1.

GR L-19650 CALTEX V PALOMAR

In 1960, Caltex announced its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest. Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the
media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by
Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing and to make sure that the contest does not
violate the anti-lottery provision of the Revised Administrative Code. Palomar however denied the mailing of such contest rules
according to him violates the said provision. He contends that the contest can be subject to fraud order if pursued because it falls
under any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or
drawing of any kind which is not allowed by the Postal Law. Caltex referred the case to the trial court and the trial court ruled in favor
of Caltex. Palomar appealed arguing that Caltex has no sufficient cause of action to seek declaratory relief (and decisions can only be
advisory in nature) and that the proposed contest does violate the Postal Law.

LAW TALKED ABOUT:

SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. No matter belonging to any of the following classes, whether sealed
as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines through the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the
mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts:

Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or conveying or
purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or in part
upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.

"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.Upon satisfactory evidence that any person or company is engaged in conducting any
lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing
of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property
of any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, the Director of Posts
may instruct any postmaster or other officer or employee of the Bureau to return to the person, depositing the same in the
mails, with the word "fraudulent" plainly written or stamped upon the outside cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever
class mailed by or addressed to such person or company or the representative or agent of such person or company.

SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic transfer service.The Director of Posts
may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise or
scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any
person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the
mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promise, forbid the issue or payment by any postmaster
of any postal money order or telegraphic transfer to said person or company or to the agent of any such person or company,
whether such agent is acting as an individual or as a firm, bank, corporation, or association of any kind, and may provide by
regulation for the return to the remitters of the sums named in money orders or telegraphic transfers drawn in favor of such
person or company

Extrinsic aids in statutory construction SPIRIT AND INTENT OF THE LAW and LETTER OF THE LAW

As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar schemes, justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to
inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals.

Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute "lottery", if it is not resorted to as a device to evade the law
and no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or
stimulated thereby.

There is no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. Under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we have
heretofore examined, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve
the element of consideration

2. GR 94723 SALVACION vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG
BARTELLI
Extrinsic aids in statutory construction SPIRIT AND INTENT original intent of a statute and INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW.
Statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises thrown our way by their framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute
may already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day.

This aid is applied here in the issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil down to two:

May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original jurisdiction in petitions for declaratory relief rests
with the lower court? The Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246,
otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?

LAW TALKED ABOUT:

Provision of Central Bank Circular No. 960:

Sec. 113 Exemption from attachment. Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever.

The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426. As amended by P.D. 1246:

Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. -- All foreign currency deposits authorized under this Act,
as amended by PD No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized under PD No. 1034, are hereby
declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and, except upon the written permission of the
depositor, in no instance shall such foreign currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any
person, government official, bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative or any other entity
whether public or private: Provided, however, that said foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or
any administrative body whatsoever.

INTERPRETATION: Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encourage
by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in
the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time. Meaning that the dollar deposit of
respondent Greg Bartelli is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against
attachment, garnishment or other court processes.

LEGAL MAXIM Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizerzmente con damo de otro.: Application of the law depends on the extent of
its justice. If the court rules that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court APPLICABLE to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a
citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which
provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail. Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental
solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.

It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted at a time when the countrys economy was in a shambles; when foreign
investments were minimal and presumably, this was the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the present times
show that the country has recovered economically; and even if not, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of
law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good when enacted. The law failed to
anticipate the inquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as as the case before us.

Laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more
enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths are disclosed and manners and opinions change with the change of
circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times... The use of the questioned SEC113 of CB 960 by Greg
Bartelli for wrong doing would be acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.

No conflict of legal policy - Dollar against Peso? Upholding the final and executory judgment of the lower court against the Central
Bank Circular protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a transient alien depositor against
injustice to a national and victim of a crime? This situation calls for fairness legal tyranny.

We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served the ends of justice.
Provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. 6426 are hereby held to
be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances.

3. GR 138298 DEL MAR V PAGCOR

LAW TALKED ABOUT:
Section 10 of P.D. No. 1869 grants it a franchise to operate jai-alai. Section 10 provides:
SEC. 10 Nature and term of franchise. Subject to the terms and conditions established in this Decree, the
Corporation is hereby granted for a period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years, the rights,
privilege and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports,
gaming pools, i.e., basketball, football, lotteries, etc., whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Extrinsic aids in statutory construction:
PLAIN MEANING RULE
These two consolidated petitions concern the issue of whether the franchise granted to the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) includes the right to manage and operate jai-alai.
Gaming the act or practice of playing games for stakes depends largely on the context of the instrument, description and
enumeration of the matters preceding the term and subject to which it is applied. When used in a statute, the words should be given
their usual and natural signification.

LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE

When words and phrases of a statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and
the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. Del Mar says that there is no specific mention of jai alai and there should
have been an express mention of jai alai. If that would be the case, it would render ineffective the use of the word etc in the said
law.
A statute is to be favored and must be adopted if reasonably possibly, which will give meaning to every word, clause, and sentence of
the statute and operation and effect to every part and provision of it. Del Mar says that the operations of jai alai was a legislative
grant by Marcos to a corporation controlled by his in-laws, the Philippine Jai Alai and Amusement Corporation (PJAC).
It is improper to inquire into the motives that influenced the legislative body except when those motives are disclosed (revealed) by
the statute itself. Del Mar insist that PAGCOR was created to operate games of chance or gaming pools for which no franchises have
been granted. P.D. No. 1869 does not have the standard marks of a law granting a franchise to operate jai-alai as those
found under P.D. No. 810 or E.O. 135. The fact that there was an existing jai alai franchise of PJAC the time PD 1869 went
into effect does not mean that jai alai can never be the subject of PAGCORs franchise upon repeal of PJACs franchise. PAGCOR was
primarily created to maximize potential sources of revenue

4. GR 123169 PARAS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay
election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. petitioner insists
that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act
No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular
local election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK election from the recall election. We do not
agree.

LAWS TALKED ABOUT:

The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:

SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall.

(a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall take place within 1 year from the date of the officials assumption to office or 1 year immediately
preceding a regular local election.

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every
part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of
office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local
official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office.

It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. Thus, the
interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the
Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to enact a local government code which shall provide for
a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum.

Moreover, petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the
Court made the following admonition:

We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the
intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth.

The SPIRIT, RATHER THAN THE LETTER OF A LAW determines its construction; hence, a statute must be read according to its
SPIRIT AND INTENT.

Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses,
hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The
proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate
could choose the officials replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected
through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to
construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled
will be contested and be filled by the electorate.

5. GR L-30642 FLORESCA vs. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION

Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation who, while working at its copper mines underground
operations, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex,
in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the
protection of the lives of its men working underground.

LAWS TALKED ABOUT:

PHILEX asserts that work-connected injuries are compensable exclusively under the provisions of Sections 5 and 46 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, which read:

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensatio.The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason
of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his
personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said
injury ...

SEC. 46. Jurisdiction The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, ...

Petitioners said that Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the case and filed an opposition claiming that the causes of action
are not based on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil Code allowing the award of
actual, moral and exemplary damages, particularly:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre- existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict.

Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict.
 (b) Art. 1173The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature
of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.

Art. 2201. In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may
be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.

Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.

The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of November 26, 1976, is:

Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under the Workmen's
Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative, that is to say, whether his or his heirs' action is exclusively restricted
to seeking the limited compensation provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or whether they have a right of
selection or choice of action between availing of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the
regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue of
negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his other employees or whether they may avail cumulatively of both actions, i.e.,
collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular
courts.

It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the Workmen's Compensation Act but a
complaint for damages. Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the WCA then they will
be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts. Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they
would also be estopped from claiming benefits under the WCA. The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this
deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed of such a remedy. However, if in
case theyll win in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted.
The SC emphasized that if they would go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous
reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures mans survival and ennobles him. As
Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth life.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing provision:

A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention of the law-making body must be
sought, first of all in the words of the statute itself, read and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly-accepted
and most obvious significations, according to good and approved usage and without resorting to forced or subtle construction
Courts, therefore, as a rule, cannot presume that the law-making body does not know the meaning of words and the rules of
grammar (Intrinsic aid). Consequently, the grammatical reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its correct sense.

6. GR L-39419 AISPORNA vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner-accused Aisporna seeks the reversal of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming
the judgment which found the petitioner guilty for having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act (Act No. 2427, as amended) and
sentenced her to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously act as agent in the solicitation or procurement of an application
for insurance by soliciting therefor the application of one Eugenio S. Isidro, without said accused having first secured a certificate of
authority to act as such agent from the office of the Insurance Commissioner, RP.

LAWS TALKED ABOUT:

The pertinent provision of Section 189 of the Insurance Act reads as follows:

No insurance company doing business within the Philippine Islands, nor any agent thereof, shall pay any commission or
other compensation to any person for services in obtaining new insurance, unless such person shall have first procured from
the Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an agent of such company as hereinafter provided. No person shall
act as agent, sub-agent, or broker in the solicitation of procurement of applications for insurance, or receive for services in
obtaining new insurance, any commission or other compensation from any insurance company doing business in the Philippine
Islands, or agent thereof, without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, which
must be renewed annually on the first day of January, or within six months thereafter. Such certificate shall be issued by the
Insurance Commissioner only upon the written application of persons desiring such authority, such application being approved and
countersigned by the company such person desires to represent, and shall be upon a form approved by the Insurance
Commissioner, giving such information as he may require. The Insurance Commissioner shall have the right to refuse to issue
or renew and to revoke any such certificate in his discretion. No such certificate shall be valid, however, in any event after the
first day of July of the year following the issuing of such certificate. Renewal certificates may be issued upon the application of
the company.

Any person who for compensation solicits or obtains insurance on behalf of any insurance company, or transmits for a
person other than himself an application for a policy of insurance to or from such company or offers or assumes to act in the
negotiating of such insurance, shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section, and shall thereby become liable to all the
duties, requirements, liabilities, and penalties to which an agent of such company is subject.

Any person or company violating the provisions of this section shall be fined in the sum of five hundred pesos. On the
conviction of any person acting as agent, sub-agent, or broker, of the commission of any offense connected with the business of
insurance, the Insurance Commissioner shall immediately revoke the certificate of authority issued to him and no such
certificate shall thereafter be issued to such convicted person.

The main issue raised is whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of the
Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph of the same section. In other words, it is necessary to determine whether or
not the agent mentioned in the first paragraph of the aforesaid section is governed by the definition of an insurance agent found on
its second paragraph.

A careful perusal of the above-quoted provision shows that the first paragraph thereof prohibits a person from acting as agent, sub-
agent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to
act from the Insurance Commissioner, while its second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of this section
and, finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation.

The respondent appellate court seems to imply that the definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph of Section 189
is not applicable to the insurance agent mentioned in the first paragraph. Parenthetically, the respondent court concludes that under
the second paragraph of Section 189, a person is an insurance agent if he solicits and obtains an insurance for compensation,
but, in its first paragraph, there is no necessity that a person solicits an insurance for compensation in order to be called an insurance
agent.

DICTIONARY: Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent mentioned in the first and second
paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a
consideration of the STATUTE AS A WHOLE. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and
isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in
order to produce harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever
possible. The MEANING OF THE LAW, it must be borne in mind, is not to be extracted from any single part, portion or section or
from isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences but from a general consideration or view of the act as a whole. Every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context. This means that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment, not
separately and independently. More importantly, the doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a
particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be
made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated

Since petitioner did not receive any compensation in the act, she did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
 7. GR 163988 NUEZ vs. GSIS
Petitioners are the heirs of Leonilo S. Nuez (Leonilo) who, during his lifetime, obtained three loans from the GSIS Family Bank,
formerly ComSavings Bank which in turn was formerly known as Royal Savings and Loan Association (the bank).
Loan Date Contracted Amount Maturity
First Loan April 6, 1976 P 55,900.00 June 30, 1978
Second Loan July 7, 1976 P127,000.00 June 30, 1978
Third Loan July 7, 1976 P105,900.00 June 30, 1978
(amended the first
loan)
Fourth Loan June 30, 1978 P1,539,135.00 December 27, 1978
More than nineteen (19) years after Leonilos June 30, 1978 Promissory Note matured or on December 11, 1997, the bank
undertook to extra judicially foreclose the properties. Officio Sheriff of issued a Notice of Extra-judicial Sale setting the sale of the
properties involved at public auction on January 9, 1998.
The auction took place as scheduled, with the bank as the highest and only bidder A Certificate of Sale was thus issued in favor of the
bank. Leonilo later filed for Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale, Reconveyance and Cancellation of Encumbrances.
Invoking prescription, he citing Articles 1142[13] and 1144[14] of the Civil Code, that when the bank filed the Petitions for Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of Mortgage, Leonilo concluded that it no longer had any right as prescription had set in.
The bank filed a motion for reconsideration on September 20, 2002, the last of the 15-day period within which it could interpose an
appeal, but it did not comply with the provision of Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court on notice of hearing, prompting herein
petitioners to file a Motion to Strike Out Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.

LAWS TALKED ABOUT:

Section 4, Rule 15 Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the
rightd of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to
ensure its receipt by the other party at least 3 days before the date of the hearing, unless the court fo good cause sets the hearing
on shorter notice.
Petitioners and counsel confuse their petition as one Petition for Review under Rule 45 with a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The
distinctions between Rules 45 and 65 are far and wide.
Rule 45 Section 1. Filing of petition with SC. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgement or final
order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the SC a verified petition for review on certiorari. He petition shall raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth.
Rule 65 Section 1. Petition for certiorari- When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgement
be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
In justifying its failure to file a collection suit, the bank contended that it would have amounted to a waiver of its right to foreclose.
But if early on it opted to foreclose the mortgages, why it waited until 1997 and 1999, more than nineteen years after the right to do
so arose.
The bank argues that what applies is Art 1141 and not 1142 but the court said the STRATEGIC LOCATION of Art 1142 being after
Art 1141 which speaks of real actions indicates that it is an exception to the rule.
ART 1141 of the Civil Code. Real actions over immovables prescribe after 30 years. ART 1142 of the Civil Code. A mortgage action
prescribes after 10 years.

8. GR L-34964 CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and TAN KIM LIONG vs ORTEGA

The only issue in this petition for certiorari to review the orders on whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply
with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405.

The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 relied upon by the petitioners reads:

Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in
bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as
of absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau
or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of
the litigation.

Sec 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to disclose to any person other than
those mentioned in Section two hereof any information concerning said deposits.
 Sec. 5. Any violation of this law will subject offender upon conviction, to an imprisonment of not more than five
years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the court.

The petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information required by the court does not fall within any of the four (4) exceptions
enumerated in Section 2, and that if the questioned orders are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5
and the bank exposed to a possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation.

The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated
in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation
had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the
same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order. It will be noted from the DISCUSSION (CONVERSATION) of the conference
committee report (between Mr. Ramos and Mr. Marcos, and, Mr. Ramos and Mr. Macapagal) on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No.
3977, which later became Republic Act 1405, that it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach
of execution to satisfy a final judgment.

It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress that the
prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to
insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed the
disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. It is hard to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to
enable debtors to evade payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of converting their assets
into cash and depositing the same in a bank.

9. GR L-37867 Philippine Veterans Administration vs. Bautista

This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of respondent for mandamus filed by Calixto V. Gasilao against the Board of
Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration.

Gasilao, was a veteran in good standing during World War II. On October 19, 1955, he filed a claim for disability pension under Section
9, Republic Act No. 65. The claim was disapproved by the PVA

Republic Act 65 was amended by Republic Act 1362 on June 22, 1955 by including as part of the benefit of P50.00, P10.00 a month
for each of the unmarried minor children below 18 of the veteran Republic Act No. 1362 was implemented by the respondents only on
July 1, 1955.

On June 18, 1957, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65 was further amended by Republic Act 1920 increasing the life pension of the
veteran to P100.00 a month and maintaining the P10.00 a month each for the unmarried minor children below 18.

August 8, 1968, the claim of the petitioner which was disapproved in December, 1955 was reconsidered and his claim was finally
approved, he requested respondents that his claim be made retroactive as of the date when his original application was flied or
disapproved in 1955. Respondents did not act on his request.

As it is generally known, the purpose of Congress in granting veteran pensions is to compensate ea class of men who suffered in the
service for the hardships they endured and the dangers they encountered, and more particularly, those who have become
incapacitated for work owing to sickness, disease or injuries sustained while in line of duty. A veteran pension law is, therefore, a
governmental expression of gratitude to and recognition of those who rendered service for the country, especially during times of war
or revolution, by extending to them regular monetary aid. For this reason, it is the general rule that a liberal construction is given to
pension statutes in favor of those entitled to pension. Courts tend to favor the pensioner, but such constructional preference is to be
considered with other guides to interpretation, and a construction of pension laws must depend on its own particular language. In the
present case, Republic Act 65 is a veteran pension law which must be accorded a liberal construction and interpretation in order to
favor those entitled to rights, privileges, and benefits granted there under, among which are the right to resume old positions in
government, educational benefits, the privilege to take promotion examinations, a life pension for the incapacited, pension for widow
and children, and hospitalization and medical benefits. Upholding the Board that the pension awards are made effective only upon
approval of the application, this would be dependent upon the discretion of the Board which had been abused in this case through
inaction extending for 12years. Such stand, therefore does not appear to be, or simply is not, in consonance with the spirit and intent
of the law. Gasilaos claim was sustained. The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the court a quo, ordering the Board of
Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration (now the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) to make Gasilaos pension
effective 18 December 1955 at the rate of P50.00 per month plus P10.00 per month for each of his then unmarried minor children
below 18, and the former amount increased to P100.00 from 22June 1957 to 7 August 1968; and declaring the differentials in pension
to which said Gasilao, his wife and his unmarried minor children below 18 are entitled for the period from 22 June 1969 to 14January
1972 by virtue of Republic Act 5753 subject to the availability of Government funds appropriated for the purpose.

10. GR 137489 CDA VS DOLEFIL

Petitioner CDA claims that it is vested with quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate cooperative disputes in view of its powers, functions
and responsibilities under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6939. The quasi-judicial nature of its powers and functions was confirmed by
the Department of Justice, through the then Acting Secretary of Justice Demetrio G. Demetria.

LAWS TALKED ABOUT:

Petitioner CDA claims that it is vested with quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate cooperative disputes in view of its powers, functions
and responsibilities under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6939
Section 3 of R.A. No. 6939 enumerates the powers, functions and responsibilities of the CDA, thus:
SEC. 3. Powers, Functions and Responsibilities.The Authority shall have the following powers, functions and responsibilities:
(a) Formulate, adopt and implement integrated and comprehensive plans and programs on cooperative development
consistent with the national policy on cooperatives and the overall socio-economic development plan of the Government;
(b) Develop and conduct management and training programs upon request of cooperatives that will provide members of
cooperatives with the entrepreneurial capabilities, managerial expertise, and technical skills required for the efficient
operation of their cooperatives and inculcate in them the true spirit of cooperativism and provide, when necessary, technical
and professional assistance to ensure the viability and growth of cooperatives with special concern for agrarian reform,
fishery and economically depressed sectors;
(c) Support the voluntary organization and consensual development of activities that promote cooperative movements and
provide assistance to wards upgrading managerial and technical expertise upon request of the cooperatives concerned;
(d) Coordinate the effects of the local government units and the private sector in the promotion, organization, and
development of cooperatives;
(e) Register all cooperatives and their federations and unions, including their division, merger, consolidation, dissolution or
liquidation. It shall also register the transfer of all or substantially all of their assets and liabilities and such other matters as
may be required by the Authority;
(f) Require all cooperatives, their federations and unions to submit their annual financial statements, duly audited by
certified public accountants, and general information sheets;
(g) Order the cancellation after due notice and hearing of the cooperatives certificate of registration for non-compliance with
administrative requirements and in cases of voluntary dissolution;
(h) Assist cooperatives in arranging for financial and other forms of assistance under such terms and conditions as are
calculated to strengthen their viability and autonomy;
(i) Establish extension offices as may be necessary and financially viable to implement this Act. Initially, there shall be
extension offices in the Cities of Dagupan, Manila, Naga, Iloilo, Cebu, Cagayan de Oro and Davao;
(j) Impose and collect reasonable fees and charges in connection with the registration of cooperatives;
(k) Administer all grants and donations coursed through the Government for cooperative development, without prejudice to
the right of cooperatives to directly receive and administer such grants and donations upon agreement with the grantors and
donors thereof;
(l) Formulate and adopt continuing policy initiatives consultation with the cooperative sector through public hearing;
(m) Adopt rules and regulations for the conduct of its internal operations;
(n) Submit an annual report to the President and Congress on the state of the cooperative movement;
(o) Exercise such other functions as may be necessary to implement the provisions of the cooperative laws and, in the
performance thereof, the Authority may summarily punish for direct contempt any person guilty of misconduct in the
presence of the Authority which seriously interrupts any hearing or inquiry with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos
(P500.00) or imprisonment of not more than ten (10) days, or both. Acts constituting indirect contempt as defined under Rule
71 of the Rules of Court shall be punished in accordance with the said Rule.
Extrinsic Aid, OPINION:
Applying the foregoing, the express powers of the CDA to cancel certificates of registration of cooperatives for non-compliance with
administrative requirements or in cases of voluntary dissolution under Section 3(g), and to mandate and conciliate disputes within a
cooperative or between cooperatives under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6939, may be deemed quasi-judicial in nature.
The reason is that in the performance of its functions such as cancellation of certificate of registration, it is necessary to establish
non-compliance or violation of administrative requirement. To do so, there arises an indispensable need to hold hearings, investigate
or ascertain facts that possibly constitute non-compliance or violation and, based on the facts investigated or ascertained, it becomes
incumbent upon the CDA to use its official discretion whether or not to cancel a cooperatives certificate of registration, thus, clearly
revealing the quasi-judicial nature of the said function. When the CDA acts as a conciliatory body pursuant to Section 8 of R.A. No.
6939, it in effect performs the functions of an arbitrator. Arbitrators are by the nature of their functions act in quasi-judicial capacity
xxx.
The quasi-judicial nature of the foregoing functions is bolstered by the provisions of Sections 3(o) of R.A. No. 6939 which grants CDA
on the exercise of other functions as may be necessary to implement the provisions of cooperative laws, the power to summarily
punish for direct contempt any person guilty of misconduct in the presence thereof who seriously interrupts any hearing or inquiry
with a fine or imprisonment prescribed therein, a power usually granted to make effective the exercise of quasi-judicial functions.
It is a fundamental rule in statutory construction that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation, vacillation or equivocation there is only room for application. 32 It can be gleaned from the above-quoted provision of
R.A. No. 6939 that the authority of the CDA is to discharge purely administrative functions which consist of policy-making,
registration, fiscal and technical assistance to cooperatives and implementation of cooperative laws. Nowhere in the said law can it
be found any express grant to the CDA of authority to adjudicate cooperative disputes.
Extrinsic AID, OPINION and PAST RULING:
The Office of the President, through the then Deputy Executive Secretary, Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing, espoused the same
view in the case of Alberto Ang, et al. v. The Board of Directors, Metro Valenzuela Transport Services Cooperative, Inc.,when it
declared and ruled that:
Concededly, Section 3(o) of R.A. No. 6939 and Article 35(4) of R.A. 6938, may not be relied upon by the CDA as
authority to resolve internal conflicts of cooperatives, they being general provisions. Nevertheless, this does not preclude the
CDA from resolving the instant case. The assumption of jurisdiction by the CDA on matters which partake of cooperative
disputes is a logical, necessary and direct consequence of its authority to register cooperatives. To our mind, the grant of this
power impliedly carries with it the visitorial power to entertain cooperative conflicts, a lesser power compared to its authority
to cancel registration certificates when, in its opinion, the cooperative fails to comply with some administrative requirements
(Sec. 2(g), R.A. No. 6939). Evidently, respondents-appellants claim that the CDA is limited to conciliation and mediation
proceedings is bereft of legal basis
The instant petition for review on certiorari suffers from a basic infirmity for lack of the requisite imprimatur from the Office of the
Solicitor General. The general rule is that only the Solicitor General can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines and that actions filed in the name of the Republic, or its agencies and instrumentalities for that matter, if not initiated by
the Solicitor General, will be summarily dismissed.
The authority of the Office of the Solicitor General to represent the Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities, is
embodied under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provides that:
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions.The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of lawyers. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also
represent government owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of
the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have the following specific
powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings;
represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and all other courts or
tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official
capacity is a party.
It is patent that the INTENT OF THE LAWMAKER was to give the designated official, the Solicitor General, in this case, the
unequivocal mandate to appear for the government in legal proceedings.
The Court is firmly convinced that considering the SPIRIT AND THE LETTER OF THE LAW, there can be no other logical
interpretation of Sec. 35 of the Administrative Code than that it is, indeed, mandatory upon the OSG to "represent the Government of
the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of a lawyer."
As an exception to the general rule, the Solicitor General, in providing legal representation for the government, is empowered under
Section 35(8), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 to "deputize legal officers of government departments,
bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent the Government in cases involving their
respective offices, brought before the courts and exercise supervision and control over such legal officers with respect to such cases."