not concerned merely wlth a specifie
< See GA t7, pp. 25ff. ,. 'k B 1" ("WP") 239-
~ " Vom Wese n und Bcgriff der <lJUO"l. Anstoteles, Physl, ,pp. .
30 1 GA 9 242 "Di e (l ri stotelische 'Physik' ist das verborgene und deshalb me
zurC:~hend 'd~;'chdl;chte G rund buc h der aben dlandischen Philosophie." Whole
se ntence ita licised in Ilcidcggel" tex l. .
/) Sec GA 1t(, p, 2 ~ $ Tliid (;1/ 1Q, D. tlRtl rcspecllvcJy.
 111\I' IIIlII VI

kincl ,of bein gs, More prcc isdy, Ihe lop ie nI' III . l'I/y.\'}rs is no l
IM~lIrdl belllg, Of! plwse l, but pllusis ilscl!', and Ii mi is 10
s illlply 11H11 Ih e burth.: n 0 1' pl\l ll i . l'Il l II I Np U"-.. II cs c 1l11n.: 1y \Vit h th e I~leatics.
s that : w1~ he rcsca rch (Ih al.
s'Iy Ihe be' \' (:l'H l1lcd th at one spcllks IIho\ll hcill g III d i fc renl senses, \\le - who
bemg 5. 7, Thus H ' . declare are
, e ldegger dca lsmg 0
,
w 'll d(1l1btin g lhal be ing is OIl C do Ilot rca ll y have to put forward an
pllllSIS
. IS not hlll. g but the QClueveme
' nl 0).r Ihe prtllW/J
' ' categor ies which 1 1 ur gul11 cnl of our OWIl , a t IC1;Jl not initi ally, but it is enou gh
Anstot le e,tab hshes later on in his ontology,"S that we
' inlerro gate our oppone nls, Tor lheir answer w ill by itself eontrad ict
In Grundbegriffe der aristote/ischen Philosophie, Heideg ger is led their
10 Ihcsis, The two eqllally hopeless alternat ives th at the E leaties are
the Phys/cs by hls discuss ion of lhe conditi ons of possibility of p fac in g
co t ' r' b' 1 lire, as Aristot le sees it, the fo llowing: granted that being has but
1 ncep ua Is mg emg, A l this slage, he has reached lhe po int roper y one
at whic h scnse, either you must say th at it is th e principle th at is, but then
l e, can assc rt that: tO,Aris totle, ta address a bei ng as th is 1$ In you
ilsclf lllUSt conclud e that that o[ which it is a principl e is not, or the other
means to address It wlth respeel lo its ori gin (Herkunji)9 Accord way
in gly,
the proper logos round .\3
A d ' reveals . the ongms or principl es o f be'n 1 gs, tl' -
len arc.: llal.' Us ing the termino logy of gramm ar, one may say that Aristot le
n to do so lS preclse ly the ail11 of th e Physics, But in order to is
reach "ccusin g the EIeatie s for ne glecti ng the difference betwee n subj eet
t~ese pnnclpl es, Anstot le l11l1st first confro nt the thesis and
put forward b predieate, namely that both subjeet and predi cate m ust be said to
Parmel lldes a nd Mcll sSlIS, that there on ly is one princip le of rea be, but
rly y in di ffere nt senses , I-Iowev er, as far as th e ontolog ieal leve
that " being" has b LI t ont:::" sense. ,, ln Ihl' s connec ti on Heide l is
l ,50

inve~tigation ~~~~
eoneern ed, one might say w ith H eidegge r th at wh at the Eleaties
emphas ises lhat this shows that Ari stot le purs lies his are
overl ookin g is really the ont ologiea l difference, th e differen ce betwee
belOg as a cnllqlle of his prcdece ssors, That is to say, he is striving n
to bcin g and beings, for " Seing canna t be identica l \V ith a particul ar
eventua . ll y bnng . out Ihe trll e mea ning of their thes 'ls and being,
' t
no , as ft" IS if being does not have a variet)' of meanin gs, sa th al each parlicu
so metlme s thoug ht, Just 10 criti eise th em fo r th e sa ke of c lar
itself,'o 't' , bci ng is" .\4 If being \Vere one, then Pann cnides' own say ing tl1at
ri l Cl s m "bein g
is" wou ld be im possib le, for as soon as you say th at a particul ar
. Basical l?', the,arg ument that Ar istotl e directs aga in st th e E leatics being
is is, you have introdu ced a differen ce," Thus Aristol le shows that the
s lmp ly lhl s: belll g ea nnot be one fo r even if you onl
aekno 1 d , , ' propon ents of the thes is that being is one do n ot j ust h ave
y want to
w e ge one pnn~l pl e of reality, you must ad mit that "a prinei a bad
le is argume nt, they cannat in fact argue at ail, s ince their thesis, if
of so me thlllg or thlll gS",1l Besides , Ari stotl e continll es,
appal
we sinc~ Irue, woul d destroy th e very possibi lity of speech ,
it \Vere

, 'ently
b do 'speak abO lit be in g in seve ra l ways , 've nlust b eglll ' Haw ever, Ar istotle remark s, th e re are ncv e rth e less so
lllqu lfy y asklll g w hat they possib ly can mean who say lhat beingo llr philoso phers who have trieel ta "void attribut in g to being ,everal senses:
rn e
is
one, Do they thlll k that it is the substan ce that ca n be said t
b
perhap s that it is some of th e ot her categor ies sllch Even the later of the old philosophers \Vere afraid lest the same
. l , 12 , a s quaal'Il)'e or or
thing should tum out to be one and many. Thercfore, some of
quanllt y, t lat has belll g? Proeeed ing in th is \Vay, Ar istotle indieate
s them, like Lycophro n, eliminated the ex pression "is", and others
changed their way of speakin g, 50 thal th ey did !lot say " man is
'GA 18, p, 28 4.
tbid .: " D'le F'orse 1lllllg, di e ber die $au; h d l ' white" bul "man has wh itened", not " he is on the way" bui "he on
t, tst !l!C~IS
.
' le n stoteJes nac hher III sea~deres
Cewl17 l1 ng der primalTI I Kategur ien d' A' an e
an setzt. " a!s die
mer Ontologi e
9CA 18, pp. 283284. Again the fo ll owing di . f' 13 Phys. 186a28-1 86b2.
of the Phys ics as weil as of Arislotle' .
t 1 1sells.slOn 0 l-Ie ldegger's mterpret 14 Phys. 186b2-3: "ou yp OW l OV 't\ aUlo EtvOl, el 1-1.11 1tO)J..t la V cnll1CttVEl
work. s e eo ogy m gene ral draws prirnarily onation
111is O1l woU: etvCtl n That Ari sl otl e takes an important step tow ards an
Ka010V . "
understanding of Ihe ontological difference is also emphasised by
" GA
1\ Phys18 i s 28'
4:5,. ~1, ~45,. wh:re ~e 'l~egge! ascribes thi s view to Bonitz. "lIeidegg 's Interpretat ion of Arislolle on the Pri... ative Character of
er
W. Brogan,
Force and the
12 . a . 11 yap ap;Ol 'H VO l1 ..nvw .... "
Ph)'s, 185a20-32 . Twolold ncsS of Oelllg", pp. 11 2- 11 3.
15 Plly.~. 186btl .. 11.

196 197

~,I~ ~, way s" , in ~rd c r 10 a vo id Jl wki ng QII !,! i tilO OUil ly by uddin g
IS , Ihus ass lIll1l1lg that "OIlC" and " be ing" only Im ve olle sense. 16
ln destroyi ng the possibility of speech, the Eleatic Ihesis s imultaneous ly
makes movement and chan ge impossible. When ad dress ing thi s iss ue,
HeIdegger argues that Aristotle 's idea is not merely that being must be
manifold because th ere exist at least two Ihings, a principle and that of
wl~i c ~ it is a prin c iple. Moreover, hi s idea indicates th at a principle is a
pnnc.lple onl y insofar as it can be expli cated as somethin g's principl e,
In01ls way, Ihe poss ibility of exp li ca lin g a being with respect to its
belll g presupposes th al there is more Ihan one principle of realily." O r
in other words:
Th is being r~lUst be .detenn ined in adv~n ce in its onlologica l
~ tru~tLlr.e, whl ch gels !ts preJ ill1 inary form by thi s: that this being
~ s pnnc l pa~ly a "towards whic h" or address and bespeaking, i.e. is
llltende.d ln the "how" of the ' Ascharac ters". A being is
categorJ cally .always th is som ethi ng as suc h and such, that is to
say : the meantrlg of being is principally manifold (lll llltiple). 18
Thus logos itself sho ws Ihat Ihe me",ing of being cannol be one. Were
it not for lhis differen ce, in virtue of which so methin g can be add ressed
as somethi ng, movement and change, and consequently nature as such
. 19 '
wou Id b e Impossible. Accord ingly, Heidegger concludes that, because
of thi s in timate connect ion bet\Veen the o ntological and the logical
dlfference, Ari stotle 's encounter with the Eleatic th esis on the unity of
beln g mUSI also be regarded as a battl e conccrnin g the question of our
access lo bcing, in which Aristotle strives l secure his th ern e by means
16, Phys . 18~b~5.3~; "~e?p~J3oilV'ro O Kat ai orepol 'l"WV cpxairov onw)..t~ a~1a
y E VlltCtt OUTOU; tO OU'[O EV
A ~ ' t<
!Cc Eoriv ci';"",, )
lto a. OU) 0\ II V t e ..
'f .... . av, marrep
',j, <;: ' , ,..
UKO,'i'ProV. Ol ~ ,l'T'IV ",e-,t v ~"tppufhIl ov. Ott 6 avBpwrro o euKo on v :U..
),ee~K~fCl1, ou~e j3a?t,$wv, EOtlV j3aoi l, Lva ~lli nOtE tO Ecrt11t?OOmovte
~O/... El veu rrO l 0001 'r o EV, WC; )lovex;(w EyOIJ:VOU TO Evoe; ~ '[o ovm."
GA 18, pp. 286f.
18 PA , p. 265: "Di~ses Seiende lll uB in der onto logi sc hen Struk tur im vorh inein
angese lzt \Verden, die dadurch ~orgebi l det ist, daO es grundsatzlich ei n ' Worauf des
Alls pre~hens .und Besp~ecl.lens Ist, d.h. verme int wird im Wie der ' Als-Characlere ' .
Da.s S~ !en d.e r ~ 1 .kategonal rll1mer dieses elwas a Is sa und sa, das besagl: Der Sinn des
S eULS I St prmzlprcllmQl1nigfallig (meh rfaltig) ."
19 F I ' . 24 Cf. Phys, 189b30190a8, where Aristotle di scusses the differenl ways in which one
' ~r t liS reason, Ar!stotle states from the begin ning o f bis di scussion of the Elenti c
thes ls that the ques tion wh ether being is one is not really <r ques tion concerning
nature, Phys. 184b25 185a2.
198
1 !I \ I' llll II VJI
or strcss ill g rh ul 0 11 kJmUII /lf '1I011 is poss ib lt! onl y as legomenon, as
20
ex plicable wi th rcspect 10 S\lIllctltillg, lIamcly ilS pr inciples.
3. The princip/es of change 'lnd theil' te/eologica/ il7telpretafiol7
111 his attempt to delermine the principl es of change, Ari stotle begins by
assertin g that one m ust reali se th al noth ing acts or is acted upon at
rano m . T hat is to say , not s impl y a nyth ing (to tuchon) can be
generated out of, or destroyed inlo anythin g: yo u do not change from
c.g. " educated" to "whil e" but frol11 "nol- \\'hite" , for il is not as
cd ucated yo u are ch an ging bu l as not._w hiIC. 21 Acco rdingly, everythin g
Ihat comes 10 be or passes away c\oes sa rrom a con trary (enanlia) to a
ca ntrary.22 Or, put in a differc nl \vay, th e principles of change are form
(e idos) and its privation (stel'esis ).'] However, this is not enongh to
aceo unt for change. Even th ough Aristotle does not explicitly make this
point here, one might deleet th e reason why the pa ir of contrari es is not
cnough just by examin in g our way of speaking: we do not normall y say
th at e.g. " uneducated becomes educated" , but "the (uneducated) man
becomes educated"." Thus change cannot be described merely in tenns
of a tra nsition from one state of bci ng to a noth er, but it requires for ils
possibil ity that there is somelhing as so meth in g, i.e. in a part icular state
of be in g, that becomes somet h ing. fn Aristotle ' s words, th e con trary
principles do not act on eaeh other, so it is not really "unedueated" that
bceomes "edueated", but it is some third thin g that is acted upon and
hence subject to change. He continues:
Besi des that, one could also be pcrplcxed on thi s po int, \Voul d one
not suppose another nature underlyin g the contra ries. For we do
not see that the conlrar ies make up th e substance of any be ing;
but the first princ iple or origin Ill ust not be asse rl ed of some thing
underlying, a substrate, for then we wo uld have a princip le of a
princi ple or an origin of the ori gin . T he slIbstrate or subject is the
orig in and thus secms to be prior la that whi ch is asserted of it. 25
20 GA 18, p. 285 ; PA , p. 265 .
21 Phys . 188a31 .1 88b8.
11 1'hvs . 188b21 . 23.
1) .
Cf. Phy,. 190b20ff
call give express ion la Ihi s kind o f generation.
25 Phys. 1 89a 27~32: "llp6C; TOtO En K'iv t o e tl moprl oE.t E.V, el Pll "tl<; Tpav
UTtoOr'v:rer 'f0 ' <; I~ v(r vrl UI " I!IUO I v ' oOr vo y&. p OpWp.v "tcilv ov"tOWV oolav "tavavTiCl,
19 9
 (' 111\ 1' 11 ' 1{ l' IVI

When Aristotle introduces th e noti o n o f subs lralc, he is di sc uss ing it
bath in the sense of matter (Inde) and as a co mposi te being, ln Ihe
former case, il is a question of the generation afa composite (sun/he/on)
being, whereas in the latter, il is thi s compos ite being Lself wh ich is
changing in sorne respect. And if is primarily thi s kind of change QI'
gene ration that is of interest here. This change would not be possible,
wcre it not for somcthing that does not change. However, it is not
unconditionally un changeable, s ince th at whi ch changes and that which
rem ains in sOllle sense are one. For w hereas it does not change wi th
re spect to its substance, e.g. Ihat it is a man, it does change with respect
ta so me of the other categories, such as quality or quantity. Thus thal
whi ch is subj ect to cha nge must be a composite being.26 For only as
compos ite can sOll1clhi ng be ex pli cated as somcthing or in terms of
something cise, and this was ro und to be th e presupposition of change,
He nce the expuls ion of the simplc, indivisible beings from the realm of
change.
However, ta just enumerate the principles of change does not explain
the being of change 0 1' w hat it means ta be a changeab le bei ng, for thi s
only says what chan ge presupposes but not rcall y " how" change is. In
other \Yards, the task still re mai ns to c larify {he being of change and
mo ve ment. Such il clarificati on rcq uires a te leologkal perspective. On
the basis ofthis change of perspective, Aris lotle ea n define change thus:
"S inee in every gel1lls there is a difference between that whi ch is in
actuality and that which is in potentiality, chan ge is the actualisation of
a potential being as su ch [i.e. as potenti al], ... ,,27 Il is onl y at thi s stage
that Heidegger sets in his interpretation. For hi s interes t concerns not
primarily the pri nciples of change sueh as thcy are initially determined
by Aristotle bu t rather their teleological interpretation, since it is only
with this interpretation that Aristotle ach ieves th e concepts with which
cha nge can be properly artic ul ated. Thus in Grundbegriffe der
aristotelischen Philosophie, we read that : " Inso far as kinesis is
dCICnnin \!d by (1IIIIrlllIl,\' und l'1/{'1'}J,i'/a , Ill csc mak c IIp the two archa l.
2K
T he Ihi rd is a PCCUIi Ul' u1Ii o n llrbolh ."
The rcaso n why Il cideggcr speaks about this union as peculiar
bccomes clear when wc loqk at Aristot le's remarks concernin g the
delinition o f change:
The reaso n why change seems ta be indefinite is that one callnot
place it among eilhcr potentia l or actual be ings. For nei ther that
wh ich is potentially of a certai n size, nor that \\Ihich is actually
(hal size, does necessarily cha nge to that size, and change seems
29
to be a kind or actualisat ion, but an incomplete one.
Change cannot be identified either with dunamis or energeia and must
thus be exp licated w ith the help or both of th ese concepts. On
I-Ieidegger's account, what is crucial here is to note that " naturaI" beings
are not simply potential , for in arder to have a potentiality for
somethin g, beings must already be something, and thus simultaneous ly
be in the mode of energeia or entelecheia. As Heidegger puts it, that
bei ng which is marked by potentiality or possibi lity must already be
"there" or present (gegen\Vdrtig)JO
On1y on the basis of thi s teleolo gica l perspective, which mak cs it
possible to explicate kines is in tenn s of a " peculiar union" of dunamis
and energeia, does Heidegger take into account the notions of form and
privation. A being that is " there" or present in its poss ibili ty for this or
that doe s not on1y have an eidos, but at the same ti me, it relates to th e
privation of this eidos. In tb is way, il is marked both by presence and
31
absence, or in other words, bath by being and not_b cin g. Moreovcr,
Heidegger continues, inso far as most thin gs have the c haractcr of " more
or less", they are not simply eithcr this or that but they are on the way
towards so me of their possible determinations and are thus ho ldin g
28 GA 18, p. 286: " So fern die K t V'10U; bestimm l w ird d urch UVOl-ll und Evpyeta,
mac hen diese beide n zwei pXat aus. D ie dri tte ist eine eigenHlm liche Verei nigung
von beiden."
29 Phys. 201b27-32: "'to 8 OKElV ap lo'tov elvctl '(~v KtVllOlV aluov on O1:. ei

1"~V ~pxi]v ,o KaS'. U1!~Ket ~vo~ Be yeo8ai nvo. Otat yp apxi] ti) px~' ta
16ap \J1tOKelllevov PXll, Kat ItpOtEpOV OKe m KO't1l)'OPOUIlEVOU elvat. "
Phys, t90at4-1 7.
27 P/~ys. 2,0 l a?- II: :'1 n~llIlv~u O ~ae' b=.amov yvo to Ilv VtEqE lf/1O
Buvape l , Il tou uva~lel OVTOEVTexew, tI tO l OtOV, lCiVI10l eO-Tlv,. "
UVal-llV 't0v ov'twv oihe el evepyewv Otl V 9Evm an;v" ot e yp 'to uvct'tov
m acv E{Veu Klvettal e avYK'1 otE 'tc VEpyEt nocrv, ~ te KlV'10I vepYElCl
I-tV dvOl n e; OoICE, td.i1 t""
" GA 18, pp. 295. 299-300.
31 Il shou ld perhnps he poi lll cd out that do does not necessari ly mean "esse nce"
hcrc, bUll hc dl stincllon bclwcCll 1"0 l1n and privation applies ta ail categories.

200
20 1
 (' ll td' Il 1lilVI
[II ~I Il lfll!..: up by 1'0 1'111 Hnd
Ihl.' /lI NC l vcs bc twccn [Il e I wO CX II'CII H.:,"I Ihlll
J2
pl'lvHli on . Acco rdin g ly , a bcin g Ihal is tlllI/fIllH'; is 1101 on ly a lrcady
something, thus being marked by el1lelecheia, but il is also " not yet"
something. To be present in this way is to be in mol ion ]) Thus w hal
Heidegger wants to s ugges t here is that eve ry bein g to w hic h
potentiali ty or possi bility belongs is in motion, for to be in mot ion is 10
relate to somethin g abse nt, which in its turn presupposes a presence. He
thus co ncludes that: "Movement is Ihe presence o f the potentiality of
being there as such."J4 But iflh is is the essence of movement, then reSI
can ollly be a li miting case of movemcnt. A being is al rest only when iL
is depr ived of ils pote ntiality 50 th al il is no t o n th e way towards
anythi ng. 35
4. Change G/wlysed inla poiesis and palhesis
T he a nalysis of 11l0vemenl is, Heid egger claims, 110thi ng but th e
ul1coveri ng of being in Ihe sense of bcing present (Gegenwortigsein),
sin ce movement is ro und to be tha t kind of prese nce w hich belon gs to
36
natura l beings. This in sig ht \Vas o ut of reac h for J\risto tl e's
predecessors, since tb ey cou ld not affirm m ovemen t as a positive
phenomenon. They Ihere/ore declared it to be indefi nile and co mpared
it to not-being, unlikeness and otherness. J7 Thus as Heidegger sees it, it
was A ri stotle 's g re a t achi evc me nt ("h at he cOli ld see that th ere is a
"GA 18, pp. 3 11f.
33 For the most part, Heidegger translates KlVllOl as "movement" (Bewegung) rather
than as "change" (VeranderuJ/g), pro bably beca use he wants ta have a broadest
Possible"notion, ,~v!.lich he can use also in connection with eVpYEw and EvtEXEta,
t~oLJgh . c hange IS, as far as .' know, the cornillon translation of K"lVllo I. For a
diSCUSSion ofhow ta translate I\tVllOl~, see R. Wardy, The Chain a/Change. A Study
ofAriSIOlle 's Physics VII.
34 GA IS, p. 313: "Bewegung ist die Gegenwart des Dase ink in nens ais solche."
J5 GA 18, p. 3 14.
36 GA IS, p. 395. Gegel1\11drtigsein, Gegenwar/, ctc., a re th us, in this COurse at least
Heide~ger's neulral tenns for prese nce, that is presence when it is not necess aril;
CO ll cerved on the bns is of product ion. ln th at case, J-I eidegge r uses the term
Herge ste/lts ein and also the tenn Ferligseill. as wc have see n earlier. As stated in
C hapt er On~, p. ~3, note 38, in GA 19, Heidegger begins 10 use the expression
Anwesendsem, wh lc h., as far as 1 can see, also is imended to be primarily a pure ly
!~mporal concept, whlch does not necessarily implica le a poi elic basis.
GA 18, pp. 317f. See Phys. 201 b l 6ff. For Heidegger's idea that Aristotle is the fi rst
(as weil as the last) to sec movement as a positive phe nom enon, see PA, p. 25/; WP,
p. 244; GA 19, p. 484; Vom Wesen der menschlichcn Freiheit. Einleit/lllg il/ die
Philosophie (GA 31). pp. 30.32.
202
( Il ,11' Il Il II V I'
i!'i flll ' h '.\' , or 111 o lil e i wO I'd s. 11H11 il is poss ib le 10 be prese nt
p" t!SCII CC 111 /11
th e way towtll'd!{ Ull cnd .
liS 0 11
" .
Thus insof'ar as th e uccoun l of rnovcmenl given in the former sectlOl1
mi ght seem 10 idenli ly m O~elll C llt wi th difference, it is insufficient. On
1k idegger's view, this acco unt does not yet really expl all1 what 11 means
J9
10 be present as bei ng in moti on. What is missi ng here IS a more far-
," cnc hin g elucidation of the rel ation between bein gs on the one hand and
th c ir fonns and privation s o n the other. Inso far as a be lll g th at lS
Illovable o r kinelOl/ ho lds itsel f between th e two ext remes that are
rcpresented by eidos and steresis, il is determi ned by the.cat~gory pros
li " in relation to". And that is to say, eyery movab le belllg IS there or
p:'esent only in re lation to so methin g thal moves it, o r as Heidegger puts
kon. '0
it in a Mildasen w ith th at w hich moves, t 1le k metl
, Accordingly, the co ncepts that wcre missing in th e aboye ana lys is of
Illovement are paiesis and path esis. Movement can on the han d be
c1cscribed in terms of pathesis , acco rding to w hi ch the movem ent of th e
1110vable being consists in ils being affected. But on the other hand,
Illovement can be rega rded as a f01'111 of pOesis, as lh e "e ffectOl of the
4
mover. ! T hus Ari s to tle sta tes that kinesis is the e11lelecheia "o f tha t
which has th e capacity ta effect as weil as of that whic h has th e capac ity
10 be affected".42 Reca lling Heidegger's interpretation o f Illoyelll ent 111
tenn s of presence, the "actualisation" (ente/echeia) of the moye r and the
moved can be described as a relation between two kinds of presence: by
affeeting the kinelan, the kin etikan lets it be prese nt preeisely in its
trans ition, in its bei ng on the way towards sO l11cthing. But on the otl~er
hand, the presence of the kinetikan is in its turn dependent upo n lts
relation 10 the presence of the kinetan: it comes forward onl y mso far as
it lets the kinetan become present.
On thi s acco unt, it is th e experi ence of kinesis as a mode of
incomplete presence whi ch has enabled Ari stotle (0 devel ~p his notion
of enteiecheia as perfcct presence, that is, os a mod e of betng wh lc h lS
not on the way towards anything, and which is found ta be presu pposed
J8 GA 18, pp. 318 and 32 1 respective ly.
'' GA 18,1'.318.
~o GA 18, p. 327. For Ihe nOlion o frrp e 'ft , see Caf. 6a36-8b24.
., GA 18. pp. 322rr. _. __ ,.
~l Phys. 202b26-27 : " l~ TU\) 5vv6'H::\ '11'0111 t1 KOU Ka l rraBrrnK ov .
201
 (' 11 1\1'11 ' 1( l' IVli

by killesis . l-l cid t.:ggc l' is thus in H pos iti on ln II I'gU ~ lI gllinSI ail t.:ntil'c
tradition of Aristot le sc ho Jarship lhal : " y ll 'I[ lJrnl bcillgs nn.: I1Hll d ! c~ [ ln [!ldr lrans ition onl y in sofar as we can
, ' 1\..
1( t . 1 ch they nlrc.ady \Ven; (10 I l. en e m . . Cll') , their eidos or
. essence\
. .
The exposition of the meaJling of being, whi ch is pred ominant in "cC t la W 11 , h 'd them wlth a Imllt
G reek cnto!ogy as weil as in the actua! cu lmination of lhi s
10w'll'ds whi ch th ey arc moY in g and whlc proYI es h
antalogy in Aristot!e; predominant, sinee it is experienced II nd ' thus lets th em be presen t or t1lere, The primary"
presence
't t us
'
al ready in the inarticulate experience of the being there [Daseill] ' h'IS n ot in need of any productlOI\ slIlce 1 IS
bc longs 1'0 that W h IC
of world and life - the exposition centres 01/ the intelprelafon of
'1i l'e'lcty finished, d th
( ~rOadlY speaking as far as the ge nesis of beings are concerne, ere
movemenl ! But insofar as kinesis is posited in terms of energeia,
ente/eelleia, these are the primary categories of being in Greek
ontology)43
I d be an 'essence or a form towurds w hich beings move as
mu st a rea y k' bout natura!
ds their own te/os. And insofar as we are spea mg a .
With this diagnosis, He idegger has also Come across what he regards as 1() \-.v ar . d to artef;"!cts they have the ir prin c ipl e of change
the limits of Aristotle 's teleology, When search ing for the genesis of belllgs as oppost: (ct'. ; th ey a lso have their le/os with in
w ithin themselves. Acco r II1g y,
that presence w hich belongs ta kinesis, A ri stotle is led ta frame a notion ' [ e th e "producer" numcly ousia in the sense of essence,
lhemse lyeso l er , , B ards such
of poiesis, of production, as that which sho uld explain the possibility of is nothing external to the being th at is produced.. ut as reg .
moyement an d change, More precisely, the only way in which AristotIe l ' ge that is in accordance wi th the other categon es, such as quah ty or
can account for the possibility of kinesis is by positing a moyer or Clan . . . s we saw 1Il the
q uantity, what has ta be there tram the begmnmg 1S, a , , H'
producer. But ift his is th e origin or final principle ofbeings that are in former section, ousia in the sense of a con crete) comp~slte be~~~. I~~ e
motion, th en ta have knowledge of these thin gs is ta know what , th us have the notion that change or movement IS pOSSI e 0 y
produces th em, sin ce knowledge in the proper sense is of origins. At v.e
because of the existence of' a hupo ke/menOIl,
. .a sub.ject or substra te.
this point, it wou ld perhaps be natural ta point ta Aristotle 's idea of the Accordingly, Heidegger cJaims that:
unmoved mover as th e ultimate principle of reality and its intelligibility,
But Heidegger does not bring in this idea at this stage, Instead, his focus The hupokeimenon was uncovered for t~e fi.rst. time by Arist~t1e,
in connect ion \Vith his uncove ri ng of kll1esls, I.e. on the b~SIS .of
concern s the notion of entelecheia as that which is fully present while
his new founding of the question of being from out of k!1l e.!.S
holding itse lf in its end. To know kinesis is to know entelecheia, for it is What this is al1 about is that Ar islotle reached ~. proper ~rasp . 0
only on the basis of the latter that the former is accessi ble'4 That is ta that which already occu rred ta Plata: that there IS SOIl.lcthmg l l~ e
hu okeimenon in kinesis, in kinoumenon. ln thl.S \Vay t le
~cat: ories" were also discovered by Aristotlc, ln krnOllme~ol:
43 GA 18, p. 392 : "Die Heraussfellung des Smes Sein, der in der griechische n
1'01}

Ontologie und de r in ihrer eigentlichen Kulmination bei Aristoteles herrschend ist,

Arist~tle has thus seen fo r the tirs! time that Iherc IS .somelh!~g
herrschend, wei l er in der unausdrcklichen Erfahrung des Daseins des Lebens schon in movement lhat remains, that has slas ;s, that a lready 15 there.
erfahrcn ist - die Herausstellung zenlriert in der Jnl erprelalion der Bewegung l
Sofern aber K1VT)<Jto; gesetzt wird in den Namen von evep'8w, EV"t"XW, s ind dies lnsofar as Aristotle ' s ontology is based up on his ,understandin g of
die primaren Seinsbtegorien der griechi schen Ontologie!" As W. Brogan bas , ", , into that presence (entelecheia) w hlch 13 presupposed
po inted out ("l-l eidegge r's Interpretation of Aristotle on the Privative Character of kmesls It mqutres k h If mat e
Force and the Twofoldness of Being", pp. 11 3ft) , in GA 33, Heidegger argues against by m;vement and change. In other words) it see ste li 1
Bren tano and others thm OlJvo)..tts and EVPYLa a re Ilot categories of being. This
' vov wurde erst von Aristoteles entdeckt, i111
45 GA 19, pp . 591-592 : D~s \l7tOK EWE . '
daim is however not at odds with the above quotation, for when saying that oUvo)..lt<; - - -- - --:-:::---::,,:--:-,
and EVPI'EW are the primary categories of being, Heidegger does not rnean la d h auf dern Baden seiner neuen
Z usammen hang mi t seiner Entdeck~!1g dei ~lVllO~, . ' aus Es handelt s ich hier bei
suggest that they are the primary predicates or that they would be determinations o f
being on the same level as the other categories. Rather, the point is that ail categori es Fundamentierung der Frage des Sems vodn er KtVa~s~t!ato s~hon
vorschwebte: dal3 es
1 d
am Kt VOU~lEVOV gibt. Da auc 1 wu r en
. . ntliche Fassung essen, \V
are ta be interpreted in the light of OlJvo/-w; and vpYELa, for these concepts provide Aristoteles um eme elge d'
us \Vith the means to give an ontological interpretation of the other categories. so etwa s wi e e in ~ltOKeillev~v ~n e~ Kl;tllO"l~; KlVOVIlEVOV also hat Aristoteles zum
"Cf, GA 18, p, 388, yon Aristote lcs (li e' Katego rJen ent ec. t gibt das bleibt das cJ""raou; hat,
e rstcn Ma l gesChJ1 , dnO c.s an der Bewegun g e \Vas , ,
das m yorhinc ln qchon dO IS!' ''

204
205
 CII !\ I"" ' I( l' IVI
fb uildation of rea lity i n sorn cthin g ,hat cJ ocs Ilot Il/wC 10 be prod uccd.
Thus as Heidegger sees il, th e pro blem wilh !\ risIOll c 's "pproach is nOI
primaril y that he disco vers (ha t somelhin g must alrcady be th ere or
present but th at this presence itself is taken as an absolute fo undation.
However, befofe turn ing to Heidegger's attempt to anal yse thi s
presence in a way that moves beyond the steps taken by Aristotle, il is
necessary to spe ll out the impl ica ti ons of th e abave account of
Arislolle's teleology wilh res pect la hi s understan ding of logos. More
specifi cally, lhe question Ihat now has la be addressed is wh ether
Arislolle' s understandin g of killesis an d ente/echeia might in ils tllm be
ro Oied in his conception of logos.
5. The commonfoundalion of /ogos and kines is
J ust as cha nge is conceivabl e onl y in relation to somelhing th at does not
change, ousa as hupokeimenon or su bstrate, speech pres upposes
som ethin g about which o ne can speak , Dl/sia as subject or as th e
"substantial" element of speech. As il is tormulaled in the Categories:
Substance in the strongest, origi nal and capital sense s that which
is not asscrted o f a s ubject , nor presen t in a su bject ." The
pri ma ry subs tances a re said to be substa nces in Ihe strongest
sense a lso because Ihey make up tbe subjeci of everylhing else
and everything el se s asserted ofthem or is prese nt in !hem .46
In this sense, ousio as subj ect is the fo undation of discursivity, making
it poss ibl e 10 explicate somclhin g as somclhin g. For as the primary
calegory, ousia is presupposcd by th e other calegori es . And as th e
"primary substance", that is, as the subj cct o f legein fi kala linos, ol/sia
is a concrete, composite being, whi ch in Aristotl e's view is the Corn mon
or everyday sense of o l/sia. Ii is Ihis noti o n of ol/sia as subj ect th al
AristOile firsl must examine in order la tind out what is common to ail
kinds o f s peech. In oth er words, when beginning to elaborate Ihe
q ues ti on of being as be ing, on he on, Aristotl e must on the one hand
seek to preserve or amrm the fact th al we speak about being in a vari ely
46 Cat. 2a 1 ! - J3, 2b 15- 17: " O ai.a att v ~ lCuptw"tata tE Ko i n:pffitw Kat
l-la.lIJta .eYOI-lVll, Tl ~nrE. Ka8" imOICEII-lVOU tl ve .yetat IJnte EV urroKEql v(p
to
tlV l OtlV , . . . tl ai rrpltat ocri a l ol To aO I arraOlv urroKeio8a t lCai
rrcivta"ta (tUa Kata TOUtwv Katllyope'icr80l li ev Tau'Cau; elvC1! Ota toino POIO'ta
OOlcn .YOVtat
206
1 I t Il ' 11 (( " VI
or d ifTcrclll S CIl ~C S. hUI 0 11 1111,' nt hl'I hund l'cvcu l what is prcs upposcd by
ail kinds of logol whkh .. dd,css so nlclhing as being.
Accord ing to the Iil lll OU S say ing in thc MetaphyslCS,
"Se ing" is spoke n ~ r in severa l senses, but with respect to a
unitary phenomenon and some single nature, and n~t merely a.s a
eommon epithel. ... For one speaks aboui sorne thmgs as bemg
because they a re subst ances , o thers because they a re
modi fi cations of substance; others becau~e tl.1ey are on tI.l : way
towards substance, or destructions or pri vat ions o ~ q u ~ lItl: s ? r
productive or ge nerative of subs tance, Of of ~ha t.whl ~ h IS sald I ~
re lat io n ta substa nce, or negat ions of Ihat whlch lS sald thus or 0
substance. 47
Were it not for this single na ture, i.e. al/sia or substance, not only wo uld
it be impossible to speak, but alt ribules or pred icates would not reall y
exist at ail , since il is onl y in relatio n ta ollsia, or more spe crfi~ all y, by
ana logy w ith ousia, th at ail olher Ihi ngs are and ca:, be s",d to be.
Accordin gly, Aristotle ean co ne lude : " Hence ' bell1g 111 the pnmary
sense, that is, not in any relative sense but sim ply or absolutely, should
,,48
be SU bstan ce.
When this subject or ousia is of a simple, indivisible n atur~, or when
wc maye from the initial noti on of ousia as a concrete ~ e m ~ to th e
proper con ce p1 of Ol'S'O as the essence or whatness of thlS be1l1g, .th.e
powers of logos arc insuffi cicnt, as wc have scen elscwh~re ) 50 th at It IS
Oilly nous that can give us aceess 10 lhese lhing~ . Accordmgly, nous and
not logos is coneerned \V ith th at whi ch exists 111 lhe hlghest sense, I. e.
th e subj ect or the ollsia as it is in itself, before every kind of expllcahon
whieh understands its obj ecl as somethin g and lherefo re Il1 volves
difference . Accordingly, Ihe range of vision that belongs to nOlis IS
wider than that of logos. This also means th at it is r eall y n OliS th al
makes logos possi bl e, for it is nous th al ti rsl of ail glves u s a subJ ect
which we can speak abo ut - hence the non-discursive ideal ln Afl stotle.
~7 Mel I003a33 -b lO : " T i> OV ),yetCLI '/to ....~ axw".a
- ,(.1 ~po
'}.,)' ' v K(.Il~iav4lu
'" " Ol
' av
' ." . . ta v yp Ot l oatat, ovw ),eyEtal. ta on na, ~
~~~i~~\~~~~;:~~~~il otaiav. ~ ~eopai ~ atEp~aE.~1 ~ ."o,6t~t~1 ~ "~~~:':,~ ~
yevvl1 r~Ka ocri a ~ nv n:pe t11v ooiav .Eyo~vO)v , 11 'tOu'Cwv 'tw o a rr
oata'" " Kat ou. 'C 'I ov
48 Met. 10280 24.29: " wmE. 10 rrp(~'tJ ov " a').)" ~ 0' rr t..w.-~
" DV ~ m'iOta av
c'i11."
207
 ( 'II AI'II -I( I-IVI
t II Al' ttl ( II Vt-

II ~wcvde r, as menti om.:d in th e bcg il1nin ~ 01 (!I ls chllplcJ'

llei dcg'gcl' 1
" nll'cady has bec Il deu il \\1 1111 on 11 IILllIlh c l' nI' uccnsio ns, No\\' it is
conv lllcc that , ev en lilOUg 11 "Il tS /"I 0 1lS and time to
not logos Ih, 0
a l is ab le to tl'y la scllic th e l'Cllltii.l1l bdwcc n th csc t"'JO concep tS.
;::serv~ or corresp ond to the nature or be in g whcn Ihis is Wc have secn carl icI' th at Il cidcgge r thinks that the concepts that
interprct cd in are
as : smo l~.rese~ ce, III th at nous d~es not li ke logos understand ilS obj ec needed to explai n the naturc of kil1esis, namely paiesis and pa/hesi
t s,
e IIlg,. m terms of someth mg el se, it is nevertheless logos that is must also be taken into a~count in connection with 10gosSO Just as
the
govenlln g Anstotl e's ontology: movabl e being is affecte d by something that moves or is produc
tive,
logos gets affected by its object. Or as Heideg ger puts it: "Think
Aristol~e strives indeed, as we have seen, in the idea of sophia 10 ing is
~love eyond logos 10 a l1 oe in , which is l'ree l'rom legein. BUl nolhing but this pros, thinking require s in v irtue of ils being: being open
;~~ rded more carefully . evcn his detcrmin ation o f that wh ich la samelh ing difJe/'el1/; its be in g cannot be understood or be origina
lly
a. es up the sccn, if not the Ito whot ' is there".5 t C lea rl y , th e idea of ~uch
ach teved b l ' fina!1 .
arc h e, that wllich is ad "l, "
. .
t lall elon, 15 no t an
~y . TI', u
LI !Il 1 )C o n entatlOn frolll /0
Ihe facl Ihal Ihe rundamenial deIC~~~;la1 i~:, oC~~':1C;I~p~are'lt openness in logos and kinesis is in Heidegger's vicw one of Aristot
le's
as, the characle r of h/lpokeimelloll , Iha\ which alrcady'
us 10 ad. vance
Ji~S b~r~> most important insights . Howev er, the problem w ith Aristotl e's concep
t
det" . ' the altog e.tl1er pnmary
. 01 e
prese nce; that is the formaI of kinesis retums in his concept of logos. For just as Aristotl e has
J ~n~l~atlo n of somethln g that is fiS stlch. And 10 be sure to
;;po eu~'eIIO", that is to say, Ihm wh ich alrcady is Ihe;c
th '
i'~
explain the possibility ofmove ment and change by positing a moyer,
he
is in need of a productive reason, a nouS paie/ika s, in order to accoun
ab:~~~~ n~se:~i~;g,fr\~~~:I~~l ~C~i~:~I~:i~ r~'~/;~~iI~: . ~I.lnt in a spee~h 52
t
ad vance, before ail speech, is the re fo r th;
about which one 5 k
X!st~lg con text, ln for the object, the "to what" oflogOS.
. s speec , namely that On Heideg ger 's accoun t, logos is rea ll y the primary theme
: . pea s, - IlIa( IS the hupokeimenon the on the of
OUSla III the forma I sense Th e basl'c ch
l ' d l" Aristoll e's ontolog y, since it is th e notion of the discursi ve structur
. aracter ot' , be in g
, is e of
re neve rom the contex t of logos itself.49 logos that lets Aristot lc re gard the wor/d as chan geable, as marked
by
kinesis , ln thi s way , logos wo rk s as an a priori in Ari stot le's
Recalli
h k ng th e quotati on above ' whcre Heideg ger staled that
tlle philosophy.53 But as we have seen earli er, Heideg ger also thinks
upo eimeno that
kinesis" we n was " uncovc' red. r.01. t1le fi[rs t t!Jne
. . connec
III tion with Aristot le's concep tion of logos in its turn is determ ined by
con ce t: fsee that He idegger apparen t ly thinks that A ri stotle 's hi s
underst anding of kinesis , in accord an ce \Vith which logos itself
p 1011
. 0 OUSlQ as hup 0 k el/HenO
. n may be interro gated f is
h regarde d as an activity th at is afe/es, incom plete, and thus of a di
perspec tive of logos as we Il l' fferent
s hould of course hardl rom t e
as rom th e perspec tive of kinesis kind than the perfcct nou S. M oreover , insofar as Ar istotle tends
. This ta
Heide ' , . y cO ~le as a surpn se at thi s stage, where interpre t kinesis in t e r11lS of product ion, 50 that th e final explana
gger 5 ldea of an essentwl co nn ect ion between logos and kinesis tion of
kinesis is reached only w ith the el ucidation of a produce r that is
not
itselfpr oduced, this makes Aristotle, or that is at least Heideg ger's
idea,
49 GA 19 , p, ...4., ,Anslole
,. conclud e that the proper task of logos must be to make accessi ble
O'o$ia libe r den vo'" hin 'H'sleszustrebt zwar wie v ' ' this
' 1 ~,
e,' e '- d \ If gese llen haben, in der Idee der
n III VOEtV as fre ' , t produc er as thal which kinesis really is, namely the presenc
bese h.en Ist auch, sei.ne Besti mtTI ung desscn, \~as letzt 1 1; .V?I~l AtYE tV: Ab,er genauer
'
e or
nur III der Onent lcrung am ) 6
~o
- e aPX Il 151, was aOlCttpET OV i5t e ntelt;;ch eia of ousia as essence.
Gru nd best immung des av d' ,'c o',
, , \ I o t a
dgewCo'll llen - Das zei gt sic h dari n, dan
en larakte d' . di~
r es \l1tOKEt~
dE\'OV
was 'lm vorh inein schon vorliegt der g'.
estun mung
' nz pn' maren
.. ' Anwese
1 '. . hat,
. des sen '
B
al von etwas \Vas berha l ' U ,nlel1 , as 151 die fonn ale
. " up ISl. nd zwar 151 d' . . ~ Chapter Three, Section 8.
. 50,, was !Ill vorhmein schon da ,'st gese hen aus d
ln emem Sprechen ber etwas Ivas' B H' bl' !eses \J1tOKEl)lEVOV ' das ~I GA 18, p, 234: "Das Denken ist nicht s anderes aIs dieses ltPO, das Denken
, "' , l i n espreche n eines em 111 lck auf das yElV: Was verlangt seinem Sein nach: ofJen sein
ln: vorhlnem ver allem Sprechen fr dieses da i . d Z ZI/III anderen, sein Sein kann nicht verstanden
. . ' selen en usammenhanges
\Vlrd , _ das ist das U1tOKei~Evov das 6 s~, na~h.ch ?as, worber gesprochcn werden, prim(lr geschell werden, wenn nicht das Wozu da ist".
Grundch arakte r des Sei ns wird aus d 'z v, die O\laLa III formale m Sinn Der Sl Sec Chllptcr Threc. Section 7,
< em .usamillenhang des oyoscJbst ~cschI;n." 5) PA , p, 265,

208 209

6. The primot.:y oftlie ClsSrtion alld the questioll aj'he/II!!,
As we saw in. eonncet on with J 'Icid egger ' s di sc ussion of e veryday
~peech, tlle basIc character of logos, whatevcr fbrm it may have, is that
It makes the world present or accessible by explicating it in di fferent
regards. But a.s not~d in the former section, even though Heidegger
suggests that, ln Anstot le ' s ontology, lo gos prescribes in advance the
ways in whi ch the world can be given, he also thinks l'hat Aristotle 's
understanding of logos is in its turn affected by the notion of being as
presence, so that logos is thought to make present that which in some
sense already was present. It is th is feature of logos that has granted to il
Ifs prol11l1lent place in Aristotle's ontological investigations:
This b~eaki!lg fil 0.( logos, of the logic a l in Ihis slric1.ly Greek
sense , Ir/ta Ihe ques.llon concerning Ihe on is II/Oti\!ated by the fact
that the on, the bemg of beillgs as such, is inlerpreted primarily
as pres.ence and that logos is the way in which 1 prnarily make
sO/17ethmg present, narnely that about which 1 speak.54
ln Chapter Two, we tb llowcd Heidegger's idea that Ihe reason why the
assertion, logos apophantikos, could become a model for discursivity in
general should be sought in way Aristol le determines Ihe assertion when
he characterises it precisely as apophantikos, stating that its
fundamental trait is that it makes ils abject manifesl as il explicates it.
Even though Heidegger himself to some degree affirms this
mterpretatron of Ihe asserlion and has tried to elaborate upon it, he is
nonetheless conv lllced that it is intimate ly bound up with Aristot1e's
u~derstanding of being in terms of presence. When bcing is identified
wllh presence and regarded as somelhing finished and vorhanden, that
IS, as ~omething which is constantly "there" for us, the idca arises that
the pnmary task of logos as sueh, whatevct form it may have, must be
to cO~Tespol1d to and preserve this prese nce. S5 And sinee it is the
assertIOn alone Ihat really can be said ta achieve this, it deserves ta be
called the primary or superior mode of speech.
" .GA. J9, p. .1 25 :. "D/eser Einbruch des oyo, des Logischen in diesem stren
?ne~hIScl~e~ Sun, tn. chese Fragesleltwig /lach dem av ist dadul"ch morivierl, daJ3 da;
~~' ~Sd~etn . des S.erendeJ: selb~f, primar ais Anwesenheit interpreti'!rt islund der
oyo., le An IsI, zn der Ich Inll etwas, namlich das, worbcr ich sOfech e ... .. .
vergegemvdrtige." 1 , p' OIIG/
55See GA 18, pp. 214ff.
2 10
1 Il \ 1' 11 Il 1 1V I
T o be sure, I\ l'lstoll \ ,IIH"oj 11 111 huvl' li l' "dul:l ivc vic\\' o r s peech . Ile
docs not wanl 10 s u g~ "s l 1/ 111 1 11 11 l, milS or speech CO LI Id be ana lysc d
usin g the stru cture o r Ihe fl sscl'li OIl - in th e grammati cal sense - as a
model , as sumin g c.g. lI\at a l bottolll tilere is an indicative ke rnel in
c very mode of speech. In his view, there are different form s o f
semamein, of signifying, and only the assertion signifies by means of
making manifest, since only it can be true or fa lse. 56 But precise ly
because Aristotle does not think it possible to reduce ail fonns of speech
to that of the assertion, he regards the assertion as mare interesting in
connection with thl;ory an knowledge. And if Heidegger is correct, the
consequence of this is thal, because of a certain theoretical bias on
A ristotle's part, he tends ta think that making manifest is the most
important aspect of speech as such, sa that it is only the assertion that
really fulfils the essence of speech.
When speech is conceived along these li nes, the subject of speech is
ascribed a certain priority over against its poss ibl e attributes or
predicates . For as noted in the discussion ab ove, the subject is thought
to be what is already present before we begin ta speak, since it is that in
virtue ofwhich there is something at ail about which one can speak, and
so the important thing is that this subject is made visible such as it is,
that it is addressed in terms of attributcs that are proper to it. In ather
wards, ifspeech is to perform its funct ion ofmaking manirest correctly,
it must "submit" to the subject, it must let itself be governed by this, sa
that the subject in its truth or in its disc lasure, and nothing eIse,
constitutes the end of the speech.
As we saw in the analysis of the assertion in Chapter Two, Heidegger
is convineed that, in order 10 undcrstand the nature of the assertion and
the motives behind its alleged supreme powers, it must be interpreted
precisely with respecl to its end. Il is not enough ta regard il as a
grammatical category, as the class of indi cative sentences or
propositions, or ta refer to its htct-stating or predicative funct ion. For
wh en a speaker is out to convince, threaten, etc., that is, ta bring about
an effect on his audience or in general ta pursue a course of act ion of
sorne kin d, the subject of his speech is ta sorne extent pushed into the
background, whether or not his utterances are assertions in the
56 De II/l , 16h13 17f1 11,
2 11
 l' ll ilP II 'I( II VI
t '1tAJlI t' I( J' IVil
grammatical sense, sincc the end of his speech is n OI I'clI l' y 10 makc (his
subject manifest, to revcal ils nature. Thus OIl L! coulcl say Ih at, in thcsc , 'II y a quest'on
to bc \Vo ule! Ih us SCc ll1 to be pnnclpa J , of ident
' ity ' since
c.
circumstances, speech tends to poilll bcyond ilse lf, whcreas Ih e ' bein gs arc 1I0t undcrsloo d 111
simple ' t crms 0 f somethmg
, dlfferent. ,rom h
asserlion can be sa id to cali altention to its subjecl, in Ihat its aim is 10 1 1 I-Iowevcr lhis is denied by Aristotle, In thls connectlOn, e
1 lcmse ves" , l' i ht
make it manifest just for the sake of making il mani/est. From a seems l0 ln' d'cate
l , the realm of simple bemgs, . even thoug l It m g
teleological perspective, non-assertoric speech must accordingly bc
make up an ideal ofbeing, is something of a speCIal case. A ' t II
described as a fonn of kinesis, leading over to a new situation of speech The question COll cern mg ' bcmg' as bcm ' g, 011 he on ' .does
. not. fi.S 0 .e
as it brings aboui an effect. In this way, such a logos is aleles, whereas . ~ s seek 10 establish the reason why a thi ng IS Ilself, for that IS
the assertion is more akin to energeia, since it does not have any ln orms u '. l.;ul task but the question always concerns the reason why
extcrnal end. not a meanmg" , " If " Wh
something is somelhing oth er, something dlfferent from,ltse, e,n
How~ver, wh en the primary tn sk of logos is thou ght 10 cOllsist in th e we are scare llm' g COI'II tll e ' why' , il is always m the sense . "why does thl s

unco ve ri ng of its object as this is in itselt; and wh en the worthiest
objects of logos moreover are themse lves purely present and not on the
way towards any th ing, it also becomes clear why the assel1ion, insofar
as it is has thc form of legein li kOla linos, in the end is regarded as an
inferior farm of ex press ion. Illstead, th e s uperior logos is logos kath
hauto, s ince this do es not ascribe ally predicate to the subject which is
foreign or external 10 it, thal is 10 say, si nce it has n o thin g ta do \Vith
that which is kOla sumbebekos, As wc sa\V in the previous chapter, th e
notion of essential predication is in its turn motivated by the idea that
the powers of logos in general are weaker than thase of nOliS, since nous
can reveaJ and preserve its abject witho ut modification, in that it does
not like logos understand its object as something, in terms of something
else, Accordi ngly, it seems that one could say that, what motivates
Aristotle to regard logos apophanlikos as the superior l'orm of speech is
simultaneously what makes him sec the limits ofthi s mode of speech as
weil as of logos as slich.
lnsonlr as the lirst philosophy is not a universal discipline, but is a
theology, concerned \Vi th Ihe supreme beings of reality, tirS! of ail God
as the ultima te princip le of reality and then other simple entities such as
pure forl11 s, its access to its th eme must be non-disc ursive in kind. 57
COl1sequentl y, the question of being, th e investigation of what it mealls
b 1 t II ' [?",58 Thi s is of course hardl y surprisll1g 111 connectlon
e ong 0 la, 1 t take
w ith the investigation of " ord inary" assertions" s uc 1 as, o ..
Aristotle 's own eX3l11pl c, " 1~ he man IS ' ducated"
e , 1.e , such asselflIOns 1
whose atlributes are kota swnbebekos or be lon g to SO~l e 0 IlC
J categories except ol/sia, like the category of quality, quantlty, etc, In
these cases, wc arc apparentl y asking why a con crete, con~posJte OUSI5~
, e dowed with some pro perty which does nol belong to ItS essence,
~o:ever A ristotl e go es on to show that our question is of the s~,e
kl'nd also' when we are interrogating abou t the essence of a thmg, 1 ne
mi ht believe that such a question asks about 1'd enllly, . b u,t Il' 1 faet , W le n
1oO~ing for the "what" of an individual thing,
, we are asklllg why some
matter is of a definite kind, Aristolle contmues:
Thus what wc are seek ing is the cause (Ihat i~, ~he fo rl11 ) in v irtLl~
of which the matter is a definite thi ng; and thl s IS the ,s ~bst~nce.~
the thing. Il is clear, then, that as regards simple en~l tleS, I1l QUJ?
and explanation arc impossible, but they reqUire a dlfferent mo e
ofi nquiry.60
W hen we are inqu irin g into essences or 1 l , 1 C abo vc-
S ,IJ11 p 1e en lOfes b
mentioned mode of questi ollin g is not poss ible, for essences c~n ~
. onl y . There/ore, to the exlent "that the questIon 10
appre 1len d e d by nOliS
what it means for a particular being to be is a questIon concernlllg w ly

57 For an in vest igation ioto the re lation between onto logy and the%gy in Ari stot le, ---------::-:---=--~. '",' , .., .,
"~ ,U', ri
~8 Me/. l 041al0- 1l: "111e.1atOe.10uta1taElov1...... i(;).)..o ).).<.O "tl vl
see H . Weid ellla nn, Metaphysik und Sprache. Eine sprachphi/osophische
Umersuchung zu Thomas von Aquin und Aristote/es. As the title imp lies, Aristo!/e is i.lTtPXEl. " . . d f f in Met Book VII. Ch. J 7.
here contrasted \Vith Thomas Aquinas, whe re the latter is said 10 airn at a slricll y S9 Arislotle di scusses thls km 0 ques Ion _ _. '").. f1010 " cnt 10 ElO<;! t9 11
universa l ont%gy, 60 M el . 104 t b7- 11: :'wot.l Ol;lOV ~T\lEl:,at ;~~ ~l~~rr/.lv OUK O"n ~lT\crl<; oU
C""ti V TO-rO If il ouai o. q,CLvepov l~t vuv 0-:'1 E t , "
i a ~ l , (1)..)..: ~rrpo rp6rroc; 11;C; SlrrllO"Ero 1WV 1010U1.lV.

212
2 11
 (' 11 1\ 1' Il ' I( l ' I V I '
it is of a certa in kincl, why it has a certain Jll odu of bcing, il cun only he
app lied to compos ite beings. And as the ct uotati on from the Me taphysics
tells us, this question ofwhal and why a thin g lcads us back to ol/sia .
But also wh en regard ed as a ge neral or pri ncipa l quest ion, Ihe
question concerning being as being, or concerning \Vhat il means to be
as such, in volves a difference. More precisely, the express ion "on he
on" conveys an onto logical di fference , for the question concerns the
reason why beings are and can be sa id to be, and the answer is given, as
we have seen, by means of Dl/sia as form or essence, and thi s is 11 0 1
identical wi th the first on of the formula, except in the cases when the
011 is a simpl e entity or pure fonn, but in that case, the question is not
reall y worth posin g.
Reca llin g He idegge r 's c1a im Ihal it is logos that lets Arislotle
discover Dl/sia as th e subject of speech, thi s can now be interpreted as
say ing thal, because of the influence of logos on Aristotle's inquiry into
being, the questi on ofbeing is nccessarily a queslion ofbeing as being,
of the possibility of explieal ing beings wi th res pecl to their being. Even
if thi s essence itscl f cann ot be discursively understood, the attempt to
circumscribe it is 1l10ti vated by thc experi ence of being as explicated, by
the fact that we address thin gs as being in different senses. 61 [n other
words, it is only on the basis of the experience of the manifold nature of
speech that the idea ar ises that there must be some si ngle natu re
underl yi ng this manifold. Morcover, even though this idea is the moti ve
behind Aristot le's concept ion of logos apophantikos as the bas ic mode
of speech, in th at th e assertion alonc is able to preserve its objecl
properly, it seems that Heideggcr, \V ith his suggestion that it was on the
basis of an encounter \V ith the di ffere nt ways in which one speaks abo ut
reality that the question arose concernin g the nature of this reality,
indi cates that the most important aspect or'this encounter was that il
made Aristotle rcatise that being is endowcd with a discursive structure
that it has the fonn of "sorn cthing as something", not that il necessaril;
has propositional form. That is, more basic than the idea of the asse rtion
as a model of reality is the insighl into the discursive nature of being in
a wider sense, the notion of the fundam ental difference between th at
6] Thi s point s also made by T. Sadler, Heidegger and Aristorle. The Question of
Beiflg, Chapter Two, Secl ion 3.
2 14
t Il \l' I II( I I V t
which is und Il '1 lIltlik ill h ~ llI g . ""l I!li s hl!cotn cs clea r onl y when one
takcs inlO ilceoll nt Ihlll Al'i stoll c' s undcrslanding of ausia and the other
categories musl be ittlCr prctcd in Ihc li gh t of hi s concepts of dunamis
and ellergeia, and mosl speci(jcally, in relation to the concept of kinesis,
since kinesis conveys this difference which belongs to logos in the sense
of the as-structure, and not merely to logos as assertion . Therefore,
Heidegger states, we must real ise that Aristotle's conceptuality does not
merely state what things are, but more im portant is that it seeks to show
62
how th ings are, namely by pointing 10 their origi n
7. The question oft"e meaning of beillg. Logos as the unity of being
At the end of the leclure course Gr llndbegriffe der aristotelise"en
Philosophie, Heidegger gives an out li ne of Aristotle's hermeneutic
situation : its fore-hav in g is the question of being as a questi on
concerning changeab le or movab le be in g; its fore- sight concerns being
as presence in th e sense o fb e in g "there", which in ilS tum leads over 10
the notion of origin (Herkullft). Finally, the fore-conception is found in
the concepts of dunamis, energeia and entelecheia' ) This is th us what
determines Aristotle's logos, in which being is addressed as presence in
the sense of fin ishcd bein g, ln other words, the meaning of being wh ich
is articulated in Aristotle's logos is Ferligsein.
To the extent that Aristotle's interpretation of logos is inseparab ly
bound up with his understandin g of being as presence, Heidegger's
principal task in thi s connection, must be to go deeper into thi s
connection between speech, bein g and time . This means that he must
show how a reinterpretation of logos can lead to or perhaps even requi re
a concept of being which is not based upon a notion of presence as the
privileged mode of time. [nstead, it should prov ide an analysis of
lemporality as the condition of this presence and therewith al so of logos
as a way of making present. On Heidegger's accoun!, only on the basis
of an ana lys is of temporality can the phenomenon of meaning be
clarified, since thi5 allulys is should reveal that time is that horizon
towards whi ch wc project in our undcrstanding and whi ch therefore is
what constitutes mean in g. Accordingly, the reinterpretation of
" GA 18, p. 395.
6) GA 18, pp. 94-395.
2 15
 ' 11 1\1'11 ,1( l' IVI'
VI tl\ t' l'El( t' IVli

temporality should also makes il possible to l'cveu l the presupp ositions logos, out' Hl'ti cllllIlioll or bei ng, 1hat bein gs are accessible \Vith respect
and meanin g of Aristotl e's logos, to their bein g. Thcrclore, one mi ght with some justification say that
Heidegger tao is faced with the question of how it mi ght be poss ible it is
logos that constitutes the uni ty or pros hen of Heideg ger's ontology.
ta find a single concept of being whi ch can acco unt for ail the differen For
t lhis reason, the possibility' of posing lhe question of being is depend
senses of being which come to express ion as we exp licate beings ent
in upon the success of a foregoing inquiry into lhe constitution of Dasein.
dirferen t regards . Even though he wants ta do justice ta the differen
l This inqlliry should circllmscribe the nalure of speech and reveal
senses of bein g in a w ay that he lhi nks Aristot le was unable to what
by poss ibili ties there are fo r our arti culatio n and concep tu ali sati on
avoidin g reducin g lhem to presence or Vorhan denhei t as the single, of
being. ln other words. ir being is Lo be interrogated \V ith respect to its
basic sense of bein g, he has to, just lik e Aristotl e, loo k for a hen, bein g address ed and ex plicated , the ques ti on of be in g mu st apparen
that tly
'<sin gle nature" 10 which ail senses o f being ultimat ely point be a questio n of precise ly th e meanin g (Sinl1) of being. Or as Heideg
back. W e ger
saw above that Aristotl e's unit y is ol/sia, and insofar as Aristotle's puts it at the beginning of Sein und Zeit, the question that has to
be
ontology is a theology, it is God th at is the primary oL/sia. This means posed is w hether wc kno w what we mean wh en we speak abo
ut
that in the end, lhe idea that evcrythin g except ol/sia can be designa as bc mg.
' 65
ted somethmg
as being only insofar as it has a re lation to ousia, is rcall y an express In Se in und Zeit, He idegge r address es the. iss ue of meanin g
ion in
of the conviction th at thin gs are onl y in relati on to God, being
the final connectioll \V ith hi s allal ys is of explica tion and il s as_stru 66
c ture.
le/os of the whole cosmos. Memlin g is hcrc characteri scd in term s of t\Vo basic fcatures
: it is that
ln Chapte r One, we saw lhal Heideg ger takes Gad ta make up the which is arl ic ulated and that towards or upon which (da s Worau!li in)
we
onti cal founda tion of Aristotl e's on to logy." But as has project our unders tanding. 61 Accord ingly, meanin g is nol reall y
been that
demons trated in the course ofthi s study, he thinks that the hum an logos which is understood, that is, it is not the abject of our understandi ng,
but
in faet a lso plays 5uch a ro le in A ri stotl e's wo rk, ev en thou gh rather, one mi ght pcrh aps say, its content. As that towards which
A ri stotle or in
may not have been entire ly clear about thi s himse lf. Accord ingl relation to whi ch wc proj ect our underst anding, meaJlin g is ta
y, w hen
making Dasein instead of God into the ontical foun dation of ontolog be
y, expl ained in terms of the " fo re-strllc ture" .68 Since it is thi s foregoi
Heidegger tries ta achieve what proved to be out of reach of Aristotl ng
e, at structu ring o f our llndcrslanding that makes it possibl e ta un ders
least at the themati c leve l, namely ta in vestigate being with respect tand
to some thin g as someth in g, th e clar ificati o n of mea nin g is
how it is give n t a finit e reason, the human lo gos, in stead no thin g
of letting differen t fro m th e investi gati on il1tO the H as wh at" o f our underst
divine reason constitute the standard . On this vicw, Dasein is that which anding,
which is what gelS artic ul ated or explicated it~ our speech
fi rst o f ail is, in lhe sense o f bei ng that being which understands being. , w hcth er
verbalis ed or not.
In other words, sinee thin gs are only in relation to Dasein' s uncove If the phenomenon o f meanin g is inti mately connec ted \Vith the as-
ring
or logos, Dasein is lhat in virlue ofw hich ail other things can be sa structure of o ur underst anding , then it seems that one could say that
id ta the
be. questi on of the mea ning of being is a ques tion co nce rnin g H as
\Vhat" wc
The ma nifold senses of bein g th us ail point back ta Dasein as that unde rstand or address be in g. Thi s i5 al50 He id egger's vi ew:
;"B ein g '
bein g whi ch underst ands and speak s about being in a vari ety and the ' as' poi nt to th e samc ori gi n . Or di ffere ntly put:
of The
different senses. In this way, it is logos that provides Heidegger with clarification of/he essence of/he 'as' goes toge /her with (he questio
the n of
gui din g clu e in his questio n of being, since it is onl y on the bas
is of'
65 Cf. SZ, p. 1.
66 SZ, 32.
64 Cf. the discussion oflhe not ion ora first philosophy in Heidegge 61 S'Z, p. 151.
r Hnd Ari Slotlc in
Chapter One, Section 4.
68 1bid. cr. (' h flpl~ t' l, Secti on 2.

2 16 2 t7
 t' II I\I' Il ' R l' I V I '
the essence of 'is ', 01 beiJlg ."h<) A cO liscqU l,;J1 CC of {hi s is, Il c idcggcl'
claims, that, when we pose this question, wc cann ot hclp but bcslowin g
upon it basically the same linguistic form as the question concerning " as
what" we understand bei ngs . Hencc the danger of mi staking th e
70
question ofbeing for a question ofbeings.
Heidegger's first steps towards this clarificati on of the as-structure
and therewith of being have been demonstrated in this study, in that it
has tri ed to elucidate hi s analyses of the as-structure on its different
levels, in partic ul ar with respect to the apophantic a nd the hermeneutic
level. In this sense, the study has hecn concerned \V ith the meaning of
being ail along. Most specitically, it has been shown that that towards
which logos is directed as weil as that which is articu lated in logos is a
7l
possibility or dunamis However, the preceding analyses were mainly
concerned with finding out the co nditions of the poss ibility of
understanding beings as this or that. But when asking about the " as" of
bein g, we are look in g for Ihal whi ch makes il possible to understand
beings as beings in genera l. As Heidegger also puts it, we are
them atisi ng our opennes s to the world as the manifestation
(Offenbarkeit) of beings as su ch in genera l (im Ganzen)71 However, if
being always comes 10 expression as thi s or that, if, "the articulation of
being varies with the particular \Vay of being of a being,,73, th e question
of the mean ing of being does Ilot seem to have a simpl e answer, i.e.
there does not seem to be a single mean in g of being. In other words,
This (way of being1 cannot be restricted to presence
[Vorhandense in ] and actua lity in the traditional sen se. The
question of the possible mlilliplicily of beil1g and therewith al the
69 GA 29/30, p 484: " Das 'Sei n' und das 'a is' we isen in denselben Ursprung. Oder
anders gewendet: Die Aujhelhmg des Wesells des 'ais ' ge/If ZI/sammell mil der Frage
nach dem Wes en des 'isl '. des Seills."
oc GA 31, pp. 49- 50.
7 1 Cf. Chapter Three, Sections 6 and 8 re spect ively, whe re il was noted that
Heidegger argues fhal the abj ect of logos is understood in tenns of ils possibility and
that the end, -rio, of logos is a possibility. T. Sheehan therefo re simply states that
oUvoj.u lS the uniti ed meaning of logos; "Heidegger ' s Interpretation of Aristotl e:
Dynomis and Energeia", p. 292.
12 GA 29/3 0, p. 483.
13 GA 24, p. 170: " Die Artikulati on des Sei ns variiert Ill it der jeweil igen Weise des
Seins eines Seienden."
218
I II l ' III( II V(i
SO I1l t; thll e tlm l II I the II/I/f) / n} ffl e cO I/C:ejJ f of bei!l~ ill genera l
bCCOlnC'l III ~C' I I .H
If being cannOI be rcduccd to Vorhanden sein, if it is a ~a.ior point of
I-Ieidegger's ontology that. it seeks to preserve the manIfold sen:es of
being, then how can one fram e a unilary concept o f belilg wlthout
falling into exaclly such a reduction, ifnot to presence then to th e bemg
of Dasein, of logos? Hei degger' s answer is that we must actually "mave
beyond" b eing if we are to be ab le ta make clear Ihal toward s whlch
being itselr is und erslood. 75 This '<bcyond" bein g is time.
8. Tempora/ityas the lillity ofbeing
Wilh Ihe idea that we must inquire into the nature of lime in order 10 be
able to conceptualise the meaning of bein g, Heidegger reveals another
dimension of logos as the hen of his anto logy: ev en Ihough ail senses of
being point back 10 Dase in as Ihat being which explicmes being, Ihis
explica ti on is itself lemporally constitul ed. So far, howeve r, the
temporalily (Zeitlichkeit) of Dasein's existe nce is a hen only to the
extent that it represents the most basic or final leve\ of the explanatlOn
of the co nstitution of ou r und crstandin g, of logos. In other \Vo rd s, on
this accounL, il is still Dasein or logos tb at makes up [-leidegger' s Ollsia,
it is jusl that logos must be a nalysed with respect to its temporal
character. Aecordin gly, Heidegger asserlS that lemporality can be sa ld
to conslituLe the " mea ning" of Dasein 's existence, more precisely, of its
care, since to explicale this mcaning is to point out that \-vhich ~llakes
possible its activity o f projection, its understanding somethlng as
. 76
1
somelllng. . '
To give a sufficient account of Heidegger's analysls of lemporality
and its attempt to challenge Aristotle 's definiti on of tim e would
certainly require a separate sludy77 Here J will only attempl to state
74 l bid: "D iese kann nihl aul' Vorhand ense in und Wirklichkeit ~m S.i ll n~ der
Trad ition eingeschrankt \Verden. Die Frage nach der m~glichen M~III1.~gfaltlgkell ~es
Seins und damt zugle ich die nach der Einheil des Degriffes von Sem uberhaupl \\l rd
brennend."
iS GA 24 , p. 399 .
"SZ, pp. 323-32 4. . . . . . Il be
77 The rol e of Ar istotle in Heidegge r's investigations 1I1to tlll~ e nas. recen y ' en
1 'ed by T Chanter "Heidegger's Understanding of the Anstotehan Concept of
~~~~,~,I, uncl J. 1~lIi s,<" l-Ieidegger, Aristot le, and T ime in Basic Problems 19", bath of
2 19
more clearly what has bce n impli cit in this study 1.1 11 il long, name ly Ihat
Heidegger 's understandin g of logos and kin esis is bas cd upon his
understanding oftime. Wc have seen earl ier that Heidegger's verdict on
Aristotle ' s ontology is that Aristotle in his inquiry into kines is - as weil
as into logos - eventually is led to conclude that kinesis presupposes a
" prod ucer" whose mod e o f bei ng is that of enlelecheia, fini shed
presence . In Ihi s w ay, the qu esti on concernin g \Vhat it means to be is
fi nall y answered in tenn s of an absolute origin that is itsel f an enti ty or
being. Broadly speakin g, H cidegge r's response to thi s is to rema in in
kinesis in th e sense uf nul pos itin g a furth er ground or bas is. Instead, he
attempts to clarify kines is by reveal in g ilS temporal stru cture. On this
v iew, temporality is thus that "single nature" to w hic h aIl se nses of
being are to be relatcd. This is the onl y ground or basis that Ihere is.
Acco rdin g to He id egger 's charac teri sali on of te mpo ralit y,
temporality is " Ihe unified phenomenon of a future which makes present
in the process o fh av ing been".7K Il e continues:
fouture, the characler or having bcen and present make man irest
the phenomena l character of the "towards oneself', the "back to",
the "Ieuing oneself be encounlered by". The phenomena of
towards ... , 10 ... , al ... , reveallempora lity as Ihe ekslalikol/ pure
and simp le. Temporalily ;5 the primordial "oulside of ilself" in
alldlor il5eJf79
However, to be outs id c itself \Vas precise ly th e bas ic character of
kinesis . In olher wonls, what Heidegger here is descri bing as the
temporal ity of human existence and its logos is a temporality that is
implied already in Aristotle's concept of kines is, though not sufficiently
conceptualised or articulated 80 For as we have seen on a number o f
occas ions, a bei ng that is kinelon is present in its transition, in its being
whom try to question the rather comfllon idea that Heidegger WOllld sim ply wan! 10
overome Aristollc 's un de rslandi ng of lime; an idea Ihat no doubt tends 10 bec ome
domin at ing in Heidegge r's own lexIs.
78 S2, p. 326: "gewesend-gegenwartigende Zukunft".
79 S2, pp, 328-329: "Z ukunft, Gewesenhei l, Gege nwart zeigen die phanomenale n
Charaktere des ' Auf-sich-zu ' , des ZurOck aur, des 'Begegnenlasscns von'. Die
Phiinomene des zu ... , auf ... , bei ... offenbaren die Ze it lichkei l aIs das KomnKov
sc hlechth in. Zeitfichkeil S( dos ursprngliche 'AujJer-sicll ' ail undfiir sicll selbst."
80 That Heidegger in Sein und Zeil work s out his concept of lemporali ly on Ihe basis
of his unde rstanding of is also suggesled by T. Sheehan, " Heidegger's Interpretati on
of Ari sloll c: DYllamis and Energeia, p. J07.
220
on the way lOw{mJs 11 11 C li O. nnd this "dy namic" presence invo lves at the
sa me li me il n.:lati on to th e past, namely th at which thi s being already
was, its ente/echeia. As far as logos is concerned, thi s is to say that
logos is able to add ress an objeet because it projects itself towards an
end (a possibility for itself), and this proj ection is simultaneollsly a
reacti vation o f what il already was, namely a possi bil ity or dunamis for
add ressing thin gs in d ifferenl ways. Accord ingly. w h en c1ari fy in g the
nature of kinesis, the analys is of temporality sinlUltaneously reveals th e
dynamic nature of logos, th at is, it shows that Ihe bc ing o f logos is
dunamis or incomplete move ment.
However, Heidegger thinks thal hi s ontol ogical project involves yet
another step: in order to be able to give an answer to th e question of the
mCaJ'lin g o f being, it is not eno ugh to poi nt ta th e lemporality
(Ze itlichkeit) of logos or Dasein, but il requires that we work out the
81
temporality ( Temporalitti t) of being itself The ai m of the proj eet of
fundamental ontology is thus not restricted to fonnulating a concept of
bein g on the basis of an inves ti gation of logos, i.e. of the phenomenon
of meanin g and its as-structure. For the idea is that logos itself together
w ith its te mporal nature w ill be sufficientl y understood onl y when we
have ac hieved an appropriate concept of being and ilS temp orali ty.82
Aceordingly, in Grllndproblell1e, Heidegger states that even though we
must sin gle ou t our o\V n being, the being o f our logos, over aga in st
other modes of being whi ch pertain to beings di ffere nt from us, we must
nevertheless seek to understand it in tenns of the unit y of the original
concept of being 83 This ori ginal concept of be in g is thus to be ac hieved
by means of an analysis of the temporality of being.
Exactl y how He idegger conceives of the relation between the
Temporaiittit of bei ng and the Ze itlichkeit of Dasein is no doubt a
di ffi cult qu esti on, since it seems that il is precise ly in connecti o n \Vith
the attempt to work out the l'ormer that he realises the limitations of his
projeet, possibly because he sees that in spite of his attempt to introduce
a more basic level o f re fl ection than that of Dasein 's temporality, the
question of be in g is not hing but precisely a question concernin g its
mea nin g, conceived of as a proj ection of D asei n. ln Grundprobleme.
"S2, p. 19.
"cr. GA 19. p. 571.
"G/124. p. 2 19.
22 1
 ( 11\ 1' 1111 1IVI'

He id egger charac ler ises lhe relalio n b lwe"n Te lllp ora /il l 111 ovc m l.: l1 1 wilh I CloI p\.' ' Il) Ill e pt'jo l' und the posterl. " A' tl
and or, -n sto e
Zeit/ichkeil in the fo llow ing way : " II [Telllpora /iltil i means tempor rcached o ut ln l UI end. n:nue ly the uni !ied tempor ality of logos
alily and
[Zeitlichkeit] il1sofar as tem poralit y itsclr is made inl D a thcm c as th kinesis whieh he eoult! not exhaus! or eompletely articulate, but whleh
e
conditi on o f th e possibi l ty o f the unde rstan din g of be in g
and of nevert~ el ess enab led him to frame what in Heideg ger' s view were hlS
ontology as such."" Accordin gly, on the bas is of a thematisation o most importa nt concepts: lgos and kinesis.
f the
tempor ality of our existen ce, it should be possibl e to revea
l the
conditi ons of our underst anding of being, so that it bec ornes clear
what
it means to understand being temporall y, and therewith, the tempor
ality
[Te m porali ld l ] o f other modes o f being, suc h as availab ility,
Vorhan denhei! , elc. , could also be clarili ed. But as already ind icated,
the latter task of workin g out the Tempar a/itiil of being is onl y parti
y
fullilled , and the focus remain s on the temporal constitution of Oasein.
If Heidegger 's project o f a ph ilosoph y o f li fe and its logos can
be
sai d la make at Icast a tempor ary hait atthis poi nt, al the analysis of
the
tempora lity of our underslanding, the consequ ence is that one must
also
say that it is logos that remain s the basic phenomenon to Heideg ger.
Ta
pose the questio n of the meanin g o f being is at th is stage of his thin
king
essenti ally the samc thin g as 10 explicate th e nature of logos,
th e
fou ndation o f the as-stru cture of our understanding . And as we
have
seen throughoul Ihis th es is, in order 10 revea l the nature o f logos,
il is
necessa ry to analy se it w ith respect to ils mo vemc nt or
change )
regardin g it as a forlll of kinesis. It is th us \Vith this determillation that
logos is subjected ta a temporal analysis, for ta con ce ive of logos on
the
basis of kines is is to approac h it as a vehicle o rthe temporal interpla y
of
past, present and future such as this has been outlined above. Hence
if
logos is that towa rds which cvery expl ication of being is pointin g, logos
is itself pointing lOwa rds kinesis as its " meanin g" or hen. Or, one could
perhap s say, at this stage, Heidegger's proj ect centres upon an attempt
ta rcad Ari stotle's dc finition of lime in the Physics as the measur
e of
movement as a ""formai indication". Thal is ta say, granted that logos
in
virtue of its kinetic nature poi nts beyond itself. it is important to affirm
that Aristotl e's own logos on the relati on betwee n time and movem
ent
(00 points beyond itself. F or wh en explica tin g time
as the measur e of

84 GA 24, p. 324: "Er meint die Zcitlichkeit, so fern

sie se lbst Zllm Them a gern ach t sit
ais Bedingung der Moglichk eit des Sein sversttind niss es und der
sol
Ont olog ie ais
cher. " 8$ See p. 173. noIe 83 .

222 223

CONCLUSION
This study began with a qu otation From Soph istical Refu/ation s
concern ing the nature o f phi losophica l beginnings. After hav in g
assessed the diffi cullies that necessaril y acco mpany every attempt at
finding the proper beginnin g, Aristotl e go es on to circum scribe the
basic traits ofsuch work that foll ows upon the initial, foundational stage
of philosophy:
When the beginning has bccn discovered, il is easier to add '.Vhat
is missi ng and to enlarge il. This is what has happened in rhetoric
and in nearly all other disciplines. Wh ercas thase who discovcred
the begin ni ng \Ve re only able 10 advane il qut c a little bit , thase
who are now ramo ll s - having inhcri led the beginning frorn
several prcdccesso rs who, succeed ing o lle another, 50 to spcak,
have gradually developed il - have been able to make il grow. 1
When read as a pre diction o f the actual course of the history of
phi losophy, Heidegger could certai nly subscribe to th is statement. On
his view, philosophy has tended precisely to merel y fil! in what was sti l!
missing in the Aristotelian beginning, while sil ently assuming it as a
basis. ln this way, one has been ab le to develop this beginning and thus
to carry the philoso phical tradition forward , but only at the co st of a
blindness regarding th e rea l power or dunamis of Aristotle's thou ght.
For to trul y make the Aristotelian legacy grow req ui res it to be
confronted and reconsidered as sueh .
ln this study, 1 have followed Heidegger's attempt to begin anew
w ith Aristotl e, rcgarded as an integral part of his attempt to begin anew
wit h phi losophy as such. In itia ll y, Heidegger's project was said to
J Soph. El. 183b2 5~31 : "W\l'tllS 0' EUPllJ..lVllS pqov 't'o rrpocr'n 8vca Kal cruvavEl v
tO ,O l1tv ecrn \" orrEp Ka l Trept -cOS PlltOp l KO ayou crU)l Ili~llKE, oxeoov 5
Iwl 1tepl t dUa cmcra txva. al )..lev yp -c cipx EUpOVTE rtaVtEw rtl
)..ll KPV 'Tl rrpo~yayov' ai of: "v EOQ), qlOV'tE, rtapaapoVTE rtop 1torov olov
K OlOoox1.s !(at !-lpOS rtpaayayoVtUlV, otUl ll\K;~Kacr l ,"
224
( 't .NVI.l ISION
centre on tll e lin 'N l ioll cOll ccrnin g th e nature of human reason, and to
takc as il S gui(\;n g cl ue !\r istotlc 's c lass ica l detinition of man as a
"rational animai": ZoiO Jl lagon echan . But as has become clear in th e
course of th is stu dy, Heidegger is convinced that the concept o f logos
pravides us \V ith the key ta Aristotle's philosophy as a whole, not onl y
to hi s und erstanding of rationalit y. Thus one could say that in
Heidegger's assessment of Aristotle's thought, the concept of logos is
regarded as a kind of pri sm in whic h Aristotle's other concepts are
reflected as different aspects of one and the same basic issue.
One way to descri be the motives bchind Heidegger's encoun ler with
the Ari stotelian logos is to point to his ambition to redeline the
discipline of logic - with the help of the father of logic himself. We
have seen that Heidegger takes such a project to require a "destruction"
of Aristotle's logic, such as it has been handed down to us, and in
particu lar of the noti on of logos apophantikos, the supposedly basic
element in Aristotle 's logie. This des tru ction , whi ch should revea l th e
basic ex pcriences that make up th e foundati on of Ar istotle's teaching of
logos, has here been di v ided in to two main stages. First, we have seen
how Hcidegger argues that the notion of logos apophal1tikos as the
superior mode of logos, and in fact Aristotle 's conception of theory and
logic in general , ma y ultimately be traced back to the experience of
speech as the basic tra it of li fe. Morcover, this experience \Vas shawn ta
be rooted in everyday, Greek life itself, since already at this level, logos
is unclerstood to be marked by a ca pacity for di stinguishing between
dilIerent things, which Aristotle has affi rmed and developed with hi s
concep ts o f slll1thesis and d ihairesis . Second ly, Ar istotle 's
understanding of logos was shown to go hand in hand with his vicw of
the "natura l" world as chan geab le, as characteri sed by kinesis, which
makes Heidegger convinced that he can rightfully c1aim that Aristotle ' s
inquiry into logos is moti vated by the will to do justice to being as
kinoumenon. Thus, if Aristotle's logic, his teachi ng of logos, is founded
up on his experience of speech as the basic trait of li fe, which grants to
life its various possibilities of addressing and articulating the world such
as it is first of ail "thcre", name ly as a changeab le, kinetic wodd , then
Aristotle's logic is in fact essentially a logic of li fe.
However, a basic assumption ofthis study has been that Heidegger's
attempt to trace Aristotle's logic and his views on theoretical knowledge
225
 'ONl'I ,IIS IO N
and articulation back to il s lo undalion in life and praxis docs not a irn 10
reduce the theoretica l to th e practical, nor to di stin guish a separate
philosophy of life or praxis which Aristotle would ha ve belrayed when
framing his conception of theory. By contras t, my idea has been thal
Heidegger thinks that, to the extent that there is a conllict in Aristotle 's
thought, this is a conllict between phenomenology and metaphys ics,
which cuts right through the distinction between the theoretical and the
practica!. More specifically, 1 have tried to show that Heidegger thinks
that th e discovery of life and praxis as the basis of Aristotle's
ph il osophy gcts its full signification only wh en it is applied to
Aristotle's understanding oftheory and onto logy. 1 have been guided by
the idea that the rcasan why Heidegger tri es to reconsider Aristotle's
conception of phi losophy as theOl'Y or /heoria in the light of an
inlerpretation of Aristotle's analysis of life is th at he wants not only to
eventually rehabilitate the traditional vie\V of Aristotle as a proponent of
the primacy oflheory, but also to be able for his oIVn part to establish
such a primacy. When seen in this \Vay, one could say that Heidegger's
interpretation of the Aristotelian logos is equally an attempt to help
philosophy to a cerlain kind of seltcretlecti on, which should make it
possible ta retrieve a genuinc sense ortheoretical research by reminding
philosophy of how it initially understood itself: as the suprerne forrn of
prax;s.
ln this study, the role of Aristotle in Heidegger's project has been
approached from severa l perspectives. It has been shown that Heidegger
not only reads Aristot!e's works from a phenoll1enological perspective,
but also can look upon Aristotle as a phenolllcnologicai thinker in his
oIVn right. Morcover, on the basis of this approach, Heidegger is able to
turn Arislotle against Aristotle himsel f in order to come to grips with his
metaphysieal assurnptions, insofar as they in lile end deprived Aristotle
of the poss ibilily of affirmi ng kinesis as the being of world and life and
led him in stead to pose the perfect mode of being peculiar to
en/elecheia as Ihe reality or essence of kinesis. However, Heidegger's
interpretation of Aristotle could to Sorne extent be regarded as an
instance or perhaps even as a confirmation of the theme of logos and
kinesis itself, and Heidegger also seems to have entertained this idea
himself. At the end of Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie,
Heidegger points to Aristotle's own chara cterisntioll or kine,\' i,y in !Cllll S
226
1 II Nt '1 I IS ltlN
of a relutloll ht.'!wCI: I1 Il (clicher and !li s stud cnt , where the one is
cffec tin g and th e olher is uffcClcd, 50 that the actuali sation, or to use
Heidegger ' , \Vord , the presence of the teacher and the student belongs
to one and the same mo ve ment.' To teach, Heidegger says, is to speak
IVith another person, so tht he who listens is ab le to go along in the
speech. In the dialogue between Heide gger and Aristotle, however, each
of them must be said to occupy both the position of listener and that of
the speaker: each of them is effectin g as weil as being affected. Thi s is
also in line with Heidegger 's notion of authentic Mitsein in philosophy:
logos as an Auseinandersetzung or as a relation betwecn address and
response, in whic h the differences between the Iwo interloculors are
preserved, in that the "teacher" does 110t aitn to take the "student's"
place but to grant to him his oIVn proper possibilities.
ln the preface to the first ed itio n of his Frhe Schriften, written late in
life, Heidegger reca lls that "Iready in hi s carli est works, the 19 12
dissertation and the 191 5 habil itation thesis, he was actually trying to
come to grips \Vith the question concerni ng the relation between
language and being, though without yel reali sing either the scope or
nature of such an cndeavour. 3 This question would continue to fasci nate
Heidegger throughout hi s writings, though eventuall y, he would look to
other thinkers th an Aristotle for help in this pursui!. More specifically ,
Heidegger would later entertain the idea of a more "original, pre-
l11etaphysical logic" that supposedly wou ld be present in pre-Socratic
thought, notably in Heraelitus' At this stage, Heidegger also begins to
opcrale w ith the notion of "another" beginn ing of philosophy, whose
possibilities were if Ilot betrayed then at Jeast reduced in AristoLle. ln
accordance with his changcd attitude towards Aristot le, Heidegger also
re-evaluates his own earlier interpretations of Aristotle. From there on,
Aristotle is defll1 itely tied to the not ion of the primacy of assertoric
speech.
2 GA 18, p. 327. Aristotle's di scuss ion ofthis Is round in Phys . 202b4fT.
) Frhe Schriftell, (GA 1), p. 55.
~ For Ibis distinction between a metaphysical and a pre.metaphysical 1agie,' see e.g.
J-Jeraklit . Der At/fang des abendlandischell Dellkens/Logik. Heraklits Lellre vom
Logos (GA 55), pp. 270-279.
227
 CONCI, I ISION
The motives behind lI e idegger's re-eva lu ation of Aristot lc 's
achievements in the lie ld of logic and language are eertainly comp lex.
To circumscribe the position that Aristotlc wi ll later occupy in
Heidegger's thought would n ot only require an in ves tiga ti o n nto
I-Je idegger' s later reflections on language an d logos, but it would also
have to involvc an assess ment of Heidegger's reinterpretation of hi s Works by Heidegger
own philosophical project as a whole, and th at belongs to another
1. Works publ ished in the Gesamltlllsgabe (Kloslcrl11ann: Frank rurt a m Ma in)
study-' The present stud y has been conlined to Heidegger's early
rcsponse to the question of logos , such as il was once posed by
GA 1
A ristotl e. Even thollgh Ihi s attemp t onl y represents one way, as UA 5
Heidegge r him sel f wou ld put it, il was a way he had to gO.6 As th e GA 9
father of logie, Aristotl e confronted Heidegger as th at philosopher GA t 7
wh am no one can ignore who sets out to address anew the question of
GA 18
logos.
ln one of his earl y courses, Heidegger claims that the basic princip le
GA 19
ofhenncneutics is that one must bcgill with that w hich is clear and from
GA 21
there on proceed ta that which is obscure.' At this stage, it is Plato who
is regarded as th e obscure philosopher who is on ly accessible via GA 24
Aristotle. However, this principle could a lso be sa id to gove rn
Heidegger's oIVn philosophieal development. Il was onl y on the basis of GA 27
his early encounter wi th Aristotle's clear and seienti lic elaboration of
GA 29/30
logos that Heidegger eventually got to the point where he was able to
tum to anothcr, more obscure or hidden beginning ofp hilosophy in pre- GA 31
Socratic th ought, where the question or logos could be ra ised anew.
GA 33
GA 45
GA 55
GA 56/57
GA 58
GA 59
5 The di fference between the early and the later Heid egger's undcrsta nd ing of
language has recently becn explored by J.-F. Courtine, "The Destruction or Logic:
From Logos to Language", who describes the change in He id egger on thi s point in GA 60
terms of a turn from Aristot le to the pre-Socral ics.
6 See SZ, p. 427.
7 GA 19, p. 11: "vom Hell en in s Dunklc".
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