ABSTRACT
Written during the period of his emigration to the United States, during and just after
World War II, the originality of Karl Lwiths book Meaning in History lies in its resolute
critique of all forms of philosophy of history. This critique is based on the now famous
idea that modern philosophies of history have only extended and deepened an illusion fab-
ricated by a long tradition of Christian historical reflection: the illusion that history itself
has an intrinsic goal. This modern extension and deepening of the chimera propagated by
Christian historical reflection is what Lwith terms secularization. Drawing on the
arguments in Meaning in History as well as those proposed in other contemporaneous and
earlier writings, including Lwiths heretofore unpublished correspondence with Leo
Strauss, this article attempts to set in relief the frequently neglected, yet eminently politi-
cal implications of Lwiths idea of secularization. Among the problems implicitly con-
sidered in relation to the theory of secularization in Meaning in History is a theme fre-
quently addressed in earlier writings: the motives that led German intellectuals like
Friedrich Gogarten, Martin Heidegger, and Carl Schmitt to adhere to the Nazi movement.
In the preface to his book Meaning in History, written during the period of his
emigration to the United States during and just following World War II and pub-
lished in 1949, Karl Lwith described the main theme of his work in the follow-
ing terms:
After I had finished this small study of the large topic of Weltgeschichte and
Heilsgeschehen [world history and the advent of salvation], I began to wonder whether the
reader might not be disappointed by the lack of constructive results. This apparent lack
is, however, a real gain if it is true that truth is more desirable than illusion. Assuming that
a single grain of truth is preferable to a vast construct of illusions, I have tried to be hon-
est with myself and, consequently, also with my reader about the possibility, or rather the
impossibility, of imposing on history a reasoned order or of drawing out the working of
God.1
1. Karl Lwith, Preface, Meaning in History (Chicago, 1949), v; Weltgeschichte und Heilsges-
chehen. Zur Kritik der Geschichtsphilosophie. Smtliche Schriften (Stuttgart, 1983), II, 608.
70 JEFFREY ANDREW BARASH
acter of the task that Lwith set out to accomplish in it. Indeed, in Meaning in
History Lwith intended to demonstrate not only the illusory character of past
attempts to impose a reasoned order on history or to grasp in it the hidden work
of God; his purpose was to show that all of these different attempts to make sense
of history themselves constitute an ordered pattern. If Lwith consistently resist-
ed any temptation to interpret this order in terms of a philosophy of history, he
nonetheless assumed that the great attempts to make sense of historical develop-
ment configure a single coherent movement. For Lwith, the tacit meaning of
this historical movement, although hidden to those thinkers who traditionally
sought a Divine or reasoned order in history, became identifiable only at the
moment of its completion in the twentieth century. It is precisely this tacit pat-
tern, as it emerged in the historicity of Western thought about history, that Lwith
interpreted in relation to an age-old process of secularization. What had above
all become secularized since the beginning of the Christian era was the quest for
historical meaning in the form of a final historical purpose.
In the pages that follow I will examine Lwiths paradoxical claim to have
grasped a historical pattern or, in other words, a connecting link between the
predominant conceptions of history in different periods which, from Antiquity
onward, constitute a coherent movement in the general interpretation of history.
If it can no longer be a question of a divine or reasoned teleological order,
but of a hidden tendency toward secularization which first became intelligible in
the twentieth century, what exactly could have been Karl Lwiths intention in
seeking to identify this tendency?
In regard to the possibility of deriving a constructive result from his analy-
ses, Lwith confessed that his ambition was quite modestto the point that he
even feared disappointing his reader. To my mind, this same modesty in the
attempt to produce constructive results accounts for his hesitancy to buttress his
conclusions by drawing more explicitly on the political assumptions of this work,
which are either kept in the background or are not submitted to examination.2
Nevertheless, these same political assumptions are clearly expressed in other ear-
lier or contemporary works.
In the analysis of Karl Lwiths thought which I will undertake in the follow-
ing essay, my main purpose will be less to impute a philosophy of history to him
than to place in relief, in relation to the political assumptions of his concept of
secularization, the profound quest which may already be gleaned from the para-
Anyone who has read Meaning in History will recognize the broad lines of inter-
pretation of Western historical thought that are developed in this work. According
to this book, Western historical thought is rooted in the original Christian expe-
rience of time, which distinguished itself from the type of cosmological inter-
pretation of historical time, modeled on the cyclical ebb and flow of natural
events, that characterized ancient Greek speculation. The shift inaugurated by the
early Christians in relation to this ancient experience of historical time occurred
with the emergence of Christian eschatological faith for which history, far from
turning eternally in a circle, opens out to the future and orients itself in terms of
a goal: toward the eschaton in the guise of the end of the world and of the last
judgment.3
According to Lwiths well-known argument in Meaning in History, the mod-
ern idea of history extends this original Christian experience of historical time by
its tacit assimilation of the idea of an orientation in the lines of continuity
between different historical epochs. This assimilation becomes manifest through
the profound affinity in the interpretation of historical time as development
toward a goal that persists amid all the changes in Christian thought and then
dominates the modern idea of history. In this movement, however, it is less a mat-
ter of a simple prolongation of the Christian idea of historical time than of its
reconfiguration: while the Christian idea of historical time is the source of the
modern conception of progress, this modern conception could only come to pre-
dominance by undermining its original Christian inspiration. It is this tendency
5. Ibid., 103.
6. Ibid.
74 JEFFREY ANDREW BARASH
Lwith writes, the Christian truth itself has, like the logos of Hegel, a temporal
setting in its successive developments. With Augustine and Thomas, the
Christian truth rests, once and for all, on certain historical facts; with Joachim the
truth itself has an open horizon and a history which is essential to it.7 Moreover,
far from indicating a progression of the human spirit, the later reception of this
idea of the advent of the epochs of Christian truth provided the surest evidence
of the decline of Christian spirituality toward the modern philosophies of histo-
ry.
The future reception of Joachims theological historism would propel this
decline by representing the advent of salvation in terms of a periodization of
world history. Here the supernatural intervenes directly in the field of human his-
tory, as the advent of salvation develops in the midst of three great historical
epochs: the Age of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. This brings an
entirely new mode of historical interpretation to the fore, namely in relation to
the sharp doctrinal distinction between the civitas dei and the civitas terrena in
the thought of St. Augustine. Joachims followers and interpreters projected the
early Christian motif of the coming of salvation, subsequent to the overthrow of
the order of this world, directly onto the development of human secular history;8
in this manner they intended to turn a critical eye toward the worldly power of
the medieval Church. Claiming to extrapolate from the teachings of Joachim as
well as of St. Francis of Assisi, this movement mixed messianic Christianity with
the radicalism of political demands that the Church condemned as heretical.
Yet, to Lwiths mind, the heritage of this movement was particularly fateful.
In a footnote Lwith recalls the fascination it elicited throughout the centuries up
until the contemporary period. This fascination was reflected by the enormous
influence of the book of Ernst Kantorowicz, Friedrich II, with its theme of a mes-
sianic mission bequeathed to a secret Germany by the struggles of the four-
teenth centuryuntil the utter profanation of this mission by Adolf Hitler.9
Another footnote recalls the persistence among the fascist ideologues of themes
borrowed from this movement.10 In an astonishing passage at the very end of the
chapter in Meaning in History dealing with Joachim, Lwith included the fol-
lowing lines which, in a book so politically discreet, are surprisingly charged
with political significance:
The revolution which had been proclaimed within the framework of an eschatological
faith and with reference to a perfect monastic life was taken over, five centuries later, by
a philosophical priesthood, which interpreted the process of secularization in terms of a
spiritual realization of the Kingdom of God on earth. As an attempt at realization, the
7. Ibid., 156. The German translation, which Lwith supervised, reinforces this interpretation by
referring not to a history which is essential to truth but to truths essential historicity (wesentliche
Geschichtlichkeit), Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen, 170.
8. Lwith refers here to the interpretation and distortion of Joachims theological doctrine to polit-
ical ends in the fourteenth century, notably by Cola di Rienzo. As Lwith explains, this later inter-
pretation goes far beyond Joachims original theological intentions.
9. Ibid., 245.
10. Ibid.
KARL LWITHS CONCEPT OF SECULARIZATION 75
spiritual pattern of Lessing, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel could be transposed into the pos-
itivistic and materialistic schemes of Comte and Marx. The third dispensation of the
Joachites reappeared as a third International and a third Reich, inaugurated by a dux or a
Fhrer who was acclaimed as a savior and greeted by millions with Heil! The source of
all these formidable attempts to fulfill history by and within itself is the passionate, but
fearful and humble, expectation of the Franciscan Spirituals that a last conflict will bring
history to its climax and end.11
II
ner (ganz unhistorisch); this critique of historical modes of reflection did not,
however, warrant for him the positing of a human nature in the Straussian
sense, patterned on a given idea of this nature as it had functioned in ancient
Greek philosophy. As Lwith wrote in this same letter composed on the eve of
Hitlers accession to power, which is of great help in clarifying his philosophical
orientation well beyond the year 1933:
I thus think in a more historical manner than you do, since the historicity of reason has
become self-evident for me, and at the same time, on that very ground, in a less historical
manner, since I constantly accord to the present, in the perspective of the future, an
absolute historical right. You, however, absolutize a history that is no longer our history,
and substitute an absolute Antiquity for an absolute Christianity. You ask: what is human-
ity and what has become of itI begin by formulating the question in this same way,
arrive however at the factical (faktische) conclusion: that is not the way we are and
what can still become of humanity!14
14. Unpublished letter from Karl Lwith to Leo Strauss, 8 January, 1933, Leo Strauss archive,
University of Chicago. I would like to thank Professor Joseph Cropsey for permission to quote from
this letter.
15. Lwith, Meaning in History; Die Dynamik der Geschichte und der Historismus [1952],
Smtliche Schriften, II, 308.
KARL LWITHS CONCEPT OF SECULARIZATION 77
reveals in the movement of world history that this phrase proves especially
important for Lwith. Beyond the shift it indicates in the passage from the opac-
ity of divine judgment ushering in the end of history to the rationalization of
human history, this phrase is of decisive significance for Lwith because of the
critical perspective it lays bare. This perspective most concerns contemporary
German assumptions about historicityparticularly fateful in their conse-
quenceswhich constitute the principal legacy of Hegels thought.
In his commentary on this legacy, in The Dynamics of History and
Historicism and several years later, in Man and History (Mensch und
Geschichte), Lwith focused his criticism on Wilhelm Dilthey, noting that for
him, even more directly than for Hegel, world history is the tribunal of the
world.16 History is the tribunal of the world in the sense that success in the
sphere of world history is the ultimate criterion of truth. Viability in history
becomes the principle that decides the legitimacy of all truth claims as such. This
is the ultimate result of the millennial march of secularization, which tends to
disregard all supernatural claims to truth, since the validity of such claims, in
their independence of this world, cannot be judged in terms of the values that pre-
dominate in it.
In the essay Man and History Lwith once again cited the phrase of Hegel,
world history is the tribunal of the world, but this time in relation to a critique
addressed both against Dilthey and, even more fundamentally, against Marx.
According to Lwiths argument, the Marxian theory of ideologies inaugurated
the tendency to evaluate truth solely in terms of its historical efficacy (a tenden-
cy which would predominate, albeit for a very different purpose, in Diltheys his-
toricism).17 For the Marxian theory of ideology, there are no criteria of truth inde-
pendent of the historical process, since all truth criteria are expressions of a his-
torical context configured by the material conditions of production. As ideologies
tacitly express the particular interests of given classes, only the proletarian revo-
lution capable of abolishing classes and the particularity of their interests would,
through the process of history, overcome this particularity in establishing univer-
sally valid criteria of truth. In presupposing that this outcome is the necessary
result of the historical process, the Marxian theory of ideologies tacitly extended
the Hegelian assumption that world history is the tribunal of the world, while
transforming the very notion of philosophical truth itself. Where Hegel presup-
posed the absolute character of such truth, the Marxian notion of ideology, in
deriving truth criteria from material conditions of production, reduced all truth
claims advanced in a class society to mere instruments of political action to be
evaluated in light of their relation to the ultimate revolutionary goal.
Even more prominently than to Diltheys historicism, Lwith assigned an
especially important role to this Marxian transformation of Hegels philosophy
of history into an instrument of political action. In writings of the 1930s written
16. Lwith, Die Dynamik der Geschichte und der Historismus, Smtliche Schriften, II, 308;
Lwith, Mensch und Geschichte [1960], Smtliche Schriften, II, 368.
17. Lwith, Mensch und Geschichte, Smtliche Schriften, II, 368.
78 JEFFREY ANDREW BARASH
much earlier than Man and History and even than Meaning in History, Lwith
considered the tacit extension and distortion of this Marxian theory to underlie
the decisionist theories of Carl Schmitt, Friedrich Gogarten, and Martin
Heidegger. All three of these authorsthe jurist, the theologian, and the philoso-
pheracting on the conviction that all past historical traditions were in decline
and could no longer be considered to be a source of truth, identified resolute deci-
sion in the face of nothingness as the sole foundation of the legitimacy of truth.
And, after 1933, the call for resolute decision in the theories of all three of these
authors led to political activism in favor of the Nazi movement.
But how can decisionism be a development of the Marxian idea that truth cri-
teria are historically configured? That is, what allows us to situate the respective
positions of these three authors in the movement of historical reflection as
Lwith conceived of it? Clearly, as witnessed by the accent placed on individual
decision in the context of cultural decline, the political orientations of Heidegger,
Schmitt, or Gogarten radically opposed the liberalism of Dilthey and Marxian
communism. It is true, of course, that fascism and Nazism both tacitly appropri-
ated certain aspects of the Marxist legacy: Mussolini began his political career as
a socialist before World War I and, as Ernst Bloch was one of the first to note,
fascism and Nazism attempted to combat Marxism by co-opting certain of its
claims and symbols.18 Nonetheless, this in itself would hardly provide sufficient
support for the assertion that the decisionist theories are an ultimate outcome of
a long tradition of secularization of the Christian sources of historical thought.
Indeed, the decision concerning the criteria of political sovereignty according to
Schmitt, of the sense of being of Dasein for Heidegger, or of Christian faith out
of nothingness for Gogarten would seem to derive from anything but tradition-
al Christian eschatology or from Lwiths notion of its secularized expression
tacitly embodied in Marxian or liberal assumptions concerning history as a
movement toward an ultimate goal. This is a crucial and admittedly difficult point
in Lwiths analysis. It is rendered still more problematic by the paucity of
explicit analysis of this theme, to which Lwith merely alludes in Meaning in
History.19 Yet I believe that it is in interpreting the striking affinities between
Lwiths analysis of the movement of historical reflection in this work in relation
to his analysis in an earlier article of the 1930s, entitled The Occasional
Decisionism of Carl Schmitt, that the profoundly political implications of
Lwiths interpretation of secularization come to light.
The early but seminal article entitled The Occasional Decisionism of Carl
Schmitt was initially published in 1935 as a critique of Carl Schmitt and later
rewritten and expanded to include critical analysis of Heidegger and Gogarten.
Where in Meaning in History Lwith attempted to link the perverse messianism
of twentieth-century fascist movements with a distortion of earlier historical
reflection that had found one of its culminating points in the Marxist theory of
18. Ernst Bloch, Erbschaft dieser Zeit [1935] (Frankfurt am Main, 1985), 70-75; translated as
Heritage of Our Times by N. and S. Plaice (Berkeley, 1990), 64-69.
19. See below.
KARL LWITHS CONCEPT OF SECULARIZATION 79
history, this earlier article attempted to tie decisionism, as he conceived of it, to
a tacit extension and distortion of the Marxian concept of ideology. What appears
in Meaning in History as a leveling out of two-dimensional Christian eschatol-
ogy to produce a one-dimensional schema assimilating all truths to secularized
historical truth criteria, finds a parallel movement in this earlier essay: before any
explicit reference to the phenomenon of secularization in Lwiths work, analy-
sis is centered in this earlier essay on the eradication of the autonomy of all tra-
ditional truth criteria capable of transcending historical contingency that the
Marxian concept of ideology inaugurated and decisionism distorted and extend-
ed in the context of a radically different political orientation. What would appear
in Meaning in History as the most fateful consequence of the leveling out of
Christian historical reflection through elimination of its absolute otherworldly
referencea leveling out already epitomized, as we have seen, in the Hegelian
dictum world history is the tribunal of the worldwas clearly foreshadowed
in this earlier article of 1935 in relation to the reorientation brought about by the
decisionist appropriation of Marxs concept of ideology.20 Let us pursue this lat-
ter analysis more closely for the light it sheds on Lwiths assumptions.
The Marxian concept of ideology presupposed that values, far from possess-
ing autonomous truth, draw their significance according to their place in the
objective historical process in relation to the ultimate revolutionary goal of over-
coming the merely partial perspectives engendered by class society. In this sense,
one could say that values, rather than absolute in a Platonic or traditional
Christian sense, are always relative to their historical context in view of the ulti-
mate revolutionary goal. What Schmitt, like Heidegger and Gogarten, shares
with the shift in philosophical perspective inaugurated by Marx is obviously nei-
ther the specific notion of ideology determined by a material infrastructure nor
that of a dialectic movement of history toward communist revolution. Rather, the
decisionist theories tacitly extended another aspect of the Marxian theory of ide-
ology, while shedding its initial dialectical structure: the assumption concerning
the facticity of all values that emerge in the historical world, signifying their
relativity to an existential situation in which truth is bereft of any autonomous
status. Hence, Carl Schmitt postulated that the criteria governing political deci-
sions are not determined on the basis of any supreme truth content, but on an
20. In regard to the decisionism of Carl Schmitt, Lwith wrote: This deviation of philosophical
insight concerning the essence of politics into an intellectual instrument of political action occurred
consciously and voluntarily for the first time in the debate that Marx engaged with Hegel. Cf. Der
Okkasionnelle Dezisionismus von Carl Schmitt [1935], Smtliche Schriften, VIII, 57; for an English
translation of this text, see Karl Lwith, The Occasional Decisionism of Carl Schmitt in Martin
Heidegger and European Nihilism, ed. R. Wolin, transl. G. Steiner (New York, 1995), 137-169.
Regarding the development of later ideologies, Lwith emphasized the fundamental role of Marxs
thought rather than that of Hegel since, in his perspective, Hegel was a greater realist than Marx.
Marx was less of a realistin other words, more of an idealistnot because of principles he adopt-
ed, but because of their application. Hence Marx adopted an eschatological goal, albeit in secular-
ized form, which, in its will to overcome this world by transforming it, showed itself to be far more
radical than Hegels intellectualism. Lwiths assumption that the communist faith is a pseudometa-
morphosis of Judeo-Christian messianism drew the critical fire of Ernst Bloch in Das Prinzip Hoff-
80 JEFFREY ANDREW BARASH
nung (Gesammelte Schriften, Band V, 2 [Frankfurt am Main, 1959], 1612). It is tempting to interpret
the idea of history presented in Meaning in History as a reaction to Blochs portrayal of the relation
between Marxism and Christianity in his earlier work Erbschaft dieser Zeit [1935] (Heritage of Our
Times). In this work, Bloch had already underlined the central role of the historical messianism of
Joachim of Floris for the development of later social movements. Blochs analyses are of particular
interest in relation to Lwiths theories, since they develop a number of assumptions which, in mod-
ifying orthodox Marxist doctrines, elaborated an idea of history diametrically opposed to that of
Lwith. Indeed, where for Bloch fascism incorporatedand pervertedcertain aspects of Marxist
philosophy that were in themselves legitimate, the major mistake of orthodox Marxism arose from its
inability to integrate and demystify the religious aspirations that, over the past centuries, have con-
stantly nourished social demands. Thus, after praising the role of Joachim of Floris, Bloch wrote the
following passage in which he emphasized for the success of the Marxist program the importance of
appropriating the religious heritage : There will be no successful attack on the irrational front with-
out dialectical intervention, no rationalization and conquest of these areas without its own theology,
adjusted to the always still irrational revolutionary content. (Erbschaft dieser Zeit, 154; English trans-
lation, 139). For Lwith, completely to the contrary, the idealism of Marxism results from the fact
that the aspirations of faith tacitly orient its social program. It is this secularization of an earlier reli-
gious promiseone that was doomed to be betrayedwhich for Lwith exhibits the hidden affinity
between Marxism and the Fascist programs which distort its fundamental principles.
KARL LWITHS CONCEPT OF SECULARIZATION 81
validity beyond mere factical validity. As Lwith wrote in The Occasional
Decisionism of Carl Schmitt, the common root of the respective positions of
these three authors appears in their decisive conviction that every heritagethe
products and the institutions, as much as the contents and the criteriahas col-
lapsed into nothingness. This conviction establishes an implicit equivalence
between the world and the human historical world.21 This is the extreme limit
of a millennial movement of secularization once this movement was stripped not
only of its absolute Hegelian underpinnings and liberal theories of historical
progress, but also of the Marxian conviction of its ultimate outcome in commu-
nist revolution. All that remained was an occasionalist relativism of values
adapted to a given factical situation.22 This relativism provides for Lwith the
clue to explain how each of these authors, after a period of great political ambi-
guity in the context of the Weimar Republic, could so readily rally to Nazism in
accord with the new factical situation presented by Hitlers absolute domination
of Germany. Rather than fundamental principles capable of evaluating the his-
torical process, decision in the case of each of these authors was made merely in
relation to the facticity of a national context as the standard of historical judg-
ment.
The second line of dependence of the decisionist theories on the historical
assumptions of the orientations that they brought into question lies in their
respective ideas of history as a processeven where, prior to their commitment
to the Nazi program, this process was conceived in terms of decline rather than
as forward movement toward a goal. Hence, the decisionist theories retained the
crucial assumption that history as a global process has a meaningeven if a neg-
ative oneand that it is within history that the meaning of history is to be sought.
Precisely this assumption concerning the overarching significance of history
fueled the conviction among each of the decisionist theorists of the possibility of
orienting the course of this process through historically effective action. After
resolutely breaking with the Hegelian and post-Hegelian philosophies of history,
the presupposition that world history has ultimate meaning or, still more pre-
cisely, that world history is the tribunal of the world, continued tacitly to ori-
ent their theories, since each of them, with an eye turned exclusively toward the
criteria of this world and toward the efficacy of decision in accord with these cri-
teria, continued to pursue an ultimate meaning in history by means of resolute
political action. This is why juridical, theological, and philosophical decisionism,
even after having definitively broken with the conviction of world-historical
progress predominant in the post-Hegelian world, could so willingly endorse a
21. Karl Lwith, Der Okkasionnelle Dezisionismus von Carl Schmitt [1935], in Smtliche
Schriften, VIII, 70.
22. Lwith alludes to this idea in Meaning and History, for example in the conclusion of this work,
where he makes the following argument in regard to Heidegger: If the universe is neither eternal and
divine, as it was for the ancients, nor transient but created, as it is for the Christians, there remains
only one aspect: the sheer contingency of its mere existence, Lwith, Meaning and History, 201. It
is precisely this possibility that, according to the earlier article, The Occasional Decisionism of Carl
Schmitt, Schmitt, Gogarten, and Heidegger thought to its nihilistic conclusion.
82 JEFFREY ANDREW BARASH
Universit dAmiens
23. Carl Schmitt, Vorbemerkung zur zweiten Ausgabe Politische Theologie [1933] (Berlin,
1985),7.