1
FIRST DIVISION of reconsidering his orders declaring the accused as having
[G.R. Nos. 107041-42. May 15, 1996]
FELICIANO MALIWAT, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
Former Special First Division, and the REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS;
RIGHT NOT DENIED WHERE ACCUSED WHO TESTIFIED
SOUGHT AND GRANTED THE POSTPONEMENT AND
CANCELLATION OF HEARING FOR NO LESS THAN 40
TIMES. - Maliwat cannot claim that he was denied due
process. The records show that he did testify on his own behalf
and was cross-examined by the prosecution. Admittedly, he was
unable to adduce additional documentary evidence that he claims
would establish his innocence and which he now attaches as
annexes in his petition for review and memorandum of law before
the Court. But as noted earlier, it was Maliwat who had sought the
postponements and cancellations of the hearings for no less than
forty (40) times, from the date of his arraignment to the
promulgation of judgment, a fact that spanned almost a decade
(1978 to 1988).
2. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; MUST RENDER JUST AND
IMPARTIAL JUDGMENT FREE FROM ANY SUSPICION;
GRANTING OF ACCUSED'S SEVERAL REQUESTS FOR
POSTPONEMENT, LENIENCY NOT IMPARTIALITY. - The
guiding rule is that a judge must not only render a just, correct
and impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to be
free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and
integrity. As applied to the case at bar, the attitude exhibited by
Judge Diaz speaks more of extraordinary leniency to the accused
in granting all his requests for postponements, even to the extent
waived his right to present further evidence.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES; JUDGES
NOT DISQUALIFIED FROM SITTING AND DECIDING CASE
WHERE HE AS THE THEN CLERK OF COURT TESTIFIED ON
THE SAME CASE AFFECTING AN ISSUED CERTIFICATION. -
Under Rule 137, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, Judge Diaz'
previous actuations in testifying as then clerk of court on the
issued official certification did not render him legally disqualified
from sitting and deciding the case. The suggestion that he is not
wholly free, disinterested and independent could have been
buttressed by the exercise of his sound discretion in voluntarily
disqualifying himself. Yet, the manner in which he exhibited
himself during the trial negates any suspicion of prejudgment in
the case.
4. ID.; EVIDENCE; GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;
ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. - The only remaining issue
then is whether or not petitioner's guilt has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. In the interest of justice, the Court treated the
annexes attached to the petition which had been marked as
exhibits in the course of the trial but were not formally offered, to
form part of the records of this case. And after close scrutiny
thereof, the Court is of the considered opinion, and so holds, that
petitioner was correctly convicted of having committed the crime
of falsification of public documents.
5. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTIONS; PERSON TAKING ADVANTAGE OF A
FALSIFIED DOCUMENT, PRESUMED THE MATERIAL
AUTHOR OF THE 'FALSIFICATION. - The settled rule is that in
the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession
of and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore
guilty of falsification. If a person had in his possession a falsified
document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of
it and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the
material author of the falsification.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Tranquilino, R. Gale, and Pacifico C. Yadao for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
2
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court is the decision [1] of public respondent Court of
Appeals (CA) dated 29 November 1991 in CA-G.R. Nos. 09428-
09429, entitled People of the Philippines versus Feliciano Maliwat, as
well as the resolution dated 17 September 1992 which denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The CA decision and resolution
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City which
convicted herein petitioner of falsification of public documents as
defined and penalized under Article 172 par. 1 of the Revised Penal
Code.
In a resolution dated 16 November 1992, this Court denied the
present petition for review for failure to comply with the Rules of Court
and Circular 28 -9 1.[2] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which the Court denied with finality on 18 January 1993. [3] Petitioner
followed with a second motion for reconsideration which the Court
noted without action in its 3 March 1993 resolution.[4]
On 21 June 1993, petitioner filed a motion for declaration of
mistrial, pleading for the first time that his constitutional right to due
process was impaired when Judge Rolando Diaz rendered the
judgment of conviction in Criminal Cases Nos. 158-77 and 159-77,
knowing fully well that he (Judge Diaz) previously testified against the
petitioner (then accused) in said cases, while then the Clerk of Court
of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Branches 2 and 3 of Cavite City.
The Court issued a resolution[5] on 7 July 1993 requiring Judge
Diaz to comment on the said motion for declaration of mistrial. On 14
July 1993, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and inhibition order against Judge Diaz. On 21 July
1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge
Diaz from conducting further proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 158-
77 and 159-77 (entitled People of the Philippines vs. Feliciano
Maliwat, Regional Trial Court, Branch 17).[6]
Judge Diaz filed his comment on petitioner's motion.[7] After
careful deliberations, the Court resolved on 14 March 1994 to lift the
entry of final judgment dated 3 February 1993 and to reinstate and
give due course to this petition for review. The parties were required
to file their respective memoranda as the Court ordered the RTC of
Cavite City to forward the records of the cases to the Court.[8]
The antecedent facts of the case may be summarized as follows:
On 18 November 1977, two (2) separate informations were filed
before the then CFI of Cavite, Branch 3 (now RTC, Branch 17)
charging petitioner with the crime of Falsification of Public and Official
Documents.
The first information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 158-77,
reads as follows:
"That on or about the first week of November 1975, in the City of Cavite,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, a private person, having somehow obtained
possession of a blank form of a transfer certificate of title with Serial No.
1403456, which is a public and official document, did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of falsification, by then and
there, filling, typing and inserting on the blank spaces therein or causing to
be filled, typed and inserted on said public and official document, the
technical descriptions of a parcel of land, Lot No. 5825 of the Imus Estate
Subdivision, Province of Cavite, with an area of 553,853 sq. meters including
the corresponding title number, and making it appear that the same is the
owner's reconstituted copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-11850 of
the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, with the herein accused as
the registered owner and that the said public and official document was
reconstituted by virtue of the order of the Court of First Instance of Cavite
dated November 13, 1963 and causing it to appear further that the then
Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, Escolastico Cuevas had
participated in the preparation and signing of the said falsified Owner's copy
of TCT No. RT-11850, when in truth and in fact, the said accused well knew
that said parcel of land is already registered in the name of Green Valley
Realty Corporation and that then Register of Deeds Escolastico Cuevas never
intervened in the preparation and signing of said falsified document much
less did he authorize anybody to write his name or affix his signature therein
nor was there any judicial proceedings for reconstitution nor order from the
Court regarding TCT RT-11850, and thereafter, the above-named accused
presented the said falsified owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of
3
Title No. RT-11850, in the office of the Register of Deeds of Cavite, for the
purpose of reconstituting the original thereof.
Contrary to law."[9]
The second information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 159-
77 and recited the same allegations as in the first information, except
that the number of the TCT involved in the second information was
TCT No. RT 11854 with serial no. 1403457, allegedly covering lot no.
5826 of the Imus Estate Subdivision, with an area of 299,403 sq.
meters.
Petitioner was arraigned on 2 August 1978 at which, he pleaded
not guilty to each charge. Thereafter, joint trial of the two (2) cases
ensued.
On 12 February 1986, the trial court rendered a decision, later
amended on 28 June 1988, the dispositive part of which, as amended,
reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused
Feliciano Maliwat guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Public
Documents as defined and penalized in par. 1, Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code and he is hereby sentenced to - in Crim. Case No. 158-77 to an
indeterminate prison term of from six (6) months of arresto mayor as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prison correccional as
maximum and to pay a fine of P5,000.00; in Crim. Case No. 159-77 to an
indeterminate [prison] term of from six (6) months of arresto mayor as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prison correccional as
maximum and to pay a fine of P5,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs in both instances.
SO ORDERED."[10]
The evidence for the prosecution sought to establish that
sometime in October 1975, Maliwat, accompanied by two (2) other
persons, went to the office of Atty. Milagros Santiago, then the acting
Register of Deeds of Cavite, to inquire about the originals of TCT Nos.
T-11850 and T-11854 covering lots 5825 and 5826 of the Imus Estate
Subdivision. The original copies of said titles, however, could not be
located by the vault keeper of the office. Meanwhile, Atty. Santiago
examined the owner's duplicate copies presented to her by Maliwat
and upon closer scrutiny, she noticed the annotations on the lower
part of the two (2) titles which read: "reconstituted as per order of
CFI/Cavite City dated November 13, 1963 Sgd. Escolastico Cuevas."
The same annotation on the two (2) titles aroused her suspicion
because she was familiar with the customary signature of Escolastico
Cuevas, and the signatures of Cuevas appearing in the two (2) titles,
[11]
appeared to be forged.
Atty. Santiago did not confront Maliwat about the said signatures,
instead, she referred the latter to the Clerk of Court (of the CFI) to
verify the existence of such an order from the court records. Maliwat
allegedly obliged but did not return to the office of the Register of
Deeds. That same afternoon, Atty. Santiago went to see the Clerk of
Court, Atty. Rolando Diaz, who informed her that the court had no
record of the said orders.
On 6 November 1975, Atty. Santiago wrote a letter to the NBI
Director to report the existence of the alleged dubious certificates of
title in Maliwat's possession and requested for an investigation of the
matter.[12] The following year, Atty. Santiago went on sick leave and
Atty. Jorge Gutierrez was designated by the Land Registration
Commission Head Office to act in her stead from 26 January - 17
February 1976. When Atty. Santiago resumed her position on 17
February, she received a letter[13] from Atty. Gutierrez informing her
that during her absence, Feliciano Maliwat had applied for
administrative reconstitution of title and that he (Gutierrez) approved
the same, based on the owner's duplicate certificates of title submitted
to him.
Concerned with these developments, Atty. Santiago informed the
NBI about the reconstitution of the two (2) alleged fake titles and
requested for an immediate investigation. The NBI acted swiftly and
sent subpoenas to Feliciano Maliwat, Atty. Gutierrez, Atty. Santiago
and Atty. Cuevas who all appeared and testified before NBI agent
Tobias Lozada.
Agent Tobias Lozada's investigation[14] revealed that on his first
day in office as acting Register of Deeds (of Cavite), Atty. Gutierrez
met a person in his office who introduced himself as Feliciano
Maliwat. Maliwat inquired why certain titles he had presented for
4
reconstitution as early as 14 January 1976 had not been acted
upon. Atty. Gutierrez had the papers located and seeing no formal
defects and believing them to be in order, reconstituted the titles. Due
to some typing errors, however, only one title was delivered to Maliwat
on that day.
The following day, when the deputy Register of Deeds Atty.
Alejandro Villanueva reported for work, Atty. Gutierrez recounted to
him the events of the previous day including the fact that he had
reconstituted the titles belonging to Feliciano Maliwat.
Atty. Villanueva informed Atty. Gutierrez that he should not have
reconstituted the titles since Atty. Santiago believed that they were
spurious and had in fact requested the NBI to look into the
matter. Atty. Villanueva also informed Atty. Gutierrez that Maliwat had
been previously convicted for estafa thru falsification of public
document and was generally believed to be part of a criminal
syndicate operating in Cavite.
With this information, Atty. Gutierrez told the NBI that he made his
own investigation and discovered that Maliwat had subsequently tried
to obtain a tax declaration from the Provincial Assessor's Office (PAO)
but this was denied because the PAO personnel doubted the
authenticity of his titles. Upon verification with the LRC main office, he
(Gutierrez) was further informed that no such titles were originally
issued to Maliwat. A similar Verification with the Bureau of Lands
yielded the same results. Atty. Gutierrez alleged that the formal
requisites presented by Maliwat for reconstitution were the following:
(a) a verified petition for issuance of new titles under R.A. 26 signed and
sworn to by Feliciano Maliwat before Salvador R. Aguinaldo, a notary public
for Manila and recorded in the latter's notarial book as Document No. 1215
on Page3 of Book No. 116, Series of 1976 (Annex D).
(b) Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-11850 on Form No. 1403456 (Annex
E) and TCT No. RT-11854 on Form No. 1403457 (Annex E-2).
Atty. Gutierrez properly identified these documents before the NBI.
Atty. Escolastico Cuevas, retired Register of Deeds of Cavite
Province, whose signatures on the certificates of title were allegedly
forged, testified before the court a quo denying his alleged signature
appearing on the two (2) titles, i.e., TCT No. RT-11850 on form No.
1403456 and TCT No. RT-11854 on form No. 1403457. He also stated
that he executed a sworn statement[15] before the NBI where he
similarly made the same denial. In that affidavit, he recalled that as
witness for the prosecution in a certain criminal case before Judge
Coquia (of the CFI Manila) several years before the present incident,
he encountered the very same titles in open court, and he testified
that the signatures attributed to him in the two (2) titles were not his,
but were plain forgeries.
Maliwat, for his part, denied authorship of the two (2) forged titles
and claimed that he bought the two (2) parcels of land from a certain
Benigno T. Aseo as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale[16] dated 2
January 1963. He registered the same and surrendered Aseo's titles
to the Register of Deeds for cancellation, after which he was issued
two (2) new titles, namely: TCT No. RT- 11850 with Serial
No. 603461 and RT- 11854 with Serial number 603462.[17] Maliwat
further claimed that he witnessed Escolastico Cuevas, the then
Register of Deeds, actually sign his name over the said titles before
they were issued to him.[18]
Thus, from the issuance of his titles in 1963 up to 1975, Maliwat
averred that he took physical possession of the lands covered
thereby, and paid real estate taxes thereon except in 1974 when he
went to Canada. He was not aware of any title adverse to his own
titles and that he was informed only during the trial that a certain
Green Valley Corporation had titles to said property and had been
paying the real estate taxes thereon. Although he had a location plan
over the said properties, he did not have them relocated anymore to
determine whether or not there was an overlap of titles.
In 1975, Maliwat alleged that certain buyers were interested in his
property. Together with a friend named Judge Alejo, they went to the
Register of Deeds to have his titles verified but the Register of Deeds
allegedly could not locate the original file copy of Maliwat's owner's
duplicate TCTs in their records. Maliwat was then informed that since
the Registry of Deeds was burned twice in the past, the file (original)
titles were presumably destroyed.
Maliwat admitted that in January 1976, he filed two (2) petitions
for reconstitution of the titles before the Register of Deeds, after which
he received a letter from then acting, Register of Deeds Gutierrez
5
requiring him to submit the owner's duplicate copies before the
Register of Deeds as basis for the reconstitution of title. Maliwat
claimed that Atty. Gutierrez got back the letter [19]when his wife and his
lawyer, Moreno Gaid, went to the office of Atty. Gutierrez to surrender
the owner's duplicate copies - which bore Serial Nos. 603461 and
603462 respectively, and not Serial Nos. 1403456 and 1403457 as
evidenced by a receipt[20] issued by Atty. Gutierrez. Maliwat denied
having any knowledge of the existence of TCT-11850 RT and T-11854
RT with serial nos. 1403456 and 1403457 which found their way into
the Register of Deeds of Cavite and maintained that what were
surrendered to Atty. Gutierrez were genuine owner's duplicate copies
of TCT 11850-RT and T-11854 RT bearing serial numbers 603461 and
603462.
After giving due course to the petition at bar, the Court
painstakingly reviewed the records to inquire and determine whether
or not petitioner was given a fair trial in the lower court.
The Court notes that from the time of petitioner's arraignment on
2 August 1978 up to the time the prosecution offered its evidence, and
rested, the hearings were either reset or cancelled no less than thirty
(30) times owing to a variety of reasons proffered by petitioner. As
early as 20 May 1982, the case was set for hearing of the evidence
for the defense, but the case was reset for another eight (8) times,
again owing to petitioner's absences. Within said period, the defense
also failed to file any written objections to the prosecution's formal
offer of evidence. When Judge Diaz took over the case on 12 April
1983, Maliwat moved to postpone for yet another eight (8) times,
prompting Judge Diaz to issue an order on 17 October 1983 declaring
Maliwat to have waived his right to present further evidence.
This was not, however, the end of the trial court's leniency in
Maliwat's favor. Owing to Maliwat's manifestation that he was
suffering from chronic malaria, Judge Diaz reconsidered[21]and set the
case for hearing on 26 March 1984. When Maliwat and counsel still
failed to appear on said date, Judge Diaz deemed the case submitted
for decision, but again reconsidered and set another hearing on 11
June 1984 to allow the defense to present additional evidence. When
both accused and counsel still failed to appear, Judge Diaz deemed
the case submitted for decision and required the parties to file their
respective memoranda. Maliwat's lawyer appealed this order to the
Court of Appeals but the appeal was deemed abandoned and
dismissed on 24 October 1987.[22]
Maliwat's absences continued up to the promulgation of judgment
by the trial court which also had to be reset four (4) times. It was only
after then that Maliwat's counsel filed a motion for new trial before the
trial court. When the motion was denied on 14 September 1988,
Maliwat appealed the decision to the appellate court. Maliwat could
have filed another motion for new trial before the appellate court on
the ground of newly discovered evidence material to his defense
under Rule 124, Sec. 14 of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure, but
he did not.Instead he sought affirmative relief by prosecuting his
appeal from the judgment of conviction until the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision affirming the judgment of conviction of the
court a quo.
Under the foregoing facts and circumstances, Maliwat certainly
cannot claim that he was denied due process. The records show that
he did testify on his own behalf and was cross-examined by the
prosecution. Admittedly, he was unable to adduce additional
documentary evidence that he claims would establish his innocence
and which he now attaches as annexes in his petition for review and
memorandum of law before the Court. But as noted earlier, it was
Maliwat who had sought the postponements and cancellations of the
hearings for no less than forty (40) times, from the date of his
arraignment to the promulgation of judgment, a fact that spanned
almost a decade (1978 to 1988).
Although admittedly a belated plea, petitioner argues that there
was a mistrial since a vital prosecution witness, then Clerk of Court
Rolando Diaz, became the judge of the case and had no choice but to
render a judgment of conviction against him.
The records show that Rolando Diaz, then Clerk of Court of the
CFI of Cavite City, indeed testified for the prosecution. But as
explained by the Solicitor General, his testimony was limited to certain
facts directly connected with or arising from the performance of his
official duties as Clerk of Court, without any reference to or
pronouncement as to the innocence or guilt of the accused. And as
explained by Judge Diaz himself in his comment before this Court
dated 19 January 1994,
6
"That the only participation of the undersigned Judge as [then] Clerk of
Court was to issue a certification and the only testimony given in this case
was, while still a Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Cavite with
station at Cavite City, he saw the accused Feliciano Maliwat in his office
after he was referred to him by the Acting Register of Deeds of Cavite
Province, Atty. Milagros Santiago and who presented to him two certificates
of title and requested for the production of the order annotated at the bottom
of the face of said certificates of title wherein it was shown that the same had
been reconstituted as per order of the Court of First Instance dated November
30, 1983 and which after diligent search he could not produce, as either the
said order or a copy of the petition were actually inexistent (sic) and he
noticed further that the signature of Escolastico Cuevas, Register of Deeds of
the Province of Cavite at the time said order was issued was not the signature
of Atty. Cuevas with which he was familiar;
That the undersigned did not consider said testimony as bias on his part
against the herein accused and he based his conviction of the accused in these
cases not on his prejudgment but rather on the over-all evidence presented
before the Court;
That accused did not question his actuations in these cases during the trial
and instead opted for the continuation thereof thus perhaps believing that the
undersigned would render judgment according to the evidence presented;
That he did not likewise question the actuations of the Judge in his appeal to
the Court of Appeals nor on certiorari to this Honorable Court which denied
his petition for review for failure to comply the Rules of Court in Circular
No. 28-91 in a resolution of November 13, 1992 whereby entry of Judgment
was issued on February 3, 1993 by the Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief
Judicial Records Office and it was only on June 21, 1993 did he file the
instant motion so as to hold in abeyance the promulgation of judgment on the
ground of mistrial";[23]
The guiding rule is that a judge must not only render a just,
correct and impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to
be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and
integrity. As applied to the case at bar, the attitude exhibited by Judge
Diaz speaks more of extraordinary leniency to the accused in granting
all his requests for postponements, even to the extent of
reconsidering his orders declaring the accused as having waived his
right to present further evidence.
Under Rule 137, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, Judge Diaz'
previous actuations did not render him legally disqualified from sitting
and deciding the case. The suggestion that he is not wholly free,
disinterested and independent could have been buttressed by the
exercise of his sound discretion in voluntarily disqualifying
himself. Yet, the manner in which he exhibited himself during the trial
negates any suspicion of prejudgment in the case.
The only remaining issue then is whether or not petitioner's guilt
has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. In the interest of justice,
the Court treated the annexes attached to the petition which had been
marked as exhibits in the course of the trial but were not formally
offered, to form part of the records of this case. And after close
scrutiny thereof, the Court is of the considered opinion, and so holds,
that petitioner was correctly convicted of having committed the crime
of falsification of public documents. As clearly observed by the trial
court which was evidently in the best position to weigh and evaluate
the evidence:
"From the evidence submitted, there is no question that the two certificates of
title RT-11850 with serial no. 1403456 and RT- 11854 with Serial No.
1403457 Exhibits A and B are falsified; that as per finding of the NBI,
testified to by then Senior Agent Toribio Lozada the same were among those
intended for the province of Cotabato but which were lost in transit as per
certification issued by Fortunato T. Pascual of the Land Registration
Commission (Exhs. Q and Q-2); and a memorandum circular of the loss was
issued by then Acting Commissioner Gregorio Bilog Jr. of the LRC (Exh. O)
and the titles found their way into the office of the Register of Deeds of
Cavite Province pursuant to a petition for reconstitution filed by the herein
accused on January 8, 1976 (Exh. R) and the same were administratively
reconstituted by then Acting Register of Deeds of Cavite province Atty. Jorge
V. Gutierrez and for which the said owners duplicate were surrendered to the
office of the Register of Deeds of Cavite province and new owner's
duplicates issued to the herein accused. The Court cannot give credence
thereto over the positive identification made by Atty. Santiago in open Court
together with the confirmation made by the NBI agent on the case. Atty.
Tobias Lazada and the former Register of Deeds, Atty. Escolastico Cuevas
whose signature thereon was forged. (Italics supplied)
7
Moreover, a closer scrutiny of the numbering of the titles in
question which accused alleges to have gotten from the office of the
Register of Deeds of Cavite Province when he registered the sale
executed in his favor by Benigno T. Aseo shows the letters 'RT'
precedes the number which the Court can take judicial notice of that
the letters RT stand for reconstituted title and these initials with the
corresponding number follow the original number of the title issued,
but in this case the same is missing and does not state the original
number of the title which is out of the ordinary procedure of the
Register of Deeds.
Likewise, it is quite absurd to see that Exhibits 'A' and 'B' which
are accountable forms bearing consecutive serial numbers (1403456
and 1403457) respectively would have been given nonconsecutive
title numbers (RT-11850 and RT-11854) and would have been issued
ten months apart (RT-11850) was issued on November 15, 1983 while
RT-11854 was issued on January 18, 1963.
Moreover, RT-11850 does not bear the number of the certificate
of titles from which it was transferred whereas TCT No. RT-11854 is
supposed to have canceled T-8331 and which apparently conflicts
with the allegation of the accused that he acquired these two parcels
of land from Benigno T. Aseo whose ownership was evidenced by
TCT No. T-2474 and T-2475. If that were the case then, the said title
number would have appeared on Exhibits 'A' and 'B'.
Anent, the testimony of the accused that the certificate of title, the
owner's duplicate of TCT No. RT-11850 and RT-11854 which he
presented for reconstitution bore the serial Nos. 603461 and 603462 it
will be noted that he only presented xerox copies of the said titles
without producing the originals and during the investigation at the NBI
as per report marked as Exhibits H and H-4 he never submitted the
originals thereof. Whichever serial numbers they bore, it appears that
said title forms were falsified in view of the attestations of the Land
Registration Commission that they were never intended for the
Register of Deeds of Cavite Province." (Italics supplied)[24]
Additionally, the Court observes that the titles presented by
Maliwat for reconstitution were allegedly owner's duplicate
reconstituted titles, since the numbers were preceded by the letters
RT. This fact, assuming it to be true, negates petitioner's allegation
that these titles were obtained from the Registry of Deeds by
canceling Aseo's (the vendor's) titles which were not reconstituted
titles. It also bears stressing that there must have been a petition for
reconstitution, whether judicial or administrative, before Maliwat could
be issued said reconstituted titles.But no such petition was
produced. From Maliwat's testimony, he averred that he obtained the
said titles when Aseo's titles were canceled by virtue of a deed of
absolute sale between him and Aseo.
The Court also observes that Exh. 1-A, which is TCT Nos. RT-
11850 and Exh. 4-A which is TCT No. RT-11854 [25] were made to
appear by accused as reconstituted titles. Thus, whether or not what
were issued to the accused bore SN 603461 and 603462 or SN
1403456 and 1403457 is of no moment because both titles should
never have been reconstituted titles in the first place. More so,
because the evidence[26] shows that Judicial Forms with SN 603461
and 603462 were issued to the Registry of Deeds of Cotabato
province in May 1963.Hence, the titles in Maliwat's possession cannot
be genuine.
The Court further notes that the signatures of Escolastico Cuevas
in SN-1403456; SN-1403457 and SN-603461 and SN-603462 were
not the same and, as plain to the naked eye, very different from the
specimen signature of Register of Deeds Escolastico
[27]
Cuevas executed before the NBI. It is ineluctable, therefore, that
these titles were falsified and the evidence points to Maliwat as the
author of the falsification under par. 1 of Article 172 in relation to
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
"When Judicial Forms 109-D, with Serial Nos. 1403456 and
1403457 were filled up, issued and made to appear in form, as
Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. RT-11850 and RT-11854,
respectively, both in the name of Feliciano Maliwat to show his
ownership of Lots Nos. 5825 and 5826 which are included in the Imus
Estate Subdivision although they were not, falsification as defined in
paragraph 7 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code was committed.
Again, when in the same forms it was made to appear that they
were signed and issued by Register of Deeds Escolastico Cuevas,
although in truth and in fact he has neither signed, issued nor filled up
8
the same, falsification penalized under paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the
same Article of the Revised Penal Code has also been committed.
The fact that no proof was introduced to prove or show as to who
committed the falsification abovementioned, does not exempt or
exculpate the herein accused-appellant from liability.The accused-
appellant is the person who stood to benefit by the falsification of the
documents in question as such, 'it is presumed that he is the material
author of the falsifications.' (Sarep vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA
440; 449).[28]
The settled rule is that in the absence of satisfactory explanation,
one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the
forger and therefore guilty of falsification.[29]
If a person had in his possession a falsified document and he
made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby,
-the clear presumption is that he is the material author of the
falsification.[30]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. Nos. 0942829 dated 29 November
1991, which upholds the amended decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cavite dated 28 June 1988 in Criminal Cases Nos. 158-77
and 159-77 is hereby AFFIRMED en toto. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED
Bellosillo, Vitug, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., on leave.
Gimenez vs. Nazareno
Facts:
On 3 August 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando
Cargando, Rogelio Baguio and Teodoro de la Vega, Jr., were charged with the
crime of murder. The accused were arraigned and each of them pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged. Following the arraignment, the judge, Hon.
Ramon E. Nazareno, set the hearing of the case for 18 September 1973 at
1:00 p.m. All the accused were duly informed of this. Before the scheduled
date of the first hearing the de la Vega escaped from his detention center and
on the said date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscals handling
the case (Fiscal Celso M. Gimenez and Federico B. Mercado) to file a motion
with the lower court to proceed with the hearing of the case against all the
accused praying thatde la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia invoking the
application of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Pursuant to the
above-written provision, the lower court proceeded with the trial of the case
but nevertheless gave de ala Vega the opportunity to take the witness stand
the moment he shows up in court. After due trial, or on 6 November 1973,
the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the other five
accused (Suan, et. al.) while holding in abeyance the proceedings against de
la Vega. On 16 November 1973, Gimenez and Mercado filed a Motion for
Reconsideration questioning the dispositive portion of the court's decision on
the ground that it will render
nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial in absentia" cited earlier.
However, this was denied by the lower court in an Order dated 22 November
1973. Gimenez and Mercado filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether judgment upon an accused tried should be in abeyance
pending the appearance of the accused before the court.
Held: The second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
provides that a "trial in absentia" may be had when the following requisites
are present:
(1) that there has been an arraignment
(2) that the accused has been notified;
(3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified.
Herein, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia.
De la Vega was arraigned on 22 August 1973 and in the said arraignment he
pleaded not guilty. He was also informed of the scheduled hearings set on
September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is evidenced by his signature on the
notice issued by the lower court. It was also proved by a certified copy of the
Police Blotter that de la Vega escaped from his detention center. No
explanation for his failure to appear in court in any of the scheduled hearings
was given. Even the trial court considered his absence unjustified.
The lower court correctly proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the
prosecution and the other accused in the absence of de la Vega, but it erred
when it suspended the proceedings as to de la Vega and rendered a decision
as to the other accused only. Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the
court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court. The court
need not wait for the time until the accused who escape from custody finally
decides to appear in court to present his evidence and cross-examine the
9
witnesses against him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose is
to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in absentia. Still, the
accused remain to be presumed innocent, a judgment of conviction must still
be based upon the evidence presented in court, and such evidence must prove
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. There can be no violation of due
process since the accused was given the opportunity to be heard. By his
failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice, he virtually waived
the rights to cross-examine and to present evidence on his behalf. Thus, an
escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to present
evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who
testified against him.
Doctrine:
The trial against the fugitives, just like those of the others, should have been
brought to its ultimate conclusion. Thereafter, the trial court had the duty to
rule on the evidence presented by the prosecution against all the accused and
to render its judgment accordingly. It should not wait for the fugitives re-
appearance or re-arrest. They were deemed to have waived their right to
present evidence on their own behalf and to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses who testified against them
People vs Buenviaje
Facts:
Defendant Jovita V. Buenviaje was accused of violating
the Medical Act, where the information filed against her
alleged that said defendant had been practicing medicine
without having obtained from the Board of Medical Examiners
the necessary certificate of registration, in the City of Manila,
whereby she was further alleged that she assisted, treated,
and manipulated the head and body of Regino Noble, for the
purposes of curing him of ailments, diseases, pains and
physical defects which he pretended to suffer from, and for
advertising and offering her services as a physician (doctor of
chiropractic), evidenced by letterheads and signs exposed on
her office door, and in newspapers circulated in Manila, and
adding the prefix Dra. To her name, causing the public to
believe that she was a legitimate doctor. Defendant admitted
said facts. She further admitted to collecting 1 from Noble
for her services, and that she graduated a doctor of
chiropractic from the American University School of
Chiropractic on 13-Aug-1919, in Chicago.
Trial court found her guilty. Counsel for defendant appealed
that the demurrer to information should have been sustained
when the information charged more than one offense (illegal
practice of medicine, and illegal representation).
G.R. No. L-22945 March 3, 1925
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-
Appellee, vs. JOVITA V. BUENVIAJE, Defendant-Appellant.
Francisco and Lualhati and Ariston Rivera for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
OSTRAND, J.:
The defendant is accused of the violation of the Medical Act,
the information alleging "that on or about the first day of
June, 1923, and for some time prior to said date, the said
accused without having obtained from the Board of Medical
Examiners the corresponding certificate of registration for
the practice of medicine in the Philippine Islands, voluntarily,
illegally and criminally and for compensation, practiced
medicine in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, assisting,
treating and manipulating the head and body of Regino Noble
for the purpose of curing him of the ailments, diseases, pains
10
and physical defects from which he pretended to suffer, and
advertising and offering her services as a physician, by
means of cards which she distributed and by letterheads and
signs which she exposed on the door of her office, situated at
No. 712 Calle Asuncion, and in newspapers which are
published and circulated in the City of Manila, in which cards,
letterheads, signs and advertising she added and prefixed to
her name the letters `Dra.,' which is the abbreviation of the
word `doctor,' for the purpose of causing the public to
believe that she, the said defendant, had received the
corresponding title of doctor."chanrobles virtual law library
To this information the defendant demurred in the court
below on the grounds: (1) That it stated more than one
offense, and (2) that it was not drawn in accordance with the
form prescribed by law. The demurrer was overruled and the
defendant pleaded not
guilty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
At the trial of the case the defendant made the following
admissions: "That on the first of June, 1923, she had no
certificate from the Board of Medical Examiners authorizing
her to practice medicine in the Philippine Islands; that on
that day she treated and manipulated the head and body of
Regino Noble in order to cure him of ailments from which he
pretended to suffer, the treatment consisting in a `thrust' by
means of the application of the hand to the spinal column;
that she for such treatment received and collected from said
Regino Noble the sum of P1; that the said treatment took
place in her office situated at No. 712 Calle Asuncion, District
of Binondo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands; that she on or
about the first day of June, 1923, and for some time prior to
that date, advertised herself as a `doctor of chiropractic,' in
said City of Manila, said advertisement appearing upon her
business cards and in the newspaper `El Debate,' in its issue
of April 29, 1923, edited and published in Manila and in
which cards and newspaper advertisement the defendant
prefixed the abbreviation `Dra.' to her name; that she was
graduated a doctor in chiropractic on the 13th day of August,
1919, as evidenced by a certificate marked Exhibit I and
issued by the American University School of Chiropractic of
Chicago, Illinois."chanrobles virtual law library
Upon this admission and some other evidence to the same
effect, the trial court found the defendant guilty as charged
in the information and, in accordance with section 2678 of
the Administrative Code, sentenced her to pay a fine of
P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
to pay the costs. From this judgment the defendant appeals
to this court and presents four assignments of
error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
I. In the first assignment of error counsel contends that the
demurrer to the information should have been sustained on
the ground that said information charged more than one
offense. The Medical Law is contained in sections 758 to 783
of the Administrative Code and it is argued that inasmuch as
some of the illegal acts with which the defendant is charged
are prohibited by section 770 of the Code and others by
section 783, the defendant is in reality accused of two
separate and distinct offenses, namely, illegal practice of
medicine and illegally representing oneself as a
doctor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
We cannot accept this view. It may be noted that the Medical
Law itself, as it appears in the Administrative Code, does not
declare any of the therein prohibited acts penal offenses. The
penal provisions relating thereto are contained in section
2678 of the Code, which reads as follows:
SEC. 2678. Violation of Medical Law. - A person violating any
provision of the Medical Law shall, upon conviction, be
punished by a fine of not more than three hundred pesos or
11
by imprisonment for not more than ninety days, or both, in
the discretion of the court.
The offense here penalized is "violation of the Medical Law."
The statute makes no distinction between illegal practice of
medicine and illegally advertising oneself as a doctor. Both
are in violation of the Medical Law and carry the same
penalty. They are merely different ways or means of
committing the same offense and both of these means are
closely related to each other and usually employed
together.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
In these circumstances and where, as alleged in the
information in the present case, the various violations have
taken place simultaneously, we do not think it was the
intention of the legislator that each single act should be
regarded as a separate offense and separate informations
presented for each. The language of this court in the case of
United States vs. Poh Chi (20 Phil., 140), in regard to the
Opium Law, is opposite to the present case.
It is true that the Commission has provided a certain
punishment for the possession of a pipe used in the smoking
of opium, for the smoking of opium, as well as a punishment
for the illegal possession of opium, but it is not believed that
it was the intention of the legislature to have separate
complaints filed against a person who was found in the illegal
possession of opium and a pipe at the same time. If that
were true then every person who was found to be smoking
opium could be charged in three different complaints: First,
with the illegal possession of the pipe; second, the illegal
possession of the opium; andthird, for smoking the opium.
Certainly the legislature did not intend any such
consequences.
In the case of United States vs. Douglass (2 Phil., 461), the
court said:
It is not objectionable, when a single offense may be
committed by the use of different means, to charge, in the
alternative, the various means by which the crime may have
been committed. (U.S. vs. Potter, 27 Fed. Cases, 604;
Bishop's New Criminal Procedure, sec. 434.)
The same rule was followed in the case of United States vs.
Dorr (2 Phil., 332); United States vs. Tolentino (5 Phil., 682);
and United States vs. Gustilo (19 Phil., 208) and is in
harmony with the views of the courts in other jurisdictions.
That the various means of committing the offense is
described in more than one section of the statute does not
necessarily effect the general principle involved; the
subdivision of a statute into section is merely a matter of
convenience and while it sometimes may be of some aid in
ascertaining the legislative intent, it is, of course, not
conclusive thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
II. Under the second assignment of error the appellant
argues in substance that chiropractic has nothing to do with
medicine and that the practice of that profession can
therefore not be regarded as practice of medicine. There is
no merit whatever in this contention. Assuming without
conceding that chiropractic does not fall within the term
"practice of medicine" in its ordinary acceptation, we have
the statutory definition contained in section 770 of the
Administrative Code and which clearly includes the
manipulations employed in chiropractic. The statutory
definition necessarily prevails over the ordinary
one.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Under the same assignment of error the defendant also
argues that the examination prescribed by section 776 of the
Administrative Code for admission to the practice of
medicine, embraces subjects which have no connection with
chiropractic and that to require chiropractors to take that
examination is unreasonable and, in effect amounts to
12
prohibition of the practice of their profession and therefore
violates the constitutional principle that all men have the
right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and are
entitled to the equal protection of the
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
There is very little force in this argument. The subjects in
which an examination is required by section 778 of the
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3111, relate to
matters of which a thorough knowledge seems necessary for
the proper diagnosis of diseases of the human body and it is
within the police power of the State to require that persons
who devote themselves to the curing of human ills should
possess such knowledge. (State vs. Edmunds, 127 Iowa,
333; 69 L.R.A., 504; Underwood vs. Scott, 43 Kan., 714;
People vs. Blue Mountain Joe, 129 Ill., 370; State vs. Mylod,
20 R. I., 632; 41 L.R.A., 428; Stewartvs. Raab, 55 Minn., 20;
Matthei vs. Wooley, 69 Ill. App., 654; State vs. Buswell, 40
Neb., 158; 24 L.R.A., 68; O'Connor vs. State, 46 Neb., 157;
U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218.)chanrobles virtual law
library
III. The third assignment of error is closely related to the
foregoing. The appellant contends that the prohibition in
section 783 against the unauthorized use of the title "doctor"
must be understood to refer to "Doctor of Medicine" and has
no application to doctors of chiropractic. Under different
circumstances that might possibly be so, but where, as here,
chiropractic is by statute made a form of the practice of
medicine, it necessarily follows that a person holding himself
out as a doctor of chiropractic in legal effect represents
himself as a doctor of
medicine.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
IV. In her fourth assignment of error the appellant attacks
the constitutionality of Act No. 3111, amending section 770
of the Administrative Code, on the ground that the subject of
the Act is not sufficiently expressed in its title and that it
embraces more than one subject. There is no merit in this
contention. The title of Act No. 3111 reads as follows:
An Act to amend sections seven hundred and fifty-nine,
seven hundred and sixty, seven hundred and sixty-one,
seven hundred and sixty-two, seven hundred and sixty-five,
seven hundred and sixty-seven, seven hundred and seventy,
seven hundred and seventy-four, seven hundred and
seventy-five, seven hundred and seventy-six, seven hundred
and seventy-eight, seven hundred and eighty, seven hundred
and eighty-two, seven hundred and eighty-three, and
twenty-six hundred and seventy-eight of Act Numbered
Twenty-seven hundred and eleven, known as the
Administrative Code, increasing the number of the members
of the Board of Medical Examiners, conferring upon the same
certain additional powers and responsibilities and for other
purposes.
All of the sections enumerated in the title quoted relate to
the same general subject, namely, defining and regulating
the practice of medicine, and section 770 is expressly
mentioned as one of the sections
amended.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
This is sufficient. Under constitutional provisions similar to
ours the general rule is that a title which declares the
amendatory statute to be an act to amend a designated
section or the like of a specified Code is sufficient and the
precise nature of the amendatory Act need not be further
stated. (Ross vs. Aguirre, 191 U.S., 60; Udell vs. Citizens
Street R. Co., 152 Ind., 507; McGuire vs. Chicago, etc., R.
Co., 131 Iowa, 340; Lankford vs. County Commissioners of
Somerset County, 73 Md., 105; Tabor vs. State, 34 Tex.
Crim., 631; Com. vs. Brown, 91 Va., 762.) For a full and
authoritative discussion of this subject, see Note to Lewis vs.
Dunne, 55 L.R.A., 833. See also Government of the
13
Philippine Islands vs. Municipality of Binalonan and Roman
Catholic Bishop of Nueva Segovia (32 Phil., 634) and Yu Cong
Eng vs. Trinidad (p.
385, ante).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
We find no error in the judgment appealed from and the
same is therefore affirmed, with the costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
Malcolm, Villamor, and Johns, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ROMUALDEZ, J., dissenting:chanrobles virtual law library
I believe that the complaint charges more than one offense,
and that the demurrer interposed on that ground should
have been sustained. For that reason I dissent from the
opinion of the majority.
Corpuz v People 194 SCRA 73 (1991)
Facts: Petitioner seeks reversal of the lower courts decision
finding him guilty for malversation of public funds. The
accused was the acting supervising cashier at the Provincial
Treasurers office. He denied having misused the whole
amount of P72,823.08 which was discovered to be a shortage
from the government funds contending that the P50,000.00
was the unliquidated withdrawal made by their paymaster
Pineda thru the 4 checks he issued while the petitioner was
on leave and that he was forced by their Provincial Treasurer
Aluning to post said amount in his cash book despite not
actually receiving the amount.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in observing the
presumption of innocence of the accused of the charge
against him
Held: It is held that presumption of innocence of the accused
should yield to the positive findings that he malversed the
government funds considering all the evidences presented
that point out to his guilt on the charge imputed against him.
Records shows that the checks issued for the paymaster
were duly liquidated to the accused and there were
inconsistent entries on his cash books and that he was not
really on leave on the day the said checks were disbursed by
the paymaster.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130709. March 6, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIANITO
MONTERON y PANTORAS, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, Branch 15, dated May 28, 1997 in Criminal Cases Nos.
36,564-96, convicting accused-appellant Marianito Monteron of the
crime of rape. The dispositive portion of the appealed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, Marianito Monteron is hereby sentenced
14
to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify Mary Ann Martenez the sum of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).1
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On March 7, 1996, at 12:10 p.m., fifteen year-old Mary Ann
Martenez was walking home from Wangan National Agricultural
School, Davao City. While she was walking on a secluded portion of
the road, Mary Ann was hit on the head by a slingshot. She turned to
see where the stone came from, she was hit again on the mouth. She
fell down unconscious.[2]
When Mary Ann came to, she found herself lying on the grass
naked. Accused-appellant was lying on top of her, also naked. She
struggled but accused-appellant, who was stronger, restrained her.
[3]
He placed his penis on top of her vagina, which caused her to feel
pain. She frantically grabbed his erect penis and pushed it away from
her. This caused accused-appellant to stand up in pain. Mary Ann ran
towards the road while putting on her clothes.
Mary Anns cousin, Arnel Arat, witnessed the whole incident as he
was then walking to Wangan Agricultural School. He met Mary Ann
while the latter was running away and brought her home. When they
got home, Mary Ann told her uncle what happened. Her uncle, in turn,
told her mother.
That afternoon, upon complaint of Mary Ann, the Calinan Police
Precinct arrested accused-appellant.
The following morning, Mary Ann was brought to the City Health
Office of Davao City where she was examined by Dr. Danilo P.
Ledesma. The latter found that Mary Anns hymen was intact and had
no laceration, but her labia minora was coaptated and her labia
majora was gaping.[4]
On March 12, 1996, accused-appellant was formally charged with
rape. At his arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of not
guilty.[5] After trial, the lower court convicted him of the crime of rape.
Accused-appellant is now before us on appeal on a lone
assigned error:
DUE TO REASONABLE DOUBT, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
IN DAVAO CITY, BRANCH 15 HAS COMMITED AN ERROR IN
NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.[6]
Accused-appellant argues that his negative plea to the
information filed against him; his filing of the notice of appeal; and his
denial of the rape charge against him during trial indicate his
innocence.[7]
We are not persuaded.
Constitutional due process demands that the accused in a
criminal case should be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. The rationale behind this constitutional
guarantee are: First, to furnish the accused with the description of the
charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; second, to
avail himself of his conviction or acquittal, for protection against a
further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court
of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient
in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.[8]
In fulfillment of the aforesaid constitutional guarantee, Rule 116,
Section 1 (a) of the Rules of Court mandates that an accused be
arraigned in open court and asked to enter a plea of guilty or not guilty
of the crime charged. The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise
the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life,
depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very
15

least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is Q: What happened next?
mobilized against him.[9] Consequently, when accused-appellant
entered a negative plea during his arraignment, the same was not A: I lost consciousness and when I regained consciousness,
binding on the court as an indication of his innocence. Rather, it is a I was surprised because I was already at the grassy
general denial of the charges impugned against him and an exercise area.
of his right to be heard of his plea.
Q: This person that you saw who hit you with a sling shot, do
Neither is accused-appellants filing of a notice of you know him?
appeal[10] indicative of his innocence. On the contrary, accused-
appellants appeal was necessitated by the judgment of conviction A: Yes, sir.
rendered against him by the trial court. At the very least, the judgment
below constituted a preliminary finding of accused-appellants guilt. Q: Why do you know him?

On the whole, accused-appellant denies having abused and A: Because he is my neighbor, sir.
raped Mary Ann. Time-tested is the rule that between the positive
assertions of prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of Q: How long?
the accused, the former undisputedly deserves more credence and
entitled to greater evidentiary weight.[11] Moreover, positive A: Very long time, sir.
identification of the accused by prosecution witnesses as to his
participation in the crime cannot be overcome by his denial of Q: What happened when you were brought to the grassy
participation.[12] place?

In the case at bar, Mary Ann Martenez positively identified A: When I regained my consciousness I was already stripped
accused-appellant as her molester in this wise: naked and he was on top of me.

Q: Did you see the person who hit you with a sling shot? Q: What was he doing?

A: Yes, sir. A: His penis was on top of my vagina, sir.

Q: Whom did you see? Q: What else happened?

A: (Witness pointing to a person wearing maong pants, white A: I felt pain in my vagina.
T-shirt and when asked his name he answered that he is
Marianito Monteron.) Q: What did you do?

A: I grabbed his penis and so he felt pain and stood up.

16

Q: You said earlier that you saw the person who hit you with Q: What was he doing that time?
a sling shot?
A: He was on top of Mary Ann. (Emphasis provided)[14]
A: Yes, sir.
It is axiomatic that negative assertions cannot prevail over the
Q: You recognized him? positive testimonies of credible witnesses.[15] Thus, the accused-
appellants denial, not being substantiated by clear and convincing
A: Yes, sir. evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence bearing no weight in
law.[16] Moreover, the defense of denial is inherently weak and has
Q: You saw a person on top of you later on the grassy place? always been viewed with disfavor by the courts due to the facility with
which they can be concocted.[17]
A: Yes, sir.
Accused-appellant challenges the testimony of Arnel Arat, saying
Q: Who is this person that you saw in the grassy place? that he was a biased witness because he is Mary Anns cousin. [18] It is
a basic precept that relationship per se of a witness with the victim
A: The same person, sir. does not necessarily mean that he is biased. [19] On the contrary,
relatives have more interest in telling the truth for they want the real
(Witness pointing to Mr. Monteron the accused). culprits to be meted their punishment.[20] To be sure, there is no law
disqualifying a person from testifying in a criminal case in which his
(Emphasis provided) [13] relative is involved if the former was at the scene of the crime and
witnessed the execution of the crime.[21] Thus, the relationship of Arnel
Mary Anns testimony pointing to accused-appellant as the author Arat to Mary Ann does not impair the credibility of his testimony,
of the crime is corroborated by her cousin Arnel Arat, viz: especially so when the same was given in a clear, convincing and
straightforward manner.
Q: What did you see?
Accused-appellant further posits that Mary Anns charge against
A: (Witness pointing to a person wearing a white T-shirt) I him was prompted by ill-will or grudge harbored by the Martenez
saw Marianito Monteron, the accused. family against the Monterons. More specifically, accused-appellant
narrated that his father and Mary Anns father quarreled in a cockpit.
Q: Did you recognize him that time? [22]
This, however, cannot be considered as a motive strong enough to
falsely accuse accused-appellant of so grave a crime as rape. Not a
A: Yes, sir. few accused in rape cases have attributed the charges brought
against them to family feud, resentment, or revenge. But such alleged
Q: Why do you know him? motives have never swayed this Court from lending full credence to
the testimony of the complainant where she remains steadfast in her
A: Because we played basketball together.
17
direct and cross examination.[23] Besides, no parent would expose his
or her own daughter to the shame and scandal of having undergone
such debasing defilement of her chastity if the charges were not true.
[24]
It is unnatural for a parent to use his own offspring as an engine of
malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to embarrassment and
even stigma.[25]
Accused-appellant also contends that it was unlikely for him to
strip naked and commit rape in broad daylight. [26] In this connection,
suffice it to say that lust is no respecter of time and place. It is known
to happen in the most unlikely places such as parks, along roadsides,
within school premises or even occupied rooms. [27] Rape has also
been committed on a passageway and at noontime.[28]
While accused-appellant is guilty of rape, the same was
committed only in its attempted stage. Mary Ann clearly testified that
accused-appellant only placed his penis on top of her vagina. In fact,
she was able to grab it and push it away from her, causing accused-
appellant to stand up. The pain she felt may have been caused by
accused-appellants attempts to insert his organ into hers. However,
the fact remains, based on Mary Anns own narrative, that accused-
appellants penis was merely on top of her vagina and has not actually
entered the same.Accused-appellant has commenced the
commission of the rape directly by overt acts, i.e., that of undressing
himself and the victim and lying on top of her, but he did not perform
all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. In the case at bar, it was Mary Anns violent resistance
which prevented the insertion of accused-appellants penis in her
vagina.
The foregoing conclusion is supported by the medical findings of
Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma that Mary Anns hymen was intact and had no
laceration.[29]
In People v. Campuhan,[30] we held that the labia majora of the
victim must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely
for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a
grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons
pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated
rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female
organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis,
there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted
rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.[31]
Consummated rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua.[32] For
attempted rape, the penalty two degrees lower shall be imposed,
[33]
i.e., prision mayor.
During his direct examination, accused-appellant testified that he
was born on December 3, 1979.[34] Consequently, when the crime was
committed on March 7, 1996, accused-appellant was only seventeen
years old. We have held that the claim of minority by an accused will
be upheld by the court even without any proof to corroborate his
testimony, especially so when coupled by the fact that prosecution
failed to present contradictory evidence thereto.[35]
Therefore, considering the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, the penalty to be imposed on accused-appellant should be
lowered by one more degree,[36] i.e., prision correccional. There being
no more aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the same shall be
imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the penalty to be imposed should be four (4) months and one (1)
day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum.
The trial court correctly ordered accused-appellant to indemnify
the victim, Mary Ann Martenez, in the amount of P50,000.00. Moral
damages may also be awarded without necessity for pleading or proof
18
thereof. In cases of attempted rape, the amount of moral damages is
P25,000.00.[37]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No.
36,564-96, is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Marianito Monteron y
Pantoras is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Attempted Rape and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four
(4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum. Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim,
Mary Ann Martenez, the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P25,000.00 as moral damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing
the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the
assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His
contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it
suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable
doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element
of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the
terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and
unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge
on the validity of the mentioned law.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the
validity of the law using the facial challenge.
Ruling:
On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not
constitute vagueness. The petitioners contention that it would not give
a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize
cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly
misplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence
can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only
be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its
face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot
be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the
statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld,
not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental
purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be
made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the
area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of
free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists.
Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial
challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such
statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a statute
is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground
that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or
other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On
19
its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on
the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court
whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the
purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real.
The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been
resolve in the Congress decision to include it among the heinous
crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is
dismissed for lacking merit.
Statutory Construction
Case of People of the R.P. vs. Purisima
GR Nos. L-42050-66 20November1978
FACTS OF THE CASE:
There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the
People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the
Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are
consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic
question of law.
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the
respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly
weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a
motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges
mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before
them the details of which will be recounted below an
Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common
ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which
constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9
because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and
substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of
deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for
short) No. 9?
There are two elements to the the offense: first, the carrying
outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed
weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a
livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon
was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with
subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence,
criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying
of any dangerous weapon outside of the residence w/o regard
to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory
construction.
HELD:
COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER
AND AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT
JUDGES.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST
20
INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VII, and PORFIRIO
CANDELOSAS, NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. GARCIA, SIMEON
BUNDALIAN, JR., JOSEPH C. MAISO, EDUARDO A. LIBORDO,
ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO T. DIZON, GEORGE M. ALBINO,
MARIANO COTIA, JR., ARMANDO L. DIZON, ROGELIO B.
PARENO, RODRIGO V. ESTRADA, ALFREDO A. REYES, JOSE A.
BACARRA, REYNALDO BOGTONG, and EDGARDO M.
MENDOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO,
ELPIDIO ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO Y ROQUE and ALFREDO
VERSOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and JUANITO DE LA CRUZ Y NUNEZ,
SABINO BUENO Y CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and
BEN CASTILLO Y UBALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Samar, and PANCHITO
REFUNCION, respondents.
Jose L. Gamboa, Fermin Martin, Jr. & Jose D. Cajucom, Office of the
City of Fiscal of Manila and the Office of Provincial Fiscal of Samar for
petitioners.
Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and Garcia.
Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon Bundalian Jr., et al.
Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32 and L-
46313-16.
Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.
Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.
MUOZ PALMA, J.:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the
Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal
of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by
the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they
involve one basic question of law.
These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance,
namely: the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, presided by
Hon. Amante P. Purisima (17 Petitions), the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XVIII, presided by Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8
Petitions) and, the Court of First Instance of Samar, with Hon.
Wenceslao M. Polo, presiding, (1 Petition).
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective
accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused,
21
the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases
filed before them the details of which will be recounted below an
Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground,
viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the
offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to
state one essential element of the crime.
Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and
substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly
weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9?
This is the central issue which we shall resolve and dispose of, all
other corollary matters not being indispensable for the moment.
A The Information filed by the People
1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court presided
by Judge Purisima follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus
PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN, accused.
Crim. Case No. 19639
VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF
PROCLAMATION 1081
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS
Y DURAN of a violation of paragraph 3, Presidential
Decree No. 9 of Proclamation 1081, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 14 th day of December, 1974, in
the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
knowingly have in his possession and under his
custody and control one (1) carving knife with a blade
of 6- inches and a wooden handle of 5-1/4 inches, or
an overall length of 11- inches, which the said
accused carried outside of his residence, the said
weapon not being used as a tool or implement
necessary to earn his livelihood nor being used in
connection therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66)
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the name of
the accused, the date and place of the commission of the crime, and
the kind of weapon involved.
2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with the Court
presided by Judge Maceren follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus
REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, accused.
CRIM. C
29677
VIOL. O
PD 9 IN
LOI
No. 266
Chief
Executiv
April 1,
22

INFORMATION ILLEGA
POSSE
The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y
AQUINO of a VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3, DEADLY
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 in relation to Letter of WEAPO
Instruction No. 266 of the Chief Executive dated April 1,
1975, committed as follows: (VIOLAT
PD NO.
That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then INFORMATION
and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry
outside of his residence a bladed and pointed weapon, The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
to wit: an ice pick with an overall length of about 8 Samar, accuses PANCHITO REFUNCION of the crime
inches, the same not being used as a necessary tool or of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON or
implement to earn his livelihood nor being used in VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9 issued by the President of
connection therewith. the Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972, pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept. 21 and 23, 1972,
Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32) committed as follows:

The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except for the That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the
name of the accused, the date and place of the commission of the evening at Barangay Barruz, Municipality of
crime, and the kind of weapon involved. Matuginao, Province of Samar Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorabe Court, the
3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First Instance of abovenamed accused, knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully
Samar is quoted hereunder: and feloniously carried with him outside of his
residence a deadly weapon called socyatan, an
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus instrument which from its very nature is no such as
PANCHITO REFUNCION, accused. could be used as a necessary tool or instrument to
earn a livelihood, which act committed by the accused
CRIM. CASE NO. is a Violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.
933
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)
For
: B. The Orders of dismissal
23
In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred
with the submittal of the defense that one essential element of the
offense charged is missing from the Information, viz: that the carrying
outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt
weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or
related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized
lawlessness or public disorder.
1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:
... the Court is of the opinion that in order that
possession of bladed weapon or the like outside
residence may be prosecuted and tried under P.D. No.
9, the information must specifically allege that the
possession of bladed weapon charged was for the
purpose of abetting, or in furtherance of the conditions
of rampant criminality, organized lawlessness, public
disorder, etc. as are contemplated and recited in
Proclamation No. 1081, as justification therefor. Devoid
of this specific allegation, not necessarily in the same
words, the information is not complete, as it does not
allege sufficient facts to constitute the offense
contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The information in these
cases under consideration suffer from this defect.
xxx xxx xxx
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is
not difficult to believe the murmurings of detained
persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession
of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than
ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so
heartless now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a
most convenient tool for extortion, what with the
terrifying risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of
five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of
scissors, which only God knows where it came from.
Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace
officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and
even that could only convey the coercive message of
one year in jail, now anything that has the semblance
of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in
trash cans, may already serve the same purpose, and
yet five to ten times more incriminating than the
infamous paltik.
For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of
intentions and wisely applied, its necessity can never
be assailed. But it seems it is back-firing, because it is
too hot in the hands of policemen who are inclined to
backsliding.
The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be
found in the heart of the Fiscal and the conscience of
the Court, and hence this resolution, let alone technical
legal basis, is prompted by the desire of this Court to
apply said checkvalves. (pp. 55-57, rollo of L-42050-
66)
2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the charges
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be
attained by Proclamation No. 1081 is the maintenance
of law and order throughout the Philippines and the
prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless
violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion.
It is therefore reasonable to conclude from the
24
foregoing premises that the carrying of bladed, pointed
or blunt weapons outside of one's residence which is
made unlawful and punishable by said par. 3 of P.D.
No. 9 is one that abets subversion, insurrection or
rebellion, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and
public disorder or is intended to bring about these
conditions. This conclusion is further strengthened by
the fact that all previously existing laws that also made
the carrying of similar weapons punishable have not
been repealed, whether expressly or impliedly. It is
noteworthy that Presidential Decree No. 9 does not
contain any repealing clause or provisions.
xxx xxx xxx
The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these
deadly weapons if not concealed in one's person and if
not carried in any of the aforesaid specified places,
would appear to be not unlawful and punishable by
law.
With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9,
however, the prosecution, through Assistant Fiscal
Hilario H. Laqui, contends in his opposition to the
motion to quash, that this act is now made unlawful
and punishable, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof,
regardless of the intention of the person carrying such
weapon because the law makes it "mala prohibita". If
the contention of the prosecution is correct, then if a
person happens to be caught while on his way home
by law enforcement officers carrying a kitchen knife
that said person had just bought from a store in order
that the same may be used by one's cook for preparing
the meals in one's home, such person will be liable for
punishment with such a severe penalty as
imprisonment from five to ten years under the decree.
Such person cannot claim that said knife is going to be
used by him to earn a livelihood because he intended it
merely for use by his cook in preparing his meals.
This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential
Decree No. 9 were to be interpreted and applied in the
manner that that the prosecution wants it to be done.
The good intentions of the President in promulgating
this decree may thus be perverted by some
unscrupulous law enforcement officers. It may be used
as a tool of oppression and tyranny or of extortion.
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore the considered and humble view of this
Court that the act which the President intended to
make unlawful and punishable by Presidential Decree
No. 9, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, is one
that abets or is intended to abet subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and
public disorder. (pp. 28-30, rollo of L-46229-32)
3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his
order dismissing the Information filed before him, thus:
... We believe that to constitute an offense under the
aforcited Presidential decree, the same should be or
there should be an allegation that a felony was
committed in connection or in furtherance of
subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence
and public disorder. Precisely Proclamation No. 1081
declaring a state of martial law throughout the country
was issued because of wanton destruction to lives and
properties widespread lawlessness and anarchy. And
25
in order to restore the tranquility and stability of the
country and to secure the people from violence anti
loss of lives in the quickest possible manner and time,
carrying firearms, explosives and deadly weapons
without a permit unless the same would fall under the
exception is prohibited. This conclusion becomes more
compelling when we consider the penalty imposable,
which is from five years to ten years. A strict
enforcement of the provision of the said law would
mean the imposition of the Draconian penalty upon the
accused.
xxx xxx xxx
It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before
and during martial law, as a matter of status symbol,
carrying deadly weapons is very common, not
necessarily for committing a crime nor as their farm
implement but for self-preservation or self-defense if
necessity would arise specially in going to and from
their farm. (pp. 18-19, rollo of L-46997)
In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given
before arraignment of the accused. In the criminal case before the
Court of (First Instance of Samar the accused was arraigned but at
the same time moved to quash the Information. In all the cases where
the accused were under arrest, the three Judges ordered their
immediate release unless held on other charges.
C. The law under which the Informations in question were filed by
the People.
As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are
charged with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.
We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9
DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS
NO. 6 and NO. 7 DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1972, AND
SEPTEMBER 23, 1972, RESPECTIVELY, TO BE
UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING PENALTIES
THEREFORE.
WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated
September 21, 1972, the Philippines has been placed
under a state of martial law;
WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081,
General Order No. 6 dated September 22, 1972 and
General Order No. 7 dated September 23, 1972, have
been promulgated by me;
WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless
violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder
mentioned in the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are
committed and abetted by the use of firearms,
explosives and other deadly weapons;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, in older to attain the desired result of the
aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders
Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6
and 7 is unlawful and the violator shall, upon conviction
suffer:
26
(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or
electrocution as a Military, Court/Tribunal/Commission
may direct, it the firearm involved in the violation is
unlicensed and is attended by assault upon, or
resistance to persons in authority or their agents in the
performance of their official functions resulting in death
to said persons in authority or their agent; or if such
unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of crimes
against persons, property or chastity causing the death
of the victim used in violation of any other General
Orders and/or Letters of Instructions promulgated
under said Proclamation No. 1081:
(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty
years to life imprisonment as a Military
Court/Tribunal/commission may direct, when the
violation is not attended by any of the circumstances
enumerated under the preceding paragraph;
(c) The penalty provided for in the preceding
paragraphs shall be imposed upon the owner,
president, manager, members of the board of directors
or other responsible officers of any public or private
firms, companies, corporations or entities who shall
willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned
by such firm, company, corporation or entity concerned
to be used in violation of said General Orders Nos. 6
and 7.
2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including
hand grenades, rifle grenades and other explosives,
including, but not limited to, "pill box bombs," "molotov
cocktail bombs," "fire bombs," or other incendiary
device consisting of any chemical, chemical
compound, or detonating agents containing
combustible units or other ingredients in such
proportion, quantity, packing, or bottling that ignites by
fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by
detonation of all or part of the compound or mixture
which may cause such a sudden generation of highly
heated gases that the resultant gaseous pressures are
capable of producing destructive effects on
continguous objects or of causing injury or death of a
person; and any person convicted thereof shall be
punished by imprisonment ranging from ten to fifteen
years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may
direct.
3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any
bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as "fan knife,"
"spear," "dagger," "bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or
club, except where such articles are being used as
necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and
while being used in connection therewith; and any
person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a
Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
4. When the violation penalized in the preceding
paragraphs 2 and 3 is committed during the
commission of or for the purpose of committing, any
other crime, the penalty shall be imposed upon the
offender in its maximum extent, in addition to the
penalty provided for the particular offenses committed
or intended to be committed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in
the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-
two.
27

(S The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory
GD offenses the intention of the accused who commits the act is
) immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily
FE perpetuated; that P.D. 9 provides and condemns not only the carrying
RDI of said weapon in connection with the commission of the crime of
NA subversion or the like, but also that of criminality in general, that is, to
ND eradicate lawless violence which characterized pre-martial law days.
E. It is also argued that the real nature of the criminal charge is
MA determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor
RC from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
OS violated but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information. 2
President
E. Our Ruling on the matter
Re
pub 1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a
lic criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the
of accusation against him. 3
the
Phil Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
ippi expressly requires that for a complaint or information to be sufficient it
nes must, inter alia state the designation of the offense by the statute, and
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This
D. The arguments of the People is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the
opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. 4
In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as
stated earlier joins the City Fiscal of Manila and the Provincial Fiscal To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution
of Samar in seeking the setting aside of the questioned orders of and the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is imperative for the specific
dismissal, the main argument advanced on the issue now under statute violated to be designated or mentioned 4 in the charge. In fact,
consideration is that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that another compelling reason exists why a specification of the statute
the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities; that violated is essential in these cases. As stated in the order of
the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for respondent Judge Maceren the carrying of so-called "deadly
reasons of public policy. 1 weapons" is the subject of another penal statute and a Manila city
ordinance. Thus, Section 26 of Act No. 1780 provides:
28
Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to
carry concealed about his person any bowie knife, dirk
dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: ... Any person
violating the provisions of this section shall, upon
conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be
punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos,
or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six
months, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court.
Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance
No. 3928 which took effect on December 4, 1957, in turn penalizes
with a fine of not more than P200.00 or imprisonment for not more
than one months, or both, at the discretion of the court, anyone who
shall carry concealed in his person in any manner that would disguise
its deadly character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly
weapon ... in any public place. Consequently, it is necessary that the
particular law violated be specified as there exists a substantial
difference between the statute and city ordinance on the one hand
and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the circumstances of the
commission of the crime and the penalty imposed for the offense.
We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and
the city ordinance are deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3)
does not contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by
implication is not favored. 6 This principle holds true with greater force
with regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be construed
strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. 7 In fact,
Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only
by subsequent ones and their violation or non- observance shall not
be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be
made to fall, at the discretion of a police officer or a prosecuting fiscal,
under the statute, or the city ordinance, or the presidential decree.
That being the case, the right becomes more compelling for an
accused to be confronted with the facts constituting the essential
elements of the offense charged against him, if he is not to become
an easy pawn of oppression and harassment, or of negligent or
misguided official action a fear understandably shared by
respondent Judges who by the nature of their judicial functions are
daily exposed to such dangers.
2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged in
the caption as well as in the body of the Information with a violation of
paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the offense
treated in the presidential decree in question?
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying
outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc.
not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood;
and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in
furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly
weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of the statute or the city
ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying
any of the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a
criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable
under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without that motivation,
the act falls within the purview of the city ordinance or some statute
when the circumstances so warrant.
Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only
reasonably, logical, and valid construction given to P.D. 9(3).
3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all
situations where a person carries outside his residence any of the
weapons mentioned or described in the decree irrespective of
29
motivation, intent, or purpose, converts these cases into one of
"statutory construction." That there is ambiguity in the presidential
decree is manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its
implementation. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to
construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure,
guided by the basic principle that penal statutes are to be construed
and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the
state.
4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure a
presidential decree in these cases the primary rule is to search for
and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the
controlling factor, for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo,
per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of a
statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to
the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. 8
There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or reason
for P.D. 9(3).
First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the
enactment of P.D. 9. These events are clearly spelled out in the
"Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of
martial law in the country pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated
September 21, 1972; (2) the desired result of Proclamation 1081 as
well as General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly mentioned
in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, aid public disorder
mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are committed and abetted by the
use of firearms and explosives and other deadly weapons.
The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a
statute usually introduced by the word "whereas", is not an essential
part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent
defects in the statute (p. 120, rollo of L-42050-66); that
the explanatory note or enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed
limits the violation of the decree, cannot prevail over the text
itself inasmuch as such explanatory note merely states or explains
the reason which prompted the issuance of the decree. (pp. 114-115,
rollo of 46997)
We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of
determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes
necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this
can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses
which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of
the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the
minds of the makers as to the mischiefs which are to
be remedied, and objects which are to be
accomplished, by the provisions of the statute." (West
Norman Timber v. State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in
Words and Phrases, "Preamble"; emphasis supplied)
While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part
thereof, it may, when the statute is in itself ambiguous
and difficult of interpretation, be resorted to, but not to
create a doubt or uncertainty which otherwise does not
exist." (James v. Du Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294,
cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble")
In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et al. this
Court had occasion to state that '(L)egislative intent must be
ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of
an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule
of statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase
might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually
intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with
those with which it is associated. Thus, an apparently general
30
provision may have a limited application if read together with other
provisions. 9
Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within
its reason or intent.
In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause, the
presidential decree states:
NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
Commander-in-Chief of an the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, in order to attain the desired result of the
aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders
Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
xxx xxx xxx
From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in
P.D. 9 are those related to the desired result of
Proclamation 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7.
General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms and
therefore have no relevance to P.D. 9(3) which refers
to blunt or bladed weapons. With respect to
Proclamation 1081 some of the underlying reasons for
its issuance are quoted hereunder:
WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up
arms against our duly constituted government and
against our people, and having committed and are still
committing acts of armed insurrection and rebellion
consisting of armed raids, forays, sorties, ambushes,
wanton acts of murders, spoilage, plunder, looting,
arsons, destruction of public and private buildings, and
attacks against innocent and defenseless civilian lives
and property, all of which activities have seriously
endangered and continue to endanger public order and
safety and the security of the nation, ...
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the
land a state of anarchy and lawlessness, chaos and
disorder, turmoil and destruction of a magnitude
equivalent to an actual war between the forces of our
duly constituted government and the New People's
Army and their satellite organizations because of the
unmitigated forays, raids, ambuscades, assaults,
violence, murders, assassinations, acts of terror,
deceits, coercions, threats, intimidations, treachery,
machinations, arsons, plunders and depredations
committed and being committed by the aforesaid
lawless elements who have pledged to the whole
nation that they will not stop their dastardly effort and
scheme until and unless they have fully attained their
primary and ultimate purpose of forcibly seizing
political and state power in this country by
overthrowing our present duly constituted
government, ... (See Book I, Vital Documents on the
Declaration of Martial Law in the Philippines by the
Supreme Court of the Philippines, pp. 13-39)
It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon
with a motivation connected with or related to the afore-quoted
desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D.
9(3), and nothing else.
Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to
be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. (U.S.
v. American Tracking Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited
31
in LVN Pictures v. Philippine Musicians Guild, 110 Phil.
725, 731; emphasis supplied)
When construing a statute, the reason for its
enactment should be kept in mind, and the statute
should be construed with reference to its intended
scope and purpose. (Statutory Construction by E.T.
Crawford, pp. 604-605, cited in Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compania de Seguros,
107 Phil. 1055, 1060; emphasis supplied)
5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire into
the consequences of the measure if a strict adherence to the letter of
the paragraph is followed.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a
valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never
intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which
the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious
consequences. 9-a
It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the
President of the Republic there was no intent to work a hardship or an
oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression,
arming one person with a weapon to impose hardship on another, and
so on. 10
At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the
following:
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is
not difficult to believe the murmurings of detained
persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession
of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than
ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so
heartless now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a
most convenient tool for extortion, what with the
terrifying risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of
five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of
scissors, which only God knows where it came from.
Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace
officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and
even that could only convey the coercive message of
one year in jail, now anything that has the semblance
of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in
trash cans, may already serve the same purpose, and
yet five to ten times more incriminating than the
infamous paltik. (pp. 72-73, rollo L-42050-66)
And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's
interpretation of P.D. 9(3) results in absurdity at times. To his example
We may add a situation where a law-abiding citizen, a lawyer by
profession, after gardening in his house remembers to return the bolo
used by him to his neighbor who lives about 30 meters or so away
and while crossing the street meets a policeman. The latter upon
seeing the bolo being carried by that citizen places him under arrest
and books him for a violation of P.D. 9(3). Could the presidential
decree have been conceived to produce such absurd, unreasonable,
and insensible results?
6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and
liberally in favor of an accused.
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the
tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals; the object is to
establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe,
and the discretion of the court limited." 11 The purpose is not to enable
a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to
provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. 12
32
Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this manner,
viz:
Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No
person should be brought within their terms who is not
clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced
criminal which is not made clearly so by the statute.
(U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246)
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict
construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws, instead, the rule merely
serves as an additional, single factor to be considered
as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws.
(People v. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684, 692)
F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.
The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged
in the Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently
valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely
by the facts alleged therein. 13 Where the facts are incomplete and do
not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation
is in order.
Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the
defendant may move to quash the complaint or information when the
facts charged do not constitute an offense.
In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is
charged with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment under Article
204 of the Revised Penal Code, failure to allege in the Information
that the judgment was rendered knowing it to be unjust, is fatal. 14
In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar
Bengzon who later became Chief Justice of the Court affirmed an
order of the trial court which quashed an Information wherein the facts
recited did not constitute a public offense as defined in Section 1,
Republic Act 145. 15
G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the People
could have availed itself of other available remedies below.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:
Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to
quash. If the motion to quash is sustained the court
may order that another information be filed. If such
order is made the defendant, if in custody, shall remain
so unless he shall be admitted to bail. If such order is
not made or if having been made another information
is not filed withuntime to be specified in the order, or
within such further time as the court may allow for
good cause shown, the defendant, if in custody, shall
be discharged therefrom, unless he is in custody on
some other charge.
Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. The information
or complaint may be amended, in substance or form,
without leave of court, at any time before the defendant
pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all
matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the
court, when the same can be done without prejudice to
the rights of the defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of
the Informations in these cases, viz:
33
First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have
filed an amended Information to include the second element of the
offense as defined in the disputed orders of respondent Judges. We
have ruled that if the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute
a punishable offense, the case should not be dismissed but the
prosecution should be given an opportunity to amend the
Information. 16
Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a
complaint either under Section 26 of Act No. 1780, quoted earlier, or
Manila City Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance No.
3928, especially since in most if not all of the cases, the dismissal
was made prior to arraignment of the accused and on a motion to
quash.
Section 8. Rule 117 states that:
An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense unless the
motion was based on the grounds specified in section
2, subsections (f) and (h) of this rule.
Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or Information is
barred only when the criminal action or liability had been extinguished
(Section 2[f]) or when the motion to quash was granted for reasons of
double jeopardy. (ibid., [h])
As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be successfully
invoked by the accused in all these cases should new complaints be
filed against them, is a matter We need not resolve for the present.
H. We conclude with high expectations that police authorities and
the prosecuting arm of the government true to the oath of office they
have taken will exercise utmost circumspection and good faith in
evaluating the particular circumstances of a case so as to reach a fair
and just conclusion if a situation falls within the purview of P.D. 9(3)
and the prosecution under said decree is warranted and justified. This
obligation becomes a sacred duty in the face of the severe penalty
imposed for the offense.
On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor Rodolfo A.
Nocon on his letter to the City Fiscal of Manila on October 15, 1975,
written for the Secretary, now Minister of Justice, where he stated the
following:
In any case, please study well each and every case of
this nature so that persons accused of carrying bladed
weapons, specially those whose purpose is not to
subvert the duly constituted authorities, may not be
unduly indicted for the serious offenses falling under
P.D. No. 9. 17
Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire into
the wisdom of a law, it is however a judicial task and prerogative to
determine if official action is within the spirit and letter of the law and if
basic fundamental rights of an individual guaranteed by the
Constitution are not violated in the process of its implementation. We
have to face the fact that it is an unwise and unjust application of a
law, necessary and justified under prevailing circumstances, which
renders the measure an instrument of oppression and evil and leads
the citizenry to lose their faith in their government.
WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We
AFFIRM the Orders of respondent Judges dismissing or quashing the
Information concerned, subject however to Our observations made in
the preceding pages 23 to 25 of this Decision regarding the right of
the State or Petitioner herein to file either an amended Information
under Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new one under
other existing statute or city ordinance as the facts may warrant.
34

Without costs. I concur with the additional observation that accused could properly
be convicted of a violation of Act 1780 of the Philippine Commission
SO ORDERED. or of the ordinance.

Fernando, Teehankee, Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Castro, C.J. and Antonio, J, concur in the result.

Aquino, J, took no part. Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring.

I concur with the qualification that under existing jurisprudence

conviction is possible, without the need of amending the information,
Separate Opinions for violation of other laws or ordinances on concealment of deadly
weapons.

Makasiar, J, concurs.
BARREDO, J., concurring.
CONCEPCION, JR., J, concurring:
I concur with the qualification that under existing jurisprudence
conviction is possible, without the need of amending the information, I concur with the additional observation that accused could properly
for violation of other laws or ordinances on concealment of deadly be convicted of a violation of Act 1780 of the Philippine Commission
weapons. or of the ordinance.

Makasiar, J, concurs.

CONCEPCION, JR., J, concurring: