Week 2 Personal Identity

NTU METAPHYSICS

2 March, 2017

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Introductory text: Carroll and Markosian (2010), An Introduction to
Metaphysics (Cambridge University Press), Chapter 5.

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OUTLINE

1 Introduction: the puzzle

2 Psychological Approaches

3 Other Approaches

4 The Problem of Fission in General

5 Bibliography

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 Section 1

Introduction: the puzzle

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PROBLEM CASES (1)
teletransportation: 15-Minute Travel (sending your transport dust)
- Q1: Would it be a good idea to take 15-Minute Travel?
- Q2: Would it be you who came out of the machine, or someone else
very similar to you?
teletransportation: Instantaneous Travel (sending information)
- Q1: Would it be a good idea to take Instantaneous Travel?
- Q2: Would it be you who came out of the machine, or someone else
very similar to you?
fission (Parfit):
- As in Instantaneous Travel, but the Scanner didnt destroy the person
on earth
- Q: Which one is you? PE on earth or PM on Mars?

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PROBLEM CASES (2)
Brown/Brownson (Shoemaker 1963)
- Suppose Browns brain was transplanted into Robinsons body, such
that the resulting creature (called Brownson) survives.
- Q: Is Brownson the same person as Brown? or Robinson?
The Split Brain Experiments (Wiggins 1967)
- Browns brain was split into two halves and put into two dierent
bodies. The resulting creatures are called Brown I and Brown II.
- Q: Which one is Brown? Brown I or Brown II? or none?

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VIEWS ON PERSONAL IDENTITY

Complex views The simple view

(reductionism) (anti-reductionism)
(the further-fact view)

physical continuity psychological continuity

Bodily Animalism
criteria (biological
criteria)

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THE PHILPAPERS SURVEY

Amongst 900 professional philosophers (2009 PhilPapers Survey)

(Bourget and Chalmers 2014):
psychological view 33.6%
biological view 16.9%
further-fact view 12.2%
other 37.3%

Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?

survival 36.2%
death 31.1%
other 32.7%

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 Section 2

Psychological Approaches

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LOCKES ARGUMENT AGAINST THE SIMPLE VIEW

The Soul Criterion

If x is a person at t1 and y is a person at t2 , then x is identical with
y i x and y has the same soul (p. 115).

Lockes argument: The Nestor Case (Essay, II. xxvii. 14)

- Imagine someone x who happens to have the same soul as Nestor (at
the siege of Troy), but who has no memory of any of Nestors
experiences.
- It seems absurd to claim that x = Nestor.
The moral: personal identity should not be arbitrary.

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MEMORY CRITERION
Lockes cobbler/prince thought experiment (Essay, II. xxvii. 15)
- suppose a princes conciousness enter into a cobblers body
- (he acts like a prince but unlike a cobbler)
- Q: Should he be the same person as the prince or the cobbler?
Shoemakers (1963) Brown/Brownson thought experiment
- the assistant mistakenly put Browns brain in Robinsons head.
- Brownson recognizes Browns life; no knowledge of Robinsons life.
- Q: Is Brownson the same person as Brown or Robinson?

The (Simple) Memory Criterion

If x is a person at t1 and y is a person at t2 (where t1 < t2 ), then x
is identical with y i y can remember xs experiences.

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CIRCULARITY OBJECTION
the circularity objection to the memory criterion (Butler; text p. 119)
- The problem: y can remember xs experiences only if y is x (I cannot
remember someone elses experiences).
- So the criterion is uninformative!
Shoemakers answer: quasi memory (Shoemaker 1970):
- distinguish between remember and quasi-remember (where
quasi-memory doesnt necessarily involve personal identity)
- we modify the memory criterion as requiring that y can
quasi-remember xs experiences (and no branching).
- memory and quasi-memory coincide as long as there is no branching.

The Psychological Criterion

If x is a person at t1 and y is a person at t2 , then x is identical with y
i there is the right kind of psychological continuity (quasi-memory,
character, etc.) between x at t1 and y at t2 .

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FISSION CASES AND NOZICKS SOLUTION
Wigginss split brain experiment and other similar cases
- The problem: psychological continuity isnt a one-one relation
- It is possible that for x at t1 , there are two (or more than two) persons
at t2 , say y1 and y2 , each of whom is psychologically continuous with x
- But x cannot be identical to two persons.
Robert Nozicks closest continuer theory (Nozick 1981):
(also known as the best candidate theory)
- y at t2 is the same person as x at t1 i (i) y is (psychologically)
continuous with x, and (ii) there is no other z at t2 that stands in a
closer (or as close) relationship to x at t1 than y at t2 does.
- In the teletransportation case: the person on Mars is you if the person
on earth was destroyed;
Problem:
- It violates the only a and b rule: whether a is identical to b should be
such that objects distinct from a and b are irrelevant (Wiggins 1980)

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 Section 3

Other Approaches

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PHYSICAL APPROACHES

The Bodily Criterion

x is the same person as y i x and y have the same body.

Bernard Williams (1956): argument from reduplication

- numerical identity vs. exact similarity (cf. Strawson)
- same memory/character ) exactly similar memories/characters.
- need some substratum to ground numerical identity
Argument from future concerns (Williams 1970)
Case 1: A and B will switch their bodies. Then, one will be given
$100,000 whilst the other be tortured.
- psychological criterion: A should prefer A-body person be tortured
Case 2: A is told that he will be tortured. But he is also told:
1 A will undergo total amnesia, and total change of his character.
2 Then, certain illusory memory (as from B) will be induced in him.
3 Finally, As memory and character will be induced to another person B.
- Can such information comfort A? No!

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BIOLOGICAL APPROACHES (ANIMALISM)
The Life Criterion
x is the same person as y i x and y have the same life.

The thesis of animalism: each of us is identical with an animal

The fetus problem (Olson 1997: 73)
(1) I was once a fetus.
(2) There can be no psychological connections between me and a fetus.
(3) Therefore, psychological approaches cannot be correct.
Reply: denying (1) (cf. Kind 2015: 86)
The too many thinkers argument (Olson 2003):
(1) There is a human animal sitting in the chair.
(2) The human animal sitting in the chair is thinking.
(3) You are the (only) thinking being sitting in the chair.
(4) Therefore, you are the animal.
If we are animals, our persistence condition is as that of an animal.
- it accommodates the teletransportation case
- but it violates the transplant intuitions
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THE SIMPLE VIEW (FURTHER-FACT)

The complex view Personal iden- The simple view Personal identity
tity consists in some other facts consists in no further fact other
not involving personal identity. than itself.

Arguments for the complex view:

- (Shoemaker 2012) The simple view leads to scepticism about the
identity of other persons, for it implies that any person-stage can be
identical or non-identical with any person-stage (cf. quidditism).
Arguments for the simple view:
- (Swinburne 2012) Thought experiments show the possibilities that
persons can undergo radical changes of mental life and bodily
constitution. This is good evidence for the simple view.
- (Lowe 2012) Any psychological criterion presupposes the identities of
events (or mental states), which cannot be identified without personal
identities. Persons are thus basic particulars.

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 Section 4

The Problem of Fission in General

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SOME PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The problem: x at t1 fissions into y1 and y2 at t2 , such that
- there is psychological and/or physical continuity both between x and
y1 , and between x and y2
- so, we have to say x = y1 and x = y2
- but certainly y1 6= y2
- This violates transitivity (derivable from Leibnizs Law)
The closest continuer theory
Tensed Identity
- y1 and y2 were identical, but now they are not identical.
- (at t2 ) y1 were x, and y2 were x, hence y1 were y2 .
- (at t1 ) x will be y1 , and x will be y2 . Hence x will be two persons.
Relative Identity
- A simpler case: Brownson is the same animal as Robinson but not as
Brown, and the same person as Brown but not as Robinson.
- Can this strategy rescue the symmetric cases?

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DAVID LEWISS SOLUTION
person-stages vs. persons (cf. relative identity)
- x at t1 , y1 at t2 , and y2 at t2 are three dierent person-stages.
- there is a person P1 composed of x-at-t1 and y1 -at-t2
- there is a person P2 composed of x-at-t2 and y2 -at-t2

y1 P1
x
y2 P2
t1 t2

Problem: two persons overlapping at t1 ?

- No mystery, because there is only one person-stage there!
- We count by partial identity rather than by strict identity.
- (cf. counting squares, counting roads)

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DEREK PARFIT
Main thesis: identity is not what matters (in survival)
Argument (1) from indeterminacy (1970:10)
- Identity is a one-one relation
- what matters need not be one-one (as the fission case shows)
- Therefore, what matters is not identity
Parfits own view:
- we use the language of identity in order to imply psychological
continuity
- So, non-branching psychological continuity is identity, but in the
branching case we should abandon the language of identity.
- We may survive as two people (p. 8).

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DEREK PARFIT (2)
Argument (2) from reductionism (1984:255f)
- Consider the split brain experiment (or any fission case)
- there seems to be four possibilities: (1) I do not survive; (2) I survive
as one of them; (3) I survive as the other; (4) I survive as both.
- (1)(4) are all implausible
- these are dierent possibilities only if we assume an anti-reductionist
view (that we are separately existing entities)
On the reductionist view, the problem disappears
- (1)(4) are dierent descriptions of the same outcome!
- In describing it, we know all the facts (granted reductionism)
- (we know all the intrinsic features of the relation relevant to survival)
- Analogy: the split of a club
- Identity doesnt matter: its a fact about language (Parfit 1995)
If identity consists in psychological continuity, then what matters is
psychological continuity.

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CRITICISMS OF PARFITS VIEW
Peter Unger (1990):
- According to Parfit, fission is a good way to continue our life
- but intuitively, fission may lead to some loss of the focus of our life,
and thus should not be preferred.
Ernest Sosa (1990):
- According to Parfit, what matters isnt identity, but survival with or
without branching
- But then it is difficult to explain why not the more the better

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 Section 5

Bibliography

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BIBLIOGRAPHY I
Bourget, David and Chalmers, David J. (2014).
What do Philosophers Believe?.
Philosophical Studies, 170:465500.

Kind, Amy (2015).

Persons and Personal Identity.
Cambridge: Polity Press.

Lewis, David (1976 [1983]).

Survival and Identity.
In A. O. Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons, pp. 1740.
University of California Press.
Reprinted in D. Lewis (1983), Philosophical Papers: Volume I, Chapter 5,
pp. 5577.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY II
Lowe, E. J. (2012).
The Probable Simplicity of Personal Identity.
In G. Gasser and M. Stefan (eds.), Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?,
pp. 137155.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Noonan, Harold W. (1998).

Animalism versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy.
The Philosophical Quarterly, 48(192):302318.

Noonan, Harold W. (2010).

The thinking animal problem and personal pronoun revisionism.
Analysis, 70(1):9398.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY III
Nozick, Robert (1981 [2004]).
Personal Identity through Time.
In Philosophical Explanations, pp. 2969.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Reprinted in R. Martin and J. Barresi eds. (2004), Personal Identity,
Chapter 2, pp. 92114.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Olson, Eric T. (1997).
The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY IV
Olson, Eric T. (2003).
An Argument for Animalism.
In R. Martin and J. Barresi (eds.), Personal Identity, Chapter 12,
pp. 318334.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Parfit, Derek (1971).
Personal Identity.
The Philosophical Review, 80(1):327.

Parfit, Derek (1984).

Reasons and Persons.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY V
Parfit, Derek (1995 [2003]).
The Unimportance of Identity.
In H. Harris (ed.), Identity, pp. 1345.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Reprinted in R. Martin and J. Barresi eds. (2003), Personal Identity,
Chapter 11, pp. 292317.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Shoemaker, Sydney (1963).
Self Knowledge and Self Identity.
Cornell University Press.

Shoemaker, Sydney (1970).

Persons and Their Pasts.
American Philosophical Quarterly, 7(4):269285.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY VI
Shoemaker, Sydney (2012).
Against Simplicity.
In G. Gasser and M. Stefan (eds.), Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?,
pp. 123136.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shoemaker, Sydney and Swinburne, Richard (1984).

Personal Identity.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Sosa, Ernest (1990 [2003]).
Surviving Matters.
In No
us, 24:297330.
Reprinted in R. Martin and J. Barresi eds. (2003), Personal Identity,
Chapter 7, pp. 199215.
Oxford: Blackwell.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY VII
Swinburne, Richard (2012).
How to Determine Which Is the True Theory of Personal Identity.
In G. Gasser and M. Stefan (eds.), Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?,
pp. 105122.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Unger, Peter (1990 [2003]).

Fission and the Focus of Ones Life.
In Identity, Consciousness, and Value, pp. 269282.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Reprinted in R. Martin and J. Barresi eds. (2003), Personal Identity,
Chapter 6, pp. 184198.
Oxford: Blackwell.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY VIII
Wiggins, David (1967).
Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Williams, Bernard (1956).
Personal Identity and Individuation.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 57:229252.

Williams, Bernard (1970).

The Self and the Future.
The Philosophical Review, 79(2):161180.

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