6 - Appendix D2 - Risk Assessment PDF

SAFETY HEALTH AND
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT
Proposed Decommissioning and Upgrade of a Bulk

Liquid Storage and Handling Facility at Maydon
Wharf, Port of Durban, KwaZulu-Natal
Report prepared for: Report prepared by:
CSIR Environmental Management Services Danil J E Rademeyer - ISHECON
P O Box 17001 P.O. Box 320
Congella, Durban, 4013 Modderfontein 1645
South Africa South Africa
March 2015
SECTION G: APPENDICES
Draft Basic Assessment Report for the proposed Decommissioning and Upgrade of a Bulk
Liquid Storage and Handling Facility at Maydon Wharf, Port of Durban, KwaZulu-Natal
SPECIALIST EXPERTISE: DANIL RADEMEYER

Graduate from the University of the Witwatersrand (South Africa) in Chemical Engineering.
Started career in Project Engineering involving cost estimation, design, equipment specification,
tender evaluation, and construction, commissioning and formalising client project hand-over
documentation. Projects included acetic acid filtration, flammable tank farm, acetaldehyde
distillation, styrene polymer reactors, ethanol fermentation and material handling.
Changed/progressed to production on a coal-to-gas ammonia plant as technical officer, and then
later as Plant Manager. Member of the team which was involved in a cryogenic gas separation
project on an ammonia plant, from construction through to commissioning. Thereafter, assumed
responsibility as Plant Manager of a nitric acid, ammonium nitrate and fertiliser complex. Career
changed to specialisation in process safety, and after completion of extensive overseas training in
this field, took over the loss prevention function for a chemical manufacturing complex. This, later,
led to a position of Process Safety Manager with responsibility for all the safety aspects pertaining
to new chemical projects in an engineering company. Experience was further extended into the
fields of metallurgy, mining, pulp and paper. When the company closed down, a private
consultancy was formed with former colleagues specialising in process safety related aspects
(Hazard & Operability Studies, Risk Assessment, Reliability Assessments, Accident Investigation,
Fire and Explosion Protection, and Training) in the chemical and petro-chemical process, mining,
explosives, and metallurgical industries.
Technical signatory for major hazard installations and explosives facilities, accredited by the South
African National Accreditation System and ISHECON is an Approved Inspection Authority by the
Department of Labour.
Major risk assessments carried out for Natref refinery, Sasol Chemicals and Polymer production
units, Island View Storage, Vopak, Shell Fuel Terminals, and Sappi Paper.
SPECIALIST DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

Refer to Appendix G.7 of this Draft Basic Assessment Report for the Curriculum Vitae of Danil
Rademeyer, which highlights his expertise. The declaration of independence by the specialist is
provided in Box 1 below.
BOX 1: DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
I, Danil Rademeyer, declare that I am an independent consultant and have no business, financial, personal or
other interest in the proposed OTGC Maydon Wharf Storage Terminal Project, application or appeal in respect
of which I was appointed, other than fair remuneration for work performed in connection with the activity,
application or appeal. There are no circumstances that compromise the objectivity of my performing such work.
DANIL RADEMEYER
DATE: MARCH 2015
Appendix D.2, Page 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Project Overview and Need for a Safety Health and Environmental Risk Assessment
Oiltanking Grindrod Calulo Terminals (Pty) Ltd (OTGC), at present, operates a bulk storage facility,
which imports molasses via ships and road tankers, at the Maydon Wharf site inside the Port of
Durban and distributes this locally. They intend to expand their business by, handling and storing
plant and vegetable oils, caustic soda solution and ethylene glycol, in addition to molasses. In order to
obtain approval from the authorities, an application for Environmental Authorisation and associated
Basic Assessment Report must be submitted, which must include the assessment of the major safety
health and environmental risks as well as their impacts.
A major safety health and environmental risk assessment was therefore carried out, which included
identifying the likely major hazards, causes, consequences and effects (impacts), quantifying the
1
consequences, severity and likelihood and estimating the individual risks by combining the severity
(lethality) and the likelihood of the various hazards. Risks were then compared with international
2
acceptability criteria and proposals made to reduce or eliminate the risk or impact, where not acceptable.
Identification and Assessment of Risks
Molasses handling at present does not have any significant impact on safety, health or the environment.
In terms of the operational phase, the proposed plant and vegetable oils, and ethylene glycol are
combustible and can therefore have thermal burn impacts on persons in the event of a fire. Caustic soda
solution is highly corrosive and can have serious impacts when splashed on persons. Spillages of
molasses, or plant and vegetable oils into the environment will have little impact apart from
inconveniences, e.g. sticky and slippery. Caustic soda solution and ethylene glycol spillages can have an
impact on aquatic life in the harbour water if spilt. Toxic effects were found to be insignificant.
As a worst case scenario, should the berth pipe containing vegetable or plant oil rupture, and it could be
ignited, the resulting jet fire, serious hazardous effects (possible fatalities) may extend up to 6 m away.
The modified site could not be classified as a Major Hazard Installation (MHI) as its operation does
not have the potential to seriously impact on persons outside the boundary. In addition the likelihood
of achieving ignition of the materials is so rare, that a fire is almost impossible.
Overall the Maximum Individual Risk of being exposed to fatal hazards at the centre of the site where
employees are present would be approximately a 7 * 10-7 chance of a fatality per person per year,
-8
reducing to 1 * 10 at a distance of 18 m away outside the site. This is equivalent to one fatality every
1 400 000 and 100 000 000 years respectively, should this installation operate for such a long time.
In terms of the acceptability of risks to the public, the United Kingdoms Health and Safety Executives
criteria, which are well developed, were used. They are conservative and yet not stringent to the point
-6
of inhibiting industrial development. Their criteria regard an individual risk of less than a 1 * 10
-4
chance per person per year as acceptable and less than 1 * 10 as tolerable.
1
The frequency at which an individual may be expected to sustain a given level of harm from the realisation of
specified hazards.
2
A standard or a norm.

Risks posed to the public by the proposed upgraded OTGC storage installation, including the boiler,
-6
do not exceed the target of a 1 * 10 chance of a fatality per person per year, and can therefore be
regarded as acceptable.
-3
Regarding risk to employees within a typical organisation, a risk level of a 1 * 10 chance of a fatality
per person per year (i.e. one in a thousand) is accepted in the United Kingdom as being the maximum
tolerable. This risk is similar to the risk of suffering a fatal, or near fatal, accident in normal life, i.e. the
-5
work situation is not adding significantly to an employees general risk level. A risk less than 1 * 10
per year would be acceptable.
-7
Thus, the maximum risk of a 7 * 10 chance of a fatality per person per year posed to employees can
be regarded as acceptable.
There are no other installations in the area close enough to be significantly affected by the proposed
upgraded OTGC site. In terms of domino effects, the blast from a hot water boiler explosion may
cause damage to the nearby storage tanks, which may then spill into the bunds. Starting a fire inside
the bunds would be extremely difficult due to the high flash and fire points of the ethylene glycol,
vegetable and plant oils. Applying a blow torch may ignite some of the material on the surface, but as
soon as the torch is removed, the flame will go out, since the bulk of the liquid will still be far below the
flash point.
Assessment of Impacts
Impacts during the decommissioning of some of the existing molasses facilities, at the beginning of
the project, could be molasses washings due to pigging of the pipelines and spillage ingress into
storm water drains and the harbour, thereby polluting the sea water. This is not significant as the
molasses will be biodegraded if released into the harbour water. If released onto the ground in the
surrounding area, it will form a sticky surface and cause discomfort to people in the area. Mitigation
will entail recycling undiluted molasses back into the storage tanks during decommissioning. Spillages
of molasses on the ground are expected to be small (i.e. in the event of the uncoupling of a pipe) and
will be washed away with water, eventually entering the harbour. Final washings from the tanks will be
pumped out into a tanker and disposed via an approved contractor. Therefore, with mitigation due to
OTGC drawing up a method statement including standard procedures for decommissioning of existing
tanks, and applying these, no impact is expected.
During all the construction, which may include some demolition activities, noise will be generated (e.g.
angle grinders) during demolition of tanks and piping, and removing scrap (e.g. crane and truck
engines). This is a low significance impact that will only affect the construction workers as outside the
site boundary, the noise will be much reduced. Construction workers will wear hearing protection,
normally specified as a result of the construction risk assessment, which will result in a low impact.
The construction contractor must complete their risk assessment and prescribe appropriate personal
protective equipment. In addition, OTGC has a permit to work procedure that will be applied.
Throughout all construction and demolition activities there may be an impact of low significance on
the health of construction workers due to welding fumes, dust and smoke from burning organic
materials. This will be mitigated by the fact that work will be done in the open with good ventilation
from wind dispersing fumes and smoke, as well as the wearing of personal protective equipment
where appropriate, prescribed by the construction risk assessment.

Heavy traffic during all the construction and demolition periods may be the cause of an impact with a
medium significance, resulting in collisions, damage, injuries as well as restriction of road traffic to the
quay, i.e. along Fletcher Road. Suitable parking areas should be designated for trucks and a
construction supervisor should be appointed to coordinate the construction traffic (by drawing up a
traffic plan prior to construction), which will ensure a low impact.
Similarly, during all the construction and demolition activities, there is a potential for a high
significance impact on the safety of construction workers due to welding, cutting, hot metals, working
at heights, lifting of heavy items, collisions, entanglement, and finger nip points. This impact will be of
a medium significance provided a skilled and competent contractor is employed (contractor to be
evaluated during selection), personal protective equipment is worn as prescribed by the construction
risk assessment and a safety supervisor is appointed in conjunction with the project manager to
monitor all safety aspects (this could be the same person who will be coordinating the traffic).
During the construction of new tanks and piping, while operating the caustic soda system (i.e.
Alternative 1 Phases 1 and 2), a medium significance, temporary environmental impact is likely from
pollution due to small spillages of caustic soda liquids, fumes from welding and generation of rubble
and scrap items. However, fumes will be minor and well ventilated, spillages will be minimal (cleaning
materials) and scrap and rubble will be disposed of by a contractor so that the environment impact will
be low. The construction contract should specify the provision of waste skips and responsible disposal
of their contents.
During demolition of the proposed new caustic soda gantry i.e. when re-erecting the tanker filling
gantry along Johnstone Road (i.e. Alternative 1 Phase 2 Option 1), small spillages may occur, but
the system will first be drained and washed out, where washing will be contained and disposed of by
the approved contractor (to be clarified and arranged). Operation of the caustic handling and storage
system during this construction stage has the potential for an environmental pollution impact, but
mitigation will be as for the operational phase, i.e. high tank level protection, bunding, sumps and a
recovery pump.
During the operation phase, pollution of ground and water due to a berth ship hose burst, berth pipe
burst, overflowing or bursting of storage tanks, or overfilling of road tankers can be a possibility.
Mitigation incorporated in the design are high integrity ship offload hoses, berth pipes and storage
tank construction, storage tank level indication and high alarms, bunding, sumps and recovery
systems, road tanker curbed catchment areas, and a sump and recovery system. In addition, integrity
assurance of hoses, piping and tanks via scheduled inspections should be implemented in line with
American Petroleum Institute (API) 650 and OTGC standards (based on best practice and
international standards).
A low atmospheric pollution impact due to smoke evolution can be expected from a fire involving plant
and vegetable oil or ethylene glycol during normal operation. An inherent mitigation is the high flash
points and the unsustainability of fires involving the low volatility combustible materials. In the event of
an unlikely fire, portable fire extinguishers and fire water hydrants with hoses that will be provided,
would act as additional mitigation.
Impact on the health of operating personnel during normal operation will be of a low significance due
to the low volatility of materials, i.e. vapour cannot be inhaled. Materials can also not be absorbed
through the skin if splashed. Further mitigation stems from the fact that materials are of low toxicity
and not carcinogenic. Operators will also wear basic personal protective equipment, e.g. gloves,
goggles.

There may be a medium significance impact on the safety of operating personnel due to splashing
with corrosive caustic soda solution, during filling operations or maintenance. This impact will be
mitigated by the wearing of personal protective equipment, e.g. gloves, goggles, and the provision of
emergency showers and eye wash fountains. Another safety impact could result from thermal burn
injuries due to accidental touching of hot water piping, however this will insulated.
Once the project is complete and normal operation resumes, an increase in road tanker traffic due to
large volumes handled may lead to a medium impact as a result of potential collisions, damage,
injuries as well as restriction of road traffic to the quay, i.e. along Fletcher Road. Suitable staging
lanes should be designated for road tankers in waiting (i.e. 2 trucks on each lane), dispatches should
be planned and scheduled to minimise congestion, which will ensure a low significance impact.
Mitigation will also be introduced into the operation phase by carrying out a preliminary Hazard and
Operability (Hazop) study before detailed design, followed by a detailed Hazop study on the final
design, and incorporating the recommendations into the final design of the storage installation.
At the end of the storage installation life, somewhere in the future, when it has to be closed down,
there could again be impacts during the decommissioning of facilities from washings and spillage
ingress into storm water drains and the harbour, thereby polluting the sea water. This is not significant
as the amount of materials released will be small and be diluted in the large volume of harbour water.
Mitigation will entail emptying all tanks by dispatch to customers during decommissioning. Spillages of
materials on the ground are expected to be small (i.e. in the event of the uncoupling of a pipe) and will
be washed away with water, eventually entering the harbour. Final washings from the tanks will be
pumped out into a tanker and disposed via an approved contractor as per the OTGC
decommissioning procedures. Therefore, with mitigation no impact is expected.
During the final demolition and remediation activities, the impacts and mitigation will be similar to the
construction impacts for the project as mentioned earlier.
Management Recommendations
Finally, main management recommendations are as follows:
(i) The project design by the Contractor must make provision of fencing around the entire OTGC site
(BS1722) with a security gate once the project is completed to prevent unauthorised access.
(ii) The Contractor must assess the risks of excavation by reviewing cable and pipe routings, and
make provision for safe excavation.
(iii) OTGC Management should ensure that roads are not closed during construction, which may
restrict access for emergency services.
(iv) The Contractor must comply with all applicable legislative requirements during construction,
specifically as prescribed in the OHS Act under the Construction Regulations and OTGC site
health, safety and environmental procedures.
(v) OTGC Management must arrange for the catchment (into trays or containers) of any molasses
spillages during commissioning, and recovery this back into remaining tanks.
(vi) OTGC Management or contractor must arrange for liquids from washing out of tanks to be
collected and disposed of by an approved waste contractor (e.g. EnviroServe).
(vii) The appointed construction contractor must carry out their risk assessment and prescribe
appropriate personal protective equipment, as well as what is required by the OTGC permit to
work system.

(viii) OTGC Management or the management of the project contractor must ensure that suitable
parking areas are designated for trucks and a construction supervisor should be appointed to
coordinate the construction traffic by drawing up a traffic plan prior to construction.
(ix) OTGC Management or the management of the project contractor must evaluate the construction
contractor skill and competence for safety standards and appoint a safety supervisor (in
conjunction with the project manager) to monitor all safety aspects (this could be same person
who will be coordinating the traffic).
(x) The construction contract should specify the provision of waste skips and responsible disposal of
its contents.
(xi) The Project Manager in consultation with OTGC management must clarify the handling and
disposal of caustic soda washings during construction for Alternative 1 Phase 2 - Option 2.
(xii) OTGC Management to implement scheduled inspections of hoses, piping and tanks in line with
API 650 and OTGC standards (based on best practice and international standards), together with
operator overfilling-prevention-training.
(xiii) OTGC Management to provide suitable scheduling of road tanker filling to minimise congestion.
(xiv) The Project Manager to incorporate in the design for staging lanes for road tankers in waiting i.e.
2 trucks on each lane.
(xv) OTGC Management to draw up an Emergency Plan to cover spillages and a possible fire and
keep records of practices on site.
(xvi) The Project Manager must arrange for a preliminary Hazop study to be carried out before
detailed design, and a final Hazop study on the final process design of the installations, and
incorporate any improvement actions into the design.
(xvii) The Project Manager must minimise flanges and joints and specify flange guards on the caustic
soda lines (optional on other lines that are not toxic or corrosive).
(xviii) OTGC Management must arrange for a method statement including detailed procedures to be
drawn up prior to any decommissioning of existing tanks.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 13
1.1 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 13

1.2 TERMS OF REFERENCE 13
1.3 APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 13
1.3.1 Major Hazard Installation Regulations 13
1.3.2 Philosophy for a Major Hazard Installation Classification 14
1.3.2.1. Risk Assessment in General 14
1.3.3 Assumptions and Limitations 15
1.3.4 Source of Information 15
2. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT ASPECTS RELEVANT TO SAFETY, HEALTH

AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 16
2.1 CURRENT OPERATIONS 16

2.2 MODIFICATIONS 17
2.2.1 Decommissioning for construction 17
2.2.2 Construction 17
2.3 OPERATIONAL 22
2.3.1 Plant 22
2.3.2 Process and Operations 22
2.3.2.1 Tank Design 22
2.3.2.2 Interconnecting Pipelines 22
2.3.2.3 Fire Prevention and Protection 23
2.3.2.4 Storm and Waste Water 23
2.3.2.5 Waste Management 23
2.3.2.6 Utilities 23
2.3.3 Design Standards and Criteria 24
2.3.4 Inventories of Materials on Site 24
2.4 DECOMMISIONING AND CLOSE DOWN 25
2.4.1 Decommissioning for demolition 25
2.4.2 Demolition 25
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT 26
3.1 OTGC TERMINAL LOCATION 26

3.2 TOPOGRAPHY, ECOLOGY AND METEOROLOGY 27
4. IDENTIFICATION OF KEY ISSUES 29

5. APPLICABLE LEGISLATION AND PERMIT REQUIREMENTS 31
6. RISK ASSESSMENT 31
6.1 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS 31

6.1.1 Hazardous Materials in the Process 31
6.1.2 Physical and flammable properties 32
6.1.3 Toxic Hazards 33
6.1.4 Material Toxic Data 33
6.1.5 Material incompatibility and interactions 34
6.1.6 Hazardous Breakdown Products 34
6.1.7 Environmental Hazards 35
6.1.8 Operational Experience 35
6.1.8.1 OTGC Site 35
6.1.8.2 Worldwide 36
a) Molasses 36
b) Other Materials 36
6.2 HAZARD ANALYSIS 36
6.2.1 Hazardous Event Identification 36
6.2.2 Cause Analysis 37
6.2.2.1 Primary Causes 37
6.2.2.2 Secondary Causes 37
6.2.2.3 Minor and Rare Causes 37
6.2.3 Event Analysis 38
6.3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 38
6.3.1 Hazard Event Development 38
6.3.1.1 Fires 38
6.3.1.2 Toxic Releases 38
6.3.2 Consequence Severity 39
6.3.2.1 Effect Distances 39
6.3.3 Hazard Effect Zones 41
6.3.3.1 Fire Radiation 41
6.3.3.2 Explosion Overpressures 43
6.3.3.3 Toxic Effects 43
6.3.3.4 Fatal Effects 43
6.4 QUALIFICATION AS A MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATION 43
6.5 LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS 44
6.5.1 Event Frequency 44
6.5.2 Risk Levels 45
6.5.2.1 Risk Contours 45
6.5.2.2 Risk Profiles 46
6.5.2.3 Societal Risk 47
6.6 ENVIRONMENTAL 50
6.6.1 Liquid Effluent 50
6.6.2 Gaseous Emissions 53
6.6.3 Solid Disposal 54

7. ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS AND IDENTIFICATION OF MANAGEMENT

ACTIONS 54
7.1 POTENTIAL IMPACT 1 (DECOMMISSIONING/DEMOLITION FOR

CONSTRUCTION PHASE) 55
7.2 POTENTIAL IMPACT 2, 7, 12, 17 (CONSTRUCTION PHASE) 56
7.6 POTENTIAL IMPACT 6 AND 21 (CONSTRUCTION PHASE) 57
7.7 POTENTIAL IMPACT 11 AND 16 (CONSTRUCTION PHASE) 57
7.8 POTENTIAL IMPACT 22 (OPERATIONAL PHASE) 58
7.15 POTENTIAL IMPACT 29 (DECOMMISSIONING FOR CLOSE DOWN PHASE) 60
7.16 POTENTIAL IMPACT 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 (DEMOLITION FOR CLOSE DOWN
PHASE) 60
7.17 CUMULATIVE IMPACTS 61
8. CONCLUSIONS 69
8.1 VALIDITY OF THE RISK ASSESSMENT 69

8.2 INCIDENT IDENTIFICATION 69
8.3 SEVERITY AND RISKS 69
8.3.1 Severity 69
8.3.2 Individual Risks 69
8.3.3 Societal Risks 70
8.3.4 Health Risks 70
8.3.5 Environmental Risks 70
8.3.6 Acceptability 70
8.3.6.1 Public Individual Risk 70
8.3.6.2 Employee Individual Risk 70
8.3.6.3 Societal Risk 70
8.3.6.4 Health and Environmental Risk 70
8.4 MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS AND INPUT TO THE
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME 71

9. REFERENCES 72
10. APPENDICES 73
10.1 APPENDIX A - THRESHOLD CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION OF A MAJOR

HAZARD INSTALLATION 73
10.2 APPENDIX B - PIPING AND INSTRUMENTATION DIAGRAM 74
10.3 APPENDIX C - WIND WEATHER DATA USED IN THIS RISK ASSESSMENT 75
10.4 APPENDIX D - HAZARD ANALYSIS 77
10.5 APPENDIX E - CONSEQUENCE METHODOLOGY 79
10.6 APPENDIX F - MODELLING INPUT DATA 82
10.7 APPENDIX G - LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS 84
10.8 APPENDIX H - RISKS 89
10.9 APPENDIX I - ACCEPTABILITY OF RISK 92
TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 2.1: Inventories of hazardous materials 24
Table 4.1: Comments raised by the public and authorities 29
Table 6.1: Physical properties 32
Table 6.2: Flammable and reactive properties 32
Table 6.3: Acute Health effects 33
Table 6.4: Toxic data 34
Table 6.5: Combustion Breakdown Products 35
Table 6.6: Effect categories 39
Table 6.7: Maximum effect distances from source 40
Table 6.8: Events with maximum effect distances 41
Table 6.9: Likelihood or frequency of hazard events 44
Table 6.10: Population data 48
Table 7.1: Decommissioning before Construction 62
Table 7.2: Demolition/Construction: Alternative 1 Phase 1 62
Table 7.3: Demolition/Construction: Alternative 1 Phase 2 Option 1 63
Table 7.4: Demolition/Construction: Alternative 1 Phase 2 Option 2 64
Table 7.5: Demolition/Construction: Alternative 2 No construction phasing 64
Table 7.6: Operational 65
Table 7.7: Decommissioning for close down 67
Table 7.8: Demolition/Remediation 68
Table A1 OTGC ship offloading, storage and road tanker filling 82
Table A2 Tank farm boiler 83

Figure 2.1: Layout of the existing OTGC site 16

Figure 2.2: OTGC site layout after Phase 1 completion 18
Figure 2.3: OTGC site layout after Phase 2 - Option 1 (Alternative 1) completion 19
Figure 2.4: OTGC site layout after Alternative 1 - Phase 2 - Option 2 completion 20
Figure 2.5: OTGC site layout after Alternative 2 completion 21
Figure 2.6: Proposed OTGC Site Process Operations 22
Figure 3.1: The location of the OTGC Terminal in relation to the rest of South Africa 26
Figure 3.2: Map showing the OTGC site at Maydon Wharf in the Port of Durban. 27
Figure 3.3: Average annual wind rose for the Durban area 28
Figure 6.1: Radiation 4 kW/m2 for various pool fires 42
Figure 6.2: Radiation 4 kW/m2 zone (red) for jet fires along the berth lines 42
Figure 6.3: Flash fire radiation cover circles (blue) for oil releases along the berth lines 43
Figure 6.4: Individual risk contours as the chance of a fatality /person/year 46
Figure 6.5: Risk profile across pipelines (A B) 47
Figure 6.6: OTGC site, and surrounding population areas 48
Figure 6.7: Societal risk F-N cure, (frequency / year versus number of fatalities) 49
Figure 6.8: Environmental risk tolerability 53

GLOSSARY
DEFINITIONS
Terms
Hazard A situation that has the potential to harm people, the environment or
physical property, through a fire, explosion or toxic release, e.g. the use,
storage or manufacture of a flammable or toxic material.
Incident An occurrence due to use of plant or machinery or from activities in the
workplace, that leads to an exposure of persons to hazards, e.g. the rupture
of a vessel and loss of containment of flammable or toxic material (also
referred to as a hazardous event).
Causative events Occurrences that give rise to a hazardous incident, e.g. failure of a
temperature indicator or pressure relief, etc.
Consequences The physical effects of hazardous incidents and the damage caused by
these effects.
Severity The seriousness of the consequences, e.g. death or injury or distress.
Risk The overall probability of a particular type of consequence of a particular
type of incident affecting a particular type of person.
Acceptability The evaluation of the risk in comparison to certain known levels of risk in
other areas.
Chronic effect value The concentration limit that is safe for all or most populations even during
continuous exposure.
Abbreviations
API American Petroleum Institute
DEA Department of Environmental Affairs
DWA Department of Water Affairs
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
OTGC Oiltanking Grindrod Calulo Terminals (PTY) Ltd
TNPA Transnet National Port Authority
MEG Mono ethylene glycol
ICI Imperial Chemical Industries
SANS South African National Standards

SAFETY HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL

RISK ASSESSMENT
1. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

1.1 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
Oiltanking Grindrod Calulo Terminals (Pty) Ltd (OTGC)s current operations include the import via
ship, and the storage, handling and the distribution in road tankers of only molasses. This is a
seasonal business and thus not highly profitable. It has been proposed by shareholding companies
to decommission and upgrade the existing Bulk Liquid storage terminal at Maydon Wharf in
Durban to handle other products in addition to molasses, namely caustic soda, plant oils (i.e.
vegetable oils) and ethylene glycol (i.e. MEG). This will require removing old tanks and piping, and
installing additional new tanks, piping and loading facilities. At the same time no interruption of
existing and future business should occur during construction. OTGC currently has a licence to
store molasses; fish, vegetable and edible oils; animal fats; glycerine; caustic soda; palm oils and
their fractions.
Any new project has to be subjected to an Environmental Impact Assessment before approval will
be granted by the authorities. The CSIR has been appointed by OTGC as the independent
Environmental Assessment Practitioner. The KwaZulu-Natal Department of Economic
Development, Tourism and Environmental Affairs (KZN DEDTEA), have permitted the downgrade
of the proposed project from a full Scoping and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) to a Basic
Assessment in terms of the 2010 EIA Regulations. Therefore, a Basic Assessment Process will be
undertaken for the proposed project.
1.2 TERMS OF REFERENCE
The assignment is for a Quantitative Risk Assessment (in terms of the National Environmental
Management Act (Act 107 of 1998, as amended)) to determine the environmental risks, assess the
identified impacts (including risks and hazards), highlight any potential flaws that may be associated
with the proposed project, determine if the proposed project is considered a Major Hazard Installation
(MHI), and provide mitigation measures and monitoring recommendations in accordance with the
requirements of the EIA Regulations and associated guidelines.
1.3 APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
1.3.1 Major Hazard Installation Regulations
The Major Hazard Installation Regulations under the Occupational Health and Safety Act (Act 85 of
1993), revised in July 2001, require that operators of all existing facilities conduct a risk assessment to
determine the potential for causing major incidents (i.e. incidents that can affect the public outside the
perimeter of the facility). This risk assessment will be used to assess, whether or not, there are

sufficient emergency plans and equipment in place to deal with any such major incident, should it
occur.
1.3.2 Philosophy for a Major Hazard Installation Classification
Briefly, a Major Hazard Installation is an installation where a hazardous substance that is listed in the
General Machinery Regulations of the Occupational Health and Safety Act (Act 85 of 1993) is
processed, handled or stored, and the content exceeds the quantity stipulated.
Alternatively, if it is not listed, it may be an installation that has the potential to cause a major incident
that will affect the public. An installation or facility is a Major Hazard Installation if it meets the criteria in
Appendix A of this report.
1.3.2.1. Risk Assessment in General
Risk is made up of two components:

The probability of a certain magnitude of hazardous event occurring.
The severity of the consequences of the hazardous event.
A risk assessment is therefore typically comprised of the following aspects:
Identification of the likely hazards expected to be associated with the operation of the installation;
Quantification of the hazards in terms of their likely frequency and magnitude;
Determination of the consequences of the hazards and their severity, should these occur; and
Estimating the risk and comparing this with certain acceptability criteria.
The focus of this assessment is on those hazards that can lead to injuries or fatalities that can affect
the outside public or neighbouring installations.
The methodology followed can therefore be summarised as follows:
Description of the plant, the location, and the meteorological conditions;

Identification of all the possible categories of hazards, by listing all the materials used in the
process with their hazardous properties, and by dividing the plant into sections with consideration
of the possible equipment related hazards in each section;
Selecting in a qualitative manner, the worst incidents within all these categories and then
quantifying these;
Evaluating the consequences of the incidents in order to determine which events were likely to
affect only the local plant and which could possibly effect the outside public (potential major
hazards);
Quantification of consequences in detail in terms of toxic cloud movements, explosion damage
circles, etc.;
Major hazards with potential consequences which may affect the local plant were not considered
further, while the severity of the remaining major hazards was determined and a frequency of
occurrence was estimated;
Estimating the risk and comparison with certain acceptability criteria;
Reviewing emergency procedures in the light of the possible major incidents;
Drawing of conclusions and proposing recommendations.

1.3.3 Assumptions and Limitations
The following was assumed as given:
Ships are offloaded under supervision from OTGC coordinated with the ship personnel.
Ship hose couplings, hoses and berth pipes are checked for leaks before ship offloading.
Storage tanks are provided with level indication displayed and alarmed in the control room.
For caustic soda solution and ethylene glycol there will be an interlock to automatically close the
tanks filling valve.
Storage tanks will be designed according to API 650 standard and will be bunded with a collection
sump and pump recovery system.
All road tankers will be filled from the top, via a loose hanging hose on weighbridges using a
weight batching system with automatic shut off.
A catchment curb and sump with pump will be provided at the road tanker filling gantries.
The hot water boiler water supply temperature is 60 C and pressure is 2 bars.
The harbour water volume was taken as 1 km square by 50 m deep.
There exists aquatic life in the harbour water.
A limitation of this assessment is that it is not a detailed environmental risk assessment; it only
attempts to assess the environmental impact from a major spill incident into the harbour water.
1.3.4 Source of Information
All information regarding the project was provided by the CSIR, who obtained this from OTGC and
Kantey and Templer Consulting Engineers, the envisaged project implementation company.
Physical, chemical and hazardous properties of the materials were obtained from material safety data
sheets in the literature references.
Weather data are from the South African weather Services in Durban.

2. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT ASPECTS RELEVANT TO

SAFETY, HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
2.1 CURRENT OPERATIONS
At present OTGC only handles molasses, which is offloaded from ships at berths 8 and 9 at Maydon
Wharf and is transferred along a pipeline into the storage tanks. Molasses is then pumped out of the
storage tanks and filled into road tankers via a road loading See Figure 2.1 below for a layout of the
present site.
RT1
PH3 PH4
T6
T5 T5
Receiving
G8 RT2
pit
T2 Under
Office
RT3 T2 ground
4 tank
PH1
T1
Employee T3
T3
T1
compound
G7
Pump
B
G3 house
G4
PH2
North
T4T 4
Ablution, 0 10 20
stores, meters
mess
Figure 2.1: Layout of the existing OTGC site
The existing OTGC terminal site mainly consists of the following infrastructure:
five vertical above ground storage tanks (of various sizes) allocated for the storage of molasses;
one smaller, unused vertical above ground storage tank;
a truck loading gantry;
a workshop in the vicinity of Johnstone Road;
pump houses;
a site office building along Johnstone Road;
two below-ground pipelines extending between the terminal and the berths; and
a mini-substation and underground service utilities (including electricity cables, sewer pipelines
and storm water pipelines) located in the vicinity of the site office building.

Detailed information pertaining to the existing infrastructure at the Storage Terminal is provided in
Section B of the Draft BA Report.
2.2 MODIFICATIONS
The following sections detail the proposed decommissioning/demolition for construction, construction,
operational and decommissioning/demolition (for site close down) phases at the OTGC Storage
Terminal site.
2.2.1 Decommissioning for construction
OTGC procedures will be followed to decommission the OTGC Storage Terminal site, before
commencing with construction with either Alternative 1 or 2. OTGC management must draw up a
method statement including detailed procedures for decommissioning of existing tanks.
2.2.2 Construction
It is proposed to consider two alternatives for implementing the expansion project, where Alternative 1
is preferred, as described below:
Alternative 1 (Phases 1 and 2) Construction phased during decommissioning of old

infrastructure and commissioning of new infrastructure.
Alternative 2 No construction phasing, i.e. complete decommissioning, preparation of site,
construct new infrastructure and commission.
With Alternative 1, there are two proposed phases, namely Phase 1 and Phase 2. With Phase 2 there
are two options i.e. Option 1 and Option 2. These alternatives are described below.
It is important to note that the numbering of the tanks provided within this section are estimates and
may change upon detailed engineering.
Note that additional information relating to the alternatives is provided in Section B of this Draft BA
Report.
Alternative 1 Phase 1 (Preferred Alternative)
Demolition of the adjacent Marine Training School;

Construction of two caustic soda tanks (i.e. T17 and T18), bunding and a pipeline from the berths;
Construction of a new caustic soda gantry parallel to Fletcher Road;
Construction of a temporary pump bay and gantry offices at the training school site for the
distribution of Caustic Soda;
Construction of fencing, and entrance and exit gate surrounding the caustic soda tanks and
gantry;
Provide a pump bay for the caustic soda tanks and gantry;
Operation of the two molasses tanks (i.e. T1 and T4);
Operation of the existing molasses gantry;
Operation (i.e. inspect and test) or upgrade of the two existing molasses pipelines; and
Construction of an office block near the existing molasses tank (i.e. T4).

Refer to Figure 2.2 for the layout of the site on completion of Phase 1 (Alternative 1).
New caustic
road loading
New New
caustic caustic
Molasses tank TK17 tank TK18
tank 1
0 10 20
meters
Molasses
tank 4
Figure 2.2: OTGC site layout after Phase 1 completion
Alternative 1 Phase 2 Option 1 (Preferred Alternative)
Construction of the remainder of the infrastructure, such as the tanks and pipelines for the MEG
and Vegetable Oils;
Demolition of the caustic soda gantry (parallel to Fletcher Road) and molasses gantry;
Demolition of remaining infrastructure on the existing terminal site (offices, three molasses tanks,
etc.);
Operation of the molasses and caustic soda pipelines and tanks;
Construction of a new gantry parallel to Johnstone Road;
Construction of a workshop;
Installation of fencing and gates around the entire upgraded facility;
Installation of an oil water separator;
Construction of a security kiosk;
Construction of pump bays;
Construction of a boiler room (including a hot water 100 KW unit for circulating water); and
Construction of the remaining infrastructure.

Refer to Figure 2.3 for the layout of the site on completion of Alternative 1: Phase 2 - Option 1.
TK7 TK8 TK9 TK14

New tank New tank
TK15 TK16
TK2
TK10 TK13
TK6
TK12 New New
caustic caustic
TK5 Molasses tank TK18
tank TK17
tank 1
New road TK11
loading TK3
0 10 20
meters
Molasses
tank 4
Figure 2.3: OTGC site layout after Phase 2 - Option 1 (Alternative 1) completion
Alternative 1 Phase 2 Option 2
Construction of the remainder of the infrastructure, such as the tanks and pipelines for the MEG
and Vegetable Oils;
Demolition of the existing molasses gantry;
Demolition of the office block near the existing molasses tank 4;
Construction of an office block near the caustic soda gantry parallel to Fletcher Road;
Demolition of the temporary pump bay and gantry offices at the training school site for the
distribution of Caustic Soda;
Demolition of remaining infrastructure on the existing terminal property (offices, three molasses
tanks, etc.);
Retain the caustic soda gantry parallel to Fletcher Road;
Operate the molasses and caustic soda pipelines and tanks;
Construction of a workshop;
Installation of fencing and gates around the entire upgraded facility;
Installation of an oil water separator;

Construction of a security kiosk;

Construction of pump bays;
Construction of a boiler room (including a hot water 100KW unit for circulating water); and
Construction of the remaining infrastructure.
Refer to Figure 2-4 below for the layout of the site on completion of Alternative 1 - Phase 2 - Option 2.
TK3 TK5 TK6 TK7

New road
TK14 loading
TK2 TK10
TK1
0
TK13 TK8 New New
caustic caustic
Molasses tank tank
TK12 tank 1 TK9 TK17 TK18
TK15
TK11
0 10 20
Molasses meters
TK16 tank 4
Figure 2.4: OTGC site layout after Alternative 1 - Phase 2 - Option 2 completion

Alternative 2 No construction phasing
Decommissioning and demolition of redundant infrastructure and three of the molasses storage
tanks at the existing terminal site.
Operation of the two remaining tanks for the storage of molasses at the existing terminal site.
Operation of the two molasses pipelines at the existing terminal site. These pipelines will be
inspected and will continue to be used if they are found to be in a good working condition or they
will be upgraded if required.
Decommissioning all existing structures and infrastructure on the Training School land.
Construction of new tanks for the storage of caustic soda, vegetable oils and MEG (ethylene
glycol), as well as ancillary infrastructure.
Installation of six pipelines between the upgraded terminal and the existing berths.
Refer to Figure 2.5 for the layout of the site on completion of Alternative 2.
Boiler
TK7 TK8 TK9 TK14
New tank New tank
TK15 TK16
TK6 TK13
TK2
TK10
TK12 New New

TK5 caustic caustic
Molasses tank tank
New road tank 1 TK11 TK17 TK18
loading TK3
0 10 20
Molasses
tank 4 meters
TK10
Figure 2.5: OTGC site layout after Alternative 2 completion

2.3 OPERATIONAL
2.3.1 Plant
The OTGC site is essentially a storage terminal for receiving materials offloaded from ships,
storage and distribution to customers in road tankers. All the proposed tanks are vertical and
atmospherically located inside bunded areas, fitted with an open vent on the roof. Tanks will be
filled via a bottom inlet valve and pumped out via a separate bottom outlet valve.
All pumps on site will be of the positive displacement type. Levels in tanks are monitored with
electronic level transmitters and are displayed in the control room. All road tankers will be filled on
weighbridges and a batching system will automatically stop filling at the set weight.
All road tankers will be top loading via a loose hanging hose in the open hatch.
2.3.2 Process and Operations
Batches of materials, e.g. molasses, plant oils and ethylene glycol will be offloaded from a ship by its
own pump at the quay at either Berth 8 or 9 and routed along a pipeline into the storage tanks on the
upgraded OTGC site. Depending on demand, the materials are pumped out of the tanks, and loaded
into road tankers for delivery to customers. Refer to Figure 2-6 below.
IMPORT MATERIALS OTGC site

Storage tanks
DISPATCH
Figure 2.6: Proposed OTGC Site Process Operations
A future pump bay for back loading (i.e. reloading) of product to the marine vessel is also envisaged
as part of the proposed project. The pumps, however, will be installed once the customer(s) require
loading of the marine vessel.
2.3.2.1 Tank Design
The new tanks will be made of carbon steel with fixed/geodesic roofs. The tanks will have a maximum
height of 25 m. Tanks will be constructed according to and in line with API 650 standards.
2.3.2.2 Interconnecting Pipelines
At present for offloading of ships, two (below-ground) pipelines service the OTGC Storage Terminal
from Berths 8 and 9 and are located in the Fletcher Road servitude (north-east of the site), and the
disused Transnet Freight Rail servitude (that divides the site into two portions). Six new pipelines will

be installed within the existing servitude along Fletcher Road in which the existing pipelines run. The
two existing molasses pipelines will be inspected and will continue to be used if they are found to be in
a good working condition or they will be upgraded if required. It is proposed that the new pipelines will
be installed above ground within the boundary of the OTGC site, and thereafter once it enters Port
owned land, it will be installed below ground.
The following pipelines will be installed:
Two new 8 (i.e. 200 mm) pipelines for vegetable oils (soft oils);
One new 14 (i.e. 350 mm) line for offloading of molasses; and
Three new 10 (i.e. 250 mm) pipelines to transfer caustic soda solution, ethylene glycol and plant
oils.
2.3.2.3 Fire Prevention and Protection
The following fire protection (fighting) measures will be provided:

Fire water hydrants with hose and branch pipes at specified locations; and
Portable fire extinguishers at strategic locations on the site and at the berth.
2.3.2.4 Storm and Waste Water
The first flush system will be used for this proposed development, i.e. the separator system.
2.3.2.5 Waste Management
a) Effluent
In the event of product spillage within the bund, product contained in the bund would be recovered
back into the tanks, and the residual sludge would be pumped out for disposal.
Although OTGC does not own the product, it shares responsibility with the client for the management
of the waste generated during operations on its sites. Local legislation and product requirements
define how generated waste is to be dealt with. OTGC ensures that all waste disposed from the site is
disposed of safely and that all certificates of cleanliness and safe disposal are kept on file.
b) Solids
Minimal solid waste is generated during the handling of the products. Where contamination of a
portion of a product batch is found, an amount of product will be emptied into slop drums. This
ensures that the quality of the stored product is retained.
2.3.2.6 Utilities
The following will be provided in the tank areas:
Fixed water supply for potable water for tank cleaning;

Compressed air point for portable air pumps and
Electrical power points for level gauges, electrical actuators and operational lighting.

2.3.3 Design Standards and Criteria
The site infrastructure and new tanks will be designed according to the latest editions of:
American Petroleum Institute (API) 650.
Atmospheric Storage tanks: EN14015
SANS 10400-T Sections 6.1 and 6.2 - Fire Extinguishing Installations on Premises.
SANS 10142 - 2005: Code of Practice for the Wiring of Premises.
Tank Inspection: API 653 - Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration and Reconstruction 1995.
SANS 10228: Code of Practice, The Identification and Classification of Dangerous Substances
and Goods.
2.3.4 Inventories of Materials on Site
Average maximum inventories of hazardous materials3 on the installation at any time are given in
Table 2-1 below. Note that although molasses and vegetable or plant oils are included in the list, they
are not regarded as hazardous i.e. not listed in SANS 10228. Also note that the capacities of the
expanded terminal are not finalised as it is based on the conceptual design. The total storage capacity
of the upgraded tank farm is not expected to exceed 85 600 m3.
Table 2.1: Inventories of hazardous materials
Material Volume containment (tanks, vessels and Specific Mass

equipment) gravity (tonnes)
Storage tank farm existing
3 3
Molasses Tank T1 @ 6830 m 6830 m 1,4 9 562
3 3
Molasses Tanks T2, T3 @ 6250 m each 12500 m 1,4 17 500
3 3
3 3
Total at present 51 154
Storage tank farm new
3 3
3 3
3
Glycols Tank T2 @ 6250 m 1,1 6 875
3 3
Vegetable oil Tanks T3, T5, T6 @ 2000 m 6000 m 0,92 5 520
3 3
Vegetable oil Tanks T7, T8, T9 @ 1500 m 4500 m 0,92 4 140
3
Glycols Tank T10 @ 6250 m 1,1 6 875
3 3
Vegetable oils Tanks T11,T12,T13,T14@2500m 10000 m 0,92 9 200
3 3
Vegetable oils Tanks T15, T16 @ 7500 m 15000 m 0,92 13 800
3 3
Caustic soda Tanks T17, T18 @ 10000 m 20000 m 1,5 30 000
solution 50%
3
Fuel oil 1 tank @ 10 m 0,8 8
Total in expansion 103 480
Tankers (temporary)
3
Molasses 3 Road tankers @ 20 m ea. 1,4 90
3
Caustic soda 3 Road tankers @ 20 m ea. 1,5
solution 50% 90
3
Vegetable oils 3 Road tankers @ 32 m ea. 0,92 90
3
Glycols 3 Road tankers @ 27 m ea. 1,1 90
Total in tankers on site 360
AVERAGE MAXIMUM TOTAL INVENTORY FOR EXPANSION (tonnes): 103 800
3
Materials that are combustible, flammable, explosive, corrosive or toxic

It should be noted that 10 m3 of fuel oil has been taken into consideration in this study as a potential
material for powering the hot water boiler.
2.4 DECOMMISIONING AND CLOSE DOWN
The following sections detail the proposed decommissioning/demolition and remediation after close
down of the OTGC Storage Terminal site.
2.4.1 Decommissioning for demolition
OTGC will draw up decommissioning procedures to be followed should the OTGC Storage Terminal
close down in the distant future.
2.4.2 Demolition
OTGCs demolition and remediation procedures will be followed should the OTGC site close down in
the distant future.

3. DESCRIPTION OF THE AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT
3.1 OTGC TERMINAL LOCATION
The location of the proposed upgraded OTGC Storage Terminal in relation to the rest of South Africa
is shown in Figure 3.1 below.
MUSINA
Limpopo
GABORONE POLOKWANE
Mpumalanga
PRETORIA
NELSPRUIT
JOHANNESBURG
North West SWAZILAND
NAMIBIA SASOLBURG
Newcastle
KIMBERLEY Free State
Natal RICHARDS BAY
BLOEMFONTEIN
LESOTHO
DURBAN
Northern Cape
OTGC
terminal
Eastern Cape
PORT ELIZABETH
Western Cape
CAPE TOWN
EAST LONDON
Figure 3.1: The location of the OTGC Terminal in relation to the rest of South Africa
OTGC operates from one location at Maydon Wharf, adjacent to Congella as shown in Figure 3.2
below.

Figure 3.2: Map showing the OTGC site at Maydon Wharf in the Port of Durban.
The OTGC Storage Terminal is located in a developed, transformed area that is designated for
industrial activity. Principal areas of activity surrounding the storage site are as follows:
Industries mainly related to freight handling and storage, shipping and engineering.
Maritime Training School, a Police Station, and railway tracks immediately adjacent to the site.
Other industrial companies approximately 1,2 km away (e.g. Unilever and the Sugar Terminal to
the north).
Durban Harbour and bay area adjacent on the south side.
M4 Highway, 400 m northeast.
Glenwood residential area 1,4 km northwest
Umbilo residential area 2,3 km west
Railway staging area 2,3 km south and Clairwood residential area 4,3 km further south.
Parks and schools, e.g. Albert Park Bowling Green, Johnson Technical High School, etc.
approximately 750 m north west.
The Indian Ocean and beach 4 km north east.
3.2 TOPOGRAPHY, ECOLOGY AND METEOROLOGY
The area around the OTGC site is essentially flat and surrounded by tall structures, e.g. large
buildings, cranes, tanks some distance away and seawater in the bay. There are many railway lines
crossing roads all around. No vegetation in the form of grass, bushes or trees is present in the
immediate vicinity surrounding the proposed site.

Meteorological conditions are typically coastal with high humidity and morning and evening sea winds
from the north and northeast. Winter nights are cool with some temperature inversions. Generally
days are clear, windy and sunny. Rainfall is in summer.
The dominant wind directions are from the north-northeast (21,5 % of time) and the south-west (20,9
% of time), with occasional winds from other directions. Wind blows most of the time across the area
parallel to the coastline. See annual wind rose for the area in Figure 3-3 below.
N
16.0
NNW NNE
14.0
NW 12.0 NE
10.0
8.0
WNW 6.0 ENE
4.0
2.0
W 0.0 E
WSW ESE
SW SE
SSW SSE
S
Figure 3.3: Average annual wind rose for the Durban area

4. IDENTIFICATION OF KEY ISSUES
A key issue is a large release of a material, mainly as a liquid. This could lead to some potential
impact on the industries and activities surrounding the site. In the case of molasses and plant or
vegetable oils, it is expected to be mainly an inconvenience or irritation to people, e.g. sticky or
slippery. The effect will be similar if it entered the harbour water.
Caustic soda solution and ethylene glycol releases could be more serious, i.e. corrosive burn injuries
and irritation of persons and pollution of harbour water can occur.
No cumulative impact is expected as effects from construction would be temporary. Impacts of

existing industries within the area, together with the impact of the proposed project will not result in
any cumulative impact.
Comments raised by the public and authorities during the Project Initiation Phase (for the release of
the Background Information Document) are listed in Table 4.1 below, as well as responses to these
comments. Appendix E of the Draft BA Report includes a complete set of comments and responses.
Table 4.1: Comments raised by the public and authorities
No Comment Response from ISHECON

1 Environmental Planning and Climate Protection
Department (eThekwini Municipality):
This Department has reviewed the Background Preliminary assessments show that caustic
Information Document (BID) submitted for the soda solution is only a corrosive hazard, i.e.
above project and has a number of reservations its effects are only experienced when it is
regarding the detail of this project and splashed onto a person or released into
downgrading of this application from Scoping and water. The tanks will be located in bunds and
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) to Basic the loading facilities will have drainage to a
Assessment. sump with a pump. So any spillage will be
contained and recovered. Operating
personnel will wear personal protective
equipment and emergency drench showers
will be provided in the event of splashing. The
area will be secured to prevent unauthorised
access.
This Department has concerns regarding the The pipeline is planned to be above ground
storage and handling of Caustic Soda on the site. on the OTGC site, but underground once it
The proposed storage will constitute a new activity enters land that is owned by the Transnet
for the site as previous liquids handled on the site National Ports Authority (TNPA). TNPA
were non-hazardous. Given the high level of generally prefers pipes above ground, but if
development surrounding the site, the risk is there are reasons why it cannot be above
notable. Furthermore, the Caustic Soda will ground, construction will have to assess the
constitute the largest product, by volume, stored risks of excavation by reviewing cable and
on the site. Typically such storage requires a pipe routings, and make provision for safe
scoping and EIA to be carried out. excavation. Detail assessment is out of scope
of specialist safety risk assessment unless
provided with cable and pipe routing
drawings. These risks are nevertheless
considered in this specialist safety risk
assessment.


Similarly, the proposed pipelines from the Refer to Appendix E of the Draft BA Report for
upgraded facility to the port are of significant a corresponding response to this comment.
concern given the likely scale of the earthworks
required, the proximity to the Durban Bay Estuary
and the nature of the products being handled.
While the BID mentions the need for an additional
six pipelines to be installed in the servitude no
detail is provided in the layout as to the precise
alignment of the pipes or the volume of the
excavations required. This Department remains
concerned that the required level of excavation
needed to install the six new pipelines is notably
significant and may not warrant the downgraded
status of this Listed Activity.
In light of the above, this Department requires a This is an environmental concern, to be

full copy of the motivation provided to the handled by the Environmental Impact
Department of Economic Development, Tourism assessors. The risks from a major release
and Environmental Affairs (DEDTEA) regarding accident are addressed in this specialist
the downgrading of the application. This safety risk assessment.
Department reserves the right to apply to the
DEDTEA to withdraw the downgraded status of
this project.
Notwithstanding the above concerns, this

Department requires that the potential impacts and
risks of the development to the Durban Bay
Estuary be specifically addressed as part of this
application.
2 eThekwini Municipality:
Fire Safety:
This Department has no objection to the proposed This is the responsibility of the project
project subject to: applicant, prior to construction.
Building plans being submitted for scrutiny to this Addressed in this specialist safety risk
Department. assessment. There are no major hazard
installations in the close vicinity, and
preliminary assessments indicate that the
OTGC installation will not qualify as a major
hazard installation.
Compliance with Major Hazard Installation Fire risks for plant and vegetable oils will be
Regulations in case the proposed storage tanks extremely low (flash points are above 100 C,
are in close proximity to existing MHIs or the so ignition is only possible if the bulk of the
facility itself will be an MHI. combustible liquids are heated to the flash
point temperatures, and this is virtually
impossible). Only basic fire protection to
comply with the building regulation will be
necessary.
Full compliance with the Interim Code relating to This will not be applicable as the materials
Fire Prevention and Flammable Liquids and handled are not flammable, some are only
Substances. Full compliance of the proposed combustible, i.e. ethylene glycol, and plant
pipelines with the petroleum product or flammable and vegetable oils. There are no flammable
gas pipeline in close proximity. gas pipelines on- or close by off-site.


Compliance with road closure during construction This is recommended in this specialist safety
period regarding response time for the brigade and risk assessment (Sections 6 and 7).
other emergency services.
Full compliance with other applicable legislative This is recommended in this specialist safety
requirements. risk assessment (Section 5).
5. APPLICABLE LEGISLATION AND PERMIT

REQUIREMENTS
The legal requirements pertaining to the identified impacts are listed below:
Occupational Health and Safety Act (Act 85 of 1993) and its regulations.
Maritime Safety Regulations of 1994.
International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code and the National Road Traffic Act (Act 93
of 1996).
Port Rules of the National Ports Act (Act 12 of 2005) (March 2009).
Merchant Shipping Act (Act 57 of 1951).
Major Hazard Installation Regulations under the Occupational Health and Safety Act (Act 85 of
1993), revised in July 2001.
National Environmental Management Act (Act 107 of 1998, as amended).
Environmental Conservation Act (Act 73 of 1989).
6. RISK ASSESSMENT
6.1 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS
The risks identified in this section as well as the impact assessment applies to all layout alternatives
(Alternative 1 Phase 1, Alternative 1 Phase 2 Option 1, Alternative 1 Phase 2 Option 2 and
Alternative 2). No significant difference in risks between the various construction options is expected;
neither will there be a difference in the operational risk for the alternative site layout options.
6.1.1 Hazardous Materials in the Process
The materials of concern here are the large inventories of vegetable oils, caustic soda solution and
ethylene glycol, which may have the potential to create major hazards if released.
The tables in the following sections summarize the properties, safety, health and environmental
information extracted from Material Hazard Data sheets and from the available literature (Weiss 1986
& Genium 1998).

6.1.2 Physical and flammable properties
Physical properties shown in Table 6-1 provide an indication of the capability of the material to cause
a hazard.
Table 6.1: Physical properties
MATERIAL Molasses Caustic soda Ethylene Vegetable Fuel oil

solution glycol oils
Boiling point at 1 atm. [C.] 107 145 197 >> 150 120
Vapour pressure @ 20 C. NA, not volatile 1,3 mm Hg 0,06 mm Hg NA, not 0,4 mm Hg
[bar] volatile
Melting point C <0 12 -14 -13 35 ND
Liquid density at 20C 1,5 1,4 1,1 1,2 0,85

3
[g/cm ] or SG
Relative gas density NA NA 2,14 ~3 3

compared to air = 1
NA Not applicable
Flammable and reactive properties in Table 6-2 provide an indication of the conditions necessary
to initiate a fire or explosion hazard.
Table 6.2: Flammable and reactive properties
Material Molasses Caustic soda Ethylene glycol Vegetable oils Fuel oil
solution
Flash point (C) Not combustible Not combustible 111 140 - 270 60
Auto ignition Not combustible Not combustible 398 316 254

temperature (C)
Explosive limits in air Not combustible Not combustible 3,2 15,3 Not explosive 0,3 - 10
% volume basis
Reactivity Stable under Absorbs carbon Hygroscopic. Incompatible Avoid contact

normal dioxide from the Absorbs with sulphuric with strong
conditions. air. moisture from and nitric oxidants such
the air. acids, and as liquid
Incompatible Reacts with caprolactum chlorine,
with oxidising ammonium Avoid solutions. concentrated
agents (e.g. salts, evolving contamination oxygen, sodium
hypochlorites ammonia gas. with materials hypochlorite,
peroxides). with hydroxyl calcium
Reacts readily compounds. hypochlorite,
with various etc.
reducing sugars Also
(i.e. fructose, incompatible
galactose, with aliphatic
maltose, dry amines,
whey solids) to isocyanates,
produce carbon chloro-sulfonic
monoxide. acid, and oleum.
ND = No data

6.1.3 Toxic Hazards
Acute (immediate) toxic hazards directly affect people and are applicable in terms of major
hazards for which the properties are given in Table 6-3. Thus, chronic and ingestion effects are
not considered.
Table 6.3: Acute Health effects
Material Molasses Caustic soda Ethylene glycol Vegetable Fuel oil

solution oils
Inhalation Unlikely due to high Breathing in mists Repeated Unlikely Mist or vapour
boiling point. or aerosols may exposure may due to high can irritate the
produce respiratory produce general boiling throat and lungs.
No effect, not volatile. irritation. deterioration of point.
health by an
accumulation in No effect,
one or many not
human organs. volatile.
Skin contact May cause irritation. Contact with skin Slightly Slight Contact may
will result in severe hazardous in case irritation of cause redness,
irritation. of skin contact the skin. itching, burning,
(irritant, and severe skin
Corrosive to skin - permeator), of damage.
may cause skin eye contact
Burns. (irritant), and of Prolonged or
Inhalation. repeated contact
can worsen
irritation by
causing drying
and cracking of
the skin, leading
to dermatitis
(inflammation).
6.1.4 Material Toxic Data
Exposure limit values for the materials stored at the proposed upgraded terminal are listed in Table
6-4 below. These are defined as follows.
Odour threshold: the concentration a person will smell the material.
Threshold Limit Value (TLV): the time weighted average concentration a person may be exposed
for 8 hours per day for a 40 hour week, is really only applicable to workers inside the factory.
Outside the site boundary the criteria of the TLV divided by 50 (fifty) is often used as an acceptable
ground level concentration, unless there is an Ambient Air Pollution criteria, which is then
considered binding.
Short Term Exposure Limit (STEL): the concentration a person may be exposed to for more than
the time weighted average (TWA) limit, but with a maximum of 4 excursions to this limit per day for
a maximum duration of 15 minutes each with at least 60 minutes between exposures, which is also
applicable to employees in a factory.

Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health Value (IDLHV): concentration represents a

maximum level from which a person could escape within 30 minutes without any escape-impairing
symptoms or irreversible health effects.
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG): categories adopted from the American
Industrial Hygiene Association for 60 minutes exposure are defined as follows:
ERPG 1: Suffer only mild transient health effects and objectionable odour.
ERPG 2: Not suffer irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair abilities
to take protective action.
ERPG 3: Will not suffer life threatening health effects.
Table 6.4: Toxic data
Material Odour TLV STEL IDLHV ERPG 1 ERPG 2 ERPG 3

(ppm) (ppm) (ppm) (ppm)
Molasses NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3
Caustic soda solution NA 2 mg/ m NA NA NA NA NA
Ethylene glycol Sweet 50 or 125 ND ND NA NA NA
3
mg/m
Plant, vegetable oils ND NA NA NA NA NA NA
Fuel oil ND ND ND ND ND ND ND
ND = No data, NA = Not applicable
6.1.5 Material incompatibility and interactions
Caustic soda solution is incompatible with ammonium salts, aluminium, tin, and zinc.
Ethylene glycol is incompatible with oxidizing agents, acids, and alkalis.
Fuel oil is incompatible with strong acids, alkalis, and oxidizers such as liquid chlorine, other
halogens, hydrogen peroxide and oxygen.
Generally, the materials stored at this installation are compatible, except fuel oil and ethylene
glycol should not become combined in any proportion.
6.1.6 Hazardous Breakdown Products
Should any of the materials be exposed to fire, it is possible that the combustion products could be
a significant hazard and hence the need to identify any such compounds. Table 6-5 below
indicates the combustion breakdown products.

Table 6.5: Combustion Breakdown Products
Material Combustion Breakdown Products
Molasses Carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide

Caustic soda solution Evaporation of water
Ethylene glycol Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and soot
Plant, vegetable oils Carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, smoke
Fuel oil Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and soot
6.1.7 Environmental Hazards
Environmental effects are not relevant to the Major Hazard Installation Regulations with the
exception of elements mentioned in the Environmental Conservation Act of 1973. Although the
effects on the environment from a major hazard may be identified in this assessment, no detailed
environmental risk assessment was carried out. Environmental eco toxic data for the materials
handled on the site, if spilt, are as follows:
Molasses: Leads to high Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) and potential oxygen depletion of
aquatic systems.
Caustic soda solution: Prolonged exposure will destroy fish and aquatic life.
Ethylene glycol: Prolonged exposure will destroy fish and aquatic life. Products of short term
bio-degradation are not likely.
Fuel oil: Middle distillates are potentially toxic to freshwater and saltwater ecosystems.
Distillate fuels will normally float on water. In stagnant or slow-flowing waterways, a
hydrocarbon layer can cover a large surface area. As a result, this oil layer can limit or
eliminate natural atmospheric oxygen transport into the water. With time, if not removed,
oxygen depletion in the waterway can cause a fish kill or create an anaerobic environment.
This coating action can also kill plankton, algae, and water birds. If released to the subsoil, it
will strongly adsorb to soils. Groundwater should be considered as an exposure pathway.
Liquid and vapour can migrate through the subsurface and preferential pathways (such as
utility line backfill) to down-gradient receptors.
6.1.8 Operational Experience
A search was carried out to locate instances of incidents, accidents or unusual occurrences,
related to similar materials handled on-site, which had effects inside and outside of site
boundaries. This will lend support to the hazards identified and give a general view of the possible
extent of the risk later on in the assessment.
6.1.8.1 OTGC Site
No fire, explosion or toxic release incidents have occurred on this terminal since it was originally
commissioned. Tankers have driven off during filling, which resulted in small spillages of molasses.
In these cases, spillages were washed away with water.

6.1.8.2 Worldwide
Incidents related to the storage depots were searched for in the IChemE 1999 accident database,
and significant incidents are described below.
a) Molasses
There are only four incidents recorded involving molasses; two were related to transport by ship.
The other two significant incidents are listed below:
UK, 05 April 1989: Deaths 0 Injuries 0. During the discharge of 3350 tonnes of molasses, a
failure of a 14 carbon steel line occurred adjacent to a flood protection bank outside the site
boundary fence. It was estimated that 520 tonnes of molasses was lost and the cost of this and
the ensuing recovery, disposal and investigation was calculated at approximately 35,000
(1989). The molasses line was installed in l941 for molasses receipt at a jetty. Since this time
eleven sections have been renewed in 1972 and six sections in 1980. The vessel concerned
berthed at the jetty. Hoses were connected and cargo discharged. Of the 520 tonnes of
molasses lost, approximately 300 tonnes was recovered, in addition to a lesser quantity of
contaminated water. The leak occurred on an 80 ft. long flanged section of line local to a pipe
support. The mechanism of failure was thought to be localised external corrosion.
Boston, USA, 15 January 1919. Deaths 21 Injuries 40. A storage tank containing
approximately 12,500 tonnes of molasses ruptured. 9000 tonnes of molasses spilled into the
streets of Boston as a result.
b) Other Materials
There is no record of major incidents involving caustic soda solution, ethylene glycol, plant and
vegetable oils, and fuel oil.
6.2 HAZARD ANALYSIS
6.2.1 Hazardous Event Identification
The site was broken down into discrete sections in order to facilitate the analysis of possible
hazards. These sections are:
Pipeline import of materials from ships at Berths 8 and 9 into storage tanks at the OTGC site;
Bulk storage of materials on site; and
Road tanker loading at the site.
The possibility of the following hazards was considered in each of the above areas:
Physical burst;
Fire (external), e.g. pool fires, jet fires; and
Toxic release.

Explosions are not possible as the liquids are not combustible (i.e. molasses and caustic soda)
and others are not volatile to allow formation of vapours (i.e. ethylene glycol, plant and vegetable
oils or fuel oil).
6.2.2 Cause Analysis
6.2.2.1 Primary Causes
As the hazards being assessed will originate mostly from loss of containment, i.e. a release, the
following generic primary causes were identified:
Creation of an open end, e.g. overflowing of a tank due to human error or failure of level
instrumentation equipment.
Integrity failure due to deterioration of the plant (material of construction failure) causing burst
of equipment and piping. This may be as a result of a crack developed in the piping or
equipment due to fatigue from vibration, stress corrosion cracking or an inherent manufacturing
defect not detected during inspection. A pressure surge or hydraulic hammer in the piping and a
high head in tanks could then initiate such a burst.
Overpressure burst due to thermal expansion of trapped liquid in piping.
External damage of piping and equipment, e.g. earthworks, cranes, vehicles.
Failure of the protective systems (instrumented, hardware and human).
6.2.2.2 Secondary Causes
Possible causes for ignition (fires) of released materials are the following:
Hot work;
Static spark discharges and lightning;
Electrical faults;
Smoking; and
Hot surfaces, friction and impact.
Possible causes for toxic exposure of people from released materials are as follows:
Not wearing personal protective equipment;

Lack of awareness; and
Failure to evacuate.
6.2.2.3 Minor and Rare Causes
Since the assessment mainly deals with likely major hazards of fire and toxic releases, the
following causes were excluded:
Joint leaks on liquid pipes due to, e.g. poorly installed gaskets, or pressure surges, or
expansion of trapped liquids.
Blowing of relief valves from over pressurisation following failure of the control and protective
systems.
Small general leaks, which may include valve spindle seal leaks, leaks due to normal wear,
or improper maintenance.

Natural events (earthquakes, storms, floods, etc.).

External or internal sabotage as a result of personnel grievances.
Aviation accidents.
The causes are also analysed in detail in the Likelihood Analysis section, in Appendix G of this
report.
6.2.3 Event Analysis
Major and significant hazards identified are analysed in terms of the causes, consequences and
preventative and protective measures in the Hazard Analysis in Appendix E of this report.
6.3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
6.3.1 Hazard Event Development
6.3.1.1 Fires
If a release of a combustible or flammable liquid is ignited immediately, a jet flame will result;
otherwise the liquid will form a pool on the ground. Early ignition will cause a fire to burn on the
pool (pool fire), or evaporation will take place from the pool to form a vapour cloud, which will drift
away assisted by the wind. Later ignition of the vapour cloud will result in a flash fire, which could
flash back and ignite the pool fire and the jet fire. The overpressure generated by a flash fire is
negligible and can be discounted.
However, as mentioned earlier, due to the low volatility of the combustible materials, explosions
can be ruled out.
In general, pool fires will only affect persons in the immediate vicinity of the fire. Jet and flash fires
are more likely to affect areas outside the installation since the fire is much more energy intensive
than pool fires. Persons exposed to the radiation from fires, may suffer severe burn injuries.
In summary, the following flammable incidents from a release of materials were considered in
detail:
Pool fire, either in a bund or on the ground;

Jet fire from liquid emerging from a rupture pipe; and
Flash fire.
6.3.1.2 Toxic Releases
The release of toxic vapours is generally the hazard that is of most significance to the public
outside the boundaries of any installation (Lees 1990 and ICI 1986).
In this assessment, releases of liquids, e.g. molasses, caustic soda solution, ethylene glycol and
vegetable oils do not have significant toxic properties and therefore was not considered in terms of
toxic risks.

6.3.2 Consequence Severity
In order to interpret the physiological effects of varying exposures, three categories were adopted
for fire, explosion and toxic releases as detailed in Table 6-6 below. These are used for emergency
planning.
Use was made of the computer programme DNV PHAST 6.7 to model each release in terms of the
flow rate, pool formation, evaporation, dispersion and resultant radiation for fires, overpressures
from explosions and concentrations for toxic releases, where applicable. This was done for two
weather conditions: Inversion with a wind speed of 1.5 m/s and neutral with a wind speed of 5 m/s.
These represent both low and high wind speed conditions as well as day and night conditions as
per the weather data presented in Appendix C of this report. The input data to these modelling
calculations, which are based on the cause analysis, is given in Tables A1 and A5 in Appendix F of
this report.
6.3.2.1 Effect Distances
In order to interpret the effects of explosion, fire and toxic releases, the following three effect
categories are defined as shown in Table 6-6.
Table 6.6: Effect categories
Category 1 2 3
Least severe Moderately severe Most severe

Explosion overpressure kPa 2 14 21
Effect in open 0,1 % fatal, ear drum 1 % fatal 20 % fatal
rupture
Effect inside building 10 % fatal 70% fatal 100 % fatal
Partial demolition of Wooden poles snapped Total building
houses destruction
2
Fire radiation kW/m 4 12 38
Effect 0 % fatal, pain, blistering 1% fatal 100% fatal
Emergency response guidelines ERPG 1 ERPG 2 ERPG 3

toxic concentration (refer to Section
6.1.4)
Effect for 30 minutes exposure Suffer only mild transient Not suffer irreversible or Will not suffer life
health effects and other serious health threatening health
objectionable odour. effects or symptoms that effects.
could impair ability to take
protective action.
Severity effect distances for the three effect categories, determined by the consequence modelling,
are shown for each hazard event (releases) in Table 6-7 below. This gives an indication of how far
away from the hazard source certain effects (radiation, overpressure, concentration) will extend.

Table 6.7: Maximum effect distances from source

Distance in m
(Most severe effect 3)
No Hazardous Event Consequence Categories Cat 1 Cat 2 Cat 3
Effects

Ship hose rupture Fire (pool) Radiation 79 31 -
1
Explosion (late) Overpressure - - -
Jet fire Radiation - - -
Fire ball Radiation - - -
Flash fire Radius - - -
Release Concentration - - -
Berth pipe rupture Fire (pool) Radiation 182 100 -
2
Jet fire Radiation 13 9 6
Flash fire Radius - - 30
Storage tanks burst Fire (pool) Radiation 84 34 -
3
Storage tanks Fire (pool) Radiation 80 32 -
4 overfilled Explosion (late) Overpressure - - -
On site piping burst Fire (pool) Radiation 64 27 -
5
Road tanker burst Fire (pool) Radiation 108 46 -
6
Road tanker Fire (pool) Radiation 38 19 -
7 overfilled Explosion (late) Overpressure - - -
Hot water boiler Fire (pool) Radiation - - -
8 burst Explosion (late) Overpressure - - -

Table 6.7: Maximum effect distances from source

Distance in m
(Most severe effect 3)
No Hazardous Event Consequence Categories Cat 1 Cat 2 Cat 3
Effects

Fuel oil tank burst Fire (pool) Radiation 17 11 5
9
Fuel oil tank leak Fire (pool) Radiation 17 11 5
10
Explosion (late) Overpressure 1 - -
Note The hazard effect does not occur.
Using the Table 6-7 above, the hazard events, which have effect the longest distance away from
the source (hazard end points), are summarised in Table 6-8 for each severity category.
Table 6.8: Events with maximum effect distances
Category 1 2 3
Effect Maximum effect distance m Event
(2) (2) (9,10)
Radiation: Pool fire 182 100 5 2. Berth pipe rupture
9, 10. Heating oil tank burst or leak
(2) (2) (2)
Jet fire 13 9 6 2. Berth pipe rupture
(2)
Flash fire 30 2. Berth pipe rupture
Explosion NA NA NA NA
Toxic release NA NA NA NA
NA Not applicable, effect does not occur
The Table 6-8 above shows that if any of the events had to occur, one could possibly expect, as a
minimum, some serious hazardous effects (Category 3) as far away as 5-6 m for a pool and jet fire
following a plant and vegetable oil berth pipe burst. In other words, this is the distance up to which
injuries (which could include fatalities) might occur. These results do not include any escape or
shielding factors, i.e. it is for a person in the open, stationary at that distance. Neither do these
results include likelihood (frequency) of the events happening. Account is only taken of the
probability.
6.3.3 Hazard Effect Zones
Severity is further illustrated by graphical outputs of some of the significant effects on plot plans of
the site and surrounding areas.
6.3.3.1 Fire Radiation
The following fire radiation radii for various releases are shown on maps of the site on the figures
below.

2
Figure 6.1: Radiation 4 kW/m for various pool fires
2
Figure 6.2: Radiation 4 kW/m zone (red) for jet fires along the berth lines

Figure 6.3: Flash fire radiation cover circles (blue) for oil releases along the berth lines
6.3.3.2 Explosion Overpressures
There is no blast over pressures to display for a hot water boiler explosion (actually a burst)
because the temperature is below the normal boiling point of water. Note that no real explosions
are possible from caustic soda or molasses as these liquids are not combustible. Although
ethylene glycol, vegetable and plant oils are combustible, they are not volatile, no flammable
vapour will form and thus vapour explosion is not possible.
6.3.3.3 Toxic Effects
There are no toxic effect zones for releases to display on maps of the site.
6.3.3.4 Fatal Effects
There are no fatal effect zones for releases to display on maps of the site.
6.4 QUALIFICATION AS A MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATION
The entire harbour site is owned by Transnet National Ports Authority and the proposed project
area is leased by OTGC and activities outside the boundary are regarded as public with respect to
OTGC. Areas outside the Maydon Wharf complex may be regarded as sensitive public areas.
None of the materials to be handled and stored on the upgraded OTGC Storage Terminal site is
listed in the Schedule A of the General Machinery Regulations in the OHS Act and, therefore, the
OTGC site is not classified as a compulsory Major Hazard Installation.
Molasses, vegetable oils and water (in the hot water boiler) are not listed as hazardous materials in
SANS 10228, and can therefore be excluded from further consideration in terms of a Major Hazard
Installation.

It can be seen, though, from the results in the previous section, that the 12,5 kW/m2 heat radiation
circles (1% fatal) from pool, jet and flash fires displayed on maps of the site in Figures 6-1, 6-2, 6-3
respectively for plant oil and ethylene glycol releases, extend outside the OTGC site boundaries.
Thus the site could be classified as a Major Hazard Installation. Refer also to 10.1 Appendix A
Threshold Criteria for Classification of a Major Hazard Installation. However, since it is almost
impossible to ignite the plant and vegetable oils (need to be heated above 100 C and an ignition
source applied), the OTGC site will not be classified as a Major Hazard Installation.
Note also that none of the hazards extends into the public domain outside the Maydon Wharf
complex.
6.5 LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS
6.5.1 Event Frequency
The likelihood of a hazardous event was determined by first drawing fault trees which represent the
development of the causes to eventually become the event. Failure data was then used to calculate
the likelihood or frequency of the event. The fault trees are given as Diagram 1 in Appendix G of this
report. The average expected frequency from the fault trees are listed in Table 6-9 below.
In order to reveal the real risk, account was taken of other similar events that can contribute to the
hazard, e.g. several liquid pipes can burst. Therefore, to obtain the total hazard frequency, the
frequency of each single event was multiplied by the number of items involved in the hazard, as
shown in the Table 6-9 below.
Table 6.9: Likelihood or frequency of hazard events
Incidents = Frequency x F
No Representative event Frequency Frequency Allowance for items (F) Incidents

source per year per year
Ship hose rupture Diagram 1 1,7* 10
-3
Allowed for ship hose used 24 hrs
-3
1,7 * 10
1
3 times month/year, i.e. F = 1
Berth pipe rupture Diagram 1 1,0 * 10
-4
Allowed for 1000 m pipeline 24
-6
1,3 * 10
2
hrs/day, 365 d/y, but only 400 m
(distance of tanks from berth),
each used 24 hr / month, i.e. F =
400/1000*24*12/24/365 = 0,013
Storage tanks burst Diagram 1 5,0 * 10
-6
Allowed for 1 tank, but ultimately
-5
6,0 * 10
3
12 combustible tanks, i.e. F= 12
Storage tanks overfilled Diagram 1 1,8 * 10
-6
Allowed for filling 3 tanks a month,
-6
1,8 * 10
4
i.e. F = 1
On site piping burst Diagram 1 1,0 * 10
-6
Allowed for 10 m pipeline on site,
-5
1,2 * 10
5
but 12 combustible tanks, i.e. F =
12
Road tanker burst Diagram 1 6,6 * 10
-6
Allowed for one road tanker full
-5
1,1 * 10
6
time on site, but 85 on site per
day for 0,5 hr, i.e. F = 0,5*80/24 =
1,7

Table 6.9: Likelihood or frequency of hazard events
Incidents = Frequency x F
No Representative event Frequency Frequency Allowance for items (F) Incidents

source per year per year
Road tanker overfilled Diagram 1 3,5 * 10
-1
Allowed for 40 road tankers filled 7,0 * 10
-1
7
every day, but 85, i.e. F = 80/40 =
2
Hot water boiler explode ICI Failure 5 in 61000/y Allowed for 1 boiler, but hot water 8,1 * 10
-6
8
-5
data base = 8,1 * 10 boiler, so can reduce by 10, i.e. F
= 0,1
Fuel oil tank burst Diagram 1 5 * 10
-6
Allowed for 1 tank, i.e. F= 1 5 * 10
-6
9
Fuel oil tank leak Purple Book 1 * 10
-4
Allowed for 1 tank, i.e. F= 1 1 * 10
-4
10
6.5.2 Risk Levels
Two types of risk were evaluated in this risk assessment and are defined as follows:
Individual risk: The chance that a particular individual at a particular location will be harmed. It
is usually described in numerical terms such as number of fatalities per person per year or
one fatality per person per, e.g. 1000, 10 000, 100 000, 106, etc. years or chance of 10-1,
10-2.10-6, 10-7 of a fatality per person per year. Assessment of individual risk does not take
account of the total number of people at risk from a particular event.
Societal risk: Estimates the chances of numbers of people being harmed from an incident. The
likelihood of the primary event (an accident at a major hazard plant) is still a factor, but the
consequences are assessed in terms of level of harm and numbers affected, to provide an idea
of the scale of an accident in terms of numbers killed or harmed.
The individual risks were determined based on the combination of frequency or likelihood of events
and their severity, taking into account ignition probabilities and the distribution of the weather
conditions in terms of stability, wind speed and direction. Estimates were also made of the societal
risks incorporating the population distribution and the ability of people to escape indoors.
Detailed analysis of the population distribution, relative vulnerability, etc. outside the boundary of
the site, was not included. Use was made of the computer model DNV 6.7 SAFETI to obtain the
risk results.
6.5.2.1 Risk Contours
Individual risk contours as injuries (fatalities) per person per year (/p/y) have been plotted on a map of
the site as shown on Figure 6-4 below. These contours may also be interpreted as the chance (0,1,
0,001, 0,001, 0,0001, 10-5, 10-6, 10-7) of a fatality / person per year.

Figure 6.4: Individual risk contours as the chance of a fatality /person/year
6.5.2.2 Risk Profiles
On the map of the risk contours in Figure 6-4 above, a transect (line across contours) was drawn.
The transect enabled a risk profile to be produced as shown in Figure 6.5 below. This graph plots the
variation of unmitigated individual risks (no allowance for escape or wind direction) against distance
over the site along the transect.

Figure 6.5: Risk profile across pipelines (A B)
6.5.2.3 Societal Risk
Societal risk depends on the population distribution normally surrounding the site, as well as whether
persons are indoors or outdoors, i.e. their ability to escape from the hazard area. Societal risk is a
way to estimate the chances of numbers of people being harmed from an incident. The likelihood
of the primary event (an accident at a major hazard plant) is still a factor, but the consequences
are assessed in terms of level of harm and numbers affected, to provide an idea of the scale of an
accident in terms of numbers killed or harmed. Evaluation of societal risk is useful for town planning
as it gives an indication of how many of the population may be harmed. Population area for the OTGC
site on a map is demarcated as shown in Figure 6.6 below.

Figure 6.6: OTGC site, and surrounding population areas
An estimate of the number of people in the populated areas was done and the population density
was calculated based on the surface area. A probability that people would be indoors was
assigned to each population area, based on the guidelines Green Book 1992. See Table 6-10
below.
Table 6.10: Population data
Time Population area Harbour area

Day People 1 400
2
Population density (persons / m 0.008
Fraction indoors 0,9
Night People 200
2
Population density (persons / m 0,002
Fraction indoors 0,099
Societal risks were determined by using the individual risks to calculate the number of fatalities in a
specific population area, taking account of the population density, the probability that people will be
indoors, the wind direction distribution and ignition probabilities associated with the population and
other activities. Societal risk is then expressed in frequency fatality (F-N) curves as shown on a
graph in Figure 6.7 below as a blue curve denoted Combination 1, which is the societal risk curve.
In this evaluation the population on site was included. There is a lower limit line (green), below
which the risks are totally acceptable and an upper limit line (red) above which risks are totally
unacceptable. The risk region between these two limit lines is regarded as tolerable.

Figure 6.7: Societal risk F-N cure, (frequency / year versus number of fatalities)

6.6 ENVIRONMENTAL
6.6.1 Liquid Effluent
Large spills of molasses into waterways or into the sea are unlikely to have a negative effect on
aquatic life, except maybe enhancing the growth and multiplication of organisms and plant life, or
leading to high BOD and potential oxygen depletion of aquatic systems.
It is also expected that releases of vegetable and plant oils may also negatively affect aquatic life
for a short period of time until these oils have been biodegraded.
Spillage of high concentration caustic soda solution will lead to a drastic increase in alkalinity of the
water, and the corrosive effect may destroy aquatic life.
Ethylene glycol is miscible with water and is also toxic towards aquatic life.
Of the above two, a caustic soda solution release is more serious in terms of toxicity to fish than
ethylene glycol. Approximately a 1000 times higher concentration in water of ethylene glycol
compared to caustic soda is required to kill the same number of fish. Therefore the case of a burst
of a caustic soda solution berth pipe was evaluated, as per Vince et al. (2007).
a) Environmental Harm
Road tanker overfilling
If a road tanker is overfilled with 50% caustic soda solution at a rate of 90 m3 / hr for 10 minutes
due to operator failure, then:
Mass released = volume rate*time*density* concentration

= 90*10/60*1,4*1000*0,5 = 10 500 kg
Assuming immediate volume of harbour water 1 km square by 50 m deep, then:
Water in harbour = 1000*1000 *50*1000 = 5 * 1010 litres
Caustic soda concentration = 10 500*1000*1000/(5 * 1010) = 0,21 mg/l which is less than LC50
Severity = Actual concentration/ LC50 = 0,21/45,4 = 0,0046
Taking the reference for water surface as Sref = 2 ha and reference time for full recovery tref = 5 yr
for aquatic systems, time for recovery with caustic soda 14 days, then the:
Environmental Harm Index (EHI) = Severity * size * time where:
Severity = Actual concentration/ LC50

Size = (Length or area contaminated above the dangerous concentration) / Sref
Time = (Estimated time for full recovery) / tref
Thus EHI = 0,0046*(1000*1000/2/100/100)*(15/365/5) = 0,0019

Storage tank burst
If a 10 000 m3 50% caustic soda solution tank had to burst, then:
Mass released = volume rate*time*density* concentration

= 10 000 *1,4*1000*0,5 = 7 000 000 kg
Caustic soda concentration = 7*106 *1000*1000/(5 * 1010) = 140 mg/l which is more than LC50
Severity = Actual concentration/ LC50 = 140/45,4 = 3,1
EHI = Severity * size * time where:

Thus EHI = 3,1*(1000*1000/2/100/100)*(15/365/5) = 1,3
Berth pipe burst
If a berth pipe with 50% caustic soda solution burst and release at a rate of 230 kg/s in 20 minutes
before operator can isolate the flow, then:
Mass released = mass rate*time*concentration

= 230*20*60*0,5 = = 138 000 kg
Caustic soda concentration = 138 000*1000*1000/(5 * 1010) = 27,6 mg/l which is less than the
LC50 = 45,4 mg/l exposing Rainbow traut (no data for sea fish readily available) to caustic soda
for 96 hrs leading to 50% of fish killed.
Severity = Actual concentration/ LC50 = 27,6/45,4 = 0,0,60

Environmental Harm Index (EHI) = Severity * size * time where:

Thus EHI = 0,6*(1000*1000/2/100/100)*(15/365/5) = 0,24
Since there are no rivers or natural waterways close by, loss of containment will most likely end up
in the harbour sea water. The Port of Durban Oil Spill Contingency Plan would be adopted in the
event of spillages within the harbour.
b) Likelihood
From Table 6-9, road tanker overfilling frequency = 0,7/y once in 1,4 years. Assuming that there is
a 10% chance that the containment curb and sump system fails, a spillage will only find its way
outside the site or into the harbour water 0,7 * 0,1 = 0,07/y once in 14 years.
From Table 6-9, storage tank burst frequency 5 * 10-6 /year/tank, so for two caustic soda tanks
frequency 1 * 10-5 /year. Assuming that there is a 10% chance that the bund fails, a spillage will only
find its way outside the site or into the harbour water 1 * 10-5 * 0,1 = 1 * 10-6 per year.
From Table 6-9, berth pipe burst frequency 1,3 * 10-6 /year, so a spillage will only find its way
outside the site or into the harbour water 1,3 * 10-6 per year.
c) Environmental Risk
The environmental risks for the three caustic soda solution spillage cases are shown on the
diagram in Figure 6-8.

Environmental Risk Tolerance

1.00E-01
1.00E-02 Tanker overfill

Frequency /year / site
1.00E-03
1.00E-04
1.00E-05
1.00E-06
1.00E-07
Storage tank burst
1.00E-08
0.1 1 10 100 1000 10000
Environmental Harm Index (EHI)
Unacceptable Tolerable
Environmental Risk Tolerance

1.00E-01
1.00E-02 Tanker overfill

Frequency /year / site
1.00E-03
1.00E-04
1.00E-05
1.00E-06
Storage tank burst
1.00E-07
Berth pipe burst
1.00E-08
0.1 1 10 100 1000 10000
Environmental Harm Index (EHI)
Unacceptable Tolerable
Figure 6.8: Environmental risk tolerability
6.6.2 Gaseous Emissions
In the event of a fire or an explosion, toxic combustion fumes may enter the atmosphere as a gas,
possibly with entrained particulate or black smoke. The heat generated in the fire will assist in
initially dispersing the fumes and these are likely to descend some distance away and affect the
environment with toxic deposits, etc. There may also be the visual impact from the smoke.

A fire on the site with the resultant use of large quantities of firewater could pose an environmental
problem if not suitably contained and directed to the effluent system or a controlled storm water
system.
6.6.3 Solid Disposal
This will only consist of building rubble, soil and scrap iron, created during construction and will be
disposed by a contractor on approved waste disposal site. No environmental hazards will be
associated with solids handling, as these are neither toxic nor combustible.
7. ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS AND IDENTIFICATION OF

MANAGEMENT ACTIONS
The following potential direct impacts have been identified for the various phases of the proposed
project:
Decommissioning/Demolition for construction Phase:
Impact 1: Molasses washing and spillages ingress into storm water drains and the harbour,
thereby polluting sea water
Demolition/Construction Phase: Alternative 1 Phase 1:
Impact 2: Noise generation from demolition and construction (grinding)

Impact 3: Construction health injuries
Impact 4: Heavy traffic, congestion, and potential for collisions
Impact 5: Construction safety injuries
Impact 6: Pollution of water and ground (building rubble, scrap, spillages)
Demolition/Construction Phase: Alternative 1 Phase 2 Option 1:

Impact 11: Pollution of water (caustic soda solution spills) and ground (building rubble) and
spillages from the demolition of the caustic soda gantry and associated piping.
Demolition/Construction Alternative 1 Phase 2 Option 2:

Impact 16: Pollution of water (caustic soda solution spills) and ground (building rubble).

Demolition/Construction Alternative 2:

Impact 21: Pollution of water and ground (building rubble)
Operational:
Impact 22: Pollution of the ground and water

Impact 23: Atmospheric pollution e.g. fumes, smoke from fires
Impact 24: Health injuries
Impact 25: Safety injuries
Impact 27: Minor accidents to public, moderated accidents to employees e.g. fires
Impact 28: Minor accidents to public, moderated accidents to employees e.g. corrosive
spillages
Decommissioning for Close Down:
Impact 29: Washing from tanks and spillages (molasses, caustic soda, ethylene glycol ingress
into storm water drains and harbour, thereby polluting sea water
Impact 30: Noise generation from demolition (grinding, fall down of steel)
Impact 31 Demolition health injuries
Impact 33: Demolition safety injuries
Impact 34: Pollution of water and ground (building rubble, scrap, spillages)
Each of the above impacts are described below in detail and included in Tables 7-1 to 7-8.
7.1 POTENTIAL IMPACT 1 (DECOMMISSIONING/DEMOLITION FOR

CONSTRUCTION PHASE)
Impact: Molasses washing and ingress of potential spillages into storm water drains and the
harbour, resulting in the pollution of sea water.
This is not a significant impact as the molasses will be biodegraded if released into the harbour
water. If released onto the ground in the surrounding area, it will form a sticky surface and cause
discomfort/nuisance to people in the area.
Mitigation should entail recycling undiluted molasses back into tanks during decommissioning.
Spillages of molasses on the ground are expected to be small (uncoupling a pipe) and will be
washed away with water eventually entering the harbour water. Final washings from the tanks will
be pumped out into a tanker and will be correctly disposed of by an approved hazardous waste
disposal contractor. With mitigation measures in place; a low significance impact is expected.

7.2 POTENTIAL IMPACT 2, 7, 12, 17 (CONSTRUCTION PHASE)
Impact: Noise will be generated (e.g. angle grinders) during demolition of tanks and piping and
removing scrap material (e.g. crane and truck engines).
The above impact applies to Alternative 1 Phase 1, Alternative 1 Phase 2 - Option 1,

Alternative 1 Phase 2 - Option 2, and Alternative 2.
This is a low significance impact that will only affect the construction workers on site, as outside
the site boundary, the noise will be much reduced. Construction workers should wear hearing
protection, which is normally specified as a result of the construction risk assessment. This will
result in a low significance impact (i.e. with the implementation of mitigation measures). The
construction contractor must carry out their risk assessment, and prescribe appropriate personal
protective equipment to construction personnel, as well as what is required by the OTGC permit to
work system.
Impact: Construction Health Injuries: there may be a small impact on the health of construction
workers due to welding fumes, dust and smoke from burning organic materials.

This will be mitigated by the fact that construction work will be done in the open with good
ventilation from wind, dispersing fumes and smoke, as well as by the use of personal protective
equipment where appropriate, prescribed by the construction risk assessment. With mitigation, the
impact on health of construction workers is predicted to be of low significance.
Impact: Heavy Traffic, Congestion and Potential for Collisions - heavy traffic may be the cause of a
high significance impact resulting in collisions, damage, injuries, as well as restriction of road traffic
to the quay i.e. along Fletcher Road.

Alternative 1 Phase 2 - Option 2, and Alternative 2. Suitable parking areas should be designated
for trucks and a construction supervisor should be appointed to coordinate the construction traffic
(by drawing up a traffic plan prior to construction), which will ensure an impact of low significance
(i.e. with the implementation of mitigation measures).

Impact: Construction Safety Injuries: there is potential for a high significance impact (without the
implementation of mitigation measures) on the safety of construction workers due to welding,
cutting, hot metals, working at heights, lifting of heavy items, collisions, entanglement, and finger
nip points.

With the implementation of mitigation measures, this impact will be of a medium significance
provided a skilled and competent contractor is employed (contractor is to be evaluated during
selection), personal protective equipment is worn by personnel as prescribed by the construction
risk assessment, and a safety supervisor is appointed (in conjunction with the project manager) to
monitor all safety aspects (this could be same person who will be assigned to coordinate the
construction traffic).
7.6 POTENTIAL IMPACT 6 AND 21 (CONSTRUCTION PHASE)
Impact: Pollution of Water and Ground.
The above impact applies to Alternative 1 Phase 1 and Alternative 2.
Pollution due to small spillages of liquids, fumes and generation of rubble and scrap items will
result in a high significance, temporary environmental impact without the implementation of
mitigation measures. However, fumes will be small and well ventilated, spillage will be minimal
(cleaning materials) and scrap and rubble will be correctly disposed of by a contractor so that the
environmental impact will be of a low significance (i.e. with the implementation of mitigation
measures). The construction contract should specify provision of waste skips and the responsible
disposal of the contents.
7.7 POTENTIAL IMPACT 11 AND 16 (CONSTRUCTION PHASE)
Impact: Pollution of water (caustic soda solution spills) and the ground (building rubble), as well as
spillages from the demolition of the caustic soda gantry (and associated piping) for Alternative 1
Phase 2 Option 1. Spillages are also likely from the operation of the caustic soda gantry for
Alternative 1 Phase 2 Option 2.
The above impact applies to Alternative 1 Phase 2 - Option 1 and Alternative 1 Phase 2 Option
2.
A medium significance, temporary environmental impact is likely from pollution due to small
spillages of caustic soda liquids, fumes and generation of rubble and scrap items. However, fumes
will be limited and well ventilated, and scrap and rubble will be disposed of by an approved
contractor so that the environment impact will be low (i.e. with the implementation of mitigation

measures). Construction contract should specify provision of waste skips and responsible disposal
of the contents.
During demolition of the caustic soda gantry, small spillages may occur, but the system will first be
drained and washed out. The substances resulting from the washing process will be contained and
correctly disposed of by the contractor. Operation of the caustic handling and storage system has
the potential for an environmental pollution impact, but mitigation will be as for the operational
phase i.e. high tank level protection, bunding, sumps and recovery pump.
7.8 POTENTIAL IMPACT 22 (OPERATIONAL PHASE)
Impact: Pollution of ground and water due to a potential burst of a hose of a berthed ship, berth
pipe burst, overflowing or bursting of storage tanks, or overfilling of road tankers.
Mitigation incorporated in the design are high integrity ship offload hoses, berth pipes and storage
tank construction, storage tank level indication and high alarms, bunding, sumps and recovery
systems, road tanker curbed catchment areas, sump and recovery system. In addition, integrity
assurance of hoses, piping and tanks via scheduled inspections should be implemented, in line
with API 650 and OTGC standards (based on best practice and international standards), together
with operator training to prevent overfilling incidents. In addition an Emergency Plan should be
drawn up by OTGC in line with their HSSE (Health Safety, Security and Environment) policy for
potential spillages of their materials at the berths and on site. The Emergency Plan and records of
practices (i.e. drills) should be kept on site. With the implementation of mitigation measures, the
significance of this impact will be low.
Impact: Atmospheric pollution due to smoke evolution can be expected from a fire involving plant
and vegetable oil or ethylene glycol.
An inherent mitigation is the high flash points and the unsustainability of fires involving the low
volatility combustible materials. In the event of an unlikely fire, portable fire extinguishers and fire
water hydrants with hoses that will be provided on the site, as well as mobile firefighting equipment
at the berths during loading, would act as additional mitigation. This impact is predicted to be of
low significance, with mitigation.
Impact: Health Injuries - impact on the health of operating personnel will be low due to the low
volatility of materials, i.e. vapour cannot be inhaled.
Materials can also not be absorbed through the skin if splashed onto it. Further mitigation stems
from the fact that materials are of low toxicity and not carcinogenic. Operators will also wear basic
personal protective equipment, e.g. gloves, goggles. With the implementation of mitigation
measures, the significance of this impact will be low.

Impact: Safety Injuries - impact on the safety of operating personnel due to splashing of corrosive
caustic soda solution, during filling operations or maintenance. This impact will be mitigated by
wearing of personal protective equipment, e.g. gloves, goggles, and the provision of emergency
showers and eye wash fountains.
Another safety impact could come from thermal burn injuries due to accidental touching of hot
water piping, but this will be insulated.
With the implementation of mitigation measures, the significance of this impact will be medium.
Impact: Heavy Traffic, Congestion, and Potential for Collisions.
An increase in road tanker traffic due to large volumes handled may lead to a medium significance
impact (without the implementation of mitigation measures) in the form of collisions, damage,
injuries, as well as restriction of road traffic to the quay i.e. along Fletcher Road. Suitable staging
lanes should be designated for road tankers in waiting (i.e. 2 trucks on each lane), and dispatches
should be planned and scheduled to minimise congestion, which will ensure a low significance
impact.
Impact: Minor Accidents to Public (such as fires and corrosive spills).
Possible releases of combustible materials (ethylene glycol, plant and vegetable oils) and the
unlikely ignition may have a medium impact on the public and a high impact on the operating
personnel in terms of burn injuries. This impact will be mitigated by the fact that the material have
high flash points, do not sustain fires and any fire can be extinguished with the available basic fire
water and potable fire extinguishers. Further mitigation will be that a preliminary Hazard and
Operability (Hazop) study will be carried out before detailed design, and a detailed Hazop study on
the final process design of the installations with actions incorporated into the design to minimise
accidents. In addition an Emergency Plan should be drawn up by OTGC to cover any possible fire,
and records of practices (and drills) should be kept on site.
With the implementation of mitigation measures, the significance of this impact will be low.
Impact: Minor Accidents to Public (such as corrosive spills).
Possible releases or spillages of caustic soda may result in an impact of corrosive burn injuries of
the public and the operating personnel. Mitigation will be a Process Hazard Analysis carried out by
the designers, integrity assurance of piping and equipment by OTGC, the wearing of personal

protective equipment by operating personnel and the existence of emergency showers. Further
mitigation will be minimising flanges and joints on the caustic pipelines and flange guards where
needed (this is optional for all other pipelines that are not toxic or corrosive). A preliminary Hazop
study will be carried out before detailed design, and a detailed Hazop study on the final process
design of the installations with actions incorporated into the design to minimise accidents. Handling
of corrosive spill incidents should be included in the Emergency Plan by OTGC. Suitable safety
warning signs should be fixed at potential leak locations by OTGC before commissioning of the
caustic soda handling and storage.
With the implementation of mitigation measures, the significance of this impact will be low.
7.15 POTENTIAL IMPACT 29 (DECOMMISSIONING FOR CLOSE DOWN PHASE)
Impact: Molasses, caustic soda, ethylene glycol and vegetable and plant oils washing and ingress
of potential spillages into storm water drains and the harbour, resulting in the pollution of sea
water.
This is a significant impact if released into the harbour water. If released onto the ground in the
surrounding area, it will contaminate the ground in the area.
Mitigation should entail initially emptying all tanks and piping by dispatch to customers, during
decommissioning. Spillages on the ground are expected to be small (uncoupling a pipe) and will be
washed away with water eventually entering the harbour water. Final washings from the tanks will
be pumped out into a tanker and will be correctly disposed of by an approved hazardous waste
disposal contractor (in line with OTGC decommissioning procedures). OTGC Management must
arrange for a method statement including detailed procedures to be drawn up prior to any
decommissioning of existing tanks. With mitigation measures in place; a low significance impact is
expected.
7.16 POTENTIAL IMPACT 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 (DEMOLITION FOR CLOSE DOWN
PHASE)
Impact: Noise will be generated (e.g. angle grinders, fall of steel) during demolition of tanks and
piping and removing scrap material (e.g. crane and truck engines).
This is a minor impact that will only affect the construction workers on site, as outside the site
boundary, the noise will be much reduced. Construction workers should wear hearing protection,
which is normally specified as a result of the construction risk assessment. This will result in a low
significance impact (i.e. with the implementation of mitigation measures). The construction
contractor must carry out their risk assessment, and prescribe appropriate personal protective
equipment to construction personnel, as well as what is required by the OTGC permit to work
system. OTGC Management must arrange for a method statement including detailed procedures
to be drawn up prior to any decommissioning of existing tanks.
Impacts 31, 32, 33 and 34 correspond to the impacts for the construction phase.

7.17 CUMULATIVE IMPACTS
All the impacts are of a temporary nature except for Impact 27 during the operational phase. There
are no other industries nearby that could add to the impact from the project, so no cumulative
impacts are expected.

Draft Basic Assessment Report for the proposed Decommissioning and Upgrade of a Bulk Liquid Storage and Handling Facility at Maydon W harf,
Port of Durban, KwaZulu-Natal
Table 7.1: Decommissioning before Construction
Direct Impacts
Impact Description Mitigation Spatial Intensity Duration Reversibility Irreplaceability Probability Significance & Status Confidence
Extent
Without With
Mitigation Mitigation
Impact 1: Molasses washing and Undiluted recycled back into Local in Low Temporary High Low Improbable Medium Low High
spillages ingress into storm tanks. harbour Neutral Neutral
water drains and harbour, Washing pumped out into tanker water
thereby polluting sea water and correctly dispose via an
approved contractor.
Table 7.2: Demolition/Construction: Alternative 1 Phase 1
Direct Impacts
Extent Without With
Impact 2: Noise generation from Wearing of personal protective Local Low Temporary High Low Probable Medium Low High
demolition and, construction equipment Neutral Neutral
(grinding)
Impact 3: Construction health Wearing of personal protective Local Low Temporary High Low Probable Medium Low High
injuries equipment Neutral Neutral
Impact 4: Heavy traffic, Coordination by appointment of Local Medium Temporary High Low Highly High Low High
congestion, and potential for a site manager, drawing up a probable Neutral Neutral
collisions traffic plan prior to construction,
undertaking barricading, and
installation of road safety signs
Impact 5: Construction safety Evaluation of contractor for Local High Temporary for Low Moderate Highly High Medium High
injuries safety standards. injuries probable Neutral Neutral
Construction risk assessment Permanent for
by contractor. disabling
Wearing of personal protective injuries or
equipment. fatalities
Appointment of a construction
site manager.
Impact 6: Pollution of water and Minimal liquids handled Local Low Temporary High Low Improbable High Low High
ground (building rubble, scrap, Clean up and disposal of solids Neutral neutral
spillages) Minimal fumes (welding)

Table 7.3: Demolition/Construction: Alternative 1 Phase 2 Option 1
Direct Impacts
Extent Without With
demolition and construction equipment Neutral Neutral
(grinding)
Impact 10: Construction safety Construction risk assessment Local High Temporary for Low Moderate Highly High Medium High
injuries by contractor injuries probable Neutral Neutral
Wearing of personal protective Permanent for
equipment disabling
Appointment of a site manager injuries or
fatalities
Impact 11: Pollution of water Minimal liquids handled Local Medium Temporary High Low Probable Medium Low High
(caustic soda solution spills) and Clean up and disposal of solids Neutral Neutral
ground (building rubble) and Minimal fumes (welding)
spillages from the demolition of Caustic soda a separate system
the caustic soda gantry and Clean up and disposal of
piping caustic soda spillages

Table 7.4: Demolition/Construction: Alternative 1 Phase 2 Option 2
Direct Impacts
Extent Without With
(grinding)
barricading, signs
equipment disabling
fatalities
Impact 16: Pollution of water Minimal liquids handled Local Medium Temporary High Low Probable High Low High
(caustic soda solution spills Clean up and disposal of solids Neutral Neutral
during operation) and ground Minimal fumes (welding)
(building rubble) Caustic soda a separate system
Clean up and disposal of
caustic soda spillages
Table 7.5: Demolition/Construction: Alternative 2 No construction phasing
Direct Impacts
Extent Without With
(grinding)

Table 7.5: Demolition/Construction: Alternative 2 No construction phasing
Direct Impacts
Extent Without With
Impact 19: Heavy traffic, Coordination by appointment of Local Medium Temporary High Low Probable High Low High
congestion, potential for a site manager, drawing up a Neutral Neutral
collisions traffic plan prior to construction
equipment disabling
fatalities
ground (building rubble) Clean up and disposal of solids Neutral Neutral
Minimal fumes (welding)
Table 7.6: Operational
Direct Impacts
Extent Without With
Impact 22: Pollution of the High integrity hoses, pipes and Local Low Temporary High Low Probable Medium Low High
ground and water tank construction (in line with Neutral Neutral
API 650 and OTGC
standards).
Berth pipe corrosion protected
Tank level indication and high
alarms
Tanks bunded, sumps and
recovery systems
Tanker loading curbed
catchment area, sump and
recovery system
Compile an Emergency Spill
Plan (and keep records of
practices on site).

Direct Impacts
Extent Without With
Impact 23: Atmospheric Materials low volatility Local Low Temporary High Low Improbable Medium Low High
pollution e.g. fumes, smoke from High flash point combustible Neutral Neutral
fires materials
Fire extinguishing
Impact 24: Health injuries Materials low volatility, minimal Site Low Temporary High Low Probable Medium Low High
inhalation, low toxicity specific Neutral Neutral
Wearing basic personal
protective equipment
Impact 25: Safety injuries Wearing of personal protective Site High Temporary for Low High Probable High Medium High
equipment specific (caustic injuries Neutral Neutral
Safety system in place e.g. soda) Permanent for
permit to work, modifications, disabling injuries
training, inspections or fatalities
Impact 26: Heavy traffic, Planning and stock control Local Medium Permanent High Low Probable Medium Low Medium
congestion, potential for Rapid road tanker loading Neutral Neutral
collisions Stream lined gantry routes
Provision of staging lane for
road tankers (i.e. two trucks on
each lane).
Impact 27: Minor accidents to Piping integrity assurance Local Minor to Permanent Low High Improbable Medium Low High
public, moderated accidents to High flash point combustible moderate Neutral Neutral
employees e.g. fires materials (injuries)
Low volatility of materials
Fire extinguishing
Preliminary and detailed
Hazop study carried out by
designers.
Emergency plan (and keep
records of practices on site).
Impact 28: Minor accidents to Piping integrity assurance Local Minor to Permanent Low High Improbable Medium Low High
public, moderated accidents to Wearing of personal protective moderate Neutral Neutral
employees e.g. corrosive equipment (injuries)
spillages Safety warning signs
Preliminary and detailed
Hazop study carried out by
designers.

Direct Impacts
Extent Without With
Minimum flanges and joints on
caustic soda lines (optional for
other pipelines that are not
toxic or corrosive).
Flange guards on caustic soda
lines (optional for other
pipelines that are not toxic or
corrosive).
Emergency plan (and keep
records of practices on site).
Table 7.7: Decommissioning for close down
Direct Impacts
Extent
Without With
Impact 29: Washing from tanks and Washing pumped out into tanker Local in Low Temporary High Low Improbable Medium Low High
spillages (molasses, caustic soda, and correctly dispose via an harbour Neutral Neutral
ethylene glycol) ingress into storm approved contractor. water
water drains and harbour, thereby
polluting sea water

Table 7.8: Demolition/Remediation
Direct Impacts
Extent Without With
demolition (grinding, fall down of equipment Neutral Neutral
steel)
Impact 31: Demolition health injuries Wearing of personal protective Local Low Temporary High Low Probable Medium Low High
equipment Neutral Neutral
Impact 32: Heavy traffic, congestion, Coordination by appointment of a Local Medium Temporary High Low Highly High Low High
and potential for collisions site manager, undertaking probable Neutral Neutral
barricading, and installation of road
safety signs
Impact 33: Demolition safety injuries Evaluation of contractor for safety Local High Temporary for Low Moderate Highly High Medium High
standards. injuries probable Neutral Neutral
Construction risk assessment by Permanent for
contractor. disabling
Wearing of personal protective injuries or
equipment. fatalities
Appointment of a construction site
manager.
ground (building rubble, scrap, Clean up and disposal of solids i.e. Neutral neutral
spillages) sell scrap
Minimal fumes (cutting)

Draft Basic Assessment Report for the proposed Decommissioning and Upgrade of a Bulk Liquid
Storage and Handling Facility at Maydon W harf, Port of Durban, KwaZulu-Natal
8. CONCLUSIONS
From the above analyses, risk assessment, emergency plan and organisational evaluations, the
following conclusions can be drawn:
8.1 VALIDITY OF THE RISK ASSESSMENT
This assessment is valid for the installations and materials listed in Section 2.3.3 as at December
2014.
8.2 INCIDENT IDENTIFICATION
In terms of material hazards associated with the process or operations there are:
combustible liquids (vegetable and plant oils, ethylene glycol, fuel oil);
corrosive liquid (caustic soda solution); and
non-hazardous liquids (molasses, water).
Causes of hazards for the plant and equipment used are described below:
potential bursting of road tankers and storage tanks;
overfilling of road tankers and storage tanks;
potential rupture of piping;
ignition of pool fires following bursts and ruptures; and
physical explosion of the hot water boiler.
8.3 SEVERITY AND RISKS
8.3.1 Severity
Operation of the upgraded OTGC installation has the potential to affect members of adjacent
installations and the public outside the site boundary up to a distance of 6 m due to fires following
ignition of a berth pipe or fuel oil tank burst. Thus, the OTGC site was not classified as a Major Hazard
Installation, because the combustible liquid fires will not seriously harm the public and the risks are
also very low.
Materials handled and stored on the site are not highly toxic, so that any release into the environment,
which mainly consist of built up areas and the harbour water, will not result in irreversible
consequences.
8.3.2 Individual Risks
Maximum fatal risks at the centre of the site, at the berths and pipelines where employees are exposed
(see risk profiles) are approximately a 7 * 10-7 chance of a fatality per person per year (Figure 6-5).
Risks reduce to less than a 1 *10-8 chance of a fatality per person per year at a distance of
approximately 18 m away, which is outside the OTGC site boundary.

8.3.3 Societal Risks
The main contributions to societal risk, which includes employees on other nearby installations, is the
possible fires of ethylene glycol, vegetable or plant oils from a ship hose burst 59%, road tanker
overfilled 18%, and other releases 23%.
8.3.4 Health Risks
No significant health risks could be identified.
8.3.5 Environmental Risks
The likelihood of major accidents resulting in substantial spillages of molasses, oils and ethylene glycol
entering the environment will be very small. Thus environmental risks will be very small.
8.3.6 Acceptability
8.3.6.1 Public Individual Risk
Referring to Section 6.5.2.2 and the contours in Figure 6.5, as well as to the risk profiles displayed in
Section 6.5.2.3, the individual risks from flammable hazards, do exceed the acceptable target stated in
Appendix I of a 1 * 10 -6 chance of a fatality per person per year outside the OTGC site, which is
considered public area. Thus the OTGC storage installation individual risks can be regarded as
acceptable, i.e. risks should continue to be proactively managed.
8.3.6.2 Employee Individual Risk
The maximum individual risk at the OTGC installations where employees are exposed (see risk profiles)
are at most 7 * 10-7 chance of a fatality per person per year. This is less than a 1 * 10-5 chance of a fatality
per person per year stated in Appendix J. Thus, the risks at the OTGC site are acceptable for employees.
8.3.6.3 Societal Risk
Societal risks for persons on-site and off-site, shown on the F-N curve, are acceptable, i.e. risks should
continue to be proactively managed.
8.3.6.4 Health and Environmental Risk
Since there are no significant health issues, the risk can be regarded as acceptable.
Environmental risks are also acceptable as shown on the Frequency - EHI diagram in Figure 6-8.

8.4 MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS AND INPUT TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL

MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME
(Note that the numbers in the { } brackets refer to the sections where the background and reasons are
detailed).
(i) The project design by the Contractor must make provision of fencing around the entire OTGC site
(BS1722) with a security gate once the project is completed to prevent unauthorised access {4}.
(ii) The contractor must assess the risks of excavation by reviewing cable and pipe routings, and by
making provision for safe excavation {4}.
(iii) OTGC Management should ensure that roads are not closed during construction, which may
restrict access for emergency services {4}.
(iv) The Contractor must comply with all applicable legislative requirements during construction,
specifically as prescribed in the OHS Act under the Construction Regulations and the OTGC site
safety health and environmental procedures {4}.
(v) OTGC Management must arrange for catchment of any molasses spillages into trays or containers
during commissioning, and recovery back into remaining tanks. Liquids from washing out of tanks
are also to be collected and disposed of by an approved hazardous waste contractor e.g.
EnviroServe {7.1}.
(vi) The appointed construction contractor must carry out their risk assessment and prescribe
appropriate personal protective equipment as well as what is required by the OTGC permit to work
system {7.2}.
(vii) The Project Manager in consultation with OTGC management must designate suitable parking
areas for trucks and a construction supervisor is appointed to coordinate the construction traffic by
drawing up a traffic plan prior to construction {7.4}.
(viii)The Project Manager in consultation with OTGC management must evaluate contractor skill and
competence for safety standards and appoint a safety supervisor (in conjunction with the project
manager) to monitor all safety aspects (this could be the same person coordinating the traffic)
{7.5}.
(ix) The construction contract set up by the Project Manager should specify provision of waste skips
and responsible disposal of the contents {7.6}.
(x) OTGC management should clarify the handling and disposal of caustic soda washings during
construction for Alternative 1 Phase 2 Option 2 {7.7}.
(xi) OTGC management must implement scheduled inspections of hoses, piping and tanks to comply
with API 650 and OTGC standards (based on international best practice and standards), together
with operator overfilling prevention training before commissioning {7.8}.
(xii) OTGC management must set up suitable scheduling of road tanker filling to minimise congestion
{7.12}.
(xiii) The Project Manager in consultation with OTGC management must arrange for staging lanes for
road tankers in waiting i.e. 2 trucks on each lane {7.12}.
(xiv) OTGC management must draw up an Emergency Plan to cover spillages and a possible fire and
keep records of practices on site {7.8, 7.13}.
(xv) The Project Manager must arrange for a preliminary Hazop study to be carried out on the basic
process design, followed by a detailed Hazop on the final design of the installations, and
incorporate any improvement actions into the design {7.14}.
(xvi) The Project Manager must minimise flanges and joints and specify flange guards on the caustic
soda lines (optional for other lines that are not toxic or corrosive) {7.14}.

(xvii) OTGC Management must arrange for a method statement including detailed procedures to be
drawn up prior to any decommissioning of existing tanks {2.2.1}
The monitoring recommendations for the management actions described in this report are included in
Appendix F of the Draft BA Report.
9. REFERENCES
a) Lex Patria Publishers, Occupational Health & Safety Act 85 of 1993.

b) IChemE, 1999, The Accident Database version 4.1, CD-ROM, Rugby, UK.
c) Weiss G 1986, Hazardous Chemical Data Book 2nd ed. - Noyes Data Corporation.
d) Genium Material Safety Data sheet Collection, Genium publishing, New York
e) Lees, F.P, 1996, Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 2nd Ed, Butterworth Heineman,
Great Britain.
f) HSE, Reducing Risks, Protecting People, HSE Books, Section 132, 2001.
g) Purple Book, Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, CPR 18E, 1999.
h) Hazard & Operability Study Manual, ISHECON, 2009
i) Vince V, Sargent B, Ramsden N & Moore T, Major Accident to the Environment, Part 1, HSE,
November 2007.
j) Yellow Book, Methods for Calculation of Physical Effects, CPR 14E (Part 2), 1997.
k) Hazard & Operability Study Manual, ISHECON, 2009
l) ICI, Process Safety Guide No 14 Reliability Data, ICI Engineering September 1992.

10. APPENDICES
10.1 APPENDIX A - THRESHOLD CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION OF A MAJOR

HAZARD INSTALLATION
Definitions in the regulations state that a Major Hazard Installation is an installation where a substance is
stored that is listed in Schedule A of the General Machinery regulations of the Occupational Health and
Safety Act and the quantity exceeds those stipulated.
The materials handled are hazardous substances listed in SABS 0228 under both the specific and
generic type names.
It is an installation where a substance is produced, processed, used, handled or stored in such a form and
quantity that it has the potential to cause a major incident. A Major Incident is an event or occurrence of
catastrophic proportions resulting from the use of plant and machinery, or from activities at a workplace.
This may be interpreted in technical terms as follows:
Catastrophic relates to the effects on the general public, i.e. persons outside the boundary of the
premises of the installation.
People entering the premises through gates, although members of the public will be regarded as
employees for the duration of the time that they remain on the premises.
A fatality to one or more members of the public may be regarded as catastrophic.
Exposing a member of the public to hazardous effects which exceeds the following thresholds:
Thermal radiation: 12 kW / m2 for 1 minute.

Blast overpressure: 14 kPa.
Toxic gas dose: Equivalent Emergency Planning Response Guideline ERPG 3 for 1 hour
and chance of fatality > 1 %.
Toxic liquid drench: More than 50 % body coverage [severe injuries or fatalities].

Draft Basic Assessment Report for the proposed Decommissioning and Upgrade of a Bulk Liquid Storage and Handling Facility at Maydon W harf, Port of Durban, KwaZulu-Natal
10.2 APPENDIX B - PIPING AND INSTRUMENTATION DIAGRAM

10.3 APPENDIX C - WIND WEATHER DATA USED IN THIS RISK ASSESSMENT
1 GENERAL WEATHER INFORMATION: DURBAN
Altitude - 0m
Atmospheric Pressure - 100 kPa Abs
Min Temp Winter - 10 o C
Min Temp Summer - 18.2 o C
Max. Temp winter - 20 o C
Max. Temp summer - 38 o C
Lowest Recorded Temp - 5 oC
Average All Year Round - 22 o C
Relative Humidity Winter - 70 %

Relative Humidity Summer - 65 %
2 WIND SPEEDS, DIRECTIONS AND THERMAL STABILITIES
The following information sources were used:
Weather Bureau data from Durban Airport weather office.
Tyson P D, Diab R D & Preston-Whyte R A, Stability Wind Roses for Southern Africa,
Environmental Studies Occasional Paper No 21, Dept. Of Geography & Environmental
Studies, Univ. Wits, Jhb. RSA.
Three Pasquill stability conditions are normally applicable namely:
- Unstable:Sunny hot day (A, B, C).

- Neutral:Overcast day or night (D).
- Stable:Clear, cold night (E, F).
The above choice was based on climatological data for the east coast area (Tyson, Diab, Preston
1979) with the following distribution over a year (information for mornings were not available):
Condition Night Day Total

(01:30) (13:30)
Unstable 258 30
Stable 5439 47
Inversion 44 323
100% 100% 100%
Thus, as a simplification Unstable and Stable (Pasquill Unstable & Neutral) were grouped together
and used as D stability class and Inversion (Pasquill Stable) as F class.
Hence occurrence Night DayWhole day

D: 2 + 54 = 56 %D: 58 + 39 = 97 %77 %
F: 44 %F: 3 %23 %

The time during a year that the wind blows in given directions were scaled to a 100 % and given in
the table below.
DAYTIME W Direction N NNE NE ENE E ESE SE

Unstable+stable D5 = 97 2.0 4.7 4.4 1.7 1.4 0.5 0.6
Inversion F1.5 = 3 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
NIGHTTIME W Direction N NNE NE ENE E ESE SE
Unstable+stable D5 = 56 1.2 2.7 2.5 1.0 0.8 0.3 0.4
Inversion F1.5 = 44 3.0 6.9 6.5 2.5 2.1 0.8 1.0
Totals Durban 6.5 14.8 13.8 5.4 4.6 1.6 2.0
SSE S SSW SW WSW W WNN NW NNW Totals

1.2 3.2 4.1 5.0 1.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.5 31.70
0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.19
SSE S SSW SW WSW W WNN NW NNW 0.00
0.7 1.8 2.4 2.9 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 18.30
1.8 4.7 6.0 7.3 2.5 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.7 46.81
3.7 10.1 12.9 15.6 5.4 1.1 0.3 0.7 1.5 100.00

10.4 APPENDIX D - HAZARD ANALYSIS
Use was made of the Hazard & Operability Study 2009 (Stage 2 technique) and the Process Hazard
Reviews to identify the major and significant hazards. These hazards were then analysed in terms of
the causes, consequences and preventative and protective measures. The findings are shown in the
table below.
EXTERNAL FIRE
Section Causes Consequences Preventative and
Protective Measures
Pipelines for offloading of Pipeline rupture due to Potential for overheat Emergency procedures,
ships, and transfer across mechanical damage e.g. damage of nearby e.g. isolation
to storage site vehicle buildings and structures Fire extinguishing
Leak due to loss of Radiation injuries to Integrity assurance,
(Pool, jet, flash fires) integrity, e.g. corrosion employees, possible maintenance, e.g.
+ Ignition sources present, public inspection, testing
e.g. hot work, smoking, Hot work procedures
arson
Bulk storage of oils and Overfilling of tank and Potential for overheat Level indication and high
ethylene glycol roof seam shear damage of nearby tanks alarms
Catastrophic rupture of a Radiation injuries to Emergency procedures,
tank, e.g. integrity loss employees, possible e.g. isolation
(Pool flash fires) Tank pipeline rupture outside public Fire extinguishing
due to mechanical Damage of nearby Integrity assurance,
damage e.g. vehicle buildings maintenance, e.g.
Leak due to loss of inspection, testing
integrity, e.g. corrosion Hot work procedures
+ Ignition sources present,
e.g. hot work, smoking,
arson
Road tanker loading of oils Overfilling and spillage of Potential for overheat Fire extinguishing
and ethylene glycol a tanker damage of nearby Emergency procedures,
Rupture of a tanker due tankers e.g. isolation
(Pool, jet, flash fires) to integrity failure or Radiation injuries to Integrity assurance,
mechanical impact e.g. employees, possible maintenance, e.g.
collision outside public inspection, testing
+ Ignition sources present, Damage of nearby Hot work procedures
e.g. hot work, smoking, buildings Smoking prohibited
arson
Fuel oil storage tank and Overfilling of tank Potential for overheat Level indication
piping Catastrophic rupture of a damage of nearby tanks Emergency procedures,
(Pool, jet, flash fires) tank, e.g. integrity loss Radiation injuries to e.g. isolation
Tank pipeline rupture employees, possible Fire extinguishing
due to mechanical outside public Integrity assurance,
damage e.g. vehicle Damage of nearby maintenance, e.g.
Leak due to loss of buildings inspection, testing
integrity, e.g. corrosion Hot work procedures
+ Ignition sources present,
e.g. hot work, smoking,
arson

EXPLOSION
Section Causes Consequences Preventative and
Protective Measures
Hot water boiler Catastrophic rupture of Damage of nearby tanks, Emergency procedures,
the shell of the boiler, piping and tankers e.g. isolation
(Blast), e.g. integrity loss, Injuries to employees, Integrity assurance,
overheating when empty possible outside public maintenance, e.g.
Boiler blocked in and Damage of nearby inspection, testing
heating generating buildings
steam and overpressure
+ Failure of overpressure
protection and relief
devices

10.5 APPENDIX E - CONSEQUENCE METHODOLOGY
1 HAZARD MAGNITUDE
Magnitude depends on the amount or rate of release of the hazardous material following loss of
containment, as a liquid.
It was determined by normal fluid flow calculations in terms of the size of the hole and the
pressure drop, head loss or in some cases from equipment specifications (pumps).
The duration of a release affects the magnitude of the hazard, e.g. a large release for a very short
time may be as hazardous as a small release for a long time.
Although injuries may be inflicted on a person when directly exposed to a release, the principal
hazard stems from the effect when experiencing the fire radiation or blast wave or inhaling the
gas. Therefore, in addition to the magnitude of release, the gas emission rate is also needed for
determining the risk to people.
Salient aspects pertaining to some of the calculations are described below:
2 HOLE SIZE
Three possible cases were considered:
Case 1 - Guillotine cut open end damage of a fixed pipe, or sheared off valve, i.e. full diameter
as below:
Case 2 - Totally open flow path, e.g. when there is an instantaneous release following a rupture
of a tank.

Case 3 Tank overflow.
3 RELEASE RATE
It was assumed that when a release occurs as a result of a pipe rupture, liquid or gas will flow from
the vessel through a valve, pipe reduction, some length of straight pipe, three elbows, and an
enlargement at the opening where the break occurred as depicted below, before emerging into the
atmosphere.
The upstream pressure and temperature were taken as that prevailing inside the vessels or
containers and the maximum flow rate was calculated using a computer program capable of handling
two phase and gas flow.
In the case of complete rupture of a vessel or tank, it was taken that the entire content is
instantaneously released as a liquid.
4 DURATION OF RELEASE
It was assumed that a release will continue until some action had been taken by the operating staff to
isolate the leak, e.g. closing a valve, or if isolation is not possible, until the entire contents had been
lost. Knowing the rate of release and the content, allowed the duration to be calculated. It should be
noted that in respect of the duration of the incidents, the UK Health & Safety Executive standards
(Lees 1980) were used:

1 min Detection via a sensor followed by automatically isolation with an actuated shut off valve.
5 mins Remote manual isolation, e.g. operator responds to panel alarm and can isolate either on the panel or at
strategically located external isolation valves.
20 min Operator is required to isolate manually directly at or very close to the source of the release, e.g. required to
don breathing apparatus set, and move through the vapour cloud to close a valve.
5 EMISSION
Not applicable as all materials are of low volatility.
6 POOL FORMATION
The average depth of a liquid pool will be in the order of about 10 mm with the diameter depending
on the amount of liquid released.
7 DISPERSION
Dispersion of vapour or gas releases is handled by using dispersion programme PHAST 6.7.
8 EXPLOSION
Chemical explosion is not relevant on this site, only a physical explosion of the hot water boiler
producing a blast. This was modelled as an overpressure burst of a vessel.

Draft Basic Assessment Report for the proposed Decommissioning and Upgrade of a Bulk Liquid Storage and Handling Facility at Maydon W harf, Port of
Durban, KwaZulu-Natal
10.6 APPENDIX F - MODELLING INPUT DATA
Table A1 OTGC ship offloading, storage and road tanker filling
EIV Emergency isolation valve, MEI Manual Emergency Isolation, NRV Non return valve, CV Control valve
No Equipment Hazard Hole Container inventory Material (composition Release Temp Pressure bar Release Notes Bund area Release
2
failure size kgs wt %) duration (s) C (m H head) rate kg/s m height m
event mm Direction
6
Ship hose Rupture 150/2 7 20 * 10 Molasses 60 EIV 40- 55 0 + 10 mH + Liquid 20 * 2 valves + 5 2*2 = 4, h 3 down
1 1200 700 m pump
6
10 /24hrs m long hose =0,2 impinging
50 Caustic soda
Leak 25 Ethylene glycol head 230
(110) Vegetable oil
6
Berth pipe Rupture 200/3 7 20 * 10 Molasses 300 MEI 40- 55 0 + 10 mH + Liquid 20 * 2 valves + 2*2 = 4, h 0 vertical
2 1200 700 m pump
6
10 /24hrs 400 m long =0,2 up
50 Caustic soda
Leak 35 Ethylene glycol head 230 pipe
Vegetable oil
Storage tanks Rupture - 10 000 000 (largest) Molasses 600 40- 55 0 + 24 mH 58* 58 = 4 down
3 Leak 1200 3333, impinging
Caustic soda
Ethylene glycol h= 3
Vegetable oil
6
Storage tanks Overfilled - 7 20 * 10 Molasses 60 EIV 40- 55 0 + 10 mH + Liquid 20 * 2 valves + 58* 58 = 24 down
4 1200 700 m pump
6
10 /24hrs 400 m long 3333, impinging
Caustic soda
Ethylene glycol head 230 pipe h= 3
Vegetable oil
On site piping Rupture 250 10 000 000 (largest) Molasses 300 MEI 40- 55 0 + 24 mH + Liquid 90 2 valves + 2*2 = 4, h 1 horizontal
5 Leak 1200 300 m pump
3
m /hr 30 m long =0,2 impinging
25 Caustic soda
Ethylene glycol head tanker pipe
Vegetable oil loading
23
Road tanker Rupture - 30 000 Molasses 600 40- 55 0 + 3 mH 2*2 = 4, h 1 down
6 Leak 1200 =0,2 impinging
10 Caustic soda
Ethylene glycol
Vegetable oil

Draft Basic Assessment Report for the proposed Decommissioning and Upgrade of a Bulk Liquid Storage and Handling Facility at Maydon W harf, Port of
Durban, KwaZulu-Natal
Table A1 OTGC ship offloading, storage and road tanker filling
2
event mm Direction
Road tanker Overfilled 100 10 000 000 (largest) Molasses 60 EIV 40- 55 0 + 24 mH Liquid 90 2 valves + 2*2 = 4, h 3 down
7 1200
3
m /hr NRV + 30 m =0,2 impinging
Caustic soda
Ethylene glycol tanker long pipe
Vegetable oil loading
23
Table A2 Tank farm boiler
2
event mm Direction
3
Hot water Steam NA 2,5D*5L 25 m Water 1 152 4 NA 3
8 boiler drum Free space 0,01,
explode
Fuel oil tank Burst - 10 000 Fuel oil 600 40 0 + 3 mH 3,3 * 3,3 = 3
9& Leak 1200 11, h = 1
10
10

10.7 APPENDIX G - LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS
1 FAILURE DATA USED IN THIS STUDY
1.1 Data from Purple Book
EQUIPMENT AND FAILURE MODE FREQUENCY / Y

Full containment atmospheric tank (i.e. semi-explosion and missile penetration proof 1e-8
double containment tank)- instantaneous release
Atmospheric tank with protective outer shell- instantaneous release 5e-7
Small release to secondary container 1e-4
Single walled atmospheric containment tank - instantaneous rupture 5e-6
10-minute release of entire inventory 5 e-6
10 mm hole leak 1 e-4
Pressure vessel- instantaneous rupture 5e-7
- 10 min release of entire inventory 5e-7
- 10mm hole leak 1e-5
Process vessels and reactors- instantaneous rupture 5e-6
- 10 min release of entire inventory 5e-6
- 10mm hole leak 1e-4
Pumps (canned)- catastrophic failure 1e-5
- leak 5e-5
Pressure relief valve fails open 2e-5
Pipes rupture diameter < 75 mm 1e-6 /m
- leak 5e-6 / m
Pipes rupture diameter 75 < d < 150 3e-7/m
- leak 2e-6/m
Pipes rupture diameter d > 150 mm 1e-7 /m
- leak 5e-7 /m
Road tanker (atm) - inst rupture 1e-5
-large leak 5e-7
-hose rupture 4 e-6/h
-hose leak 4e-5/h
-arm rupture 3e-8/h
-arm leak 3e-7/h
Road tanker (press) - inst rupture 5e-7
-large leak 5e-7
-hose rupture 4 e-6/h
-hose leak 4e-5/h
-arm rupture 3e-8/h
-arm leak 3e-7/h

Human Failure
Source Person Task Level Failure Rate
Prob of Error
-4
ICI Operator Simplest 1 * 10
-3
Routine 1 * 10
-2
Must take care, e.g. a checklist is needed 1 * 10
-1
Non routine 1 * 10
-1
Checking another operator 1 * 10
-2
Supervisor Checking an operator 1 * 10
-3
Du Pont Operator Simple 1 * 10
-1
Checking another operator or shift change-over 1 * 10
1.2 System Factors
The standard of inspection and maintenance, integrity assurance and general safety
management systems in place on a site can have a significant effect on the failure rates used.
Pitblado (Ref. 19 pg 115) states that one can adjust generic data depending on the particular
plant effectiveness with respect to maintenance and safety systems.
The minimum standard should be a factor of 1. Some plants fall below this standard; hence
failure data must actually be increased up to a maximum of one order of magnitude. For those
that are of world class standard and have much more that the basic safety systems in place
the failure data can be reduced by a factor of 0,5.
Evidence of Inspection, maintenance and FACTOR

process safety systems
Nothing in place 10
9
Something in place 8
7
6
Bare minimum in place 5
3
Typical average system 1
0.9
0.75
The very best fully accredited PSM 0.5
2 FAULT TREE GENERATION
It should be noted that there is a range of frequency data that could be used. Typically,
frequency numbers vary within a range of two orders of magnitude. This means that the risk
estimates will also be average numbers within a range of approximately one order of
magnitude on either side.
Most of the failures leading to the identified potential major hazards are associated with loss of
containment as a result of vessel or pipe rupture, or due to leaks.
In order to account for the entire system, the frequencies of the representative events were
multiplied by the number of items involved to obtain the incident rate.
A fault tree is essentially a logic diagram, which represents the development of events from the
root causes with failure data in terms of their frequency or probability of occurrence to the final
'top' event or hazard as illustrated below.

COMPONENT 1 FAILS
SUB CAUSES
OR
COMPONENT 2 FAILS
COMPONENT n FAILS
AND HAZARD
PROTECTION SYSTEM 1 FAILED

PROTECTION SYSTEM 2 FAILED
PROTECTION SYSTEM n FAILED
The quantified fault trees are given in the diagrams below and for convenience are presented
from left to right. Each input is described and detailed in Table A.
TABLE A LOGIC DIAGRAM (FAULT TREE) INPUTS

Ref. no: Description, calculations and notes
1 'Ship offloading hose failure' From Purple Book failure data, loading hose fails 0,000004 per hour
operation ie f = 0,000004/hr/yearIt takes on average 24 hours to offload a
ship ie the time hose will be pressurised, thus t = 24 hrs/y
2 'System factor (integrity The piping is regularly checked and maintained if deterioration noticed, ie
assurance)' schedule inspection, maintenance and safety systems F = 0,5
3 'Severe wear conditions' No severe wear conditions eg corrosion on hoses, F = 1
4 'Ships offloaded' Taken that a ship is offloaded every month for a material, ethylene glycol,
vegetable and plant oils, so 3 combustible materials ie f = 12*3 = 36/y
5 'Berth pipe >150 mm fails' From Purple Book failure of piping > 150 mm given as 0,0000001/y. Pipng
length based on 1000 m from dock onto site, hence failure rate 0,0000001 *
1000 = 0,0001/y
7 'Severe wear conditions' Severe wear conditions moisture from sea and salt e.g. corrosion, F = 2
8 'Berth pipe impact damage' Berth pipe damaged by a vehicle or earthworking machine eg grader
unlikely, but assume crane working close by once every 10 years,
procedures in place to protect pipes, from ICI failure data human failure on
action embbeded in the procedure is 0,003 and dispite procedure, earthwork
machine operator slips with simple task where care is required of 0,01, then f
= 1/10 * 0,003 * 0,01= 0,000003/y
9 'Atmospheric tank failure' From Purple Book catastrophic failure of atmospheric tank given as f =
0,000005/y average
11 'Severe wear conditions' Severe wear conditions eg corrosion from sea moisture and salt, F = 2
12 'Atmospheric tank filled' Storage tanks are filled monthly from ships, for 3 combustible materials,per
year, hence f = 3 +*12 = 36/y
13 'Tank already full' From ICI failure data, general error of comissioning or not noticing tank
already full eg misreading data P = 0,003
14 'Level indication fail' From radar level transmitter supplier Endress & Hauser, failure rate is
0,0085/y. Calibrated every 6 months, fractional dead time fDt =1/2 * f * T =
1/2 * 0,0085 * 0,5 = 0,0021
15 'Operator monitoring fail' From ICI failure data,operator will neglect to monitor level ie simple routine
task P = 0,001
16 'High level alarm fail' From ICI failure data:For Rudder dip level switch use Mobrey float level
switch fail to danger of 0,1/yRelay0,004West Gaudian indicating alarm
0,02Total0,124fDT = 1/2fT = 1/2*0,124*0,5 = 0,031 (tested every 6 months)
17 'Operator ignores alarm' From Lawley failure data, operator will ignore a level alarm P = 0,05
18 'Hi tank level shu toff fail' Failure rates: From radar level transmitter supplier Endress & Hauser, failure
rate is 0,0085/y.Trip amplifier Bailey0,08Relay0,004Motorised valve0,18Total
0,264Calibrated every 6 months, fractional dead time fDt =1/2 * f * T = 1/2 *
0,264 * 0,5 = 0,066

19 'Tank piping >75 mm or <150 From appendix H in the report, Purple Book failure of piping >75 mm or <
mm fails' 150 mm given as 0,0000001/y. Tank piping about 10 m, hence failure rate
0,0000001 * 10 = 0,000001/y
21 'Severe wear conditions' Severe wear conditions eg corrosion from sea moisture and salt, F = 2
22 'Atmospheric road tanker From Purple Book, catastrophic failure of atmospheric road tanker is given by
fails' Purple Book as f = 0,00001
24 'Severe wear conditions' No severe wear conditions eg corrosion, F = 1
25 'Tanker collision' From ICI failure data tanker incidents on other roads 16 per million km
(assumed done per 10 years). On site only travel 10 km per year and further
assume only 1 out of 100 tankers will rupture on collision, thus f = 16 /1000
000 * 10/100 = 0,0000016/y
26 'Road tankers filled' From project personnel, 40 road tankers loaded per every working day ie f =
40 * 365 = 14 600/y
27 'Batching incorrect' From ICI failure data, general error of comissioning eg misreading data P =
0,003
28 'Meter faulty' From ICI failure data, lvariable flow toatlising meter failure 0,68/y. Calibrated
3 monthly, then fDt = 1/2*f*T = 1/2*0,68*0,25 = 0,085
29 'Batching permissive wrong' Each tanker is checked physically by security through opening hatch for
levels and empty, the batching system is set up to only permit the correct
quantity to be entered, hence probability tanker not empty or wrong quantity
alowed to be entered, from ICI failure data simple aritmetic error with self
checking P = 0,03
30 'High level shut off fail' From ICI failure data:Magnetron float level switch 0,052/y Trip module
0,001Solenoid shut off valve0,02Total0,073fDT = 1/2fT = 1/2*0,073*0,5 =
0,018 (tested every 6 months)
31 'Operator fail to trip filling' From ICI failure data, high stress, happens rapidly, operator unable to stop
overflow 50:50 chance ie P = 0,5


10.8 APPENDIX H - RISKS
1 RISKS ESTIMATION
Risk is the product of the likelihood of the event (F) and the severity (S) of the consequences, i.e.
R = F x S.
F was determined earlier by an estimate of the frequency of the events as incidents per year.
Severity is the consequence effect (C) at a specific distance from the hazard source and the
probability P) of the injury effect, i.e. death at that distance.
S=CxP
Thus R = F x C x P as a function of distance from the source.
The total risk at a point = Sum of all the risk contributions (Explosion, fire, toxic releases).
Flammable risks
Ignition probabilities used are as follows:
On site
Time Immediate PIgnition Delayed PIgnition Operating P
Day 0,063 0,065 0,001
Night 0,063 0,065 0,001
Vehicles on the roads

Time PIgnition Speed m/s Vehicles / hr
Day 0,2 33 240
Night 0,2 33 6
Areas surrounding site

Time PIgnition Duration (s) Operating P
Day 0,01 10 0,01
Night 0,01 10 0,01
The explosion risk was based on the peak overpressure at a location where a person may be present
follows:
Peak overpressure bar: Probability of fatality %

< 0,10 outdoors and indoors
> 0,10 outdoors, 2,5 indoors
> 0,3100 outdoors and indoors
The risk from a fire was based on the radiation intensity at a location where a person may be present as
follows:
n 2
Probability of fatality via the probit equation Pr = A + B logn I t where I Radiation kW/m , t time in
minutes.
The constants A, B and n were obtained from available databases, e.g. the Purple Book 1999.

Toxic risks
The risk from a toxic release was based on the concentration at a location where a person may be
present as follows:
n
Probability of fatality via the probit equation Pr = A + B logn c t where c ppm and t time in minutes.
The constants A, B and n were obtained from available databases, or alternatively it could be derived
from the LC50 based on the method in the Purple Book 1999.
Where these constants are not available or could not be calculated, the toxicity was based on dangerous
dose.
2 RISK CONTOURS
By drawing, circles of the total risk against distance around the source gave a set of uniform risk
contours. Note the risk along a contour is constant. See the figure below.
Hazard source
Risk contours
It was necessary to take into account that the wind blows in several directions and the proportion of the
time that it blows in each direction differs. This has the effect of increasing the flammable and toxic risk
in certain areas while decreasing it in others.
The risks determined earlier for a uniformly distributed wind were proportioned to each of the 16
directions according to the wind direction distribution by multiplying it with an appropriate factor:
F=1/100 * (Number of wind directions, e.g. 16) * (% of time wind blows in direction)
This adjustment gives the variation of the fatal risk with the distance from a toxic release in any specific
direction. In order to elucidate the effect, use was made of a map of the area surrounding the
installation. Sectors, according to the 16 wind directions were marked out from each installation as
centre and risk contours were drawn as in the illustration below.

-6
Risk contours are shown for 10 injuries (fatalities) per person per year (/p/y) for the installation. This
-6
may also be interpreted as a risk contour for a 10 chance of a fatality / person per year.
3 RISK PROFILES
By drawing a centre line from left to right or from bottom to top, across the contours and plotting the
risks against distance allows a risk profile to be drawn. This gives an indication of the risk with distance
from the installation as illustrated in the Figure below.
R
Distance

10.9 APPENDIX I - ACCEPTABILITY OF RISK
In deciding what acceptability criteria to use, there are two factors to keep in mind. Firstly, if
incidents happen too often, the reaction of the public would be such as to cause the facility to
be closed. Secondly, if too stringent targets were set, the penalties on operation or the cost of
preventing the incidents would be intolerable burdens on the business.
1 INDIVIDUAL RISK CRITERIA
1.1 Public
A criterion used for deciding the acceptability or tolerability of a chemical installation to the
public in general, is based on everyday life involuntary risks. This roughly requires that a
hazardous installation should not pose an individual risk to the public greater than 10 times
that of being killed by a lightning strike, i.e.10-6 deaths per person per year. The Health and
Safety Executive in the UK have adopted this limit (see HSE 2001). A risk > 1 * 10-4 would be
totally unacceptable, and will not be granted approval for either construction or continued
operation. For existing installations, if the risk is > 1 * 10-6 but < 1 * 10-4, then serious
consideration needs to be given to reducing the risk.
1.2 Employees
People inside the facility site are looked upon as being employees who are different from the
public as far as safety is concerned. They have been trained in handling all the potential
hazards on the site, i.e. emergency procedures, availability of suitable protective equipment
(PPE). Criteria by the Health & Safety Executive in the UK (HSE 2001) a target risk of 10-3 for
employees is regarded as the absolute tolerable maximum. A risk of less than 10-5 would be
totally acceptable.
2 SOCIETAL RISK CRITERIA
This was adopted from the UK Health and Safety Executive, HSE 2010, which specifies upper
and lower societal limits as follows:
Intolerable if fatalities of 50 or more people in a single event can happen with a
frequency of more than 1 in 5000 per year (2 * 10-4).
Acceptable if fatalities of 50 or more people will not occur with a frequency more than
two orders of magnitude less that that regarded above as intolerable, i.e. 1 in 50 000
per year or 2 * 10-5 per year.
When used on an F-N curve, the slope of the limit lines shall pass through the above
point with a slope of 1 and be parallel to each other as shown below.

F - N CURVE
Tolerable
Acceptable
1.E-02
FREQUENCY / y
1.E-04
1.E-06
1.E-08
1 10 100 1000
FATALITIES (N)
The straight lines on the F N curve indicate these limits. The upper line represents the
tolerable limit and the lower line the risk acceptance. The region between the upper and the
lower line is denoted the ALARP area (As Low As Reasonable Practical). For scenarios with
risk levels that lay between these two lines the risk should be reduced if practical, typically
subject to cost benefit analysis. For scenarios with risk levels above the upper line, measures
must be implemented to reduce the risk. Below the lower line risk is acceptable and no
measures need to be implemented.

6 - Appendix D2 - Risk Assessment PDF

Diunggah oleh

Informasi Dokumen

Judul Asli

Hak Cipta

Format Tersedia

Bagikan dokumen Ini

Bagikan atau Tanam Dokumen

Opsi Berbagi

Apakah menurut Anda dokumen ini bermanfaat?

Apakah konten ini tidak pantas?

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

6 - Appendix D2 - Risk Assessment PDF

Diunggah oleh

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

SAFETY HEALTH AND

ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT

Proposed Decommissioning and Upgrade of a Bulk

Report prepared for: Report prepared by:

CSIR Environmental Management Services Danil J E Rademeyer - ISHECON

P O Box 17001 P.O. Box 320

Congella, Durban, 4013 Modderfontein 1645

South Africa South Africa

SPECIALIST EXPERTISE: DANIL RADEMEYER

SPECIALIST DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

BOX 1: DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

DATE: MARCH 2015

Appendix D.2, Page 1

Identification and Assessment of Risks

Appendix D.2, Page 2

Appendix D.2, Page 3

Appendix D.2, Page 4

Finally, main management recommendations are as follows:

Appendix D.2, Page 5

Appendix D.2, Page 6

1. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 13

1.1 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 13

2. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT ASPECTS RELEVANT TO SAFETY, HEALTH

2.1 CURRENT OPERATIONS 16

3. DESCRIPTION OF THE AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT 26

3.1 OTGC TERMINAL LOCATION 26

4. IDENTIFICATION OF KEY ISSUES 29

Appendix D.2, Page 7

5. APPLICABLE LEGISLATION AND PERMIT REQUIREMENTS 31

6.1 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS 31

Appendix D.2, Page 8

7. ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS AND IDENTIFICATION OF MANAGEMENT

7.1 POTENTIAL IMPACT 1 (DECOMMISSIONING/DEMOLITION FOR

8.1 VALIDITY OF THE RISK ASSESSMENT 69

Appendix D.2, Page 9

10.1 APPENDIX A - THRESHOLD CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION OF A MAJOR

TABLES AND FIGURES

Appendix D.2, Page 10

Figure 2.1: Layout of the existing OTGC site 16

Appendix D.2, Page 11

Appendix D.2, Page 12

SAFETY HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL

1. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

1.2 TERMS OF REFERENCE

1.3 APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

1.3.1 Major Hazard Installation Regulations

Appendix D.2, Page 13

1.3.2 Philosophy for a Major Hazard Installation Classification

1.3.2.1. Risk Assessment in General

Risk is made up of two components:

A risk assessment is therefore typically comprised of the following aspects:

The methodology followed can therefore be summarised as follows:

Description of the plant, the location, and the meteorological conditions;

Appendix D.2, Page 14

1.3.3 Assumptions and Limitations

The following was assumed as given:

1.3.4 Source of Information

Appendix D.2, Page 15

2. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT ASPECTS RELEVANT TO

Figure 2.1: Layout of the existing OTGC site

Appendix D.2, Page 16

2.2.1 Decommissioning for construction

Alternative 1 (Phases 1 and 2) Construction phased during decommissioning of old