Barredo vs.

Garcia
G.R. No. L-48006
July 8, 1942

In the Old Civil Code, quasi delict arises from the two provisions:
ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to
another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so
done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is
enforcible, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom another is responsible.
xxxxx
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable
for any damages caused by their employees while engaged in the
branch of the service in which employed, or on occasion of the
performance of their duties.
xxxxx
Using quasi delict, the employer, Barredo, was made liable for the
negligent act of his driver which cause the death of the respondents child.
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is
caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the matter or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum
and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It
follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction
of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability.

1
 Elcano vs. Hill
G.R. No. L-24803
May 26, 1977

Civil liability arising from quasi delict is separate and distinct from that
arising in delict. Hence acquittal in the latter does not bar recovery from the
former.

xxx An acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence,

whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from
criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or
'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.
Moreover, the civil liability of a minor is borne by his parents.

xxx pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the

minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by
marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority
over the child's person xxx

2
 Cinco vs. Canonoy
G.R. No. L-33171
May 31, 1979

Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to

property during the pendency of the criminal action.

Yes, there can be an independent civil action for damage to property

separate and independent to the civil liability arising from the crime itself.
Both actions may proceed without the need of suspending the other.
xxx The concept of quasidelica as enunciated in Article 2176 of the
Civil Code is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but
also damage to property. 7 It makes no distinction between "damage to
persons" on the one hand and "damage to property" on the other.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter xxx

3
 Baksh vs. CA
February 19, 1993

The breach of promise to marry per se is not an

actionable wrong.
However Article 21 and Article 2176 granted and adequate legal
remedy for untold number of oral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or
public policy shall compensate the latter for damages.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter
The fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love and promise
to marry made the woman surrender her virginity. This is indeed
considered as torts specifically, intentional and malicious acts.

4
 Dulay vs. CA
G.R. No. 108017
April 3, 1995

When criminal action is instituted, civil action for recovery of civil

liability is impliedly instituted with criminal action unless:
1) Waiver of civil action;
2) Reservation; and
3) Institution of civil action prior to the criminal action

Quasi-delict covers not only acts not punishable by law but also
criminal in character, whether intentional, voluntary, or negligent, provided
no double recovery. The plaintiff must choose between which is bigger in the
two cases.
Moreover, the employer can be held liable for the acts of its employee
using quasi delict.
Article 2180. When an injury is caused by negligence of
employee, there is a presumption that there was negligence on
the part of the employer either in selection or supervision of
employees.

5
 Garcia vs. Florido
G.R. No. L-35095
August 31, 1973

It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action
for damages, means abandonment of right to press recovery for damages in
the criminal case, and instead to recover them in the present civil case.
xxx As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private
respondents to the former has ceased to be involved in the criminal
action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in
the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the
civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he
has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his
interest in the criminal case has disappeared xxx

6
 Andamo vs. IAC
November 6, 1990

Whether a corporation which has built through its agents, water

paths, water conductors, and contrivances, within its land, causing
inundation and damage to an adjacent land be held civilly liable under
quasi delict.
Yes, since there is a causal connection between the acts of the
agents and that damage suffered by victims. Moreover, the separate
civil action lies against the offender, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided offended party is
not allowed to recover twice. The only exception is if the act from
which civil liability might arise did not exist.

7
 Taylor vs. Manila Electric Rail road
G.R. No. L-4977
March 22, 1910

The plaintiff having sufficient capacity and understanding to be

sensible of danger is therefore liable to his own negligent act. This breaks
the causal connection to the alleged negligent act of respondent and to that
injury suffered by petitioner.
If the injury is caused by the negligence of the plaintiff itself, he shall
be denied the right to recover. He is deemed responsible for his own acts. If
the injury produced should not be the result of acts or omissions of a third
party, the latter has no obligation to repair the same although such act or
omission were imprudent or unlawful and much less when it is shown that
the immediate cause of an injury was the negligence of injured party himself.

8
 Tayag vs. Alcantara
G.R. No. L-50959
July 23, 1980

Whether the acquittal of the driver based on reasonable doubt

exonerate the liability of employer based on quasi- delict.
Article 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from act or commission of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceeding regardless of the result of the
latter.
The proceedings may both ensue provided that the plaintiff does not
recover twice.

9
 Barredo vs. Garcia
G.R. No. L-48006
July 8, 1942

Quasi-delict vis--vis Delict

Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the
culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of
private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act,
while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the
damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are
punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter,
cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence
intervenes."
The Court reiterates that the subsidiary liability of the employer arising
from delict is distinct and separate of its civil liability arising from quasi
delict.
xxx that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and
distinct legal institution, independent from the civil responsibility
arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article
1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the
negligent acts of his employee.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate
individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code.
Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil
liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the
Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same
negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a
crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it
inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the
defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable under
article 1903 of the Civil Code.

10
 Padilla vs. CA
129 SCRA 558

Whether or not the acquittal based on reasonable doubt carries

with it extinction of civil liability.
It will only be extinguished if the there is a declaration that the
facts from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
Hence in the following instances, civil liability is not extinguished:
1) Acquittal based on reasonable doubt
2) Liability is only civil in nature
3) Civil liability did not arise from the criminal act of which the accused
was acquitted.

There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code in the rendition of

judgement of acquittal and a judgement awarding damages in the same
criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal
operates to extinguish criminal liability. It does not however, extinguish civil
liability unless there is a clear showing that the act from which civil liability
might arise did not exists.

11
 Cruz vs. CA
GR. No. 122445
November 18, 1997

The elements of a crime are:

1) The offender does or fails to do an act;

2) The doing or the failure to do the act is voluntary;
3) It without malice;
4) The material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and:
5) There is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender,
taking into consideration his employment, or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding
persons, time, and place.

12
 Philippine Rabbit Bus Line vs. People
GR No. 147703
April 14, 2004

Can the employer resists its subsidiary liability in behalf of the

employee?
No. Employer is deemed subsidiary liable upon the acts of his
employee under delict.
The requisites for subsidiary liability are:
1) Employer of the convicted;
2) Employer is engaged in some trade or industry;
3) Crime was committed by the employee in the discharge of their
duties; and
4) Employee is insolvent.

The Court emphasized that, subsidiary liability of employers does not

make them parties to the criminal case. They cannot appeal in behalf of their
employee.

13
 People vs. Ligon
July 29, 1987

Does the judgement of acquittal based on reasonable doubt exonerate

the accused civil liability?
No. Only preponderance of evidence is required in civil action for
damages. The judgement of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the
accused when it includes a declaration that the facts from which civil liability
might arise did not exist.

14
 Cangco vs. Manila Railroad
GR No. L-12191
October 14, 1918

The liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or

omissions of their servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause
damages which amount to the breach of contract, is not based upon a mere
presumption of the masters negligence in their selection or control and proof
of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve
the master of liability for the breach of contract.

The same is one of the most important distinction between quasi-delict

and culpa contractual. In the latter defense of diligence is not available, as
oppose to quasi delict where the employer may be exonerated from liability
upon proof of exercise of due diligence in selection and supervision of
employees.

Hence the existence of a contract and of its non-performance is

sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.

15
 Fores vs. Miranda
GR No. L-12163
March 4, 1959

The action for breach of contract imposes on the defendant carrier a

presumption of liability upon mere proof of injury to passengers. It can only
exempted if it proves that the incidence is due to unforeseen event or force
majeure.

Moreover, in breach of contract proof of bad faith or fraud is essential

to justify an award of moral damages. Hence, in this case the mere
carelessness of the driver does not per se constitute to justify an inference of
malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier and more importantly there is
no proof of bad faith or malice.

xxx Art. 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of

contract in bad faith. It is true that negligence may be occasionally so
gross as to malice; but the fact must be shown in evidence, and a
carriers bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that
the contract was breached through the negligence of the carriers
employee xxx

16
 Far East Bank vs. CA
GR No. 108164
February 23, 1995

In culpa contractual, the moral damages may be recovered

where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice
in the breach of contract (Art. 2220). Bad faith, in this context,
includes gross, but not simple negligence.

Moreover, to be awarded an exemplary damages, the defendant,

in quasi-contract, found to have acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner.

Nominal damages are awarded in order that a right of the

plaintiff, which has been violated or invade by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him (Art. 2221).

Lastly, attorneys fees may be recovered where the Court deems

such recovery to be just and equitable.

17
 Air France vs. Carrascoso
GR No. L-21438
September 28, 1966

A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and

degree from any other contractual relation. And this, is because of the
relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Its business is
mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the
comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage,
therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carriers employees, naturally, could give ground
for an action for damages.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have

a right to be treated by the carriers employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy, and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities, and
abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of the employees towards a passenger gives the
latter an action for damages against a carrier.

18
 PSBA vs. CA
GR No. 84698
February 4, 1992

Art. 2180 provides that the damage should have been caused or
inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to
be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody.
However, a material situation does not exist in the case since
assailants of the private respondent were not students of PSBA.

However, it does not automatically relieved PSBA of liability. As

the Court reiterated:

xxx When an academic institution accepts students for

enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in
bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For
its part, the school undertaken to provide the student with an
education that would presumably suffice to equip him with necessary
tools and skills to pursue higher education or profession. On the other
hand, the student covenants to abide by the schools academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations xxx

19
 Syquia vs. CA
GR No. 98695
January 27, 1993

It is basic that parties are bound by the terms of their contract, which
is the law between them. Where there is nothing in the contract which is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy, the
validity of the contact must be sustained. Moreover, a contracting party
cannot incur liability more than what is expressly specified in his
undertaking. It cannot be extended by implication, beyond the terms of the
contract.
And as a rule of evidence, where the terms of an agreement are
reduced in writing, the document itself, being constituted by the parties are
the exposition of their intentions, is the only instrument of evidence in
respect of that agreement which the law will recognize so long as it exists for
purpose of evidence.
And if the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations
shall control.

20
 Calalas vs. Sunga
GR No. 122039
May 31, 2000

In the breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by

proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this
case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his
destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil
Code provides that a common carrier are presumed to have been at fault or
to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as defined in Art. 1733 and Art. 1755 of the Code. This shifts to the
common carrier such burden of proof.

21
 SYLLABUS FOR NEGLIGENCE

What is the test to determine negligence?

The test of negligence is as follows: Did the defendant in doing the

alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? (Picart vs.
Smith)

What/Who are the exceptions in using the ordinary diligence of

a good father as a standard in determining negligence?

The first exemption is in determining whether or not children are

negligent in particular accidents. In the case of Jarco Marketing vs. CA, the
Court ruled that a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed
to have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from
criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal
liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of
age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment.

However, this ruling has been abandoned since it restricts the judges
to an inflexible rule that changes only whenever there is an amendment to
the law changing the age of exemption from criminal liability.

Hence, the ruling in Taylor vs. Manila Electric Rail Road subsists as the
test in determining whether or not a child can be considered as negligent in
particular situations for failure to observe the diligence of a good father. If he
is imbued sufficient level of maturity and knowledge, then he is obliged to
observe the diligence of a good father.

Second, professional experts who holds himself out as being

competent to do things requiring professional skill, will be held liable for
negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in
the particular work which he attempts to do (Culion vs. Philippine).

Third, an intoxicated man does not assume automatic negligence when

faced in accidents. xx Mere intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It
is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to
prove negligence. It is the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is
drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to
him, and no greater degree of care is required than by a sober one xxx
(Wright vs. Manila Electric)

22
 Lastly, an insane or demented person though criminally exempted
from liability is not freed from civil liability or damages for injuries he caused
(US vs. Baggay).
What is the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur? When is it
applicable as a mode of evidence?

xxx Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself is rebuttable
presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises
upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's
exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily does
not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of
evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred
from mere fact that accident happened provided character of accident
and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in
absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which
caused injury is shown to have been under management and control of
alleged wrongdoer xxx (Layugan vs. IAC)

The doctrine is only applicable in the absence of any proof to tie the
negligent act of the defendant with the injury sustained by the petitioner.

The requisites are:

xxx 1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused
the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured xxx (DM
Consunji vs. CA)

What are the exceptions in applying the doctrine?

xxx (1) where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents

evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of
the injury complained of or where there is direct evidence as to
the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and
circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. Finally,
once 2) the actual cause of injury is established beyond
controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant, no
presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes
inapplicable when the circumstances have been so completely
eludicated that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably
be made, whatever the source of the evidence, as in this case xxx
(Layugan vs. IAC)

23
 Picart vs. Smith
37 Phil 809
March 15, 1918

The test of negligence is as follows: Did the defendant in doing the

alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?
The Court also introduced the criteria in determining negligence,
to wit:
xxx Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the
position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his
foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.
By applying the test of negligence it can be said that the act of the
defendant is the proximate cause of the injury while that of the plaintiff is
the remote cause.
xxx It is enough to say that the negligence of the defendant was in t
his case the immediate and determining cause of the accident
and that the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff was a more remote
factor in the case xxx

24
 Taylor vs. Manila Rail Road
GR No. L-4977
March 22, 1910

The question brought before the Court is on what standard of conduct

shall be used in determining whether or not a child has been negligent or
not? Whether the diligence of a good father is equally applicable to children?
The Court held that in determining whether a child is negligent or not,
his level of maturity and knowledge should be taken into consideration. If he
is imbued sufficient level of maturity and knowledge, then he is obliged to
observe the diligence of a good father.
As the Court pronounced:
xxx In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-
grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically
than the average boy of his age
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient
capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to
which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of
the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his
experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the
necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which
would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own
deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held
to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful
and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries
would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless
plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the
accident which inflicted the injury xxx

25
 Jarco Marketing vs. CA
GR No. 129792
December 21, 1999

The Court in determining whether the child is negligent applied the

conclusive presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old
in that they are incapable of contributory negligence.
In his book,former Judge Cezar S. Sangco stated:
xxx In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is
conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment,
and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The
same presumption and a like exemption from criminal
liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under
fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted
with discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-
delict and required discernment as a condition of liability, either
criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy,
conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and
that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for
negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen
years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule,
therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be
conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a
matter of law xxx

26
 Del Rosario vs. Manila
GR no. L-35283
November 5, 1932

The presumption of negligence on the part of the company from the

breakage of this wire has not been overcome. They are deemed liable for the
death of the child.
xxx It is doubtful whether contributory negligence can
properly be imputed to the deceased, owing to his
immature years and the natural curiosity which a child
would feel to do something out of the ordinary, and the mere
fact that the deceased ignored the caution of a companion of the
age of 8 years does not, in our opinion, alter the case. But even
supposing that contributory negligence could in some measure be
properly imputed to the deceased, a proposition upon which the
members of the court do not all agree, yet such negligence
would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case, not
having been the determining cause of the accident xxx

27
 Ylarde vs. Aquino
G.R. No. L-33722
July 29, 1988

Were there acts and omissions on the part of private respondent

Aquino amounting to fault or negligence which have direct causal relation to
the death of his pupil Ylarde?

xxx The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving

his pupils in such a dangerous site has a direct causal
connection to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it
was but natural for the children to play around. Tired from the
strenuous digging, they just had to amuse themselves with
whatever they found. Driven by their playful and adventurous
instincts and not knowing the risk they were facing three of them
jumped into the hole while the other one jumped on the stone. Since
the stone was so heavy and the soil was loose from the digging, it was
also a natural consequence that the stone would fall into the hole
beside it, causing injury on the unfortunate child caught by its heavy
weight. Everything that occurred was the natural and probable effect of
the negligent acts of private respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the
child Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe situation
created by private respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of all
the pupils concerned to real danger xxx

28
 Culion vs. Philippine
GR No. 32611
November 3, 1930

In this connection it must be remembered that when a person

holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring
professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to
exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular
work which he attempts to do.

xxx The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the
engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he
was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats. For this reason,
possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and the
flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate
impression of the danger of fire. But a person skilled in that
particular sort of work would, we think have been sufficiently
warned from those circumstances to cause him to take greater
and adequate precautions against the danger. In other words
Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by
one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats.
There was here, in our opinion, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy
antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes
negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have
resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an
unavoidable accident. It would not have occured but for Quest's
carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the
injury was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from
blame.

We therefore see no escape from the conclusion that this accident is

chargeable to lack of skill or negligence in effecting the
changes which Quest undertook to accomplish xxx

29
 US vs. Pineda
GR No. L- 12858
January 22, 1918

A pharmacist is one of the professions obliged to observe a higher

degree of diligence more than the diligence of a good father.

xxx The profession of pharmacy, it has been said again and again, is
one demanding care and skill. The responsibility of the druggist to
use care has been variously qualified as "ordinary care," "care
of a special high degree," "the highest degree of care known to
practical men." Even under the first conservative expression,
"ordinary care" with reference to the business of a druggist, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut has said must be held to signify "the
highest practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, and
vigilance, and most exact and reliable safeguards consistent
with the reasonable conduct of the business, in order that
human life may not be constantly be exposed to the danger
flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless
medicine xxx

Moreover, he can be made responsible for fraudulent act.

xxx The prosecution would have to prove to a reasonable degree

of certainty that the druggist made a material representation;
that it was false; that when he made it he knew that it was
false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth
and as positive assertion; that he made it with the intention that it
should be acted upon by the purchaser; that the purchaser acted in
reliance upon it, and that the purchased thereby suffered injury xxx

30
 BPI vs. CA
G.R. No. 112392
February 29, 2000

BPI in allowing the withdrawal of private respondent's deposit, failed to

exercise the diligence of a good father of a family. In total disregard of
its own rules, petitioner's personnel negligently handled private respondent's
account to petitioner's detriment.
xxx While it is true that private respondent's having signed a blank
withdrawal slip set in motion the events that resulted in the withdrawal
and encashment of the counterfeit check, the negligence of
petitioner's personnel was the proximate cause of the loss that
petitioner sustained. Proximate cause, which is determined by
a mixed consideration of logic, common sense, policy and
precedent, is "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred." The proximate cause of the withdrawal and eventual
loss of the amount of $2,500.00 on petitioner's part was its
personnel's negligence in allowing such withdrawal in
disregard of its own rules and the clearing requirement in the
banking system. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk of
incurring a loss on account of a forged or counterfeit foreign check and
hence, it should suffer the resulting damage xxx

31
 Wright vs. Manila Electric
G.R. No. L-7760
October 1, 1914

Whether intoxication warrants a prima facie presumption of

negligence:
xxx Mere intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is
but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence
tending to prove negligence. It is the general rule that it is
immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary
care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater
degree of care is required than by a sober one. If one's conduct
is characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is
immaterial whether he is drunk or sober
The conclusion that if he had been sober he would not have been
injured is not warranted by the facts as found. It is impossible to say
that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under
the conditions described xxx

32
 US vs. Baggay
G.R. No. 6659
September 1, 1911

Insane or demented person though not criminally liable is still civilly

liable, particularly liability for damages.
xxx True it is that civil liability accompanies criminal liability,
because every person liable criminally for a crime or
misdemeanor is also liable for reparation of damage and for
indemnification of the harm done, but there may be civil
liability because of acts ordinarily punishable, although
the law has declared their perpetrators exempt from
criminal liability. Such is the case of a lunatic or insane
person who, in spite of his irresponsibility on account of
the deplorable condition of his deranged mind, is still
reasonably and justly liable with his property for the
consequences of his acts, even though they be performed
unwittingly, for the reason that his fellows ought not to
suffer for the disastrous results of his harmful acts more
than is necessary, in spite of his unfortunate condition.
Law and society are under obligation to protect him during his
illness and so when he is declared to be liable with his property
for reparation and indemnification, he is still entitled to the
benefit of what is necessary for his decent maintenance, but
this protection does not exclude liability for damage
caused to those who may have the misfortune to suffer
the consequences of his acts xxx

33
 Marinduque vs. Workmens
G.R. No. L-8110
June 30, 1956

Does the violation of an order of an administrative agency constitute

negligence?
xxx Many courts hold that violation of a statute or ordinance
constitutes negligence per se. Others consider the
circumstances.
However there is practical unanimity in the proposition that
violation of a rule promulgated by a Commission or board
is not negligence per se xxx
Rather, a violation of an order of an administrative agency can
be considered only as rebuttable presumption of negligence. As
oppose to a violation of ordinance or statute enunciation negligence per se.
xxx not notorious negligence, which we have interpreted
to mean the same thing as gross negligence
implying conscious indifference to consequences
pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and
probably result in injury utter disregard of
consequences. Getting or accepting a free ride on the
companys haulage truck couldnt be gross negligence, because
as the referee found, no danger or risk was apparent xxx

34
 Layugan vs. IAC
G.R. No. 73998
November 14, 1988

In the absence of proof of negligence, the petitioner assails the

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur against the driver of the truck.
xxx Any immobile object along the highway, like a parked truck, poses
serious danger to a moving vehicle which has the right to be on the
highway. He argues that since the parked cargo truck in this case was a
threat to life and limb and property, it was incumbent upon the driver
as well as the petitioner, who claims to be a helper of the truck driver,
to exercise extreme care so that the motorist negotiating the road
would be properly forewarned of the peril of a parked vehicle
Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself is rebuttable
presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which
arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in
defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one
which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence. Res
ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged
wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that accident happened
provided character of accident and circumstances attending it lead
reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would not have
occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been
under management and control of alleged wrongdoer xxx
However, the Court held that the doctrine does not apply in this case
since it satisfies the two exceptions of applying the doctrine, to wit:
xxx Hence, it has generally been held that the presumption of
inference arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is
overcome, 1) where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or
presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is
the cause of the injury complained of or where there is direct
evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the
facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly

35
 appear. Finally, once 2) the actual cause of injury is established
beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the
defendant, no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine
becomes inapplicable when the circumstances have been so
completely eludicated that no inference of defendant's liability can
reasonably be made, whatever the source of the evidence, as in this
case xxx

Ramos vs CA
G.R. No. 124354
April 11, 2002

The injury incurred by petitioner Erlinda does not normally happen

absent any negligence in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of
an endotracheal tube. As was noted in the Decision, the instruments used in
the administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were all
under the exclusive control of private respondents Dr. Gutierrez and Dr.
Hosaka.

Applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur:

xxx [with the] reasoning that the injury to the patient therein
was one which does not ordinarily take place in the absence of
negligence in the administration of an anesthetic, and in the
use and employment of an endotracheal tube. The court went on
to say that "[o]rdinarily a person being put under anesthesia is not
rendered decerebrate as a consequence of administering such
anesthesia in the absence of negligence. Upon these facts and under
these circumstances, a layman would be able to say, as a matter of
common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of
professional treatment were not as such as would ordinarily
have followed if due care had been exercised." Considering the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the testimony of Cruz
was properly given credence in the case at bar xxx

36
 Batiquin vs. CA
G.R. No. 118231
July 5, 1996

The requisites for the Doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur are as follows:
xxx which arises upon proof that 1) instrumentality causing
injury was in defendant's exclusive control 2) and that the
accident was one which ordinary does not happen in
absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is [a] rule of evidence
whereby negligence of [the] alleged wrongdoer may be inferred
from [the] mere fact that [the] accident happened provided [the]
character of [the] accident and circumstances attending it lead
reasonably to belief that in [the] absence of negligence it would not
have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have
been under [the] management and control of [the] alleged
wrongdoer . . . . Under [this] doctrine . . . the happening of an
injury permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces
substantial evidence that [the] injury was caused by an agency or
instrumentality under [the] exclusive control and management of
defendant, and that the occurrence [sic] was such that in the
ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had
been used xxx
Lastly, 3) the defendant must not be able to provide any
explanation to exculpate his liability.
It must be emphasized that the doctrine can be invoked when and
only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is
absent and not readily available.

37
 DM Consunji vs. CA
G.R. No. 137873
April 20, 2001

xxx Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where

evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following
requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does
not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under
the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence;
and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured xxx

By proving the doctrine, the presumption of negligence against the

defendant arises.

xxx the defendants negligence is presumed or inferred when

the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the application of res
ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all
the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to explain. The
presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other
evidence and, under appropriate circumstances disputable
presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the
inference. It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to
prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the
defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the
circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been established
xxx

38
 SYLLABUS FOR CAUSATION

What is proximate cause?

xxx that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,

unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.'
And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that
an injury to some person might probably result therefrom xxx
( Bataclan vs. Medina)

What is remote cause?

It is the cause which some independent force merely took

advantage of to accomplish something not natural effect thereof.

xxx a remote cause cannot be considered as the legal cause

of the damage xxx ( Gabeto vs. Araneta)

xxx remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or
give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and
the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such

39
 condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause xxx (Urbano vs. IAC)

What is concurrent cause?

In the case of Africa vs. Caltex, concurrent cause is defined as the

active and substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third
persons innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a substantial factor in
bringing about the harmful so laong as the actors negligent conduct actively
and continuously operate bringing about the harm to another.

xxx Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent

and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would
not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any
of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the
responsible persons xxx

What are three tests in determining proximate cause which is

applicable in the Philippines?

But for test is the cause without which the injury could not have
resulted (Bataclan vs. Medina).

On the other hand, Substantial Factor was explained as, xxx if the
actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the
fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of
the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from
being liable xxx (Philippine Rabbit vs. IAC)

Lastly, cause and condition does not distinguish active nor passive and
static condition as long as it created a risk that has contributed to the
accident or injury.

xxx If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which
made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But
so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary
antecedents which have played an important part in producing the
result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and
passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the
latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before xxx
(Phoenix vs. IAC)

40
What is an efficient intervening cause?

Efficient intervening cause is one that destroys the causal connection

between the negligent act and injury and thereby negates liability.

xxx it is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any

reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to
avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away
[sufficient intervening cause releaving Koh from liability] from where
they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding
such immediate peril would be the natural course to take xxx (McKee
vs. IAC)

Bataclan vs. Medina

GR No. L-10126
October 22, 1957

The question faced before the Court is whether or not the proximate
cause of the accident is the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that
burned the bus, including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to
leave it. In such case, Medina shall be exonerated from responsibility.
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.
We do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the
overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the
vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back,
the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or
unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in
response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but
most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that
because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to
carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural
than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to
extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other
words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected

41
 and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the
trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside
help

Fernando vs. CA
GR No. 92087
May 8, 1992

Petitioners fault the city government of Davao for failing to clean a

septic tank for the period of 19 years resulting in an accumulation of
hydrogen sulfide gas which killed the laborers. They contend that such failure
was compounded by the fact that there was no warning sign of the existing
danger and no efforts exerted by the public respondent to neutralize or
render harmless the effects of the toxic gas. They submit that the public
respondent's gross negligence was the proximate cause of the fatal incident.
To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the
negligence of another, a claimant must establish the relation
between the omission and the damage. He must prove under Article
2179 of the New Civil Code that the defendant's negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury.
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.
In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that an accident such
as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless
one removes its covers. The accident in the case at bar occurred

42
 because the victims on their own and without authority from the public
respondent opened the septic tank. Considering the nature of the task
of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been cleaned
for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of
the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr.
Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know
the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to
take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause
of the accident.
In Culion Ice, Fish and Elect. Co., v. Phil. Motors Corporation
(55 Phil. 129, 133), We held that when a person holds himself out as being
competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for
negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in
the particular work which he attempts to do.

Urbano vs. IAC

GR No. L-72964
January 7, 1988

Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde
who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition
was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in
Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.
The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was
inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not
yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected
with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance
surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2
or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural,
and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a
criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death
must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or

43
between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al.

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action

if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the
condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote
cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was
not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause."

Phoenix vs. CA
GR No. L-65295
March 10, 1987

A dump truck, owned by Phoenix, was parked askew (not parallel to the
street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking
the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early
warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear.
Dionisio, private respondent, claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by
swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the
dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical
injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and
loss of two gold bridge dentures. He now asks for damages alleging that the
proximate cause of suffering the same is the negligent act of the driver.

Petitioner assails that Dionisios act is a sufficient intervening cause,

and that their drivers negligent act is only a passive and static condition.

Sufficient intervening cause vis--vis passive static condition

vis--vis forseeable intervening cause:

44
 It has been agreed upon that indeed Dionisio was also negligent. He
was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been.
Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General
Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that
was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane. But nonetheless, the
proximate cause of his injury is the negligent act of the driver parking his
truck in a skew.

The truck driver whether or not created a passive and static

condition is immaterial. As explained in this case:

xxx Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish

between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions"
upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has created only
a passive static condition which made the damage possible,
the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of
causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which
have played an important part in producing the result it is quite
impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations,
particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of
other active forces which have gone before. The defendant who spills
gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act may be
culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the
gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire
as the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has
created, the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse
of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains
static will not necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in
the highway may still be liable to another who fans into it a month
afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the
decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far
as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the
forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a
position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even
in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and
"condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and
the character of the intervening cause xxx

As the Court ruled, there is no distinction whether a person

provided a static condition only or an active force as long it has created
a risk in which an injury later resulted. The improper parking of the
dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone
driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created
this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible.

45
 Moreover, the negligent act of Dionisio is not just an
ordinary intervening cause but a forseeable intervening cause:

xxx Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause

is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably
to be anticipated or one which the defendant has reason
to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the
defendant may be negligence among other reasons,
because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant
may be negligent only for that reason. Thus one who sets a
fire may be required to foresee that an ordinary, usual and
customary wind arising later wig spread it beyond the
defendant's own property, and therefore to take precautions to
prevent that event. The person who leaves the combustible or
explosive material exposed in a public place may foresee the risk
of fire from some independent source. ... In all of these cases
there is an intervening cause combining with the defendant's
conduct to produce the result and in each case the defendant's
negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that
very risk.

Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the

fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk,
to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed
come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within
the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's
negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that
intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will
not supersede the defendant's responsibility xxx

Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate

and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due
care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages
though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.

46
 Pilipinas Bank VS. CA
GR No. 105410
July 25, 1994

In the case at bench, the proximate cause of the injury is the

negligence of petitioner's employee in erroneously posting the cash
deposit of private respondent in the name of another depositor who
had a similar first name. As held by the trial court:
xxx Applying the test, the bank employee is, on that basis, deemed to
have failed to exercise the degree of care required in the performance of
his duties. As earlier stated, the bank employee posted the cash deposit
in the account of Florencio Amador from his assumption that the name
Florencio appearing on the ledger without, however, going through the
full name, is the same Florencio stated in the deposit slip. He should

47
 have continuously gone beyond mere assumption, which was proven to
be erroneous, and proceeded with clear certainty, considering the
amount involved and the repercussions it would create on the totality of
the person notable of which is the credit standing of the person involved
should a mistake happen. The checks issued by the plaintiff in the course
of his business were dishonored by the bank because the ledger of
Florencio Reyes indicated a balance insufficient to cover the face value
of checks xxx

Quezon City vs. Dacat

GR No. 150304
June 15, 2005

That the negligence of petitioners, who rammed into a pile of

earth/street digging, was the proximate cause of the accident, to quote:

xxx Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of
February 28, 1988 which caused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio
Dacara, Jr. when his car turned turtle was the existence of a pile of earth
from a digging done relative to the base failure at Matahimik
Street nary a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps
which could have served as an adequate warning to motorist especially
during the thick of the night where darkness is pervasive.

48
 "Negligence of a person whether natural or juridical over a
particular set of events is transfixed by the attending
circumstances so that the greater the danger known or
reasonably anticipated, the greater is the degree of care
required to be observed

The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the
responsibility of the city government relative to the
maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control
and supervision over the same. Failure of the defendant to
comply with the statutory provision found in the subject-article
is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City
government liable. Harsh application of the law ensues as a result
thereof but the state assumed the responsibility for the maintenance
and repair of the roads and bridges and neither exception nor
exculpation from liability would deem just and equitable xxx

Gabeto vs. Araneta

GR No. L015674

October 17, 1921

It is therefore evident that the stopping of the rig by Agaton

Araneta in the middle of the street was too remote from the accident
that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause
thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head of the
horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the

49
animal, and the defendant cannot be charged with liability for the accident
resulting from the action of the horse thereafter.

xxx The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of
which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken. Julio
Pagnaya had a natural interest in refuting this fact, as well as in
exculpating himself in other respects; and we are of the opinion that
the several witnesses who testified for the defendant gave a more
credible account of the affair than the witnesses for the plaintiff.
According to the witnesses for the defendant, it was Julio who jerked
the rein, thereby causing the bit it come out of the horse's mouth; and
they say that Julio, after alighting, led the horse over to the curb, and
proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was slipped
entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself free from control, started
to go away as previously stated xxx

Urbano vs. IAC

GR No. L-72964

Januay 7, 1988

50
 The infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening
cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death.
The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

The wound was therefore concluded as a remote cause.

xxx A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an

action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the
condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the independent
cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation
the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause xxx

Far East Shipping vs. CA

51
 GR No. 130068

October 1, 1998

Concurrent causes are considered as proximate cause if:

xxx It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to

render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury.
It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more
efficient causes other than piaintiff's, is the proximate cause of
the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to
produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he
is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the
negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent,
and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no
defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not
have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or
wrongful acts of the other concurrent rortfeasor. Where several
causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an
efficient cause without which the injury would not have
happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the
causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the
responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case,
it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty
owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's
negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not
exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible
for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause
of the injury xxx

If both paties are held liable, they may be regarded as tortfeasors who
are solidary liable.

xxx There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose

liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total
damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts
or omissions of two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination the direct and
proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible
for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted

52
 in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors
and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article
2194 of the Civil Code xxx

Sabido vs. Custodio

GR No. L- 21512
August 31, 1966

Petitioner is being sued for allowing Sabido to hang on the bus

which eventually led to his death when he was side swiped by a 6x6 truck. To
relieve themselves from liability, petitioners impute the blame on the truck
for over speeding.
As the Court decided, both the drivers of the bus and truck are
solidary liable. Their concurrent actions are the proximate cause of the
death of Custodio, as explained:
xxx where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omission of two or more persons, although acting
independently of each other, are, in combination, the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third
person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury,
even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury,
or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the
other tort-feasor xxx

53
 Bataclan vs. Medina
GR No. L-10126
October 22, 1957

But for test as defined in this case, is the cause without which
the damages would not have resulted. In this case the but for test case is
determine as:
xxx we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was
the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when
the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on
its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a
lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only
by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30
in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and
coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and
flashlights were not available; and what was more natural
than that said rescuers should innocently approach the
vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested
from them xxx

54
 Philippine Rabbit vs. IAC
GR No. 66102-04
August 30, 1990

xxx It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another,
the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have
foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it
occurred does not prevent him from being liable xxx

Here, the defendant bus was running at a fast speed when the accident
occurred and did not even make the slightest effort to avoid the accident.
The bus driver's conduct is thus a substantial factor in bringing
about harm to the passengers of the jeepney, not only because he was
driving fast and did not even attempt to avoid the mishap but also because it
was the bus which was the physical force which brought about the injury and
death to the passengers of the jeepney.

55
 Phoenix vs. IAC
GR No. L-65295
March 10, 1987

The Court held that the passive and active condition created by the
truck driver is immaterial. Nonetheless, he will still be made liable. As
explained in this case:

xxx Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish

between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions"
upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has created only
a passive static condition which made the damage possible,
the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of
causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which
have played an important part in producing the result it is quite
impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations,
particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of
other active forces which have gone before. The defendant who spills
gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act may be
culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the
gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire
as the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has
created, the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse
of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains
static will not necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in
the highway may still be liable to another who fans into it a month
afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the
decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far
as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the
forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a
position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even
in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and
"condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and
the character of the intervening cause xxx

As the Court ruled, there is no distinction whether a person

provided a static condition only or an active force as long it
has created a risk in which an injury later resulted. The
improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable

56
 risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street
and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be
held responsible.

Manila Electric Company vs. Remoquillo

GR No. L-8328
May 18, 1956

The stringing of wires of such high voltage (3,600 volts), uninsulated

and so close to houses is a constant source of danger, the same is
considered as a passive static condition capable of bringing risks.
Nonetheless, in this case it is only considered as a remote cause.
xxx A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition
or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and
the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause xxx
Applying the same, the Court held that:
xxx the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the
electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and
negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized
iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward
the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet,
considering the latters length of 6 feet xxx

57
 Rodrigueza vs. Manila Railroad
GR No. 15688
November 19, 1921

The existence of the house of Rodrigueza may have created a

condition making the disaster possible, however, it is not considered as the
proximate cause.

xxx [The proximate cause] was the negligent act of the defendant in
causing this fire. The circumstance that Remigio Rodrigueza's
house was partly on the property of the defendant company
and therefore in dangerous proximity to passing locomotives
was an antecedent condition that may in fact have made the
disaster possible, but that circumstance cannot be imputed to
him as contributory negligence destructive of his right of action,
because, first, that condition was not created by himself; secondly,
because his house remained on this ground by the toleration, and
therefore with the consent of the Railroad Company; and thirdly,
because even supposing the house to be improperly there, this fact
would not justify the defendant in negligently destroying it xxx

58
 McKee vs. IAC
GR No. 68102
July 16, 1992

Efficient intervening cause is one that destroys the causal connection

between the negligent act and injury and thereby negates liability.
In this case:
xxx it is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any
reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid
running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where
they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane.
Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to
take xxx
The negligent act of the driver is deemed to be the sufficient
intervening cause which negated the liability of Koh.
xxx Applying the above definition, although it may be said that
the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the
chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the
eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a
sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the truck
driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of
the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the
collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the
former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its
proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of
the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under the given
circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car
xxx

59
 Manila Electric vs. Remoquillo
GR No. L-8328
May 18, 1956

Indeed there has been a violation of the permit for the construction of
the media agua which should be 3 feet away from the building. However,
the same was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it.
xxx Had said media agua been only one meter wide as allowed by
the permit, Magno standing on it, would instinctively have stayed
closer to or hugged the side of the house in order to keep a safe
margin between the edge of the media agua and the yawning 2-story
distance or height from the ground, and possibly if not probably
avoided the fatal contact between the lower end of the iron sheet and
the wires xxx
Hence, the efficient intervening cause releasing the company
from any negligence and liability is the sole negligent act of Magno.
xxx the death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence
and in some measure by the too close proximity of the media agua or
rather its edge to the electric wire of the company by reason of the violation
of the original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said
illegal construction of the media agua. We fail to see how the Company
could be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence. Although
the city ordinance called for a distance of 3 feet of its wires from any
building, there was actually a distance of 7 feet and 2 3/4 inches of the wires
from the side of the house of Pealoza
[The] act of Magno in turning around and swinging the
galvanized iron sheet with his hands was the proximate and
principal cause of the electrocution, then his heirs may not recover
xxx

60
 Teague vs. Fernandez
GR No. L-29745
June 4, 1973

The question is whether or not the failure to comply with the

ordinance regarding building specification such as the measurements of
stairways is the proximate cause of the death of respondent.

xxx the general principle is that the violation of a statute or

ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the
intervention of the another agency if the occurrence if the accident
in the manner in which it happened was the very thing which the
statute or ordinance was intended to prevent xxx

Hence the proximate cause is the overcrowding at the stairway, the

same problem which the ordinance would like to prevent.

61
 Urbano vs. IAC
GR No. L-72964
Januay 7, 1988

The medical findings lead us to a distinct possibility that the

infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause
later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
Hence, the wound inflicted by Urbano is deemed to be a remote cause
to the death of Javier.
xxx A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an
action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish
the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the
injury was made possible, if there intervened between
such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury,
even though such injury would not have happened but for
such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
instances which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate
cause xxx

62
 SYLLABUS: DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE/ DOCTRINE OF
DISCOVERED PERIL/ DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING NEGLIGENCE
What is the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance?
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty
of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the
last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is
made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the
prior negligence of the plaintiff (Picart vs. Smith).
For example, it has been said that drivers of vehicles who bump the
rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident, unless
contradicted by other evidence. The rationale behind the presumption is that
the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a
position to observe the vehicle in front of him (Raynera vs. Hiceta)
Does the other less negligent party released from any liability
upon assailing the doctrine?
Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last
clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law
concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the
plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines (Phoenix vs. CA)
This means that even if the doctrine of last clear chance indeed exists,
it does not rule in the favor of the defendant alone. The petitioner being
equally negligent must bear a part of his suffering.
What are the exceptions in applying the doctrine?
1) A passenger filing action against a carrier based on contract

63
 does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from
the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be
inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its
owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of
negligence
(Bustamante vs. CA; Anuran vs. Buno)

2) It cannot apply between tortfeasors

Furthermore, "as between defendants: The doctrine cannot be

extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether
only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by reason
of his discovery of the latter's peril, and it cannot be invoked as
between defendants concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a
negligent actor cannot defend by pleading that another had
negligently failed to take action which could have avoided the injury
(Bustamante vs. CA)

3) It does not apply if the defendant was not aware of the existence of the
peril during the event.
it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the
last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the
existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been
aware of it. One cannot be expected to avoid an accident or injury if he
does not know or could not have known the existence of the peril
(Pantranco vs. Baesa)
4) It does not apply if the defendant is required to act instantaneously
during the peril.

The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party
charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury
cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after
the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which
any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have
contributed to the injury (Ong vs. Metropolitan)

5) It does not apply for breach of contractual obligation.

We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case.
Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence in the
performance of its contractual obligation to L.C. Diaz. This is a case of
culpa contractual, where neither the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would

64
 exonerate the defendant from liability (Consolidated Bank vs.
CA)

6) It does not apply in emergency situation (EMRGENCY RULE)

The rationale of this rule is that a person who is confronted with a

sudden emergency might have no time for thought, and he must make a
prompt decision based largely upon impulse or instinct. Thus, he
cannot be held to the same standard of conduct as one who had
an opportunity to reflect, even though it later appears that he
made the wrong decision
An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and
is required to act without much time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was
brought by his own negligence (Engada vs. CA)

65
 PICART vs. SMITH
37 Phil 809
March 15, 1918

Where both parties are negligent, how do we determine who is

at fault? What is the Doctrine of the Last Clear Chance?
In this case, Picart, riding on his pony, met a collision with an
automobile. He then asks for damages for the injuries he suffered. As the
Court explains both parties are negligent. It is therefore incumbent upon the
Court to determine whether Picart, being negligent, would still be adjudged
with damages. To resolve the case, the Court applied the Doctrine of the
Last Clear Chance:
xxx The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff
was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the
defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the
consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior
negligence of the plaintiff xxx
But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and
in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the
negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous,
since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the
negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under
these circumstances the law is that the person who has the
last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so
is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the
prior negligence of the other party xxx

66
 It must be emphasized that in applying this doctrine, the petitioner is
not freed from liability. Since both parties are at fault, the damages awarded
shall be mitigated to compensate for the other partys contributory
negligence. As explained in the cited case, Rakes vs. Atlantic:
xxx It was held that while the defendant was liable to the plaintiff by
reason of its negligence in having failed to keep the track in proper
repair nevertheless the amount of the damages should be
reduced on account of the contributory negligence in the
plaintiff xxx
The Court also introduced the criteria in determining negligence, to wit:
xxx Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the
position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his
foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.
By applying the doctrine it can be said that the act of the defendant is
the proximate cause of the injury while that of the plaintiff is the remote
cause.
xxx It is enough to say that the negligence of the defendant was in
this case the immediate and determining cause of the accident and that
the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff was a more remote factor in
the case xxx

67
 Bustamante vs. CA
GR No. 89880
February 6, 1991

What are the exceptions in applying the Doctrine of the Last

Clear Chance?

The petitioners are parents of deceased passengers asking for

damages resulting to the death of their sons and daughters. This was caused
by the collision of the bus passenger with the truck. The petitioners therefore
prays a collection for damages against the driver and owner of the truck.
The CA using the doctrine of last clear chance absolved the truck
driver imputing that the negligence of the bus driver is the proximate cause
of the injury. Furthermore, the latter has the last clear chance to minimize
the peril but it failed to do so.

xxx the bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the collision
and his reckless negligence in proceeding to overtake the hand tractor
was the proximate cause of the collision." (Rollo, p. 95). Said court also
noted that "the record also discloses that the bus driver was not a
competent and responsible driver. His driver's license was
confiscated for a traffic violation on April 17, 1983 and he was using
a ticket for said traffic violation on the day of the accident in question
(pp. 16-18, TSN, July 23, 1984). He also admitted that he was not a
regular driver of the bus that figured in the mishap and was not given
any practical examination xxx

68
 The Court judged differently assailing that the last clear chance does
not apply in the case at hand. The exceptions of application of the doctrine
was promulgated by the Court in this case:

xxx the principle of "last clear chance" applies "in a suit between the
owners and drivers of colliding vehicles. It 1) does not arise where a
passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce
its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt
the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that
the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence."

Furthermore, "as between defendants: The doctrine cannot be

extended into the field of 2) joint tortfeasors as a test of whether
only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by
reason of his discovery of the latter's peril, and it cannot be
invoked as between 3) defendants concurrently negligent. As
against third persons, a negligent actor cannot defend by pleading that
another had negligently failed to take action which could have avoided
the injury." Xxx

Since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of
the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased
passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles.
Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving the owner and driver of
the cargo truck from liability.

69
 Phoenix vs. IAC
GR No. L-65295
March 10, 1987

Doctrine of last clear chance vis--vis comparative negligence

Lastly, the truck driver assails the doctrine of the last clear chance
that private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the
accident and hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to take that
"last clear chance" must bear his own injuries alone.
xxx The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts
to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent
provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the
casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see
what role, if any, the common law last clear chance
doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law
concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to
recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has
been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines xxx
This means that even if the doctrine of last clear chance indeed
exists, it does not rule in the favor of the defendant alone. The
petitioner being equally negligent must bear a part of his suffering.
ART. 2179 of the Civil Code provides:

70
 When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of
due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
xxx The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his
employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior
negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that
increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril
precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or
omission. To accept this proposition is to come too close to
wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man
must respond for the forseeable consequences of his own
negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to
reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate
them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners'
pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society xxx
The comparative negligence of Dionisio led the court to
mitigate the award of damages, 20-80 ratio to the favor of Dionisio.

71
 Glan vs. IAC
GR No. 70493
May 18, 1989

The case involves a collision between a jeepney and a truck

carrying various hard ware materials owned by the petitioner. It resulted to
the death of some passengers, hence, the family of the deceased herein
private respondents ask for damages. From the investigations of policemen
and testimony of witnesses, the jeepney was found beyond the demarcation
line in the middle of the road, this means he is outside his lane. Furthermore,
the jeepney was in zig zagged manner before the collision.
The Court applying the doctrine of the last clear chance absolved
the petitioner. This case clearly manifest an exemption of the
comparative negligence applicable to two negligent parties.
Allegedly, the truck driver was not negligent because he has prevented the
impending peril against the jeepney driver.
xxx From these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver
of the jeep had what judicial doctrine has appropriately
called the last clear chance to avoid the accident, while
still at that distance of thirty meters from the truck, by
stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the
truck, either of which he had sufficient time to do while running at
a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In those circumstances,

72
 his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance, not merely
rely on a supposed right to expect, as the Appellate Court would
have it, the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path xxx
The Court similarly applied the explanation enshrined in the doctrinal case of
Picart vs. Smith:
xxx It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from
fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on
the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the
defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is
to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will
be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable
interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person
who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and
fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party xxx
According to the Court, the death of the jeepney driver was caused
by his negligent act of not impeding the peril which is within his control to
desist. This case strictly applied the doctrine clearly deviating from latter
jurisprudence applying a comparative negligence between the parties. As the
Court has proven, the truck was already in the full stop. There is
indeed an intervening time between the acts of the parties, hence,
clearly exonerating the truck driver from liability. The intervening
time should have been used by the jeepney driver to save himself.
xxx Compassion for the plight of those whom an accident has robbed
of the love and support of a husband and father is an entirely natural
and understandable sentiment. It should not, however, be allowed to
stand in the way of, much less to influence, a just verdict in a suit at
law xxx

73
 Pantranco vs. Baesa
GR No. 79050-51
November 14, 1989

The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance is not applied in blanket. The

collision of a bus and jeepney in this case has led the Court to re-emphasized
two basic exemptions in the application of the doctrine.
xxx 1) it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly
had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the
existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due care,
have been aware of it. One cannot be expected to avoid an accident
or injury if he does not know or could not have known the existence of
the peril. In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver
David Ico knew of the impending danger. When he saw at a distance
that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not
immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his
right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will
return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney
approaching from the opposite direction xxx
xxx a motorist who is properly proceeding on his own side of the
highway is generally entitled to assume that an approaching vehicle
coming towards him on the wrong side, will return to his proper lane of
traffic. There was nothing to indicate to David Ico that the bus could

74
 not return to its own lane or was prevented from returning to the
proper lane by anything beyond the control of its driver xxx
Moreover, even if the jeepney had known the peril, the Court reiterated
that it would be impossible for anyone to prevent the same.
xxx By the time David Ico must have realized that the bus was not
returning to its own lane, it was already too late to swerve the
jeepney to his right to prevent an accident. The speed at which
the approaching bus was running prevented David Ico from
swerving the jeepney to the right shoulder of the road in time
to avoid the collision. Thus, even assuming that the jeepney driver
perceived the danger a few seconds before the actual collision, he had
no opportunity to avoid it. This Court has held that the last clear
chance doctrine 2) "can never apply where the party charged is
required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be
avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril
is or should have been discovered" xxx
Hence, it is the bus company who should bear the loss. It is his failure
in going back to his own lane upon seeing the jeepney which caused
the injury, thereby making his negligent act as the proximate cause.
Since the case at hand asked for damages arising from quasi
delict, the company alleviated itself from liability assailing the diligence
of a good father in supervision and election of its employees.
The Court ruled in the negative:
xxx When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee,
there instantly arises a presumption that the employer has been
negligent either in the selection of his employees or in the
supervision over their acts. Although this presumption is
only a disputable presumption which could be overcome
by proof of diligence of a good father of a family, this
Court believes that the evidence submitted by the
defendant to show that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the case of Ramirez, as a
company driver is far from sufficient. No support evidence
has been adduced. The professional drivers license of Ramirez
has not been produced. There is no proof that he is between 25
to 38 years old. There is also no proof as to his educational
attainment, his age, his weight and the fact that he is married or
not. Neither are the result of the written test, psychological and
physical test, among other tests, have been submitted in
evidence [sic]. His NBI or police clearances and clearances from

75
 previous employment were not marked in evidence. No evidence
was presented that Ramirez actually and really attended the
seminars xxx

Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. CA

GR No. 97626
March 14, 1997

Private respondent, RMC Company, assails damages against the

Bank for allegedly allowing its deposit to be accounted in the account
another. Allegedly, their company secretary, Yabut, deposited instead
in the account of his husband the earnings of the company. Private
respondent asks for reimbursement of the amount P304,979.74. by
virtue of quasi delict:
There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages
suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must
respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between
the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages
incurred by the plaintiff.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case which may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. (Picart vs. Smith)
Applying the same, the proximate cause of the injury suffered by
the Bank is:

76
 xxx the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was
negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all
the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut,
despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not
completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure
of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips,
original or duplicate xxx
xxx proximate cause [is defined] as "that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. . . ."
PROXIMATE CAUSE: In this case, absent the act of Ms. Mabayad
in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the
deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which
to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity.
Even applying the Doctrine of the Last Clear Chance would still
hold the fact the bank has the last fair chance to avoid the peril:
xxx Here, assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in
entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with
the opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by the
petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank, thru its
teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its
client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation
procedure xxx
However, it cannot be denied that the company is equally
negligent. It was negligent in not checking its monthly statements of
account. Had it done so, the company would have been alerted to the
series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. This
calls for the application of comparative negligence:
Article 2179 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
xxx When the plaintiff's own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory,
the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded xxx
This prompted the Court to divide the damages with the ratio 60-40, in
favor of private respondent.

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 Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District
GR No. L-7664
August 29, 1958

A young boy 14 years of age was found dead in one of the pools of the
respondent. Allegeing negligence in the respondent to assure the safety of
its customer, the parents of the deceased come before the Court praying for
damages arising from quasi delict.
The lower courts however found that the respondent is not remised in
its duty since every precaution or warning is available in the premises. Life
guards and other life saving materials can also be easily availed by
customer. Moreover, the life guard on duty upon knowing the situation
immediately went to the relied of the boy. The respondents relief operations
team earnestly did their best thereafter to save the life of the boy. However,
the boy has been lifeless already prior to the same.
Petitioner now rests to the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance, explaining
that even if Ong was indeed at fault, the respondent has the last fair chance
or opportunity to save the boys life.
The Court ruled in the negative assailing that the doctrine does
not apply in this case.

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 xxx Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming
pool and it being apparent that he went there without any companion
in violation of one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of
the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard responded to the call for help
as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after
retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put
into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no
room for the application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to
impute liability to appellee..
xxx The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the
party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the
injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at
hand after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least
in cases in which any previous negligence of the party charged
cannot be said to have contributed to the injury xxx

Anuran vs. Buno

GR No. L-21353
May 20, 1996

A passenger jeepney was parked on the road to Taal, Batangas. A

motor truck speeding along, negligently bumped it from behind, with such
violence that three of its passengers died, even as two others suffered
injuries that required their confinement. Hence, So, these suits were
instituted by the representatives of the dead and of the injured, to recover
consequently damages against the driver and the owners of the truck and
also against the driver and the owners of the jeepney.
The CA exonerated the owners and drivers of the jeepney using the
Doctrine of the Last Clear Chance:
xxx It explained that although "the driver of the ill-starred vehicle was
not free from fault, for he was guilty of an antecedent negligence in
parking his vehicle with a portion thereof occupying the asphalted
road", it considered the truck driver guilty of greater
negligence which was the efficient cause of the collision; and
applying the doctrine of the "last clear chance" said Court

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 ordered the owners of the truck to pay, solidarily with its
driver xxx
The Court finds the reasoning of the CA erroneous. This case warrants
the exemption of the application of the doctrine.
xxx The principle about the "last clear chance" would call for
application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two
colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver
of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was
likewise guilty of negligence xxx
As the Court further explained, the common carries, by operation of
law, is obliged to observe utmost diligence towards their passengers.
xxx It must be remembered that the obligation of the carrier to
transport its passengers safely is such that the New Civil Code
requires "utmost diligence" from the carriers (Art. 1755) who
are "presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they have observed
extraordinary diligence" (Art. 1756). In this instance, this legal
presumption of negligence is confirmed by the Court of Appeals'
finding that the driver of the jeepney in question was at fault in parking
the vehicle improperly. It must follow that the driver and the owners
of the jeepney must answer for injuries to its passengers xxx
Raynera vs. Hiceta
GR No. 120027
April 21, 1999

Reynaldo Raynera, the deceased, crashed his motorcycle into the left
rear portion of the truck trailer, which was without tail lights. Due to the
collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and truck helper Geraldino D.
Lucelo rushed him to the Paraaque Medical Center. Upon arrival at the
hospital, the attending physician pronounced Reynaldo Raynera dead on
arrival. The family of the deceased now asks for damages.
Imputing the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance, the Court ruled in favor of
the truck driver.
xxx We find that the direct cause of the accident was the
negligence of the victim. Traveling behind the truck, he had
the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of
him. He was in control of the situation. His motorcycle was

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 equipped with headlights to enable him to see what was in front of
him. He was traversing the service road where the prescribed speed
limit was less than that in the highway xxx
NEGLIGENCE: The omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct
of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something, which a prudent
and reasonable man would not do.
PROXIMATE CAUSE: cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.
The doctrine imposts that between two negligent parties, the person
who has the last fair chance or opportunity to prevent the peril but fails to do
so shall suffer the consequences.
xxx It has been said that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear
of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the
accident, unless contradicted by other evidence. The rationale
behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle
has full control of the situation as he is in a position to observe
the vehicle in front of him.
Consequently, no other person was to blame but the victim himself
since he was the one who bumped his motorcycle into the rear of the
Isuzu truck. He had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident xxx

Canlas vs. CA
GR No. 112160
February 28, 2000

Canlas and Private respondent Manosca decided to undertake a

business venture. To pursue the same, Canlas decided to undertake a Special
Power of Attorney in favor of Manosca so that he could mortgage the lands
for a loan. Manosca was able to mortgage the land to Asian Savings Bank
through the use of an impostor who acted as Spouses Canlas. Petitioner
asked for annulment of the deed of real esate mortgage with the prayer of
damages against the negligent act of the respondent Bank.
The Court ruled that respondent Bank should reimburse the petitioner
for being remised in observance of its diligence, particularly in approving a
loan with impostors in the absence of any proof of their identities.

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 Applying the Doctrine of the Last Clear Chance, the Bank has within its
capacity the last fair chance to prevent the fraudulent act.
xxx In essence, the doctrine of last clear chance is to the effect
that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of
one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other,
or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the
one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending
harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences
arising therefrom xxx
xxx Assuming that Osmundo Canlas was negligent in giving Vicente
Maosca the opportunity to perpetrate the fraud, by entrusting to
latter the owner's copy of the transfer certificates of title of subject
parcels of land, it cannot be denied that the bank had the last
clear chance to prevent the fraud, by the simple expedient of
faithfully complying with the requirements for banks to
ascertain the identity of the persons transacting with them xxx
For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking
institutions, whose business is impressed with public interest, respondent
Asian Savings Bank has to bear the loss sued upon.
Moreover, the Court held the REM as void.
xxx Settled is the rule that a contract of mortgage must be constituted
only by the absolute owner on the property mortgaged; a mortgage,
constituted by an impostor is void. Considering that it was
established indubitably that the contract of mortgage sued upon was
entered into and signed by impostors who misrepresented themselves
as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas, the Court is of
the ineluctible conclusion and finding that subject contract of mortgage
is a complete nullity xxx

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 Consolidated Bank vs. CA
GR No. 138569
September 11, 2003

LC Diaz, a client of petitioner bank, made a deposit through his

employee. During the transaction, the employee left the passbook in the
possession of the teller while he when to another bank. When employee
returned, the passbook was nowhere to be found. Allegedly, the teller cannot
remember to whom she gave the same. Consequently, Diaz found out that
the passbook was used by another thereby withdrawing an amount of
P300,000. Private respondent now prays for damages for the alleged
negligence of the Bank.

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 To exonerate itself, Solidbank assails the application of the doctrine of
the last clear chance to which the Court ruled in the negative.
xxx We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the
present case. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to
negligence in the performance of its contractual obligation to
L.C. Diaz. This is a case of culpa contractual, where neither the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear
chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant from
liability. Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the
plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the
plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of
contract xxx
Solidbanks rules on savings account require that the deposit book
should be carefully guarded by the depositor and kept under lock and key, if
possible. When the passbook is in the possession of Solidbanks tellers during
withdrawals, the law imposes on Solidbank and its tellers an even higher
degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook.
Likewise, Solidbanks tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in
insuring that they return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized
representative. The tellers know, or should know, that the rules on
savings account provide that any person in possession of the
passbook is presumptively its owner. If the tellers give the passbook
to the wrong person, they would be clothing that person
presumptive ownership of the passbook, facilitating unauthorized
withdrawals by that person. For failing to return the passbook to
Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz, Solidbank and
Teller No. 6 presumptively failed to observe such high degree of
diligence in safeguarding the passbook, and in insuring its return to
the party authorized to receive the same.
xxx In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of
contract, there is a presumption that the defendant was at
fault or negligent. The burden is on the defendant to prove
that he was not at fault or negligent. In contrast, in culpa
aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant was
negligent. In the present case, L.C. Diaz has established that Solidbank
breached its contractual obligation to return the passbook only to the
authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. There is thus a presumption that
Solidbank was at fault and its teller was negligent in not returning the
passbook to Calapre. The burden was on Solidbank to prove that there
was no negligence on its part or its employees xxx

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 The Court accepts that Diaz is also negligent. In this case, L.C. Diaz
was guilty of contributory negligence in allowing a withdrawal slip signed by
its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an impostor. Thus, the
liability of Solidbank should be reduced.
In Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals, where the Court
held the depositor guilty of contributory negligence, it allocated the
damages between the depositor and the bank on a 40-60 ratio. The
Court applies this ratio in this case.

Engada vs. CA
GR No. 140698
June 20, 2003

The petitioner, driver of a pick up made a head on collision with Iran,

the driver of a Tamarraw FX. Allegedly, the pick ups right signal light flashed,
at the same time, it swerved to its left, encroaching upon the lane of the
Tamaraw and headed towards a head-on collision course with it. Iran swerved
to his left but the pick-up also swerved to its right. Thus, the pick-up collided
with the Tamaraw, hitting the latter at its right front passenger side. The
impact caused the head and chassis of the Tamaraw to separate from its
body. The passenger therein also suffered injuries.

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 In his defense, petitioner avers that although his act of occupying the
Tamaraws lane was the initial act in the chain of events, Irans swerving to
the left after petitioner flashed his right turn signal, constituted a sufficient
intervening event, which proximately caused the eventual injuries and
damages to private complainant.

The Court introduced the emergency rule in defending the act of Iran.

xxx The rationale of this rule is that a person who is confronted

with a sudden emergency might have no time for thought, and
he must make a prompt decision based largely upon impulse or
instinct. Thus, he cannot be held to the same standard of conduct as
one who had an opportunity to reflect, even though it later appears
that he made the wrong decision xxx

xxx An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of

danger and is required to act without much time to consider
the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better
solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence
xxx

Hence, the existence of this emergency rule barred the application of

the doctrine of the last clear chance.

xxx Instead, what has been shown is the presence of an emergency

and the proper application of the emergency rule. Petitioners act of
swerving to the Tamaraws lane at a distance of 30 meters from
it and driving the Isuzu pick-up at a fast speed as it
approached the Tamaraw, denied Iran time and opportunity to
ponder the situation at all. There was no clear chance to speak
of xxxx

Moreover, the law requires diligence to be observed by vehicles who

overtakes or drives outside their lane.

It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the
purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty
to see to it that the road is clear and he should not proceed if he
cannot do so in safety (The Land Transportation and Traffic Code).

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