Legitime and Collation Cases

VOL.
148, FEBRUARY 27, 1987 69
Rosales vs. Rosales
No. L-40789. February 27,1987.*
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES. IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner, vs. FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents.
Civil Law; Succession; A surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-
in-law. The entire code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in-law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of
intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a
daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms our observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the
Code.
Same; Same; Neither is a widow (surviving spouse) a compulsory heir of her parent-in-law in accordance with the provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code. The aforesaid provision of law refers to the estate of the
deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent in law. Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the
estate of the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 71 SCRA 262; 265, L-42257, June 14, 1976, to wit: "We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case
No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with
respect to his estate. x x x."
PETITION to review the orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the question raised is whether the widow whose husband pre-deceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunato T. Rosales and their two (2) children
Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, pre-deceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the
deceased has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R.
Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16,1972 declaring the following individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate
Fortunato T. Rosales (husband), ; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), ; Macikequerox Rosales, ; and Antonio Rosales (son), .
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order dated February 4,1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir
of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The trial court denied her plea. Hence this petition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution. Firstis a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Secondare the Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow from
getting a share of the estate in question final as against the said widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his
own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:
"Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares."
"Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of

other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation."
"Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the
latter in equal portions."
"Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be
entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child."
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-inlaw. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in-law
either by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a
decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature
intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that:
"Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
1. (1)Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
2. (2)In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
3. (3)The widow or widower;
4. (4)Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
5. (5)Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code."
The aforesaid provision of law3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v. Salas,4 to wit:
"We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although
married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. x x x." (Emphasis supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the
deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales
that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil Code, viz
"Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he
were living or if he could have inherited.
"Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have
succeeded." (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who pre-deceased his
grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of
her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner.
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Petition denied.
o0o
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon
No. L-24561. June 30, 1970.
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee, vs. ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositorsappellants.
Succession; Testamentary succession; Wills; Interpretation of provisions of wills; Intention of testator paramount.The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and
complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's wiIl.
Same; Same; Same; Partition of estate in will is valid.Where the testator in her will specified each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among her compulsory heirs and grandchildren
to whom she bequeathed the same, the testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. This is a valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article
1080 of the Civil Code. This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to their legitime.
Same; Same; Same; Interpretation of wills; Effect of use of words "I bequeath" in testament.The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in the testamentary dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to
convert the same into devises to be taken solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the estate where the testator's intent that his testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as
heirs and not as mere devisees, is clear and that said dispositions were borne out by the use of phrase "my heirs in this testament" referring to the "devisees."
Same; Same; Collation; Does not apply where no donations were made by testator during her lifetime.Articles 1061 and 1063 of the Civil Code on collation do not apply to a case of a distribution and partition of
the entire estate by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will
which would call for collation.
Same; Same; Partition of estate in will; Heirs cannot compel payment of their legitime in real estate instead of money as specified in the will. The forced heirs may not legally insist on their legitime being
completed with real properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash as provided in the will. The properties are not available for the purpose where the testatrix had specifically partitioned and distributed them to
her heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention of the testatrix as solemnized in her will by implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real properties
intact to her named beneficiaries under the will. That the purchasing value of the Philippine peso has greatly declined since the testatrix' death provides no legal basis or justification for overturning the wishes and
intent of the testatrix. The transmission of rights to the succession are transmitted f rom the moment of death of the decedent and accordingly, the value thereof must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would
never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of the currency and properties of the estate.
APPEAL from the orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. Pasicolan, J,
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving the Executrix-appellee's project of partition instead of Oppositors-Appellants' proposed counter-project of partition. 1
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon,
Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-
deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositorsappellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate
grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank
deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among her abovenamed heirs.
Testate proceedings were in due course commenced 2 and by order dated March 13, 1961, the last will and testament of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera
was appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate, and upon her filing her bond and oath of office, letters testamentary were duly issued to her.
After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo of Angeles, Pampanga was appointed commissioner to appraise the properties of the estate. He filed in due course his report of appraisal,
and the same was approved in toto by the lower court on December 12, 1963 upon joint petition of the parties. The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a total appraised value of
P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11. 3 (1/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the legitime of legitimate children and descendants) . 4 In ter will, the testatrix
"commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six
children and eight grandchildren. The appraised values of the real properties thus respectively devised by the testatrix to the beneficiaries named in her will, are as follows:
"1 Estela Dizon............................... P 98,474.80
2. Angelina Dizon........................... 106,307.06
3. Bernardita Dizon....................... 51,968.17
4. Josefina Dizon........................... 52,056.39
5. Tomas Dizon............................ 131,987.41
6. Lilia Dizon................................. 72,182.47
7. Marina Dizon........................... 1,148,063.71

8. Pablo Rivera, Jr....................... 69,280.00
9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Dioli or
Jolly Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon........... 72,540.00
Total Value........................ P1,801,960.01"
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance adjudicating the estate as follows:
1. "(1)with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina (executrix-appellee) and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered to have received in the will more than their respective legitime, while the
the rest of the appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received less than their respective legitime;
2. (2)thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively given them in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to complete their respective legitimes to P129,254.96;
3. (3)on the other hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the cash and/or properties necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number 2
above;
4. (4)the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remain untouched."
On the other hand oppositors submitted their own
counter-project of partition dated February 14, 1964, wherein they proposed the distribution of the estate on the following basis:
"(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value of one-half (1/2) of the entire estate, the value of the said one-half (1/2) amounting to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the Oppositors-
Appellants should consist of their legitime, plus the devises in their favor proportionally reduced; (c) in payment of the total shares of the appellants in the entire estate , the properties devised to them plus other
properties left by the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to them; and (d) to the grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs are adjudicated the properties respectively devised to them subject to reimbursement by
Gilbert D. Garcia et al, of the sums by which the devise in their favor should be proportionally reduced."
Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition made by the testatrix of practically her whole estate of P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were proposed to be reduced to the amounts set forth
after the names of the respective heirs and devisees totalling one-half thereof as follows:
"1. Estela Dizon.................. P 49,485.56

2. Angelina Dizon............. 53,421.42
3. Bernardita Dizon......... 26,115.04
4. Josefina Dizon............. 26,159,38
5. Tomas V. Dizon.......... 65,874.04
6. Lilia Dizon................. 36,273.13
7. Marina Dizon........... 576,938.82
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr....... 34,814.50
9. GrandchiIdren Gilbert Garcia et al .... 36,452.80
T o t a 1................. P905,534.78"
while the- other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting the legitime of the executrix-appellee and oppositors-appellants, to be divided among them in seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their
respective legitimes.
The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or
prejudiced, the same shall be completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process has been followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observed that the executrix and the oppositors differ in respect
to the source from which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to fully restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in
controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted. This is legally permissible withIn the limitation of the
law, as aforecited," With reference to the payment in cash of some P230,552.38 , principally by the executrix as the largest beneficiary of the will to be paid to her five co-heirs, the oppositors (excluding Tomas Dizon), to
complete their-impaired legitimes, the lower court ruled that "(T)he payment in cash so as to make the proper adjustment to meet with the requirements of the law in respect to legitimes which have been impaired is, in
our opinion, a practical and valid solution in order to give effect to the last wishes of the testatrix."
From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed this appeal, and raise. anew the following issues:
1. 1.Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the nature of devises imputable to the free portion of her estate, and therefore subject to reduction;
2. 2.Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under Article 1063, or merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code; and
3. 3.Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on account of their legitime, instead of some of the real properties left by the Testatrix;
which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below.
The issues.raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the testatrix which is "the life and soul of a will." 5 In consonance therewith, our Civil Code included the new provisions found in Articles 788
and 791 thereof that "(1)f a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "(T)he words of a will are to
receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will
prevent intestacy." In Villanueva, vs. Juico6 for violation of these rules of interpretation as well as of Rule 128, section 59 of the old Rules of Court, 7 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned the
lower court's decision and stressed that "the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution
and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise." 8
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain 9 when expressed clearly and precisely in his
last will amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may
substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Guided and restricted by these fundamental premises, the Court finds for the appellee.
1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of her -estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her
death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of her last will and for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly
provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in her estate and designated the
particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition 10 of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of
Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for the right of such compulsory heirs:
"ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.
"ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive."
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition, wherein the five oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and
_______________
10
ART. 1079. Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided. or its value, (n)
563
VOL. 33, JUNE 30, 1970 563
Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon
Lilia, were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete their respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash
and/or properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition by will more than their respective legitimes.
2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in Article 1056 of the old Civil Code which has been reproduced now as Article 1080 of the present Civil Code. The only amendment in the
provison was that Article 1080 "now permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by act inter vivos."11 This was intended to repeal the then prevailing doctrine 12 that for a testator to
partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all the formalities provided by law. Authoritative commentators doubt the efficacy of the amendment 13 but the question does not here concern us, for
this is a clear case of partition by will, duly admitted to probate, which perforce must be given full validity and effect, Aside from the provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other codal provisions support the
executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition
made by the testatrix to onehalf and limit the same, which they would consider as mere devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the
legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further
run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him."
4.
In Habana vs. Imbo,14 the Court upheld the distribution made in the will of the deceased testator Pedro Teves of two large coconut plantations in favor of his daughter, Concepcion, as against adverse claims of
other compulsory heirs, as being a partition by will, which should be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil Code. In
upholding the sale made by Concepcion to a stranger of the plantations thus partitioned in her favor in the deceased's will which was being questioned by the other compulsory heirs, the Court ruled that
"Concepcion Teves by operation of law, became the absolute owner of said lots because 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him' (Article 1091,
New Civil Code), from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the latter, and, she can not be deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law (Arts. 657, 659, and
661, Civil Code).15 Concepcion Teves could, as she did, sell the lots in question as part of her share of the proposed partition of the properties, especially when, as in the present case, the sale has been expressly
recognized by herself and her co-heirs x x x."
4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in their favor are in the nature of devises of real property, citing the testatrix' repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her assignment or
distribution of her real properties to the respective heirs.
From this erroneous premise, they proceed to the equally erroneous conclusion that "the legitime of the compulsory heirs passes to them by operation of law and that the testator can only dispose of the free portion,
that is, the remainder of the estate after deducting the legitime of the compulsory heirs x x x and all testamentary dispositions, either in the nature of institution of heirs or of devises or legacies, have to be taken from
the remainder of the testator's estate constituting the free portion."16
Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix' will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the whole context of the
will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through
her will. The repeated use of the words I bequeath" in her testamentary dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the same into devises to be taken solely from the free one-half disposable portion of
the estate. Furthermore, the testatrix' intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of
the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise
command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said
deceased."17 Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the estate,
as contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code precisely provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with
regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors' own theory of bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 of the Civil Code covers precisely the case of the executrix-appellee, who admittedly was
favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of her -estate in providing that "(T)he devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property, provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of
the share pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the
testatrix constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be respected
insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired"
and invoking of the construction thereof given by some authorities that " 'not deemed subject to collation' in this article really means not imputable to or chargeable against the legitime", while it may have some
plausibility19 in an appropriate case, has 110 application in the present case. Here, we have a case of a distribution and partition of the entire estate by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations
during her lifetime which would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will which would call for the application of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on
collation. The amount of the legitime of the heirs is here determined and undisputed.
5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants, the secondary issues are likewise necessarily resolved. Their right was merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of
the Civil Code and this has been complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix
principally to the executrix-appellee.
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of partition. The properties are not available for the
purpose, as the testatrix had specifically partitioned and distributed them to her heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention of the testatrix as solemnized in her
will, by implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real properties intact to her named beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. The appraisal report of the properties of the estate as filed by the
comissioner appointed by the lower court was approved in toto upon joint petition of the parties, and hence, there cannot be said to be any questionand none is presentedas to fairness of the valuation thereof or that
the legitime of the heirs in terms of cash has been understated. The plaint of oppositors that the purchasing value of the Philippine peso has greatly declined since the testatrix' death in January, 1961 provides no legal
basis or justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the testatrix. The transmission of rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code) and accordingly,
the value thereof must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of the currency and properties of the estate.
There is evidence in the record that prior to November 25, 1964, one of the oppositors, Bernardita, accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on account of her inheritance, which, per the parties' manifestation, 20 "does not in any
way affect the adjudication made to her in the projects of partition of either party as the same is a mere advance of the cash that she should receive in both projects of partition." The payment in cash by way of making the
proper adjustments in order to meet the requirements of the law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as to give effect to the last will of the testatrix has invariably been availed of and sanctioned; 21 That her
cooppositors would receive their cash differentials only now when the value of the currency has declined further. whereas they could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time of approval of the project of
partition and when the peso's purchasing value was higher, is due to their own decision of pursuing the present appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. Without cost.
Orders affirmed.
Notes.Construction of wills.In the interpretation and construction of testamentary provisions the intention of the testator controls (Del Rosario vs. Del Rosario, 2 Phil. 321; In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil, 333).
The words composing the will should be plainly construed in order to avoid a violation of the intentions and purpose of the testator (Benedicto vs. Javellana, 10 Phil. 197). Otherwise stated, the testamentary dispositions
must be liberally construed so as to give effect to the intention of the testator as revealed by the will itself (Government of P.I vs. Abadilla,46 Phil. 642). See also Solla vs. Ascueta, 49 Phil. 333, as to the rule when there is
ambiguity in the terms of the will.
VOL. 152, JULY 23, 1987 205
De Roma vs. Court of Appeals
No. L-46903. July 23, 1987.*
BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as Guardian of Rosalinda de Roma, respondents.
Civil Law; Succession; Intestacy; Collation; Fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the donated properties from collation as required under Art. 1061, Civil Code; Given the precise language of
the deed of donation the decedent-donor would have included an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's intention.We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions
expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable"
and should not be construed as an express prohibition against collation. The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061. We surmise
from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the legal consequences of the donation being made. It is
reasonable to suppose, given the precise language of the document, that he would have included therein an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's intention. Anything less than such express prohibition
will not suffice under the clear language of Article 1062.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Intention to exempt donated properties from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general rule in Art. 1062, Civil Code; Absent such a clear
indication of that intention, the rule not the exception should be applied.The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Article
1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.
Constitutional Law; Judiciary; Decisions; Provision in Art. X, Sec. 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution fixing the period for the Court of
Appeals to decide cases within the 12-month period is merely directory, and failure to decide would not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid; Provision reworded in Art.
VIII, Sec. 5, 1987 Constitution which impresses upon courts the need for speedy disposition of cases, but serious studies and efforts are now being taken by the Supreme Court There is no need to dwell long on the other
error assigned by the petitioner regarding the decision of the appealed case by the respondent court beyond the 12month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution. As we held in Marcelino v.
Cruz, the said provision was merely directory and failure to decide on time would not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid. It is worth stressing that the aforementioned
provision has now been reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed with greater urgency, the need for the speedy disposition of the cases that
have been clogging their dockets these many years. Serious studies and efforts are now being taken by the Court to meet that need.
PETITION to review the order of the Court of Appeals.
CRUZ, J.:
Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna by the private respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties
earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included. 1
The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth P10,297.50. 2 There is no dispute regarding their valuation; what the parties cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to
collation. The private respondent vigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited
such collation and the donation was not officious.
The two articles provide as follows:
"Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition."
"Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so expressly provided, or if the donee should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as
inofficious."
The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial court, **which held that the decedent, when she made the donation in favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited collation. Moreover, the donation did not impair the
legitimes of the two adopted daughters as it could be accommodated in, and in fact was imputed to, the free portion of Candelaria's estate. 3
On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent court *** holding that the deed of donation contained no express prohibition to collate as an exception to Article 1062. Accordingly, it ordered
collation and equally divided the net estate of the decedent, including the fruits of the donated property, between Buhay and Rosalinda. 4
The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as f ollows:
"IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi sa akin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella Castaneda, may karampatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino at
naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lungsod ng San Pablo sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay kusang-loob kong ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang
mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na ang nagmamay-aring
tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at
mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;
"IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang legitima ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang
mga lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking kabuhayan na ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre Disposicion." ' 5
We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng
pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express prohibition against collation. 6 The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily
exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.
We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the legal consequences of the donation being
made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise language of the document, that he would have included therein an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's intention.
Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article 1062. The suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free
portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious. The sole issue is whether or not there was an express prohibition to
collate, and we see none.
The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the
exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.
There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner regarding the decision of the appealed case by the respondent court beyond the 12-month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of
the 1973 Constitution. As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz,7 the said provision was merely directory and failure to decide on time would not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid.
It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed with greater urgency, the
need for the speedy disposition of the cases that have been clogging their dockets these many years. Serious studies and efforts are now being taken by the Court to meet that need.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Decision affirmed.
Notes.A rule which would require a judge to resolve a motion for execution within 15 days would be difficult, if not impossible to follow. (Universal Far East Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 642.)
Failure of judge to decide a case within 30 days does not divest him of his jurisdiction. (Marcelino vs. Cruz, Jr., 121 SCRA 51.)
o0o
VOL. 206, FEBRUARY 19, 1992 383
Locsin vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 89783. February 19, 1992.*
MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, JOSE B. LOCSIN, AUREA B. LOCSIN, MATILDE L. CORDERO, SALVADOR B. LOCSIN and MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO , petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, JOSE JAUCIAN, FLORENTINO JAUCIAN, MERCEDES JAUCIAN ARBOLEDA, HEIRS OF JOSEFINA J. BORJA, HEIRS OF EDUARDO JAUCIAN and HEIRS OF VICENTE JAUCIAN, respondents.
Civil Law; Succession; The rights to a persons succession are transmitted from the moment of his death and do not vest in his heirs until such time. The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the
private respondents, nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the properties which she had already disposed of more than ten (10) years before her death. For those properties did not
form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of (the decedents), death and those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. The
rights to a persons succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time. Property which Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime
no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay claim.
Same; Same; Prescription; Trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing the action for annulment and reconveyance on the ground of prescription.Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial
court and the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing this action for annulment and reconveyance on the ground of prescription. Commenced decades after the transactions had been consummated, and six (6) years after
Doa Catalinas death, it prescribed four (4) years after the subject transactions were recorded in the Registry of Property, whether considered an action based on fraud, or one to redress an injury to the rights of the
plaintiffs. The private respondents may not feign ignorance of said transactions because the registration of the deeds was constructive notice thereof to them and the whole world.
PETITION for review on certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals.
NARVASA, C.J.:
Reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-11186affirming with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Albay in favor of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7152 entitled Jose
Jaucian, et al. v. Mariano B. Locsin, et al., an action for recovery of real property with damagesis sought in these proceedings initiated by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
The petition was initially denied due course and dismissed by this Court. It was however reinstated upon a second motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, and the respondents were required to comment
thereon. The petition was thereafter given due course and the parties were directed to submit their memorandums. These, together with the evidence, having been carefully considered, the Court now decides the case.
First, the facts as the Court sees them in light of the evidence on record:
The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and Magdalena, all surnamed Locsin. He owned extensive residential and agricultural properties in the provinces of Albay and Sorsogon. After his
death, his estate was divided among his three (3) children as follows:
1. (a)the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Pilar, Sorsogon, were adjudicated to his daughter, Magdalena Locsin;
2. (b)106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, father of the petitioners Julian, Mariano, Jose, Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed Locsin;
3. (c)more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong, eighteen (18) hectares of riceland in Daraga, and the residential lots in Daraga, Albay and in Legazpi City went to his son Mariano, which Mariano
brought into his marriage to Catalina Jaucian in 1908. Catalina, for her part, brought into the marriage untitled properties which she had inherited from herparents, Balbino Jaucian and Simona Anson.
These were augmented by other properties acquired by the spouses in thecourse of their union, 1which however was not blessed withchildren.
Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought under the Torrens System. Those that Mariano inherited from his father, Getulio Locsin, were surveyed cadastrally and registered in the name of
Mariano Locsin married to Catalina Jaucian. 2
Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as the sole and universal heir of all his properties. 3The will was drawn up by his wifes nephew and trusted legal adviser, Attorney
Salvador Lorayes. Attorney Lorayes disclosed that the spouses being childless, they had agreed that their properties, after both of them shall have died should revert to their respective sides of the family, i.e., Marianos
properties would go to his Locsin relatives (i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina to her Jaucian relatives. 4
Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness. In due time, his will was probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without any opposition from both sides of the
family. As directed in his will, Doa Catalina was appointed executrix of his estate. Her lawyer in the probate proceedings was Attorney Lorayes. In the inventory of her husbands estate 5 which she submitted to the
probate court for approval,6 Catalina declared that all items mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33 are the private properties of the deceased and form part of his capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse,
while items Nos. 34 to 42 are conjugal.7
Among her own and Don Marianos relatives, Doa Catalina was closest to her nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, her nieces, Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and Maria Olbes-Velasco, and the husbands of
the last two: Hostilio Cornelio and Fernando Velasco. 8Her trust in Hostilio Cornelio was such that she made him custodian of all the titles of her properties; and before she disposed of any of them, she unfailingly
consulted her lawyer-nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. It was Atty. Lorayes who prepared the legal documents and, more often than not, the witnesses to the tansactions were her nieces Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-
Cornelio, Maria Olbes-Velasco, or their husbands. Her niece, Elena Jaucian, was her life-long companion in her house.
Don Mariano relied on Doa Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact, hence, nine (9) years after his death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and fully cognizant that she was also advancing in
years, Doa Catalina began transferring, by sale, donation or assignment, Don Marianos, as well as her own, properties to their respective nephews and nieces. She made the following sales and donations of properties
which she had received from her husbands estate, to his Locsin nephews and nieces:
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M PRICE WITNESSE
. S
23 Jan. 26, 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Mariano 962 P 481
Locsin
1-JRL Apr. 7, 1966 Deed of Sale in favor of Jose R. Locsin 430,203 P 20,000
1-JJL Mar. 22, 1967 Deed of Sale in favor of Julian Locsin 5,000 P 1,000 Hostilio
Cornelio
(Lot 2020) Helen M.
Jaucian
1 Nov. 29, 1974 Deed of Donation in favor of Aurea 26,509
Locsin, Matilde L. Cordero and Salvador

. S
Locsin
Locsin
2 Feb. 4, 1975 Deed of Donation in favor of Aurea 34,045
Locsin
3 Sept. 9, 1975 Deed of Donation in favor of Aurea (Lot 2059)
Locsin vor of Aurea B. Locsin
4 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in fa 1,424 Hostilio
Cornelio
Fernando
Velasco
. S
July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in P 5,750 Hostilio
Cornelio
. S
Locsin
5 favor of Aurea B. Locsin 1,456 Elena
Jaucian
July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 5,720 -ditto
6 favor of Aurea B. Locsin 1,237
July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in P 4,050 -ditto
7 favor of Aurea B. Locsin 1,404
Nov. 26, 1974 Deed of Sale in favor of P 4,930 -ditto
15 Aurea Locsin 261
Oct 17, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of P 2,000 Delfina
Anson
16 Aurea Locsin 533 M.Acabado

. S
Locsin
Nov.26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of P 1,000 Leonor
Satuito
17 Aurea Locsin 373 Mariano
B.Locsin
Sept. 1, 1975 Conditional Donation in P 3,000 -diito
19 favor of Mariano Locsin 1,130
Dec. 29, 1972 Deed of Reconveyance P 1,000 Delfina
Anson
1-MVRJ in favor of Manuel V. del 1,510.66 Antonio
Illegible
Rosario whose material (Lot2155)
grandfather was Getulio
locsin
. S
Locsin
June 30, 1973 Deed of Reconveyance P 500 Antonio
Illegible
2-MVRJ in favor of Manuel V. del 319.34 Salvador
Nical
Rosario but the rentals (Lot2155)
from bigger portion of lot
2155 leased to Filoil Re
finery were assigned to
Maria Jaucian Lorayes
Cornelio
. S
Locsin
Of her own properties, Doa Catalina conveyed the following to her own nephews and nieces and others:
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE
2-JJL July 16, 1964 Deed of Sale in favor Vicente 5,000 P1,000
Jaucian (lot 2020)
(6,825sqm. when
resurveyed)
24 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in favor 100 P1,000
of Francisco Maquiniana
26 July 15, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in favor 130 P1,300
of Francisco M. Maquiniana
27 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in favor 100 P1,000
of Ireneo Mamia
28 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in favor 75 P 750
of Zenaida Buiza
29 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in favor 150 P1,500
of Felisa Morjelladfs
Apr. 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in favor 31 P 1,000

30 of Inocentes Motocinos
Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in favor 150 P 1,500
31 of Casimiro Mondevil
Mar. 1, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in favor 112 P 1,000
32 of Juan Saballa
Dec. 28, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in favor 250 P 2,500
25 of Rogelio Marticio
Doa Catalina died on July 6, 1977.
Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 affirming and ratifying the transfers she had made during her lifetime in favor of her husbands, and her own, relatives. After the reading of her
will, all the relatives agreed that there was no need to submit it to the court for probate because the properties devised to them under the will had already been conveyed to them by the deceased when she was still alive,
except some legacies which the executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to distribute.
In 1989, or six (6) years after Doa Catalinas demise, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces who had already received their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in the Regional Trial Court
of Legaspi City (Branch VIII, Civil Case No. 7152) to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration, and intended
solely to circumvent the laws on succession. Those who were closest to Doa Catalina did not join the action.
After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, 1985 in favor of the plaintiffs (Jaucian), and against the Locsin defendants, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for the plaintiffs and against the defendants:
1. (1)declaring the plaintiffs, except the heirs of Josefina J. Borja and Eduardo Jaucian, who withdrew, the rightful heirs and entitled to the entire estate, in equal portions, of Catalina Jaucian Vda. de Locsin,
being the nearest collateral heirs by right of representation of Juan and Gregorio, both surnamed Jaucian, and full-blood brothers of Catalina;
2. (2)declaring the deeds of sale, donations, reconveyance and exchange and all other instruments conveying any part of the estate of Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin including, but not limited to those in the
inventory of known properties (Annex B of the complaint) as null and void ab-initio;
3. (3)ordering the Register of Deeds of Albay and/or Legazpi City to cancel all certificates of title and other transfers of the real properties, subject of this case, in the name of defendants, and derivatives
therefrom, and issue new ones to the plaintiffs;
4. (4)ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to reconvey ownership and possession of all such properties to the plaintiffs, together with all muniments of title properly endorsed and delivered, and all the
fruits and incomes received by the defendants from the estate of Catalina, with legal interest from the filing of this action; and where reconveyance and delivery cannot be effected for reasons that might have
intervened and prevent the same, defendants shall pay for the value of such properties, fruits and incomes received by them, also with legal interest from the filing of this case;
5. (5)ordering each of the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the further sum of P20,000.00 each as moral damages; and
6. (6)ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs attorneys fees and litigation expenses, in the amount of P30,000.00 without prejudice to any contract between plaintiffs and counsel.
Costs against the defendants.9
The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186) which rendered its now appealed judgment on March 14, 1989, affirming the trial courts decision.
The petition has merit and should be granted.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents, nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the properties which she had already disposed of more
than ten (10) years before her death. For those properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of (the decedents) death and those which
have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. 10 The rights to a persons succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time. 11 Property which Doa Catalina
had transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in
her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or
revocation of a decedents gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs. 12
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doa Catalina, in transferring the properties she had received from her late husband to his nephews and nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in
violation of the private respondents rights to her succession. Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could conceivably be
impaired by any transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth
in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke:
Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor, or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all relatives who, at
the time of the acceptance of the donation are by law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation shall be reduced on petition of any person affected.
The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doa Catalina was already 90 years old when she died on July 6, 1977. It insinuated that because of her advanced years she may have been imposed upon, or unduly
influenced and morally pressured by her husbands nephews and nieces (the petitioners) to transfer to them the properties which she had inherited from Don Marianos estate. The records do not support that conjecture.
For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, Doa Catalina had already begun transferring to her Locsin nephews and nieces the properties which she received from Don Mariano. She sold a 962-
sq.m. lot on January 26, 1957 to his nephew and namesake Mariano Locsin II. 13 On April 7, 1966, or 19 years before she passed away, she also sold a 43-hectare land to another Locsin nephew, Jose R. Locsin. 14 The next
year, or on March 22, 1967, she sold a 5,000 sq.m. portion of Lot 2020 to Julian Locsin. 15
On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020 16 was partitioned by and among Doa Catalina, Julian Locsin, Vicente Jaucian and Agapito Lorete. 17At least Vicente Jaucian, among the other respondents in this case, is estopped from
assailing the genuineness and due execution of the sale of portions of Lot 2020 to himself, Julian Locsin, and Agapito Lorete, and the partition agreement that he (Vicente) concluded with the other co-owners of Lot 2020.
Among Doa Catalinas last transactions before she died in 1977 were the sales of property which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin and Mariano Locsin in 1975. 18
There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doa Catalina was mentally incompetent when she made those dispositions. Indeed, how can any such suggestion be made in light of the fact that even as she
was transferring properties to the Locsins, she was also contemporaneously disposing of her other properties in favor of the Jaucians? She sold to her nephew, Vicente Jaucian, on July 16, 1964 (21 years before her death)
one-half (or 5,000 sq.m.) of Lot 2020. Three years later, or on March 22, 1967, she sold another 5,000 sq.m. of the same lot to Julian Locsin. 19
From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers of her properties to her relatives and other persons, namely: Francisco Maquiniana, Ireneo Mamia, Zenaida Buiza, Feliza Morjella, Inocentes Motocinos, Casimiro
Mondevil, Juan Saballa and Rogelio Marticio.20 None of those transactions was impugned by the private respondents.
In 1975, or two years before her death, Doa Catalina sold some lots not only to Don Marianos niece, Aurea Locsin, and his nephew, Mariano Locsin II, 21 but also to her niece, Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda. 22 If she was
competent to make that conveyance to Mercedes, how can there be any doubt that she was equally competent to transfer her other pieces of property to Aurea and Mariano II?
The trial courts belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his entire estate to his wife, from a consciousness of its real origin which carries the implication that said estate consisted of properties which his wife
had inherited from her parents, flies in the teeth of Doa Catalinas admission in her inventory of that estate, that items 1 to 33 are the private properties of the deceased (Don Mariano) and forms (sic) part of
his capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items 34 to 42 are conjugal properties, acquired during the marriage. She would have known better than anyone else whether the listing included
any of her paraphernal property so it is safe to assume that none was in fact included. The inventory was signed by her under oath, and was approved by the probate court in Special Proceedings No. 138 of the Court of
First Instance of Albay. It was prepared with the assistance of her own nephew and counsel, Atty. Salvador Lorayes, who surely would not have prepared a false inventory that would have been prejudicial to his aunts
interest and to his own, since he stood to inherit from her eventually.
This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes testimony that before Don Mariano died, he and his wife (Doa Catalina), being childless, had agreed that their respective properties should eventually
revert to their respective lineal relatives. As the trusted legal adviser of the spouses and a full-blood nephew of Doa Catalina, he would not have spun a tale out of thin air that would also prejudice his own interest.
Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that among Doa Catalinas nephews and nieces, those closest to her: (a) her lawyer-nephew Attorney Salvador Lorayes; (b) her niece and companion Elena
Jaucian; (c) her nieces Maria Olbes-Velasco and Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and their respective husbands, Fernando Velasco and Hostilio Cornelio, did not join the suit to annul and undo the dispositions of property which
she made in favor of the Locsins, although it would have been to their advantage to do so. Their desistance persuasively demonstrates that Doa Catalina acted as a completely free agent when she made the conveyances
in favor of the petitioners. In fact, considering their closeness to Doa Catalina it would have been well-nigh impossible for the petitioners to employ fraud, undue pressure, and subtle manipulations on her to make her
sell or donate her properties to them. Doa Catalinas niece, Elena Jaucian, daughter of her brother, Eduardo Jaucian, lived with her in her house. Her nephew-in-law, Hostilio Cornelio, was the custodian of the titles of
her properties. The sales and donations which she signed in favor of the petitioners were prepared by her trusted legal adviser and nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. The (1) deed of donation dated November 29,
197423 in favor of Aurea Locsin, (2) another deed of donation dated February 4, 1975 24 in favor of Matilde Cordero, and (3) still another deed dated September 9, 1975 25 in favor of Salvador Lorayes, were all witnessed by
Hostilio Cornelio (who is married to Doa Catalinas niece, Maria Lorayes) and Fernando Velasco who is married to another niece, Maria Olbes, 26 The sales which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin on July 15, 1974 27 were
witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio and Elena Jaucian. Given those circumstances, said transactions could not have been anything but free and voluntary acts on her part.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing this action for annulment and reconveyance on the ground of prescription. Commenced decades after the
transactions had been consummated, and six (6) years after Doa Catalinas death, it prescribed four (4) years after the subject transactions were recorded in the Registry of Property, 28whether considered an action based
on fraud, or one to redress an injury to the rights of the plaintiffs. The private respondents may not feign ignorance of said transactions because the registration of the deeds was constructive notice thereof to them and
the whole world.29
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision dated March 14, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 11186 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondents complaint for
annulment of contracts and reconveyance of properties in Civil Case No. 7152 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch VIII of Legazpi City, is DISMISSED, with costs against the private respondents, plaintiffs therein.
SO ORDERED.
Petition granted; decision reversed and set aside.
Note.Rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. (Jimenez vs. Fernandez, 184 SCRA 190.)
o0o
VOL. 404, JUNE 25, 2003 683
Manongsong vs. Estimo
G.R. No. 136773. June 25, 2003.*
MILAGROS MANONGSONG, joined by her husband, CARLITO MANONGSONG, petitioners, vs. FELOMENA JUMAQUIO ESTIMO, EMILIANA JUMAQUIO, NARCISO ORTIZ, CELESTINO ORTIZ, RODOLFO
ORTIZ, ERLINDA O. OCAMPO, PASTOR ORTIZ, JR., ROMEO ORTIZ, BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, SR., BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, JR., AURORA NICOLAS, GLORIA RACADIO, ROBERTO DELA CRUZ, JOSELITO
DELA CRUZ and LEONCIA S. LOPEZ, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; In general, only questions of law are appealable to the court under Rule 45.In general, only questions of law are appealable to this Court under Rule 45. However,
where the factual findings of the trial court and Court of Appeals conflict, this Court has the authority to review and, if necessary, reverse the findings of fact of the lower courts. This is precisely the situation in this case.
Evidence; Civil Cases; Preponderance of Evidence; In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon.x x x Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue
has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of
evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff s prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance
of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants. The concept of preponderance of evidence refers to evidence which is of greater weight,
or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.
Civil Law; Property; Co-Ownership; Marriage; The presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage.The presumption under
Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership.
Same; Contracts; Sale; Elements; Article 1458 of the Civil Code enumerates the elements of a valid contract of sale.Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the elements of a valid contract of sale are: (1) consent or
meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent.
Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he cannot change his theory on appeal.When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he
cannot change his theory on appeal. To allow him to do so is not only unfair to the other party, it is also offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the Decision2 of 26 June 1998 and the Resolution of 21 December 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51643. The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision
dated 10 April 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135, in Civil Case No. 92-1685, partitioning the property in controversy and awarding to petitioners a portion of the property.
Antecedent Facts
Spouses Agatona Guevarra (Guevarra) and Ciriaco Lopez had six (6) children, namely: (1) Dominador Lopez; (2) Enriqueta Lopez-Jumaquio, the mother of respondents Emiliana Jumaquio Rodriguez and Felomena
Jumaquio Estimo (Jumaquio sisters); (3) Victor Lopez, married to respondent Leoncia Lopez; (4) Benigna Lopez-Ortiz, the mother of respondents Narciso, Celestino, Rodolfo, Pastor, Jr. and Romeo Ortiz, and Erlinda
Ortiz Ocampo; (5) Rosario Lopez-dela Cruz, named to respondent Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. and the mother of respondents Benjamin, Jr., Roberto, and Joselito, all surnamed dela Cruz, and of Gloria dela Cruz Racadio
and Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas; and (6) Vicente Lopez, the father of petitioner Milagros Lopez Manongsong (Manongsong).
The contested property is a parcel of land on San Jose Street, Manuyo Uno, Las Pias, Metro Manila with an area of approximately 152 square meters (Property). The records do not show that the Property is
registered under the Torrens system. The Property is particularly described in Tax Declaration No. B-001-00390 3 as bounded in the north by Juan Gallardo, south by Calle Velay, east by Domingo Lavana and west by San
Jose Street. Tax Declaration No. B-001-00390 was registered with the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Las Pias on 30 September 1984 in the name of Benigna Lopez, et al. 4 However, the improvements on the
portion of the Property denominated as No. 831 San Jose St., Manuyo Uno, Las Pias were separately declared in the name of Filomena J. Estimo under Tax Declaration No. 90-001-02145 dated 14 October 1991. 5
Milagros and Carlito Manongsong (petitioners) filed a Complaint 6 on 19 June 1992, alleging that Manongsong and respondents are the owners pro indiviso of the Property. Invoking Article 494 of the Civil Code
7
( Article 494 of the Civil Code provides:
No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.), 7 petitioners prayed for the partition and award to them of an area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5) of the Property or its prevailing market value, and for
damages.
Petitioners alleged that Guevarra was the original owner of the Property. Upon Guevarras death, her children inherited the Property. Since Dominador Lopez died without offspring, there were only five children left
as heirs of Guevarra. Each of the five children, including Vicente Lopez, the father of Manongsong, was entitled to a fifth of the Property. As Vicente Lopez sole surviving heir, Manongsong claims her fathers 1/5 share in
the Property by right of representation.
There is no dispute that respondents, who are the surviving spouses of Guevarras children and their offspring, have been in possession of the Property for as long as they can remember. The area actually occupied
by each respondent family differs, ranging in size from approximately 25 to 50 square meters. Petitioners are the only descendants not occupying any portion of the Property.
Most respondents, specifically Narciso, Rodolfo, Pastor, Jr., and Celestino Ortiz, and Erlinda Ortiz Ocampo (Ortiz family), as well as Benjamin, Sr., Benjamin, Jr., and Roberto dela Cruz, Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas
and Gloria Dela Cruz Racadio (Dela Cruz family), entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners. Under the Stipulation of Facts and Compromise Agreement 8 dated 12 September 1992 (Agreement),
petitioners and the Ortiz and Dela Cruz families agreed that each group of heirs would receive an equal share in the Property. The signatories to the Agreement asked the trial court to issue an order of partition to this
effect and prayed further that those who have exceeded said one-fifth (1/5) must be reduced so that those who have less and those who have none shall get the correct and proper portion. 9
Among the respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez who each occupy 50 square meter portions of the Propertyand Joselito dela Cruz, did not sign the Agreement. 10 However, only the Jumaquio sisters
actively opposed petitioners claim. The Jumaquio sisters contended that Justina Navarro (Navarro), supposedly the mother of Guevarra, sold the Property to Guevarras daughter Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio.
The Jumaquio sisters presented provincial Tax Declaration No. 911 11 for the year 1949 in the sole name of Navarro. Tax Declaration No. 911 described a residential parcel of land with an area of 172.51 square
meters, located on San Jose St., Manuyo, Las Pias, Rizal with the following boundaries: Juan Gallardo to the north, I. Guevarra Street to the south, Rizal Street to the east and San Jose Street to the west. In addition,
Tax Declaration No. 911 stated that the houses of Agatona Lopez and Enriquita Lopez stood on the Property as improvements.
The Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA12 (Kasulatan) dated 11 October 1957, the relevant portion of which states:
AKO SI JUSTINA NAVARRO, sapat ang gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at naninirahan sa LAS PIAS, ay siyang nagma-may-ari at nagtatangkilik ng isang lagay na lupa na matatagpuan sa Manuyo, Las Pias, Rizal,
lihis sa anomang pagkakautang lalong napagkikilala sa pamamagitan ng mga sumusunod na palatandaan:
BOUNDARIES:
NORTH: JUAN GALLARDO SOUTH: I. GUEVARRA ST.
EAST: RIZAL ST., WEST: SAN JOSE ST.,
na may sukat na 172.51 metros cuadrados na may TAX DECLARATION BILANG 911.
NA DAHIL AT ALANG ALANG sa halagang DALAWANG DAAN LIMANGPUNG PISO (P250.00), SALAPING PILIPINO, na sa akin ay kaliwang iniabot at ibinayad ni ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, may sapat na gulang,
Pilipino, may asawa at naninirahan sa Las Pias, Rizal, at sa karapatang ito ay aking pinatutunayan ng pagkakatanggap ng nasabing halaga na buong kasiyahan ng aking kalooban ay aking IPINAGBILI, ISINALIN AT
INILIPAT sa nasabing, ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, sa kanyang mga tagapagmana at kahalili, ang kabuuang sukat ng lupang nabanggit sa itaas nito sa pamamagitan ng bilihang walang anomang pasubali. Ang lupang ito ay
walang kasama at hindi taniman ng palay o mais.
Simula sa araw na ito ay aking ililipat ang pagmamay-ari at pagtatangkilik ng nasabing lupa kay ENRIQUETA LOPEZ sa kanilang/kanyang tagapagmana at kahalili x x x.
The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila certified on 1 June 1994 that the KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA, between Justina Navarro (Nagbili) and Enriqueta Lopez (Bumili), was notarized
by Atty. Ruperto Q. Andrada on 11 October 1957 and entered in his Notarial Register x x x. 13 The certification further stated that Atty. Andrada was a duly appointed notary public for the City of Manila in 1957.
Because the Jumaquio sisters were in peaceful possession of their portion of the Property for more than thirty years, they also invoked the defense of acquisitive prescription against petitioners, and charged that
petitioners were guilty of laches. The Jumaquio sisters argued that the present action should have been filed years earlier, either by Vicente Lopez when he was alive or by Manongsong when the latter reached legal age.
Instead, petitioners filed this action for partition only in 1992 when Manongsong was already 33 years old.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
After trial on the merits, the trial court in its Decision14 of 10 April 1995 ruled in favor of petitioners. The trial court held that the Kasulatan was void, even absent evidence attacking its validity. The trial court declared:
It appears that the ownership of the estate in question is controverted. According to defendants Jumaquios, it pertains to them through conveyance by means of a Deed of Sale executed by their common ancestor Justina
Navarro to their mother Enriqueta, which deed was presented in evidence as Exhs. 4 to 4-A. Plaintiff Milagros Manongsong debunks the evidence as fake. The document of sale, in the observance of the Court, is
however duly authenticated by means of a certificate issued by the RTC of the Manila Clerk of Court as duly notarized public document (Exh. 5). No countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or impugn
the documents legality or its validity.
x x x The conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because the property conveyed had a conjugal character. No positive evidence had been introduced that it was solely a paraphernal property. The
name of Justina Navarros spouse/husband was not mentioned and/or whether the husband was still alive at the time the conveyance was made to Justina Navarro. Agatona Guevarra as her compulsory heir should have
the legal right to participate with the distribution of the estate under question to the exclusion of others. She is entitled to her legitime. The Deed of Sale [Exhs 4 & 4-1 (sic)] did not at all provide for the reserved
legitime or the heirs, and, therefore it has no force and effect against Agatona Guevarra and her six (6) legitimate children including the grandchildren, by right of representation, as described in the order of intestate
succession. The same Deed of Sale should be declared a nullity ab initio. The law on the matter is clear. The compulsory heirs cannot be deprived of their legitime, except on (sic) cases expressly specified by law like for
instance disinheritance for cause. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Since the other respondents had entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners, the dispositive portion of the trial courts decision was directed against the Jumaquio sisters only, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the remaining active defendants, Emiliana Jumaquio and Felomena J. Estimo, jointly and severally, ordering:
1. 1.That the property consisting of 152 square meters referred to above be immediately partitioned giving plaintiff Milagros Lopez-Manongsong her lawful share of 1/5 of the area in square meters, or the
prevailing market value on the date of the decision;
2. 2.Defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as compensatory damages for having deprived the latter the use and enjoyment of the fruits of her 1/5 share;
3. 3.Defendants to pay plaintiffs litigation expenses and attorneys fee in the sum of P10,000.00; and
4. 4.Defendants to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.15 (Emphasis supplied)
When the trial court denied their motion for reconsideration, the Jumaquio sisters appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners, in their appellees brief before the Court of Appeals, presented for the first time a supposed photocopy of the death certificate 16 of Guevarra, which stated that Guevarras mother was a certain Juliana
Gallardo. Petitioner also attached an affidavit 17 from Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. attesting that he knew Justina Navarro only by name and had never met her personally, although he had lived for some years with Agatona
Guevarra after his marriage with Rosario Lopez. On the basis of these documents, petitioners assailed the genuineness and authenticity of the Kasulatan.
The Court of Appeals refused to take cognizance of the death certificate and affidavit presented by petitioners on the ground that petitioners never formally offered these documents in evidence.
The appellate court further held that the petitioners were bound by their admission that Navarro was the original owner of the Property, as follows:
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees themselves admitted before the trial court that Justina Navarro and not Juliana Gallardo was the original owner of the subject property and was the mother of Agatona Navarro ( sic).
Plaintiffs-appellees in their Reply-Memorandum averred:
As regards the existence of common ownership, the defendants clearly admit as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
History of this case tells us that originally the property was owned by JUSTINA NAVARRO who has a daughter by the name of AGATONA GUEVARRA who on the other hand has six children namely: x x x x x x x x x.
which point-out that co-ownership exists on the property between the parties. Since this is the admitted history, facts of the case, it follows that there should have been proper document to extinguish this status of co-
ownership between the common owners either by (1) Court action or proper deed of tradition, x x x x x x x x x.
The trial court confirms these admissions of plaintiffs-appellees. The trial court held:
x x x xxx xxx
With the parties admissions and their conformity to a factual common line of relationship of the heirs with one another, it has been elicited ascendant Justina Navarro is the common ancestor of the heirs herein
mentioned, however, it must be noted that the parties failed to amplify who was the husband and the number of compulsory heirs of Justina Navarro. x x x x x x x x x
Therefore, plaintiffs-appellees cannot now be heard contesting the fact that Justina Navarro was their common ancestor and was the original owner of the subject property.
The Court of Appeals further held that the trial court erred in assuming that the Property was conjugal in nature when Navarro sold it. The appellate court reasoned as follows:
However, it is a settled rule that the party who invokes the presumption that all property of marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof
of acquisition during the coveture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.
In this case, not a single iota of evidence was submitted to prove that the subject property was acquired by Justina Navarro during her marriage. x x x
The findings of the trial court that the subject property is conjugal in nature is not supported by any evidence.
To the contrary, records show that in 1949 the subject property was declared, for taxation purposes under the name of Justina Navarro alone. This indicates that the land is the paraphernal property of Justina
Navarro.
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby rendered DISMISSING plaintiffs-appellees complaint in so far as defendants-appellants are
concerned.
Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the same in its Resolution of 21 December 1998. 19
On 28 January 1999, petitioners appealed the appellate courts decision and resolution to this Court. The Court initially denied the petition for review due to certain procedural defects. The Court, however, gave due
course to the petition in its Resolution of 31 January 2000. 20
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues before this Court:
1. 1.WHETHER PETITIONER HAS NO COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE ON THE ALLEGED SALE BY ONE JUSTINA NAVARRO;
2. 2.WHETHER THERE IS PRETERITION AND THE ISSUES RAISED ARE REVIEWABLE;
3. 3.WHETHER THERE IS CO-OWNERSHIP PRO INDIVISO;

4. 4.WHETHER THE RULE OF THE MAJORITY CO-OWNERS ON THE LAND SHOULD PREVAIL;
5. 5.WHETHER THE ALLEGED SALE IS VALID AND BINDS THE OTHER CO-HEIRS;
6. 6.WHETHER PRESCRIPTION APPLIES AGAINST THE SHARE OF PETITIONERS.21
The fundamental question for resolution is whether petitioners were able to prove, by the requisite quantum of evidence, that Manongsong is a co-owner of the Property and therefore entitled to demand for its partition.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The issues raised by petitioners are mainly factual in nature. In general, only questions of law are appealable to this Court under Rule 45. However, where the factual findings of the trial court and Court of Appeals
conflict, this Court has the authority to review and, if necessary, reverse the findings of fact of the lower courts. 22This is precisely the situation in this case.
We review the factual and legal issues of this case in light of the general rules of evidence and the burden of proof in civil cases, as explained by this Court in Jison v. Court of Appeals:23
x x x Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes
out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff s prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants. The concept of
preponderance of evidence refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the validity of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng Lupa
Petitioners anchor their action for partition on the claim that Manongsong is a co-owner or co-heir of the Property by inheritance, more specifically, as the heir of her father, Vicente Lopez. Petitioners likewise allege that
the Property originally belonged to Guevarra, and that Vicente Lopez inherited from Guevarra a 1/5 interest in the Property. As the parties claiming the affirmative of these issues, petitioners had the burden of proof to
establish their case by preponderance of evidence.
To trace the ownership of the Property, both contending parties presented tax declarations and the testimonies of witnesses. However, the Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized KASULA-TAN SA BILIHAN
NG LUPA which controverted petitioners claim of co-ownership.
The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a public document and prima facie evidence of its authenticity and due execution. To assail the authenticity and due execution of a notarized
document, the evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. 24 Otherwise the authenticity and due execution of the document should be upheld. 25 The trial court itself held that (n)o
countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or impugn the documents legality or its validity. 26
Even if the Kasulatan was not notarized, it would be deemed an ancient document and thus still presumed to be authentic. The Kasulatan is: (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3)
unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. It appears, on its face, to be genuine. 27
Nevertheless, the trial court held that the Kasulatan was void because the Property was conjugal at the time Navarro sold it to Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio. We do not agree. The trial courts conclusion that the
Property was conjugal was not based on evidence, but rather on a misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil Code, which provides:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. 28
There was no evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired the Property during her marriage. There is no basis for applying the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to the present case. On the
contrary, Tax Declaration No. 911 showed that, as far back as in 1949, the Property was declared solely in Navarros name. 29 This tends to support the argument that the Property was not conjugal.
We likewise find no basis for the trial courts declaration that the sale embodied in the Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or
gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller. When the disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of
values,30 that is, the property sold is replaced by the equivalent monetary consideration.
Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the elements of a valid contract of sale are: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent. 31 The presence of
these elements is apparent on the face of the Kasulatan itself. The Property was sold in 1957 for P250.00. 32
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not admitting the documents presented by petitioners for the first time on appeal
We find no error in the Court of Appeals refusal to give any probative value to the alleged birth certificate of Guevarra and the affidavit of Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. Petitioners belatedly attached these documents to their
appellees brief. Petitioners could easily have offered these documents during the proceedings before the trial court. Instead, petitioners presented these documents for the first time n appeal without any explanation. For
reasons of their own, petitioners did not formally offer in evidence these documents before the trial court as required by Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court (SECTION 34. Offer of evidence.The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified).
33
To admit these documents now is contrary to due process, as it deprives respondents of the opportunity to examine and controvert them.
Moreover, even if these documents were admitted, they would not controvert Navarros ownership of the Property. Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr.s affidavit stated merely that, although he knew Navarro by name, he was
not personally acquainted with her.34 Guevarras alleged birth certificate casts doubt only as to whether Navarro was indeed the mother of Guevarra. These documents do not prove that Guevarra owned the Property or
that Navarro did not own the Property.
Petitioners admitted before the trial court that Navarro was the mother of Guevarra. However, petitioners denied before the Court of Appeals that Navarro was the mother of Guevarra. We agree with the appellate
court that this constitutes an impermissible change of theory. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he cannot change his theory on appeal. To allow him to do so is not only unfair to the other party, it
is also offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. 35
If Navarro were not the mother of Guevarra, it would only further undermine petitioners case. Absent any hereditary relationship between Guevarra and Navarro, the Property would not have passed from Navarro
to Guevarra, and then to the latters children, including petitioners, by succession. There would then be no basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership by virtue of inheritance from Guevarra. On the other hand, this
would not undermine respondents position since they anchor their claim on the sale under the Kasulatan and not on inheritance from Guevarra.
Since the notarized Kasulatan is evidence of greater weight which petitioners failed to refute by clear and convincing evidence, this Court holds that petitioners were not able to prove by preponderance of evidence
that the Property belonged to Guevarras estate. There is therefore no legal basis for petitioners complaint for partition of the Property.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of 26 June 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51643, dismissing the complaint of petitioners against Felomena Jumaquio Estimo and Emiliana Jumaquio, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Judgment affirmed.
Note.A co-owner has full ownership of his pro indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its enjoyment. ( Del Campo vs. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA
1 [2001])
o0o
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Buenaventura vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 126376. November 20, 2003.*
SPOUSES BERNARDO BUENAVENTURA and CONSOLACION JOAQUIN, SPOUSES JUANITO EDRA and NORA JOAQUIN, SPOUSES RUFINO VALDOZ and EMMA JOAQUIN, and NATIVIDAD JOAQUIN ,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES LEONARDO JOAQUIN and FELICIANA LANDRITO, SPOUSES FIDEL JOAQUIN and CONCHITA BERNARDO, SPOUSES TOMAS JOAQUIN and SOLEDAD
ALCORAN, SPOUSES ARTEMIO JOAQUIN and SOCORRO ANGELES, SPOUSES ALEXANDER MENDOZA and CLARITA JOAQUIN, SPOUSES TELESFORO CARREON and FELICITAS JOAQUIN, SPOUSES
DANILO VALDOZ and FE JOAQUIN, and SPOUSES GAVINO JOAQUIN and LEA ASIS, respondents.
Remedial Law; Actions; Party-in-Interests; Petitioners are interested in the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale, but they have failed to show any legal right to the properties; An action must be prosecuted in the
name of the real party-in-interest.It is evident from the records that petitioners are interested in the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale, but they have failed to show any legal right to the properties. The trial and
appellate courts should have dismissed the action for this reason alone. An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest.
Civil Law; Contracts; Sale; If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, the contract of sale is valid despite the manner of payment, or even the breach of that manner of payment .A contract of sale
is not a real contract, but a consensual contract. As a consensual contract, a contract of sale becomes a binding and valid contract upon the meeting of the minds as to price. If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties
as to the price, the contract of sale is valid, despite the manner of payment, or even the breach of that manner of payment. If the real price is not stated in the contract, then the contract of sale is valid but subject to
reformation. If there is no meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, because the price stipulated in the contract is simulated, then the contract is void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code states that if the price in a
contract of sale is simulated, the sale is void.
Same; Same; Same; It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a contract of sale; Failure to pay the consideration is different from lack of consideration; Failure to pay the consideration
results in a right to demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid contract while lack of consideration prevents the existence of a valid contract .It is not the act of payment of price that
determines the validity of a contract of sale. Payment of the price has nothing to do with the perfection of the contract. Payment of the price goes into the performance of the contract. Failure to pay the consideration is
different from lack of consideration. The former results in a right to demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid contract while the latter prevents the existence of a valid contract.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 to annul the Decision2dated 26 June 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41996. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision 3 dated 18 February 1993
rendered by Branch 65 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (trial court) in Civil Case No. 89-5174. The trial court dismissed the case after it found that the parties executed the Deeds of Sale for valid consideration
and that the plaintiffs did not have a cause of action against the defendants.
The Facts
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows:
Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all
surnamed JOAQUIN. The married Joaquin children are joined in this action by their respective spouses.
Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real property executed by defendant parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their co-defendant children and the
corresponding certificates of title issued in their names, to wit:
1. 1.Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-7 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256395 executed on 11 July 1978, in favor of defendant Felicitas Joaquin, for a consideration of P6,000.00 (Exh. C), pursuant to
which TCT No. [36113/T-172] was issued in her name (Exh. C-1);
2. 2.Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-3 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256394 executed on 7 June 1979, in favor of defendant Clarita Joaquin, for a consideration of P1[2],000.00 (Exh. D), pursuant to
which TCT No. S-109772 was issued in her name (Exh. D-1);
3. 3.Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-1 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256394 executed on 12 May 1988, in favor of defendant spouses Fidel Joaquin and Conchita Bernardo, for a consideration of P54,
[3]00.00 (Exh. E), pursuant to which TCT No. 155329 was issued to them (Exh. E-1);
4. 4.Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-2 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256394 executed on 12 May 1988, in favor of defendant spouses Artemio Joaquin and Socorro Angeles, for a consideration of
P[54,3]00.00 (Exh. F), pursuant to which TCT No. 155330 was issued to them (Exh. F-1); and
5. 5.Absolute Sale of Real Property covering Lot 168-C-4 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256395 executed on 9 September 1988, in favor of Tomas Joaquin, for a consideration of P20,000.00 (Exh. G), pursuant to
which TCT No. 157203 was issued in her name (Exh. G-1).
6. [6.Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-1 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256395 executed on 7 October 1988, in favor of Gavino Joaquin, for a consideration of P25,000.00 (Exh. K), pursuant to which TCT
No. 157779 was issued in his name (Exh. K-1).]
In seeking the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid deeds of sale and certificates of title, plaintiffs, in their complaint, aver:
XX
The deeds of sale, Annexes C, D, E, F, and G, [and K] are simulated as they are, are NULL AND VOID AB INITIO because
1. a.Firstly, there was no actual valid consideration for the deeds of sale x x x over the properties in litis;
2. b)Secondly, assuming that there was consideration in the sums reflected in the questioned deeds, the properties are more than three-fold times more valuable than the measly sums appearing therein;
3. c)Thirdly, the deeds of sale do not reflect and express the true intent of the parties (vendors and vendees); and
4. d)Fourthly, the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.
XXI
Necessarily, and as an inevitable consequence, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 36113/T-172, S-109772, 155329, 155330, 157203 [and 157779] issued by the Registrar of Deeds over the properties in litis x x x
are NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
Defendants, on the other hand aver (1) that plaintiffs do not have a cause of action against them as well as the requisite standing and interest to assail their titles over the properties in litis; (2) that the sales were with
sufficient considerations and made by defendants parents voluntarily, in good faith, and with full knowledge of the consequences of their deeds of sale; and (3) that the certificates of title were issued with sufficient factual
and legal basis.4 (Emphasis in the original)
The Ruling of the Trial Court
Before the trial, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case against defendant spouses Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis. 5 Instead of filing an Answer with their co-defendants, Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis
filed a Motion to Dismiss.6 In granting the dismissal to Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis, the trial court noted that compulsory heirs have the right to a legitime but such right is contingent since said right commences only
from the moment of death of the decedent pursuant to Article 777 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 7
After trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed the complaint. The trial court stated:
In the first place, the testimony of the defendants, particularly that of the x x x father will show that the Deeds of Sale were all executed for valuable consideration. This assertion must prevail over the negative
allegation of plaintiffs.
And then there is the argument that plaintiffs do not have a valid cause of action against defendants since there can be no legitime to speak of prior to the death of their parents. The court finds this contention
tenable. In determining the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered (Art. 908 of the New Civil Code). Hence, the legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as of the time of
the death of the decedent. Plaintiffs therefore cannot claim an impairment of their legitime while their parents live.
All the foregoing considered, this case is DISMISSED.
In order to preserve whatever is left of the ties that should bind families together, the counterclaim is likewise DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.8
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The appellate court ruled:
To the mind of the Court, appellants are skirting the real and decisive issue in this case, which is, whether x x x they have a cause of action against appellees.
Upon this point, there is no question that plaintiffs-appellants, lik
e their defendant brothers and sisters, are compulsory heirs of defendant spouses, Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito, who are their parents. However, their right to the properties of their defendant parents,
as compulsory heirs, is merely inchoate and vests only upon the latters death. While still alive, defendant parents are free to dispose of their properties, provided that such dispositions are not made in fraud of creditors.
Plaintiffs-appellants are definitely not parties to the deeds of sale in question. Neither do they claim to be creditors of their defendant parents. Consequently, they cannot be considered as real parties in interest to
assail the validity of said deeds either for gross inadequacy or lack of consideration or for failure to express the true intent of the parties. In point is the ruling of the Supreme Court in Velarde, et al. vs. Paez, et al.,101
SCRA 376, thus:
The plaintiffs are not parties to the alleged deed of sale and are not principally or subsidiarily bound thereby; hence, they have no legal capacity to challenge their validity.
Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their action on the supposed impairment of their legitime by the dispositions made by their defendant parents in favor of their defendant brothers and sisters. But, as correctly held by the
court a quo, the legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as of the time of the death of the decedent. Plaintiffs therefore cannot claim an impairment of their legitime while their parents live.
With this posture taken by the Court, consideration of the errors assigned by plaintiffs-appellants is inconsequential.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, the instant petition.
Issues
Petitioners assign the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:
1. 1.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CONVEYANCE IN QUESTION HAD NO VALID CONSIDERATION.
2. 2.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT EVEN ASSUMING THAT THERE WAS A CONSIDERATION, THE SAME IS GROSSLY INADEQUATE.
3. 3.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEEDS OF SALE DO NOT EXPRESS THE TRUE INTENT OF THE PARTIES.
4. 4.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CONVEYANCE WAS PART AND PARCEL OF A CONSPIRACY AIMED AT UNJUSTLY DEPRIVING THE REST OF THE CHILDREN
OF THE SPOUSES LEONARDO JOAQUIN AND FELICIANA LANDRITO OF THEIR INTEREST OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.
5. 5.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE A GOOD, SUFFICIENT AND VALID CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. 10
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petition without merit.
We will discuss petitioners legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale before discussing the issues on the purported lack of consideration and gross inadequacy of the prices of the Deeds of Sale.
Whether Petitioners have a legal interest over
the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale
Petitioners Complaint betrays their motive for filing this case. In their Complaint, petitioners asserted that the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly
deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime. Petitioners strategy was to have the Deeds of Sale declared void so that ownership of the lots would eventually revert to their respondent
parents. If their parents die still owning the lots, petitioners and their respondent siblings will then co-own their parents estate by hereditary succession.(Article 1078 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states: Where
there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased.)
It is evident from the records that petitioners are interested in the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale, but they have failed to show any legal right to the properties. The trial and appellate courts should have
dismissed the action for this reason alone. An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest. 12
[T]he question as to real party-in-interest is whether he is the party who would be benefitted or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
xxx
In actions for the annulment of contracts, such as this action, the real parties are those who are parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to
one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment which would positively result to them from the contract even though they did not intervene in it ( Ibaez v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 22 Phil. 572 [1912]) x x
x.
These are parties with a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. . . . The phrase present substantial interest more
concretely is meant such interest of a party in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him, under the substantive law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand and the
defendant will be protected in a payment to or recovery by him. 13
Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale. As the appellate court stated, petitioners right to their parents properties is merely inchoate and vests only upon their parents
death. While still living, the parents of petitioners are free to dispose of their properties. In their overzealousness to safeguard their future legitime, petitioners forget that theoretically, the sale of the lots to their siblings
does not affect the value of their parents estate. While the sale of the lots reduced the estate, cash of equivalent value replaced the lots taken from the estate.
Whether the Deeds of Sale are void
for lack of consideration
Petitioners assert that their respondent siblings did not actually pay the prices stated in the Deeds of Sale to their respondent father. Thus, petitioners ask the court to declare the Deeds of Sale void.
A contract of sale is not a real contract, but a consensual contract. As a consensual contract, a contract of sale becomes a binding and valid contract upon the meeting of the minds as to price. If there is a meeting of
the minds of the parties as to the price, the contract of sale is valid, despite the manner of payment, or even the breach of that manner of payment. If the real price is not stated in the contract, then the contract of sale is
valid but subject to reformation. If there is no meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, because the price stipulated in the contract is simulated, then the contract is void. 14 Article 1471 of the Civil Code states
that if the price in a contract of sale is simulated, the sale is void.
It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a contract of sale. Payment of the price has nothing to do with the perfection of the contract. Payment of the price goes into the performance of the
contract. Failure to pay the consideration is different from lack of consideration. The former results in a right to demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid contract while the latter
prevents the existence of a valid contract.15
Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the Deeds of Sale were absolutely simulated. To prove simulation, petitioners presented Emma Joaquin Valdozs testimony stating that their father, respondent Leonardo
Joaquin, told her that he would transfer a lot to her through a deed of sale without need for her payment of the purchase price. 16 The trial court did not find the allegation of absolute simulation of price credible.
Petitioners failure to prove absolute simulation of price is magnified by their lack of knowledge of their respondent siblings financial capacity to buy the questioned lots. 17 On the other hand, the Deeds of Sale which
petitioners presented as evidence plainly showed the cost of each lot sold. Not only did respondents minds meet as to the purchase price, but the real price was also stated in the Deeds of Sale. As of the filing of the
complaint, respondent siblings have also fully paid the price to their respondent father. 18
Whether the Deeds of Sale are void
for gross inadequacy of price
Petitioners ask that assuming that there is consideration, the same is grossly inadequate as to invalidate the Deeds of Sale.
Articles 1355 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not invalidate a contract, unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 1470 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 1470. Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale, except as may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners failed to prove any of the instances mentioned in Articles 1355 and 1470 of the Civil Code which would invalidate, or even affect, the Deeds of Sale. Indeed, there is no requirement that the price be
equal to the exact value of the subject matter of sale. All the respondents believed that they received the commutative value of what they gave. As we stated in Vales v. Villa:19
Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and extricate him from bad bargains, protect him from unwise investments, relieve him from one-sided contracts, or annul the effects of foolish acts. Courts cannot constitute
themselves guardians of persons who are not legally incompetent. Courts operate not because one person has been defeated or overcome by another, but because he has been defeated or overcome illegally. Men may do
foolish things, make ridiculous contracts, use miserable judgment, and lose money by themindeed, all they have in the world; but not for that alone can the law intervene and restore. There must be, in addition,
a violation of the law, the commission of what the law knows as an actionable wrong, before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it. (Emphasis in the original)
Moreover, the factual findings of the appellate court are conclusive on the parties and carry greater weight when they coincide with the factual findings of the trial court. This Court will not weigh the evidence all over
again unless there has been a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are clearly erroneous so as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. 20 In the instant case, the trial court found
that the lots were sold for a valid consideration, and that the defendant children actually paid the purchase price stipulated in their respective Deeds of Sale. Actual payment of the purchase price by the buyer to the
seller is a factual finding that is now conclusive upon us.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Judgment affirmed in toto.
Note.A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. (Delos Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 632 [1999])
o0o
VOL. 638, DECEMBER 15, 2010
Arellano vs. Pascual
G.R. No. 189776.December 15, 2010.*
AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians, AGNES P. ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO, petitioner, vs. FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL, respondents.
Succession; Collation; Words and Phrases; The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the
hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime.The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical
operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator
during his lifetime. The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be
reduced. Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded.
Same; Same; Siblings are collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitimethat part of the testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs.The
records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime
that part of the testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs. The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3) concurring. The primary
compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants are primary compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory heirs are those who succeed only
in the absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs are those who succeed together with the primary or the secondary compulsory
heirs; the illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs.
Same; Same; Where a person does not have any compulsory heirs entitled to legitime, he is at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing is left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. The decedent not
having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that
it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a stranger, chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
CARPIO-MORALES,J.:
Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters 1 Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and
respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual. 2
In a petition for Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of Administration, docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034, filed by respondents on April 28, 2000 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati, respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property) located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the
validity of which donation respondents assailed, may be considered as an advance legitime of petitioner.
Respondents nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as Administrator of the estate by Branch 135 of the Makati RTC. 3
Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati, which respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited
that it may be considered as an advance legitime to petitioner, the trial court, acting as probate court, held that it was precluded from determining the validity of the donation.
Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated property only for the purpose of determining whether it formed part of the decedents estate ,4 the probate court found the Deed of Donation
valid in light of the presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus went on to hold that it is subject to collation following Article 1061 of the New Civil Code which reads: 5
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way
of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate estate. Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that:
1.The property covered by TCT No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati as part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual;
2.The property covered by TCT No. 181889 to be subject to collation;
3. 1/3 of the rental receivables due on the property at the mezzanine and the 3rd floor of Unit 1110 Tanay St., Makati City form part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual;
4.The following properties form part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual:
a. 1/3 share in the House and Lot at 1110 Tanay St., Rizal Village Makati TCT No. 348341 and 1/3 share in the rental income thereon;
b. 1/3 share in the Vacant Lot with an area of 271 square meters located at Tanay St., Rizal Village, Makati City, TCT No. 119063;
c.Agricultural land with an area of 3.8 hectares located at Puerta Galera Mindoro covered by OCT No. P-2159;
d. Shares of stocks in San Miguel Corporation covered by the following Certificate Numbers: A0011036, A006144, A082906, A006087, A065796, A11979, A049521, C86950, C63096, C55316, C54824,
C120328, A011026, C12865, A10439, A021401, A007218, A0371, S29239, S40128, S58308, S69309;
e. Shares of stocks in Paper Industries Corp. covered by the following Certificate Numbers: S29239, S40128, S58308, S69309, A006708, 07680, A020786, S18539, S14649;
f. share in Eduardo Pascuals shares in Baguio Gold Mining Co.;
g.Cash in Banco De Oro Savings Account No. 2 014 12292 4 in the name of Nona Arellano;
h.Property previously covered by TCT No. 119053 now covered by TCT No. 181889, Register of Deeds of Makati City;
i.Rental receivables from Raul Arellano per Order issued by Branch 64 of the Court on November 17, 1995.
5.AND the properties are partitioned as follows:
a.To heir Amelia P. Arellanothe property covered by TCT No. 181889;
b. To heirs Francisco N. Pascual and Miguel N. Pascualthe real properties covered by TCT Nos. 348341 and 119063 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City and the property covered by OCT No. 2159, to
be divided equally between them up to the extent that each of their share have been equalized with the actual value of the property in 5(a) at the time of donation , the value of which shall be
determined by an independent appraiser to be designated by Amelia P. Arellano, Miguel N. Pascual and Francisco N. Pascual. If the real properties are not sufficient to equalize the shares, then
Franciscos and Miguels shares may be satisfied from either in cash property or shares of stocks, at the rate of quotation. The remaining properties shall be divided equally among Francisco, Miguel
and Amelia. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner faulted the trial court in holding that
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF THE ESTATE OF ANGEL PASCUAL, JR.
II
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III
. . . APPELLEES WHO ARE MERELY COLLATERAL RELATIVES OF DECEASED ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AS HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.
xxxx
and
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. EQUALLY AMONG HIS LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS.6 (underscoring supplied)
By Decision7 of July 20, 2009, the Court of Appeals found petitioners appeal partly meritorious. It sustained the probate courts ruling that the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation in this wise:
Bearing in mind that in intestate succession, what governs is the rule on equality of division , We hold that the property subject of donation inter vivos in favor of Amelia is subject to collation. Amelia
cannot be considered a creditor of the decedent and we believe that under the circumstances, the value of such immovable though not strictly in the concept of advance legitime, should be deducted from her share in the
net hereditary estate. The trial court therefore committed no reversible error when it included the said property as forming part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual.8 (citation omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the probate court, herein petitioner was able to submit prima facie evidence of shares of stocks owned by the [decedent] which have not been included
in the inventory submitted by the administrator.
Thus, the appellate court disposed, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated January 29, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135 in Special Proceeding Case No.
M-5034 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the order of inclusion of properties of the Intestate Estate of Angel N. Pascual, Jr. as well as the partition and distribution of the same to the co-heirs are
concerned.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the said court for further proceedings in accordance with the disquisitions herein.9 (underscoring supplied)
Petitioners Partial Motion for Reconsideration 10 having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution 11 of October 7, 2009, the present petition for review on certiorari was filed, ascribing as errors of the appellate
court its ruling
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED BY ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. TO PETITIONER AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF HIS ESTATE AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH.
II
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED TO PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III
. . . THAT RESPONDENTS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR DECEASED BROTHER ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AND ARE ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.
IV
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. EQUALLY AMONG PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS, AS HIS LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS.12 (underscoring supplied)
Petitioners thus raise the issues of whether the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation; and whether the property of the estate should have been ordered equally distributed among the parties.
On the first issue:
The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the return
to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime. 13
The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced. 14
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded. 15
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any
legitimethat part of the testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs.16
The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3) concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children
and descendants are primary compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory heirs are those who succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs.
The concurring compulsory heirs are those who succeed together with the primary or the secondary compulsory heirs; the illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs. 17
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to
petitioner, assuming that it was valid, 18 is deemed as donation made to a stranger, chargeable against the free portion of the estate. 19 There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to
collation.
On the second issue:

The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 1003.If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles .
(underscoring supplied)
Art. 1004.Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision ordering the collation of the property donated to petitioner, Amelia N. Arellano, to the estate of the deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr. is set
aside.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch 135 of the Makati Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to conduct further proceedings in the case for the purpose of determining what
finally forms part of the estate, and thereafter to divide whatever remains of it equally among the parties.
SO ORDERED.
Petition granted, judgment set aside.
Note.Property received by compulsory heirs from the decedent under an implied trust is subject to collation. (Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals, 343 SCRA 637 [2000])
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VOL.

148, FEBRUARY 27, 1987 69

Rosales vs. Rosales

No. L-40789. February 27,1987.*

PETITION to review the orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Our answer to the first question is in the negative.

"Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of

"Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

3. (3)The widow or widower;

4. (4)Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

5. (5)Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon

No. L-24561. June 30, 1970.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

"1 Estela Dizon............................... P 98,474.80

2. Angelina Dizon........................... 106,307.06

3. Bernardita Dizon....................... 51,968.17

4. Josefina Dizon........................... 52,056.39

5. Tomas Dizon............................ 131,987.41

6. Lilia Dizon................................. 72,182.47

7. Marina Dizon........................... 1,148,063.71

Jolly Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon........... 72,540.00

Total Value........................ P1,801,960.01"

On the other hand oppositors submitted their own

"1. Estela Dizon.................. P 49,485.56

3. Bernardita Dizon......... 26,115.04

4. Josefina Dizon............. 26,159,38

5. Tomas V. Dizon.......... 65,874.04

6. Lilia Dizon................. 36,273.13

7. Marina Dizon........... 576,938.82

8. Pablo Rivera, Jr....... 34,814.50

9. GrandchiIdren Gilbert Garcia et al .... 36,452.80

which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below.

VOL. 33, JUNE 30, 1970 563

Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon

VOL. 152, JULY 23, 1987 205

De Roma vs. Court of Appeals

No. L-46903. July 23, 1987.*

PETITION to review the order of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The two articles provide as follows:

The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as f ollows:

Locsin vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 89783. February 19, 1992.*

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M PRICE WITNESSE

(Lot 2020) Helen M.

1 Nov. 29, 1974 Deed of Donation in favor of Aurea 26,509

Locsin, Matilde L. Cordero and Salvador

2 Feb. 4, 1975 Deed of Donation in favor of Aurea 34,045

Locsin, Matilde L. Cordero and Salvador

3 Sept. 9, 1975 Deed of Donation in favor of Aurea (Lot 2059)

Locsin, Matilde L. Cordero and Salvador

Locsin vor of Aurea B. Locsin

4 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in fa 1,424 Hostilio

EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M PRICE WITNESSE

July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in P 5,750 Hostilio

5 favor of Aurea B. Locsin 1,456 Elena

July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 5,720 -ditto

6 favor of Aurea B. Locsin 1,237

July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in P 4,050 -ditto

7 favor of Aurea B. Locsin 1,404