The problem of cultural rooting in Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics

Michael Burak

Ancient Philosophy

Makridis
 In the field of ethics, virtue ethics provides a unique perspective on what it means to lead

an ethical life, a perspective that goes beyond simple morality and deals with questions of what

it is to flourish and lead a successful life. However, virtue ethics - both classically and

contemporarily - has faced significant problems. This paper seeks to detail, wrangle with and

proffer solutions to pertinent problems facing contemporary virtue ethicists who seek to apply

and modernize an ancient philosophy. To do so, this paper will focus on Aristotles Nicomachean

Ethics, with references to other works of Aristotles and contemporary virtue ethicists.

Alasdair Macintyres After Virtue is perhaps the most famous attempt at revitalizing the

tradition of virtue ethics as exemplified in Aristotle, and brought virtue ethics back into the

limelight. This paper will not spend overmuch time on Macintyres work, though it is

emblematic of a trend towards the revitalization of virtue ethics, and shares a key problem(to

later be detailed) with the Nicomachean Ethics, that of the tendency towards cultural relativism

within virtue ethics. For now, suffice it to say that modernizing Aristotleian virtue ethics is an

ongoing project.

As a project, I believe the modernization of virtue ethics to be of great worth. Virtue

ethics provides an ethics that allows for a resolution of the contrast between man-as-he-

happens-to-be and man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature missing from other

ethical traditions, providing a good way of living instead of simply moral advice (Macintyre

52) . So what problems bedevil virtue ethics, and why should they be resolved?

This paper will begin by sketching out Aristotles arguments, with a focus on how he

erred. This is not to say that the Aristotleian method and argument is not of worth - of course not

- but that it is incomplete, a mere gesturing, as Aristotle states in Book 1:

 Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter

admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the

products of the crafts. Now fine and just actions, which political science investigates, admit of

much variety and fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be thought to exist only by convention,

and not by nature...We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such

premisses to indicate the truth roughly and in outline ( Aristotle 1;3 ) .

From a sketch of the argument, I will detail three pertinent problems - two

regarding necessary conditions for the virtuous life(the problem of external goods and the

problem of Aristotles link between statecraft and soulcraft) , and one regarding what I see as

relativism in Aristotles choices in virtues. Finally, I will offer possible solutions, including those

mentioned by Aristotle himself, and offer some conclusions.

Detailing Aristotles argument in all its complexity, within the specific text this paper

will cover, within both historical and overall philosophical context, and within the schema of his

other works(especially the Politics for this papers purposes) is a daunting task, one beyond the

structural limits of this paper. To offer a sketch focusing on pertinent details to the later

expounded problems in this paper: Aristotles endeavor begins expressly as a search for the

human good, a superlative good for which all action is aimed towards, an end. This good is

declared to be eudamonia, often translated as happiness, the definition of which differs greatly in

Aristotle compared to our contemporary notions of happiness, his conception more rooted in

flourishing than in mere pleasure and contentment. Politics is posited as the science of the

human good, aiming to achieve it for nations/city-states. Aristotle offers the contemplative life as

the way to happiness, and backs this assertion up through an argument from function:
 Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude,

and a clearer account of what it is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could first

ascertain the function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in

general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the 'well' is thought to reside

in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function...Now if the function of man

is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle, and if we say 'so-and-so-and

'a good so-and-so' have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre, and a good lyre-player,

and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of goodness being idded to the

name of the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-

player is to do so well): if this is the case, and we state the function of man to be a certain kind

of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the

function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well

performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case,

human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than

one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete. (Aristotle 1;7) .

Still within Book 1, Aristotle makes another claim important to my critique - the claim

that happiness requires a certain lifestyle of external goods - friends, riches, power, good birth.

Here, I will argue, Aristotle makes a critical mistake, especially in contrast to the function

argument he has just used. Aristotle shuts off the good life from a good chunk of humanity and a

good chunk of his favored social structure, the polis.

In Book 2, Aristotle elucidates his separation of intellectual virtues from moral virtues.

Aristotles list and the specific qualities of his virtues - both moral and intellectual - include
rather specific virtues (such as those concerning money, the monetary virtues of liberality and

magnificence), takes up much of the work and will be detailed through this paper as needed

instead of summarized fully. He sets forward two important contentions: matters revolving

around what is good are not fixed but general or case-by-case, and that the virtues are rooted in

balance, avoiding excess. This intermediate is determined by a rational principle, divined

through practical wisdom.

The final point critical to my critique is that Aristotle contends that virtue is concerned

with action, specifically voluntary actions. As states of character, not passions nor faculties,

virtues imply choice. In essence, coercion impedes and even strips one of the ability to practice

the virtues.

The first problem with Aristotles argument that I will tackle is the problem of external

goods. Aristotle asserts that happiness requires external goods as necessary conditions:

Yet evidently, as we said, it needs the external goods as well; for it is impossible,

or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment. In many actions we use friends and

riches and political power as instruments; and there are some things the lack of which takes the

lustre from happiness, as good birth, goodly children, beauty; for the man who is very ugly in

appearance or ill-born or solitary and childless is not very likely to be happy, and perhaps a man

would be still less likely if he had thoroughly bad children or friends or had lost good children or

friends by death. (Aristotle 1;8) .

Here, Aristotle makes a mistake. His account of the virtues (and thus happiness) as

flowing from a teleological function argument simply does not jive with this contention of

necessary external goods. Firstly, the move from a universal quality of rationality as providing
the key to happiness in the function argument to the assertion that very few people could

actually have access to happiness is troubling rhetorically and meta-ethically. Secondly, these

necessary conditions are intensely culturally rooted, a problem I will return to in discussing the

relativity of Aristotles virtues. Finally, some of the external goods seem to have a limited if not

nonexistent link to virtue and happiness or function improperly as preconditions for it.

Meta-ethically, Aristotles function argument performs well on a metric of universality.

Mans particular function of rationality is just that - a function particular to man and one that

almost all can indulge in. There is, of course, the case of the mentally ill or disabled, who can

not share in mans particular reasoning function. When I say that the function argument is a

universal argument or that the quality of rationality is universal, I mean that is something all

humans have the capacity for, even if unexpressed.

How is this different from the external goods, how does it not fall into the same trap?

After all, one can be born mentally disabled and one can be born without good looks. In each

case, fortune takes its toll and limits ones potential. Rhetorically, one might argue that Aristotle

ought to have pushed and made this comparison more clear, though a comparison between being

born poor and being born mentally retarded would no doubt raise even more modern objections

to Aristotleian thought, but this would require a reframing of the function argument with this in

mind. The problem with poor birth, poor looks, poor economic status and so on restraining the

virtues as opposed to, say, mental retardation is that of scale and likelihood. Simply put, that one

may be born mentally retarded is rare compared to the essential or even average human

condition - but that one may be born without the particular combination of external conditions is

very likely due to how numerous and common they are.

 On a prescriptive level, Aristotles limiting of virtuous action based on these necessary

conditions is problematic. The idea of happiness for humans qua humans is an admirable one,

but when it becomes happiness for humans limited to a very small group of people in very

specific conditions, why not turn to another argument? If the good life is all but unachievable,

why even ruminate on it and why construct an ethical system that seeks to achieve it? Aristotle

posits that happiness is the human good, but it is not too human of a good if it can be only

achieved within very, very specific circumstances, not too particular to the human condition nor

universal as an end except in futile grasping.

Aristotles selection of external goods is culturally rooted, in a way that will further

bedevil his selection of the virtues. His selection of good birth, for example, and riches, imply a

class-based society with goods. These selected external goods flow from the cultural mores of

Aristotles Greece, and are none too applicable in other societies.

It is not the idea of providing conditions for happiness that is problematic - it is difficult

to imagine a happy comatose person, as virtue comes in action - but it is the range and

specificity of Aristotles external goods that provides problems. Perhaps the problem is in how

Aristotles external goods provide equipment for, a stage for, and modulate the grandiosity of

action. Inborn mental capacity does the same, but it seems to be more prone to cultivation than,

say, good birth, a factor wholly sundered to fate. One needs money to practice liberality, just as

one needs a mote of brainpower to practice reason or practical wisdom. In this sense, Aristotles

function argument provides a large stage after which the stage is shrunken dramatically by the

addition of external goods, in my opinion needlessly given their culturally rooted basis

compared to the universality of the function argument.

 At this point it is propitious to turn to a necessary condition that Aristotle makes less

explicit than his external goods - that the virtuous individual must live within a proper and

certain sort of state. Given Aristotles link between statecraft and soulcraft, and his championing

of the teleological state, this turn is unsurprising, but I take issue with it. Firstly, it ignores the

great credence we put to virtue in tough situations - concentration camps, occupations by foreign

powers. Secondly, it serves to even further culturally root the virtues, moving even more from

happiness for humans to happiness for a select group of people within a particular socio-

historical framework. While this is unobjectionable on a descriptive level, as a description of the

virtues of and practiced by certain people in Greece at the time, it limits applicability to other

contexts (particularly modern contexts, in the revitalization of virtue ethics.) Avoiding this trap,

whatever it may do to Aristotles famed connection between state and man, is key for a

contemporary virtue ethics.

Aristotles explicit claim that the state has a teleological function in shaping its citizen is

distinct from his implicit claim that one needs a proper state in order to flourish. Some of the

ways Aristotle requires his sort of state include the formerly mentioned external goods of riches

and birth, but also his conceptions of justice as including the criteria of following the laws - with

tellingly no discussion of patently unfair laws. Aristotle defines the virtue of justice as both a

virtue itself and the full expression of the moral virtues, and so its rooting in the laws of the state

is unfortunate. As justice includes both a criteria of virtue and a criteria of following the laws,

exercising justice can and in a modern society often would require going against the other

virtues, leading to a paradoxical or at least incomplete theory of justice. Furthermore, this

allegiance to the laws of the state and even the exaltation of it as a high expression of virtue,
leads to a deification of the same problematic defense used at Nuremberg - that evil actions

become good or at least excusable when practiced within a legal context. Aristotle has tellingly

no advice in the NE for citizenry living under tyranny on how to lead virtuous lives - his virtue is

set within a specific political framework. Given there is not exactly a preponderance of

Aristotleian city-states in the modern world, along with the general diversity of forms of

government throughout said modern world, this is troubling for the modern virtue ethicist.

To return to the point regarding virtue within oppression: though coercion and the

cruelties of fate may limit the stage upon which one can access and exercise the virtues, there is

a particular impressiveness to the exercise of virtue under duress ignored by Aristotle. This ties

in with my earlier point regarding the limiting of virtue through Aristotles use of external goods,

but I feel that oppression under the state one is in is a special case, as acting under oppression -

or more specifically against oppression - is the virtuous action in that circumstance, in tension

with Aristotles contention regarding following the laws. As stated previously, when the ill laws

of a state do not properly foster virtue and following them would be more detrimental to ones

character than disobeying them, then one must choose to be more virtuous than less.

Furthermore, I reject a possible Aristotleian response that this represents an incomplete or less

exemplary exercise of virtue. Virtue is meant to be recognizable, the virtuous praised and

blamed accordingly, and Aristotles view of this recognition is too narrow, too centered on the

mores of the state. Put simply, the Tibetan people are seen as virtuous for their struggle under

Chinese oppression, even if it is in contradiction to the edicts of China. This recognition does not

come from the Chinese who claim Tibet, but from the world at large. In a global society wherein

the struggles of oppressed peoples have the potential to gain great praise, be more extraordinary
than those living in comfort, it strikes me as a mistake to write them off entirely.

The link between the state, its mores and virtues also plays into the culturally rooted

virtues of Aristotle, which will be the subject of my last critique of the NE.

Whether Aristotles views were culturally relativistic is a point of debate, both within the

text and on a wider scholarly level. Given the attention paid so far in this paper to justice as a

problematic virtue, the overall culturally relativistic notions of a proper state and proper external

goods, I will not proceed at length with an argument that Aristotles virtues are culturally bound,

but deign to leave my contention that his views that they are as it stands and address the

problems with one possible solution. Though Aristotle asserts that human beings have and

recognize qualities in common, and seeks an objective, universal good as part of his project(thus

the function argument), and though some scholars have argued that Aristotles virtues are not

culturally relativistic, I must disagree. Specifically, Nussbaum argues that Aristotles virtues are

intentionally vague, meant to highlight the most important spheres of human experience

(Nussbaum 6) . I have no great issue with this notion of spheres, and it may even be useful for

designing a contemporary virtue ethics, but Nussbaum ignores or at the very least downplays the

specificity of Aristotles virtues. This is to say, Aristotles method may be enlightening but the

implementation of it leaves one wanting, and there is not much informationally additive or

compelling about the argument of spheres - it may be useful for the understanding of Aristotles

overall theory and method, but it does not change the relativism of the his virtues, can not. In a

sense, it misses the point.

Now, to possible solutions, both within the text and within the endeavor of producing a

contemporary virtue ethics. The solutions I will provide (and reject) are not organized by the
problems I have proposed - those of external goods, the proper state and culturally rooted

virtues, all of which are connected - but are instead general solutions, attempts to save the

theory. These solutions are proposed by Aristotle and Macintyre. Aristotles solution is often to

point to the vagueness of the endeavor, and to practical wisdom as a catch-all out to problems

within the theory. Macintyres solution, to me, falls into the odious trap of cultural relativism,

which I will attempt to argue against in brief to close out the paper.

Aristotles use of practical wisdom is problematic for its vagueness and for its quality as

a capability which is not particularly human. Aristotle lists practical wisdom as one of the

intellectual virtues, allowing knowledge for that which is good overall for men and then that

which is particularly good in each situation. There may be a problem here regarding the use of

virtue being needing to fulfill virtue, a sort of circularity, also found in justice (as justice is both

a virtue and the expression of virtue.) I will not focus overmuch on this point, but instead on the

vagueness of this answer. If men are endowed with the ability to practically reason their way

through otherwise difficult situations for expressing the virtues, such as liminal cultural zones

where the mores to be followed may be contradictory or unclear, this is a compliment to men but

not to Aristotle. On a meta-ethical level, the concept of practical wisdom simply describes this

action, but Aristotle does not give specific enough advice for recognizing it - beyond his sparse

treatment of the minor intellectual virtue of understanding - , cultivating it or practicing it. To

say well, when in doubt, use your practical wisdom would be an acceptable answer with more

detail as to what that is or how to acquire it, but without those it is an entirely too vague and

simply descriptive answer. I place Aristotles repeated assertions of the vagueness and generality

of his endeavor, of grasping the virtues, in this same space. The purported vagueness of the
endeavor in the NE is bad rhetoric, especially in contrast to its ostensible goal of objective

morality, the explication of which ought to be clear and understandable to all.

Secondly, I will return to a similar argument to my argument regarding limiting virtue

through external goods. Practical wisdom, in contrast with wisdom as the highest form of

knowledge, is not a particularly human good . It strikes me as odd, problematic that the main

action-finder for virtuous action, which ought to be rooted in mans particular function (as is its

ultimate goal), is not particular to man. This may be a problem of Aristotles endeavor to provide

general intellectual virtues, thus making practical wisdom too broad and assigning it to even

non-human creatures. Regardless of the origin of this problem, practical wisdom must be

clarified, narrowed and most likely shorn of its non-human connotation to provide an effective

mechanism for resolution of the theorys overall problems.

Macintyres solution is a problematic turn to cultural relativism. Identifying the

Aristotleian expression of the virtues as one of many disparate cultural traditions while sharing

his method, Macintyre both makes the same mistake I feel Nussbaum did(confusing the method

for the theory, or ineffectively seeking to separate them) and embraces this problematic cultural

relativism. Why is cultural relativism inappropriate for ethics, and for virtue ethics specifically?

Refuting cultural relativism is a task beyond the scope of this paper, which has for the most part

taken it as a given that the very notion is problematic. I will make two against the theory and

practice of cultural relativism, and then end with a general reiteration of my critique of cultural

relativism within Aristotle and virtue ethics.

Firstly, cultural relativism does not handle cultural liminality well. In situations where

one is between two cultures - whether this be physically on the border between two cultures
(such as striding the border between states), or in a situation where it is unclear which culture

should be dominant socially - cultural relativism provides no coherent framework for action.

One might say to simply use ones gut instinct, but I would raise the same objection of

vagueness and lack of helpfulness to this that I raised regarding the concept of practical wisdom.

Secondly, cultural relativism provides an incomplete view of the self. Human beings are,

beyond a set of essential characteristics(such as Aristotles ballyhooed rationality), multifarious

in nature and often belong to several cultural groups at once. Which cultural group is dominant

within a person can be unclear, even to the person themselves, and is subject to a continual

calculus based on the perceived goods of belonging to and expressing allegiance to different

possible cultural groupings. One can be a Hispanic, a biker, a democrat and a gun owner at once,

and they can all easily come into conflict. Beyond the state, cultural relativism even fails within

the person.

Within virtue ethics, cultural relativism is problematic because it throws the entire

endeavor into disarray, especially when some virtues feed into others and are necessary for the

expression of the highest virtue and happiness. Regarding the last point, I speak of justice as put

forth by Aristotle once more. Without justice, one can not be fully virtuous, but justice is

severely culturally bound in the ways described earlier. Cultural relativism is a needless limiting

factor in an ostensibly universal endeavor, a confusion, a bad tool applied to a good method.
 Sources:

Aristotle, . "Nicomachean Ethics." Nicomachaen ethics. MIT, 2011. Web. <http://

classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.html>.

MacIntyre, Alasdair C. After Virtue, A Study In Moral Theory. 3rd ed. Notre Dame:

University of Notre Dame Pr, 2007.

Martha, Nussbaum. Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotleian Approach. N.p., n.d. Web.

<http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/previous/en_GB/wp-32/_files/

82530817639581768/default/WP32.pdf>.