Rawls Political Liberalism

Priority of right in political liberalism

Seems to imply conception of justice as purely involving right not using
ideas of the good exxept purely instrumental or those that are a matter of
personal choice

But he sees them as complementary no conception of justice can draw

entirely pon one or the other, but must combine both

Distinguishes between political conception of justice and a comprehensive

moral doctrine (i.e. religious one)
Features of a conception of justice:
1) Moral conception worked out for a specific subject
- The basic structure of a constitutional democratic regime
2) acception the political conception doesnt presuppose a
comprehensive moral doctrine
- merely the basic structure
3) it isnt formulated in terms of a comprehensive doctrine but in terms
of fundamental ideas

so basically it is a matter of scope the range of subjects to which a

conception applies

conception is general when it applies to a wide range of subject

conception is comprehensive when it includes conceptions of what is of
value in human life

II

Political liberalism is a political conception of justice for the main

instituions of life
- affirms basic rights and liberties, assigns them a certain priority
political conception must draw upon ideas of the good but the main
question is to what extent

main restriction would seem to be that the ideas of the good must be
included if
1) they can be shared by citizens who are free and equal
- this can be dodgy as it opens up positive liberty
2) they dont presuppose any particular comprehensive doctrine
- but surely they do by limiting what comprehensive doctrines are
allowed

so its restrictued by the priority of right

this means that admissible ideas of the good must respect the limits of,
and serve a role within the poltical conception of justice

2 Goodness as Rationality

five ideas of the good in justice which meet these conditions:

1) ideas of goodness as rationality
2) idea of primary goods
3) idea of permissible comprehensive conceptions of the good
4) idea of the political virtues
5) idea of the good of a well-ordered political society

- rationality is taken for granted by pretty much every political

conception of justice
- this supports the idea that members of a democratic society to at
least some expent a rational plan of life in light of which they
schedule their important endeavors and allocate their various
resources

given this any workable political conception of justice is to serve as a

public basis must count human life and fulfilling basic human needs and
purposes as good, and endorse rationality as a basic principle of political
and social organisation

goodness as rationality provides part of a framework serving two main

roles
1) helps identify a list of primary goods
2) relying on an index of primary goods, enable us to specify aims or
motivations of parties in the original position

3 Primary Goods and Interpersonal Comparison

idea of goodness as rationality is to provide part of a framework for an

account of primary goods
- has to be combined with a conception of citizens as free and
equal
conception of persons as a poltical conception, not part of a
compregensive doctrine
conception of persons, with rationality and basic facts of the human
condition that provides requisite background for specifying citizens needs
- this allows us to come up with a list of primary goods

2
conception of primary goods role is:
basic feature of well-ordered political society is that there is a public
understanding about the kinds of claims it is appropriate for citizens to
make about questions of justice
justice as fairness can then hold that fulfilment of claims related to those
needs is advantageous
- so it is improving the circumstances of citizens
an effective political conception of justice includes, then, a political
understanding of what is to be publically recognised as citizens needs and
hence as advantageous for all

problem being that where there are conflicting concpetions of the good,
how is it possible to work out what claims are appropriate?
government can no more act to maximise the fulfilment of citizens
rational preferences, or wants or to advance human excellence, or the
values of perfection than it can to advance catholocism

political liberalism therefore looks for an account that is independent of

any particular omprehensive doctrine

conception of primary goods addresses this problem

- rests on identifying partial similarity in citizens permissible
conceptions of the good
- i.e. conceptions that dont violate the principles of polticial justice

two things suffice for a shared idea of rational advantage:

1) citizens affirm the same political conception of each as free and
equal
2) permissible conceptions of the good all require roughly the same
primary goods
the same basic rights, libertie and opportunities and the same all-
purpose means

these claims count as appropriate claims

list of primary goods

1) right and liberties
2) freedom and movement and free choice of occupation against a
background of opportunity
surely I cant just go and be a doctor tomorrow? I dont have a right
to a job
3) powers and perogatives of offices and position of responsibility in
political economic institutions
4) income and wealth
5) social base of self-respect

these are mostly based in instutions

IV
Introduction of primary goods forms the basis of interpersonal
comparisons
- based on objective features of citizens social requirements

recognise the limits of the political and the practicable

1) limits of justice as fairness as the focus of an overlapping consense
2) respect the constraints of simplicity and availability of information to
which any practicable political conception is subject

Sen and Arrow have noted significant variations in peoples capacities,

their determinate conceptions of the good and their preferences and
tastes

Point out that sometimes so great in difference that it is hardly fair to

secure everyone the same index of primary goods

Reply that while citizens dont have equal capacities, they have at least
to the essential minimum degree, the moral, intellectual and physical
capacities that enable them to be fully cooperating members of society
But surely like the nomad, the child, the brain-dead, how can we say that
they have the same essential capacities

How do we deal with these variations?

Distinguishes 4 types
1) variations in moral and intellectual capacities/skill
2) variations in physical capacities and skills
- includes illness and accident
3) variations in citizens conceptions of the good
4) variations in tastes and preferences

given assumption that everyone has capacity to be a normal cooperating

member of society (is this a good assumption?

Principles of justice are satisfied if none of these variations among citizens

are unfair and give rise to injustice

Variations in moral intellectual capacities are above the line of essential

minimum capacity
- it is handled by social practices of qualifying for positions and
free competition against background of equal opportunity
- variations in physical capacity can put people below the line
- but allocation of money to treatment aims at restoring people
above the line

variations in conceptions of the goo

- justice as fairness is fair to the conception of the goods
- even though not all conceptions have the chance to flourish
variations in preferences and taste
- seen as our own responsibility
- something we must learn to deal ith

VI

Use of primary goods assumes that by the virtue of their moral powers
citizens have some part in forming and cultivating their final ends and
preferences

It isnt an objection that an index doesnt accommodate those with

unusual tastes
- it is unreasonable for people to hold such preferences and simply
require them to make out the best they can
- we dont view citizens as passive carriers of desires
- moral power to r=form, revise and pursua a conception of the
good

hodling people responsible is reasonable only under certain assumptions

- assume that citizens can regulate their preferences and ends in
light of their expectations of primary goods

4 Primary Goods as Citizens needs

isnt impossible to permit all conceptions of the good

but basic instittuons allow sufficient space for ways of life worthy of
citizens devoted to support
- how are we judging the worthy ones?
Rejects the idea of maximising overall wellbeing
Doesnt try to estimate the extent to which individuals succeed in
advancing their way of life
Doesnt try and judge intrinsic worth of their ends

Rights, liberties and opportunities as primary goods are clearly not basic
values of life, even though they are essential

2
primary goods specify what their needs are when questions of justice arise

political conception allows us to work out what primary goods are needed

index not intended to approximate an idea of the good specified by a

comprehensive conception

skipping to important quotes

citizens as free and equal are to be at liberty to take charge of their lives
and each is expected by others to adapt their conception of the good to
their expected fair share of primary goods

surely though many aspirational ways of thinking dont fit with a fair
share

many liberal thoughts are that the state musnt favour any comprehensive
doctrine
equally common theme of critics of liberalism that it is arbitrarily biased
for one form or anoher of individuals

neutrality needs to be in the discussion of the permissible conception of

the good and of political virtues

can be defined in different ways (neutrality)

- procedural reference to a procedure that can be legitimated or
justified without appealing to moral values or because
justification requires some values can be justified with respect to
natural values

justice as fairness isnt procedurally neutral

- principles of justice more substantive than procedural values as
is its conception of societies
- it focuese on finding the overlapping concepnsus
- common ground
- but common ground isnt necessarily neutral ground

so there can be neutrality of aim rather than neutrality of procedure

- institutions can be endorsed by citizens general
- might mean:
- state ensures for all citizens equal ops in advancing any
coneption of the good
- not to do anything to favour a comprehensive doctrine
- not to do anything that means people are more likely to pick a
certain doctrine

but says that priority of right exludes the first as it only allows permissile
conceptions of the good

second meaning

I LITERALLY FUCKING DONT KNOW WHAT THEY ARE ON ABOUT

Political liberalism may still affirm the superiority of certain forms of moral
character and encourage certain moral virtues
thus, justice as fairness includes an account of certain political virtues
the virtues of fair social cooperation such as the virtues of civility and
tolerance, of reasonableness and the sense of fairness

so the ideas of the good may be incorporated to political conception of

justice where they are poltical ideas

this is compatible with liberalism as tied to principles of justice and forms

of conduct and judgement and conduct is essential

so if a regime takes steps to strengthen toleration and trust, it does so to

strengthen and sustain fair social cooperation between free and equal
citizens not as part of a comprehensive doctrine

this will do but got was it shit note taking

SUMMARY FROM WEB

Rawls has in mind neutrality of aim or justificatory neutrality

This maintains that the justification for a low should be neutral
It shouldnt presuppose values particular to one conception of the good
Piety is a clear example of a value which would violate justificatory
neutrality

Why do liberals argue for justificatory neutrality?

Sher says
1) because non-neutral government decisions vilate the autonomy of
citizens
2) because they pose unacceptable risks of oppression, instability or
error
3) because non-neutral governments rest on value-premises that
cannot be rationally defended

by requiring jutfication for a law to be neutral the neutrality constraint

ensures that only those laws or policies tha rest on value-premises
reasonable citizens could accept are legit

this rules out a lot of intolerant measures therefore

this might help us avoid the pressures of a perfectionist state

however its utility might be over stated

but consider homosexuality

Devlin makes a common morality argument against homosexuality, saing
that societal bonds are crucial
And common thought and morality pretty much forms this
Liberals might try and say NOPE this is a non neutral idea of what the
good life is (i.e. plugging being heterosexual)

But this isnt careful enough

Devlin didnt justify his argument on the idea that heterosexuality is good
or homo is offensive
It was that decrim would be harmful
His argument could thus be framed in terms more congenial with the
neutrality constraint

i.e. liberals themselves recognise that the state shouldnt be neutral

between all conceptions of the good, but between permissible conceptions
of the good

devlin would say that decrim would be impermissible because it threatens

social cohesion necessary to maintain stability

one does not have to establish that a prohinition on homosecuslity

violates the neutrality constraint in order to establish a persuasive case
against such a provision

emphasises a key point that not only must the objectives of legislation ne
beutral, but the means chosen must be reasonable and demonstrably
justified

prohibitions on homo fail this because Devlin doesnt show evidence that
harm would be done, also doesnt show that education is not a better way
round (i.e. some mid point) also there is a requirement of proportionality
that it has to outweigh benefits and costs

the neutral state could justify loads of things based on values that you
couldnt reasonably reject like public safety (traffic laws eg) but this isnt
actually the case oif a similar level of public safety can be achieved not
with such stringent traffic controls

public reason demands that there be a proportionality between the effects

of the measure and the objective in question

the coercive power of the state inst necessarily legit when it is consistent
with the requirements of the neutrality constraint
the government must consider a diverse range of concerns wihich the
neutrality constrain itself is silent about