Self-knowledge (psychology)

Self-knowledge is a term used in psychology to describe how we interpret the memory. The analytical interpreta-
the information that an individual draws upon when nd- tion of our own memory can also be called meta memory,
ing an answer to the question What am I like?". and is an important factor of meta cognition.
While seeking to develop the answer to this ques- The connection between our memory and our self-
tion, self-knowledge requires ongoing self-awareness knowledge has been recognized for many years by lead-
and self-consciousness (which is not to be confused ing minds in both philosophy[3] and psychology,[4][5] yet
with consciousness). Young infants and chimpanzees the precise specication of the relation remains a point of
display some of the traits of self-awareness[1] and controversy.[6]
agency/contingency,[2] yet they are not considered as
also having self-consciousness. At some greater level of
cognition, however, a self-conscious component emerges 1.1 Is there a specialized memory for self-
in addition to an increased self-awareness component, knowledge?
and then it becomes possible to ask What am I like?",
and to answer with self-knowledge. Studies have shown there is a memory advantage for
Self-knowledge is a component of the self, or more accu- information encoded with reference to the self.[7]
rately, the self-concept. It is the knowledge of ones self
and ones properties and the desire to seek such knowl- Patients with Alzheimers who have diculty rec-
edge that guide the development of the self-concept. ognizing their own family have not shown evidence
Self-knowledge informs us of our mental representations of self-knowledge.[8]
of ourselves, which contain attributes that we uniquely
pair with ourselves, and theories on whether these at-
tributes are stable, or dynamic. 1.2 Self-knowledge and the division of
memory
The self-concept is thought to have three primary aspects:
Self-theories have traditionally failed to distinguish be-
The cognitive self tween dierent source that inform self-knowledge, these
are episodic memory and semantic memory. Both episodic
The aective self
and semantic memory are facets of declarative memory,
The executive self which contains memory of facts. Declarative memory is
the explicit counterpart to procedural memory, which is
implicit in that it applies to skills we have learnt; they are
The aective and executive selves are also known as the
not facts that can be stated.
felt and active selves respectively, as they refer to the emo-
tional and behavioral components of the self-concept.
Self-knowledge is linked to the cognitive self in that its
motives guide our search to gain greater clarity and assur-
ance that our own self-concept is an accurate representa-
tion of our true self; for this reason the cognitive self is
also referred to as the known self. The cognitive self is
made up of everything we know (or think we know about
ourselves). This implies physiological properties such as
hair color, race, and height etc.; and psychological prop-
erties like beliefs, values, and dislikes to name but a few.

1 Relationship with memory

Self-knowledge and its structure aect how events A basic schematic representation of memory showing the 'loca-
we experience are encoded, how they are selectively tions of semantic and episodic memory.
retrieved/recalled, and what conclusions we draw from

1
2 2 MOTIVES THAT GUIDE OUR SEARCH FOR SELF-KNOWLEDGE

1.2.1 Episodic memory
Main article: Episodic memory
Episodic memory is the autobiographical memory that in-
dividuals possess which contains events, emotions, and
knowledge associated with a given context.
1.2.2 Semantic memory
Main article: Semantic memory
Semantic memory does not refer to concept-based knowl-
edge stored about a specic experience like episodic
memory. Instead it includes the memory of meanings,
understandings, general knowledge about the world, and
factual information etc. This makes semantic knowl-
edge independent of context and personal information.
Semantic memory enables an individual to know infor-
mation, including information about their selves, without
having to consciously recall the experiences that taught
them such knowledge.
1. Episodic memory is not the only drawing point for
self-knowledge, contrary to long-held beliefs. Self-
knowledge must therefore be expanded to include
the semantic component of memory.[14][15]
2. Self-knowledge about the traits one possesses can
be accessed without the need for episodic retrieval.
This is shown through study of individuals with neu-
rological impairments that make it impossible to
recollect trait-related experiences, yet who can still
make reliable and accurate trait-ratings of them-
selves, and even revise these judgements based on
new experiences they cannot even recall.[16]
2 Motives that guide our search for
self-knowledge
People have goals that lead them to seek, notice, and in-
terpret information about themselves. These goals begin
the quest for self-knowledge. There are three primary
motives that lead us in the search for self-knowledge:

Self-enhancement
Semantic self as the source of self-knowledge Peo-
ple are able to maintain a sense of self that is supported Accuracy
by semantic knowledge of personal facts in the absence of
direct access to the memories that describe the episodes Consistency
on which the knowledge is based.

Individuals have been shown to maintain a sense 2.1 Self-enhancement

of self despite catastrophic impairments in episodic
recollection. For example, subject W.J., who suf- Main article: Self-enhancement
fered dense retrograde amnesia leaving her unable
to recall any events that occurred prior to the devel-
Self-enhancement refers to the fact that people seem
opment of amnesia. However, her memory for gen- motivated to experience positive emotional states and to
eral facts about her life during the period of amnesia
avoid experiencing negative emotional states. People are
remained intact. motivated to feel good about themselves in order to max-
imize their feelings of self-worth, thus enhancing their
This suggests that a separate type of self-esteem.
knowledge contributes to the self- The emphasis on feelings diers slightly from how other
concept, as W.J.'s knowledge could not theories have previously dened self-enhancement needs,
have come from her episodic memory.[9] for example the Contingencies of Self-Worth Model.[17]
A similar dissociation occurred in Other theorists have taken the term to mean that people
K.C. who suered a total loss of are motivated to think about themselves in highly favor-
episodic memory, but still knew a able terms, rather than feel they are good.[18][19]
variety of facts about himself.[10][11] In many situations and cultures, feelings of self-worth are
promoted by thinking of oneself as highly capable or bet-
Evidence also exists that shows how pa- ter than ones peers. However, in some situations and cul-
tients with severe amnesia can have ac- tures, feelings of self-worth are promoted by thinking of
curate and detailed semantic knowledge oneself as average or even worse than others. In both
of what they are like as a person, for ex- cases, thoughts about the self still serve to enhance feel-
ample which particular personality traits ings of self-worth. The universal need is not a need to
and characteristics they possess.[12][13] think about oneself in any specic way, rather a need to
maximize ones feelings of self-worth. This is the mean-
This evidence for the dissociation between episodic and ing of the self enhancement motive with respect to self-
semantic self-knowledge has made several things clear: knowledge.
 3

2.1.1 Arguments other inuential theories, such as cognitive dissonance

theory.[27]
In Western societies, feelings of self-worth are in fact
promoted by thinking of oneself in favorable terms.
2.3.1 Self-verication theory
In this case, self-enhancement needs lead people to
Main article: Self-verication theory
seek information about themselves in such a way that
they are likely to conclude that they truly possess
what they see as a positive dening quality. This theory was put forward by William Swann of the
University of Texas at Austin in 1983 to put a name to
See Self-verication theory section. the aforementioned phenomena. The theory states that
once a person develops an idea about what they are like,
they will strive to verify the accompanying self-views.[28]
2.2 Accuracy Two considerations are thought to drive the search for
self-verifying feedback:[29]
Accuracy needs inuence the way in which people search
for self-knowledge. People frequently wish to know the
We feel more comfortable and secure when we be-
truth about themselves without regard as to whether they
lieve that others see us in the same way that we see
learn something positive or negative.[20] There are three
ourselves. Actively seeking self-verifying feedback
considerations which underlie this need:[21]
helps people avoid nding out that they are wrong
about their self-views.
Occasionally people simply want to reduce any un-
certainty. They may want to know for the sheer in- Self-verication theory assumes that social inter-
trinsic pleasure of knowing what they are truly like. actions will proceed more smoothly and protably
when other people view us the same way as we view
Some people believe they have a moral obligation ourselves. This provides a second reason to selec-
to know what they are really like. This view holds tively seek self-verifying feedback.
particularly strong in theology and philosophy, par-
ticularly existentialism.
These factors of self-verication theory create contro-
Knowing what one is really like can sometimes help versy when persons suering from low-self-esteem are
an individual to achieve their goals. The basic fun- taken into consideration. People who hold negative self-
damental goal to any living thing is survival, there- views about themselves selectively seek negative feedback
fore accurate self-knowledge can be adaptive to in order to verify their self-views. This is in stark con-
survival.[22] trast to self-enhancement motives that suggest people are
driven by the desire to feel good about themselves.
Accurate self-knowledge can also be instrumental in
maximizing feelings of self-worth.[23] Success is one of
the number of things that make people feel good about 3 Sources
themselves, and knowing what we are like can make suc-
cesses more likely, so self-knowledge can again be adap- There are three sources of information available to an in-
tive. This is because self-enhancement needs can be met dividual through which to search for knowledge about the
by knowing that one can not do something particularly self:
well, thus protecting the person from pursuing a dead-end
dream that is likely to end in failure.
The physical world
The social world
2.3 Consistency
The psychological world
Many theorists believe that we have a motive to pro-
tect the self-concept (and thus our self-knowledge) from
change.[24][25] This motive to have consistency leads peo- 3.1 The physical world
ple to look for and welcome information that is consis-
tent with what they believe to be true about themselves; The physical world is generally a highly visible, and quite
likewise, they will avoid and reject information which easily measurable source of information about ones self.
presents inconsistencies with their beliefs. This phe- Information one may be able to obtain from the physical
nomenon is also known as self-verication theory. Not world may include:
everyone has been shown to pursue a self-consistency
motive;[26] but it has played an important role in various Weight - by weighing oneself.
4 3 SOURCES

Strength - by measuring how much one can lift.
Height - by measuring oneself.
3.1.1 Limitations
Many attributes are not measurable in the physical how we see ourselves reected in other peoples eyes.[34]
world, such as kindness, cleverness and sincerity.
Even when attributes can be assessed with reference
to the physical world, the knowledge that we gain is
not necessarily the knowledge we are seeking. Ev-
ery measure is simply a relative measure to the level
of that attribute in, say, the general population or
another specic individual.
This means that any measurement only merits
meaning when it is expressed in respect to the
measurements of others.
Most of our personal identities are therefore
sealed in comparative terms from the social
world.
3.2 The social world
The comparative nature of self-views means that people
rely heavily on the social world when seeking information
about their selves. Two particular processes are impor-
tant:
Social Comparison Theory [22]
Reected Appraisals
3.2.2 Reected appraisals
Reected appraisals occur when a person observes how
others respond to them. The process was rst explained
by the sociologist Charles H. Cooley in 1902 as part of
his discussion of the "looking-glass self", which describes
He argued that a persons feelings towards themselves are
socially determined via a three-step process:
A self-idea of this sort seems to have three
principled elements: the imagination of our ap-
pearance to the other person; the imagination
of his judgment of that appearance; and some
sort of self-feeling, such as pride or morti-
cation. The comparison with a looking-glass
hardly suggests the second element, the imag-
ined judgment which is quite essential. The
thing that moves us to pride or shame is not the
mere mechanical reection of ourselves, but
an imputed sentiment, the imagined eect of
this reection upon anothers mind. (Cooley,
1902, p.153)
In simplied terms, Cooleys three stages are:[34]
1. We imagine how we appear in the eyes of another
person.
2. We then imagine how that person is evaluating us.
3. The imagined evaluation leads us to feel good or bad,
in accordance with the judgement we have conjured.

3.2.1 Social comparison Note that this model is of a phenomenological nature.

In 1963, John W. Kinch adapted Cooleys model to ex-
Main article: Social comparison theory plain how a persons thoughts about themselves develop
rather than their feelings.[35]
People compare attributes with others and draw infer- Kinchs three stages were:
ences about what they themselves are like. However, the
conclusions a person ultimately draws depend on whom 1. Actual appraisals - what other people actually think
in particular they compare themselves with. The need for of us.
accurate self-knowledge was originally thought to guide
the social comparison process, and researchers assumed 2. Perceived appraisals - our perception of these ap-
that comparing with others who are similar to us in the praisals.
important ways is more informative.[30]
3. Self-appraisals - our ideas about what we are like
based on the perceived appraisals.
Complications of the social comparison theory Peo-
ple are also known to compare themselves with peo- This model is also of a phenomenological approach.
ple who are slightly better o than they themselves are
(known as an upward comparison);[31] and with people
who are slightly worse o or disadvantaged (known as a Arguments against the reected appraisal models
downward comparison).[32] There is also substantial evi- Research has only revealed limited support for the models
dence that the need for accurate self-knowledge is neither and various arguments raise their heads:
the only, nor most important factor that guides the social
comparison process,[33] the need to feel good about our- People are not generally good at knowing what an
selves aects the social comparison process. individual thinks about them.[36]
3.3 The psychological world
Felson believes this is due to communication
barriers and imposed social norms which place
limits on the information people receive from
others. This is especially true when the feed-
back would be negative; people rarely give one
another negative feedback, so people rarely
conclude that another person dislikes them or
is evaluating them negatively.
Despite being largely unaware of how one person
in particular is evaluating them, people are better at
knowing what other people on the whole think.[37]
The reected appraisal model assumes that ac-
tual appraisals determine perceived appraisals.
Although this may in fact occur, the inuence
of a common third variable could also produce
an association between the two.
The sequence of reected appraisals may accurately char-
acterize patterns in early childhood due to the large
amount of feedback infants receive from their parents,
yet it appears to be less relevant later in life. This is be- those people in the random condition to report feeling
cause people are not passive, as the model assumes. Peo-
ple actively and selectively process information from the
social world. Once a persons ideas about themselves take
shape, these also inuence the manner in which new in-
formation is gathered and interpreted, and thus the cycle
continues.
3.3 The psychological world
The psychological world describes our inner world. with their choices and decisions.
There are three processes that inuence how people ac-
quire knowledge about themselves:
Introspection
Self-perception processes
Causal attributions
3.3.1 Introspection
Introspection involves looking inwards and directly con-
sulting our attitudes, feelings and thoughts for meaning.
Consulting ones own thoughts and feelings can some-
times result in meaningful self-knowledge. The accuracy
of introspection, however, has been called into question
since the 1970s. Generally, introspection relies on peo-
ples explanatory theories of the self and their world, the
accuracy of which is not necessarily related to the form
of self-knowledge that they are attempting to assess.[38]
A strangers ratings about a participant are more cor-
respondent to the participants self-assessment rat-
ings when the stranger has been subject to the partic-
ipants thoughts and feelings than when the stranger
5
has been subject to the participants behavior alone,
or a combination of the two.[39]
Comparing sources of introspection. People believe
that spontaneous forms of thought provide more mean-
ingful self-insight than more deliberate forms of think-
ing. Morewedge, Giblin, and Norton (2014) found that
the more spontaneous a kind of thought, the more spon-
taneous a particular thought, and the more spontaneous
thought a particular thought was perceived to be, the more
insight into the self it was attributed. In addition, the
more meaning the thought was attributed, the more the
particular thought inuenced their judgment and deci-
sion making. People asked to let their mind wander until
they randomly thought of a person to whom they were
attracted to, for example, reported that the person they
identied provided them with more self-insight than peo-
ple asked to simply think of a person to whom they were
attracted to. Moreover, the greater self-insight attributed
to the person identied by the (former) random thought
process than by the latter deliberate thought process led
more attracted to the person they identied.[40]
Arguments against introspection Whether intro-
spection always fosters self-insight is not entirely clear.
Thinking too much about why we feel the way we do
about something can sometimes confuse us and under-
mine true self-knowledge.[41] Participants in an intro-
spection condition are less accurate when predicting their
own future behavior than controls[42] and are less satised
[43]
3.3.2 Self-perception processes
Main article: Self-perception theory
Wilsons work is based on the assumption that people are
not always aware of why they feel the way they do. Bems
self-perception theory[44] makes a similar assumption.
The theory is concerned with how people explain their
behavior. It argues that people don't always know why
they do what they do. When this occurs, they infer the
causes of their behavior by analyzing their behavior in
the context in which it occurred. Outside observers of
the behavior would reach a similar conclusion as the in-
dividual performing it. The individuals then draw logical
conclusions about why they behaved as they did.
Individuals come to know their own atti-
tudes, emotions, and other internal states par-
tially by inferring them from observations of
their own overt behavior and/or the circum-
stances in which this behavior occurs. Thus, to
the extent that internal cues are weak, ambigu-
ous, or uninterpretable, the individual is func-
6 4 ACTIVATION

tionally in the same position as an outside ob- 4.1.1 Self-concept

server, an observer who must necessarily rely
upon those same external cues to infer the in- Self-concept, or how people usually think of themselves
dividuals inner states. (Bem, 1972, p.2) is the most important personal factor that inuences cur-
rent self-representation. This is especially true for at-
The theory has been applied to a wide range of phe- tributes that are important and self-dening.
nomena. Under particular conditions, people have Self-concept is also known as the self-schema, made of
been shown to infer their attitudes,[45] emotions,[46] and innumerable smaller self-schemas that are chronically
motives,[47] in the same manner described by the theory. accessible.[52]
Similar to introspection, but with an important dier-
ence: with introspection we directly examine our atti-
4.1.2 Self-esteem
tudes, feelings and motives. With self-perception pro-
cesses we indirectly infer our attitudes, feelings, and mo-
Self-esteem aects the way people feel about themselves.
tives by analyzing our behavior.
People with high self-esteem are more likely to be think-
ing of themselves in positive terms at a given time than
3.3.3 Causal attributions people suering low self-esteem.[53]

Causal attributions are an important source of self-

knowledge, especially when people make attributions for 4.1.3 Mood state
positive and negative events. The key elements in self-
perception theory are explanations people give for their Mood state inuences the accessibility of positive and
actions, these explanations are known as causal attribu- negative self-views.
tions. When we are happy we tend to think more about our
Causal attributions provide answers to Why?" questions positive qualities and attributes, whereas when we are
by attributing a persons behavior (including our own) to sad our negative
[54]
qualities and attributes become more
a cause. [48] accessible.

People also gain self-knowledge by making attributions This link is particularly strong for people suering low
for other peoples behavior; for example If nobody wants self-esteem.
to spend time with me it must be because I'm boring.
4.1.4 Goals

4 Activation People can deliberately activate particular self-views. We

select appropriate images of ourselves depending on what
[55]
Individuals think of themselves in many dierent ways, role we wish to play in a given situation.
yet only some of these ideas are active at any one given One particular goal that inuences activation of self-views
time. The idea that is specically active at a given time is is the desire to feel good.[56]
known as the Current Self-Representation. Other the-
orists have referred to the same thing in several dierent
ways: 4.2 Situational factors that inuence cur-
rent self-representation
The phenomenal self[49]
4.2.1 Social roles
Spontaneous self-concept[50]

Self-identications[51] How a person thinks of themselves depends largely on

the social role they are playing. Social roles inuence our
Aspects of the working self-concept[52] personal identities.[57]

The current self-representation inuences information

4.2.2 Social context and self-description
processing, emotion, and behavior and is inuenced by
both personal and situational factors.
People tend to think of themselves in ways that distinguish
them from their social surroundings.[58]
4.1 Personal factors that inuence current
self-representation The more distinctive the attribute, the more likely it
will be used to describe oneself.
 7

Distinctiveness also inuences the salience of group
identities.
Self-categorization theory[59] proposes that
whether people are thinking about themselves
in terms of either their social groups or various
personal identities depends partly on the social
context.
Group identities are more salient in the intergroup
contexts.
The extent of the eect depends on personal
variables. For example people with high self-
esteem do not show this eect, and sometimes
do the opposite.[63]
Memory for prior events inuence how people think
about themselves.[64]
Fazio et al. found that selective memory
for prior events can temporarily activate self-
representations which, once activated, guide
our behavior.[65]

Group size The size of the group aects the salience

of group-identities. Minority groups are more distinctive, 5 Deciencies
so group identity should be more salient among minority
group members than majority group members.
5.1 Specic types

Group status Group status interacts with group size to 5.1.1 Misperceiving
aect the salience of social identities.
Deciency in knowledge of the present self.

Giving reasons but not feelings disrupts self-insight.

4.2.3 Social context and self-evaluation

The social environment has an inuence on the way peo- 5.1.2 Misremembering
ple evaluate themselves as a result of social-comparison
processes. Deciency of knowledge of the past self.

Knowledge from the present overinforms the knowl-

The contrast eect People regard themselves as at the edge of the past.
opposite end of the spectrum of a given trait to the people
False theories shape autobiographical memory.
in their company.[60] However, this eect has come under
criticism as to whether it is a primary eect, as it seems to
share space with the assimilation eect, which states that 5.1.3 Misprediction
people evaluate themselves more positively when they are
in the company of others who are exemplary on some Deciency of knowledge of the future self.
dimension.
Knowledge of the present overinforms predictions of
future knowledge.
Whether the assimilation or contrast eect prevails
depends on the psychological closeness, with peo- Aective forecasting can be aected by durability
ple feeling psychologically disconnected with their bias.
social surroundings being more likely to show con-
trast eects. Assimilation eects occur when the
subject feels psychologically connected to their so- 5.1.4 Miswanting
cial surroundings.[61]
6 See also
4.2.4 Signicant others and self-evaluations
Aective forecasting
Imagining how one appears to others has an eect on how Cognitive dissonance
one thinks about oneself.[62]
Know thyself

4.2.5 Recent events Memory

Phenomenology
Recent events can cue particular views of the self, either
as a direct result of failure, or via mood. Self-awareness
8 7
Self-categorization theory
Self concept
Self-enhancement
Self-esteem
Self-perception theory
Self psychology
Self-verication theory
Social comparison theory
Social identity
Sociology
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10 9 EXTERNAL LINKS

[62] Baldwin, M. W. (1994). Primed relational schemas as a

source of self-evaluative reactions. Journal of Social and
Clinical Psychology, 13,380-403

[63] Brown, J. D., & Smart, S. A. (1991). The self and social
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375

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[65] Fazio, R. H., Erein, E. A., & Falender, V. J. (1981).

Self-perception following social interaction. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 41,232-242

8 Further reading
Brown, J. D. (1998). The self. New York: McGraw
Hill. ISBN 0-07-008306-1

Sedikides, C., & Brewer, M. B. (2001). Individual

self, relational self, collective self. Philadelphia, PA:
Psychology Press. ISBN 1-84169-043-0
Suls, J. (1982). Psychological perspectives on the self
(Vol. 1). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Asso-
ciates. ISBN 0-89859-197-X

Sedikides, C., & Spencer, S. J. (Eds.) (2007). The

self. New York: Psychology Press. ISBN 1-84169-
439-8

9 External links
Self-knowledge (psychology) at PhilPapers
Self knowledge. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos-
ophy.
William Swanns Homepage including many of his
works
International Society for Self and Identity

Journal of Self and Identity

 11

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