CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
DEPARTMENT (BASED ON THE UPDATED SYLLABUS)
Judicial Power
Section 1, Article VIII
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999
FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality
of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component city. July
4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a
plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA
No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of Santiago from
an independent component city to a component city.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the
lack of provision to submit the law for the approval of the
people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.
Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528
saying that the said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago
from an independent component city into a component city. It
allegedly did not involve any creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units, therefore, a plebiscite of the people of
Santiago is unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of
petitioners to file the petition and argued that the petition raises
a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the
petition at bar.
RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme
Court has the jurisdiction over said petition because it involves
not a political question but a justiciable issue, and of which only
the court could decide whether or not a law passed by the
Congress is unconstitutional.
That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger,
division, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of
local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the implementation of RA
No. 8528. Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was
the President of the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other
petitioners were all residents and voters in the City of Santiago.
It is their right to be heard in the conversion of their city through
a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of
their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike
down the law as unconstitutional.
Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Requisites of Judicial Review/Inquiry
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the
courts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers
conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations,
namely:
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have "standing"
to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
of the case.
A. Actual case or controversy
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right,
an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is
"definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interest;" a real and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Lacson vs. Perez, GR No. 147780, May 10, 2001
Alunan III vs. Mirasol, GR No. 108399, July 31, 1997
Salonga vs. Pano, 134 SCRA 438
PACU vs. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806
LACSON VS. PEREZ
357 SCRA 756 G.R. No. 147780
May 10, 2001
Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of
Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well as
General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to
suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of
several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were
thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction,
mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the
issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of
Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by
virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate
court, wherein the information against them were filed, would
desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is
resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly faced with
impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that
hold departure orders were issued against them.
Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with
the warrantless arrests and hold departure orders allegedly
effected by the same.
Held: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc.
No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant petition has
been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have
declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities
intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for
all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only
resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion
in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant,
thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38.
Petitioners prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at
this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has
adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, providing for the period in which a
warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper
judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such
may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention
should have no legal ground, the arresting officer can be
charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were
neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure
orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave the
country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders
null and void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings
initiated for that purpose. Petitioners prayer for relief regarding
their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being
that no complaints have been filed against them for any crime,
furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its
purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are
not subjected to.
Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent
with their undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their
agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf,
are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the
required judicial warrants for all acts committed in relation to or
in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang.
ALUNAN ET AL. VS MIRASOL ET AL.
G.R. No. 108399
July 31, 1997
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated
January 19, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36,
Manila nullifying an order of the DILG, which cancelled the
general elections for the SK dated December 4, 1992 in the
City of Manila on the ground that the elections previously held
on May 26, 1990 served the purpose of the first SK under the
LGC of 1991 (R.A. 7160).
On September 18, 1992, the DILG issued a resolution through
then Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III exempting the City of
Manila from holding its SK election on December 4, 1992. This
was issued in relation to the letter of Joshue R. Santiago,
acting president of the KB City Federation of Manila. In its
resolution, the DILG stated:
[A] close examination of . . . RA 7160 would readily reveal the
intention of the legislature to exempt from the forthcoming
Sangguniang Kabataan elections those kabataang barangay
chapters which may have conducted their elections within the
period of January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 under BP 337.
Manifestly the term of office of those elected KB officials have
been correspondingly extended to coincide with the term of
office of those who may be elected under RA 7160.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the
RTC of Manila, which then issued an injunction ordering
petitioners to desist from implementing the order of the DILG.
Trial of the case ensued and a Decision was issued holding
that the (1) the DILG had no power to "exempt" the City of
Manila from holding SK elections on December 4, 1992
because under Art. IX, C, 2(1) of the Constitution the power to
enforce and administer "all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall" is vested solely in the COMELEC; (2) the COMELEC
had already in effect determined that there had been no
previous elections for KB by calling for general elections for SK
officers in every barangay without exception; and (3) the
"exemption" of the City of Manila was violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because, according to the
DILG's records, in 5,000 barangays KB elections were held
between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 but only in the
City of Manila, where there were 897 barangays, was there no
elections held on December 4, 1992.
Petitioners sought this review on certiorari. They insist that the
City of Manila, having already conducted elections for the KB
on May 26, 1990, was exempted from holding elections on
December 4, 1992. In support of their contention, they cite
532(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991, which
provides that:
All seats reserved for the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang
kabataan in the different sangguniang shall be deemed vacant
until such time that the sangguniang kabataan chairmen shall
have been elected and the respective pederasyon presidents
have been selected: Provided, That, elections for the
kabataang barangay conducted under Batas Pambansa Blg.
337 at any time between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992
shall be considered as the first elections provided for in this
Code. The term of office of the kabataang barangay officials
elected within the said period shall be extended
correspondingly to coincide with the term of office of those
elected under this Code.
Issue: Whether the case has been moot and academic.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the issue is not moot and it
is necessary in fact to decide the case on the issues raised by
the parties. The case comes with the rule that courts will
decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is
capable of repetition and yet evade review. Rejecting the
contention of being moot and academic, the Supreme Court in
the Southern Pacific Terminal case held:
The question involved in the orders of the Interstate Commerce
Commission are usually continuing (as are manifestly those in
the case at bar), and these considerations ought not to be, as
they might be, defeated, by short-term orders, capable of
repetition, yet evading review, and at one time the government,
and at another time the carriers, have their rights determined
by the Commission without a chance of redress.
Moreover in Roa vs. Wade, the US Supreme Court explained:
[W]hen, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact the litigation,
the normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that the
pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate
process is complete. If that termination makes a case moot,
pregnancy litigation seldom will survive. Our laws should not
be that rigid. Pregnancy provides a classic justification
for a conclusion of non-mootness. It truly could be capable of
repetition, yet evading review.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 36 is REVERSED and the case filed against
petitioner by private respondents is DISMISSED.
SALONGA vs PAO
 G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985
Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected
right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause,
alleging that no prima facie case has been established to
warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him.
Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the
respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass,
oppress, and persecute him, a member of the democratic
opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred
in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September
and October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims
of the bombing, implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those
responsible.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the
petitioner a Notice of Preliminary Investigation in People v.
Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-
accused), stating that the preliminary investigation of the
above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 oclock p.m. on
December 12, 1980 and that petitioner was given ten (10)
days from receipt of the charge sheet and the supporting
evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The
petitioner states that up to the time martial law was lifted on
January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he
has not received any copies of the charges against him nor
any copies of the so-called supporting evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended
complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March
1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the
violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD
1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a
motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure of the
prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. On 2
December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City)
denied the motion. On 4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued a
resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of
the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40
people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge
dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of
the present petition for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga
that no prima facie case has been established by the
prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him.
He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the
lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of
law exists in the Philippines today.
Issues: 1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual
case
2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still
deserves a decision from the Supreme Court
Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a
consensus on the Courts judgment had been arrived at, and a
draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate
opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge
Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal
Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the
petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice,
the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the
exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in
the information filed under the questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and
the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from
circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it
once again in the Courts crowded agenda for further
deliberations.
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the
filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has
been rendered moot and academic by the action of the
prosecution.
2. Yes. Despite the SCs dismissal of the petition due to the
cases moot and academic nature, it has on several occasions
rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness
was clearly apparent.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or
rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar
on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:
The fact that the case is moot and academic should not
preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and
unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower
court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution
that excessive bail shall not be required.
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the
Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created
through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree
No. 15, the Centers new charter pursuant to the Presidents
legislative powers under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court
discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and
development of Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV,
Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA
183), the fact that the petition was moot and academic did not
prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from
promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever
printed in the Reports.
Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs
Secretary of Education
95 Phil. 806 Political Law Civic Efficiency
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities
(PACU) assailed the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as
amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180.
These laws sought to regulate the ownership of private schools
in the country. It is provided by these laws that a permit should
first be secured from the Secretary of Education before a
person may be granted the right to own and operate a private
school. This also gives the Secretary of Education the
discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed by
private schools. It also provides that the Secretary of Education
can and may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a
school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring
previous governmental approval or permit before such person
could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous
restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and
government. PACU also avers that such power granted to the
Secretary of Education is an undue delegation of legislative
power; that there is undue delegation because the law did not
specify the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary
must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban books
granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is
unconstitutional.
HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy
presented. PACU did not show that it suffered any injury from
the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers
granted to him by the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the
ownership of schools. The Constitution provides for state
control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates
certain fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the
development of moral character, personal discipline, civic
conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the
duties of citizenship. The State control of private education was
intended by the organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those
that are offensive to Filipino morals. This is still part of the
power of control and regulation by the State over all schools.
B. The constitutional question must be raised by the
proper party
(1) Tatad vs. Secretary, Department of Energy, GR No.
124360, November 5, 1997
(2) Anti-graft League of the Philippines vs. CA, 260 SCRA
236
(3) Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236
(4) The People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56)
(5) Agan, Jr. vs. Philippine International Air Terminals Co.,
Inc, GR No. 155001, May 05, 2003
(6) Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141
(7) Philconsa vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506
NOT PROPER PARTIES
(1) Cutaran vs. DENR, GR No. 134958, January 31, 2001
(2) Joya vs. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568
(3) Lacson vs. Perez, GR No. 147780, May 10, 2001
(4) IBP vs. Zamora, GR No. 141284, August 15, 2000
Francisco Tatad et al vs Secretary of Energy
Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law
Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history
shows that the government has always been finding ways to
alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws
accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One such
law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA
8180. This law allows that any person or entity may import or
purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products
from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate
refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such
crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject
only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails
the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others, that
the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and
imported refined petroleum products violates the equal
protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff
differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and
discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream
oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have
to source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be
taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude
products.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180
because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It
violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly
which is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied that
our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an
oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex
stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All
other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant
players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of
various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works
to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff
differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of
their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new
players. New players that intend to equalize the market power
of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own
will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build
refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge
disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will
be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4%
tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective
players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse.
The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be
attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without
new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and
Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle
dream.
RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it
discriminated against the new players insofar as it placed
them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil
companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions
already being observed by the latter.
Anti-Graft League of the Philippines vs. CA [G.R. No.
97787; August 1, 1996]
Facts: PD 674 was issued by Pres. Marcos, establishing the
Technological Colleges of Rizal. It directed the Board to
provide funds for the purchase of a site and the construction of
the necessary structures thereon. The Province was able to
negotiate with respondent Ortigas & Co., Ltd. for the
acquisition of four parcels of land located in Ugong Norte,
Pasig. The projected construction, however, never
materialized because of the decimation of the Provinces
resources brought about by the creation of the Metro Manila
Commission (MMC) in 1976.
Twelve years later, with the property lying idle and the Province
needing funds to propel its 5-year Comprehensive
Development Program, the then incumbent Board passed
Resolution No. 87-205 dated October 15, 1987 authorizing the
Governor to sell the same. The property was eventually sold
to Valley View Realty Development Corporation.
Issue: 1) WON the action is a taxpayers suit.
2) WON petitioner has locus standi.
Held: 1) No. To constitute a taxpayers suit, two requisites
must be met, namely, that public funds are disbursed by a
political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is
violated or some irregularity is committed, and that the
petitioner is directly affected by the alleged ultra vires act.
In the case at bar, disbursement of public funds was only made
in 1975 when the Province bought the lands from Ortigas at
P110.00 per square meter in line with the objectives of P.D.
674. Petitioner never referred to such purchase as an illegal
disbursement of public funds but focused on the alleged
fraudulent reconveyance of said property to Ortigas because
the price paid was lower than the prevailing market value of
neighboring lots. The first requirement, therefore, which would
make this petition a taxpayers suit is absent.
2) No. As a taxpayer, petitioner would somehow be adversely
affected by an illegal use of public money. When, however, no
such unlawful spending has been shown, as in the case at bar,
petitioner, even as a taxpayer, cannot question the transaction
validly executed by and between the Province and Ortigas for
the simple reason that it is not privy to said contract. In other
words, petitioner has absolutely no cause of action, and
consequently no locus standi, in the instant case.
MACASIANO VS. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, 224
SCRA 236
FACTS: Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as
unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279,
otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act
of 1992. He predicates his locust standi on his being a
consultant of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy on Operation
for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties
of Public Domain (executed immediately after his retirement on
2 January 1992 from the Philippine National Police) and his
being a taxpayer. As to the first, he alleges that said Sections
28 and 44 "contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that
serve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding
demolition of illegal structures"; because of the said sections,
he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal structures
which he assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past."
As a taxpayer, he alleges that "he has a direct interest in
seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully
disbursed."
On 14 May 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment to
the petition. He maintains that, the instant petition is devoid of
merit for non-compliance with the essential requisites for the
exercise of judicial review in cases involving the
constitutionality of a law. He contends that there is no actual
case or controversy with litigants asserting adverse legal rights
or interests, that the petitioner merely asks for an advisory
opinion, that the petitioner is not the proper party to question
the Act as he does not state that he has property "being
squatted upon" and that there is no showing that the question
of constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. He argues
that Sections 28 and 44 of the Act are not constitutionality
infirm.
Issue: Whether or not Petitioner has legal standing
Held: It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the
constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be
determined by the courts unless that, question is properly
raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to
a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality
must be very lis mota presented.
To reiterate, the essential requisites for a successful judicial
inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are:
(a) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination,
(b) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper
property,
(c) the constitutional question must be raised at the
opportunity, and
(d) the resolution of the constitutional question must be
necessary to the decision of the case.
A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of
sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or
measures complained of. It is easily discernible in the instant
case that the first two (2) fundamental requisites are absent.
There is no actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not
claim that, in either or both of the capacities in which he is filing
the petition, he has been actually prevented from performing
his duties as a consultant and exercising his rights as a
property owner because of the assertion by other parties of
any benefit under the challenged sections of the said Act.
Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is
the "right to determine actual controversies arising between
adverse litigants." Wherefore, for lack of merit, the instant
petition is DISMISSED with costs against the petitioner. SO
ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS. VERA [G.R. NO. L-45685; NOVEMBER 16,
1937]
Facts: Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad
interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, who heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu
Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case.
The CFI of Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of
conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months
of prision correccional to eight years of prison mayor, to pay
the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended
party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon
appeal, the court, on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to
an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of
prision correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-
seven days of prison mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all
other respects.
Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for
leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to
court was to have been heard on August 19, 1937. But at this
juncture, herein petitioners came to this court on extraordinary
legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an
interminable proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila
which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu
Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by
this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism
and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial
machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court
imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng."
This court may review the actuations of the aforesaid Court of
First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The People
of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more
particularly the application of the defendant Mariano Cu
Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of Act No.
4221, and thereafter prohibit the said Court of First Instance
from taking any further action or entertaining further the
aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to
prison in accordance with the final judgment of conviction
rendered by this court in said case (G. R. No. 41200).
Issue: WON the People of the Philippines, through the
Solicitor General and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper
party in present case.
Held: Yes. The People of the Philippines, represented by the
Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a
proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule
is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really
violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in
whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial
interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the
mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule
that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws
Agan Jr. v PIATCO
420 SCRA 575
Petition: Motions for Reconsideration by respondents of the
decision of this court declaring the contracts for the NAIA IPT
III project null and void
Petitioner: DEMOSTHENES P. AGAN, JR.
Respondent: PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS
CO., INC., MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
AND COMMUNICATIONS and SECRETARY LEANDRO M.
MENDOZA
Ponente: Puno
Date: January 21, 2004
Facts:
On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal
to the Government through the DOTC/MIAA for the
development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III
(NAIA IPT III).
DOTC/MIAA invited the public for submission of competitive
and comparative proposals to the unsolicited proposal of
AEDC. On September 20, 1996 a consortium composed of the
Peoples Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil.
Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank
Corp. (Security Bank) (collectively, Paircargo Consortium),
submitted their competitive proposal to the Prequalification
Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC).
DOTC issued the notice of award for the NAIA IPT III project to
the Paircargo Consortium, which later organized into herein
respondent PIATCO. Hence, on July 12, 1997, the
Government, through then DOTC Secretary Arturo T. Enrile,
and PIATCO, through its President, Henry T. Go, signed the
Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer
Arrangement of the NAIA IPT III. On November 26, 1998, the
1997 Concession Agreement was superseded by the Amended
and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) containing
certain revisions and modifications from the original contract. A
series of supplemental agreements was also entered into by
the Government and PIATCO.

On September 17, 2002, various petitions were filed before this
Court to annul the 1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA and
the Supplements and to prohibit the public respondents
DOTC and MIAA from implementing them. This Court granted
the said petitions and declared the 1997 Concession
Agreement, the ARCA and the Supplements null and void.
Respondent PIATCO, respondent-Congressmen and
respondents-intervenors now seek the reversal of the said
decision and pray that the petitions be dismissed. In the
alternative, PIATCO prays that the Court should not strike
down the entire 1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA
and its supplements in light of their separability clause.
Respondent-Congressmen and NMTAI also pray that in the
alternative, the cases at bar should be referred to arbitration
pursuant to the provisions of the ARCA. PIATCO-Employees
pray that the petitions be dismissed and remanded to the trial
courts for trial on the merits or in the alternative that the 1997
Concession Agreement, the ARCA and the Supplements be
declared valid and binding.
Issue:
Whether or not the state can temporarily take over a business
affected with public interest
Held:
Yes. PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation,
contravene the constitutional provision on temporary takeover
and obligate the government to pay reasonable cost for the
use of terminal and/or terminal complex.
Section 17, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution grants the State
in times of national emergency the right to temporarily take
over the operation of any business affected with public interest.
This right is an exercise of police power which is one of the
inherent powers of the State. Police power has been defined
as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare." It consists of two essential elements: (1) an
imposition of restraint upon liberty or property and (2) the
power is exercised for the benefit of the common good. It is
also settled that public interest on the occasion of a national
emergency is the primary consideration when the government
decides to temporarily take over or direct the operation of a
public utility or a business affected with public interest. The
nature and extent of the emergency is the measure of the
duration of the takeover as well as the terms thereof.
Section 5.10(c), Article V of the ARCA provides that respondent
PIATCO shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for the
duration of the temporary takeover by GRP, which
compensation shall take into account the reasonable cost for
the use of the Terminal and/orTerminal Complex. It clearly
obligates the government in the exercise of its police power to
compensate respondent PIATCO and this obligation is
offensive to the Constitution. Police power cannot be
diminished, let alone defeated by any contract for its
paramount consideration is public welfare and interest.
Ople v. Torres, 293 SCRA 141 (1998)
Facts:
Senator Blas Ople prayed to invalidate Administrative Order
No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" on the following important
constitutional grounds:
a.) it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate;
b.) it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected
zone of privacy.
He also contended that the appropriation of public funds by the
president for the implementation of AO 308 is an
unconstitutional usurpation of the exclusive right of congress to
appropriate public funds for expenditure.
AO 308 aims to establish a computerized system to properly
and efficiently identify persons seeking basic services on social
security and reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations.
Then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the
government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee, the respondents have the following
counter arguments:
a.) The instant petition is not a justiciable case as would
warrant a judicial review
b.) AO 308 was issued within the executive and
administrative powers of the president without
encroaching on the legislative powers of congress.
They also contend that A.O. No. 308 implements the
legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987.
c.) The funds necessary for the implementation of the ID
reference system may be sourced from the budgets of
the concerned agencies
d.) AO 308 protects an individuals interest in privacy
Issues:
a.) Whether or not Senator Ople has the standing to sue
and the justiciability of the case at bar.
b.) Whether or not AO 308 is not merely an
administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the
power of the President to issue (encroachment of
legislative power)
c.) Whether or not AO 308 violates the right to privacy.
Held:
a.) Petitioner Ople as a Senator has legal standing to
bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O.
No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As
taxpayer and member of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn
the legality of the misalignment of public funds and
the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.
The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not
affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308
have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No.
308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is
not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure
its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have
started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for
the rules
b.) An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government.
The respondents argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the
legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987 was
rejected by the SC because the Administrative Code is a
general law which "incorporates in a unified document the
major structural, functional and procedural principles of
governance" and "embodies changes in administrative
structures and procedures designed to serve the people." AO
308 establishes for the first time a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a
delicate adjustment of various contending state policies-- the
primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest
against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of
policies, etc.
They also argue that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it
confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and
creates no office. However, without the ID, a citizen will have
difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given
this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and
imposes no duty cannot stand.
c.) AO 308 is a violation to the right to privacy. The
essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." The
right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several
provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly
recognized in several provisions of the Bill of Rights,
Civil Code and even the Revised Penal Code.
The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show
that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two
considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and
foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business
with basic service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not
totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides
for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common
reference number to establish a linkage among concerned
agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and
"computer application designs." It is noteworthy that A.O. No.
308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and
what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify
people who will seek its coverage. Considering the banquet of
options available to the implementors of A.O. No. 308, the fear
that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not
groundless.
It also does not state whether encoding of data is limited to
biological information alone for identification purposes. The SG
claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System
will contribute to the "generation of population data for
development planning." This is an admission that the PRN will
not be used solely for identification but for the generation of
other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O.
No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give
the government the roving authority to store and retrieve
information for a purpose other than the identification of the
individual through his PRN.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative
Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" declared null and void for
being unconstitutional.
PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ
G.R. No. 113105, August 19 1994, 235 SCRA 506
FACTS:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994
(GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of
Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it
imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of
appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by
the President. It also authorized members of Congress to
propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to
them and to realign their respective operating budgets.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law,
making it as Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN ACT
APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY
ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED
AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of
1994). On the same day, the President delivered his
Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill
he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of
Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to
any other expense category claiming that it violates Section 25,
Article 7 of the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were
raised before the Supreme Court.
Petition prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare
unconstitutional and void the provision under Article 16 of
the Countrywide Development Fund and the veto of the
President of the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of
1994.
There were 16 members of the Senate who sought for the
issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Department
of Budget and Management and the National Treasurer and
questions the constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the
President in the items of the GAA of 1994 as well as the
constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the
appropriation for debt services.
Senator Tanada and Senator Romulo sought the issuance of
the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same
respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of (1) the
veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of
1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and (2) the conditions imposed
by the President inthe implementation of certain appropriations
for the CAFGUs, DPWH, and National Highway Authority.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Congress have the legal standing to
question the validity of acts of the Executive.
HELD:
The Court held that the members of Congress have the legal
standing to question the validity of acts of the Executive
which injures them in their person or the institution of Congress
to which they belong. In the latter case, the acts cause
derivative but nonetheless substantial injury which can be
questioned by members of Congress. In the absence of
a claim that the contract in question violated the rights of
petitioners or impermissibly intruded into the domain of the
Legislature, petitioners have no legal standing to institute the
instant action in their capacity as members of Congress.
[G.R. No. 134958. January 31, 2001]
PATRICIO CUTARAN, DAVID DANGWAS and PACIO DOSIL,
petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and
NATURAL RESOURCES, herein represented by SEC.
VICTOR O. RAMOS, OSCAR M. HAMADA and GUILLERMO
S. FIANZA, in his capacity as Chairman of Community
Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands (CSTFAL), Baguio
City, respondents.
FACTS: Cutaran et.al. assails the validity of DENR Special
Order31, Special Order 25, and Department Administrative
Order 2 for being issued without prior legislative authority.-
Special Order (SO) 31 (1990): Creation of a Special Task
force on acceptance, identification, evaluation and delineation
of ancestral land claims in the Cordillera Administrative
Region- Special Order (SO) 25: Creation of Special Task
Forces provincial and community environment and natural
resources offices for the identification, delineation and
recognition of ancestral land claims nationwide- DAO 2:
Implementing Rules and Guidelines of Special Order no. 25
The same year SO 31 was issued, relatives of petitioners filed
separate applications for Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim
(CALC) for the land they occupy inside the Camp John Hay
Reservation. -These petitions were denied. Also pursuant to
the SOs, the heirs of A peg Carantes filed application for
CALC for some portions of land in the Camp John Hay
Reservation, overlapping some of the land occupied by the
petitioners. The petitioners contend that if not for the
respondents timely resistance to the Orders, the petitioners
would be totally evicted from their land.- Petitioners filed in the
CA petition to enjoin respondents from implementing Orders on
ground that they are void for lack of legal basis. CA ruled that
SO31 has no force and effect for preempting legislative
prerogative for it was issued prior to the effectivity of RA7586
(National Integrated Protected Systems), but it sustained
SO25and DAO 2 on the ground that they were issued pursuant
to powers delegated to DENR under RA7586.- Petitioners now
contend that CA erred in upholding the validity of SO25 and
DAO 2 and seek to enjoin the DENR from processing the
application of CALC of Heirs of Carantes.
ISSUE: WON SO 25 and DAO 2 are valid
HELD: Not a justiciable controversy. The petition was
prematurely filed. There is yet no justiciable controversy for the
court to resolve. The adverse legal interests involved are the
competing claims of the petitioners and heirs of Carantes to
possess a common piece of land. Since the CALC application
of the Heirs of Carantes has not yet been granted or issued,
and which the DENR may or may not grant, there is yet no
actual or imminent violation of petitioners asserted right to
possess the disputed land.- Definition of justiciable
controversy: a definite and concrete dispute touching on the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests which
may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a
law.- Subject to certain well-defined exceptions, the courts will
not touch an issue involving the validity of a law unless there
has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that
has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person
contesting its validity. This Court cannot rule on the basis of
petitioners speculation that the DENR will approve the
application of the heirs of Carantes. There must be an actual
governmental act which directly causes or will imminently
cause injury to the alleged legal right of the petitioner to
possess the land before the jurisdiction of this Court may be
invoked. There is no showing that the petitioners were being
evicted from the land by the heirs of Carantes under orders
from the DENR.
JOYA VS. PCGG [225 SCRA 568; G.R. No. 96541; 24 Aug
1993]
Facts: On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman
of PCGG, wrote then President Corazon C. Aquino, requesting
her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement
between the Republic of the Philippines through PCGG
and Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc concerning
the scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two) Old
Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from
Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to
be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his
relatives and cronies. On 14 August 1990, then President
Aquino, through former Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., authorized Chairman Caparas to sign
the Consignment Agreement allowing Christie's of New York to
auction off the subject art pieces for and in behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines. On 15 August 1990, PCGG,
through Chairman Caparas, representing the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines, signed
the Consignment Agreement withChristie's of New York.
According to the agreement, PCGG shall consign
toCHRISTIE'S for sale at public auction the eighty-two Old
Masters Paintings then found at the Metropolitan Museum of
Manila as well as the silverware contained in seventy-one
cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of the Philippines,
and such other property as may subsequently be identified by
PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the
provisions of the agreement.
On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit through then
Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo submitted to President Aquino
the audit findings and observations of COA on
the Consignment Agreement of 15 August 1990 to the effect
that: the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter
into the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful legality; the
contract was highly disadvantageous to the government;
PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in
the U.S.; and, the assets subject of auction were historical
relics and had cultural significance, hence, their disposal was
prohibited by law.
After the oral arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991, we
issued immediately our resolution denying the application for
preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the
artworks on the ground that petitioners had not presented a
clear legal right to a restraining order and that proper parties
had not been impleaded.
On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as
scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned
over to the Bureau of Treasury.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
(2) Whether or not the Old Masters Paintings and antique
silverware are embraced in the phrase "cultural treasure of the
nation".
(3) Whether or not the paintings and silverware are properties
of public dominion on which can be disposed of through the
joint concurrence of the President and Congress.
(4) Whether or not PCGG has complied with the due process
clause and other statutory requirements for the exportation and
sale of the subject items.
(5) Whether or not the petition has become moot and
academic, and if so, whether the above Issue warrant
resolution from this Court.
Held: This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court
which provides that every action must be prosecuted and
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all
persons having interest in the subjectof the action and in
obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The
Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is
brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise
the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act that is being challenged. The term
"interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in
the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover,
the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one
based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some
third and related party.
There are certain instances however when this Court has
allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a
citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the
enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right
recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions
the validity of a governmental act authorizing
the disbursement of public funds.
Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in
fact and in law. The ownership of these paintings legally
belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members
thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity to
view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on
exhibit.
The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino
administration however should not be understood to mean that
the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on
the government without complying with constitutional and
statutory requirements of due process and just compensation.
If these properties were already acquired by the government,
any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and
their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper
parties the true owners thereof whose authority to recover
emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by
statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they
are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces
have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any
clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged
unauthorized disposition.
Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit.
Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any expenditure
involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to
be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit
that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from
private sources and not with public money.
Anent the second requisite of actual controversy, petitioners
argue that this case should be resolved by this Court as an
exception to the rule on moot and academic cases; that
although the sale of the paintings and silver has long been
consummated and the possibility of retrieving the treasure
trove is nil, yet the novelty and importance of the Issue raised
by the petition deserve this Court's attention. They submit that
the resolution by the Court of the Issue in this case will
establish future guiding principles and doctrines on the
preservation of the nation's priceless artistic and cultural
possessions for the benefit of the public as a whole.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be
an actual case of controversy one which involves a conflict
of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible
of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic
or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not
cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and
academic when its purpose has become stale, such as the
case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition
is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction
sale of the artworks on a particular date 11 January 1991
which is long past, the Issue raised in the petition have
become moot and academic.
The cultural properties of the nation which shall be under the
protection of the state are classified as the "important cultural
properties" and the "national cultural treasures." On the other
hand, a "national cultural treasures" is a unique object found
locally, possessing outstanding historical, cultural, artistic
and/or scientific value which is highly significant
and important to this country and nation. This Court takes note
of the certification issued by the Director of the Museum that
the Italian paintings and silverware subject of this petition do
not constitute protected cultural properties and are not among
those listed in the Cultural Properties Register of the National
Museum.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and
mandamus is DISMISSED.
IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec.
18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP
Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for
the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist
the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless
violence. The President declared that the services of the
Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in
nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when
the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition
seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines
null and void and unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the
necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial
review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the
PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the
civilian character of the PNP
Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily
exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.
Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may
revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review
the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is
no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or
review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces.
The distinction places the calling out power in a different
category from the power to declare martial law and power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise,
the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped
together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and
review without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said
powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest
leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out
because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power
compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of
which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic
civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating
safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full
discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out
the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show
that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis.
The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as
there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists
no justification for calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment
of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is
militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The
deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the
civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of
the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to
the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP
does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The
real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a
civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since
none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members
of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to
speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint
visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the
PNP.
C. The constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity
Umali vs. Guingona, GR No. 131124, March 21, 1999
FACTS:
Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of BIR
by Pres. Ramos. Barely a year later, Ramos received
a confidential memorandum against petitioner for malfeasance,
misfeasance and nonfeasance9. Ramos then authorized
Umalis preventive suspension and referred the complaint to
the PCAGC10 for investigation. PCAGC then issued a
resolution finding a prima facie evidence to support 6 of the 12
charges against him. Hence, Ramos issued an administrative
order dismissing him with forfeiture of retirement and all
benefits under the law. Umali contends that as Regional
Director, he belongs to the Career Executive Service with
tenurial protection who can only be removed for cause even if
he is a presidential appointee under the direct authority of the
President.
ISSUES
Whether he may be validly removed from office.
HELD
Petitioner failed to prove that his is a CESO eligible, which
is fatal to the case.NEVERTHELESS, the court allowed him to
retire with full benefits by the exercise of the Supreme Courts
equity powers. This is because the Commissioner of the BIR
manifested to the Ombudsman that his office is no longer
interested in pursuing the case, hence, giving no more basis to
the Administrative order.
D. The decision of the constitutional question must be
determinative of the case itself. It is the Lis Mota of the
case
GUALBERTO DE LA LLANA VS MANUEL ALBA
112 SCRA 294 Political law Constitutional Law Political
Question if there is no question of law involved BP 129
In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act
Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and
for Other Purposes, was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a
judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity because, first of
all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed
because of the reorganization and second, he said such law
would contravene the constitutional provision which provides
the security of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that
only the Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the
Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be
validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129).
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this
Court is empowered to discipline judges of inferior courts and,
by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.
Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under
the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with
such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished
from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office.
There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the
abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal,
there is an office with an occupant who would thereby
lose his position. It is in that sense that from the
standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of
security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the
incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of
separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between
removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid
of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In
the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it
would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices
and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its
view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be
entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic
principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No
question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly
this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by
either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but
only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put
in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be
appointed to the vacant positions created by the
reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to
whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from
the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is
sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to
preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of
the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the
power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this
Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would
thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not
readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with
distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance
with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives
between one which would save and another which would
invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.
Ty vs. Trampe, 250 SCRA 500
G.R. No. 117577. December 1, 1995
ALEJANDRO B. TY AND MVR PICTURE TUBE,
INC., petitioners, vs. THE HON. AURELIO C. TRAMPE, in his
capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Metro Manila, THE HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE
MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR OF PASIG AND THE MUNICIPAL
TREASURER OF PASIG, respondents.
Facts:
On 06 January 1994, respondent Assessor sent a notice of
assessment respecting certain real properties of petitioners
located in Pasig, Metro Manila. In a letter dated 18 March
1994, petitioners through counsel "request(ed) the Municipal
Assessor to reconsider the subject assessments Not satisfied,
petitioners on 29 March 1994 filed with the Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 163, presided
over by respondent Judge, a Petition for Prohibition with prayer
for a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to
declare null and void the new tax assessments and to enjoin
the collection of real estate taxes based on said assessments.
In a Decision dated 14 July 1994, respondent Judge denied
the petition "for lack of merit."
Issue:
Whether Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, repealed the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 921.
Ruling:
In disposing of the above issues against petitioners, the
court a quo ruled that the schedule of market values and the
assessments based thereon prepared solely by respondent
assessor are valid and legal, they having been prepared in
accordance with the provisions of the Local Government Code
of 1991 (R.A. 7160). It held also that said Code had effectively
repealed the previous law on the matter, P.D. 921, which
required, in the preparation of said schedule, joint action by all
the city and municipal assessors in the Metropolitan Manila
area. R.A. 7160 has a repealing provision (Section 534) and, if
the intention of the legislature was to abrogate P.D. 921, it
would have included it in such repealing clause, as it did in
expressly rendering of no force and effect several other
presidential decrees. Hence, any repeal or modification of P.D.
921 can only be possible under par.
SUPREME COURT IS A CONSTITUTIONAL CREATION
a.) MMDA vs. Jancom, G.R. 147465, April 10, 2002
b.) People vs. Gacott, G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995
GMMSWMC VS JANCOM
494 SCRA 280 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales J.)
If the contract provides that it shall be effective until and unless
it is approved by the President, the same shall first be
approved to be valid and enforceable.
FACTS: President Fidel Ramos issued Presidential
Memorandum Order no. 202 creating an Executive Committee
(EC) to oversee and develop waste-to-energy projects for the
waste disposal sites in Rizal and Carmona under the Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme. Respondent Jancom
International Development Projects Pty. Limited of Australia
was one of the bidders for the Rizal Site which subsequently
entered into a partnership with its co-respondent Asea Brown
Boveri under the firm name Jancom Environmental
Corporation (JANCOM). Consequently, EC declared JANCOM
as the sole complying bidder of the Rizal Waste Disposal Site
hence a Contract for the BOT implementation of the Solid
Waste Management Project for the Rizal Site was entered
between Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste
Management Committee (GMMSWMC) and Metro Manila
Development Authority (MMDA), and JANCOM. The contract
was submitted for approval to President Ramos who
subsequently endorsed it to then incoming President Joseph E.
Estrada. Owing to the clamor of the residents of Rizal, the
Estrada administration ordered the closure of the San Mateo
landfill. GMMSWMC thereupon adopted a Resolution not to
pursue the contract with JANCOM, citing as reasons therefore
the passage of Republic Act 8749, otherwise known as the
Clean Air Act of 1999, the non-availability of the San Mateo
site, and costly tipping fees.
JANCOM filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City to declare the GMMSWMC Resolution and the acts
of MMDA calling for the bids for and authorizing the forging of a
new contract for the Metro Manila waste management as
illegal, unconstitutional and void, and to enjoin them from
implementing the Resolution and making another award. The
trial court ruled in favor of JANCOM which was subsequently
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court declared
the contract valid and perfected, albeit ineffective and
unimplementable pending the approval by the President.
JANCOM and MMDA later entered into negotiations to modify
certain provisions of the contract which were embodied in a
draft Amended Agreement which bore no signature of the
parties. JANCOM then filed before the Pasig City RTC an
Omnibus Motion for a writ of execution which upon its
issuance, was challenged by GMMSWMC and MMDA. The
Court of Appeals however affirmed the RTC Order.
ISSUE: Whether or not contract is ineffective and
unimplentable until and unless it is approved by the President
HELD: The only question before the Court is whether or not
there is a valid and perfected contract between the parties. As
to necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the contract, these are
outside the realm of judicial adjudication. These considerations
are primarily and exclusively a matter for the President to
decide. While the Court recognizes that the garbage problem is
a matter of grave public concern, it can only declare that the
contract in question is a valid and perfected one between the
parties, but the same is still ineffective or unimplementable
until and unless it is approved by the President, the contract
itself providing that such approval by the President is
necessary for its effectivity.
In issuing the alias writ of execution, the trial court in effect
ordered the enforcement of the contract despite this Courts
unequivocal pronouncement that albeit valid and perfected, the
contract shall become effective only upon approval by the
President.
PEOPLE V. GACOTT
G.R. NO. 116049 MARCH 20, 1995
Bidin, J.
Facts:
On February 2, 1994, a complaint for violation of the Anti-
Dummy Law (C.A. No. 108) was filed by Asst. City Prosecutor
Perfecto E. Pe against respondents Strom and Reyes. The
accused filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss the criminal case
contending that since the power to prosecute is vested
exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under Republic Act No.
1130, the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has no power or
authority to file the same. The prosecution filed an opposition
pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has already been
abolished by Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972.
Despite such opposition, however, respondent judge granted
the motion espousing the position that the Letter Of
Implementation relied upon by the City Fiscal is not the law
contemplated in Article 7 of the New Civil Code which can
repeal another law such as R.A. 1130. Thus, respondent judge
in the assailed order of March 18, 1994 held that the City
Prosecutor has no power or authority to file and prosecute the
case and ordered that the case be quashed.
Issue:
whether or not respondent judge in granting the Motion to
Quash gravely abused his discretion as to warrant the
issuance of a writ of certiorari
 The Office of the President modified its decision which had
Held: already become final and executory.
Yes. The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing
the case is quite obvious in the light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 FACTS:
and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish the On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President (OP) issued
Anti-Dummy Board could not have been expressed more a win-win Resolution which reopened case O.P. Case No. 96-
clearly than in the aforequoted LOI. Even assuming that the C-6424. The said Resolution substantially modified its March
City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in his 29, 1996 Decision. The OP had long declared the said
opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of the text of Decision final & executory after the DARs Motion for
LOI No. 2 would have immediately apprised the respondent Reconsideration was denied for having been filed beyond the
judge of the fact that LOI No. 2 was issued in implementation 15-day reglementary period.
of P.D. No. 1. Paragraph 1 of LOI No. 2 reads:
The SC then struck down as void the OPs act, it being in gross
Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1 dated September 23, disregard of the rules & basic legal precept that accord finality
1972, Reorganizing the Executive Branch of the National to administrative determinations.
Government, the following agencies of the Department of
Justice are herebyreorganized or activated in accordance with
The respondents contended in their instant motion that the
the applicable provisions of the Integrated Reorganization Plan
win-win Resolution of November 7, 1997 is not void since it
and the following instructions: . . . (emphasis supplied).
seeks to correct an erroneous ruling, hence, the March 29,
1996 decisioncould not as yet become final and executory
General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D No. 1, issued by
as to be beyond modification. They further explained that the
the former President Marcos under his martial law powers
DARs failure to file their Motion for Reconsideration on time
have the same force and effect as the laws enacted by
was excusable.
Congress. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Aquino
vs. Comelec, (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all proclamations, orders,
ISSUE:
decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued, or done by
Was the OPs modification of the Decision void or a valid
the former President are part of the law of the land, and shall
exercise of its powers and prerogatives?
remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless modified,
1. Whether the DARs late filing of the Motion for
revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders,
Reconsideration is excusable.
decrees, instructions, or other acts of the President. LOI No. 2
2. Whether the respondents have shown a justifiable reason
is one such legal order issued by former President Marcos in
for the relaxation of rules.
the exercise of his martial law powers to implement P.D. No. 1.
3. Whether the issue is a question of technicality.
Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. 1 nor LOI No. 2 has been
expressly impliedly revised, revoked, or repealed, both
HELD:
continue to have the force and effect of law.
1.
No.
Indeed, Section 3, Article XVII of the Constitution explicitly
Sec.7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated February 12,
ordains:
1987, mandates that decisions/resolutions/orders of the
Office of the President shallbecome final after the lapse
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
of 15 days from receipt of a copy therof xxx unless a
proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive
Motion for Reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain
The respondents explanation that the DARs office procedure
operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
made it impossibleto file its Motion for Reconsideration on
time since the said decision had to be referred to its different
Instances when SC may sit en banc
departments cannot be considered a valid justification. While
1) When there is a need to overturn the decision of the
there is nothing wrong with such referral, the DAR must not
division;
disregard the reglementary period fixed by law, rule or
2) When there is a need to overturn a doctrine or principle of
regulation.
law laid down by the court;
The rules relating to reglementary period should not be
3) When a division cant reach a decision
made subservient to the internal office procedure of an
4) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
administrative body.
international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be
2.
heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases
No. The final & executory character of the OP Decision can no
which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en
longer be disturbed or substantially modified. Res judicata has
banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application,
set in and the adjudicated affair should forever be put to rest.
or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be
and due regard since they are designed to facilitate the
decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members
adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration
case and voted thereon.
of justice. TheConstitution guarantees that all persons shall
have a right to the speedy disposition of their cases
Cases vs. matters
before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative
Fortich vs. Corona, GR No. 131457, August 19, 1999
bodies.
While a litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case
Fortich vs Corona 398 SCRA 685
must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
100 SCAD 781
procedure to ensure an orderly & speedy administration of
298 SCRA 685
justice. The flexibility in the relaxation of rules was never
1998
intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the
rules with impunity.
A liberal interpretation & application of the rules of
procedure can only be resorted to in proper cases and
under justifiable causes and circumstances.
3.
No. It is a question of substance & merit.
A decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court or
tribunal which is declared void on the ground that the same
was rendered Without or in Excess of Jurisdiction, or with
Grave Abuse of Discretion, is a mere technicality of law or
procedure. Jurisdiction is an essential and mandatory
requirement before a case or controversy can be acted on.
Moreover, an act is still invalid if done in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
In the instant case, several fatal violations of law were
committed. These grave breaches of law, rules & settled
jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not of technical nature.
When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and
executory, vested rights were acquired by the petitioners, and
all others who should be benefited by the said Decision.
In the words of the learned Justice Artemio V. Panganiban
in Videogram Regulatory Board vs CA, et al., just as a losing
party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy
the finality of the resolution of his/her case.
Appointments and qualifications
- Article VIII, Section 7(1)
- Article VIII, Section 8(5)
- Article VIII, Section 9
Section 7.
1. No person shall be appointed Member of the
Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A
Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty
years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or
more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines.
Sec. 8 (5)
The Council shall have the principal function of recommending
appointees to the judiciary. It may exercise such other
functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of
lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of
at least three nominees preferred by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment
within ninety days from the submission of the list.
NO NON-JUDICIAL WORK FOR JUDGES
Article VIII, Section 12
Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other
courts established by law shall not be designated to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative function.
- Meralco vs. Pasay Trans Co., 57 Phil. 600 (1933)
- Garcia vs. Macaraig, 30 SCRA 106 (1969)
G.R. No. L-37878 November 25, 1932
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., ET
AL., respondents.
Sec. 11 of Act 1446 provides:
Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any
other person or corporation, now or hereafter in
existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the
grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or
corporation shall use such right of way, and the
compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such
other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed
by the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board
of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be
final.
Said Act provides that for every
franchise granted, terms as to the
usage and compensation to be paid to
the grantee shall be fixed by the
members of the Supreme Court sitting
as board of arbitrators, a majority vote
is required and this is final
Pursuant to said Act, MERALCO filed a petition before the
court requesting the members of the Supreme Court sitting as
board of arbitrators to fix the terms upon which certain
transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig
bridge of the MERALC
Copies were sent to affected transpo company (one of which is
the Pasay Transpo) and to Atty-Gen which disclaimed any
interest.
ISSUES: Whether or not the members of the Supreme Court
can sit as arbitrators and fix the terms and
compensation as is asked of them in this case
HELD: No
The Supreme Court represents one of the three
divisions of power in our government. It is judicial
power and judicial power only which is exercised by
the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the
guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction
usurpations by any other department of the
government, so should it as strictly confine its own
sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by
implication conferred on it by the Organic Act.
The Supreme Court and its members should not and
cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform
any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or
connected with the administering of judicial functions
The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise
jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional
jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law
(sec. 26).
When the Organic Act speaks of the
exercise of "jurisdiction" by the
Supreme Court, it could not only
mean the exercise of "jurisdiction"
by the Supreme Court acting as a
court, and could hardly mean the
exercise of "jurisdiction" by the
 members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators
A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper
sense of the term, and possesses none of the
jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall
be exercised by the Supreme Court.
The power conferred on this court is exclusively
judicial, and it cannot be required or authorized to
exercise any other. . . . Its jurisdiction and powers and
duties being defined in the organic law of the
government, and being all strictly judicial, Congress
cannot require or authorize the court to exercise any
other jurisdiction or power, or perform any other duty.
section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims
which guide the operation of a democratic government
constitutionally established, and that it would be
improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a
majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of
the Manila Electric Company
PAZ GARCIA VS CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.
December 8, 2011
39 SCRA 106 Political Law Separation of Powers
FACTS: Judge Catalino Macaraig, Jr. took his oath as Judge of
the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The
court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to
be organized from scratch. From July 1, 1970 to February 28,
1971, Macaraig was not able to assume the duties and
functions of a judge due to the fact that his Court Room can
not be properly established due to problems as to location and
as to appropriations to make his Court up and running. When
Macaraig realized that it would be some time before he could
actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended
leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of
Justice, he had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on
extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits
he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by
the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, convinced
Macaraig to forego his leave and instead to assist the
Secretary, without being extended a formal detail, whenever
he was not busy attending to the needs of his court.
Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that
Macaraig is incompetent, dishonest and has acted in violation
of his oath as a judge. Garcia said that Macaraig has not
submitted the progress of his Courts as required by law. And
that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he is fully
aware that he has not been performing the duties of a judge.
Also questioned was the fact that a member of the judiciary is
helping the the DOJ, a department of the executive oi charge
of prosecution of cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence
and dishonesty as Judge.
HELD: No. Macaraigs inability to perform his judicial duties
under the circumstances mentioned above does not constitute
incompetence. Macaraig was, like every lawyer who gets his
first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial
duties and rid himself of the stigma of being a judge without a
sala, but forces and circumstances beyond his control
prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.
On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning
that the Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing,
to be sure, of judges being detailed in the DOJ to assist the
Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of
exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line
between what a judge may do and what he may not do in
collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the
other great departments of the government must always be
kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of
separation of powers on which our government rests by
mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually
eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions
in the interest of the public service.
The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the
independence of said three departments from each other,
limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check
and balance between and among them, have long been
acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any
temporary or passing governmental conveniences or
exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under
our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge
of even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself
in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him
for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior
approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal
effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, the
Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is
discontinued.
SALARY
ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 10
Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of
lower courts shall be fixed by law. During the continuance in
office, their salary shall not be decreased.
JUDGE DAVID NITAFAN VS COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE
152 SCRA 284 Political Law Constitutional Law The
Judicial Department Judicial Autonomy Income Tax
Payment By The Judiciary
Judge David Nitafan and several other judges of the Manila
Regional Trial Court seek to prohibit the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR) from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries or compensation for such
would tantamount to a diminution of their salary, which is
unconstitutional. Earlier however, or on June 7, 1987, the
Court en banc had already reaffirmed the directive of the Chief
Justice which directs the continued withholding of taxes of the
justices and the judges of the judiciary but the SC decided to
rule on this case nonetheless to settle the issue once and for
all.
ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are
exempt from the payment of income tax.
HELD: No. The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution,
based on their deliberations, was NOT to exempt justices and
judges from general taxation. Members of the judiciary, just like
members of the other branches of the government, are subject
to income taxation. What is provided for by the constitution is
that salaries of judges may not be decreased during their
continuance in office. They have a fix salary which may not be
subject to the whims and caprices of congress. But the salaries
of the judges shall be subject to the general income tax as well
as other members of the judiciary.
But may the salaries of the members of the judiciary be
increased?
Yes. The Congress may pass a law increasing the salary of the
members of the judiciary and such increase will immediately
take effect thus the incumbent members of the judiciary (at the
time of the passing of the law increasing their salary) shall
benefit immediately.
Congress can also pass a law decreasing the salary of the
members of the judiciary but such will only be applicable to
members of the judiciary which were appointed AFTER the
effectivity of such law.
Note: This case abandoned the ruling in Perfecto vs Meer and
in Endencia vs David
TENURE
a.) Article VIII, Section 11
b.) Article VIII, Section 2 par. 2
Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of
the lower court shall hold office during good behavior until they
reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en
banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts,
or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted in thereon.
Section 2 (2) No law shall be passed reorganizing the
Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its
Members.
REMOVAL
Article XI Accountability of Public Officers
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of
the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation
of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers
and employees may be removed from office as provided by
law, but not by impeachment.
In Re: Raul M. Gonzalez
Adm. Matter No. 88-4-5433
160 SCRA 771
Facts:
The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated 16 March
1988 from Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez, "Tanodbayan/Special;
Prosecutor" forwarding to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a
"letter-complaint, dated 14 December 1987 with enclosure of
the Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court," together
with a telegram of Miguel Cuenco, for "comment within ten (10)
days from receipt hereof." Mr. Justice Fernan had brought this
1st Indorsement to the attention of the Court en banc in view of
the important implications of policy raised by said 1st
Indorsement.
Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor. He
forwarded to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a letter-
complaint. The letter was said to be from
concerned employees of the SC (an anonymous letter).
The letter was originally addressed to Gonzales referring to the
charges for disbarment sought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against
Justice Fernan, and asking him (Gonzales) to do something
about it.
The Court furnished to Mr. Raul M. Gonzales a copy of the per
curiam Resolution in which, the Court Resolved to dismiss the
charges made by complaint Cuenco against Mr.Justice Fernan
for utter lack of merit. In the same Resolution, the Court
Resolved to require complainant Cuenco to show cause why
he should not be administratively dealt with for making
unfounded serious accusations against Mr. Justice Fernan.
Upon request of Mr. Cueco, the Court had granted him an
extension of up to 30 March 1988, Mr. Cuenco filed a pleading
which appears to be an omnibus pleading relating to, inter alia,
Administrative Case No. 3135. Insofar as Administrative Case
No. 3135 is concerned, the Court treated this pleading as a
Motion for Reconsideration. By a per curiam Resolution dated
15 April 1988, the Court denied with finality Mr Cuenco's
Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Supreme Court justice can be disbarred
during his term of office.
RULING:
A public officer (such as Justice Fernan) who under the
Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar
as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be
removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged
with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer.
Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be
charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan, or any other
court, with any offense which carries with it the penalty of
removal from office.
Another reason why the complaint for disbarment should be
dismissed is because under the Constitution, members of the
SC may be removed only by impeachment. The above
provision proscribes removal from office by any other method.
Otherwise, to allow such public officer who may be removed
solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding
his office with an office that carries the penalty of removal from
office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the
Constitution.
The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and
disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under
the Republic. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall
not extend further than removal from office
and disqualification to hold any office. But the party convicted
shall nevertheless be held liable and subject to prosecution,
trial and punishment according to law.
The court is not saying that its Members or other constitutional
officers are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly
criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the court is saying
is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement that must
be observed before such liability may be determined and
enforced. A member of the Supreme Court must first be
removed from office, via the constitutional route
of impeachment, and then only may he be held liable either
criminally or administratively (that is, disbarment), for any
wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in
appropriate proceedings.
FISCAL AUTONOMY
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the
legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous
year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly
released.
JURISDICTION
Article VIII, Section 1
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Article VIII, Section 2 par. 1
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts
but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over
cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
Article VIII, Section 5
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax,
impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any
lower court is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question
of law is involved.
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other
stations as public interest may require. Such
temporary assignment shall not exceed six months
without the consent of the judge concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a
miscarriage of justice.
5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to
the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in
accordance with the Civil Service Law.
Article VI, Section 30
Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
Article VII, Section 18
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of
all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he
may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines
or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours
from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation
or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if
the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires
it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in
or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person
thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within
three days, otherwise he shall be released.
DELIBERATIONS
a.) Prudential Bank vs. Castro. 158 SCRA 646 (1988)
b.) Consing vs. Court of Appeals, 177SCRA 14 (1989)
PRUDENTIAL BANK V CASTRO, 158 SCRA 646
And neither does the rule apply to administrative cases
decided by the SC itself, as it held in Prudential Bank v. Castro,
158 SCRA 646. This is regarding minute resolution.
"No constitutional provision is disregarded in the SC's Minute
Resolution denying a motion for reconsideration 'for lack of
merit, the issues raised therein having been previously duly
considered and passed upon. In an administrative case, the
constitutional mandate that 'no *** motion for reconsideration of
a decision of the court shall be *** denied without stating the
legal basis therefor is inapplicable. And even if it were, said
resolution stated the legal basis for the denial, and, therefore,
adhered faithfully to the constitutional requirement. 'Lack of
merit,' as a ground for denial is legal basis.
FAST FACTS: The case at bar relates with the disbarment of
Atty. Grecia (resp).
Contentions c/o Resp
 CJ Claudio Teehankee should have voluntary inhibited
himself from the proceedings. CJ was prejudicial against
Greciathat he rendered a decision against Grecia (disbarment)
. The Courts decision violates the Constitution in that it lacks
certification by the CJ that the conclusions of the Court
werereached in consultation before the case was assigned to a
member for the writing of the opinion of the Court.
HELD & RATIO: As to CJ Teehankees voluntary inhibition.
Petition denied for lack of legal and factual basis. After a
member has given an opinion on the merits of a given case, he
may not be disqualified from participating in the proceedings
because a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the
action of the Court and raise an objection of this sort after
decision has already been rendered. It should be made of
record that at no time during the deliberations on the case did
the CJ show any ill willnor any sign of vindictiveness much less
any attempt to exact vengeance for past affront against Grecia.
As to the lack of certification.This requirement is only
present in judicial decisions, not in admin istrative
cases, like a disb arment proceeding. Even if such
certification were required, it is beyond doubt that
the conclusions of the Court in its decision were arrived at after
consultation and deliberations and voted attest to that. Per
curiam decision opinion of the court as a whole; there is no
ponente. For cases where the court does not want to expose
the identity of the ponente.
Resolution v Decision Resolution does not decide the case;
dilatory; i.e. dismissal of a case for lack of merit.
Decision when the court has given due course; must state
facts and law
Consing v CA, 177 SCRA 14 (1989)
Merlin Consing (pet) sold a house and lot to Caridad
Santos. Provided in their contract of sale were
particular terms of payment in which the purchase price
shall be paid installment basis, plus interest). In the process,
Santos defaulted in her payments. Consing demanded for her
payment and had planned to resort to court litigation. Santos
expressed her willingnessto settle her obligation. However, this
is upon the condition that the Consings comply with all the laws
and regulations onsubdivision and after payment to her
damages as a consequence of the use of a portion of her lot as
a subdivision road. In response, the Consings submitted a
revised subdivision plan.
CFI Decision Santos was fully justified in refusing to pay
further her monthly amortizations because although
Consing submitted a revised plan and may have corrected
irregularities and/or have complied with the legal requirements
for the operation of their subdivision, he cannot escape liability
to Santos for having sold to her portions of the roads or streets
denominated as right-of-way
Contention c/o Consing: CA did not comply with the
certification requirement.
Purpose of certification requirement
To ensure that all court decisions are reached after
consultation with members of the court en banc or division, as
the case may be
To ensure that the decision is rendered by a court as a whole,
not merely by a member of the same
To ensure that decisions are arrived only after deliberation,
exchange of ideas, and concurrence of majority vote
ISSUE: W/N absence of certification by the Court of Appeals
renders that decision invalid.
HELD: NO. The certification requirement imposed by the
1987 constitution was meant to ensure the implementation of
the constitutional requirement that decisions of the Supreme
Court and lower collegiate courts, such as the CA,
Sandiganbayan and CTA, are reached after consultation with
the members of the court sitting en banc or in a division before
the case is assigned to a member thereof for decision writing.
The absence would not necessarily mean that the case
submitted for decision had not been reached in consultation
before being assigned to one member for the writing of the
opinion of the court since the regular performance of official
duty is presumed. The lack of certification serves as an
evidence of failure to observe the certification requirement but
it would not have the effect of invalidating the decision.
The absence of certification does not invalidate a decision. It is
only evidence for failure to observe the requirement. There
could be an administrative case on the ground of lack of
certification
VOTING
Cruz vs. DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing
the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No.
8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and
its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section
2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution.
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to
the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the
ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights
granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources
in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and
occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the
right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the
same time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not
part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands
and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of
private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant
from the State. However, the right of ownership and
possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a
limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.

REQUIREMENTS AS TO DECISIONS
Article VIII, Sections 13-14
Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case
submitted to it for the decision en banc or in division shall be
reached in consultation before the case the case assigned to a
Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A
certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be
issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case
and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or
dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must
state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be
observed by all lower collegiate court.
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a
decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the legal basis therefor.
Mendoza vs. CFI, 66 SCRA 96
GENEROSO MENDOZA VS COURT OF APPEALS
March 20, 2012
84 SCRA 76 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Judgment
Confirms Title In whose name may title be dealt with Sec
29, PD 1529
In 1964, it was proven that a parcel of land located in Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, is owned by Mendoza. Mendoza applied for a
title. During pendency of the application before the land
registration court, Mendoza sold the land to Daniel Cruz. The
contract of sale was admitted in court in lieu of the pending
application for land title. The registration court rendered a
decision in July 1965, ordering the registration of the two
parcels of land in the name of Cruz subject to the usufructuary
rights of Mendoza.
The decision became final and executory. In 1968, however,
upon failure of Cruz to pay Mendoza, Mendoza petitioned that
the title issued in the name of Cruz be cancelled. The land
registration court ruled in favor of Mendoza on the ground that
the court erred in its earlier decision in issuing the land title to
Cruz who was not a party to the application of title initiated by
Mendoza. Cruz appealed. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor
of Cruz.
ISSUE: Whether or not the title can be dealt with in the name
of a third party.
HELD: Yes. The Court of Appeals ruling must be sustained.
First of all, it was proven that Mendoza caused the registration
in the name of Cruz pursuant to their contract of sale. Second,
Mendoza overlooks Section 29 of the Land Registration Act
which expressly authorizes the registration of the land subject
matter of a registration proceeding in the name of the buyer
(Cruz) or of the person to whom the land has been conveyed
by an instrument executed during the interval of time between
the filing of the application for registration and the issuance of
the decree of title.
SEC. 29. After the filing of the application and before the
issuance of the decree of title by the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office, the land therein described may be dealt
with and instruments relating thereto shall be recorded in the
office of the register of deeds at any time before issuance of
the decree of title, in the same manner as if no application had
been made. The interested party may, however, present such
instruments to the Court of First Instance instead of presenting
them to the office of the register of deeds, together with a
motion that the same be considered in relation with the
application, and the court after notice to the parties, shall order
such land registered subject to the encumbrance created by a
said instruments, or order the decree of registration issued in
the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the property
has been conveyed by said instruments. . . .
A stranger or a third party may be dealt with in the land
registration proceedings. The only requirements of the law are:
(1) that the instrument be presented to the court by the
interested party together with a motion that the same be
considered in relation with the application; and (2) that prior
notice be given to the parties to the case. And the peculiar
facts and circumstances obtaining in this case show that these
requirements have been complied with in this case.
Dissenting Opinion (Justice Aquino):
It is not lawful and just that the two lots in litigation should be
registered in the name of Daniel Cruz. The registration in his
name is not proper because he did not intervene in the land
registration proceeding; he did not defray the expenses
thereof, and he has not paid to Generoso Mendoza, or his
widow, Diega de Leon, the sum of P6,000 as the price of the
parcel of land.
Sin perjuicio judgment judgment consisting only of the
dispositive portion is not valid.
a.) Valladolid vs. Inciong, 121 SCRA 205 (1992)
b.) Nunal vs. COA, 169 SCRA 356 (1989)
VALLADOLID v. INCIONG
G.R. No. L-52364 March 25, 1983 (FIRST DIVISION)
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
FACTS:
Ricardo Valladolid, petitioner, in was employed by JRM in 1977
as a telephone switchboard operator. He was subsequently
transferred to the position of clerk-collector by the president of
JRM. The transfer was motivated by the interception of
business and confidential matters to a competitor hotel by
(allegedly) Villadolid who was then working as a switchboard
operator and while serving in his capacity as clerk/collector,
copies of Accounts Receivables reached the competitor hotel
(Tropicana Apartment- Hotel) although said copies were not
referred to them. That to finally and fully confirmed suspicions
that Ricardo Valladolid was the person responsible for the
aforementioned disclosures, a plan for the entrapment was
conceived by the Copacabana Apartment- Hotel. After the
entrapment scheme had been effected, Valladolid filed a
written request for a 5 day vacation leave which was extended
to 30 days. When he went back to work, JRM refused to admit
him and instead asked him to resign. RM maintains that
Valladolid left the office that same day and never returned,
because he was reprimanded for his unauthorized absences.
Valladolid later on filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with
vacation and sick leave pay.
The Ministry ruled that the application for clearance with
preventive suspension is denied and respondent (JRM) is
hereby ordered to reinstate complainant (Valladolid) to his
former position without backwages and without loss of seniority
rights. Valladolid appealed the foregoing order to the Minister
of Labor seeking modification of the same, praying for the
award of backwages from the time he was illegally dismissed
but the Deputy Minister of Labor (Inciong) dismissed both
appeals after finding "no sufficient justification or valid reason
to alter, modify, much less reverse the Order appealed from.
ISSUE:
WON the non-award of backwages raised by Valladolid
claiming that the Orders of Deputy Minister of Labor are
contrary to law and evidence.
WON JRM was deprived of due process when the Deputy
Minister of Labor sustained the finding of respondent Regional
Director that there is no evidence to support the dismissal of
private respondent.
HELD:
Petitions for certiorari are DENIED.
RATIO:
Loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an
employee. Proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee's
misconduct is not required, it being sufficient that there is some
basis for the same or that the employer has reasonable ground
to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct
and his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust
and confidence demanded of his position. However, as this
was Valladolid's first offense, as found by the Regional
Director, dismissal from the service is too harsh a punishment,
considering that he had not been previously admonished,
warned or suspended for any misdemeanor. Besides as clerk-
collector, he need not be given access to facts relative to the
business of Copacabana, which, if divulged to Tropicana would
be to the former's prejudice.
The Regional Director ruled that the absences of Valladolid
were unauthorized but did gross neglect of duty or
abandonment of work which requires deliberate refusal to
resume employment or a clear showing in terms of specific
circumstances that the worker does not intend to report for
work. But as Valladolid had been AWOL, no error was
committed by respondent Regional Director in ordering his
reinstatement without backwages.
JRM cannot claim that it was deprived of due process
considering that applications for clearance have to be
summarily investigated and a decision required to be rendered
within ten (10) days from the filing of the opposition. As this
Court had occasion to hold there is no violation of due process
where the Regional Director merely required the submission of
position papers and resolved the case summarily thereafter.
PERIODS FOR DECIDING CASES
(1) Article VIII, Section 15
Section 15.
1. All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within
twenty-four months from date of submission for the
Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme
Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts,
and three months for all other lower courts.
2. A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules
of Court or by the court itself.
3. Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a
certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice
or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a
copy thereof attached to the record of the case or
matter, and served upon the parties. The certification
shall state why a decision or resolution has not been
rendered or issued within said period.
4. Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory
period, the court, without prejudice to such
responsibility as may have been incurred in
consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case
or matter submitted thereto for determination, without
further delay.
(2) Article VII, Section 18 par. 3
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
ACT AS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (PET)
Article VII, Section 4 par. 4
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President,
duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or
city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of
canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty
days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the
presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in
joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of
the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be
proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an
equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith
be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of
the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS
Supervision of lower courts
Article VIII, Section 6
The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over
all courts and the personnel thereof.
Temporarily assign judges to other stations in public
interest
Article VIII, Section 5(3)
Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as
public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall
not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.
Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid
miscarriage of justice
Article VIII, Section 5(4)
Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage
of justice.
Appointment of officials and employees of entire judiciary
Article VIII, section 5(6)
Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in
accordance with the Civil Service Law.
Promulgate rules concerning the enforcement and
protection of constitutional rights
A.M. 02-1-07-SC, Jan. 21, 2002
In Re: Request for Creation of a Special Division, A.M. No.
02-1-09-SC, January 21, 2002, it was held that it is within the
competence of the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its power
to promulgate rules governing the enforcement and protection
of constitutional rights and rules governing pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, to create a Special Division in the
Sandiganbayan which will hear and decide the plunder case
against former President Estrada.

Promulgate Rules Concerning Pleading, Practice and
Procedure Admission to the Practice of Law
(1) Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316 (1988)
(2) In re: Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534 (1954)
(3) Aguirre vs. Rana, Bar Matter No. 1036, June 10, 2003
ENRIQUE ZALDIVAR VS RAUL GONZALEZ
166 SCRA 316 Legal Ethics Contemptuous Language
Duty of a Lawyer
FACTS: Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was
charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then
Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed
with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to
investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The
Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and
Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily
restrain from investigating and filing informations against
Zaldivar.
Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he
filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had
a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored
one on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Courts issuance
of the TRO is a manifestation theta the rich and influential
persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, [while]
it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given
due course.
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez.
The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side.
Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were
true; that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that
he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out
where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. He also
said, even attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the
Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to go slow
on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.
HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez
clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements
necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court
betrayed their oath of office. Such statements constitute the
grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such
statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme
Court and, through the Court, the entire system of
administration of justice in the country.
Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free
speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of
speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is
not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on
occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interests. One of
these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the
integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.
There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity
of the system of administering justice.
Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court,
is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and
respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the
embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the
government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to
uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not
to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier
than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but
his criticisms must be bona fide. In the case at bar, his
statements, particularly the one where he alleged that
members of the Supreme Court approached him, are of no
relation to the Zaldivar case.
The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the
practice of law.
IN: RESOLUTION CUNANAN, ET. AL
18 MARCH 1954
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of
unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino Cunanan et.
al petitioners.
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much
public interest and concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as the
Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. Generally a candidate is deemed
passed if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o
falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past few
exams the passing grades were changed depending on the
strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations (1946-
72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 75%).
Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as
those reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and feeling that
they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates
who obtained averages of a few percentages lower than those
admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951
Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he
was given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the
senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then
became law on June 21, 1953
Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to
admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from
insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations.
By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it
qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation
for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure
in the exams.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the
legal profession and the administration of justice, the S.C.
would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.
An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for
the practice of the law that should be developed constantly and
maintained firmly.
The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act
of admitting, suspending, disbarring, and reinstating attorneys
at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C.
equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice
of law. The primary power and responsibility which the
constitution recognizes continue to reside in this court.
Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law
seeks to cure are not the rules set in place by the S.C. but
the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this
power is not included in the power granted by the Const. to
Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.
Reasons for Unconstitutionality:
1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional
responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court,
and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting to do
so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and
supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since the rules
made by congress must elevate the profession, and those
rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation
5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law,
contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable
from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.
HELD:
Under the authority of the court:
1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the
examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the said law
are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and
effect.
2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations
subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955) is valid and
shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who
failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the
candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN
Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject
are considered as having passed whether they have filed
petitions for admissions or not.)
AGUIRRE V RANA B.M. NO. 1036 JUNE 10, 2000
FACTS: Respondent is a successful bar passer who was
allowed only to take oath but not to sign the roll of attorneys
pending the resolution of the complaint of the petitioner who
charges respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
Apparently, the respondent appeared as counsel to an election
candidate before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers
(MBEC) of Masbate before he took his oath and signed the
rolls of attorneys. In his comment, respondent alleges he only
provide specific assistance and advice not as a lawyer but as a
person who knows the law. He contends that he did not sign
the pleadings as a lawyer. The Office of the Bar Confidant was
tasked to investigate and its findings disclosed that according
to the minutes of the meeting of the MBEC, the respondent
actively participated in the proceeding and signed in the
pleading as counsel for the candidate.
ISSUE: WON the respondent is fit for admission to the bar.
HELD: The court held that respondent did engaged in
unauthorized practice of law. It held that all the activities he
participated during that time involves the practice of law
despite the fact that he is not yet a member of the Bar. The
right to practice law is not a right but a privilege extended to
those morally upright and with the proper knowledge and skills.
It involves strict regulation, one of which is on the moral
character of its members. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should
know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still
had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys. Because the court finds respondent not morally fit to
be admitted in the Bar, notwithstanding the fact that he already
took his oath, he was denied admission to the bar.
THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
Article VIII, Section 8
Section 8.
1. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under
the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of
the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of
the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative
of the private sector.
2. The regular members of the Council shall be
appointed by the President for a term of four years
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Of the Members first appointed, the representative of
the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the
professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for
two years, and the representative of the private sector
for one year.
3. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the
Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a
record of its proceedings.
4. The regular Members of the Council shall receive
such emoluments as may be determined by the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in
its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
5. The Council shall have the principal function of
recommending appointees to the judiciary. It may
exercise such other functions and duties as the
Supreme Court may assign to it.
AUTOMATIC RELEASE OF APPROPRIATION FOR THE
JUDICIARY
Article VIII, Section 3
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the
legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous
year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly
released.