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KHALID DURAN
religion over and against the legalistic one: the prime concern is not the
fulfillment of the law, but a close experience of, ifnot union with, the divine.
The legalist or "orthodox" version of Islam tends to demand sobriety,
whereas its Sufi version longs for ecstasy. The legalist version erects protec
tive walls, whereas Sufism seeks to break those walls down. While the
"orthodox" version tends to be exoteric, the Sufi version of Islam manifests
esoteric tendencies. In Europe, the 1980s witnessed a boom of esotericism,
and Sufism came to strike a responsive chord.
Over the last few decades, quite a number of Sufi masters from the
Middle East fledpoliticalturmoilin theirhomelandsand tookrefugein the
West, Such has been their success inwinning
otherwise decried as decadent.
Europeans over to their way that they can hardly complain of dearth of
malleable and enterprising European adepts.
There are those Sufis who fully converted to Islam, and there are
others?twice as many?who are not official converts, but are, nonetheless,
high inBritainandGermany,
close to Islam.Their numberisparticularly
but theymay be foundall overEurope, especiallyin theNetherlandsand
Italy, but also in Spain and even Greece.
was highlighted
In 1982theconversionphenomenon by a well-known
columnist who noted sardonically in the leading Spanish daily, El Pais, "if
in today's Spain someone wants to be up-to-date, in terms of aesthetics and
spirituality, he had better turnMuslim."
come under the influence of an Egyptian spiritualist, Dr. Sal?h 'Id, who
was then a teacher at a local high school. After Sal?h 'Id's death in 1982,
themantle fell to Stefan Makowski, now Husayn 'Abd al-Fatt?h.
This wholesome role ofHaus Schnede has not always been recognised.
On the contrary, there has been considerable hostility on the part of older
Muslim communities. 1983 was a particularly bad year, inasmuch as the
Nordic mysticsof Haus Schnede had a bad press in some of theArab
countries. It all started with a damaging feature in Stern, Germany's most
widely read weekly newsmagazine. The anti-Muslim bias was all-too-appa
rent. The article was full of absurdities and concoctions of a highly sen
sationalist nature. It was not just a matter of inaccuracies but of outright
defamation.
For the Burhani Sufis, thiswas painful enough. The real shock came
when they saw the entire piece reproduced in a distorted manner in al
Madinah, a prestigious daily of Saudi Arabia. The Arabic version was
perhaps even more scandalous than the German original.
For a shortwhile, the disputes seemed amicably settled, but soon the
simmering flame of discord rose again. Much of the infighting is obviously
due to the practice on the part of donors from overseas to entrust thewelfare
of diasporacommunitiesto individuals
of theirverypersonalchoice,mostly
a single person in each country. Since these donors generally rely on a staff
strongly inclined to "orthodoxy", their appointed representatives in theWest
are generally persons ill-disposed torwards anything related to Sufism. In
the case ofWestern Europe, as in the case of theUnited States, the result
goes to tinygroups
of Islamicprojectsalmost invariably
is thatthefunding
who represent the orthodox or legalist ideological orientation whereas the
larger and more dynamic communities have little share in it. Inevitably, this
breeds resentment, generally expressing itself in hostility to the overseas
funding agencies and to the countries they belong to. Not only that, in
Germany itcreated a great deal of bad blood and wrangling among prominent
Muslim personalities and groups. The clash and rivalry between Husayn
Makowski and Ahmad Von Denffer is an unfortunate instance in point.
Aside from the long-standing conflicts betweend the Sunnis and the
Shi'is, Islam inGermany also became a battle-ground of competing forest
retreats?one Sufi, the other strongly leaning towards strict orthodoxy. In
this way, two converts of a fairly similar background, both of them middle
class academics with a foible for authorship and leadership, ended up as
rivals rather than as collaborators in the furtherance of a common cause.
Ahmad Von Denffer worked with the Islamic Foundation headquartered in
Leicester, England which is run largely by leaders of Pakistan's Jam?'at-i
Isl?mi. Husayn Makowski, even though he lacked the resources that sup
ported Ahmad Von Denffer, apparently had a better instinct for intellectual
fads and religious trends as well as a greater sensitivity which appeals to
potential converts.
Less openly hostile, but essentially just as much opposed to the Sufis,
is the "Association of German-speaking Muslims", a group dominated by
militant devotees of Imam Khomeini. The members number hardly more
than a hundred, barely half of whom are converts. Among those, half are
German wives of activists following the "Une of the Imam". Among the rest
are Iranians or other Shi'i immigrants who mobilize the converts for their
propaganda purposes, and occasionally for their clashes with other Muslim
groups. Originally itwas an association of German Sunni Muslims. Ever
IV
The Sufis have faced problems not only with the Shi'is and the prop
onents of an orthodox version of Islam, but differences within their own
ranks were even more detrimental to the northward progress of the tariqah.
m Egypt and theSudan, knownforanything
The leadership but open-min
dedness, found their representative in theGerman rain-forests too ambitious
and too foreign to their way of thinking. In 1984, Husayn was sacked by
the ultra-conservative Sudanese head of the Burh?niyyah. The process was
somewhat similar to the case ofMalcolm X and Elijah Muhammad. Husayn
'Abd al-Fatt?h Makowski, not unlike Malcolm X, was devoted to his leader
and loved to play the role of a lieutenant. But he was imaginative, energetic,
and a fast learner, soon surpassing the head of the order. Then there was
the usual back-biting based on rivalry among the various representatives.
Many of the German Burhani Sufis would never have known any
thing about their new faith, if not forHusayn, who initiated them. True,
the basic framework was bequeathed to him by his Egyptian mentor, Sal?h
?d, but the movement with its organizational structure was his creation;
Haus Schnede was his initiative. Now the majority of the Burhani Sufis
dissociated itselffrom him and he had tomove out. Husayn took a number
of his followers, both male and female, and made the neighbouring village
of Bahlburg his new headquarters, installing himself inwhat used to be a
youth hostel.
Reduced to a much smaller role Husayn, and the few disciples who
moved inwith him at Bahlburg, devised numerous schemes of putting their
financialresourcesand professionalskills togetherfor a varietyof joint
v?ntures. His associates were by no means heart-broken "refuseniks" of
Western society. That brand of Sufi converts which stayed behind at Haus
Schnede, were concentrating mainly on endless Burhani liturgies. Those
who remained in touch with Husayn were mostly living in Hamburg and
other large cities. They tended to have a rich experience in professional life.
There were business managers among them, medical practitioners, lawyers,
linguists, journalists, and even parliamentarians, though psychologists were
still inmajority. InHamburg, two Protestant clergymen continued delivering
theirSundaysermonsas paid employeesof theChurchwhile "clandestinely"
seeking their own spiritual satisfaction with the Sufis.
The latter point is partly explained by what was said earlier in the
context of the conflict between Makowski and Von Denffer. But the relation
ship between converts from theWest and theirEastern brethren-in-faith is
often also problematic in a more general sense. Newcomers frequently com
plain that there isno place in theworld where Islam ispractised authentically,
as a model, with a leader they can look up to with pride. Converts usually
regard theMuslims of theMiddle Eastern or North African diaspora as bad
examples, regardless of whether they are diplomats, students or workers.
Such reproaches used to be voiced most vociferously at theDarqawi head
quartersinGranada, Spain (and previouslyinNorwich,Britain),but they
can also be heard inHaus Schnede.
ration. For this and several other reasons, converts visitingMuslim countries
are sometimes treated condescendingly, either as pitiable romantics or as
zealots pestering their brethren-iii-faith with fund-raising formosques. The
dynamic amir (commander) of this brand of Islam in Spain, a converted
psychiatrist named Mans?r, had a conspicuous success in fund-raining since
he could persuade the amir of a Gulf state?albeit not a conspicuously rich
Gulf State?to sponsor his movement. However, such success stories are
rare. Moreover, theArabs anyhow seem to feel greater affinitywith Spain
than with Britain, France or Germany.
VI
In any case, Husayn did not have to discover this for himself. A
heated debate was already going on this subject among German converts at
the time when he joined. It was usually the older converts telling the more
recent ones: "Do not become Arabs or Turks; be German Muslims. Listen
to us, we made the same mistakes you are committing now!"
In the end, neither of them got it, for lack of funds, and the 50,000
Muslims of Hamburg continue with mosques that are converted apartments
or stores.
vn
It was but natural that after his disappointments inArabia and the
near disastrous failure of his business enterprise (DARAB), Husayn should
vra
In view of those and many other queer associations under the aegis
of the Sufi brand of Islam, Husayn has emerged, after all these years of a
"pilgrim's progress" with its manifold reorientations, as remarkably safe
and sound, and seems on his way to end up as an almost traditionalist
Muslim, though unshakably Sufi and certainly with a distinct European, if
not Germanic, identity.
Husayn, once themost stylish of them all with his comely turban and
impressive white robes, took to yuppie suits when he tried his luck as a
businessman. As explained above, thiswas also part of the reorientation he
underwentafter1984andmighthavepartlybeen provokedbyhisdifficulties
with foreignmentors bent on cutting the hyper-dynamic young convert down
to size.
vexing problems. For this or some other reason Husayn seems to have
become more circumspect in the exercise of hypnosis, and prefers to wield
the pen rather than his eyes.
Husayn's pilgrim's progress has been faster than that of most other
converts. Within a span of fifteen years (since he first came under the
influence of Sal?h 'Id) he has traversed a number of phases forwhich others
need fifty or more years. He is young (36 in 1991), and is conscious of it.
All this, however, is not to say that Husayn's conversion to. Islam
was motivated by a desire for distinction in society and for leadership.
Husayn has always been in the midst of it. One of his strongest points is
that he always seems to have his finger on the pulse of his generation. He*
interacts admirably well with all kinds of people, being perceptive and respon
sive. In other words, he could have gone in for any of the other fashionable
trends. His choice of Sufism was not merely based on a cool calculation that
this wasthe most promising enterprise. In fact, it did not seem so at all
when Husayn started with Sal?h 'Id. Europeans were still resentful of Arab
oil policies.Husayn had hardlyjoinedwhen the IranianRevolutionbroke
out. At that time it took a lotof courage to preach Islam inWestern Europe.
In the final analysis, then, even if there was any social motivation in
his conversion, the dominant motive was doubtlessly a religious one. And
the impulses were of all kinds: spiritual, intellectual, doctrinal, historical.
We find thesereflectedinhiswritings,especiallyin themanuscriptof his
yet unpublished book, The "New Age" is but a Prelude to Islam. In that
book, Husayn introduces himself as a one-time propagandist of the New
Age, someone who was then a vanguardist intellectual?and who continues
being so, by now demolishingthemythsof theNew Age theories,and by
pointing out the fallacies of the "pseudo-scientific" assumptions that had
gotten the better of his generation. As a Muslim and as a Sufi, he wishes
to explain the limitations to which the contemporary phenomena are sub
jected; the lack of eternity in the things that fascinate the proponents of a
New Age of ideological convergence. Husayn warns that everything is tem
poral, transient, limited, restricted, ultimately insignificant.He assumes the
role of a caller, telling people to come down from the new Tower of Babel,
to "get out of it".
One might say that the book falls under the category of "doomsday
literature", drawing heavily on eschatological materials from a variety of
historical sources and contemporary fantasies. But then,Husayn will always
be an irrepressible optimist with great plans for the future.What role were
there for him to play ifArmageddon were to occur now, if the world really
came to end before even the 90s are over? The real thing is yet to come.
Islam has yet to unfold. Husayn has yet to find his proper place.
IX
Critics will probably tear Husayn to pieces, ifat all any serious pub
lication takes note of this book about a New Age that has grown old already.
But even thatwould not deter Husayn's advance. Sooner or later the dare
devil convert will come up with something new and might achieve a break
through, at last.
One might argue that the authoring of such type of a book is, in
itself, symptomatic of the convert situation. Who among them has not turned
into an author? Or should we say that they converted to Islam because they
of theQur'?n, and
Husaynmay be ahistoricalinhis understanding
he may be apolitical in his views about Islam and the world?certainly two
The result is that converts with their natural urge to prove their
mettle, are induced to become inclined to exhibit excessive zeal. InGermany,
this trend created fairly serious problems. The desire to be "more royal than
the king" might be regarded as a universal phenomenon with many converts
to any religion. In the case of Islam this has been aggravated by the encour