Submitted by: Ulrike Josefa Rasch

Student Number: 559627

Course: 151010041-A13/14
Lecturer: Toufic Haddad

Development and Conflict

Using a case study, discuss the doctrine of

the Responsibility to Protect and how it has
been employed in practice.


Usingacasestudy,discussthedoctrineoftheResponsibilitytoProtectandhowit
hasbeenemployedinpractice.

Maliciousgossipscouldcalltheresponsibilitytoprotect(RtoP)oldwineinanewbottle.
Advocacy circles, however, call the doctrine a new international security and human
rights norm to address the international communitys failure to prevent and stop
genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity1. Basically, the
norm, which was collectively adopted by the General Assembly at the 2005 United
Nations(UN)WorldSummit2,evokesaconditionalsovereigntybystatingthat(w)here
apopulationissufferingseriousharm,asaresultofinternalwar,insurgency,repression
or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the
principleofnoninterventionyieldstotheinternationalresponsibilitytoprotect(ICISS,
2001, p. xi). This yielding of responsibility to the international community can
encompass coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in
extreme cases military intervention (ICISS, 2001, p. xi). RtoP attempts to define clear
rules and procedures for cases in which humancreated humanitarian crises lead to
foreign interventions, known as humanitarian interventions. Nevertheless, the
emphasised approach is comprehensive, highlighting that (t)he exercise of the
responsibility to both prevent and react should always involve less intrusive (sic)
measuresbeingconsideredbeforemorecoercive(sic)onesareapplied(ICISS,2001,p.
xi). The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)
established RtoP in 2001. The commission was founded in Canada and its work is the
answertoacallmadebyformerUNSecretaryGeneralKofiAnnan.KofiAnnanscallfor
adoctrineofhumanitarianinterventionaroseagainstthebackdropoffailedoratleast
highlycontroversialhumanitarianinterventionsduringthelastdecades(Barnet,2012,
p.235).Inthatregard,thecommissionexpectednolessasthereportwillbreaknew
ground in a way that helps generate a new international consensus on these issues
(ICISS, 2001, p. viii). Due to the large scope of this topic, this essay will focus on the
question of whether the report at least accomplished a consensus about its most
controversial aspect; whether and exactly when military interventions should be
exerted.Eventhoughthereportestablishesajustcausethresholdthatrequiresalarge

1Retrievedfromhttp://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/
2Retrievedfromhttp://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/aboutrtop

2
scalelossoflifeoralargescaleofethniccleaningasaconditiontoruleoutmilitary
intervention (ICISS, 2001, p. xii), reality shows that these happenings did not
automatically evoke military intervention by the international community. Comparing
thecasesofhumancreatedcrisesinLibya(2011)andSyria(ongoing),thefirstbeinga
target of RtoP and the latter not, two main tipping points appear decisive for the
question of whether coercive measures under the doctrine are ruled out; first, the
diversityofconflictactorsand,second,thestancethatstatesandregionalorganisations
takeontheissue.Inthissense,thisessayarguesthatRtoPhasfailedwithregardstoa
consensus about when coercive measures should be employed. However, the norm is
notrendereduselessduetoitsotherelements,theresponsibilitytoprevent.Theessay
isstructuredasfollows:AfteranintroductiontoRtoP,thecrisesinLibyaandSyriawill
be compared with respect to the aforementioned tipping points. The existence of the
tipping points will be considered in the context of international relations theories.
Finally,theessaywillcometotheconclusionthatthesuccessorfailureofRtoPshould
not be measured solely on the basis of employment or nonemployment of coercive
measures,butratheronachievementsprovidedbyitspreventionframework.

RtoP,oldwineinanewbottle?

The RtoP is not a blank sheet in the UN Security Council and General Assembly
discourse.Thenormroseinviewofalineoffailedsocalledhumanitarianinterventions.
ForHolzgrefeandKeohanne(2003),ahumanitarianinterventionoccurs,wheneverthe
threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at
preventingorendingwidespreadandgraveviolationsofthefundamentalhumanrights
of individuals other that its own citizens, without the permission of the state within
whose territory force is applied (p. 18). So, the crucial point of humanitarian
interventions is the missing permission of the targeted state. This aspect of
humanitarian interventions is particularly critical in the light of Article 2.13of the
Charter of the United Nations Organisation (UN Charter). It states that (t)he
OrganizationisbasedontheprincipleofthesovereignequalityofallitsMembers.The
principle of sovereign state equality can be traced back to the Westphalian Peace of

3Retrievedfromhttps://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml

3
1648 (Caporaso, 2000, p. 1). Furthermore, Article 2.7 of the UN Charter4sets out that
[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
interveneinmatterswhichareessentiallywithinthedomesticjurisdictionofanystate
or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter;butthisprincipleshallnotprejudicetheapplicationofenforcementmeasures
underChapterVll.Inthissense,Article2.7isknownasthenoninterventiondoctrine.
However,thelastpartofArticle2.7indicatesthesoleresponsibilityoftheUNSecurity
Counciltolegitimizetheuseofforceininternationalworldorderonthebasisofchapter
VIIoftheUNCharter.BasedonArticle24oftheUNCharter5,itsmembersconferonthe
UN Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the
SecurityCouncilactsontheirbehalf.Asiscommonlyacknowledged,theconstructionof
the Security Council has often formed an obstacle against the maintenance of
international peace by awarding veto power to the P5 (China, Russia, France, United
Kingdom, USA)6in cases where the Security Council could have released decisive
CouncilresolutionsunderchapterVIIoftheCharter.Againstthisbackdrop,theSecurity
Councilhasnotbeenabletoproperlyinterveneinseveralcasesofmassatrocities,such
asCambodia(1975),Bosnia(1992),Somalia(1992),Rwanda(1994)andKosovo(1999)
(Evans, 2009, p. 155). Nevertheless, scholars like Knudsen (2009) show that
humanitarian interventions have been much more a rule than an exception in the last
twocenturiesandagenerallyrecognizedprincipleofinternationallaw(p.2).Knudsen
undelays his claim with several historical examples, subordinated to what he calls the
EuropeangreatpowerinterventionsinGreece182730,Lebanon186061,Crete1866
68, the Balkans 187578 and Macedonia 19038 (p. 3). His analysis shows that solely
theColdWarperiodremainsadversetotheprincipleofhumanitarianinterventions.In
the1990s,humanitarianinterventionsrepeatedtobecometheruleintheinternational
statecommunity(Knudsen,2009).However,theendofexpandingpowerinfluencehas
characterised these interventions most of the time. The main issue of the intervening
parties was to protect their religious (Christian) affiliates throughout the world and
thereforeunderpintheirsphereofinfluence(Knudsen,2009,p.4).Insum,undeniably,
these interventions had humanitarian effects but were basically motivated by political

4Retrievedfromhttps://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml
5Retrievedfromhttps://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml
6SeeArticle26oftheUNCharter.

4
and geostrategic state considerations. Consequently, one of the main problems of
humanitarian interventions is the unreliability with which they are ruled out and the
dangerthatstatescanmisusethemasTrojanhorses(Bellamy,2005,p.31)toenforce
politicalobjectivesunderthepretextofhumanitarianismonforeigngrounds.Thesetwo
problemsareembodiedintheSecurityCouncilsaforementionedpartiallackofpower
to act and the insecurity about states objectives when ruling out humanitarian
intervention. This is where the RtoP as a refurbished humanitarian intervention
doctrine comes into play by trying to resolve the problems. First, primarilyafter the
constitutionoftheUNCharter,RtoPgivesstatesandregionalorganisationspermission
toactalsointermsofmilitaryactionincircumstanceswheretheSecurityCouncilis
unable to take action (ICISS, 2001, p. xiii). Second, RtoP contains precautionary
principles intended to avoid the maltreatment of RtoP by the respective actors in
question.Theseprinciplesencompasstheneedforarightintention(haltoraverthuman
suffering),deployingmilitaryinterventionsasalastresort,adaptingproportionalmeans,
and having reasonable prospects when ruling out the RtoP (ICISS, 2001, p. xii). How
popular RtoP has become over the last decade is demonstrated by its increasing
appearancewithintheUNsecuritydiscourse,especiallyaftertheReportoftheSecretary
General, Implementingtheresponsibilitytoprotect, released in 2009. This was the first
allinclusive document from the UN Secretariat on the Responsibility to Protect,
following Ban's stated commitment to turn the concept into policy7. In this purpose,
three pillars have been designed: First, the protection responsibilities of individual
States; second, the international communitys role in assisting States to fulfill their
responsibilities (capacitybuilding); and third, the international communitys residual
responsibilityfortimelyanddecisiveresponse(Welsh,2009,p.2).

However, facing the detailed frame of RtoP, it seems surprising that the doctrine has
been employed fairly quickly, for example, in the case of Libya, but not in view of the
miseryofSyria.Furthermore,theproceedingsinSyriaalsohavemetthecriteriaofthe
RtoPjustcausethresholdforsometimenow.Againstthebackdropofthepopulations
agonyinSyriaandtheinactionoftheinternationalcommunity,itappearsthatRtoPhas
failedtobreaknewgroundinawaythathelpsgenerateanewinternationalconsensus
on humanitarian interventions, one of the main concerns of the ICISS report on the

7Retrievedfromhttp://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/aboutrtop/learnabout

rtop
5
responsibilitytoprotect.Apparentlyalargescalelossoflifeandalargescaleofethnic
cleaning are not the real trigger points for the application of the RtoP, especially
coercivemeasures,butrather(interalias):

1. Thediversityoftheconflictactors
2. Thepositioningofstatesandregionalorganisations

Following,thisassumptionwillbedemonstratedwiththecasesofLibyaandSyria.

The humanitarian crises in Libya and Syria in terms of RtoP similar, but not
identical?

Bothcrises,theoneinLibyaandtheoneinSyria,roseagainstthebackdropoftheso
called Arab Spring at the beginning of 2011. Political disturbances had spread from
Tunisia to Egypt and beyond (Bellamy, 2011b, p. 838) pushed by longtime supressed
civilsocietygroupsatleastatthebeginningoftheuprising.Inbothcases,widespread
human rights violations have been deployed. However, in the case of Libya, it was
sufficient for then head of state Muammar Gaddafi to threaten publicly that he would
clean every single Libyan house8from the protesting cockroaches9to alarm the
internationalcommunityinsuchawaythatitissuedSecurityCouncilResolution1973.
Resolution1973authorizedtheUNmemberstatestotakeallnecessarymeasures()
toprotectciviliansandcivilianpopulatedareasunderthreatandtoestablishanofly
zone(S/RES/1973,p.3)10.Moreover,Resolution1973wasthefirstresolutionissuedby
the Security Council in which it clearly authorized the use of military force with the
purpose of human protection, but without the clear permission of the sovereign state
(Bellamy,2011a,p.1).Asregardscompleteness,itmustbesaidthattheSecurityCouncil
had already tried to bring the situation under control by freezing the economic
resources of the Gaddafi family, imposing an arms embargo and travel bans on the
Gaddafi clan through Resolution 1970 (Bellamy, 2011b, p. 839840). Despite this
roundabout,justeightmonthsafterthecrisisinLibyahadcapturedtheinternational

8Retrievedfrom

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/201122216458913596.html
9Retrievedfromhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldmiddleeast12544624
10Retrievedfromhttp://daccessdds

ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/268/39/PDF/N1126839.pdf?OpenElement
6
communitys attention in February 2011, the Libyan Transitional Council (TNC) (the
interimoppositiongovernment,latertitledtheNationalTransitionalCouncil)officially
declaredtheendoftheconflict.11ThesituationinSyria,however,wasandisstillquite
different. The Syrian crisis started with small protests in March 2011, which were
brutallysupressedbynationalsecurityforces12.SinceSyrianPresidentBasharAlAssad
launched attacks and dismissed international calls to open his policies for the
protestors considerations (such as more political participation and constitutional
change),theprotestspilledover13.InFebruary2014,afteralmostthreeyearsofconflict,
the death toll had risen to approximately 136,227.14The crisis has long since reached
whatwouldusuallyfulfiltheconditionsofabreachofinternationalpeaceinthereading
of the UN Charter. Since the number of Syrian refugees passed the 2 million mark in
September 2013, neighbouring countries (Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey) are being
affectedandthecrisisisreachingthescaleofaregionalconflict.15Nevertheless,several
attemptsofSecurityCouncilmemberstopassacomprehensiveresolutionallowingthe
useofmilitaryforcetohaltkillingsandexpulsionunderthethirdpillaroftheRtoPand
chapter VII of the UN Charter have been blocked by vetoes from Russia and China.16
AlthoughRtoPallowsstatesandregionalorganisationsasalastresortandonlyifthe
Security Council fails to discharge its responsibility to protect in conscienceshocking
situationscryingoutforaction(sic)tomeetthegravityandurgencyofthatsituation
(ICISS, 2001, p. xiii) to deploy action even without a Security Council resolution, not
one of the respective actors seems willing to substantially intervene in the tragedy of
Syria.Bytakingacloserlookattheproceedingsinthetwocountries,itseemsclearthat
twomaincategoriessupportedthequickactionundertheRtoPinLibya.However,the
characteristicsofthesametriggerpointsareactuallypreventingforeignactioninSyria.

11Retrievedfrom

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/10/201110235316778897.html
12Retrievedfromhttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/24/syriacrackdown

shooting
13Retrievedfrom

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8820940/SyriaChinacalls
forBasharalAssadtoreform.html
14Retrievedfromhttp://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/syriadeathtolltops

136/976524.html
15Retrievedfromhttp://www.unhcr.org/522495669.html
16Retrievedfromhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/newshelling

pessimisminsyriaadayafterbombkillstopgovernment
aides/2012/07/19/gJQAJzszvW_story.html
7
1.Thediversityoftheconflictactors

The first trigger point is the diversity of the conflict actors. Why is this issue of such
importance? For one thing, it should be referred to as realism theory. Realists
understandtheworldasanarchy.Tosurvive,everystatemustprotectitsowninterest
towardsotherstates.Thebiggestconcernofrealistsistheabsenceofasupranational
authority that can preserve the security of the state (Barnett, 2012, p. 226). In this
sense, states are manifested in a selfhelp world in which they must learn to help
themselvesbecausenootherstatewill(Barnett,2012,p.226).However,thisdoesnot
mean that states will always decline to help others. They will help, but only if they
assumethattheoutcomeoftheiractionwillfurthertheirowninterests(Barnett,2012,
p. 226). Regarding the current world order, which is extensively marked by
interdependence, states engage in RtoP because they care about how other states
perceive them. By, for example, public concern and action on behalf of human rights,
thesestatesexpecttogainaccesstoaregimeofexclusive(mostlyWestern)stateswhere
while sharing values they can improve their economic and security foreign relations
(Keohane, 1984, pp. 89-90). In the case of the Libyan humanitarian crisis, the actors in
conflict were manageable. Although Libya is composed of many different tribes, the
opposition succeeded in building up a strong interim government within one month after the
start of the conflict.17 Furthermore, Gaddafi did everything possible to be understood in his
position and objectives. His statements so obviously violated human dignity that it was easy
for the human rights-centred international community to deny his legitimacy. Whoever was
against Gaddafi and his regime was automatically on the right side to gain awards. The
situation in Syria, however, is exactly the other way around. The challengers of the Assad
regime organised themselves loosely, initiating different opposition groups like the Syrian
National Council (SNC) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Since the very beginning, these
organisations have been divided by ideological differences.18 Although the opposition tried to
reorganise like the body of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition
Force, they were continuously and dramatically fragmented19. Furthermore, the conflict has

17Retrievedfrom

http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/02/26/libya.protests/index.html?_s=PM:WORLD
18Retrievedfromhttp://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/world/middleeast/syrian

oppositionishobbledbydeepdivisions.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&
19Retrievedfromhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/28/ussyriaopposition

idUSBRE82R0UT20120328
8
grown progressively sectarian, with many conflict actors, such as the Syrian Kurds, the
Sunnis and the Allawites20. Since spring 2013, part of the rebel forces have even claimed
allegiance to Al Qaeda21. At the same time, Assad Al-Bashar still denies responsibility for
crimes such as arbitrary detentions, torture and even massacres on the part of his government
forces22. Finally, human rights observers have made allegations towards the FSA, stating that
the rebels are also committing grave human rights abuses against ordinary civilians23. Asking
from a realists perspective whether a state should intervene in the Syrian conflict to gain
advantages in relation to other states, the answer is a clear no. Apparently, states presume that
due to the high diversity of the involved actors, no clear victory can be achieved. Another
trigger point seems to be the positioning of states and regional organisations towards the
conflict.

2.Positioningofstatesandregionalorganisationstowardstheconflict

The importance of the actors positioning can be seen in the light of constructivism
theories. For constructivists, the states identity is formed by its positioning and
exchangewithinwhatconstructivistscalltheinternationalsociety.Inthissense,states
donotsolelycareabouttheirwealthandnationalsecurity,butabouthigherprinciples
that they share with the international society. These principles can encompass, for
example,thecommitmenttohumanrightsandtheadvanceofdemocracyasauniversal
value (Barnett, 2012, p. 228). The difference to realisms approaches is that
constructivistsdonotperceivestatestobeuniquelyresponsibleonlyfortheirnational
community, but additionally for a global or regional community. Thus, states feel
responsible for defending values shared with their global or regional community
partnersbecausetheyformpartoftheirnationalculture(Barnett,2012,p.228)Taking
into consideration that regional organisations are made up by states and therefore
expressthewillofstates,theconstructivistapproachprovidesanexplanationinregards
towhythestanceofregionalorganisationsseemstobeweakerinthefaceoftheSyrian

20Retrievedfromhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/20/syriawarsectarian

_n_2336563.html
21Retrievedfromhttp://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/04/11/syriaalqaeda

connection/2075323/
22Retrievedfromhttp://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2012/jun/03/syriaassad

deniesresponsibilityhoulamassacrevideo
23Retrievedfromhttp://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/20/syriaarmedoppositiongroups

committingabuses
9
crisesthanitwasintheLibyanconflict.Inrelationtothequestionofwhyastatedecides
todeliveraid,Barnet(2012)statesthatconstructivistsareattentivetohowthestates
identity is likely to shape its willingness to provide aid because those foreign policy
practices are deeply related to its natural culture (p. 229). Adapting this view to the
cases of Libya and Syria, it seems that states natural culture changed dramatically
from supporting military intervention in the case of Libya to refusing it in the case of
Syria.Whathappened?InthecaseofLibya,regionalorganisationssuchastheLeagueof
ArabStates,theOrganisationoftheIslamicConference(OIC)andtheAfricanUnion(AU)
requested international help with a unified voice very quickly, almost within a month
aftertheconflictbrokeout(Bellamy,2011b,pp.839840).InMarch2011,theLeagueof
Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council were already calling on the Security
Council to establish a nofly zone over Libya (Bellamy, 2011b). Moreover, the Human
RightsCouncil(HRC)throughadecisionoftheUNGeneralAssemblyexpelledLibya
justtwomonthsaftertheconflictarose(Bellamy,2011a,p.2).Asaconsequenceofthe
early condemnations, the Security Council released Resolutions 1970 and 1973.
Resolution 1970 was even adopted unanimously, while at the adoption of resolution
1973,China,Russia,India,BrazilandGermanyrefrainedfromvoting,withtheaimtoat
least not stand in the way of its adoption 24 . Finally, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), including 15 NATO countries from all over the world (like the
United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Qatar and Sweden), translated Resolution 1973 into
action by enforcing the nofly zone over Libya 25 . It was rather different in Syria.
AlthoughtheLeagueofArabStatesandtheGulfCooperationCouncilrespondedtothe
crisis, they did it very late26. In this context, the Security Council has not to date been
able to reach a consensus on whether to intervene with a strong mandate under the
responsibility to react in Syria. Furthermore, China and Russia threaten to block any
suchresolutionwiththeirvetopowerintheSecurityCouncil27.Thelatestconfusionand
finallyfailureofalargescalepeaceconferenceinGenevaisrepresentativeofthelackof

24Retrievedfromhttps://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm

25Retrievedfromhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldafrica13092451
26Retrievedfromhttp://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/11/12/uksyriacrisisarabs

idUKBRE8AB1CD20121112
27Retrievedfromhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/raghidadergham/unsecuritycouncil

syria_b_919459.html

10
actors consensus. The participants are still widely divided28. As regards constructivist
theory, these international and regional organisations reactions imply that the
respectiveactorsdidnotachieveamilitarysolutionunderRtoP,asconsistentwiththe
natural culture. Indeed, NATO was blamed for removing Gaddafi from power. The
questionaroseastowhetherthedownfallofthedictatorwastherealincentivebehind
the NATO intervention and whether this was a right intention in the sense of RtoP
(Grtner,2011,p.6).CivilsocietyandNATOmemberstatesblamedtheorganisationfor
overlywideningitsmandate.Thesechargeswererelatedtothemassivebombardments
thatNATOemployedovergovernmentalstrongholds,alsocausingciviliancasualties,to
upholdthenoflyzone.Thebombardmentssuggestthatproportionalmeansasspecified
by RtoP have not been met. In addition, critics felt confirmed by the early calls from
European states for Gaddafi to abandon power29. Finally, one can assume that the
controversyafterthemilitaryinterventioninLibyahasdeeply(atleastatthemoment)
reshaped the states identity and culture in terms of the use of force for humanitarian
purposes.ThecaseofLibyahasforthemomenteliminatedenthusiasmforRtoP.

Conclusion

RtoP has not accomplished the intention to consolidate a consensus about its most
controversial aspect; whether and exactly when military interventions should be
exerted.ThecaseofLibyademonstratesthatactionemployedinthenameofRtoPcan
lead to success in terms of halting governmental human rights abuses. However, as
criticalvoicesintheaftermathoftheinterventionshow,thereremainsahugedivision
about how such interventions should be employed. Although RtoP lists principles and
procedures for exerting humanitarian interventions, practice shows that they are
particularly difficult to generalize. Moreover, in view of the ongoing crisis in Syria, it
becomesclearthatRtoPmanifestsonlyaresponsibilitytoprotectandnotaduty.States
and regional actors are still driven by multipolar considerations and interests, as the
triggerpointanalysisabovehasexposed.Tosumup,thereremainsextensiveinsecurity
about how to employ RtoP in practice, and worse, a nonconsensus about whether to

28Retrievedfromhttp://original.antiwar.com/kevinzeese/2014/01/31/issyrianpeace

conferencelayingthefoundationforwar/
29Retrievedfromhttp://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/25/opinion/laoebolopionlibya

responsibilityt20110825
11
employ it in the first place. Against the background of exuberant eulogies on the
doctrine, this insight is somewhat frustrating. Nevertheless, commentators and critics
perhaps expected too much too early from the norm. However, by focusing on other
partsofthedoctrine,suchasactionsunderpillarone(theprotectionresponsibilitiesof
individualstates),morepositiveinsightsarepossible.Thereis,forexample,Kenya.On
March4in2013,theKenyanpeopleelectedanewpresidentandparliament,peacefully.
AgainstthebackdropofmassiveviolenceaftertheelectionsinDecember2007,inwhich
inthecourseofthreemonthsapproximately1,500peoplewerekilledandhundredsof
thousandswereexpelled,thefearofsimilarconditionsinthisyear'selectionswashuge.
Nevertheless, starting in 2008, as part of its primary responsibility to protect its
population, the Kenyan government undertook, strongly supported by civil society, a
number of measures to prevent renewed outbreaks of violence. For the overall
discussion,thisleadstotheconclusionthatcasessuchasthepeacefulelectionsinKenya
must be recognized, communicated and discussed publicly. The highprofile use of
militarymeanswasnotappropriatedtoachievepeacefulelectionsandprotectionofthe
Kenyan population against serious human rights crimes, but rather a mixture of long
andshorttermpreventivemeasures(Diepen,2013).ThepreventionpillarofRtoPhas
proveditselfsuccessful,atleastintheKenyanCase.

12
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