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I45
6. God exists.
7. None of the sentences on the board are true.
with cases like (7) that are pathological while falling short of
antinomy.
Finally there are cases involving a vicious semantic regress but
no vicious circle. All the cases so far have involved a sentence that
belongs to its own ancestral domain. On a deeper analysis, however,
it is not the cyclical character of these cases that renders them patho-
logical; and it is a virtue of the grounding condition that it brings
this out. Consider that all the cases so far suffer from "unconsum-
mated reference" 10 much like the bureaucratic regress in which
each clerk endlessly refers you to the next to settle your accounts.
Such regresses are pathological whether cyclic or not. For a seman-
tic example, imagine an endless sequence of sentences, all distinct,
whose representative form (for the nth sentence of the sequence) is:
8. Sna1 is true.
Here each sentence of the sequence belongs to the domain of its
predecessor. Any natural language is bound to admit regressions of
this sort, and sentences belonging to such regresses are semantically
pathological in having their content somehow left undetermined.
There is something schematic in the concept of truth, which re-
quires filling in. Failing that, sentences of the type of (8) lose their
comprehensibility. Poincar6 and Russell took the vicious circle to
be fundamental for the logical paradoxes; 11 but examples of the
type of (8) indicate that the pathological character of those para-
doxes is due rather to the vicious regress. It remains true that strict
antinomy is known only for the cyclic cases; however, in accordance
with the diagnosis of "positive" and "mixed" variants of the Liar
paradox, contradiction is viewed here as but the extreme symptom
of semantic pathology.
On account of all these cases, one can readily become enamored of
some semantic grounding condition. As Quine puts it for the corre-
sponding principle of set theory: "If the classes it precludes are not
wanted, its sweep is gratifyingly clean." 12 In full strength in set
theory, a grounding axiom is problematic; in semantics it wreaks
10 This apt term is borrowed from J. Searle's dissertation Problems Arising in
the Theory of Meaning out of the Notions of Sense and Reference, Oxford Uni-
versity, 1959.
11 H. Poincar6, "Les Mathematiques et la logique," Revue de Metaphysique et
de Morale, 14 (1906), 294-317, and B. Russell, "Mathematical Logic as Based on
the Theory of Types," American Journal of Mathematics, 30 (1908), 222-262.
12W. V. Quine, Set Theory and Its Logic (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press,
1963), p. 286. The remark occurs in the course of a discussion enumerating some
of the losses incurred by accepting the grounding condition in set theory.
havoc, banishing the laws of logic on their naive construal (as state-
ments about all statements including themselves) along with the
general principles of semantic theory including the grounding con-
dition itself. Also, groundlessness being an inherited characteristic,
such a principle banishes particular semantic statements about
groundless sentences, including innocuous statements like:
9. (1) is groundless.
Before acquiescing in such a "gratifyingly clean sweep" it is appro-
priate to demand more coercive arguments than have yet been pro-
vided that nothing less will do.
Support for a mitigated grounding condition in semantics comes
from the Liar paradox. Scrapping the condition altogether would
rob us of a fitting explanation of that paradox and related phenom-
ena. Semantic theories adequate to natural language appear then
to want a grounding condition reformulated with suitable exemp-
tions, or at any rate a set of semantic principles that, however indi-
rectly, deny statementhood to critical sorts of groundless sentences.
III. PARADOXES OF GROUNDEDNESS
The most elementary paradoxes of set theory deal with classes
whose members are the grounded classes (Mirimanoff's paradox) or
the classes free of cycles of length k (Russell's paradox has k = 1).
Holding to our initial correspondence between sentences and
classes, determined by the function D(S), this family of paradoxes
can be carried over to semantics.
The discussion of the last section ought to provide some indica-
tion that the grounding concept is a central notion of semantics,
perhaps even more so than of set theory. It seems bound to figure
somehow in the principles of any semantic theory adequate to cope
with the paradoxes. More specifically, the discussion so far provides
substantial evidence for the claim:
10. Grounded sentences are immune to the Liar paradox.
The evidence of course is less than conclusive, but the claim at any
rate has been raised and supported by examples. By all known
principles of grammar, (10) is a well-formed English sentence, whose
underlying grammatical subject specifies the condition "grounded
sentence." Recalling how domains are specified, it seems clear that
(10) has for its domain the class of all grounded sentences. Anyone
who has granted this much now falls prey to the paradox of
grounded sentences; for, on foregone assumptions, (10) is demon-
strably both grounded and groundless:
nothing, and h* can be taken as any element not in the left field of
F and consequently bearing FjP to nothing.
The hypothesis of (T4) now ensures the existence of some sub-
relation F included in Q and functional onto the left field of P.
By the Lemma, for each element h there is an element h* bearing
FjP (and thereby QJP) to exactly those things to which h bears P.
Now imagine that h bears P to exactly the R-grounded elements;
in that case its counterpart h* would bear R to exactly the
R-grounded elements; but (T2) precludes the existence of any
such h*, and so the Lemma precludes the existence of any such
h, establishing (T4).
Now the paradox of grounded sentences can be seen as an ana-
logue of Richard's paradox, arising directly from an instance of
(T4).15 Temporarily limiting the discussion to simple sentences with
intransitive main verbs, 'about' can be glossed 'has for its under-
lying grammatical subject a term satisfied by', which admits of logi-
cal analysis into the relative product of a grammatical relation J
(has for its underlying grammatical subject) and the converse satis-
faction relation Z (is satisfied by); the role of the grammatical re-
lation J is to identify the term whose satisfaction is in question.
Our self-imposed limitation to simple sentences guarantees that
every sentence under consideration has exactly one grammatical
subject term (J is functional), and the rules of grammar supply for
each term at least one sentence having that term in the position of
grammatical subject (a is onto the set of terms). (T4) now secures
that no term can bear Z to exactly the set of (JIZ)-grounded sen-
tences.
Any pretensions to the notion of aboutness can now be aban-
doned, for J can as well be 'has for its first term' under a conven-
tion of counting from left to right, or right to left, or in any defi-
nite manner, so long as the conditions (a)-(c) of (T4) are fulfilled.
Each such application provides another variation on the grounding
paradox. In similar fashion paradoxes of "grounded paragraphs"
or "grounded books" and so on can be constructed; each ramifies the
set of concepts that prove pathological for any given language.
l5 A version of Richard's paradox comes out as a special case of a variant of
(T4) that results from replacing "R-grounding"therein by "R-irreflexive."Let
Q be any function assigning a number to each term of a given class, and let Z
be the converseof the satisfactionrelation ("is satisfiedby") for those terms. Let
a number be called richardian just in case Q assigns it to no term satisfied by
that number; the richardian numbers then coincide with those that are QjZ-
irreflexive,and the paradox arises from presuming that some term of the given
class can be satisfiedby exactly the richardiannumbers.
tion systems," simplified and adapted to suit present purposes. See Chapter III
A-1 of his Theory of Formal Systems (Princeton, N.J.: University Press, 1961).
ing a term of one system express the concept of grounding for some
second system. If indefinite terms have the complete freedom naively
ascribed to them, it should be possible for the indefinite term of
English to play vicar for the definite term of German, so that En-
glish after all could express its own grounding concept.
Abstractly a conceptual framework may be thought of as having
a fixed terminology but no fixed ontology, and the free possibility of
associating concepts with terms rather than any one definite and
fixed association of concepts with terms. It is possible to take the
terminology as fixed by the device of taking it broad enough, say
as the class of all sequences in a universal phonetic alphabet. This
would allow for the grafting onto English of terms from any other
language, and so would seem to be liberal enough. Concepts may
be taken in the liberalized sense of type 3 systems, with their merely
negative notion of expressibility.
Within this kind of framework, contextual parameters intervene
between terms and classes in such a way that it may not be possible
in advance to stipulate a fixed ontology from which those classes
are drawn. However, there is one part of this varying ontology that
remains constant, providing a fixed point in an ever-changing sys-
tem, and that is the terminology itself. All that needs to be known
about a given model in such a framework is that part of the model
relating to this fixed point, which is to say the metalinguistic part
of it.
The abstract representation of such a conceptual framework,
then, is given by a terminology T and a nod in the direction of
some chosen model of conceptual systems. A type 3 conceptual
framework can be identified with the class of all possible type 3
conceptual systems built on an initially fixed terminology. Now
there are two ways of construing the concept of grounded terms
within such a framework: either by way of the terms that are
grounded in some particular realization, or by way of the terms
that are grounded in all possible realizations. On either construal
the limitative result carries over, and the concept of grounding is
inexpressible even in a conceptual framework of this extremely
open sort.
As a corollary, it also follows that there is no such thing as a pure
indefinite term. It appears that the semantic concept of a pure in-
definite term, like the theological concept of an omnipotent being,
is after all subject to tacit reservations. Indefinite terms can con-
textually accomplish any task that any definite term whatsoever can
accomplish, logic permitting.
There are yet some ways in which our models might be enriched,
but it becomes increasingly difficult to suppose that further elab-
orations will afford the means for transcending these limitative re-
sults.'7 A fairly substantial case can now be made for the conceptual
incompleteness of every possible language. To recapitulate, ele-
mentary conceptual systems exhibit the neatest structure, and they
give rise to systematically elusive concepts on the basis of simple
combinatorial facts. This feature survives progressive "loosening"
of the relations between terms and concepts on the one hand and
between concepts and classes on the other.
VI. OBTRUSIVENESS OF THE GROUNDING CONCEPTS
When further structure of conceptual systems is brought into ac-
count, a sort of linguistic Gresham's law takes hold, under which
"good" concepts may be driven out by "bad" ones. Conceptual sys-
tems of a regular structure incorporate closure properties that make
the design of a rich language, or discovery of the semantic principles
governing a rich language, a perilous affair.
The neatest paradoxes of the family under discussion take R as
the converse satisfaction relation: Grelling's paradox so results from
(TI), and the paradox of grounded terms so results from (T2). The
relevant theorems show that, contrary to expectations, the expres-
sion 'grounded term' does not hold of exactly the grounded terms,
and the expression 'heterological' does not hold of exactly the
heterological terms. What then are their respective extensions? One
view is that semantic concepts are functions with "singularities," so
that 'grounded term' for example might hold of all the grounded
terms excluding itself.'8 This resolution is "minimal" in the sense
of deleting no more from the naively considered extension of
'grounded term' than logical consistency demands: a single item.
It is also an "inner" as contrasted with a logically possible but not
17 There is, for example, the irksome fact that not every concept after all has
an extension. Let a russellian class be one that is not a member of itself; then
the term 'russellian class' while having a definite sense has no extension, for
want of a class whose members are exactly the russellian classes. A theory of
concepts adequate to such terms calls for extensive revision in our models, which
are all "platonistic." Basically the semantic rules need to associate with terms
"virtual classes" in Quine's sense (see his Set Theory and Its Logic). Further di-
agonal theorems would also be wanted to accommodate these revisions, since
(Ti) through (T4) have also been given "platonistically." These accommodations
run askew to present concerns which always involve real (not merely virtual)
classes that cannot be assigned to any term.
18 As in K. Godel, p. 50 of his "Russell's Mathematical Logic," in P. A. Schilpp,
ed., The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell (New York: Tudor Press, 1944). See also
W. Quine. "On Frege's Way Out," Mind, LXIV (1955): 145-159.
that they might do so entailing that they would per impossibile ex-
press their own grounding concepts. Let it suffice here to present the
simplest of these results, an analogue of Tarski's limitative theorem
framed in terms of satisfaction rather than truth.19 Suppose a con-
ceptual system whose structure ensures closure under union and
also:
[Closure under Complementation]: Relative to its ontology, the
complement of any class that is represented in the system, it-
self is represented in the system.
Closure under both union and complementation render the system
boolean, and in particular they ensure closure of represented classes
under intersection, the intersection of any two sets being the com-
plement of the union of their complements. Now imagine any such
boolean system to be augmented so as to incorporate relational
terms, by way of functions in 0 that assign to terms classes of ordered
pairs (subclasses of N2). Consider now two more conditions on such
augmented systems:
[Metalinguistic Identity]: The identity relation over the ter-
minology of the system, is represented in the system.
[Relational Domains]: For any relation that is represented in
the system, so is its domain (the class of its first members).
Now we get the following result on relative representability:
T6. Let S be any boolean conceptual system meeting the struc-
tural conditions [Metalinguistic Identity] and [Relational
Domains]; and let R be any relation over the terminology
of S. Now if the relation R is represented in the system S,
then so is the class of R-heterological terms.
The R-heterological terms are those which do not bear R to them-
selves; those things which do bear R to themselves comprise the
domain of the intersection of R with the metalinguistic identity
relation, that it [Domain (R n I)]; and the R-heterological terms
comprise the intersection of the complement of this class with the
class of terms. The hypothesized conditions clearly suffice to ensure
representability of the complement of [Domain (R n I)]. They also
19 Tarski has this result in one form, and Smullyan has it in another, each
dealing with the concept of truth rather than satisfaction. See Theorem 1, Sec-
tion II.2 of A. Tarski, A. Mostowski, and R. M. Robinson, Undecidable Theories
(Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1953); and Theorem 1.1, Chapter III-A of R. M.
Smullyan, op. cit.