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Francisco vs House of Representatives

[415 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 160261; 10 Nov 2003]

Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief
Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy poised in front of the
Court was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second
complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law.
Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution and whether there solution thereof is a political question
has resulted in a political crisis.
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5,
section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.


[267 SCRA 408; G.R. No. 122156; 3 Feb 1997]

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation No. 50dated 8 December 1986,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a close
bidding held on 18September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its
hotel operator, which bidfor the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning

bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts,
matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has

disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of
the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with
Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and
mandamus. In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art.
XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has
been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become
ahistorical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage
and culture
It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in
the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and
capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents
and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.
Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries
with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by
respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the
hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry
is unquestionably a part of the national economy.
Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative
of the Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore
null and void.
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any
commodity to be sold to thehighest bidder solely for the sake of
privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a
significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century
Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple meaning of
the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this
Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the
duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to
respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus
ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner
MANILAPRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of
the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and
thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other
acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.


[46 Phil 126; G.R. No. L-22008; 3 Nov 1924]


Macaria Fajardo was an employee of La Flor de la Isabela, a Tobacco

factory. She was granted a vacation leave, by reason of her pregnancy,
which commenced on the 16th of July 1923. According to Fajardo, during
that time, she was not given the salary due her in violation of the
provisions of Act No. 3071. Fajardo filed a criminal complaint based on
Section 13 and 15 of said Act against the manager of the tobacco Factory,
Julio Pomar, herein defendant. The latter, on the other hand, claims that
the facts in the complaint did not constitute an offense and further alleges
that the aforementioned provisions of Act No. 3071 was unconstitutional.
Section 13, Act No. 3071 provides that, Every person, firm or corporation
owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any description
shall be obliged to grant to any woman employed by it as laborer who may
be pregnant, thirty days vacation with pay before and another thirty days
after confinement: Provided, That the employer shall not discharge such
laborer without just cause, under the penalty of being required to pay to
her wages equivalent to the total of two months counting from the day of
her discharge. Section 15 of the same Act provides for the penalty of any
violation of section 13. The latter was enacted by the legislature in the
exercise of its supposed Police Power with the purpose of safeguarding
the health of pregnant women laborers in "factory, shop or place of labor of
any description," and of insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable
support for one month before and one month after their delivery. The trial
court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, sentencing the defendant to
pay the fine of fifty pesos and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment. Hence, the case was raised to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the former decision.


Whether or not Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional.

Whether or not the promulgation of the questioned provision was a valid

exercise of Police Power.


The Supreme Court declared Section 13 of Act No. 3071 to be

unconstitutional for being violative or restrictive of the right of the people to
freely enter into contracts for their affairs. It has been decided several
times, that the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of
the individual, protected by the "due process of law" clause of the
constitution. The contracting parties may establish any agreements, terms,
and conditions they may deem advisable, provided they are not contrary to
law, morals or public policy

The police power of the state is a very broad and expanding power. The
police power may encompass every law for the restraint and punishment of
crimes, for the preservation of the public peace, health, and morals. But
that power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor
transcend or violate the express inhibition of the constitution. The Police
Power is subject to and is controlled by the paramount authority of the
constitution of the state, and will not be permitted to violate rights secured
or guaranteed by the latter.


[G.R. No. 174153; 25 Oct 2006]


Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an

initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with
the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition
under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of
6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution.
Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of
Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes
will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to
unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of
enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs.
Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative


Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the
Constitution through a peoples initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA
6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions
to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in

denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition.


According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic
requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the
COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Direct Proposal by the PeopleThe petitioners failed to show
the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the
signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and
misleading which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing

Revision through Initiatives The framers of the constitution intended a clear
distinction between amendment and revision, it is intended that the third
mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only
amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the
executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary