Commensurability (philosophy of science)

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Commensurability is a concept, in philosophy of science, whereby scientific theo
ries are commensurable if scientists can discuss using a shared nomenclature tha
t allows direct comparison of theories to determine which theory is more valid o
r useful. On the other hand, theories are incommensurable if they are embedded i
n starkly contrasting conceptual frameworks whose languages do not overlap suffi
ciently to permit scientists to directly compare the theories or to cite empiric
al evidence favoring one theory over the other. Discussed by Ludwik Fleck in the
1930s,[1] and popularized by Thomas Kuhn in the 1960s, the problem of incommens
urability results in scientists talking past each other, as it were, while compa
rison of theories is muddled by confusions about terms, contexts and consequence
s.
Introduction of the term
In 1962, Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend both independently introduced the idea
of incommensurability to the philosophy of science. In both cases the concept ca
me from mathematics and in its original sense is defined as the absence of a com
mon unit of measurement that would allow a direct and exact measurement of two v
ariables, such as the prediction of the diagonal of a square from the relationsh
ip of its sides.
The term commensurability was coined because of a series of problems that both a
uthors found when trying to interpret successive scientific theories. Without do
ubt its implementation is better understood thanks to the critiques that both Ku
hn and Feyerabend have made in response to certain theses proposed by followers
of the received view of theories. These include the famous thesis on the accumul
ation of scientific knowledge, which states that the body of scientific knowledg
e has been increasing with the passage of time. Both Kuhn and Feyerabend reject
this thesis, in favor of a model that sees both revolutions and periods of norma
lcy in the history of science.
Another equally important thesis proposes the existence of a neutral language of
comparison which can be used to formulate the empirical consequences of two com
peting theories. This would allow one to choose the theory with the greatest emp
irically verified contents or explanatory powers or the greatest content that is n
ot falsified if the formulation is Popperian.
The idea at the root of this second thesis does not just relate to the existence
of said language but also implies at least two further postulates[original rese
arch?]. Firstly, this choice between theories presupposes that they can be inter
translated, for example between Theory A and its successor B and in the case of Po
pper that B can be deduced from A. Secondly, it is assumed that the choice is al
ways carried out under the same standards of rationality.
In both cases the concept of incommensurability makes the viability of the thesi
s impossible. In the first, by showing that certain empirical consequences are l
ost between successive theories. In the second case, by confirming that it is po
ssible to make a rational choice between theories even when they can not be tran
slated into a neutral language. However, although the reasons for the introducti
on of these counter arguments, and the criticism from which they arise, are the
same, the sense in which the coauthors use them are in no way identical. For thi
s reason the idea of incommensurability will be discussed for each coauthor sepa
rately.
Perspectives
Feyerabend's perspectives
Feyerabend locates incommensurability within a principle from the field of seman
tics which has the underlying idea that the change in significance in the basic
terms of a theory changes the totality of the terms of the new theory, so that t
here are no empirically common meanings between T and T'
Feyerabend is credited with coining the modern philosophical sense of "incommens
urability,"[2][3] which lays the foundation for much of his philosophy of scienc
e. He first presented his notion of incommensurability in 1952 to Karl Popper's
LSE seminar and to a gathering of illustrious Wittgensteinians (Elizabeth Anscom
be, Peter Geach, H. L. A. Hart and Georg Henrik von Wright) in Anscombe's Oxford
flat.[4] Feyerabend argued that frameworks of thought, and thus scientific para
digms, can be incommensurable for three reasons. Briefly put, Feyerabend's notio
n of incommensurability is as follows:
1. The interpretation of observations is implicitly influenced by t
heoretical assumptions. It is therefore impossible to describe or evaluate obser
vations independently of theory.
2. Paradigms often have different assumptions about which intellect
ual and operational scientific methods result in valid scientific knowledge.
3. Paradigms can be based on different assumptions regarding the st
ructure of their domain, which makes it impossible to compare them in a meaningf
ul way. The adoption of a new theory includes and is dependent upon the adoption
of new terms. Thus, scientists are using different terms when talking about dif
ferent theories. Those who hold different, competing theories to be true will be
talking over one another, in the sense that they cannot a priori arrive at agre
ement given two different discourses with two different theoretical language and
dictates.
According to Feyerabend, the idea of incommensurability cannot be captured in fo
rmal logic, because it is a phenomenon outside of logic's domain.
Theories
In 1989, Feyerabend presented an idea informed by Popper's critical rationalism
whereby "investigation starts with a problem. The problem is the result of a con
flict between an expectation and an observation, which, in its turn, is formed b
y the expectation." (Feyerabend, 1989; pp.96). Scientific methodology then resolve
s problems by inventing theories that should be relevant and falsifiable, at lea
st to a greater degree than any other alternative solution. Once an alternative
theory is presented the critical phase commences regarding T' which must answer
the following questions: (a) why has theory T been successful up until now and (
b) why has it failed. If the new theory T' answers both questions then T is disc
arded.
That is, a new theory T', in order to be an adequate successor to the refuted th
eory T, must have a collection of additional predictions regarding T (Class A),
as well as a collection of successful predictions that coincide to a certain deg
ree with the old theory (Class S). These Class S predictions constitute those pa
rts of the new theory containing new truths and they therefore exclude a series
of consequences of T, the failures in the old theory, which are part of the untr
ue (false) contents of the new theory (Class F).
Given this model it is possible to construct relational statements between certa
in terms from T and from T', which will be the basis for the comparison between
the theories. This will allow a choice between the two in the light of their emp
irical contents. But, if we come across a theory T' in which Class S is empty th
en the theories are incommensurable with each other.
However, Feyerabend clarifies this by stating that, incommensurability between T
and T' will depend on the interpretation given to the theories. If this is inst
rumental, every theory that refers to the same language of observation will be c
ommensurable. In the same way, if a realist perspective is sought then it will f
avour a unified position which employs the most highly abstracted terms of whate
ver theory is being considered in order to describe both theories, giving a sign
ificance to the observational statements as a function of these terms, or, at le
ast to replace the habitual use they are given.
It can be noted that the instrumentalist interpretation recognizes the existence
of certain statements whose truth is not only dependent on the observational st
atements but also on the evaluation criteria they are subjected to, which are an
chored in the theories. For example, to afirm the relational character of longit
ude, this asseveration can not be decided solely using observational terms. Its
truth value, in part, depends on the theory that establishes the sense in which
the terms are used. In this case they relate to quantum mechanics (QM) as oppose
d to classical mechanics (CM). In this sense, the instrumentalist position only
deals with the empirical consequences and leaves to one side the relationship th
at the concepts have with each other.
In this same way Feyerabend comments that:
It is certain, of course, that the relativist scheme has very often given us num
bers that are practically identical to the numbers obtained from CM, but this do
es not mean that the concepts are very similar...[For] even if ...yielding stric
tly identical predictions can be used as an argument to show that the concepts m
ust match, at least in this case, different magnitudes based on different concep
ts can give identical values for their respective scales while being different m
agnitudes...[So] it is not possible to make a comparison of the contents, nor is
it possible to make a judgement regarding its verisimilitude.
Paul Feyerabend