Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola *Succession Set X* Page 1 of 40
Republic of the Philippines Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot located at #9200 Catmon St., San Antonio Village,
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 157451 December 16, 2005
LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests the burden of showing why it
should not be allowed. In the present case, petitioner has failed to discharge this burden
satisfactorily. For this reason, the Court cannot attribute any reversible error on the part of the
appellate tribunal that allowed the probate of the will.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse
and set aside the December 12, 2002 Decision 2 and the March 7, 2003 Resolution 3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 44296. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, and the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. In its place judgment is rendered approving and allowing probate to the said last will and
testament of Placido Valmonte and ordering the issuance of letters testamentary to the
petitioner Josefina Valmonte. Let this case be remanded to the court a quo for further and
concomitant proceedings."4
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision of the CA, as follows:
"x x x: Like so many others before him, Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United
States until he finally reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the
Makati, which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte and titled in their names in
TCT 123468. Two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed
Josefina who was then 28 years old, in a ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on
February 5, 1982. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8,
1984 of a cause written down as COR PULMONALE.
"Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2)
pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page
contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was
signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left hand margin by the
three instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the attestation
clause and the acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation
clause and again on the left hand margin. It provides in the body that:
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF PLACIDO VALMONTE IN THE NAME OF THE LORD AMEN:
I, PLACIDO VALMONTE, of legal age, married to Josefina Cabansag Valmonte, and a resident of
9200 Catmon Street, Makati, Metro Manila, 83 years of age and being of sound and disposing
mind and memory, do hereby declare this to be my last will and testament:
1. It is my will that I be buried in the Catholic Cemetery, under the auspices of the Catholic
Church in accordance with the rites and said Church and that a suitable monument to be erected
and provided my by executrix (wife) to perpetuate my memory in the minds of my family and
friends;
2. I give, devise and bequeath unto my loving wife, JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, one half (1/2)
portion of the follow-described properties, which belongs to me as [co-owner]:
a. Lot 4-A, Block 13 described on plan Psd-28575, LRC, (GLRO), situated in Makati, Metro Manila,
described and covered by TCT No. 123468 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro-Manila
registered jointly as co-owners with my deceased sister (Ciriaca Valmonte), having share and
share alike;
b. 2-storey building standing on the above-described property, made of strong and mixed
materials used as my residence and my wife and located at No. 9200 Catmon Street, Makati,
Metro Manila also covered by Tax Declaration No. A-025-00482, Makati, Metro-Manila, jointly in
the name of my deceased sister, Ciriaca Valmonte and myself as co-owners, share and share
alike or equal co-owners thereof;
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
3. All the rest, residue and remainder of my real and personal properties, including my savings
account bank book in USA which is in the possession of my nephew, and all others whatsoever
and wherever found, I give, devise and bequeath to my said wife, Josefina C. Valmonte;
4. I hereby appoint my wife, Josefina C. Valmonte as sole executrix of my last will and testament,
and it is my will that said executrix be exempt from filing a bond;
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 15th day of June 1983 in Quezon City,
Philippines.
"The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the grounds that:
1. Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the testator, especially those found in the USA;
2. Petitioner failed to state the names, ages, and residences of the heirs of the testator; or to
give them proper notice pursuant to law;
3. Will was not executed and attested as required by law and legal solemnities and formalities
were not complied with;
4. Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of the alleged execution he being in
an advance sate of senility;
5. Will was executed under duress, or the influence of fear or threats;
6. Will was procured by undue and improper influence and pressure on the part of the petitioner
and/or her agents and/or assistants; and/or
7. Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument
should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto;
and she also opposed the appointment as Executrix of Josefina alleging her want of
understanding and integrity.
"At the hearing, the petitioner Josefina testified and called as witnesses the notary public Atty.
Floro Sarmiento who prepared and notarized the will, and the instrumental witnesses spouses
Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Feliza Gomez and Josie Collado. For the opposition, the oppositor Leticia
and her daughter Mary Jane Ortega testified.
"According to Josefina after her marriage with the testator they lived in her parents house at
Salingcob, Bacnotan, La Union but they came to Manila every month to get his $366.00 monthly
*Succession Set X* Page 2 of 40
pension and stayed at the said Makati residence. There were times though when to shave off on
expenses, the testator would travel alone. And it was in one of his travels by his lonesome self
when the notarial will was made. The will was witnessed by the spouses Eugenio and Feliza
Gomez, who were their wedding sponsors, and by Josie Collado. Josefina said she had no
knowledge of the existence of the last will and testament of her husband, but just serendipitously
found it in his attache case after his death. It was only then that she learned that the testator
bequeathed to her his properties and she was named the executrix in the said will. To her
estimate, the value of property both real and personal left by the testator is worth more or less
P100,000.00. Josefina declared too that the testator never suffered mental infirmity because
despite his old age he went alone to the market which is two to three kilometers from their home
cooked and cleaned the kitchen and sometimes if she could not accompany him, even traveled
to Manila alone to claim his monthly pension. Josefina also asserts that her husband was in good
health and that he was hospitalized only because of a cold but which eventually resulted in his
death.
"Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the testators will, testified that it
was in the first week of June 1983 when the testator together with the three witnesses of the will
went to his house cum law office and requested him to prepare his last will and testament. After
the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public
told them to come back on June 15, 1983 to give him time to prepare it. After he had prepared
the will the notary public kept it safely hidden and locked in his drawer. The testator and his
witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were
instructed by his wife to come back on August 9, 1983, and which they did. Before the testator
and his witnesses signed the prepared will, the notary public explained to them each and every
term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the testator spoke and understood. He likewise explained
that though it appears that the will was signed by the testator and his witnesses on June 15,
1983, the day when it should have been executed had he not gone out of town, the formal
execution was actually on August 9, 1983. He reasoned that he no longer changed the
typewritten date of June 15, 1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty. The
notary public also testified that to his observation the testator was physically and mentally
capable at the time he affixed his signature on the will.
"The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the testimony of the notary public, and testified
that the testator went alone to the house of spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez at GSIS Village,
Quezon City and requested them to accompany him to the house of Atty. Floro Sarmiento
purposely for his intended will; that after giving his instructions to Atty. Floro Sarmiento, they
were told to return on June 15, 1983; that they returned on June 15, 1983 for the execution of the
will but were asked to come back instead on August 9, 1983 because of the absence of the
notary public; that the testator executed the will in question in their presence while he was of
sound and disposing mind and that he was strong and in good health; that the contents of the
will was explained by the notary public in the Ilocano and Tagalog dialect and that all of them as
witnesses attested and signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. And that
during the execution, the testators wife, Josefina was not with them.
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
"The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should not inherit alone because aside from her
there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him.
She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of
the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind. She
knew whereof she spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the Makati residence and asked
Leticias family to live with him and they took care of him. During that time, the testators
physical and mental condition showed deterioration, aberrations and senility. This was
corroborated by her daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and wanted to
marry.
"Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t]he evidence adduced, reduces the
opposition to two grounds, namely:
1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution and attestation of
the will; and
2. Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he was then in an
advanced state of senility
"It then found these grounds extant and proven, and accordingly disallowed probate." 5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate.
The CA upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had
acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had testamentary
capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his "sexual exhibitionism and
unhygienic, crude and impolite ways"6 did not make him a person of unsound mind.
Hence, this Petition.7
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
"I.
Whether or not the findings of the probate court are entitled to great respect.
"II.
*Succession Set X* Page 3 of 40
Whether or not the signature of Placido Valmonte in the subject will was procured by fraud or
trickery, and that Placido Valmonte never intended that the instrument should be his last will and
testament.
"III.
Whether or not Placido Valmonte has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed
the subject will."8
In short, petitioner assails the CAs allowance of the probate of the will of Placido Valmonte.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Probate of a Will
At the outset, we stress that only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for Review under
Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As an exception, however, the evidence presented
during the trial may be examined and the factual matters resolved by this Court when, as in the
instant case, the findings of fact of the appellate court differ from those of the trial court. 9
The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily mean that every will
presented for probate should be allowed. The law lays down the procedures and requisites that
must be satisfied for the probate of a will.10 Verily, Article 839 of the Civil Code states the
instances when a will may be disallowed, as follows:
"Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its
execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary or of some other person;
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his
will at the time of affixing his signature thereto."
In the present case, petitioner assails the validity of Placido Valmontes will by imputing fraud in
its execution and challenging the testators state of mind at the time.
Existence of Fraud in the
Execution of a Will
Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the formalities in the execution of the will, but
maintains that the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of the existence of fraud.
Particularly, she alleges that respondent, who is the testators wife and sole beneficiary,
conspired with the notary public and the three attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it.
Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the
will.
Petitioner contends that it was "highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young life [to]
almost immediately plunge into marriage with a man who [was] thrice her age x x x and who
happened to be [a] Fil-American pensionado," 11 thus casting doubt on the intention of respondent
in seeking the probate of the will. Moreover, it supposedly "defies human reason, logic and
common experience"12 for an old man with a severe psychological condition to have willingly
signed a last will and testament.
We are not convinced. Fraud "is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the
subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to
the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic
fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will
which, but for the fraud, he would not have made." 13
We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud
at the time of its execution.14 The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will
only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. 15 Unfortunately in this case, other than the
self-serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.
It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a
will.16 That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that
he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and
disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken "the cudgels of taking
care of [the testator] in his twilight years."17
*Succession Set X* Page 4 of 40
Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing on
the will does not invalidate the document, "because the law does not even require that a
[notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion." 18 More important, the
will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses who must
also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another. 19Furthermore, the testator and
the witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public. 20 In any event, we agree with
the CA that "the variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was
satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses." 21
The pertinent transcript of stenographic notes taken on June 11, 1985, November 25, 1985,
October 13, 1986, and October 21, 1987 -- as quoted by the CA -- are reproduced respectively as
follows:
"Atty. Floro Sarmiento:
Q You typed this document exhibit C, specifying the date June 15 when the testator and his
witnesses were supposed to be in your office?
A Yes sir.
Q On June 15, 1983, did the testator and his witnesses come to your house?
A They did as of agreement but unfortunately, I was out of town.
xxxxxxxxx
Q The document has been acknowledged on August 9, 1983 as per acknowledgement appearing
therein. Was this the actual date when the document was acknowledged?
A Yes sir.
Q What about the date when the testator and the three witnesses affixed their respective
signature on the first and second pages of exhibit C?
A On that particular date when it was acknowledged, August 9, 1983.
Q Why did you not make the necessary correction on the date appearing on the body of the
document as well as the attestation clause?
A Because I do not like anymore to make some alterations so I put it in my own handwriting
August 9, 1983 on the acknowledgement. (tsn, June 11, 1985, pp. 8-10)
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
Eugenio Gomez:
Q It appears on the first page Mr. Witness that it is dated June 15, 1983, whereas in the
acknowledgement it is dated August 9, 1983, will you look at this document and tell us this
discrepancy in the date?
A We went to Atty. Sarmiento together with Placido Valmonte and the two witnesses; that was
first week of June and Atty. Sarmiento told us to return on the 15th of June but when we returned,
Atty. Sarmiento was not there.
Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento on June 15, 1983, did you again go back?
A We returned on the 9th of August and there we signed.
Q This August 9, 1983 where you said it is there where you signed, who were your companions?
A The two witnesses, me and Placido Valmonte. (tsn, November 25, 1985, pp. 7-8)
Felisa Gomez on cross-examination:
Q Why did you have to go to the office of Atty. Floro Sarmiento, three times?
xxxxxxxxx
A The reason why we went there three times is that, the first week of June was out first time. We
went there to talk to Atty. Sarmiento and Placido Valmonte about the last will and testament.
After that what they have talked what will be placed in the testament, what Atty. Sarmiento said
was that he will go back on the 15th of June. When we returned on June 15, Atty. Sarmiento was
not there so we were not able to sign it, the will. That is why, for the third time we went there on
August 9 and that was the time we affixed our signature. (tsn, October 13, 1986, pp. 4-6)
Josie Collado:
Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento in his house on June 15, 1983, what transpired?
A The wife of Atty. Sarmiento told us that we will be back on August 9, 1983.
Q And on August 9, 1983 did you go back to the house of Atty. Sarmiento?
A Yes, Sir.
*Succession Set X* Page 5 of 40
Q For what purpose?
A Our purpose is just to sign the will.
Q Were you able to sign the will you mentioned?
A Yes sir. (tsn, October 21, 1987, pp. 4-5)"22
Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a "grand conspiracy" in the commission of
a fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent stood to receive any benefit
from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses and the notary
are credible evidence of its due execution. 23 Their testimony favoring it and the finding that it
was executed in accordance with the formalities required by law should be affirmed, absent any
showing of ill motives.24
Capacity to Make a Will
In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the following
guidelines:
"Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time
of its execution.
"Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all
his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or shattered by disease,
injury or other cause.
"It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of
the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act.
"Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the
contrary.
"The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his
dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month,
or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the
validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval."
According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be
considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the
proper objects of the testators bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido
had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds
of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the
proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we
have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity.
There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA,25 which held thus:
"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries
with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as
insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on
one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of
body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded
person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable
him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To
constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or
unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary
incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound
mind."26
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals areAFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
DOCTRINE: Ortega discusses two issues: (i) how to prove the fact of fraud in the making of the
will; and (ii) what constitutes a sound and disposing mind.
FACTS: Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached
retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the Philippines and lived in the house
located at San Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca
Valmonte.
1. Two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who
was then 28 years old. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on
October 8, 1984 of a cause written down as COR PULMONALE.
2. Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2)
pages, and dated June 15, 19893 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The will contained
provisions bequeathing Placidos properties to his Wife Josefina and appointing her as sole
executrix of his last will and testament, and thatsaid executrix be exempt from filing a bond.
*Succession Set X* Page 6 of 40
3. The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia and she also opposed the
appointment as Executrix of Josefina, alleging her want of understanding and integrity.
4. The petitioner Josefina testified and called as witnesses the notary public, Atty. Floro
Sarmiento who prepared and notarized the will, and the instrumental witnesses spouses
Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Feliza Gomez and Josie Collado. For the opposition, the
oppositor Leticia and her daughter Mary Jane Ortega testified.
5. According to Josefina, she had no knowledge of the existence of the last will and testament of
her husband, but just serendipitously found it in his attach case after his death. It was only then
that she learned that the testator bequeathed to her his properties and she was named the
executrix in the said will.
6. Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the testators will, testified that
it was in the first week of June 1983 when the testator together with the three witnesses of the
will went to his house cum law office and requested him to prepare his last will and testament.
Sarmiento explained that though it appears that the will was signed by the testator and the
witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been executed had he not gone out of
town, the formal execution was actually on August 9, 1983. He reasoned that he no longer
changed the typewritten date of June 15, 1983 because he did not like the document to appear
dirty. The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the testimony of the notary public.
7. The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should not inherit alone because aside from her
there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him.
She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of
the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind.
The court held that the evidence adduced, reduces the opposition to two grounds, (1) Non-
compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution and attestation of the will;
and (2) Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he was then in
an advancedstate of senility. The trial court disallowed the probate.
8. The appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate. The CA upheld the
credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who hadacknowledged the due
execution of the will.
ISSUE:
1. WON the signature of Placido Valmonte was procured thru fraud
2. WON Placido Valmonte has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed
the will.
HELD: Petition has no merit.
PROBATE OF WILL: The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily
mean that every will presented for probate should be allowed. The law lays down the procedures
and requisites that must be satisfied for the probate of a will. Verily, Article 839 of the Civil Code
states the instances when a will may be disallowed.
EXISTENCE OF FRAUD IN THE EXECUTION OF A WILL
Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the formalities in the execution of the will,but
maintains that the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of the existence of fraud.
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
Particularly, she alleges that respondent, who is the testators wife and sole
beneficiary,conspired with the notary public and the three attesting witnesses in deceiving
Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the
attestation of the will.
Fraud is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretence, by which the subject of it is
cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or
contents of the document which he executed, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in
consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which,
but for the fraud, he would not have made. the party challenging the will bears the burden of
proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to
the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. the party challenging
the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The
burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible
evidence of fraud.
It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a
will. That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that
he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary, and
disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken cared of the testator in
his twilight years. The conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the
document, because the law does not even require that a (notarial) will x x x be executed
and acknowledged on the same occasion. Petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a grand
conspiracy in the commission of fraud, There was no showing that the witnesses of the
proponent stood to receive any benefit from the allowance of the will.
The testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its
due execution. Their testimony favoring it and the finding that it was executed in accordance
with the formalities required by law should be affirmed, absent any showing of ill motives.
CAPACITY TO MAKE A WILL
According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be
considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of; (2) the
proper objects of the testators bounty; and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying
this test to the present case, the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will. It must be noted that despite his
advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent
of his shares in them, and even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it
was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. The omission of some relatives from
the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution,
intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6801 March 14, 1912
*Succession Set X* Page 7 of 40
JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appellee,
vs.
ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bataan, admitting
to probate a document which was offered as the last will and testament of Pioquinto Paguio y
Pizarro. The will purports to have been executed in the pueblo of Pilar, Province of Bataan, on the
19th day of April, 1908. The testator died on the 28th of September, 1909, a year and five
months following the date of the execution of the will. The will was propounded by the executrix,
Juliana Bagtas, widow of the decedent, and the opponents are a son and several grandchildren
by a former marriage, the latter being the children of a deceased daughter.
The basis of the opposition to the probation of the will is that the same was not executed
according to the formalities and requirements of the law touching wills, and further that the
testator was not in the full of enjoyment and use of his mental faculties and was without the
mental capacity necessary to execute a valid will.
The record shows that the testator, Pioquinto Paguio, for some fourteen of fifteen years prior to
the time of his death suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his body; that a few years prior
to his death his hearing became impaired and that he lost the power of speech. Owing to the
paralysis of certain muscles his head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. He retained
the use of his right hand, however, and was able to write fairly well. Through the medium of
signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other members of his family.
At the time of the execution of the will there were present the four testamentary witnesses,
Agustin Paguio, Anacleto Paguio, and Pedro Paguio, and attorney, Seor Marco, and one
Florentino Ramos. Anacleto Paguio and the attorney have since died, and consequently their
testimony was not available upon the trial of the case in the lower court. The other three
testamentary witnesses and the witness Florentino Ramos testified as to the manner in which the
will was executed. According to the uncontroverted testimony of these witnesses the will was
executed in the following manner:
Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items relating to the
disposition of his property, and these notes were in turn delivered to Seor Marco, who
transcribed them and put them in form. The witnesses testify that the pieces of paper upon
which the notes were written are delivered to attorney by the testator; that the attorney read
them to the testator asking if they were his testamentary dispositions; that the testator assented
each time with an affirmative movement of his head; that after the will as a whole had been thus
written by the attorney, it was read in a loud voice in the presence of the testator and the
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
witnesses; that Seor Marco gave the document to the testator; that the latter, after looking over
it, signed it in the presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn signed it in
the presence of the testator and each other.
These are the facts of record with reference to the execution of the will and we are in perfect
accord with the judgment of the lower court that the formalities of the Code of Civil Procedure
have been fully complied with.
This brings us now to a consideration of appellants' second assignment of error, viz, the
testator's alleged mental incapacity at the time of the execution of the will. Upon this point
considerable evidence was adduced at the trial. One of the attesting witnesses testified that at
the time of the execution of the will the testator was in his right mind, and that although he was
seriously ill, he indicated by movements of his head what his wishes were. Another of the
attesting witnesses stated that he was not able to say whether decedent had the full use of his
mental faculties or not, because he had been ill for some years, and that he (the witnesses) was
not a physician. The other subscribing witness, Pedro Paguio, testified in the lower court as a
witness for the opponents. He was unable to state whether or not the will was the wish of the
testator. The only reasons he gave for his statement were the infirmity and advanced age of the
testator and the fact that he was unable to speak. The witness stated that the testator signed
the will, and he verified his own signature as a subscribing witness.
Florentino Ramos, although not an attesting witness, stated that he was present when the will
was executed and his testimony was cumulative in corroboration of the manner in which the will
was executed and as to the fact that the testator signed the will. This witness also stated that he
had frequently transacted matters of business for the decedent and had written letters and made
inventories of his property at his request, and that immediately before and after the execution of
the will he had performed offices of his character. He stated that the decedent was able to
communicate his thoughts by writing. The testimony of this witness clearly indicates the
presence of mental capacity on the part of the testator. Among other witnesses for the
opponents were two physician, Doctor Basa and Doctor Viado. Doctor Basa testified that he had
attended the testator some four or five years prior to his death and that the latter had suffered
from a cerebral congestion from which the paralysis resulted. The following question was
propounded to Doctor Basa:
Q. Referring to mental condition in which you found him the last time you attended
him, do you think he was in his right mind?
A. I can not say exactly whether he was in his right mind, but I noted some mental
disorder, because when I spoke to him he did not answer me.
Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the substance of his testimony is that the testator had
suffered a paralysis and that he had noticed some mental disorder. He does not say that the
testator was not in his right mind at the time of the execution of the will, nor does he give it at
his opinion that he was without the necessary mental capacity to make a valid will. He did not
*Succession Set X* Page 8 of 40
state in what way this mental disorder had manifested itself other than that he had noticed that
the testator did not reply to him on one occasion when he visited him.
Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never seen the testator, but his answer was in reply to a
hypothetical question as to what be the mental condition of a person who was 79 years old and
who had suffered from a malady such as the testator was supposed to have had according to the
testimony of Doctor Basa, whose testimony Doctor Viado had heard. He replied and discussed at
some length the symptoms and consequences of the decease from which the testator had
suffered; he read in support of his statements from a work by a German Physician, Dr. Herman
Eichost. In answer, however, to a direct question, he stated that he would be unable to certify to
the mental condition of a person who was suffering from such a disease.
We do not think that the testimony of these two physicians in any way strengthens the
contention of the appellants. Their testimony only confirms the fact that the testator had been
for a number of years prior to his death afflicted with paralysis, in consequence of which his
physician and mental strength was greatly impaired. Neither of them attempted to state what
was the mental condition of the testator at the time he executed the will in question. There can
be no doubt that the testator's infirmities were of a very serious character, and it is quite evident
that his mind was not as active as it had been in the earlier years of his life. However, we can not
include from this that he wanting in the necessary mental capacity to dispose of his property by
will.
The courts have been called upon frequently to nullify wills executed under such circumstances,
but the weight of the authority is in support if the principle that it is only when those seeking to
overthrow the will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will
intervene to set aside a testamentary document of this character. In the case of Bugnao vs.
Ubag (14 Phil. Rep., 163), the question of testamentary capacity was discussed by this court. The
numerous citations there given from the decisions of the United States courts are especially
applicable to the case at bar and have our approval. In this jurisdiction the presumption of law is
in favor of the mental capacity of the testator and the burden is upon the contestants of the will
to prove the lack of testamentary capacity. (In the matter of the will of Cabigting, 14 Phil. Rep.,
463; in the matter of the will of Butalid, 10 Phil. Rep., 27; Hernaez vs. Hernaez, 1 Phil. Rep., 689.)
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well established, and the
testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by a court of competent
jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to
overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. This we think they have failed to do. There
are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have repeatedly held
that mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not render a person
incapable of making a will. The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full
enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will. If
such were the legal standard, few indeed would be the number of wills that could meet such
exacting requirements. The authorities, both medical and legal, are universal in statement that
the question of mental capacity is one of degree, and that there are many gradations from the
highest degree of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of diseased mentality which are
denominated as insanity and idiocy.
The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as any other right which
a person may exercise and this right should not be nullified unless mental incapacity is
established in a positive and conclusive manner. In discussing the question of testamentary
capacity, it is stated in volume 28, 70, of the American and English Encyclopedia of Law, that
Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression, perfect soundness of mind is not
essential to testamentary capacity. A testator may be afflicted with a variety of mental
weaknesses, disorders, or peculiarities and still be capable in law of executing a valid
will. (See the numerous cases there cited in support of this statement.)
The rule relating to testamentary capacity is stated in Buswell on Insanity, section 365, and
quoted with approval in Campbell vs. Campbell (130 Ill., 466), as follows:
To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind shall be
wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or otherwise, or that the
testator should be in the full possession of his reasoning faculties.
In note, 1 Jarman on Wills, 38, the rule is thus stated:
The question is not so much, that was the degree of memory possessed by the testator,
as, had he a disposing memory? Was he able to remember the property he was about to
bequeath, the manner of disturbing it, and the objects of his bounty? In a word, were his
mind and memory sufficiently sound to enable him to know and understand the
business in which he was engaged at the time when he executed his will. (See
authorities there cited.)
In Wilson vs. Mitchell (101 Penn., 495), the following facts appeared upon the trial of the case:
The testator died at the age of nearly 102 years. In his early years he was an intelligent and well
informed man. About seven years prior to his death he suffered a paralytic stroke and from that
*Succession Set X* Page 9 of 40
time his mind and memory were mush enfeebled. He became very dull of hearing and in
consequence of the shrinking of his brain he was affected with senile cataract causing total
blindness. He became filthy and obscene in his habits, although formerly he was observant of the
properties of life. The court, in commenting upon the case, said:
Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will affect the
capacity to make a will, if sufficient intelligence remains. The failure of memory is not
sufficient to create the incapacity, unless it be total, or extend to his immediate family
or property. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Dougal (the testator) had lived over one hundred years before he made the will, and his
physical and mental weakness and defective memory were in striking contrast with
their strength in the meridian of his life. He was blind; not deaf, but hearing impaired;
his mind acted slowly, he was forgetful or recent events, especially of names, and
repeated questions in conversation; and sometimes, when aroused for sleep or slumber,
would seem bewildered. It is not singular that some of those who had known him when
he was remarkable for vigor and intelligence, are of the opinion that his reason was so
far gone that he was incapable of making a will, although they never heard him utter an
irrational expression.
In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw the same contrast as
was pictured by the court in the case just quoted. The striking change in the physical and mental
vigor of the testator during the last years of his life may have led some of those who knew him in
his earlier days to entertain doubts as to his mental capacity to make a will, yet we think that the
statements of the witnesses to the execution of the will and statements of the conduct of the
testator at that time all indicate that he unquestionably had mental capacity and that he
exercised it on this occasion. At the time of the execution of the will it does not appear that his
conduct was irrational in any particular. He seems to have comprehended clearly what the nature
of the business was in which he was engaged. The evidence show that the writing and execution
of the will occupied a period several hours and that the testator was present during all this time,
taking an active part in all the proceedings. Again, the will in the case at bar is perfectly
reasonable and its dispositions are those of a rational person.
For the reasons above stated, the order probating the will should be and the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellants.
CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
1. Pioquinto Paguio died on September 28, 1909.
2. For some 14 or 15 years prior to the time of his death, he suffered from a paralysis of the left
side of his body; that a few years prior to his death his hearing became impaired and that he lost
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
the power of speech.
3. He retained the use of his right hand and was able to write fairly well.
4. Through the medium of signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other
members of his family.
5. The testator wrote out on several pieces of paper the disposition of his property.
6. The same was in turn delivered to one Seor Marco who transcribed and put them in form.
7. The pieces of paper were then delivered to a lawyer who read them to the testator asking if
they were his dispositions.
8. The testator assented each time with an affirmative movement of his head.
9. The widow of the decedent Juliana Bagtas then sought the probate of the purported last will
and testament of Pioquinto.
10. The CFI of Bataan admitted the same for probate.
11. Isidoro Paguio, a son of the decedent by a former marriage, opposed the probation on the
ground that the testator was not n full enjoyment and use of his mental faculties and was without
mental capacity necessary to execute a valid will.
ISSUE:
Was the will was validly executed?
HELD:
The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well-established, and the
testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by the court of competent
jurisdiction , this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to
overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. The opponents failed to do this.
The courts have repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and body , induced by age and
disease does not render a person incapable of making a will. The law does not require that a
person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in
order to execute a valid will. If such were the legal standard , few indeed would be the number of
wills that could meet such exacting requirements. The authorities, both medical and legal, are
universal in the statement that the question of mental capacity is one of degree, and that there
are many gradations from the highest degree of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of
diseased mentality which are denominated insanity or idiocy.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24665 October 13, 1926
Estate of the deceased Isidra Abquilan. ATANASIO ABQUILAN, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
FELICIANA ABQUILAN, opponent-appellee.
STREET, J.:
*Succession Set X* Page 10 of 40
This appeal has been brought to reverse an order of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Occidental Negros, refusing to legalize an instrument (Exhibit A) purporting to be the last will and
testament of Isidra Abquilan, deceased. It appears that the deceased left no forced heirs, and her
only heirs, in case of intestacy, are her brother, Atanasio Abquilan, the proponent of the will, and
Feliciana Abquilan, a sister, who is the opponents.
Upon hearing the cause the trial court found that the document propounded as the will of the
deceased is apocryphal, that the purported signatures of the deceased to the supposed will are
forgeries, and that the instrument in question was not executed by the deceased. He therefore
denied probate, and the proponent appealed.
We have carefully examined the evidence, and upon repeated perusal of the appealed decision,
we find that the conclusions of fact stated therein are so completely in harmony with our own
view of the case, that no new exposition of the facts is necessary. A clear preponderance of the
evidence shows that on November 6, 1924, the date when the will purports to have been
executed, the supposed testatrix was not in a condition such as to enable her to have
participated in the act, she being in fact at that time suffering from paralysis to celebral
hemorrhage in such degree as completely to discapacitate her for intelligent participation in the
act of making a will. A careful comparison of the name of the testatrix as signed in two places to
the Exhibit A, with many of her authentic signatures leads to the conclusion that the signatures
to the supposed will were made by some other person. Furthermore, the combined testimony of
Juan Serato and Alejandro Genito completely demonstrate in our opinion that no will at all was
made on November 6, the date attributed to the questioned document, and that, instead an
attempt was made on the night of that day to fabricate another will, which failed of completion
because of the refusal of Alejandro Genito to be party to the making of a will in which the
testatrix took no part. The instrument before us was undoubtedly fabricated later, probably on
November 7, at a time when the condition of the deceased was such as to make rational
participation on her part in the act of making a will impossible.The judgment appealed from will
be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant. 1awph!l.net
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 4445 September 18, 1909
CATALINA BUGNAO, proponent-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO UBAG, ET AL., contestants-appellants.
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
CARSON, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros, admitting to
probate a document purporting to be the last will and testament of Domingo Ubag, deceased.
The instrument was propounded by his widow, Catalina Bugnao, the sole beneficiary thereunder,
and probate was contested by the appellants, who are brothers and sisters of the deceased, and
who would be entitled to share in the distribution of his estate, if probate were denied, as it
appears that the deceased left no heirs in the direct ascending or descending line.
Appellants contend that the evidence of record is not sufficient to establish the execution of the
alleged will in the manner and form prescribed in section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and
that at the time when it is alleged that the will was executed, Ubag was not of sound mind and
memory, and was physically and mentally incapable of making a will.
The instrument propounded for probate purports to be the last will and testament of Domingo
Ubag, signed by him in the presence of three subscribing and attesting witnesses, and appears
upon its face to have been duly executed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure touching the making of wills.
Two of the subscribing witnesses, Victor J. Bingtoy and Catalino Mario, testified in support of the
will, the latter being the justice of the peace of the municipality wherein it was executed; and
their testimony was corroborated in all important details by the testimony of the proponent
herself, who was present when the will was made. It does not appear from the record why the
third subscribing witness was not called; but since counsel for the contestants makes no
comment upon his absence, we think it may safely be inferred that there was some good and
sufficient reason therefore. In passing, however, it may be well to observe that, when because of
death, sickness, absence, or for any other reason, it is not practicable to call to the witness stand
all the subscribing witnesses to a will offered for probate, the reason for the absence of any of
these witnesses should be made to appear of record, and this especially in cases such as the one
at bar, wherein there is a contests.
The subscribing witnesses gave full and detailed accounts of the execution of the will and swore
that the testator, at the time of its execution, was of sound mind and memory, and in their
presence attached his signature thereto as his last will and testament, and that in his presence
and in the presence of each other, they as well as the third subscribing witness. Despite the
searching and exhaustive cross-examination to which they were subjected, counsel for
appellants could point to no flaw in their testimony save an alleged contradiction as to a single
incident which occurred at or about the time when the will was executed a contradiction,
however, which we think is more apparent than real. One of the witnesses stated that the
deceased sat up in bed and signed his name to the will, and that after its execution food was
given him by his wife; while the other testified that he was assisted into a sitting position, and
was given something to eat before he signed his name. We think the evidence discloses that his
wife aided the sick man to sit up in bed at the time when he signed his name to the instrument,
and that he was given nourishment while he was in that position, but it is not quite clear whether
*Succession Set X* Page 11 of 40
this was immediately before or after, or both before and after he attached his signature to the
will. To say that the sick man sat up or raised himself up in bed is not necessarily in conflict with
the fact that he received assistance in doing so; and it is not at all improbable or impossible that
nourishment might have been given to him both before and after signing the will, and that one
witness might remember the former occasion and the other witness might recall the latter,
although neither witness could recall both. But, however this may have been, we do not think
that a slight lapse of memory on the part of one or the other witness, as to the precise details of
an unimportant incident, to which his attention may not have been particularly directed, is
sufficient to raise a doubt as to the veracity of these witnesses, or as to the truth and accuracy of
their recollection of the fact of the execution of the instrument. Of course, a number of
contradictions in the testimony of alleged subscribing witnesses to a will as to the circumstances
under which it was executed, or even a single contradiction as to a particular incident, where the
incident was of such a nature that the intention of any person who was present must have been
directed to it, and where the contradictory statements in regard to it are so clear and explicit as
to negative the possibility or probability of mistake, might well be sufficient to justify the
conclusion that the witnesses could not possibly have been present, together, at the time when it
is alleged the will was executed; but the apparent contradictions in the testimony of the
witnesses in the case at bar fall far short of raising a doubt a to their veracity, and on the other
hand their testimony as a whole gives such clear, explicit, and detailed account of all that
occurred, and is so convincing and altogether satisfactory that we have no doubt that the trial
judge who heard them testify properly accepted their testimony as worthy of entire confidence
and belief.
The contestants put upon the stand four witnesses for the purpose of proving that at the time
and on the occasion when the subscribing witnesses testified that the will was executed, these
witnesses were not in the house with the testator, and that the alleged testator was at that time
in such physical and mental condition that it was impossible for him to have made a will. Two of
these witnesses, upon cross-examination, admitted that they were not in the house at or
between the hours of four and six in the afternoon of the day on which the will is alleged to have
been made, this being the time at which the witnesses in support of the will testified that it was
executed. Of the other witnesses, one is a contestant of the will, Macario Ubag, a brother of the
testator, and the other, Canuto Sinoy, his close relative. These witnesses swore that they were in
the house of the deceased, where he was lying ill, at or about the time when it is alleged that the
will was executed, and that at that time the alleged subscribing witnesses were not in the house,
and the alleged testator was so sick that he was unable to speak, to understand, or to make
himself understood, and that he was wholly incapacitated to make a will. But the testimony of
Macario Ubag is in our opinion wholly unworthy of credence. In addition to his manifest interest
in the result of the investigation, it clearly discloses a fixed and settled purpose to overthrow the
will at all costs, and to that end an utter disregard of the truth, and readiness to swear to any
fact which he imagined would aid in securing his object. An admittedly genuine and authentic
signature of the deceased was introduced in evidence for comparison with the signature
attached to the will, but this witness in his anxiety to deny the genuineness of the signature of
his brother to the will, promptly and positively swore that the admittedly genuine signature was
not his brother's signature, and only corrected his erroneous statement in response to a
somewhat suggestive question by his attorney which evidently gave him to understand that his
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
former answer was likely to prejudice his own cause. On cross-examination, he was forced to
admit that because his brother and his brother's wife (in those favor the will was made) were
Aglipayanos, he and his other brothers and sisters had not visited them for many months prior to
the one particular occasion as to which testified; and he admitted further, that, although he lived
near at hand, at no time thereafter did he or any of the other members of his family visit their
dying brother, and that they did not even attend the funeral. If the testimony of this witness
could be accepted as true, it would be a remarkable coincidence indeed, that the subscribing
witnesses to the alleged will should have falsely pretended to have joined in its execution on the
very day, and at the precise hour, when this interested witness happened to pay his only visit to
his brother during his last illness, so that the testimony of this witness would furnish conclusive
evidence in support of the allegations of the contestants that the alleged will was not executed
at the time and place or in the manner and form alleged by the subscribing witnesses. We do not
think that the testimony of this witness nor any of the other witnesses for the contestants is
sufficient to raise even a doubt as to the truth of the testimony of the subscribing witnesses as to
the fact of the execution of the will, or as to the manner and from in which it was executed.
In the course of the proceedings, an admittedly genuine signature of the deceased was
introduced in evidence, and upon a comparison of this signature with the signature attached to
the instrument in question, we are wholly of the opinion of the trial judge, who held in this
connection as follows:
No expert evidence has been adduced with regard to these two signatures, and the
presiding judge of this court does not claim to possess any special expert knowledge in
the matter of signatures; nevertheless, the court has compared these two signatures,
and does not find that any material differences exists between the same. It is true that
the signature which appears in the document offered for authentication discloses that at
the time of writing the subscriber was more deliberate in his movements, but two facts
must be acknowledge: First, that the testator was seriously ill, and the other fact, that
for some reason which is not stated the testator was unable to see, and was a person
who was not in the habit of signing his name every day.
These facts should sufficiently explain whatever difference may exist between the two
signatures, but the court finds that the principal strokes in the two signatures are
identical.
That the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our opinion fully established by
the testimony of the subscribing witnesses who swore positively that, at the time of its
execution, he was of sound mind and memory. It is true that their testimony discloses the fact
that he was at that time extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with
severe intermittent attacks of asthma; that he was too sick to rise unaided from his bed; that he
needed assistance even to rise himself to a sitting position; and that during the paroxysms of
asthma to which he was subject he could not speak; but all this evidence of physical weakness in
no wise establishes his mental incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed the
evidence of the subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing
*Succession Set X* Page 12 of 40
the will, and his clear recollection of the boundaries and physical description of the various
parcels of land set out therein, taken together with the fact that he was able to give to the
person who wrote the will clear and explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition
of his property, is strong evidence of his testamentary capacity.
Counsel for appellant suggests that the fact that the alleged will leaves all the property of the
testator to his widow, and wholly fails to make any provision for his brothers or sisters, indicates
a lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence; and because of the inherent improbability
that a man would make so unnatural and unreasonable a will, they contend that this fact
indirectly corroborates their contention that the deceased never did in fact execute the will. But
when it is considered that the deceased at the time of his death had no heirs in the ascending or
descending line; that a bitter family quarrel had long separated him from his brothers and
sisters, who declined to have any relations with the testator because he and his wife were
adherents of the Aglipayano Church; and that this quarrel was so bitter that none of his brothers
or sisters, although some of them lived in the vicinity, were present at the time of his death or
attended his funeral; we think the fact that the deceased desired to leave and did leave all of his
property to his widow and made no provision for his brothers and sisters, who themselves were
grown men and women, by no means tends to disclose either an unsound mind or the presence
of undue influence on the part of his wife, or in any wise corroborates contestants' allegation that
the will never was executed.
It has been said that "the difficulty of stating standards or tests by which to determine the
degree of mental capacity of a particular person has been everywhere recognized, and grows out
of the inherent impossibility of measuring mental capacity, or its impairment by disease or other
causes" (Greene vs. Greene, 145 III., 264, 276); and that "it is probable that no court has ever
attempted to lay down any definite rule in respect to the exact amount of mental capacity
requisite for the making of a valid will, without appreciating the difficulty of the undertaking"
(Trish vs. Newell, 62 III., 196, 203).
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries
with it full testamentary capacity, and that degree of mental aberration generally known as
insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity, and while on
one hand it has been held that "mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from the disease of
body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will, a weak or feeble minded
person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding memory sufficient to enable him to
know what he is about, and how or to whom he is disposing of his property" (Lodge vs. Lodge, 2
Houst. (Del.), 418); that, "To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the
mind should be unbroken or unimpaired, unshattered by disease or otherwise"
(Sloan vs. Maxwell, 3 N. J. Eq., 563); that "it has not been understood that a testator must
possess these qualities (of sound and disposing mind and memory) in the highest degree. . . .
Few indeed would be the wills confirmed, if this is correct. Pain, sickness, debility of body, from
age or infirmity, would, according to its violence or duration, in a greater or less degree, break in
upon, weaken, or derange the mind, but the derangement must be such as deprives him of the
rational faculties common to man" (Den. vs. Vancleve, 5 N. J. L.,680); and, that "Sound mind does
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
not mean a perfectly balanced mind. The question of soundness is one of degree"
(Boughton vs. Knight, L. R.,3 P. & D., 64; 42 L. J. P., 25); on the other hand, it has been held that
"testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of
an unsound mind. Weakness of intellect, whether it arises from extreme old age from disease, or
great bodily infirmities or suffering, or from all these combined, may render the testator
incapable of making a valid will, providing such weakness really disqualifies her from knowing or
appreciating the nature, effects, or consequences of the act she is engaged in" (Manatt vs. Scott,
106 Iowa, 203; 68 Am. St. Rep., 293, 302).
But for the purposes of this decision it is not necessary for us to attempt to lay down a definition
of testamentary capacity which will cover all possible cases which may present themselves,
because, as will be seen from what has already been said, the testator was, at the time of
making the instrument under consideration, endowed with all the elements of mental capacity
set out in the following definition of testamentary capacity which has been frequently announced
in courts of last resort in England and the United States; and while is some cases testamentary
capacity has been held to exist in the absence of proof of some of these elements, there can be
no question that, in the absence of proof of very exceptional circumstances, proof of the
existence of all these elements in sufficient to establish the existence of testamentary capacity.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction
which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of
and the person who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and
to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among
the objects of his bounty.
(Cf. large array of cases cited in support of this definition in the Encyclopedia of Law, vol. 23, p.
71, second edition.)
In our opinion, the evidence of record establishes in a strikingly conclusive manner the execution
of the instrument propounded as the last will and testament of the deceased; that it was made in
strict conformity with the requisites prescribed by law; and that, at the time of its execution, the
deceased was of sound mind and memory, and executed the instrument of his own free will and
accord.
The order probating the will should be land is hereby affirmed, with the cost of this instance
against the appellants.Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.
CASE DIGEST
FACTS: The court admitted to probate a document purporting to be the last will and testament
of Domingo Ubag, deceased. The instrument was propounded by his widow, Catalina Bugnao, the
*Succession Set X* Page 13 of 40
sole beneficiary thereunder, and probate was contested by the appellants, who are brothers and
sisters of the deceased, and who would be entitled to share in the distribution of his estate, if
probate were denied, as it appears that the deceased left no heirs in the direct ascending or
descending line.
The appellants alleged that the evidence of record is not sufficient to establish the execution of
the alleged will in the manner and form prescribed in section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure;
and that at the time when it is alleged that the will was executed, Ubag was not of sound mind
and memory, and was physically and mentally incapable of making a will.
ISSUES: Whether or not the deceased was of sound mind and memory at the time of the
execution of his last will and testament.
RULINGS: That the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our opinion fully
established by the testimony of the subscribing witnesses who swore positively that, at the time
of its execution, he was of sound mind and memory. It is true that their testimony discloses the
fact that he was at that time extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with
severe intermittent attacks of asthma; that he was too sick to rise unaided from his bed; that he
needed assistance even to rise himself to a sitting position; and that during the paroxysms of
asthma to which he was subject he could not speak; but all this evidence of physical weakness in
no wise establishes his mental incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed the
evidence of the subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing
the will, and his clear recollection of the boundaries and physical description of the various
parcels of land set out therein, taken together with the fact that he was able to give to the
person who wrote the will clear and explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition
of his property, is strong evidence of his testamentary capacity.
But when it is considered that the deceased at the time of his death had no heir in the ascending
or ascending line; that a bitter family quarrel had separated him from his brothers and sisters,
who declined to have any relations with the testator because he and his wife were adherents of
the Aglipayano church; and that this quarrel was so bitter that none of his brothers or sisters,
although some of them lived in the vicinity, were present at the time of his death or attended his
funeral; we think the fact that the deceased desired to leave and did leave all of his property to
his widow and made no provision for his brothers and sisters, who themselves are grown men
and women, by no means tends to disclose either an unsound mind or the presence of undue
influence on the part of his wife, or in anywise corroborates contestants allegation that the will
never was executed.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24569 February 26, 1926
MANUEL TORRES, petitioner-appellant and
LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, appellant,
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellee.
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
Araneta & Zaragoza for appellant.
Marcaida, Capili & Ocampo and Thomas Cary Welch for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This case concerns the probate of the alleged will of the late Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez.
Tomas Rodriguez died in the City of Manila Philippine Islands. On February 25, 1924, leaving a
considerable estate. Shortly thereafter Manuel Torres, one of the executors named in the will
asked that the will of Rodriguez be allowed. Opposition was entered by Margarita Lopez, the first
cousin of the deceased on the grounds: (1) That the testator lacked mental capacity because at
the time of senile dementia and was under guardianship; (2) that undue influence had been
exercised by the persons benefited in the document in conjunction with others who acted in their
behalf; and (3) that the signature of Tomas Rodriguez to the document was obtained through
fraud and deceit. After a prolonged trial judgment was rendered denying the legalization of the
will. In the decision of the trial judge appeared, among others, these findings:
All this evidence taken together with the circumstances that before and at the time
Tomas Rodriguez was caused to sign the supposed will Exhibit A, and the copies thereof
there already existed a final judgment as to his mental condition wherein he was
declared physically and mentally incapacitated to take care of himself and manage his
estate shows in a clear and conclusive manner that at the time of signing the supposed
will of Tomas Rodriguez did not possess such mental capacity as was necessary to be
able him to dispose of his property by the supposed will.
But even supposing as contended by petitioner's counsel that Tomas Rodriguez was at
the time of execution of the will, competent to make a will, the court is of the opinion
that the will cannot be probated for it appears from the declaration of the attesting
witness Elias Bonoan that when the legatee Luz Lopez presented the supposed will,
Exhibit A, to Tomas Rodriguez, she told him to sign said Exhibit A because it was a
document relative to the complaint against one Castito, which Exhibit 4, then pending in
the justice of the peace court, and for the further reason that said Tomas Rodriguez was
then under guardianship, due to his being mentally and physically incapacitated and
therefore unable to manage his property and take care of himself. It must also be taken
into account that Tomas Rodriguez was an old man 76 years of age, and was sick in the
hospital when his signature to the supposed will was obtained. All of this shows that the
signature of Tomas Rodriguez appearing in the will was obtained through fraudulent and
deceitful representations of those who were interested in it. (Record on Appeal, p. 23)
From the decision and judgment above-mentioned the proponents have appealed. Two errors are
specified, viz: (1) The court below erred in holding that at the time of signing his will, Tomas
Rodriguez did not possess the mental capacity necessary to make the same, and (2) the court
below erred in holding that the signatures of Tomas Rodriguez to the will were obtained through
*Succession Set X* Page 14 of 40
fraudulent and deceitful representations, made by persons interested in the executions of said
will.
The record is voluminous close to two thousand typewritten pages, with a varied assortment
of exhibits. One brief contains two hundred seventy-four pages, the other four hundred fifteen
pages. The usual oral argument has been had. The court must scale this mountains of evidence
more or less relevant and of argument intense and prolific to discover the fertile valleys of fact
and principle.
The topics suggested by the assignments of error Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence
will be taken up separately and in order. An attempt will be made under each subject first to
make findings of fact quite separate and apart from those of the judge and second to make
findings of law and the law by rendering judgment.
I. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
A. Facts. For a long time prior to October, 1923, Tomas Rodriguez was in feeble health. His
breakdown was undoubtedly due to organic weakness, to advancing years and to an accident
which occurred in 1921 (Exhibit 6). Ultimately, on August 10 1923, on his initiative, Tomas
Rodriguez designated Vicente F. Lopez as the administrator of his property (Exhibit 7).
On October 22, 1923, Margarita Lopez petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila to name a
guardian for Tomas Rodriguez because of his age and pathological state. This petition was
opposed by Attorney Gregorio Araneta acting on behalf of Tomas Rodriguez for the reason that
while Rodriguez was far from strong on account of his years, he was yet capable of looking after
his property with the assistance of his administrator, Vicente F. Lopez. The deposition of Tomas
Rodriguez was taken and a perusal of the same shows that he was able to answer nearly all of
the questions propounded intelligently (Exhibit 5-g). A trial had at which considerable oral
testimony for the petitioner was received. At the conclusion of the hearing, an order was issued
by the presiding judge, declaring Tomas Rodriguez incapacitated to take care of himself and to
manage his property and naming Vicente F. Lopez as his guardian. (Exhibit 37).
Inasmuch as counsel for the appellee make such of one incident which occurred in connection
with the guardianship proceedings, it may as well be mentioned here as later. This episode
concerns the effort of deputy sheriff Joaquin Garcia to make service on Tomas Rodriguez on
October 31, 1923. We will let the witness tell in his own words what happened on the occasions
in question:
I found him lying down on his bed. . . . And when it (the cleaning of his head) was
finished, I again entered his room, and told him that I had an order of the court which I
wanted to read as I did read to him, but after reading the order he asked me what the
order meant; 'I read it to you so that you may appear before the court, understand,'
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
then I read it again, but he asked what the order said; in view of that fact I left the order
and departed from the house. (S. R., p. 642.)
To return to our narrative possibly inspired by the latter portion of the order of Judge Diaz,
Tomas Rodriguez was taken to the Philippine General Hospital on November 27, 1923. There he
was to remain sick in bed until his death. The physician in charge during this period was Dr. Elias
Domingo. In the clinical case record of the hospital under the topic "Diagnosis (in full)," we find
the following "Senility; Hernia inguinal; Decubitus" (Exhibit 8).
On the door of the patient's room was placed a placard reading "No visitors, except father,
mother, sisters, and brothers." (Testimony of head nurse physician, there were permitted to visit
the patient only the following named persons: Santiago Lopez, Manuel Ramirez, Romana Lopez,
Luz Lopez de Bueno, Remedio Lopez, Benita Lopez, Trinidad Vizcarra, Apolonia Lopez, Antonio
Haman, and Gregorio Araneta ((Exhibit 9). The list did not include the names of Margarita Lopez
and her husband Antonio Ventura. Indeed the last named persons experienced considerable
difficulty in penetrating in to the room of Rodriguez.
Santiago Lopez states that on one occasion when he was visiting Tomas Rodriguez in the hospital
, Rodriguez expressed to him a desire to make a will and suggested that the matter be taken up
with Vicente F. Lopez (S. R., p. 550). This information Santiago Lopez communicated to Vicente F.
Lopez, who then interviewed Maximino Mina, a practicing attorney in the City of Manila, for the
purpose of securing him to prepare the will. In accordance with this request, Judge Mina
conferred with Tomas Rodriguez in the hospital in December 16th and December 29th. He
ascertained the wishes of Rodriguez and wrote up a testament in rough draft. The attorney
expected to return to the hospital on December 31st to have the will executed but was unable to
do so on account of having to make a trip to the provinces. Accordingly, the papers were left with
Santiago Lopez.
In corroboration of the above statements, we transcribe a portion of Judge Mina's testimony
which has not been challenged in any way:
ARANETA: Q. Will you please tell your motive for holding an interview with Vicente
Lopez?
MAXIMINO MINA: A. Then I arrived in the house of Vicente Lopez, after the usual
greeting and other unimportant things, he consulted me or presented the question as to
whether or not D. Tomas could make his will, having announced his desire to do so. I
told him that it seemed that we were not called upon to decide or give an opinion as to
whether or not he can make a will; it is a question to be submitted to the court, but as
he had announced his desire, it is our duty to comply with it. Then he requested me to
do what was necessary to comply with his wishes: I told him I was to see him; then we
agreed that on the morning next to the following evening that is on the 16th, I should go
to the General Hospital and so I did.
*Succession Set X* Page 15 of 40
Q. Did you go to the hospital in the evening of the 16th? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you meet D. Tomas? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did D. Tomas tell you his desire to make a will?
OCAMPO: Leading.
ARANETA: I withdraw. What, if anything, did D. Tomas tell you on that occasion when you
saw him there? A. He told me that.
Q. Please tell us what conversation you had with D. Tomas Rodriguez? A. The
conversation I had with him that evening according to my best recollection I
cannot tell the exact words and perhaps the order. After the usual greetings, Good
evening, D. Tomas, ' Good evening,' How are you,' ' How do you do? Very well, just came
here in the name of D. Vicente Lopez why does he not come. He cannot come because
he has many things to do, and besides it is hard for him and makes him tired, so he told
me to come.' Mina, your tenant, attorney.' Are you an attorney? Yes.' Where do you live?
I live in Quiapo.' Oh, in Quiapo, a good district, it is gay a commercial place you must
have some business there because that is a commercial place. Unfortunately, I have
none, D. Tomas.' Well, you must be have because the profession alone does not give
enough. Where is your office? I work in the office of Mr. Chicote. That Mr. Chicote must
be rich, it seems to me that he is. The profession gives almost nothing it is better to
have properties. I am an attorney but do not depend upon my profession. I interrupted
D. Tomas saying, since you want to make a will, when and to whom do you want to
leave your fortune? Then he said, To whom else? To my cousin Vicente Lopez and his
daughter Luz Lopez. Which properties do you want to give to your cousin and niece? All
my properties, Won't you specify the property to be given to each of them? What for? All
my property. Don't you have any other relatives? Yes, sir I have. Won't you give any to
those relatives? What for? was his answer. Well, do you want to specify said properties,
to say what they are? and he again said, What for? they know them, he is my attorney-
in-fact as to all property. I also said, Well and as legacy won't you give property to other
persons? answers, I think, something, they will know it. After being asked, Whom do you
think, would you want to be your executor? After hesitating a little, This Torres, Manuel
or Santiago Lopez also. Then I asked him, What is your religion? He answered, Roman
Apostolic Catholic, and then he also asked me, and your? Also Roman Apostolic Catholic,
Where have you studied?' 'In the University of Santo Tomas.' 'It is convenient to
preserve the Catholic religion that our descendants have left us. And you, what did you
have anything more to say as to your testamentary dispositions? No, he answered. Then
I remind him, 'You know that Vicente Lopez has sent me to get these dispositions of
yours, and he said, Yes, do it.' I asked him, When do you want it done? Later on, I will
send for you. After this believing to have done my duty, I bade him good-bye.
Q. Did you have any other occasion to see him? A. Yes.
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola *Succession Set X* Page 16 of 40

Q. When? A. On December 29, 1923, also in the evening. the exception of the words '3 de enero de 1924' It seems to be literally identical. (S. R.
pp. 244-249.)
Q. Why did you go to see him? A. Because as I had not received any message either
from Vicente Lopez or Tomas Rodriguez, as I had received notices in connection with the As the witness stated, the will which was prepared by him is identical with that signed by the
few cases I had in the provinces particularly in Tayabas, which compelled me to be testator and the attesting witnesses with the single exception of the change of the date from
absent from Manila until January 1st at least, for I might be there for several days, so I December 31, 1923, to January 3, 1924. Two copies besides the original of the will were made.
went to the General Hospital of my own accord since I had not received any The will is brief and simple in terminology.
messages from them with a rough draft which I had prepared in accordance with
what he had told me in our conversation. After the greetings, I told him, Here I am D. For purposes of record, we copy the will as here translated into English:
Tomas; this is the rough draft of your will in accordance with your former statements to
me in order to submit it to you. Do you want to read it?' 'Please do me the favor of
ONLY PAGE
reading it. I read it slowly to him in order that he could understand it . After reading, Is it
all right, that is the way, few words you see it takes only a few minutes; now I can
execute the will. We can do it takes only a few minutes.' In view of that statement of his, In the City of Manila, Philippines Islands, this January 3, 1924, I, Tomas Rodriguez, of age
I called his attention, ' But we don't have witnesses, D. Tomas.' I looked out through the and resident of the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, do freely and voluntarily make this
door to see if I could call some witnesses but it was late then and it was thought better my will and testament in the Spanish language which I know, with the following clauses:
to do it on the 31st of December. Then we talked about other things, and he again
asked. Where were you born? I told him in Quiapo. Ah, good district, and especially now First I declare that I am a Roman Apostolic Catholic, and order that my body be buried in
that the fiesta of Quiapo is coming near,' and then I interrupted him, Yes, the fiesta of accordance with my religion, standing and circumstances.
the Holy Child and of Our Lady of Mount Carmel' because we also talked about the fiesta
of San Sebastian. I again reminded him that we could not do it because the witnesses
Second. I name my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno as my
were not there and he explained, Good Christmas present, isn't it?' I did not tell him
only universal heirs of all my property.
anything and in view of that I did not deem it necessary to stay there any longer.

Third. I appoint D. Manuel Torres and D. Santiago Lopez as my prosecutors.

Q. With whom did you make the arrangement to make the will on the evening of the
31st of December you said that it was agreed that the will be executed on the
evening of December 31st? A. With Santiago Lopez and Don Tomas. In witness whereof I sign this typewritten will, consisting of one single page, in the
presence of the witness who sign below.

Q. Was the will executed on the 31st of December? A. What happened is this: In view
of that agreement, I fixed up the draft which I had, dating it the 31st of December, (Sgd.) TOMAS RODRIGUEZ
putting everything in order; we agreed that Santiago would meet me on 31st day
between five and six in the evening or a little before, but it happened that before the (Left marginal signatures:)
arrival of that date Santiago Lopez came and told me that I need not trouble about TOMAS RODRIGUEZ
going to the General Hospital; because it could not be carried out for the reason that ELIAS BONOAN
certain requisites were lacking. In view of this and bearing always in mind that on the V. L. LEGARDA
following day I had to go to the provinces, I told Santiago Lopez that I would leave the A. DE ASIS
papers with him because I might go to the provinces.
We hereby certify that on the date and in the place above indicated, Don Tomas
Q. What may be the meaning of those words good Christmas present? A. They are Rodriguez executed this will, consisting of one single typewritten page, having signed at
given a Christmas present when Christmas comes or on the occasion of Christmas. the bottom of the will in the presence of us who saw as witnesses the execution of this
will, we signed at the bottom thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Q. I show you this document which is marked Exhibit A, tell me if that is the will or copy
of the will which you delivered to Santiago Lopez on December 21, 31, 1923? A. With (Sgd.) V. L. LEGARDA
ELIAS BONOAN
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
A. DE ASIS
(Exhibit A.)
On the afternoon of January 3, 1924 there gathered in the quarters of Tomas Rodriguez in the
Philippine General Hospital, Santiago Lopez and Dr. A. De Asis, attesting witness; and Dr. Elias
Fernando Calderon, Dr. Elias Domingo and Dr. Florentino Herrera, physicians, there for purposes
of observation. (Testimony of Elias Bonoan, S. R., p. 8 of Vl. Legarda, S. R. p. 34. ) Possibly also
Mrs. Luz Lopez de Bueno and Mrs. Nena Lopez were present; at least they were hovering in the
background.
As to what actually happened, we have in the record two absolutely contradictory accounts. One
emanates from the attesting witness, Doctor Bonoan. The other is the united testimony of all
remaining persons who were there.
Doctor Elias Bonoan was the first witness called at the trial. He testified on direct examination as
to formal matters, such as the identification of the signatures to the will .On cross-examination,
he rather started the proponents of the will by stating that Luz Lopez de Bueno told Tomas
Rodriguez to sign the document it concerned a complaint against Castito and that nobody read
the will to the testator. Doctor Bonoan's testimony along this line is as follows:
QUESTIONS.
MARCAIDA : Q. Why were you a witness to the will of Tomas Rodriguez?
Araneta: I object to the question as being immaterial.
Court: Objection overruled.
Dr. Bonoan: A. Because I was called up by Mrs. Luz by telephone telling me to be in the
hospital at 3 o'clock sharp in the afternoon of the 3d of January.
Q. Who is that Luz whom you have mentioned? A. Luz Lopez, daughter of Vicente
Lopez.
Q. What day, January 3, 1924? A. Yes, sir.
Q. When did Luz Lopez talk to you in connection with your going to the hospital? A.
On the morning of the 3d she called me up by telephone.
Q. On the morning? A. On the morning.
*Succession Set X* Page 17 of 40
Q. Before January 3, 1924, when the will of Tomas Rodriguez was signed, did Luz Lopez
talk to you? A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many days approximately before was it? A. I cannot tell the day, it was
approximately one week before, on that occasion when I was called up by her about
the deceased Vicente Lopez.
Q. What did she tell you when you went to the house of Vicente Lopez one week
approximately before signing the will? - A. That Tomas Rodriguez would make a will.
Q. Don't you know where the will of Tomas Rodriguez was made? - A. In the General
Hospital.
Q. Was that document written in the hospital? A. I have not seen it.
Q. When you went to the General Hospital on January 3, 1924, who were the persons
you met in the room where the patients was ? A. I met one of the nieces of the
deceased Tomas Rodriguez, Mrs. Nena Lopez and Dna. Luz Lopez.
Q. Were those the only persons? A. Yes, sir.
Q. What time approximately did you go to the General Hospital on January 3d? A. A
quarter to 3.
Q. After you, who came? A. Antonio de Asis, Doctor Herrera, later on Doctor Calderon
arrived with Doctor Elias Domingo and lastly Santiago Lopez came and then Mr.
Legarda.
Q. When you entered the room of the patient, D. Tomas Rodriguez, in the General
Hospital in what position did you find him? A. He was lying down.
Q. Did you greet D. Tomas Rodriguez? A. I did.
Q. Did D. Tomas Rodriguez answer you? A. Dna. Nena immediately answered in
advance and introduced me to him saying that I was the brother of his godson.
Q. Did other persons whom you have mentioned, viz, Messrs. Calderon, Herrera,
Domingo, De Asis and Legarda greet Tomas Rodriguez?
ARANETA: I object to the question as being improper cross-examination. It has not been
the subject of the direct examination.
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
COURT: Objection overruled.
ARANETA: Exception.
A. No, sir, they joined us.
Q. What was D. Tomas told when he signed the will.? A. To sign it.
Q. Who told D. Tomas to sign the will? A. Luz Lopez.
Q. What did Luz Lopez tell Tomas Rodriguez in order that he should sign the will? A.
She told him to sign the document; the deceased Tomas Rodriguez before signing the
document asked what that was which he was to sign.
Q. What did anybody answer to that question of D. Tomas? A. Luz Lopez told him to
sign it because it concerned a complaint against Castito. D. Tomas said, 'What is this?"
And Luz Lopez answered, 'You sign this document, uncle Tomas, because this is about
the complaint against Castito.
Q. Then Tomas Rodriguez signed the will? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who had the will? Who was holding it? A. Mr. Vicente Legarda had it his own hands.
Q. Was the will signed by Tomas Rodriguez lying down, on his feet or seated? A. Lying
down.
Q. Was the will read by Tomas Rodriguez or any person present at the time of signing
the will, did they read it to him? A. Nobody read the will to him.
Q. Did not D. Tomas read the will? A. I have not seen it.
Q. Were you present? A. Yes, sir. ( S. R. p. 8)
As it would be quite impracticable to transcribe the testimony of all the others who attended the
making of the will, we will let Vicente L. Legarda, who appears to have assumed the leading role,
tell what transpired. He testified in part:
ARANETA : Q. Who exhibited to you those documents, Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2?
LEGARDA: A. Santiago Lopez.
*Succession Set X* Page 18 of 40
Q. Did he show you the same document? A. First that is to say the first document he
presented to me was a rough draft, a tentative will, and it was dated December 31st,
and I called his attention to the fact that the date was not December 31, 1923, and that
it was necessary to change the date to January 3, 1924, and it was done.
Q. And it was then, was it not when Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2 were written? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you any know where it was written? A. In the General Hospital.
Q. Did any time elapse from your making the suggestion that the document which you
delivered to Santiago Lopez be written until those three Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2 were
presented to you? A. About nine or ten minutes approximately.
Q. The time to make it clean? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where were you during that time? A. In the room of D. Tomas Rodriguez.
Q. Were you talking with him during that time. A. Yes, sir.
Q. About what things were you talking with him? A. He was asking me about my
health, that of my family how my family was my girl, whether we were living in Pasay,
he asked me about the steamer Ildefonso, he said that it was a pity that it had been lost
because he knew that my father-in-law was the owner of the steamer Ildefonso.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When those documents, Exhibit A, A-1, and A-2, that is the original and two copies of
the will signed by D. Tomas Rodriguez were written clean, will you please tell what
happened? A. When Santiago Lopez gave them to me clean, I approached D. Tomas
Rodriguez and told him: Don Tomas, here is this will which is ready for your signature.
Q. What did D. Tomas do when you said that his will you were showing to him was
ready? A. The first thing he asked was: the witnesses? Then I called the witnesses
Gentlemen, please come forward, and they came forward, and I handed the documents
to D. Tomas. D. Tomas got up and then took his eyeglasses, put them on and as he saw
that the electric lamp at the center was not sufficiently clear, he said: 'There is no more
light;' then somebody came forward bringing an electric lamp.
Q. What did D. Tomas do when that electric lamp was put in place? A. The eyeglasses
were adjusted again and then he began to read, and as he could not read much for a
long time, for he unexpectedly felt tired and took off the eyeglasses, and as I saw that
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
the poor man was tired, I suggested that it be read to him and he stopped reading and I
read the will to him.
Q. What happened after you had read it to him? A. He said to me, 'Well, it is all right.
It is my wish and my will. Don't you have any pen?' I asked a pen of those who were
there and handed it to D. Tomas.
Q. Is it true that Tomas Rodriguez asked at that time 'What is that which I am going to
sign?' and Luz Lopez told him: 'It is in connection with the complaint against Castito?'
A. It is not true, no, sir.
Q. During the signing of the will, did you hear Luz Lopez say anything to Tomas
Rodriguez? A. No, Sir, she said nothing.
Q. According to you, Tomas Rodriguez signed of his own accord? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did nobody tell him to sign? A. Nobody.
Q. What happened after the signing of the will by Tomas Rodriguez? A. I called the
witnesses and we signed in the presence of each other and of Tomas Rodriguez.
Q. After the signing of the will, did you have any conversation with Tomas Rodriguez?
A. Doctor Calderon asked D. Tomas Rodriguez some questions.
Q. Do you remember the questions and the conversation held between Doctor Calderon
and D. Tomas after the signing of the will? A. I remember that afterwards Doctor
Calderon talked to him about business. He asked him how the business of making loans
at 18 per cent. It seems that Tomas Rodriguez answered: That loan at 18 per cent is
illegal, it is usury. (S. R., p. 38.)
In addition to the statements under oath made by Mr. Legarda, an architect and engineer in the
Bureau of Public Works and professor of engineering and architecture in the University of Santo
Tomas, suffice it to say that Luz Lopez de Bueno denied categorically the statements attributed
to her by Doctor Bonoan (S. R., p. 568). In this stand, she is corroborated by Doctor Calderon,
Domingo, and Herrera, the attending physicians. On this point, Doctor Calderon the Director of
the Philippine General Hospital and Dean of the College of Medicine in the University of the
Philippines, testified:
Mr. ARANETA: Q. What have you seen or heard with regard to the execution of the will?
Dr. CALDERON: A. Mr. Legarda handled the will to D. Tomas Rodriguez. D. Tomas asked
for his eyeglass, wanted to read and it was extremely hard for him to do so. Mr. Legarda
*Succession Set X* Page 19 of 40
offered to read the will, it was read to him and he heard that in that will Vicente Lopez
and Luz Lopez were appointed heirs; we also saw him sign that will, and he signed not
only the original but also the other copies of the will and we also saw how the witnesses
signed the will; we heard that D. Tomas asked for light at that moment; he heard that D.
Tomas asked for light at that moment; he was at that time in a perfect mental state. And
we remained there after the will was executed. I asked him, 'How do you feel, how are
you? Well I am well, ' he answered. ' How is the business? There is a crisis at there is
one good business, namely, that of making loans at the rate of 18 per cent, 'and he
answered, 'That is usury.; When a man answers in that way, ' That is usury it shows that
he is all right.
Q. Were you present when Mr. Legarda handed the will to him? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did any person there tell Don Tomas that was a complaint to be filed against one
Castito? A. No, sir, I have not heard anything of the kind.
Q. It was said here that when the will was handed to him, D. Tomas Rodriguez asked
what that was which he was to sign and that Luz Lopez answered, 'That is but a
complaint in connection with Castito.' Is that true? A. I have not heard anything of the
kind.
Q. Had anybody told that to the deceased, would you have heard it? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was Luz Lopez there? A. I don't remember having seen her; I am not sure; D.
Santiago Lopez and the three witnesses were there; I don't remember that Luz Lopez
was there.
Q. Had anybody told that to the deceased, would you have heard it? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you remember whether he was given a pen or he himself asked for it? A. I don't
know; it is a detail which I don't remember well; so that whether or not he was given a
pen or he himself asked for it, I do not remember.
Q. But did he sign without hesitation ? A. With no hesitation.
Q. Did he sign without anybody having indicated to him where he was to sign? A. Yes,
without anybody having indicated it to him.
Q. Do you know whether D. Tomas Rodriguez asked for more light before signing? A.
He asked for more lights, as I have said before.
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
Q. Do you remember that detail? A. Yes, sir. They first lighted the lamps, but as the
light was not sufficient, he asked for more light.
Q. Do you remember very well that he asked for light? A. Yes, sir. (S. R. p.993).
A clear preponderance of the evidence exists in favor of the testimony of Vicente Legarda,
corroborated as it is by other witnesses of the highest standing in the community. The only
explanation we can offer relative to the testimony of Doctor Bonoan is that possibly he may have
arrived earlier than the others with the exception of Luz Lopez de Bueno, and that Luz Lopez de
Bueno may have made some sort of an effort to influence Tomas Rodriguez. There is however no
possible explanation of the statement of Doctor Bonoan to the effect that no one read the will to
Rodriguez when at least five other persons recollect that Vicente Legarda read it to him and
recall the details connected with the reading.
There is one curious occurrence which transpired shortly after the making of the will which
should here be mentioned. It is that on January 7, 1923 (1924), Luz Lopez de Bueno signed a
document in favor of Doctor Bonoan in the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000). This paper
reads as follow:
Be it know by these present:
That I, Luz Lopez de Bueno in consideration of the services which at my instance were
and will when necessary be rendered by Dr. Elias Bonoan in connection with the
execution of the will of my uncle, Don Tomas Rodriguez and the due probate thereof, do
hereby agree to pay said doctor, by way of remuneratory donation, the sum of one
thousand pesos (P1,000), Philippine currency, as soon as said services shall have been
fully rendered and I shall be in possession of the inheritance which in said will is given to
me.
In witness whereof, I sign this document which was freely and spontaneously executed
by me in Manila, this January 7, 1923.
(Sgd.) LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO
(Exhibit 1)
There is a sharp conflict of testimony, as is natural between Doctor Bonoan and Luz Lopez de
Bueno relative to the execution of the above document. We shall not attempt to settle these
differences as in the final analysis it will not affect the decision one way or the other. The most
reasonable supposition is that Luz Lopez de Bueno imprudently endeavored to bring over Doctor
Bonoan to her side of the race by signing and giving to him Exhibit 1. But the event cannot easily
be explained away.
*Succession Set X* Page 20 of 40
Tomas Rodriguez passed away in the Philippine General Hospital, as we said on February 25,
1924. Not even prior to his demise the two actions in the Lopez family had prepared themselves
for a fight over the estate. The Luz Lopez faction had secured the services of Doctor Domingo,
the physician in charge of the Department of Insane of San Lazaro Hospital an Assistant
Professor of Nervous and Mental Diseases in the University of the Philippines, as attending
physician; as associated with him for purposes of investigation Dr. Fernando Calderon the
Director of the Philippine General Hospital and Dr. Florentino Herrera, a physician in active
practice in the City of Manila; and had arranged to have two members of the medical fraternity,
Doctors De Asis and Bonoan as attesting witnesses. The Margarita Lopez faction had taken equal
precautions by calling a witnesses in the guardship proceedings Dr. Sixto de los Angeles
Professor and Chief of the Department of Legal Medicine in the University of the Philippines, and
Dr. Samuel Tietze, with long experience in mental diseases; thereafter by continuing Doctors de
Los Angeles and Tietze to examine Tomas Rodriguez and by associating with them Dr. William
Burke, a well-known physician of the City of Manila. Skilled lawyers were available to aid and
abet the medical experts. Out of such situations, do will contests arise.
An examination of the certificates made by the two sets of physicians and of their testimony
shows that on most facts they concur. Their deductions from these facts disclose a substantial
divergence of opinion. It is a hopeless task to try to reconcile the views of these distinguished
gentlemen who honestly arrived at definite but contradictory conclusions. The best that we can
do under the circumstances is to set forth the findings of the Calderon committed on the hand
and of the De Los Angeles committee on the other.
Doctors Calderon, Domingo and Herrera examined Tomas Rodriguez individually and jointly
before the date when the will was executed. All of them, as we have noticed were, present at the
signing of the will to note the reactions of the testator. On the same day that the will was
accomplished, the three doctors signed the following certificate:
The undersigned, Drs. of Medicine, with offices in the City of Manila, and engaged in the
practice of their profession do hereby certify:
That they have jointly examined Mr. Tomas Rodriguez, confined in the General Hospital,
floor No. 3, room No. 361 on three different occasion and on different days and have
found that said patient is suffering from anemia, hernia inguinal, chronic dyspepsia and
senility.
As to his mental state the result of the different tests to which this patient was
submitted is that his intellectual faculties are sound, except that his memory is weak,
which is almost a loss for recent facts, or events which have recently occurred, due to
his physical condition and old age.
They also certify that they were present at the time he signed his will on January 3,
1924, at 1:25 p.m. and have found his mental state in the same condition as was found
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
by the undersigned in their former examination and that in executing said will the
testator and full knowledge of the contents thereof.
In testimony whereof, we sign in Manila this January 3, 1924.
(Sgd.) FLORENTINO HERRERA
Tuberias 1264
Quiapo
(Sgd.) Dr. FERNANDO CALDERON
General Hospital
Manila
(Sgd.) Dr. ELIAS DOMINGO
613 Remedios
Malate
(Exhibit E in relation with Exhibits C and D.)
Doctor Calderon while on the witness-stand expressed a definite opinion as to the
mentality of Tomas Rodriguez What follows is possibly the most significant of the
doctor's statements:
Dr. CALDERON testifying after interruption:
A. I was naturally interested in finding out the true mental state of Tomas Rodriguez and
that was the chief reason why I accepted and gave my cooperation to Messrs. Elias
Domingo and Florentino Herrera because had I found that Tomas Rodriguez and
Florentino Herrera because had I found that Tomas Rodriguez was really insane, I should
have ordered his transfer to the San Lazaro Hospital or to other places, and would not
have left him in the General Hospital. Pursuant to my desire, I saw Tomas Rodriguez in
his room alone twice to have interviews with his, he begging a person whom I knew
since several years ago; at the end of the interviews I became convinced that there was
nothing wrong with him; I had not seen anything indicating that he was insane and for
this reason I accepted the request of my companions and joined them; we have been on
five different occasions examining Tomas Rodriguez jointly from the physical standpoint
but chiefly from the standpoint of his mental state; I have been there with Messrs.
Herrera and Elias Domingo, examining Tomas Rodriguez and submitting to a mental test
on the 28, 29, 10 and 31 of December and the 22nd of January, 1924 five
consecutive days in which he have been together besides my particular visits.
Q. Will you place state the result of the observation you made alone before those made
by the three of you jointly? A. I asked Tomas Rodriguez some questions when I went
*Succession Set X* Page 21 of 40
alone there, I asked him were he was living formerly and he well remembered that in
Intramuros, Calle Real; I asked him whether he remembered one Calderon who was
living in the upper floor of the house and then he told me yes; than I asked him about
his tenant by the name of Antonio Jimenez and he told me yes, now I remember that
he had two daughters, Matilde and Paz. Then I told him that I had been living in the
house of the gentlemen, Antonio Jimenez already dead in the upper story of the
house belonged to Tomas Rodriguez; I told him that Antonio Jimenez was his tenant of
the upper story, that is that he was living on the ground floor and Antonio Jimenez
upstairs and he remembered all of this I also began to talk of my brother, Felipe
Calderon, who he said of course that he knew; he remembered him because he was his
companion and was a successful attorney. This was when I had an interview with him.
Then in order to observe better and to be sure of my judgment or opinion about the
mental state of Tomas Rodriguez, I saw him again and we began to speak of something
which I don't remember now. In fine, we talked of things of interest and as I had finally
accepted the request of Drs. Elias Domino and Florentino Herrera to join then the first
and second time that Herrera, Domingo and myself went there, no stenographic notes
were taken of what happened there.
Q. So that before joining Doctors Herrera and Domingo you had already paid two visits
to the patient? A. Yes, sir.
Q. From the result f the conversation you had with Tomas Rodriguez on those two visits
what is your opinion as to his mental capacity? A. That he was sick; that he was
weak, but I have found absolutely no incoherence in his ideas; he answered my
questions well and as I was observing him there were times when he did not remember
things of the present because this must be admitted but on the other hand he had
a wonderful memory of past events; in talking with him, you would not notice in the
conversation any alteration in his mind nor that man had lost the reasoning power or
logic.
Q. Did you notice any loss of memory, or that his memory was weakening about things
of the past? A. About things of the past, I mean that you talk to him now about
specific matters, and after about five or ten minutes he no longer remembers what had
been talked of.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Do you remember the conversation you had with him for the first time when the
three of you paid a visit to the patient? A. I don't remember the details, but I do
remember the questions I put to him. I asked D. Tomas Rodriguez: You are an old man
aged, sick: Yes, I am thinking to make a will. But why don't you decide? There is no
hurry there is time to make a will, 'he said. Then in case you decide to make a will, to
whom are you going to leave your property? Don't you have any relatives? I have a
relative, Vicente Lopez, my first cousin, and Margarita Lopez my first cousin they are
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
brothers.' In that case, to whom, do you want to leave your property? Why, I don't have
much, very little, but I am decided to leave it to my cousin, Vicente Lopez and his
daughter Luz Lopez. Why would you not give anything to Margarita Lopez? No because
her husband is very bad, 'to use his exact language is very bad.'
Q. Did you talk with him on that occasion about his estate? A. Yes, sir, he told me that
he had three estates, one on Calle Magallanes, another on Calle Cabildo and the third
on Calle Juan Luna and besides he had money in the Monte de Piedad and Hogar
Filipino.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. From the question made by you and the answers given by Mr. Tomas Rodriguez on
that occasion, what is your opinion as to his mental capacity? A. The following: That
the memory of Tomas Rodriguez somewhat failed as to things of the present, but is all
right with regard to matters or facts of the past; that his ideas were incoherent; that the
thought with logic, argued even with power and generally in some of the interviews I
have arrived at the conclusion that Tomas Rodriguez had an initiative of his own, did not
need that anybody should make him any suggestion because he answered in such a
way that if you permit me now to show you my stenographic notes, they will prove to
you conclusively that he had an initiative of his own and had no need of anybody
making him any question. (S. R. p. 72.)
Doctor Elias Domingo, who was the attending physician for Tomas Rodriguez throughout all the
time that Rodriguez in the hospital had examined him, was likewise certain that Rodriguez
possessed sufficient mentality to make a will. Among other things, Doctor Domingo testified:
ARANETA: Q. Have you known D. Tomas Rodriguez?
Dr. DOMINGO: A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you attend D. Tomas Rodriguez as physician? A. Yes, sir.
Q. When did you begin to attend him as physician? A. On November 28, until his
death.
Q. On November 28 or October 28, 1923, do you remember? A. I had been attending
him as physician from November 28th although it true that I had opportunities to see
and examine him during the months of October and November.
Q. What was the object of your visits or attendance during the months of October and
November? A. It was for the purpose of observing his mental state.
*Succession Set X* Page 22 of 40
Q. Did you really examine his mental condition or capacity during the months of October
and November? A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many times did you visit him? A. I don't remember exactly but I visited him
about five or six times.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Please tell us the result of your examination during those months of October and
November? A. I examined him physically and mentally; I am not going to tell here the
physically result but the result of the mental examination, and that is: General Conduct:
In most of the times that I have seen him I found him lying on his bed, smoking a
cigarette and asked for a bottle of lemonade from time to time; I also observed that he
was very careful when throwing the ash of the cigarette, seeing to it that it did not fall
on the blankets; he also was careful not to throw the stub of the cigarette in any place
to avoid fire; I made more observations as to his general conduct and I found that
sometimes Don Tomas could move within the place although with certain difficulty. On
two occasions I found him seated, once seated at the table, seated in the chair, and
other on a rocking chair. I also examined his manner of talking and to all questions that I
put to him he answered with a coherence and in a relevant manner, although
sometimes he showed eagerness and certain delay. I based these points of my
declaration on the questions which are usually asked when making a mental
examination for instance I asked him, What is your name, 'and he correctly answered
Tomas Rodriguez; I asked him if he was married and he answered 'No;' I asked him his
profession and he answered that formerly he was an attorney but that at the time I was
making the examination he was not practising the profession; I asked him with what he
supported himself and he said that he lived upon his income, he said verbatim, 'I live on
my income.' I also asked him what the amount of him income was and he answered that
it was about P900; I asked him what the source of this income was and he said that it
came from his property.
Q. Did you ask him about his property? A. No, at that time.
Q. Proceed. A. I also observed his emotional status and effectivity. I found it rather
superficial, and he oftentimes got angry due to his physical disease; I asked him if he
had any relatives and he answered correctly saying that he had. He mentioned Vicente
Lopez, Margarita Lopez, and Luz Lopez. As to his memory. His memory of the past. He
very easily remembered past events and when he described them he did it with such
pleasure the he used to smile afterwards if it was a fact upon which one must smile,
His memory of recent facts was very much lessened. I say this because on various
occasions and not having known me when he had a better memory, after I had seen him
thrice he remembered my name and he recognized me. Insight and judgment. I arrived
at the conclusion that he had fair knowledge of himself because he knew that he was
sick and could not be moving with ease, but he believed that he could perform with
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
sufficient ease mental acts; his judgment was also all right because I asked him this
question: 'Supposing that you could find a bill of P5 in the vestibule of a hotel, what
would you do with it ?' He told me that he would take the bill and give it to the manager
in order that the latter may look for the owner if possible. His reasoning. I found that he
showed a moderated retardation in the flow of his thought, especially with regard to
recent events, but was quite all right as to past events, His capacity, He believed that
he was capable of thinking properly although what did not permit him to do so was his
physical decrepit condition. The conclusion is that his memory is lost for recent events
tho not totally and diminution of his intellectual vigor. This is in few words the result of
my examination.
Tomas Rodriguez was likewise examined thoroughly by Doctors De los Angeles, Tietze, and
Burke. Doctor De los Angeles had been a witness in the gurardianship proceedings and had seen
the patient of November 6 and 7, 1923. Doctor Tietze had also been a witness in the
guardianship case and had visited the patient on November 9 and 12, 1923, and on January 15,
1924. Doctors Tietze and Burke together examined Rodriguez on January 17, 20, and 24, 1924.
The three physicians conducted a joint examination result, on March 15, 1924, they prepared and
signed the following:
MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
In the Matter of Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez, male, 76 years of age, single and residing or
being confined in the Philippine General Hospital.
We, the undersigned Doctors, Sixto de los Angeles, W. B. Burke, and Samuel Tietze, do
hereby certify as follows:
1. That we are physicians, duly registered under the Medical Act, and are in the actual
practice of the medical profession in the Philippines.
2. That on January 27th and 28th, and February 10th, 1924, at the Philippine General
Hospital, we three have with care the diligence jointly and personally examined the
person of said Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez; and previous to these dated, we have
separately and partly jointly observed and examined said patient on various occasions;
Dr. Sixto de los Angeles, at the patient's home, 246 Magallanes St., Manila, on
November 6th and 7th , 1923; Dr. Samuel Tietze, at the patient's home on November
9th and 12th, 1923, and at the Philippine General Hospital no January 17th, 20th, and
24, 1924; and as a result of the medical examinations and the history of the case we
found and hereby certify to the following conclusions:
(a) That he was of unsound mind suffering from senile dementia, or of mental
impairment exceeding to a pathological extent the unusual conditions and changes
found to occur in the involutional period of life.
*Succession Set X* Page 23 of 40
(b) That he was under the influence of the above condition continuously, at least from
November, 1923, till the date of our joint reexamination, January 27th and 28th, and
February 10th, 1924; and that he would naturally have continued without improvement,
as these cases of insanity are due to organic pathological changes of the brain. This
form of mental disease is progressive in its pathological tendency, going on to
progressive atropy and degeneration of the brain, the mental symptoms, of course,
running parallel with such pathological basis.
(c) That on account of such disease and conditions his mind and memory were so
greatly impaired as to make him unable to know or to appreciate sufficiently the nature,
effect, and consequences of the business he was engaged in; to understand and
comprehend the extent and condition of his properties; to collect and to hold in his mind
the particulars and details of his business transactions and his relations to the persons
who were or might have been the objects of his bounty; and to free himself from the
influences of importunities, threats and ingenuities, so that with a relatively less
resistance, he might had been induced to do what others would not have done.
3. We have diagnosed this case as senile demential of the simple type, approaching the
deteriorated stage upon the following detailed mental examination:
(a) Disorder of memory. There was almost an absolute loss of memory of recent
events, to the extent that things and occurrences seen or observed only a few minutes
previously were completely forgotten. Faces and names of person introduced to him
were not remembered after a short moment even without leaving his bedside . He
showed no comprehension of the elemental routine required in the management of his
properties, i.e.: who were the lessees of his houses, what rents they were paying, who
was the administrator of his properties, in what banks he deposited his money or the
amount of money deposited in such banks. Regarding his personal relation, he forgot
that Mr. Antonio Ventura is the husband of his nearest woman cousin; the Mrs. Margarita
Lopez was married, saying that the latter was single or spinster, in spite of the fact that
formerly, during the past twenty-five years, he was aware of their marriage life, He did
not know the names of the sons and daughters of Mr. Vicente Lopez, one of his nearest
relatives, even failing to name Mrs. Luz Lopez de Bueno, a daughter of said Vicente
Lopez, and who now appears to be the only living beneficiary of his will. He also stated
that Mr. Vicente Lopez frequently visited him in the hospital, though the latter died on
January 7th, 1924. He did not recognized and remember the name and face of Doctor
Domingo, his own physician. However, the memory for remote events was generally
good, which is a characteristic symptom of senile dementia.
(b) Disorientation of time, place and persons. He could not name the date when
asked (day or month); could not name the hospital wherein he was confined; and failed
to recognize the fact that Doctor Domingo was his physician.
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
(c) Disorders of perception. He was almost completely indifferent to what was going
on about him. He also failed to recognize the true value of objects shown him, that is he
failed to recognized the 'Saturday Evening Post' nor would he deny that it was a will
when presented as such. He also failed to show normal intellectual perception. Making
no effort to correlate facts or to understand matters discussed in their proper light.
(d) Emotional deterioration. The patient was not known during his time of physical
incapacity to express in any way or lament the fact that he was unable to enjoy the
happiness that was due him with his wealth. As a matter of fact, he showed complete
indifference. He showed loss of emotional control by furious outbreaks over trifling
matter and actually behaved like a child; for example, if his food did not arrive
immediately of when his cigar was not lit soon, he would becomes abusive in his
language and show marked emotional outburst. If the servants did not immediately
answer his call, he would break down and cry as a child.
(e) Symptoms of decreased intellectual capacity. There was a laxity of the internal
connection of ideas. The patient has shown no insight regarding his own condition. He
did not appreciate the attitude of the parties concerned in his case; he would on several
occasion become suspicious and fail to comprehend the purpose of our examination. He
was inconsistent in his ideas and failed to grasp the meaning of his own statements.
When questioned whether he would make a will, he stated to Doctor Tietze that he
intended to bequeath his money to San Juan de Dios Hospital and Hospicio de San Jose.
When He was informed, however, that he had made a will on January 31, 1924, he
denied the latter statement, and failed to explain the former. Although for a long time
confined to bed and seriously ill for a long period, he expressed himself as sound
physically and mentally, and in the false belief that he was fully able to administer his
business personally.
His impairment of the intellectual field was further shown by his inability, despite his
knowledge of world affairs, to appreciate the relative value of the statement made by
Doctor Tietze as follows: 'We have here a cheque of P2,000 from the King of Africa
payable to you so that you may deposit it in the bank. Do you want to accept the
cheque?' His answer was as follows: 'Now I cannot give my answer. It may be a
surprise.' Such answer given by a man after long experience in business life, who had
handled real estate property, well versed in the transaction of cheques, certainly shows
a breaking down of the above field. No proper question were asked why the cheque was
given by the King, who the King was, why he was selected by the King of Africa, or if
there is a King of Africa at present. He further shows doubt in his mental capability by
the following questions and answers:
"MARCAIDA: P. Tiene usted actualmente algn asunto en los tribunales de
justicia de Manila? -- R. No recuerdo en este momento.
*Succession Set X* Page 24 of 40
"P. De tener usted algn asunto propio en los tribunales de justicia de Manila,
a qu abogado confiara usted la defensa del mismo?--R. Al Sr. Marcaida,
como conocido antiguo.
"P. Ha hablado usted y conferenciado alguna vez o varias veces en estos das,
o sea desde el 25 de octubre de 1923 hasta hoy, con algn abogado para que
le defendiera algn asunto ante el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila?--R.
Con ninguno, porque en caso de nombrar, nombrara al Sr. Marcaida. (P. 5,
deposition, Nov. 19, 1923.)
"ARANETA: P. No recuerda usted que usted me ha encomendado como
abogado para que me oponga a que le declaren a usted loco o incapacitado?--
R. S, seor, quien ha solicitado? (P. 9, deposition, Nov. 19, 1923.)
"Dr. DOMINGO: P. Don Toms, me conoce usted? Se acuerda usted que soy el
Doctor Domingo?--R. S. (P. 7, sten. N., Jan. 28, 1924.)
"P. Quin soy, Don Toms, usted me conoce?--R. No s. (P. 6, sten. N., Feb. 10,
1924.)
"Dr. NGELES: P. Me conoce usted, D. Toms?--R. Le conozco de vista. (P. 6,
sten. N., Jan. 28, 1924.)
"P. Nos vamos a despedir ya, Don Toms, de usted. Yo soy el Doctor ngeles,
me conoce usted?--R. De nombre.
"P. Este es el Doctor Burke, le conoce usted?--R. De nombre.
"P. Este es el Doctor Domingo, le conoce usted?--R. De vista.
"P. Este es el Doctor Burke, recuerda usted su nombre?--R. No. (P. 10, sten. N.,
Jan. 28, 1924.)
"P.Usted conoce a este Doctor? (Sealando al Doctor Burke).--R. De vista; su
nombre ya lo he olvidado, ya no me acuerdo.
"P.Usted nos ve a los tres? (Doctores ngeles, Burke y Tietze).--R. Ya lo creo.
"Dr. BURKE: P. Qu profesin tenemos? (Sealando a los Sres. ngeles, Burke
y Tietze).--R. YO creo que son doctores.
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola *Succession Set X* Page 25 of 40

"P. Y lso dos? (Sealando a los Doctores ngeles y Tietze).--R. No. s. Q. Among your observations on the 1st of January, 1924, you say 'with pains all over the
body, and uttered some incoherent words of the same topics whenever is awakened.'
"P. Y este seor? (Sealando al Doctor ngeles).--R. No me acuerdo en este How could you observe that he had pains all over the body?
momento. (P. 4. And 5, sten. N., Feb. 10, 1924.)
APOLONIO FLOREZA, nurse: A. I observed that by the fact that whenever I touched the
(f) Other facts bearing upon the history of the case obtained by investigation of Doctor body of the patient he complained of some pain.
Angeles:
Q. On what part of the body did you touch him? A. On all the parts of his body.
I. Family History. His parents were noted to be of nervous temper and irritable.
xxx xxx xxx
II. Personal history. He was a lawyer, but did not pursue his practice, devoting the
greater part of his life to collecting antiquities, He was generally regarded by his Q. How did you touch him, strongly or not? A. Slightly.
neighbors as miserly and erratic in the ordinary habits of life. He lead a very unhygienic
life, making no attempt to clean the filth of dirt that was around him. He was neglectful Q. When you touched him slightly, what did he do? A. He said that it was aching.
in personal habits. On April, 1921, he suffered an injury to his forehead, from which he
became temporarily unconscious, and was confined in the Philippine General Hospital
Q. What words did he say when, according to your note, he uttered incoherent words
for treatment. He frequently complained of attacks of dizziness and headache, following
whenever he awakes? A. As for instance, 'Maria,' repeating it 'Where are my 50
this injury; suffered form a large hernia; and about two years ago, he was fined for
centavos, where is my key?'
failure in filing his income tax, from which incident, we have reason to believe, the onset
of his mental condition took place. This incident itself can most probably be considered
as a failure of memory. His condition became progressively worse up to his death. Q. Did you hear him talk of Maria? A. Only the word Maria.

4. The undersigned have stated all the above facts contained in this certificate to the Q. How long approximately was he talking uttering the name of 'Maria, Where are my 50
best of our knowledge and belief. centavos,' and where is my key? A. For two or three minutes.

Manila, P.I., March 15, 1924. Q. Can you tell the court whether on those occasions when he said the name of Maria
he said other words and was talking with somebody? A. He was talking to himself.
(Sgd.) SIXTO DE LOS ANGELES
W.B. BURKE, M.D. Q. This remark on Exhibit 8-B when was it written by you? A. January 2, 1924.
SAMUEL TIETZE
Q. In the observation correspondingly to January 2, 1924 you say, 'With pains over the
(Exhibit 33 in relation with Exhibits 28 and 29.) body,' and later on talked too much whenever patient is awakened.' How did you
happen to know the pain which you have noted here? A. The pains all over the body, I
have observed them when giving him baths.
Another angle to the condition of the patient on or about January 3, 1924, is disclosed by the
treatment record kept daily by the nurses, in which appear the nurse's remarks. (Exhibits 8-A, 8-
B, and 8-C.) In this connection, the testimony of the nurses is that Rodriguez was in the habit for Q. Besides saying that it ached when you touched the body, do you know whether he
no reason at all of calling "Maria, where are my 50 centavos, where is my key." In explanation of did any extraordinary thing? A. You mean to say acts?
the observation made by the nurses, the nurse Apolonio Floreza testified.
Q. Acts or words? A. Yes, sir, like those words which I have already said which he used to
Direct questions of Attorney OCAMPO: say Maria, the key, 50 centavos.
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
Q. You say that he called Maria. What did he say about Maria on that date January 2,
1924? A. He used to say Maria where is Maria?
Q. On that date January 2, 1924, did you answer him when he said Maria? A. No sir.
Q. In this observation of yours appearing on page 8-C you say among other things with
pain all over the body and shouted whenever he is given injection.' Did you really
observe this in the patient? A. Yes, sir.
Q. How did he shout?
ARANETA: Objection as being immaterial.
COURT: Overruled.
ARANETA: Exception.
A. In a loud voice.
Q. Besides shouting do you remember whether he said anything? A . He repeated the
same words I have said before Maria the 50 centavos the key.
Q. When did this observation occur which appear on page 8-C? A. On January 3, 1924.
(S. R. p. 5595.)
On certain facts pertaining to the condition of Tomas Rodriguez there is no dispute. On January 3,
1924, Rodriguez had reached the advanced age of 76 years. He was suffering from anemia,
hernia inguinal, chronic dypsia, and senility. Physically he was a wreck.
As to the mental state of Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, Doctors Calderon, Domingo and
Herrera admit that he was senile. They, together with Doctors De los Angeles, Tietze, and Burke,
further declare that his memory however for remote events was generally good. He was given to
irrational exclamations symptomatic of a deceased mind.
While, however, Doctors Calderon Domingo, and Herrera certify that the intellectual faculties of
the patient are "sound, except that his memory is weak," and that in executing the will the
testator had full understanding of the act he was performing and full knowledge of the contents
thereof, Doctors De Los Angeles, Tietze and Burke certify that Tomas Rodriguez was of unsound
mind and that they diagnosed his case as senile dementia of the simple type approaching the
deteriorated stage. Without attempting at this stage to pass in judgment on the antagonistic
conclusions of the medical witnesses, or on other disputed point, insofar as the facts are
concerned, a resolution of the case comes down to this: Did Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924,
*Succession Set X* Page 26 of 40
possess sufficient mentality to make a will, or had he passed so far along in senile dementia as
to require the court to find him of unsound? We leave the facts in this situation to pass on to a
discussion of the legal phases of the case.
B. Law. The Code of Civil Procedure prescribes as a requisite to the allowance of a will that the
testator be of "sound mind" (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 614). A "sound mind" is a "disposing
mind." One of the grounds for disallowing a will is "If the testator was insane or otherwise
mentally incapable of the execution." (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 634 [2].) Predicated on these
statutory provisions, this court has adopted the following definition of testamentary capacity:
"'Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the
testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who
would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in
which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.'" (Bugnao vs.
Ubag [1909], 14 Phil., 163, followed in Bagtas vs. Paguio [1912], 46 Phil., 701.) The mental
capacity of the testator is determined as of the date of the execution of his will (Civil Code, art.
666).
Various tests of testamentary capacity have been announced by the courts only later to be
rejected as incomplete. Of the specific tests of capacity, neither old age, physical infirmities,
feebleness of mind, weakness of the memory, the appointment of a guardian, nor eccentricities
are sufficient singly or jointly to show testamentary incapacity. Each case rests on its own facts
and must be decided by its own facts.
There is one particular test relative to the capacity to make a will which is of some practical
utility. This rule concerns the nature and rationality of the will. Is the will simple or complicated?
Is it natural or unnatural? The mere exclusion of heirs will not, however, in itself indicate that the
will was the offspring of an unsound mind.
On the issue of testamentary capacity, the evidence should be permitted to take a wide range in
order that all facts may be brought out which will assist in determining the question. The
testimony of subscribing witnesses to a will concerning the testator's mental condition is entitled
to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent. The evidence of those present at the
execution of the will and of the attending physician is also to be relied upon. (Alexander on Willis,
vol. I, pp. 433, 484; Wharton & Stille's Medical Jurisprudence, vol. I pp. 100 et seq.)
The presumption is that every adult is sane. It is only when those seeking to overthrow the will
have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to set
aside a testamentary document. (Hernaez vs. Hernaez [1903], 1 Phil., 689; Bagtas vs.
Paguio, supra.)
Counsel for the appellee make capital of the testator being under guardianship at the time he
made his will. Citing section 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure and certain authorities, they insist
that the effect of the judgment is conclusive with respect to the condition of the person. To this
statement we cannot write down our conformity. The provisions of the cited section were taken
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
from California, and there the Supreme court has never held what is now urged upon us by the
appellee. The rule announced that in some states, by force of statute, the finding of insanity is
conclusive as to the existence of insanity during the continuance of adjudication, is found to rest
on local statutes, of which no counterpart is found in the Philippines. (32 C.J., 647; Gridley vs.
Boggs [1882], 62 Cal., 190; In the matter of the Estate of Johnson [1881], 57 Cal., 529.) Even
where the question of insanity is out in issue in the guardianship proceedings, the most that can
be said for the finding is that it raises a presumption of incapacity to make a will but does not
invaluable the testament if competency can be shown. The burden of providing sanity in such
case is cast upon the proponents.
It is here claimed that the unsoundness of mind of the testator was the result of senile dementia.
This is the form of mental decay of the aged upon which will are most often contested. A Newton,
Paschal, a Cooley suffering under the variable weather of the mind, the flying vapors of incipient
lunacy," would have proved historic subjects for expert dispute. Had Shakespeare's King Lear
made a will, without any question it would have invited litigation and doubt.
Senile dementia usually called childishness has various forms and stages. To constitute
complete senile dementiathere must be such failure of the mind as to deprive the testator of
intelligent action,. In the first stages of the diseases, a person may possess reason and have will
power. (27 L. R. A., N. S. [1910], p. 89; Wharton & Stille's Medical Jurisprudence, vol. I. pp. 791 et
seq.; Schouler on Wills, vol. I, pp. 145 et seq.)
It is a rather remarkable coincidence that of all the leading cases which have gone forth from this
court, relating to the testator having a sound and disposing mind, and which have been brought
to our notice by counsel, every one of them has allowed the will, even when it was necessary to
reverse the judgment of the trial court. A study of these cases discloses a consistent tendency to
protect the wishes of the deceased whenever it be legally possible. These decisions also show
great tenderness on the part of the court towards the last will and testament of the aged. (See
Hernaez vs. Hernaez [1903], 1 Phil., 689, per Arellano, C. J., In the matter of the will o f Butalid
[1908] 10 Phil., 27 per Arellano, C. J.; Bugnao vs. Ubag [1909] 14. Phil., 163, per Carson, J.;
Macapinlac vs. Alimurong [1910], 16 Phil., 41, per Arellano, C.J.; Bagtas vs. Paguio [1912], 22
Phil., 227, per Trent, J.; Galvez vs. Galvez [1913], 26 Phil., 243, per Torres, J.; Samson vs. Corrales
Tan Quintin [1923], 44 Phil., 573, per Ostrand, J.; and Jocson vs. Jocson [1922], 46 Phil., 701, per
Villamor, J.) Because of their peculiar applicability, we propose to make particular mention of four
of the earlier cases of this court.
In the case of Hernaez vs. Hernaez supra the subject of the action was the will executed by Dona
Juana Espinosa. The annulment of the will was sought first upon the ground of the incapacity of
the testatrix. She was over 80 years of age, so ill that three days extreme unction, and two days
afterwards she died. Prior thereto she walked in a stooping attitude and gave contradictory
orders," as a result of her senile debility." The chief Justice reached the conclusion that neither
from the facts elicited by the interrogatories nor the documents presented "can the conclusion
be reached that the testatrix was deprived of her mental faculties." The will was held valid and
efficacious.
*Succession Set X* Page 27 of 40
In the case of In the matter of the will of Butalid, supra, the will was contested for the reason that
Dominga Butalid at the date of the execution of the document was not in the date of the
execution of the document was not in the free use of her intellectual powers, she being over 90
years of age, lying in bed seriously ill, senseless and unable to utter a single word so that she did
not know what she was doing when she executed the will while the document was claimed to
have been executed under the influence and by the direction of one of the heirs designated in
the will. Yet after an examination of the evidence in the will. Yet after an examination of the
evidence in the will. The Chief Justice rendered judgment reversing the judgment appealed from
and declaring the will presented for legalization to be valid and sufficient.
In the case of Bugnao vs. Ubag, supra the court gave credence to the testimony of the
subscribing witnesses who swore positively that at the time of the execution of the will the
testator was of sound mind and memory. Based on these and other facts, Mr. Justice Carson,
speaking for court, laid down the following legal principles:
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably
carries with it full testamentary known as insanity or idiocy there are numberless
degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it had been held that
mere weakness of mind or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will to
render a person incapable of making a will a weak or feeble minded person may make a
valid will provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know
what he is about and how or to whom he is disposing of his property' (Lodge vs. Lodge,
2 Houst. [Del.] 418); that, "To constitute a sound be unbroken or unimpaired,
unshattered by disease or otherwise (Sloan vs. Maxwell, # N. J. Eq., 563); that it has not
been understood that a testator must possess these qualities (of sound and disposing
mind and memory) in the highest degree. . . .Few indeed would be the wills confirmed it
this is correct. Pain, sickness, debility of body from age or infirmity, would according to
its violence or duration in a greater or less degree, break in upon, weaken, or derange
the mind, but the derangement must be such as deprives him of the rational faculties
common to man' (Den. vs. Vancleve, 5 N. J. L., 680); and that Sound mind does not
mean a perfectly balanced mind. The question of soundness is one of degree' (Boughton
vs. Knight. L. R., 3 P. & D., 64; 42 L. P. P., 25); on the other hand, it has been held that
testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be
insane or of an unsound mind. Weakness of intellect, whether it arises from extreme old
age, from disease, or great bodily infirmities of suffering, or from all these combined,
may render the testator in capable of making a valid will, providing such weakness
really disqualifies for from knowing or appreciating the nature, effects, or consequences
of the act she is engaged in (Manatt vs. Scott, 106 Iowa, 203; 68 Am. St. Rep., 293,
302).
In the case of Nagtas vs. Paquio, supra, the record shows that the testator for some fourteen or
fifteen years prior to the time of his death suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his body,
that a few years prior to his death his hearing became impaired and that he had lost the power
of speech. However, he retained the use of his hand and could write fairly well. Through the
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
medium of signs, he was able to indicate his wishes to his family. The will was attacked n the
ground that the testator lacked mental capacity at the time of its execution. The will was
nevertheless admitted to probate, Mr. Justice Trent, speaking for the court, announcement the
following pertinent legal doctrines:
* * * There are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that the courts
have repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and
disease do not render a person incapable of making a will. The law does not require that
a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental
powers in order to execute a valid will. If such were the legal standard few indeed would
be the number of wills that could meet such exacting requirements. The authorities,
both medical and legal are universal in the statement that the question of mental
capacity is one of degree and that there are many graduations from the highest degree
of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of diseased mentality which are
denominated as insanity and idiocy.
The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as any other
right which a person may exercise and this right should be nullified unless mental
incapacity is established in a positive and conclusive manner. In discussing the question
of testamentary capacity, it is stated in volume 28, page 70, of the American and
English Encyclopedia of Law that
'Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression perfect soundness of mind is not
essential to testamentary capacity. A testator may be afflicted with a variety of mental
weakness, disorders or peculiarities and still be capable in law of executing a valid will.'
(See the numerous cases there cited in support of this statement.)
The rule relating to testamentary capacity is stated in Buswel on Insanity, section 365
and quoted with approval in Campbell vs. Campbell (130 Ill. 466) as follows:
To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind shall be
wholly unbroken unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise or that the testator
should be in the full possession of his reasoning faculties.
In note, 1 Jarnan on Wills, 38, the rule is thus stated:
The question is not so much, what was the degree of memory possessed by the testator
as had, he a disposing memory? Was he able to remember the property he was about to
bequeth the manner of distributing it and the object of his bounty? In a word, were his
mind and memory sufficiently sound to enable him to know and understand the
business in which he was engaged at the time when he executed his will.' (See
authorities there cited)
*Succession Set X* Page 28 of 40
In Wilson vs. Mitchell (101 Penn., 495), the following facts appeared upon the trial of the
case: The testator died at the age of nearly 102 years. In his early years he was an
intelligent and well informed man. About seven years prior to his death he suffered a
paralytic stroke and from that time his mind and memory were much enfeebled. He
became very dull of hearing and in consequence of the shrinking of his brain he was
affected with senile cataract causing total blindness. He became filthy and obscene in
his habits, although formerly he was observant of the proprieties of life. The court, in
commenting upon the case, said:
Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will affect the
capacity to make a will, if sufficient intelligence remains. The failure of memory is not
sufficient to create the incapacity, unless it be total or extend to his immediate family to
property. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Dougal (the testator) had lived over one hundred years before he made the will and his
physical and mental weakness and defective memory were in striking contrast with
their strength in the meridian of his life. He was blind; not deaf, but hearing impaired;
his mind acted slowly, he was forgetful of recent events, especially of names and
repeated questions in conversation; and sometimes, when aroused from sleep or
slumber, would seem bewildered. It is not singular that some of those who had known
him when he was remarkable for vigor and intelligence are of the opinion that his
reason was so far gone that he was incapable of making a will, although they never
heard him utter an irrational expression.
In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw the same
contract as was pictured by the court in the case just quoted. . . .
The particular difference between all of the Philippine case which are cited and the case at bar
are that in none of the Philippine cases was there any declaration of incomplicated and in none
of them were the facts quite as complicated as they are here. A case in point where the will was
contested, because the testator was not of sound and disposing mind and memory and because
at the time of the making of the will he was acting under the undue influence of his brothers and
where he had a guardian when he executed his will, is Ames' Will ([1902] 40 Ore., 495). Mr.
Justice Moore, delivering the opinion of the court, in part said:
It is contended by contestant's counsel that on the day said pretended will purports to
have been executed, Lowell was declared incompetent by a court which had jurisdiction
of the person and subject-matter and that the decree therein appointing a guardian of
his person and estate raises the distable presumption that he did not possess sufficient
testamentary capacity at the time to overcome which required evidence so strong as to
leave no reasonable doubt as to his capacity to make a valid will, and the testimony
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
introduced by the proponent being insufficient for that purpose the court erred in
admitting it to probate.
The appointment of a guardian of a person alleged to be non compos mentis, by a court
having jurisdiction must necessarily create a presumption of the mental infirmity of the
ward; but such decree does not conclusively show that the testamentary capacity of the
person under guardianship is entirely destroyed and the presumption thus created may
be overcome by evidence proving that such person at the time he executed a will was in
fact of sound and disposing mind and memory: Stone vs. Damon, 12 Mass., 487; Breed
vs. Pratt, 18 Pick, 115: In re Slinger's Will, 72 Wis., 22 (37 N. W. 236).
The testimony shows that the testator retained a vivid recollection of the contents of
the books he had read and studied when he was young but that he could not readily
recall to his mind the ordinary incidents of his later life. The depth and intensity of
mental impression always depend upon and are measured by the degree of attention
given to the perception of truth, which demands reflection; and hence the inability of a
person to recollect events and hence the inability is evidence of mental decay, because
it manifest a want of power on concentration of the mind. The aged live in the past and
the impression retained in their minds are those that were made in their younger days,
because at that period of their lives they were able to exercise will power by giving
attention. While the inability of a person of advanced years to remember recent events
distinctly undoubtedly indicates a decay of the human faculties, it does not conclusively
establishsenile dementia, which is something more than a mere loss of mental power,
resulting from old age and is not only a feeble condition of the mind but a derangement
thereof. . . . The rule is settled in this state that if a testator at the time he executes his
will understand the business in which he is engaged and has a knowledge of his
property and how he wishes to dispose of it among those entitled to his bounty, he
possess sufficient testamentary capacity, notwithstanding his old age, sickness debility
of body, or extreme distress.
xxx xxx xxx
It is contented by contestant's counsel that if Lowell at the time he executed the
pretended will, was not wholly lacking in testamentary capacity, he was, in
consequence of age ill health, debility of body and infirmity of will power, Andrew and
Joseph having knowledge thereof took advantage of his physical and mental condition
and unduly influenced him to device and bequeth his property in the manner indicated,
attempting thereby to deprive the contestant of all interest therein except such as was
given her by statute. . . . Assuming that he was easily persuaded and that his brothers
and the persons employed by them to care for him took advantage of his enfeebled
condition and prejudiced his mind against the contestant did such undue influence
render the will therefore executed void? . . . When a will has been properly executed, it
is the duty of the courts to uphold it, if the testator possessed a sound and disposing
mind and memory and was free from restraint and not acting under undue influence
*Succession Set X* Page 29 of 40
notwithstanding sympathy for persons legally entitled to the testator's bounty and a
sense of innate justice might suggest a different testamentary disposition.
Believing, as we do, that the findings of the circuit court are supported by the weight of
the testimony its decree is affirmed.
Insofar as the law on testamentary capacity to make a will is concerned and carrying alone one
step further the question suggested at the end of the presentation of the facts on the same
subject a resolution of the case comes down to this: Did Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924,
possess sufficient mentality to make a will which would meet the legal test regarding
testamentary capacity and have the proponents of the will carried successfully the burden of
proof and shown him to be of sound mind on that date?
II. UNDUE INFLUENCE
A. Facts. The will was attacked on the further ground of undue influence exercised by the
persons benefited in the will in collaboration with others. The trial judge found this allegation to
have been established and made it one of the bases of his decision. it is now for us to say if the
facts justify this finding.
Tomas Rodriguez voluntary named Vicente F. Lopez as his administrator. The latter subsequently
became his guardian. There is every indication that of all his relatives Tomas Rodriguez reposed
the most confidence in Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno. Again, it was
Vicente F. Lopez, who, on the suggestion of Rodriguez secured Maximino Mina to prepare the will,
and it was Luz Lopez de Bueno who appears to have gathered the witnesses and physicians for
the execution of the will. This faction of the Lopez family was also a favor through the orders of
Doctor Domingo as to who could be admitted to see the patient.
The trial judge entertained the opinion that there existed "a preconceived plan on the part of the
persons who surrounded Tomas Rodriguez" to secure his signature to the testament. The trial
judge may be correct in this supposition. It is hard to believe, however, that men of the standing
of Judge Mina, Doctors Calderon, Domingo, Herrera, and De Asis and Mr. Legarda would so
demean themselves and so fully their characters and reputation as to participate in a scheme
having for its purpose to delude and to betray an old man in his age, rather named was acting
according to the best of his ability to assist in a legitimate act in a legitimate manner. Moreover,
considering the attitude of Tomas Rodriguez toward Margarita Lopez and her husband and his
apparent enmity toward them, it seems fairly evident that even if the will had been made in
previous years when Rodriguez was more nearly in his prime, he would have prepared somewhat
a similar document.
B. LAW. One of the grounds for disallowing a will is that it was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the art of the beneficiary or some other person for his
benefit (Code of Civil Procedure, sec., 634[4]). Undue influence, as here mentioned in connection
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
with the law of wills and as further mentioned in the Civil Code (art. 1265), may be defined as
that which compelled the testator to do that which is against the will from fear the desire of
peace or from other feeling which is unable to resist.
The theory of undue influence is totally rejected as not proved.
III. JUDGMENT
To restate the combined issued of fact and law in this case pertaining to testamentary capacity:
Did Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, possess sufficient mentality to make a will which would
meet the legal test regarding testamentary capacity and have the proponents of the will carried
successfully the burden of proof and shown him to be of sound mind on that date?
Two of the subscribing witnesses to the will, one a physician clearly to the regular manner in
which the will was executed and to the testator's mental condition. The other subscribing
witness, also, a physician on the contrary testified to a fact which, if substantiated, would require
the court to disallow the will. The attending physician and three other eminent members of the
medical fraternity, who were present at the execution of the will, expressed opinions entirely
favorable to the capacity of the testator. As against this we have the professional speculations of
three other equally eminent members of the medical profession when the will was executed. The
advantage on those facts is all with those who offer the will for probate.
The will was short. It could easily be understood by a person in physical distress. It was
reasonable, that is, it was reasonable if we take into account the evident prejustice of the
testator against the husband of Margarita Lopez.
With special reference of the definition of testamentary capacity, we may say this: On January 3,
1924, Tomas Rodriguez, in our opinion comprehended the nature of the transaction in which he
was engaged. He had two conferences with his lawyer, Judge Mina, and knew what the will was
to contain. The will was read to him by Mr. Legarda. He signed the will and its two copies in the
proper places at the bottom and on the left margin. At that time the testator recollected the
property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims
upon him While for some months prior to the making of the will he had not manage his property
he seem to have retained a distinct recollection of what it consisted and of his income.
Occasionally his memory failed him with reference to the names of his relatives. Ordinarily, he
knew who they were, he seemed to entertain a prediliction towards Vicente F. Lopez as would be
natural since Lopez was nearest in which the instrument distributed the property naming the
objects of his bounty. His conversations with Judge Mina disclosed as insistence on giving all of
his property to the two persons whom he specified.
On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez may have been of advanced years, may have been
physically decrepit, may have been weak in intellect, may have suffered a loss of memory, may
have had a guardian and may have a been extremely eccentric, but he still possessed the spark
*Succession Set X* Page 30 of 40
of reason and of life, that strength of mind to form a fixed intention and to summon his enfeebled
thoughts to enforce that intention, which the law terms "testamentary capacity." That in effect is
the definite opinion which we reach after an exhaustive and exhausting study of a tedious
record, after weighing the evidence for the oppositors, and after giving to the case the serious
consideration which it deserves.
The judgment of the trial court will be set aside and the will of Tomas Rodriguez will be admitted
to probate without special pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
FACTS: On January 3,1924, the testator Thomas Rodriquez, who was 76 years of age and was in
feeble health for a long time, made his will where he made his cousin Vicente Lopez and his
daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno as the only and universal heir of his properties. The probate of the
will was opposed by Margarita Lopez, cousin and nearest relative of the deceased. The ground
cited for the opposition was that the testator lacked mental capacity, she claimed that at time of
the execution of the supposed will, the deceased was suffering from senile dementia and was
under guardianship.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testator was mentally capacitated during the execution of the will.
RULING: The deceased testator had mental capacity to make his will during its execution. The
Supreme Court held that at the time of the making of the will, the testator may be of old age,
may have been physically decrepit, may have been week of intellect, have suffered a loss of
memory, had a guardian over his person and property and may have been eccentric, but he still
possessed that spark of reason and of life, that strength of mind to form a fixed intention, and to
summon his enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention which the law terms testamentary
capacity.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-39033 November 13, 1933
In re will of the late Matea Abella. MONS. SANTIAGO SANCHO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
MARCIANA ABELLA, opponent-appellant.
Sotto and Astilla for appellant.
B. Quitoriano for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
This is an appeal taken by the opponent Marciana Abella from the judgment rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
Wherefore, this court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the opposition filed by
Marciana Abella is without merit and, therefore, it is hereby denied. The application filed
herein is granted and the document, Exhibit A, is hereby ordered and decreed probated
as the last will and testament of the late Matea Abella. So ordered.
In support of her appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged errors in the decision of the
court a quo, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that Matea Abella was in the full enjoyment of her
mental faculties and executed the document, Exhibit A, as a true expression of her last
will.
2. The lower court erred in holding that the requirements of the law have been complied
with in the execution of the will, Exhibit A.
3. The lower court erred in holding that when the late Matea Abella affixed her alleged
signatures to the will, Exhibit A, she did not act under the illegal and undue influence of
certain legatees.
4. The lower court erred in decreeing the probate of the will, Exhibit A.
The following facts have been proven by a preponderance of evidence presented during the trial,
to wit:
The testatrix, Matea Abella, resident of the municipality of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, had been informed
that Dr. Antonio Querol of San Fernando La Union, was a good physician. On April 13, 1932, she
left her home situated in the said municipality of Sinait, accompanied by her niece, Filomena
Inay, to consult the said physician in his clinic in San Fernando, La Union, stopping at the convent
of the parish church of the said municipality, in charge of Father Cordero with whom she was
acquainted he having been the parish priest of Sinait. During her stay in the said convent, she
went to Dr. Antonio Querol's clinic twice within the period of one week accompanied by her
aforesaid niece, Filomena Inay, to consult the said physician who, after submitting her to a
general medical examination, found that she was suffering from dyspepsia and cancer of the
stomach.
On or about April 26, 1932, Matea Abella ordered a sexton of the convent to call Attorney
Teodoro R. Reinoso to whom she expressed her desire to make a will, in the presence of the
Father Cordero's sister, Father Zoilo Aguda, Macario Calug and the fiscal of the convent.
Inasmuch as the aforesaid attorney had to attend to other business, he could not finish his
interview with the testatrix on the first day and had to continue it the following day, also in the
*Succession Set X* Page 31 of 40
presence of Father Cordero, his sister, Filomena Inay and some children who were then at the
convent. Inasmuch as he did not finish the interview on the second day, the said attorney
returned again on the afternoon of the 28th and continued it in the presence of the same persons
who entered and left the sala. At the end of the interview, Matea Abella ordered he niece,
Filomena Inay, to bring her some papers which were in her trunk, which she delivered to the said
attorney. After the will had been drafted in Ilocano, the dialect of the testatrix, Macario Calug
read it to her and she approved it. When the will had been copied clean, it was again read to the
testatrix and she express her approval thereof, but inasmuch as it was rather late at night, she
did not care to sign the same suggesting that it be postponed to the following day, April 29,
1932, which was done. At about 7:30 o'clock on the morning of April 29, 1932, the signing of the
will took place in the corridor of the convent. The testatrix Matea Abella was the first to sign it on
a table in the presence of each and every one of the instrumental witnesses thereto and of other
persons, including Father Cordero. After the testatrix, each of the instrument witnesses signed in
the presence of the testatrix and of each and every one of the other witnesses. After the will had
been signed, Attorney Teodoro R. Reinoso delivered the original and the copies thereof to the
testatrix, retaining one for his file. On July 3, 1932, Matea Abella died of the senile debility in the
municipality of Sinait at the age of 88 years.
The opponent herein attempted to prove that the testatrix was deaf and that her eyesight was
defective; that when one moved away from her and again approached her she was unable to
recognize him; that it was necessary to shout into her ear to call her for meals; that she used to
urinate on her clothes without being aware of it; that she had a very poor memory inasmuch as
she used to try to collect from her debtors in spite of the fact that they had already paid their
debts; that once, although she had sold a parcel of land for P60 she said she had sold it for P160;
that she was unable to go downstairs without assistance; that when she was called at mealtime
she used to answer: "Why, I have already eaten"; that she could not remember her properties
nor the names of her tenants; that she could no longer read; that she often repeated to her
tenants the same questions regarding their crops; that she had been suffering from the
disabilities for more than two months previous to her death; that the deceased complained of
headache and of stomachache; that she already began to be dotty five years before, and
particularly a few days previous to her death; that in her will she bequeathed properties which
she had already donated to other persons.
We are face to face with two divergent theories regarding the mental state of the testatrix Matea
Abella at the time of the execution of her will, Exhibit A. The opponent claims that, inasmuch as
the testatrix was 88 years of age when she made her will, she was already suffering from senile
debility and therefore her mental faculties were not functioning normally anymore and that she
was not fully aware of her acts. As an indication of her senile debility, she attempted to prove
that the testatrix had very poor memory in connection with her properties and interest; that she
could not go downstairs without assistance, and that she could not recall her recent acts.
On the other hand, as to the mental sanity of the testatrix at the time of the execution of her will,
we have the undisputed fact of her having left her home in Sinait, Ilocos Sur, on April 13, 1932, in
order to go to San Fernando, La Union, to consult Dr. Antonio
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
Querol of whose ability she had heard so much regarding her headaches and stomach
trouble, stopping at the convent of the parish church; the fact of her having walked twice to the
aforesaid doctor's clinic, accompanied by her niece, Filomena Inay; the fact that she had
personally furnished the aforesaid doctor with all the necessary data regarding the history of her
illness the fact of her having brought with her in her trunk the deeds to her properties; the fact of
her having called for Attorney Teodoro R. Reinoso; the fact of her having personally furnished
said attorney all the data she wished to embody in her relative to her properties and the persons
in whose favor she wished to bequeath them; the fact of her not wishing to sign her will on the
night of April 28, 1932, but the following day, in order to be able to see it better, and the fact of
her having affixed her signature, in her own handwriting, to the original as well as to the copies
of her will which consisted of nine pages. All these data show that the testatrix was not so
physically weak, nor so blind, nor so deaf, nor so lacking in intelligence that she could not, with
full understanding thereof, dispose of her properties and make a will. Neither senile debility, nor
blindness, nor deafness, nor poor memory, is by itself sufficient to incapacitate a person for
making his ill (Avelino vs. De la Cruz, 21 Phil., 521; Bagtas vs. Paguio, 22 Phil., 227; Jocson vs.
Jocson, 46 Phil., 701; Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485; Torres and Lopez de
Bueno vs. Lopez, 48 Phil., 772; 28 R.C.L., p. 94, par. 44). The mere fact that in her will Matea
Abella disposed of properties, which she had already donated to other persons at a prior date, is
not an indication of mental insanity. At most it constitutes forgetfulness or a change of mind, due
to ignorance of the irrevocability of certain donations.lawphil.net
It is insinuated that the testatrix has been unduly influenced in the execution of her will. There is
nothing in the records establishing such claim either directly or indirectly. The fact of her having
stopped at the convent of the parish church of San Fernando, La Union, is not unusual in the
Philippines where, due to lack of hotels, the town convents are usually given preference by
strangers because they are given better accommodations and allowed more freedom. In the
present case, the testatrix Matea Abella was a stranger in San Fernando, La Union. Inasmuch as
Father Cordero, the parish priest of the said town, was well known to her having served in the
church of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, in the same capacity, she did not have any difficulties in obtaining
accommodations in his convent. The fact that Matea Abella stopped at a convent and enjoyed
the hospitality of a priest who gave her accommodations therein, nor the fact that the will was
executed in the convent in question in the presence of the parish priest and witnessed by
another priest, could certainly not be considered as an influence which placed her under the
obligation to bequeath of her property to the bishop of said diocese.
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold: (1) That neither senile
ability, nor deafness, nor blindness, nor poor memory, is by itself sufficient to establish the
presumption that the person suffering therefrom is not in the full enjoyment of his mental
faculties, when there is sufficient evidence of his mental sanity at the time of the execution of
the will; and (2) that neither the fact of her being given accommodations in a convent, nor the
presence of the parish priest, nor a priest acting as a witness, constitutes undue influence
sufficient to justify the annulment of a legacy in favor of the bishop of a diocese made in her will
by a testatrix 88 years of age, suffering from defective eyesight and hearing, while she is
stopping at a convent within the aforestated diocese.
*Succession Set X* Page 32 of 40
Wherefore, not finding any error in the judgment appealed from, it is hereby affirmed in toto,
with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Case digest
Opponent alleged that the testators mental faculties were not functioning normally
anymore; that she had poor eyesight/hearing; that she urinated without knowing; that she had
very poor memory. SC ruled that senile debility, blindness, deafness, or poor memory is not by
itself sufficient to incapacitate a person from making his/her will. In this case, the records showed
that the testators mental faculties were functioning well.
Also, the fact that the testator included in her dispositions property that she had already
donated does not indicate mental insanity. At most, it is merely forgetfulness.
1. WILLS; PROBATE; CAPACITY TO MAKE A WILL. Neither seniledebility, nor deafness, nor
blindness, nor poor memory, is by itself sufficient toestablish the presumption that the person
suffering therefrom is not in the fullenjoyment of his mental faculties, when then is su fficient
evidence of his mentalsanity at the time of the execution of the will.
2. ID.; ID.; ID. Neither the fact of her being given accommodations ina convent, not the
presence of the parish priest, nor a priest acting as a witness,constitutes undue influence
sufficient to justify the annulment of a legacy infavor of a bishop of a diocese, made in her will by
a testatrix 88 years of age,suffering from defective eyesight and hearing, while she is stopping in
a conventwithin the aforestated diocese
ALSUA BETTS v CA
CASE DIGEST
FACTS: On 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Dona Florentina Ralla, together with all their
children entered into a duly notarized agreement over the then present and existing properties of
the spouses.
On 1955, the spouses separately executed their respective holographic wills, the provisions of
which were in conformity and in implementation of the extrajudicial partition of November, 1949.
Their holographic wills similarly provided for the institution of the other to his or her share in the
conjugal properties, the other half already to be partitioned as part of the legitime of the four
living children.
On 1959, Dona Florentina died. About 2 weeks after the death of his wife, Don Jesus executed a
new will, thereby revoking and canceling his previous holographic will which he made on 1955
and also its codicil. On 1962, Don Jesus died. Petitioner herein Alsua-Betts, as the executrix
named in the will filed a petition for the probate of said new will of Don Jesus Alsua. Oppositions
thereto were filed by his children.
ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned will was executed in accordance with the requisites
prescribed by law pertaining to the soundness of mind of the testator during execution of his will.
RULING: Don Jesus was of sound mind at the time of the execution of his will. Between the
highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full
testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or
idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity and incapacity and while on one hand it
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola *Succession Set X* Page 33 of 40

has been held that mere weakness of mind, or imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will
not render a person from making a will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to
enable him to know what he is about to do and how and to whom he is disposing his property. To
constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or
unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary
incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound
mind.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his
widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the
estate. In due time she submitted an inventory of the estate as follows:
INVENTARIO

"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries
with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de un te
insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on
one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of rreno, con sus mejoras y edificaciones, situadoen
body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded
person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable
him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To la Escolta, Manila............................................................. P500,000.00
constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or
unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary
incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de dos
mind."2
parcelas de terreno situadas en Antipolo, Rizal................... 658.34
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila Cuatrocientos noventa y uno (491) acciones

SECOND DIVISION de la 'Central Azucarera de la Carlota a P17.00

G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982 por accion ................................................................................8,347.00

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, Diez mil ochocientos seize (10,806) acciones
Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs. de la 'Central Luzon Milling Co.', disuelta y en
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO
RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants. liquidacion a P0.15 por accion ..............................................1,620.90

Cuenta de Ahorros en el Philippine Trust

ABAD SANTOS, J.: Co.............................................................................................. 2,350.73

The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio TOTAL.............................................................. P512,976.97
Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his
two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski.
MENOS:

The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the
Deuda al Banco de las Islas Filipinas, garan-
companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for
substitutions.
tizada con prenda de las acciones de La Carlota ......... P 5,000,00
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
VALOR LIQUIDO........................................... P507,976.97
The testamentary dispositions are as follows:
A.En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge Ramirez, ambas menores de
edad, residentes en Manila, I.F., calle 'Alright, No. 1818, Malate, hijos de su
sobrino D. Jose Ma. Ramirez, con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos
descendientes, y, en su defecto, con sustitucion vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la participacion indivisa de la finca
Santa Cruz Building, lo ordena el testador a favor de los legatarios nombrados,
en atencion a que dicha propiedad fue creacion del querido padre del
otorgante y por ser aquellos continuadores del apellido Ramirez,
B.Y en usufructo a saber:
a. En cuanto a una tercera parte, a favor de la esposa del testador, Da.
Marcelle Ramirez, domiciliada en IE PECO, calle del General Gallieni No. 33,
Seine Francia, con sustitucion vulgar u fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de
Wrobleski, de Palma de Mallorca, Son Rapina Avenida de los Reyes 13,
b.Y en cuanto a las dos terceras partes restantes, a favor de la nombrada Da.
Wanda de Nrobleski con sustitucion vulgar v fideicomisaria a saber:
En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras partes, a favor de D. Juan Pablo
Jankowski, de Son Rapina Palma de Mallorca; y encuanto a la mitad restante, a
favor de su sobrino, D. Horace V. Ramirez, San Luis Building, Florida St. Ermita,
Manila, I.F.
A pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias precedentemente ordinadas, las
usufiructuarias nombradas conjuntamente con los nudo propietarios, podran en
cualquier memento vender a tercero los bienes objeto delegado, sin
intervencion alguna de los titulares fideicomisaarios.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of
the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in
satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez
"en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow's
usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the provisions for
vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct and in
*Succession Set X* Page 34 of 40
favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are
invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions
for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not related to the
second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c)
that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who
is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the proposed
partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow
Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express win to give this property to them
Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in its order dated May 3, 1967. It is
this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this Court.
1. The widow's legitime.
The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in full
ownership. They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired his widow's legitime. Indeed,
under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be
entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate." And since Marcelle alone survived the deceased,
she is entitled to one-half of his estate over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance,
condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and justifiably so.
It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the testament
provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle
who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio" as her legitime and which is more
than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To
give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testator's intention for as stated
above his dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
2. The substitutions.
It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint- judgment of another heir so that he
may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted." (Art. 857, Civil Code.
And that there are several kinds of substitutions, namely: simple or common, brief or
compendious, reciprocal, and fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil Code.) According to Tolentino,
"Although the Code enumerates four classes, there are really only two principal classes of
substitutions: the simple and the fideicommissary. The others are merely variations of these
two." (111 Civil Code, p. 185 [1973].)
The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the
heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or
should not wish, or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall
comprise the three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the testator
has otherwise provided.
The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first
heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a
second heir the whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid and shall take
effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir
originally instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary or first heir and the
second heir are living at time of the death of the testator.
It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of the legacies of
Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants, thus: con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus
respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con substitution vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so provided. The appellants
question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski" in
connection with the one-third usufruct over the estate given to the widow Marcelle However, this
question has become moot because as We have ruled above, the widow is not entitled to any
usufruct.
The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in connection with Wanda's
usufruct over two thirds of the estate in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace v. Ramirez.
They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda survived the
testator or stated differently because she did not predecease the testator. But dying before the
testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to
accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar
substitution is valid.
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in their claim
that it is void for the following reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the
heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution
"provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows:
*Succession Set X* Page 35 of 40
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, substitution,
or transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly adopted this
construction. From this point of view, there can be only one tranmission or
substitution, and the substitute need not be related to the first heir. Manresa,
Morell and Sanchez Roman, however, construe the word "degree" as
generation, and the present Code has obviously followed this interpretation. by
providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree "from the heir
originally instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must
be related to and be one generation from the first heir.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a
parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or
degree from the fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. 193-194.)
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as
required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the testator
contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties
subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked
owners." (Brief, p. 26.)
3. The usufruct of Wanda.
The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda is void
because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.
The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land
shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the
Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession.
We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private
lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught
and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a
Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct,
albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title
to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as
follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership
and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo
Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special pronouncement as
to costs.SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his
widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the
estate.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of
the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow en plenodominio in
satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or free portion shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez
en nudapropriedad. Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the
widows usufruct and the remaining two-third (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
-APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez (a Filipino national, died in
Spain on December 11, 1964) among principal beneficiaries:
Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez
-widow
-French who lives in Paris
-received (as spouse) and usufructuary rights over 1/3 of the free portion
Roberto and Jorge Ramirez
-two grandnephews
-lives in Malate
-received the (free portion)
Wanda de Wrobleski
-companion
-Austrian who lives in Spain
-received usufructuary rights of 2/3 of the free portion
-vulgar substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez
-Maria Luisa Palacios -administratix
-Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed because
a. vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda wrt widows usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski
and Horacio Ramirez, wrt to Wandas usufruct is INVALID because first heirs (Marcelle and
Wanda) survived the testator
b. fideicommissary substitutions are INVALID because first heirs not related to the second heirs
or substitutes within the first degree as provided in Art 863 CC
c. grant of usufruct of real property in favor of an alien, Wanda, violated Art XIII Sec 5
*Succession Set X* Page 36 of 40
d. proposed partition of the testators interest in the Santa Cruz Building between widow and
appellants violates testators express will to give this property to them
-LC: approved partition
ISSUE
WON the partition is valid insofar as
a. widows legitime
b. substitutions
c. usufruct of Wanda
HELD
a. YES, appellants do not question because Marcelle is the widow[1]and over which he could
impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever[2]
-the proposed creation by the admininstratix in favor of the testators widow of a usufruct over
1/3 of the free portion of the testators estate cannot be made where it will run counter to the
testators express will. The Court erred for Marcelle who is entitled to of the estate enpleno
dominio as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled
to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run
counter to the testators intention for as stated above his disposition even impaired her legitime
and tended to favor Wanda.
b. Vulgar substitutions are valid because dying before the testator is not the only case where a
vulgar substitution can be made. Also, according to Art 859 CC, cases also include refusal or
incapacity to accept inheritance therefore it is VALID.
BUT fideicommissary substitutions are VOID because Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez
are not related to Wande and according to Art 863 CC, it validates a fideicommissary substitution
provided that such substitution does not go beyond one degreefrom the heir originally
instituted. Another is that there is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the
usufructuary to the substitutes and in fact the apellee agrees that the testator contradicts the
establishment of the fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties be subject to
usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement ofthe usufructuaries and naked owners.
c. YES, usufruct of Wanda is VALID
-Art XIII[3]Sec 5 (1935): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall
be transferred or assigned except toindividuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire
or hold land of the public domain in the Philippines.[4]
The lower court upheld the usufruct thinking that the Constitution covers not only succession by
operation of law but also testamentary succession BUT SC is of the opinion that this provision
does not apply to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and
meaningless. Any alien would circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine
landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land BUT an alienmay be bestowed
USUFRUCTUARY RIGHTS over a parcel of land in the Philippines. Therefore, the usufruct in favor
of Wanda, although a real right, is upheld because it does not vest title to the land in the
usufructuary (Wanda) and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by
the Constitution.
Decision: Marcelle (as legitime), Jorge and Roberto Ramirez (free portion) in naked
ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo
Jankowski and Horace Ramirez
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola *Succession Set X* Page 37 of 40

FIRST DIVISION the same was falsely dated or antedated; that the testatrix was not in full possession of her
mental faculties to make testamentary dispositions; that undue influence was exerted upon the
G.R. No. 76648 February 26, 1988 person and mind of the testatrix by the beneficiaries named in the win; and that the will failed to
institute a residual heir to the remainder of the estate.

THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MATILDE MONTINOLA-SANSON, petitioners,

vs. After a hearing on the merits, the probate court, finding the evidence presented in support of the
COURT OF APPEALS and EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, respondents. petition to be conclusive and overwhelming, rendered its decision allowing the probate of the
disputed will.

Petitioner thus appealed the decision of the probate court to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
in toto the decision. 8
GANCAYCO, J.:

On September 24,1986, petitioner filed with the respondent court a motion for new
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 promulgated
trial. 9 Attached to her motion was the Affidavit of Merit of Gregorio Montinola Sanson,
August 29,1986 affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
petitioner's son, alleging that witnesses have been located whose testimonies could shed light as
XXII 2 dated March 21, 1985, the dispositive part of which reads:
to the ill health of the testatrix as well as undue influence exerted on the latter.

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment declaring the holographic will

The appellate court in its resolution of October 13, 1986, 10 denied the motion for new trial of
marked in evidence as Exhibit "H" as one wholly written, dated, and signed
petitioner on the following grounds: (1) the Affidavit of merit attached to the motion alleged that
freely by the late Herminia Montinola in accordance with law while in
efforts were exerted to locate unnamed witnesses only after the court's decision was handed
possession of full testamentary capacity, and allowing and admitting the same
down, and (2) the unnamed witnesses would allegedly shed light on the fact of grave illness of
to probate.
the testatrix as well as the undue influence exerted on her which are merely corroborative or
cumulative since these facts were brought to light during the trial.
Upon the finality of the decision, let letters testamentary issue to the executor,
Eduardo F. Hernandez, as well as the certificate of probate prescribed under
The motion for reconsideration of petitioner dated October 27, 1986 11 was likewise denied by
Section 13 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.
the appellate court in its resolution of November 20, 1986 12 on the ground that the affidavit of
one Patricia Delgado submitted with the motion constitutes cumulative evidence and the motion
3
SO ORDERED. being in reality a second motion for reconsideration which is prescribed by law.

This case arose from a petition filed by private respondent Atty. Eduardo F. Hernandez on April In the petition now before Us, petitioner assigned the following errors:
22, 1981 with the Court of First Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial Court) seeking the probate
of the holographic will of the late Herminia Montinola executed on January 28, 1980. 4 The
I
testatrix, who died single, parentless and childless on March 29,1981 at the age of 70 years,
devised in this will several of her real properties to specified persons.
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS'
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUND THAT THE EVIDENCE SOUGHT TO BE
On April 29,1981, private respondent who was named executor in the will filed an urgent motion
PRESENTED IS MERELY CUMULATIVE.
for appointment of special administrator. 5 With the conformity of all the relatives and heirs of the
testatrix except oppositor, the court in its order of May 5, 1981 6 appointed private respondent as
Special Administrator of the testate estate of deceased. II

On June 29,1981, Matilde Montinola Sanson (petitioner), the only surviving sister of the deceased THE SAID COURT ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR
but who was not named in the said win, filed her Opposition to Probate of Will, 7 alleging inter RECONSIDERATION OF THE RESOLUTION DENYING THE AFORESAID MOTION
alia: that the subject will was not entirely written, dated and signed by the testatrix herself and FOR NEW TRIAL.
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
III
AT ANY RATE, THE SAID COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE HOLOGRAPHIC
WILL IN QUESTION WAS WHOLLY WRITTEN, DATED AND SIGNED BY THE LATE
HERMINIA MONTINOLA.
IV
THE SAID COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED WILL WAS
FRAUDULENTLY ANTEDATED TO CONCEAL ITS ACTUAL DATE OF EXECUTION
AND TO SHIELD IT FROM PROBABLE DISPUTES AS TO THE TESTAMENTARY
CAPACITY ON THE PART OF THE ALLEGED TESTATRIX AT THE TIME OF ITS
ACTUAL EXECUTION.
V fact that the testatrix was gravely ill at or but the time that the questioned will
THE SAID COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LATE HERMINIA MONTINOLA
WAS NOT SUBJECTED TO UNDUE PRESSURE AND IMPROPERIMPORTUNINGS ON
THE PART OF THOSE STANDING TO BENEFIT FROM THE ALLEGED WILL.
VI
THE SAID COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL IN QUESTION
TO PROBATE.
In the meantime, petitioner who passed away on November 3, 1986, was substituted by her
heirs.
In the first and second assigned errors, petitioners maintain that the appellate court erred in
denying the motion for new trial insisting that the new evidence sought to be presented is not
merely corroborative or cumulative.
On the other hand, the contention of private respondent is that the motion for new trial was a
pro-forma motion because it was not in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 53 of the Rules of Court. We
find merit in this contention.
Section 1, Rule 53 provides
Before a final order or judgment rendered by the Court of appeals becomes
executory, a motion for new trial may be filed on the ground of newly
discovered evidence which could not have been discovered prior to the trial in
the court below by the exercise of the diligence and which is of such a
*Succession Set X* Page 38 of 40
character as would probably change the result. The motion shall be
accompanied by affidavits showing the facts constituting the grounds therefor
and the newly discovered evidence.
The affidavit of merit executed by Gregorio Montinola Sanson alleged the following:
xxx xxx xxx
3. That in her plea for new trial in the said case, I have exerted efforts to locate
witnesses whose whereabouts were not known to us during the trial in the
lower court, but I have finally succeeded in tracking them down;
4. That despite their initial reluctance to testify in this case,I am convinced that
they would testify under proper subpoena for purposes of shedding light on the
was allegedly executed;
5. That they had the clear opportunity to know the circumstances under which
the purported will was executed; and that they know for a fact that there was
'undue influence' exerted by petitioner and other relatives to procure improper
favors from the testatrix;
13
xxx xxx xxx
Said motion for new trial is not in substantial compliance with the requirements of Rule 53. The
lone affidavit of a witness who was already presented said the hearing is hardly sufficient to
justify the holding of new trial. The alleged new witnesses were unnamed without any certainty
as, to their appearance before the court to testify. Affiant attests only on his belief that they
would testify if and when they are subpoenaed by the court. Furthermore, the allegations in the
affidavit as to the undue influence exerted on the testatrix are mere conclusions and not
statement of facts. The requisite affidavits must state facts and not mere conclusions or
opinions, otherwise they are not valid. 14 The affidavits are required to avoid waste of the court's
time if the newly discovered evidence turns out to be immaterial or of any evidentiary weight.
Moreover, it could not be said that the evidence sought to be presented is new having been
discovered only after the trial. It is apparent from the allegations of affiant that efforts to locate
the witnesses were exerted only after the decision of the appellate court was handed down. The
trial lasted for about four years so that petitioner had ample time to find said alleged witnesses
who were admittedly known to her. The evidence which the petitioner now propose to present
could have been discovered and presented during the hearing of the case, and there is no
sufficient reason for concluding that had the petitioner exercised proper diligence she would not
have been able to discover said evidence. 15
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola
In addition, We agree with the appellate court that since the alleged illness of the testatrix as
well as the charges of undue influence exerted upon her had been brought to light during the
trial, and new evidence on this point is merely corroborative and cumulative which is generally
not a ground for new trial. 16 Accordingly, such evidence even if presented win not carry much
probative weight which can alter the judgment. 17
It is very patent that the motion for new trial was filed by petitioner only for the purpose of
delaying the proceedings. In fact, petitioners son in his manifestation admitted that he had to
request a new law firm to do everything legally possible to meet the deadline for the filing of a
motion for reconsideration and/or for new trial.18 This would explain the haphazard preparation of
the motion, thus failing to comply with the requirements of rule 53, which was filed on the last
day of the reglementary period of appeal so that the veracity of the ground relied upon is
questionable. The appellate court correctly denied the motion for new trial.
The motion for new trial being pro-forma, it does not interrupt the running of the period for
appeal. 19 Since petitioner's motion was filed on September 24,1986, the fifteenth or last day of
the period to appeal, the decision of the respondent court became final on the following day,
September 25. And when the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was filed on October
30,1986, it was obviously filed out of time.
Since the questioned decision has already become final and executory, it is no longer within the
province of this Court to review it. This being so, the findings of the probate court as to the due
execution of the will and the testamentary capacity of testatrix are now conclusive. 20
At any rate, even assuming that We can still review this case on its merits, the petition will also
have to fail.
During the hearing before the probate court, not only were three (3) close relatives of the
testatrix presented but also two (2) expert witnesses who declared that the contested will and
signature are in the handwriting of the testatrix. These testimonies more than satisfy the
requirements of Art. 811 of the Civil Code 21 in conjunction with Section 11 of Rule 76, Revised
Rules of Court, 22 or the probate of holographic wills.
As regards the alleged antedating of the will, petitioner failed to present competent proof that
the will was actually executed sometime in June 1980 when the testatrix was already seriously ill
and dying of terminal lung cancer. She relied only on the supposed inconsistencies in the
testimony of Asuncion Gemperle, niece and constant companion of testatrix, which upon careful
examination did not prove such claim of antedating.
*Succession Set X* Page 39 of 40
The factual findings of the probate court and the Court of Appeals that the will in question was
executed according to the formalities required by law are conclusive on the Supreme Court when
supported by evidence. 23We have examined the records of this case and find no error in the
conclusion arrived at by the respondent court that the contested will was duly executed in
accordance with law.
Petitioner alleges that her exclusion from the alleged holographic will was without rhyme or
reason, being the only surviving sister of the testatrix with whom she shares an intimate
relationship, thus demonstrating the lack of testamentary capacity of testatrix.
In the case of Pecson v. Coronel, 24
it was held
The appellants emphasize the fact that family ties in this country are very
strongly knit and that the exclusion of a relative from one's estate is an
exceptional case. It is true that the ties of relationship in the Philippines are
very strong, but we understand that cases of preterition of relatives from the
inheritance are not rare. The liberty to dispose of one's estate by will when
there are no forced heirs is rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in the
Philippines since 1889...
Article 842 of the Civil Code provides that one who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will
of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
It is within the right of the testatrix not to include her only sister who is not a compulsory heir in
her will. Nevertheless, per testimony of Asuncion Gemperle, the latter had reserved two boxes of
jewelry worth P850,000.00 for petitioner. Furthermore, petitioner's son Francis was instituted as
an heir in the contested will.
Petitioner still insists that the fact that in her holographic will the testatrix failed to dispose of all
of her estate is an indication of the unsoundness of her mind.
We cannot subscribe to this contention. Art. 841 of the Civil Code provides
A will shall be valid even though it should not contain an institution of an heir,
or such institution should not comprise the entire estate, and even though the
person so instituted should not accept the inheritance or should be
incapacitated to succeed.
In such cases, the testamentary dispositions made in accordance with law shall
be complied with and the remainder of the estate shall pass to the legal heirs.
 Ortega v Valmonte to Heirs of Montinola *Succession Set X* Page 40 of 40

Thus, the fact that in her holographic will, testatrix disposed of only eleven (11) of her real 1. Spontaneity, freedom, and speed of writing
properties does not invalidate the will, or is it an indication that the testatrix was of unsound
mind. The portion of the estate undisposed of shall pass on to the heirs of the deceased in xxx xxx xxx
intestate succession.

3. good line quality.

Neither is undue influence present just because blood relatives, other than compulsory heirs
have been omitted, for while blood ties are strong in the Philippines, it is the testator's right to
4. presence of natural variation... (Exhibit X).
disregard non-compulsory heirs. 25 The fact that some heirs are more favored than others is proof
of neither fraud or undue influence. 26 Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making
a testament, otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. 27 The characteristics of spontaneity, freedom and good line quality could not be
achieved by the testatrix if it was true that she was indeed of unsound mind
and/or under undue influence or improper pressure when she the Will.
The contention of the petitioner that the will was obtained by undue influence or improper
pressure exerted by the beneficiaries of the will cannot be sustained on mere conjecture or
suspicion; as it is not enough that there was opportunity to exercise undue influence or a IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit with costs
possibility that it may have been exercised. 28 The exercise of improper pressure and undue against petitioner. The decision of respondent court dated August 29, 1986 in toto the decision of
influence must be supported by substantial evidence that it was actually exercised. 29 the Regional Trial Court of Manila dated March 21, 1985 is hereby declared to be immediately
executory.
Finally, We quote with approval the observation of the respondent court
SO ORDERED.
There is likewise no question as to the due execution of the subject Will. To Our
minds, the most authentic proof that decreased had testamentary capacity at
the time of the execution of the Will, is the Will itself which according to a
report of one of the two expert witnesses (Exhibits X to X-3) reveals the
existence of significant handwriting characteristics such as: