BERNARD GERT

WITTGENSTEIN'S PRIVATE LANGUAGE

ARGUMENTS

In this paper I shall present an interpretation of Wittgenstein's attack

on private language. By interpreting this attack as containing two
arguments, one proving that a private language is impossible, the
other that it bears no relationship to our ordinary language, I hope to
show both the strength of the attack and its philosophical and lin-
guistic significance. On my interpretation the first argument, which is
the most important, makes no use of the verification principle or of the
need for verification, confirmation or justification. Nor does it involve
any questioning of memory. Finally, it does not even require that
language be a social phenomenon. The second argument does involve
justification, in fact, it is primarily about justification. The failure to
distinguish the second argument from the first is one of the reasons for
thinking that justification plays the major role in Wittgenstein's
argument against the possibility of a private language. 1
My interpretation conforms quite closely to the text and, at least to
me, makes sense of some remarks that formerly made no sense.
However, it also involves pointing out some places where Witt-
genstein expressed himself poorly and indeed, some places where he
must be regarded as mistaken. I see nothing troubling about this. It
would be truly incredible if someone who did the pioneering work in
philosophy that Wittgenstein did were not occasionally mistaken.
However, if one prefers to believe that Part One of the Investigations,
though admittedly obscure at times, contains no mistakes, he may
regard this paper as presenting two arguments concerning private
language that were inspired by Wittgenstein's remarks. Whether or
not these arguments are the ones that Wittgenstein intended, though
important, is not the most important matter. The primary point is that
the arguments be correct and philosophically significant.
Wittgenstein's first account of a private language comes in
paragraph 243.

A human being can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame and punish
himself; he can ask himselfa question and answer it. So we could imagine human beings

Synthese 68 (1986) 409-439.

(~) 1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company
410 BERNARD GERT

who spoke only in monologue; who accompanied their activities by talking to them-
selves. An explorer who watched them and listened to their talk might succeed in
translating their language into ours. (This would enable him to predict these people's
actions correctly, for he also hears them making resolutions and decisions.)
But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give
vocal expression to his inner experiences - his feelings, moods, and the rest - for his
private use? - Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language? - But that is not what I
mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to
the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot
understand the language.2

This paragraph makes clear that Wittgenstein does not mean by a

private language merely:

(a) something which only one person speaks, or

(b) s o m e t h i n g w h i c h is u s e d , in a n o r d i n a r y sense, to d e s c r i b e
o n e ' s i n n e r life, f e e l i n g s , m o o d s , etc., o r
(c) a c o m b i n a t i o n of (a) a n d (b), a l a n g u a g e a b o u t o n e ' s i n n e r
life s p o k e n b y o n l y o n e p e r s o n .

A n e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a p r i v a t e l a n g u a g e is t h a t " T h e
i n d i v i d u a l w o r d s of this l a n g u a g e a r e to r e f e r to w h a t c a n o n l y b e
k n o w n to t h e p e r s o n s p e a k i n g ; t o his i m m e d i a t e p r i v a t e s e n s a t i o n s . "
W o r d s w h i c h r e f e r to t h i n g s w h i c h c a n b e k n o w n to s o m e o n e o t h e r
t h a n t h e s p e a k e r , e.g., " d o g " a n d " t r e e , " c a n n o t b e p a r t of w h a t
W i t t g e n s t e i n m e a n s b y a p r i v a t e l a n g u a g e . B u t s i m p l y to s a y t h a t in a
p r i v a t e l a n g u a g e w o r d s r e f e r o n l y t o p r i v a t e s e n s a t i o n s , is m i s l e a d i n g .
T h e w o r d " r e f e r " is t h e i m p o r t a n t w o r d (see 244). A p r i v a t e l a n g u a g e
is n o t o n e in w h i c h w o r d s r e f e r to s e n s a t i o n s in a n y o r d i n a r y f a s h i o n .
T h i s p o i n t is m a d e q u i t e c l e a r l y in p a r a g r a p h 2 5 6 :

Now, what about the language which describes my inner experiences and which only I
myself can understand? How do I use words to stand for my sensations? - As we
ordinarily do? Then are my words for sensations tied up with my natural expressions of
sensation? In that case, my language is not a 'private' one. Someone else might
understand it as well as L - But suppose I didn't have my natural expression of
sensation, but only had the sensation? And now I simply associate names with sensations
and use these names in descriptions.
F r o m W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s r e m a r k t h a t if " . . . m y w o r d s for s e n s a t i o n s a r e
t i e d u p w i t h m y n a t u r a l e x p r e s s i o n s of s e n s a t i o n . . , m y l a n g u a g e is n o t
a ' p r i v a t e ' o n e , " it is v e r y t e m p t i n g to c o n c l u d e t h a t h e h o l d s t h a t all
s e n s a t i o n s h a v e n a t u r a l e x p r e s s i o n s . S u c h a t e m p t a t i o n is to b e
a v o i d e d , for h e t a l k s in p a r a g r a p h s 272f. a b o u t t h e s e n s a t i o n of r e d ,
 WITTGENSTEIN'S PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS 411

and it is doubtful that he held this sensation to have a natural

expression. 3 He does hold that talk about sensations depends on
something public, e.g., e~i~ther notural expressions or colored objects
(see 580). We understand what others mean when they talk of their
sensations, because: the meanings of ordinary sensation terms are
explained by referring to things which can be observed by more than
one person.
In a private language the meaning of the words cannot be explained
by referring to things which have any connection to anything which
can be known by anyone other than the speaker. What is necessary to
explain the meaning of these words ~a~not be known by anyone other
than the speaker. This is why no one else can understand a private
language. The claim that no one other than the speaker can under-
stand the language must be understood in the strongest sense. Not
only must no one else be able to come to understand it by observation,
it must not even be possible for the ~p~eaker to explain to anyone what
he means by the words in his private !~alaguage. But this is a con-
sequence of its being a private language, it is not the way in which a
private language should be defined, 4 For Wittgenstein a private lan-
guage is what occurs when we " . . . simply associate names with
sensations" ignoring all connection between the sensations and any-
thing publicly observable. His argument against the possibility of a
private language is an argument against the possibility of constructing
a language in this way.
This procedure raises two separate questions, First, is it possible to
construct a language in the way that Wittgenst~in suggests? Second,
even if it is not, is it possible to construct a language which has the
same initial consequences as a private language, i.e., unintelligibility
to everyone but the speaker in some other way? Critics of Witt-
genstein's argument against private language do not consider the first
question at all. Defining a private language in terms of its initial
consequences, they pay almost no attention tO the way in which a
language which can be understood only by th speaker can be con-
structed. 5 Wittgenstein, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with
showing the consequences of trying to construct a language in a
certain way. Thus, there has been a sing`n!0r lack of communication
between those who attack Wittgenstein's arguments concerning
private language and those who defend hin~. in order to further
communication I shall try to show why Wittgenstein thought that a
412 BERNARD GERT

private language defined in this way was the only one which has the
consequence that no one other than the speaker can possibly under-
stand it, while making it plausible that the speaker does in fact
understand it.
If we are to have a language which is understandable only by the
speaker, one which he cannot even explain to others, the meanings of
the words in this language must be understandable only to someone
who knows something that can be known only by the speaker. What, if
anything, is there that can be known by only one person? A common
philosophical answer is, one's immediate private sensations. 6 Witt-
genstein, of course, disagrees with this (see 246). But in order to allow
the hypothesis of a private language to be formulated he grants that
one can have sensations which are neither directly nor indirectly
connected with anything public (see 256, 257). Of such sensations
(one of the points of the private language arguments is to show that
there can be no such sensations) Wittgenstein admits one can have
incommunicable knowledge.
The hypothesis of a private language requires more than the pos-
sibility of sensations which can be known only by the speaker. It also
requires that knowing the meaning of the words referring to these
sensations depends solely upon knowing the speaker's sensations.
(These two premises are more closely linked than they seem. See note
21.) But if understanding the words of a private language depends
upon knowing the immediate private sensations of the speaker, there
must be an intimate relationship between the meanings of these words
and the speaker's sensations. What is the nature of this relationship?
The simplest answer is, it is one of identity; the meanings of the words
in a private language are the speaker's immediate private sensations.
This is not only the simplest answer, it is the answer that Witt-
genstein presents the defender of private language as holding.
However, as a variation, he need not maintain that the sensation is the
meaning, but only that knowing the sensation associated with the word
is both necessary and sufficient for knowing the meaning of the word.
Since Wittgenstein presents the defender of private language as hold-
ing that knowing the sensation is both a necessary and sufficient
condition for understanding the meaning of the word, his defender of
private language must either give the simplest answer or its variation
(see 264). When talking about the variation I shall say that the
meaning is determined by the sensation. It is unimportant for my
 WITTGENSTEIN'S PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS 413

arguments whether one uses the original formulation or the variation.

Each word in the private language is associated with a particular
sensation which is the word's meaning. On this view, to give a word a
private meaning, I need only associate it with some sensation. I can
even create a public language by simply associating words with some
public object. The only difference between public language and a
private one, on this account, is that the words in a private language
are associated with private objects, words in a public language with
public objects. This supposedly explains why no one else can under-
stand my private language for I cannot get them to know my im-
mediate private sensations. I can, however, explain my public lan-
guage; this is done simply by getting others to know what things I
have associated with my words. 7
In the very first paragraph of the Investigations, Wittgenstein
presents a statement of this view of language " . . . the individual words
in language name objects - sentences are combinations of such
names." He then continues: "In this picture of language we find the
roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. The meaning
is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands."
We need only substitute "sensation" for "object" in the last sentence
of the quotation, and we have the view of meaning that allows words
to have private meaning, i.e., that makes one think that a private
language is possible.
The view that the meaning of a word is its referent, its variation,
viz: the meaning of a word is determined by its referent, and con-
sequences, e.g., a referentless word is meaningless, provide Witt-
genstein with most of the positions that he attacks in the In-
vestigations. In its place he suggests the following: the meaning of a
word is its use in the language, with variations, e.g., the meaning of a
word is determined by its use in the language, and consequences, e.g.,
a useless word is meaningless. 8 According to the first view, which I
shall call the "bearer theory of meaning" (see 40), one gives a word a
meaning simply by giving it a referent, i.e., simply by pointing at or
concentrating on something and uttering a sound (see 38). According
to Wittgenstein one can give a word meaning only by giving it a use in
the language. 9 According to the bearer theory, one can teach some-
one the meaning of a word simply by pointing to an object and
uttering a sound; according to Wittgenstein one can teach the mean-
ing of a word only by teaching the use of the word. In a private
414 BERNARD GERT

language, the object supposedly referred to, i.e., the immediate

private sensation, is considered apart from its connection with any-
thing that can be publicly observed. Thus no use can even be
imagined for the sound uttered when concentrating on this sensation.
This allows Wittgenstein to contrast his theory of meaning with the
bearer theory in the most decisive way.
If a person already speaks a language, then it may be possible to
teach him the meaning of a new word simply by pointing and uttering
a sound (see 32). But this is possible only because '~... the overall role
of the word in the language is clear" (30).
To distinguish those cases in which pointing and uttering may be
sufficient to give a word meaning (or to teach it) from those cases in
which it is not, Wittgenstein contrasts ostensive definition with osten-
sive teaching.
In both, part of what is done " . . . will consist in the teacher's
pointing to the objects, directing the child's attention to them, and at
the same time uttering a word; for instance, the word 'slab', as he
points to that shape" (6). If the child knows enough of the language to
" . . . ask what the name is," then the pointing and uttering may be all
that is needed to enable him to use the word. When the pointing and
uttering is done in these circumstances, i.e., when it is done for
someone who knows how to use similar words, then it is called
ostensive definition. Obviously, ostensive definition cannot be the
basis of language for it presupposes knowledge of the use of similar
words. This is true whether one is giving an ostensive definition to
someone else or to oneself.
In contrast to ostensive definition, ostensive teaching occurs when
the. person being taught does not know how to use that kind of word,
or does not know how to use words at all. According to Wittgenstein,
pointing and uttering, when it is ostensive teaching, must include
other training if it is to enable the person to understand the word
being taught. Wittgenstein says, "Doubtless the ostensive teaching
helped to bring this about; but only together with a particular training.
With different training, the same ostensive teaching of these words
would have effected a quite different understanding" (6).
Though Wittgenstein generally uses the terms "ostensive definition"
and "ostensive teaching" to refer to the pointing and uttering, he is
clear that pointing and uttering, by itself, is neither. This is the point
 WITTGENSTEIN'S PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS 415

of the final section of paragraph 6. "I set the brake up, by connecting
rod and lever; - Yes, given the whole of the rest of the mechanism.
Only in conjunction with that is it a brake lever, and separated from
its support it is not even a lever; it may be anything, or nothing."
Nonetheless pointing and uttering constitute a prominent part of both
ostensive definition and ostensive teaching; such a prominent part that
one is apt to forget that anything else is necessary. If one forgets that
ostensive definition presupposes knowledge of the language and
ostensive teaching requires additional training, one will think that
pointing and uttering, all by itself, is enough to give a sound a referent
and thus make it a word.
T h e following example clearly shows that simply pointing and
uttering are not sufficient to teach a word or to give it a referent.
Suppose we point to a table and say "table" and as a result a child
says "table" when pointing to tables, but makes no other use of the
word, nor responds to other people's use in a normal fashion. It is very
doubtful that we would hold that he understood the word "table."
Suppose that after he had pointed to a table and said "table" he
looked at you expectantly and fussed until you pointed to the table and
said "table." Suppose further he became annoyed if anyone u s e d the
word "table" when there was no table present, or when there was, but
the person using the word did not point to it while saying "table". We
would then be quite sure he did not understand the word "table." H e
undoubtedly thought that the word was part of a game or ritual in
which the uttering of a certain sound was to be accompanied by
pointing to certain kinds of objects. It would be completely wrong to
say that for him the word "table" referred to tables. It would be true
that he h a d made some association between the word "table" and
tables, but the association was not one of referring. 1
In our language, we generally use the same word, e.g., " t a b l e " when
we describe tables, ask questions about them, or issue orders about
them. Which of these uses, if any, makes us say that the word "table"
refers to tables is not considered, but suppose that we only used the
word "table" when describing a table within one's sight, e.g., " T h a t
table over there is very large." T h e word used when asking about
(what we now call) a table was "elbat." And when issuing orders
involving tables, the word "batel" was always used. In this situation it
is not clear if any or all of the three words should be said to refer t o
416 BERNARD GERT

tables. Most likely, we would say that they were three forms of the
same word. It is because a word is used in many different ways that it
is said to refer. 11
That an association between a word and a thing is not enough to
make that word refer is clear from the word "ouch." There is an
association between this word and pain, yet "ouch" does not refer to
pain. It is quite possible that one might concentrate on a pain and
utter "ouch," but this would certainly not make the word "ouch" refer
to pain. What makes us say that the word "pain" refers to pain, is the
many uses that the word "pain" has. We did not learn how to use the
word "pain" simply by concentrating on our sensations. How could
concentration on a sensation possibly tell one how a certain sound is to
be used? Thus, concentrating on a pain, I could utter a sound I later
use in a manner similar to the way we use the word "pain," the word
"ouch," the word "help" the word "damn," etc. It should be clear that
which use I make of the word will not be determined by the sensation
on which I concentrated at the time I first uttered the sound. Nor will
future concentration and uttering change things.
In paragraph 257, immediately prior to his discussion of "S",
Wittgenstein tells us what it would be like for "pain" to be a word in a
private language. He asks "What would it be like if human beings
showed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)?" That
is, what would happen if there were no connection between the
sensation of pain and anything that could possibly be known by
anyone other than the person having the sensation. His answer is,
"Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word
'tooth-ache.'"
Now comes the hypothesis of the possibility of a private language,
the creating of a language simply by associating a sound with a
sensation. "Well, let's assume the child is a genius and itself invents a
name for the sensation!" Remember that he is inventing this name in
the absence of any outward signs of pain. (Also, and this is not
accidental, no obvious outward cause of pain.) Thus he must simply be
associating a sound with his sensation making no use of any con-
nection with anything publicly observable. Wittgenstein then draws
the consequence "But then, of course, he couldn't make himself
understood when he used the word."
In the rest of the paragraph, Wittgenstein begins to fashion the
argument that has geen the subject of many articles on private
 WITTGENSTEIN'S PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS 417

language. He begins to question the possibility of a private language;

one in which sounds get meaning simply by being associated with
private sensations.
Unfortunately, the first question, "So does he understand the name,
without being able to explain its meaning to anyone?" is misleading. It
seems to make the inability to make himself understood, to explain the
meaning of the name, crucial. But though the inability to explain the
meaning of the word to anyone else does throw some doubt on his
understanding the word himself, it is not the crucial consideration. To
take it as such would be taking the fact that no one else can
understand the language as essential, rather than consequential. What
is important is why he cannot make himself understood.
The next two questions show that the attack on private language is
best viewed as an attack on the view that concentrating on a sensation
and uttering a sound is sufficient to make that sound a word. "But
what does it mean to say that he had 'named his pain?' - How has he
done this naming of pain?" These are the crucial questions. These are
the questions that Wittgenstein presses home in the rest of the
paragraph. The central discussion concerns the possibility of creating
a name for the sensation. This is shown by the rest of the paragraph
where Wittgenstein points out the weakness of the view that one can
simply 'name one's pain.'

W h e n o n e says ' H e g a v e a n a m e to his sensation' one forgets that a great deal of

stage-setting in the l a n g u a g e is presupposed if the m e r e act of n a m i n g is to m a k e sense.
A n d w h e n we speak of s o m e o n e ' s having given a n a m e to pain, what is presupposed is
the existence of the g r a m m a r of the word 'pain;' it shows the post w h e r e the new word is
stationedL

In the next paragraph, Wittgenstein begins the discussion of "S",

which has been the focal point of arguments concerning private
language. His argument against private language is most profitably
viewed as an argument against private ostensive definition, not as an
argument against the possibility of language understood by only one
person (see 380). That is, Wittgenstein's argument should not be
interpreted as the following: from the assumption that there is a
language that cannot be understood by anyone other than the speaker
it follows that it is impossible for the speaker himself to understand the
language. 12 This interpretation l~eads to the view that verifiability and
memory are important in the argument. It should be interpreted as the
418 BERNARD GERT

following: simply concentrating on a sensation and making a mark or

uttering a sound is not sufficient to make that mark or sound refer to
(stand for, be a sign of) that sensation. This interpretation shows that
the attack on private language is simply part of Wittgenstein's general
attack on the bearer theory of meaning. T h a t the latter is the
argument Wittgenstein uses in discuss!ng the case of " S " is clear from
the opening sentences of paragraph 258.

Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a
certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign "S" and write this sign in a
calendar for every day on which I have the sensation.

If Wittgenstein is taken as denying the possibility of my keeping a

r e c o r d of a sensation for which I already have a concept, e.g., a
toothache, or the sensation one gets when one's leg falls asleep (what
it often called "pins and needles"), by writing " S " in my diary he is
obviously mistaken. But he does not want us to imagine a case of this
kind. This is clear from his very next statement. " I will remark first of
all that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated." If Wittgenstein
were describing either of the cases I have mentioned, he would be
clearly mistaken. " S " would mean " t o o t h a c h e " or "the sensation of
pins and needles." But why should Wittgenstein deny that I can record
these sensations by writing " S " in my diary? For as he pointed out in
paragraph 243, a private language is not merely one in which a person
records his inner experiences for his private use. But this is all that the
imaginary cases that I have mentioned would be; hence it would be
pointless to deny their possibility. (See 204 for a parallel point.)
It should be clear that Wittgenstein intends us to imagine someone
who attempts to create a new sensation word simply by associating
" S " with a sensation. W h e n he remarks that " . . . a definition of the
sign cannot be formulated," he is noting that the man has cut himself
off from the possibility of communicating with others. T h e person
accepts his inability to communicate with others and remarks " B u t still
I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition."
Wittgenstein points out that one cannot point to the sensation in the
ordinary sense. T h e reply " B u t I speak, or write the sign down, and at
the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation - and so as
it were, point t o it inwardly" is the clearest statement of how one
thinks a private language can be created. According to this view a
word can be created at least for my own use, simply by the procedure
 WITTGENSTEIN'S PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS 419

described above. Wittgenstein denies this and asks, " B u t what is this
c e r e m o n y for? for that is all it seems to be! A definition surely serves
to establish the meaning of a sign." Thus he denies that the c e r e m o n y
described by the upholder of private language establishes the meaning
of the sign. This is not accepted by the proponent of private language
who says, "Well, that is done precisely by the concentrating of my
attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connexion between
the sign and the sensation."
We have here the crux of the issue; is the kind of procedure
described sufficient to establish the desired connection between the
sign and the sensation? Wittgenstein says no; " B u t 'I impress it on
myself' can only mean: this process brings it about that I r e m e m b e r
the connexion right in the future. But in the present case I have no
criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to
seem right to me is right. A n d that only means that here we can't talk
about 'right.'" Wittgenstein's point is that, by itself, the private
c e r e m o n y accomplishes nothing. After I have concentrated on my
sensation and uttered the sound, nothing follows about how I should
use the sound in the future: hence, there is no right or wrong use of
the sound just as there is no legal or illegal action prior to the setting
up of a legal code.
T h e sentence " B u t in the present case I have no criterion of
correctness" is misleading. It suggests that though there is a right and
wrong use, I have no way of checking and hence " . . . whatever is
going to seem right to me is right." This leads some people to think
that a private language is impossible because there can be no in-
dependent check on my memory. 13 But Wittgenstein's point goes
deeper than that; it is not that " I have no criteria of correctness," but
that "There are no criteria of correctness." T h e private c e r e m o n y
does not even provide a hint about how to use the sound in the future.
This is the reason that " W h a t e v e r is going to seem right to me is
right"; not because I have no check on my memory, but because there
is nothing to r e m e m b e r that will tell me how the sound is to be used.
T h a t the private c e r e m o n y does not create rules for the use of the
word is also the point of paragraphs 259 and 260. In paragraph 259,
Wittgenstein asks, " A r e the rules of the private language impressions
of rules?" This question is not meant to show that one has no check on
whether he remembers the rules for the use of " S " . It is not about
m e m o r y at all. It points out that the private c e r e m o n y provides no
420 BERNARD GERT

rules for the use of " S " , we only h a v e the mistaken impression that it
has. Wittgenstein's reply, " T h e balance on which impressions are
weighed is not the impression of a b a l a n c e " emphasizes the distinction
between actually having rules, and only thinking one has them.
This same point is m a d e by the initial dialogue in the next
paragraph, 260; " ' W e l l I believe that this is the sensation S again.' -
Perhaps you believe that you believe it!" T h e upholder of private
language thinks that his private c e r e m o n y has at least determined that
" S " refers to a sensation. A l t h o u g h he admits that he might be wrong
in believing this is the same sensation " S " referred to before, he
believes that he is at least entitled to say that he believes he is right.
Wittgenstein denies this. This is the point of his remark, " P e r h a p s you
believe that you believe it!" H e is pointing out that you cannot e v e n
believe that this is S, i.e., what is referred to by " S " because " S " was
n e v e r given a use and so nothing counts as S. Y o u can at the most
believe that there is something to believe a b o u t S, though, of course,
this belief would be false.
O n Wittgenstein's description of the private ceremony, the speaker
does no m o r e than c o n c e n t r a t e on his sensation and utter a sound, he
does not m a k e any use of this sound. Since " S " has no use, the
question arises. " T h e n did the m a n who m a d e the entry in the
calendar m a k e a note of nothing whatever?" (260). T o this question,
Wittgenstein does not reply that the m a n m a d e a note, though not a
note of a sensation; but rather that he did not m a k e a note at all. H e
says, " D o n ' t consider it a matter of course that a person is making a
note of something w h e n he m a k e s a mark, - say in a calendar. For a
note has a function, and this ' S ' so far has none."
W i t t g e n s t e i n is not denying that the m a n has a sensation; he is not
c o n c e r n e d with this m a n ' s internal state (cf. 383). H e is denying that
writing " S " on the calendar is sufficient to m a k e it a note of anything,
e v e n if the person has a sensation w h e n he writes " S " . This is the
point of the parenthetical r e m a r k , " O n e can talk to oneself. - If a
p e r s o n talks w h e n no one else is present, does that m e a n that he is
talking to himself?" Just as talking to oneself is not merely uttering
sounds when no one else is present, so a sign of a sensation is not
m e r e l y a sound uttered or a m a r k written w h e n one is concentrating
on a sensation (see 344).
But the defender of private language can maintain that his private
c e r e m o n y does not include merely concentrating on a sensation and
 WITTGENSTEIN'S PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS 421

uttering a sound, but also includes undertaking to use the sound in

such and such a way. Wittgenstein then asks "And how do you
undertake that? Is it to be assumed that you invent the technique of
using the word: or that you found it ready made?" (262). This point is
elaborated in paragraph 263:

" B u t I can (inwardly) undertake to call T H I S 'pain' in the future." "But is it certain that
you have undertaken it? Are you sure that it was e n o u g h for this purpose to concentrate
your attention on your feeling?" - A queer question. -

We can see from these paragraphs that Wittgenstein presents the

defender of private language as unconcerned with the use of words.
For him, simply concentrating on the sensation while uttering the
sound counts as undertaking to use the sound in a certain way, i.e., to
refer to his sensation. He rejects the suggestion that he needs either to
"invent the technique of using the word: or that (he) found it ready-
made." That is, he thinks that concentrating (pointing) and uttering by
itself, is sufficient to give a sound a referent and thus make it a word
(see 38). He has forgotten that pointing and uttering counts as an
ostensive definition only when it presupposes knowledge of the lan-
guage, and that it counts as ostensive teaching only when accom-
panied by other training. For the defender of private language, simply
concentrating on this sensation while uttering a sound counts as
undertaking to use the sound in a certain way. (See 197 for similar
points about intending.)
It is the view that simply associating the sound and the sensation is
sufficient to make the sound a word that Wittgenstein ridicules with his
statement: "Once you know what the word stands for, you understand
it, you know its whole use" (264). This is what lies behind the view
that one can have a private language, one feels that all that one needs
to do is to associate the word with something, and then everything else
follows. Wittgenstein holds exactly the reverse of 264. "Once you
understand a word, know its whole use, then you know what it stands
for" (see 371,373). This is why he says in 314, "It shows a fundamen-
tal misunderstanding, if I am inclined to study the headache I have
now in order to get clear about the philosophical problem of sen-
sation." Those who are so inclined would agree with the proposal
considered by Wittgenstein in 316: "In order to get clear about the
meaning of the word 'think' we watch ourselves while we think; what
422 BERNARD GERT

we observe will be what the word means!" Wittgenstein thinks this

entirely wrong.
B u t surely, one might say, "thinking" means thinking, "pain" means
pain. How could anyone deny this? And isn't this nonetheless what
Wittgenstein is denying? Wittgenstein is not denying these truisms, but
he is attacking what is sometimes taken as a consequence of these
truisms, namely that if you want to know what "pain" or "thinking"
means examine pain and thinking. According to Wittgenstein one
learns a concept by learning the use of a word (see 383). "You learned
the concept 'pain' when you learned language" (384 see also 380,
381). If one did not know what "pain" or "thinking" meant, he would
never find out by simply concentrating on his pain or thinking. How
would he know what he was concentrating on?
The defender of private language thinks that concentrating on his
pain will make it clear how he is to use the word "pain." He forgets
that it is only because he has already learned what "pain" means that
he knows what to concentrate on. He thinks that it is the private
ceremony that makes it clear how the word "pain" is to be used. He
forgets that he knew how to use the word "pain" before he went
through this ceremony. It is only his forgetting these things that allows
him to believe that his ceremony made it clear how the word "pain"
was to be used. By reminding him of these simple facts Wittgenstein
makes clear that concentrating on a sensation is an idle ceremony; it
does nothing to provide a use for a sound (see 127).
The futility of private ostensive definition is put most explicitly in
paragraph 268 when Wittgenstein compares it to the right hand giving
the left hand money. This paragraph also makes clear that the person
who " . . . had given himself a private definition of a word" simply
"said the word to himself and at the same time has directed his
attention to a sensation," Paragraphs 258, 259, 260, 262, 263, 264,
and 268 are those in which Wittgenstein is arguing against the
possibility of a private language.
The defender of private language holds the bearer theory of mean-
ing. Thus, he holds that it is sufficient to give a word meaning to
associate it with something. He thinks he can make this association by
means of a private ostensive definition. Wittgenstein's argument con-
sists primarily of attempts to show the futility of private ostensive
definition, that it does none of the things that the defender of private
language thinks that it does. Thus, these arguments show the bearer
 W1TTGENSTEIN'S PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS 423

theory of meaning applied to sensation terms results in sensation terms

having no meaning at all.
Paragraphs 261, 265, 266, and 267 are also concerned with the
application of the bearer theory of meaning to sensation terms. But
these paragraphs do not contain arguments showing the impossibility
of a private language, i.e., that the bearer theory leads to no meaning
at all. In these paragraphs Wittgenstein tries to show that the bearer
theory applied to sensation terms results in terms that have no relation
to our ordinary sensation terms. These paragraphs simply show that
we can say nothing about our private language. It is the other
paragraphs that show that such a language cannot exist.
Wittgenstein starts 261 by asking "What reason have we for calling
'S' the sign for a sensation? For 'sensation' is a word of our common
language not of one intelligible to me alone. So the use of the word
stands in need of a justification which everyone understands." The
problem posed by this question is the following. " S " is a word of
private language, hence unintelligible to everyone but the speaker. If
there is a connection between the meaning of the word " S " and the
meaning of the word "sensation", then the meaning of " S " cannot be
completely unintelligible to everyone but the speaker. If it is in-
telligible to anyone else, then the meaning of " S " is not private
anymore. If the upholder of private language continues to maintain
that " S " is a completely private word, then he is not permitted to say
that " S " refers to a sensation. TM Further, as Wittgenstein points out in
his next remark, "And it would not help either to say that it need not
be a sensation; that when he writes 'S' he has something. - and that is
all that can be said. 'Has' and 'something' also belong to our common
language." Even to say " S " refers to "something" requires that the
meaning of " S " be intelligible to others for "something" is a word
others understand.
Wittgenstein's remark "So in the end when one is doing philosophy
one gets to the point where one would like just to emit an inarticulate
sound," is an emphatic way of making the point that nothing can be
said about the meaning of a word in a private language. What
Wittgenstein means by "doing philosophy" here, is trying to carry out
the full implications of the bearer theory of meaning.
Paragraph 265 describes the most ambitious attempt to relate
private language to our common language, i.e., to say something
intelligible about the meaning of words in a private language. Thus
424 BERNARD GERT

265, like 261, is not to be taken as an argument against the possibility

of a private language, but only as an argument against the possibility
of relating a private language to our c o m m o n language. It is very
important to recognize this, for it is only in 265 that Wittgenstein
discusses memory. Yet his argument against the possibility of private
language has been thought to depend on the impossibility of m e m o r y
for which there is no public check, is T h a t 265 is primarily c o n c e r n e d
with the attempt to relate a private language to our c o m m o n language
should be clear from the opening sentences of the paragraph. " L e t us
imagine a table (something like a dictionary) that exists only in our
imagination. A dictionary can be used to justify the translation of a
word X by a word Y. But are we also to call it a justification if such a
table is to be looked up only in the imagination? - 'Well, yes; then it
is a subjective justification.'"
T h e defender of private language must think he can justify translat-
ing his private language into c o m m o n language in the following way.
H e concentrates on a sensation and writes " S " . This establishes the
meaning of " S " . T h e n while concentrating on the same sensation, he
recalls what word of our c o m m o n language is used to refer to it, e.g.,
"twinge". Thus "twinge" refers to the same thing that one concen-
trated on when one said " S " . On the bearer theory, which the
defender of private language holds, the meaning of a word is its
referent, therefore "twinge" and " S " mean the same. But, " S "
remains a word in a private language for one justifies one's
identification of " S " and "twinge" in such a way that no one else can
know that this identification is justified.
However, this requires that no one else can know what I mean by
"twinge". Thus this word now becomes a word in a private language.
For if someone else knows what I mean by "twinge" they could also
know what " S " means, and it would no longer be a word in a private
language. If I wish to relate " S " to our public language and keep " S "
as a word in a private language, I b e c o m e involved in a dilemma. If
" S " means the same as "twinge" then either " S " is no longer a word
in a private language or no one else can know what I mean by
"twinge", i.e., it becomes a word in a private language. This dilemma
shows the impossibility of relating a private language to our public
language.
T h e defender of private language may very well accept the second
horn of the dilemma. Indeed, since he holds the bearer theory, he will
 WITTGENSTEIN'S PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS 425

be forced to accept it. For if the meaning of a sensation term is (or is

determined by) the sensation it refers to, then no one can know what
anyone else means by the sensation terms he uses. Thus the bearer
theory applied to sensation terms results in all sensation terms being
words in a private language. T o escape this conclusion we must give
up the bearer theory. This is very easy to do. One need only see that
one could utter " o u c h " whenever concentrating on a pain, yet this
would not make " o u c h " mean the same as "pain". Two words have
the same meaning only if they have the same use in the language.
(This may explain why some philosophers maintain that no two words
have exactly the same meaning.)
Denying that " o u c h " means the same as "pain", does not require
denying that one says " o u c h " when one is having a pain. Similarly
denying that " S " means the same as "twinge" does not require de-
nying that one, in fact, says " S " only when one is having a twinge.
T h e r e is no need to deny the correctness of one's m e m o r y . But
m e m o r y only enables one to associate a sound with a sensation. Thus
Wittgenstein's argument does not require an attack on unverifiable
m e m o r y claims. T h e defender of private language is not prohibited
from saying "This is S again.", because there is no way to check on
whether it really is S or not. H e is prohibited from saying this because
" S " is only a sound associated with a sensation, it is not a word that
can be used as the sentence requires. It is as if one said "This is ouch
again." This makes no sense, for " o u c h " does not fit in the sentence.
Saying "This is S again" has even less sense, for " S " has no use,
whereas " o u c h " does. It is the use of " o u c h " that leads us to provide
an interpretation of the sentence that does make sense.
Questions about m e m o r y are irrelevant to either private language
argument. T h e only discussion of m e m o r y occurs in 265 where the
defender of private language claims that translation of " S " by
"twinge" is justified by his "private table" in the same way that one
m e m o r y can justify another. " B u t surely I can appeal from one
m e m o r y to another. For example, I don't know if I have r e m e m b e r e d
the time of departure of a train right and to check it I call to mind how
a page of the time-table looked. Isn't it the same h e r e ? " T h e defender
of private language is saying that one m e m o r y can justify another, and
so the private table can justify a translation of one word by another.
Wittgenstein maintains that it is proper to say that one m e m o r y
justifies another only if there is some independent check on one's
426 BERNARD GERT

memory. This point is primarily about justification, not about memory

(see 378). Wittgenstein claims that translation by the private table is
not like justification of one memory by another. He claims that when
we talk of justification by memory there is some independent standard
of correctness. "[I]f the mental image of the time-table could not itself
be tested for correctness, how could it confirm the correctness of the
first memory?" But Wittgenstein never claims that all memory claims
need to be justified (cf. 289).
We only talk of justification when two independent sources agree.
This is the point of the parenthetical remark "(As if someone were to
buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it
said was true.)" Obviously Wittgenstein has in mind buying several
copies of the same paper. But the point can perhaps be made clearer
by the following case. Suppose there are two different morning papers
and one reads some news bulletin in one which he thinks needs to be
checked. He then buys the other paper and sees the same bulletin. He
would think that he had confirmed the truth of what was said. But if he
found out that the same reporter wrote the bulletin in both papers, he
would not regard the second bulletin as having confirmed the first. If a
person swears he did not commit the crime, we do not think his story
is confirmed if he repeats his denial. Of course we might become
convinced by his story if he repeated it long enough, but this is not
confirmation. Like justification, confirmation demands an independent
check, ff I continue to remember that such and such happened, I may,
and most likely will, believe that it did happen. But my belief is not
confirmed or justified, by my continuing to remember it happening.
What will count as confirming this or justifying it, will be that someone
else also remembers it, or t h a t something happens now, which my
memory explains.
Throughout 265, 266 and 267, Wittgenstein is concerned with
distinguishing justification from subjective or imagined justification.
At the end of 265 he says, "Looking up a table in the imagination is
no more looking up a table than the image of the result of an imagined
experiment is the result of an experiment." In 266 he contrasts looking
at a working clock to see what time it is with using the face of a clock
(even an imagined clock, to make a guess about the time. In 267, he
contrasts imagining " . . . what is called justifying the choice of dimen-
sions for a bridge," with actually justifying an imagined choice of
dimensions. In all of these, what he seems to be doing, is emphasizing
 WITTGENSTEIN'S PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS 427

the necessity of independent tests of real justification, and to make

clear that imagining that one is justifying something is not really
justifying it).
Wittgenstein, as far as I can see, never claims that lack of
justification makes a private language impossible. Further, Wittgen-
stein discusses memory only in order to show that memory does not
provide an analogy on which the upholder of private language can
defend his use of "subjective justification". It is therefore quite
puzzling that memory is thought to be crucially involved in the
argument against the possibility of a private language. It is not even
crucially involved in the argument showing that we can say nothing
about the meaning of words in a private language. Of course, if one
does not distinguish between Wittgenstein's argument against the
possibility of a private language and his argument against the pos-
sibility of relating a private language to ordinary language, this
mistaken interpretation is not quite so puzzling.
It seems to me worthwhile to distinguish these two arguments quite
sharply. Failure to distinguish them has resulted in the second
argument being almost completely overlooked, and the first argument
considered as if it depended on the concepts of justification,
confirmation, etc. We can state Wittgenstein's two arguments
concerning private language in the following concise fashion. (1)
Concentrating on a sensation and uttering a sound does not make that
sound into a word having any relationship to our ordinary sensation
words. (2) Even more serious, it does not even make the sound into a
word at all.
Paragraph 269 seems quite confused. Wittgenstein says that in a
man's behavior there are criteria for, (1) his not understanding a word,
(2) "for his 'thinking he understands', attaching some meaning to the
word, but not the right one," and (3) "his understanding the word
right." He concludes that the second of these, " . . . sounds which no
one else understands, but which I 'appear to understand' might be
called a 'private language'." Wittgenstein's remarks strongly suggest
that in a private language one has attached the wrong meaning to a
sound. But in a private language one has attached no meaning to the
sound though one might think that one had. Given the previous
accounts of private language I do nothing which would even make it
appear that I understand, i.e., all that I do is to repeat a sound or make
a mark at what must seem like arbitrary intervals. In this paragraph,
428 BERNARD GERT

Wittgenstein talks as if people might really speak a private language,

rather than belief in the possibility of a private language being the
consequence of a mistaken theory of meaning a6 (see also 653).
Paragraph 270 is probably the most difficult paragraph to under-
stand. Here Wittgenstein is not merely concluding his argument
against the possibility of a private language, he is also making some
positive remarks about the meaning of sensation words. The argument
against the possibility of a private language is an argument against the
bearer theory of meaning applied to sensation words. Wittgenstein in
the previous paragraphs has shown that simply associating a sound
with a sensation is not sufficient to make that sound a word, to give it
meaning, or to make it refer to the sensation. Wittgenstein's positive
view is that in order to make a sound a word, we must give it a use. It
is only by giving a sound a use in the language that we can give it
meaning or make it refer.
Prior to 270, no use could be imagined for the sound that was
associated with the sensation. Since the sound had no use, Witt-
genstein had little trouble showing that it had no meaning. In 270,
Wittgenstein does imagine a use for the sound. He then tries to show
that this use depends upon some connection between the sensation
associated with the sound and something publicly observable. Further,
and this is the crucial point, he shows that the use of the sound will be
understandable by all. Since the use of " S " is understandable, the
meaning is understandable and hence the meaning of " S " cannot
depend in any way upon the unknowable association set up between
the sound and the sensation.
Thus 270 is an even stronger attack on the bearer theory than the
previous paragraphs. Previously, Wittgenstein had simply shown that
associating a sound and a sensation was not sufficient to make that
sound refer to that sensation. It was still possible that though this
unknowable association was not sufficient, it was necessary. On this
weaker version of the bearer theory, it is not sufficient to give meaning
to a sound to associate it with a sensation; one must also give the
sound a use. However, knowledge of such an association is still
necessary before one can understand the meaning. In 270, Witt-
genstein shows that even this weaker version of the bearer theory is
wrong. The meaning of the word does not depend upon knowing
about some unknowable association, in fact, once the word has a use,
the unknowable association is seen to be irrelevant.
 WITTGENSTEIN'S PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS 429

T h e r e are some obvious objections to the interpretation of 270 that

I am offering. I maintain that the use of " S " depends upon the
correlation between S and a rise in blood pressure, and hence " S " is
not a sign until after the correlation has been made. But, it may be
objected, in the very first sentence of 270 before mentioning the
correlation Wittgenstein says: " L e t us now imagine a use for the entry
of the s i g n ' S ' in my diary." Since, in the first sentence, Wittgenstein
refers to "the sign ' S ' " , this must mean that " S " is already a sign,
independent of what is described in 270. However, though this sounds
like a good argument, most, if not all, of its persuasiveness is lost when
we realize that Wittgenstein refers to the " s i g n ' S ' " in paragraph 258,
when it is obvious that he does not regard it as a genuine sign. As we
noted earlier, Wittgenstein is engaged in describing something that he
claims cannot exist; thus one must expect that at times he will be
forced to say things that are literally nonsense.
T h e next sentence, " ! discover that whenever I have a particular
sensation a m a n o m e t e r shows that my blood pressure rises," also
seems to support the view that " S " acquired a meaning prior to 270.
For in order to discover something, that something must have existed
independent of my discovering it. T h a t is, I must have identified the
particular sensation prior t o the discovery of the correlation with
the rise in blood pressure. Otherwise I could not have discovered
the correlation. Thus, it seems that identification of a particular
sensation was done independently of the discovery of any correlations.
H e n c e , the existence of the particular sensation S is not dependent on
any correlation. If the sensation S is established independently of any
correlation, then it would seem that the sign " S " has a use, as the
name of this sensation, independent of any correlation. Thus, we must
conclude that, unhelpful as it may be, Wittgenstein simply made " S "
the sign for a sensation prior to paragraph 270, and that we have no
idea how this was done.
However, strong as this reasoning appears, it runs into insuperable
difficulties when one tries to reconcile it with the rest of what Witt-
genstein says in this paragraph. After pointing out the usefulness of
the correlation, Wittgenstein says:

And now it seems quite indifferent whether I have recognized the sensation right or not.
Let us suppose that I regularly identify it wrong, it does not matter in the least. And that
alone shows that the hypothesis that I make a mistake is mere show.
430 BERNARD GERT

If " S " names a particular sensation, independent of the correlation,

then these sentences are incomprehensible. Why, once a correlation is
established, is it "indifferent whether I have recognized the sensation
right or not?" Equally puzzling, why is it that if "I regularly identify it
wrong, it does not matter in the least?" Thus it seems as if the ability
"to say that my blood pressure is rising without using any apparatus"
does h a v e some bearing on " S " becoming a genuine sign for a
sensation. It does so because later I explain this ability by saying that I
discovered a correlation between S and rising blood pressure. But
Wittgenstein's point is that without this ability there would have been
nothing for S to explain, hence no use for " S " . It is giving S a
connection to something publicly observable that enables me to give
r
" S " a use.
Once I have established this ability and have used " S " in this way so
that it explains this ability, " S " is a sign for a sensation. This point is
explicitly made in the final sentences of paragraph 270. Wittgenstein
asks, " A n d what is our reason for calling " S " the name of a sensation
here?" and answers, "Perhaps the kind of way this sign is employed in
this language-game." Why is " S " a sign for a sensation? Because " S "
is used like other sensation words. The person says things like " S
lasted for three minutes," "I felt S five times yesterday," " S is getting
more intense now."
To his question, " A n d why a 'particular sensation', that is, the same
one every time?" Wittgenstein answers, "Well aren't we supposing
that we write 'S' every time?" It is my use of " S " that makes S the
same sensation every time. For I can say "It's S again, only this time it
is slightly more intense.", but if it is more intense how can it be the
same sensation? This question indicates that one is operating with a
concept of " s a m e " that is inappropriate (see 377, 378). Imagine
circumstances in which S is sometimes unpleasant. In this circum-
stance I might stop writing " S " every time; when the sensation was
unpleasant I might write " U " . In these circumstances we might say
that there were two distinct sensations of rising blood pressure. But I
might also continue writing " S " every time and simply say that
sometimes S is pleasant, sometimes unpleasant. (Are there two distinct
sensations of heat, one when it is pleasant and another when un-
pleasant? Or is there one sensation of heat which is sometimes
pleasant, sometimes unpleasant?) It is my use of " S " that decides the
matter.
 WITTGENSTEIN'S PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS 431

Wittgenstein is still concerned with the person who thinks that

simply writing " S " while concentrating on a sensation determines the
meaning of " S " . It is important to note that Wittgenstein does not
question the possibility of one concentrating on the same sensation
every time. He does not say that because his m e m o r y claim is un-
verifiable we cannot say that every time he writes " S " he is concen-
trating on the same thing. He is simply maintaining that what makes S
the same sensation every time is that one uses " S ' " e v e r y time in a way
fitting in with the criteria of S. This being the case, questions about
the unknowable relation between " S " and S are seen to be irrelevant.
This is why Wittgenstein says:

A n d now it seems quite indifferent whether I have recognized the sensation right or not.
L e t us suppose I regularly identify it wrong, it does not matter in the least. A n d that
alone shows that the hypothesis that I make a mistake is mere show. (We as it were
turned a knob which looked as if it could be used to turn on some part of the machine;
but it was a mere ornament, not connected with the mechanism at all.)

This passage about the meaning of " S " in 270 is followed by an

almost identical passage about the meaning of "pain" in 271
Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the word 'pain' meant - so he
constantly called different things by that name - but nevertheless used the word in a way
fitting in with the usual symptoms and presuppositions of "pain" - in short he uses it as
we all do. Here I should like to say: a wheel that can be turned though nothing else
moves with it, is not part of the mechanism.

Just as learning (teaching someone) what the word " p a i n " means
requires learning (informing him) of the relationship between pain and
the behavior t h a t naturally accompanies it, so learning (teaching
someone) what " S " means requires learning (informing him) of the
relationship between S and rising blood pressure (see 288). F o r
example, you might make someone's blood pressure rise and tell him
that what he feels is the sensation S. It is only after this that he could
identify S by introspection. T h e sensation one has when his blood
pressure rises is S. Correctly saying that one's blood pressure is rising
without using any apparatus is the criterion of the sensation S. This
does not mean that the person who has S determines that he has it by
finding out if his blood pressure is rising. But it does mean that others
determine whether he has S by seeing whether he is able to say that
his blood pressure is rising without using any apparatus. A n d it also
means that he learned what sensations were S only after learning what
432 BERNARD GERT

sensations enabled him to say that his blood pressure was rising. W e
could even define "S'" as the sensation of rising blood pressure.
Against the view that one can create a language simply by associat-
ing sounds with one's immediate private sensations, i.e., a private
language, Wittgenstein makes the following points. Such sounds will
have no relationship to any words in our c o m m o n language. Thus
there will be no pre-existing rules which determine how these sounds
are to be used. Since there are no rules for the use of these sounds,
one must invent some use if the sounds are to b e c o m e words. But if,
by hypothesis, these sounds are simply associated with one's im-
mediate private sensations, ignoring all connections between these
sensations and anything that can be known by anyone else, it will be
impossible to invent a use for the sounds. If these sounds have no use,
then they are not words, for the meanings of words are determined by
their use. If, on the other hand, we discover some contingent
connection between the sensation and something public, then we can
give a use to the sound which we have associated with our immediate
private sensations. H o w e v e r , since the use of the sound requires a
connection with some public thing (which becomes the criterion), it
will no longer be a word in a private language. Indeed, the unknow-
able association is seen to be irrelevant to the use and hence to the
meaning. Nothing in these arguments involves any use of the
verifiability p r i n c i p l e ) 7
Also, nothing in these arguments requires that language be a social
phenomenon, i.e., nothing in them requires denying that a man alone
on a desert island from birth might have a language. Thus my
interpretation of Wittgenstein's arguments is importantly different
from that provided by Rhees in his symposium with A y e r on the
question: 'Can T h e r e Be a Private Language? '18 On my interpretation
it is irrelevant whether or not a man alone on a desert island can
create a language. Wittgenstein's arguments simply point out that
neither Ayer's Crusoe nor anyone else can create a language simply
by associating sounds and things, whether these things be physical
objects or sensations. W h e t h e r Crusoe could c o m e to use sounds or
marks on paper in sufficiently complex ways to warrant our saying that
he had invented a language is a psychological question, not a
philosophical one. But e v e n if Crusoe did invent a language it would
not be a private one, at least not in Wittgenstein's sense, for as Ayer
describes it, Friday comes to understand Crusoe's language. Since in
 WITTGENSTEIN'S PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS 433

243 Wittgenstein contrasts a private language with a language which

human beings speak only in monologue, it seems quite clear that the
view that language must be a social phenomenon plays no role in his
arguments against private language. Thus all talk about desert islands
is irrelevant to discussions of private language.
On my interpretation, Wittgenstein's arguments against a private
language are just that, arguments against the privacy of sensation
language; they are not arguments against the privacy of sensations.
Some may take this conclusion to be conclusive evidence against my
interpretation. It has been maintained that Wittgenstein's arguments
against the possibility of a private language are also arguments against
the privacy of sensations. 19 Of course, in one sense, this is correct.
Since sensations are referred to by words of ordinary language, and
these words have meanings intelligible to all, sensations are not
private in the sense that only I can ever know if I am using a sensation
word correctly. Further something is a sensation only if it can be
referred to by a sensation word. This requires the sensation to have
some connection, either direct or indirect, to something publicly
observable. Thus it is always possible that someone else experience the
same sensation.
However, there is a sense of privacy that Wittgenstein does not
deny to sensations. He says, "The proposition 'Sensations are private'
is comparable to: 'One plays patience by oneself'" (248). 20 T o deny
that sensations are private would therefore be like denying that one
plays patience by oneself. I assume that no one claims that Witt-
genstein would deny this. He does deny that there is any point in
saying that sensations are private, and so saying it is misleading (see
298, 299). Just as saying that someone was playing patience by himself
would be misleading, for it would suggest that someone might play
patience and yet not play it by himself; so the statement about
sensations being private is misleading as it suggests that someone
might have a sensation that was not private, i.e., that when we say of
two people that they had the same sensation, it makes sense to ask if
same means "numerically identical" or "qualitatively similar" (see
253).
Wittgenstein does not deny that we have sensations or that we refer
to them. Nor does he maintain that to know what pain or S feels like,
one need simply know the meaning of the words "pain" and "S". He
does deny that to know what "pain" or " S " means, one need simply
434 BERNARD GERT

concentrate on what one later learns to be pain or S. He does deny

that the meaning of the words that refer to sensations can be known
only by the person using the words. 21 On Wittgenstein's view anyone
can know the meaning of the words which the speaker uses to refer to
his sensations. It is only on the bearer theory of meaning that only the
speaker can know the meaning of the words he uses to refer to his
sensations (see 293). Thus Wittgenstein shows that not only is the
bearer theory of meaning inadequate, but that, at least in the case of
sensations, the theory should be completely reversed. Finding the
referent is no help in discovering the meaning, on the contrary,
discovering the meaning is essential to finding the referent. Witt-
genstein does not deny that there are mental processes (see 154). He
simply maintains that " A n 'inner process' stands in need of outward
criteria." (580). The phrase "stands in need of" is the important one.
What does an 'inner process' need 'outward criteria' for? Certainly not
in order to exist. What then? Clearly, in order to be talked about,
referred to, etc.
It is the failure to separate questions about language from questions
about psychology that leads one t o regard Wittgenstein as "really a
behaviorist in disguise" (307). Wittgenstein's protest that he is not is
sincere. He is concerned only to deny that the language of sensations
is learned by introspecting one's own immediate private sensations.
This point is made most emphatically in paragraph 304. To the charge
that he again and again reaches "the conclusion that the sensation
itself is a nothing" Wittgenstein replies. "Not at all, it is not a
something, but not a nothing either! The conclusion was only that a
nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing
could be said" (cf. end of 6). Here again the important question is
"would serve just as well" for what? The answer obviously is: would
serve just as well to explain our talk about sensations. It is only with
the concept of sensations, not the phenomena of sensations, that
Wittgenstein is concerned (see 383). But of course, if we had no
concept of sensation, we could not talk about sensations. But it does
not follow that there would be no sensations. From the fact that
having the concept of sensation requires knowledge of a public
criterion it does not follow that being aware of something that one
later learns to call a sensation demands knowledge of a public cri-
terion. But this is to begin to talk about criteria and to leave the
discussion of private language.
 WITTGENSTEIN'S PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS 435

It may be claimed that if my interpretation of Wittgenstein's

arguments against the possibility of a private language is correct, this
is so much the worse for Wittgenstein. For ! have not merely admitted,
but claimed, that his argument simply amounts to noting that merely
pointing or concentrating on something and uttering a sound will
never result in a language. H e does make the further claim that if you
ignore all connections between sensations and anything that can be
publicly observed, there is nothing else to do with your sensations
except to concentrate on them and utter a sound. But this claim is also
one that does not seem controversial. Since these claims are both
obvious, it may not be out of place to mention that they do have some
philosophical and linguistic significance. Refutation of the bearer
theory makes clear that the meaning of sensation words is discovered
by introspection no more than the meaning of words like " d o g " or
" t r e e " . We are also provided with a conclusive argument against
anyone who holds that sense-data language is a basic language. For it
is a necessary condition for this view to be true that one be able to
create a language simply by introspecting and naming those sensations
that one discovers in introspection. It would seem that a conclusive
argument against a standard form of phenomenalism is of philosophi-
cal significance. 22

APPENDIX

T h r e e Versions of the Bearer T h e o r y and Their Refutations

(A) One knows the meaning of a sound that is a referring word

if one knows what it refers to.
(B) One knows what a sound refers to if one knows what it is
associated with.
(c) One knows what a sound is associated with if one knows
what to concentrate one's attention on when the sound is
uttered.

REFUTATION

(1) One knows what a sound refers to only if one knows the
meaning of the sound that is the referring word.
436 BERNARD GERT

(2) One knows the meaning of a sound that is a referring word

only if one knows that it is a referring word.
(3) One knows that a sound is a referring word only if one
knows a language.
(4) One knows a language only if one knows that number of
related language games which are sufficient to produce a
referring word.
(5) One knows that a sound is a referring word only if one
knows its role in that number of related language games
which are sufficient to make it a referring word.
(6) One knows the meaning of a sound that plays a role in a
language game only if one knows how to use and respond
to the sound in a consistent and acceptable manner.
(7) One knows the meaning of a sound that is a referring word
only if one knows how to use and respond to that sound in a
consistent and acceptable manner in that number of related
language games which are sufficient to make the sound a
referring word.

II

(A) One can make a sound refer by giving it a referent.

(B) One can give a sound a referent by associating it with
something.
(c) One can associate a sound with something by regularly
concentrating on that thing when uttering the sound.

REFUTATION

(1) One can give a sound a referent only by making it refer.

(2) One can make a sound refer only by making it a referring
word.
(3) One can make a sound a referring word only by giving it
roles in that number of related language games which are
sufficient to produce a referring word.

III

(A) A sound is a referring word if it refers to something.

(B) A sound refers to something if it is associated with that
thing.
 WITTGENSTEIN'S PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS 437

(c) A sound is associated with something if that thing is

regularly concentrated on when uttering the sound.

REFUTATION

(1) A sound refers to something only if it is a referring word.

(2) A sound is a referring word only if it has roles in that
number of related language games which are sufficient to
produce a referring word.

NOTES

I See A. J. Ayer, 'Can There Be a Private Language?', reprinted in Wittgenstein, The

Philosophical Investigations, George Pitcher (ed.), Doubleday, New York, 1966, p. 256.
Unless explicitly noted, all the essays I shall refer to are reprinted in the Pitcher
Collection; all page references are to this book.
2 Philosophical Investigations, MacMillan, New York, 1954. All references are to Part 1
and hence all numbers are paragraph numbers. I shall put them in parentheses in the
text.
3 Thus Wittgenstein is using the term "sensation" as philosophers have often used it,
and does not restrict it to pains, tickles, itches, etc.
4 Strawson in 'Review of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations" says a private
language is "a language of which the individual names (descriptive words) refer solely to
the sensations of the user of the language" (p. 42). He does not seem aware that the
crucial point is how the words are supposed to be made to refer to the sensation.
Malcolm in 'Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations' says "By a 'private language' is
meant one that not merely is not but cannot be understood by anyone other than the
speaker" (p. 66). However, he immediately goes on to say "The reason for this is that
the words of this language are supposed to 'refer to what can only be known to the
person speaking; to his immediate private sensations'" (243). Malcolm realizes the
crucial point is how the words are supposed to be made to refer to the sensations.
However his way of talking suggests that the argument against the possibility of a
private language stems from the impossibility of anyone other than the speaker
understanding it.
5 E.g., Ayer, pp. 259f.
6 See Ayer, pp. 253f.
7 Both Ayer (pp. 257f) and R. Rhees (p. 268) realize that the private language
argument is an argument against a certain theory of meaning applied to sensation terms,
and that this argument also holds when the same theory of meaning is applied to
physical object terms. However, Ayer seems to think this counts against the argument.
See also Strawson, p. 43.
8 These slogans, especially the first, "the meaning is the use in the language," should
not be taken as more than slogans. The variation and consequences are much less
objectionable (see 373). Very similar views are expressed by some who do linguistics.
See especially The Theory of Speech and Language by Alan M. Gardiner, Oxford, 1932.
9 This answers the question that Ayer raises on pp. 257f.
438 BERNARD GERT

10 See similar point by Malcolm, p. 96.

~J Wittgenstein is not clear on this point, primarily because he does not distinguish
between language games and language, but seems to hold that a language can consist of
only one language game, or one kind of language game. If he had avoided this
confusion he could have provided a much clearer argument against the possibility of a
private language. See appendix. Paragraph 18 illustrates his mistake most clearly.
Do not be troubled by the fact that languages (2) and (8) consist only of orders. If you
want to'say that this shows them to be incomplete, ask yourself whether our language is
complete; - whether it is so before the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the
infinitesimal calculus were incorporated in it, for these are, so to speak, suburbs of our
language. (And how many houses or streets does it take before a town begins to be a
town?)
Wittgenstein should have considered his parenthetical question more carefully. For it is
clear that one house does not make a town; nor does one street, especially if it has only
one kind of house on it, diversity is needed. To be a town there must not only be houses
where people li3re, but also houses where they trade and conduct the business of the
town. Just because there can be a town without suburbs does not mean there can be a
town with only one kind of single function house. Wittgenstein's analogy between a
language and a town was better than he knew, but it leads to a conclusion different from
the one he drew.
12 Moreland Perkins: 1965, 'Two Arguments Against a Private Language', The Journal
of Philosophy 62(17), explicitly interprets the argument in this way, see p. 444.
~3 See Ayer, p. 256, Strawson, pp. 42ff., Malcolm pp. 68ff. The difficulty of the point
becomes evident when we notice that Malcolm makes the right point at the bottom of
73, but on 74 goes back to the position expressed on 68f. See also Donagan 'Witt-
genstein on Sensation', p. 339.
14 To use Carnap's terminology, Wittgenstein often uses the material mode. He has
good reasons for this. Nonetheless, it sometimes makes his thought easier to understand
if one changes to the formal mode.
15 See note 13.
~6 It should not be too surprising that this paragraph is confused. It has no clear
relationship to any of the other paragraphs on private language. It seems, unlike the
other paragraphs, not to be part of an argument, but simply to be an attempt by
Wittgenstein to say something about what a private language is. Philosophers, not unlike
people in other fields, most often go astray when they attempt to describe what they are
doing, rather than simply doing it. Wittgenstein's remarks about criteria in paragraph
354 provide another example of the confusion that arises when Wittgenstein attempts to
describe a concept instead of simply using it.
tv Carnap's 'protocol language' is identical to Wittgenstein's 'private language'.
However Carnap draws only the first conclusion in arguing against a protocol language.
He not only doesn't draw the second, he talks as if a protocol language is indeed
possible. Carnap's argument does depend on the verifiability principle, but his argument
is not Wittgenstein's. On the contrary it seems as if Carnap holds a version of the bearer
theory which is the main object of Wittgenstein's attacks on private language (see Ayer,
pp. 252ff.). In paragraph 272, Wittgenstein does invoke the verifiability principle, but it
 WITTGENSTEIN'S PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS 439

is instructive to note that in this paragraph he does not talk about language, and in fact
seems to either be confused or mistaken. See my article, 'Imagination and Verifiability',
Philosophical Studies, April, 1965.
18 Pages 267 to 285. See also Strawson, pp. 38, 48.
19 John W. Cook, 'Wittgenstein on Privacy', pp. 286 to 323.
20 Though Cook refers to paragraph number 248 several times, he does not discuss it.
He never once quotes it or even refers to its content. This is extraordinary given his
thesis.
21 Putting this sentence in the material mode we get: "What he does deny is that
sensations can be known only by the person having them." This explains the close
relationship between the two premises of the private language hypothesis given on page
412. The first premise is a material mode variation. Thus interpreting wittgenstein's
attack on private language as being primarily an attack on a theory of meaning does not
imply that Wittgenstein is attacking only one of the two premises on which the private
language hypothesis is based.
22 1 have benefited greatly from comments on several earlier versions of this paper by
Professor Normal Malcolm. Extensive discussions with Professor Moreland Perkins have
also been very valuable. I do not know the degree to which they share the views
expressed in this final version. I am also grateful to the National Endowment for the
Humanities for providing me with the time that enabled me to complete the final version
of this paper.

Department of Philosophy
Dartmouth College
Thornton Hall
Hanover, NH 03755
U.S.A.