Republic of the Philippines his appointment as Military Mayor, Beronilla received copy of a
SUPREME COURT memorandum issued by Lt. Col. Arnold to all Military Mayors in Northern
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4445 February 28, 1955
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUEL BERONILLA, FILIPINO VELASCO, POLICARPIO
PACULDO, and JACINTO ADRIATICO, defendants-appellants.
Agripino A. Brillantes, Valera, Eufemio and Bernardez for appellants.
Prospero C. Sanidad and Claro M. Recto for defendant.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jaime R. de
los Angeles and Martiniano P. Vivo for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is an appeal by accused Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo,
Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico from the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Abra (Criminal Case No. 70) convicting them of murder
for the execution of Arsenio Borjal in the evening of April 18, 1945, in the
town of La Paz , Province of Abra.
Arsenio Borjal was the elected mayor of La Paz, Abra, at the outbreak of
war, and continued to serve as Mayor during the Japanese occupation,
until March 10, 1943, when he moved to Bangued because of an attempt
upon his life by unknown persons. On December 18, 1944, appellant
Manuel Beronilla was appointed Military Mayor of La Paz by Lt. Col. R.
H. Arnold, regimental commander of the 15th Infantry, Philippine Army,
operating as a guerrilla unit in the province of Abra. Simultaneously with
Luzon, authorizing them "to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try persons
accused of treason, espionage, or the aiding and abetting (of ) the enemy"
(Exhibit 9). He also received from the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry a
list of all puppet government officials of the province of Abra (which
included Arsenio Borjal, puppet mayor of La Paz), with a memorandum
instructing all Military Mayors to investigate said persons and gather
against them complaints from people of the municipality for collaboration
with the enemy (Exhibit 12-a).
Sometime in March, 1945, while the operations for the liberation of the
province of Abra were in progress, Arsenio Borjal returned to La Paz with
his family in order to escape the bombing of Bangued. Beronilla, pursuant
to his instructions, placed Borjal under custody and asked the residents of
La Paz to file complaints against him. In no time, charges of espionage,
aiding the enemy, and abuse of authority were filed against Borjal; a 12-
man jury was appointed by Beronilla, composed of Jesus Labuguen as
chairman, and Benjamin Adriatico, Andres Afos, Juanito Casal, Santiago
Casal, Benjamin Abella, Servillano Afos, Mariano Ajel, Felimon
Labuguen, Felix Murphy, Pedro Turqueza, and Delfin Labuguen as
members; while Felix Alverne and Juan Balmaceda were named
prosecutors, Policarpio Paculdo as clerk of the jury, and Lino Inovermo as
counsel for the accused. Later, Atty. Jovito Barreras voluntarily appeared
and served as counsel for Borjal. Sgt. Esteban Cabanos observed the
proceedings for several days upon instructions of Headquarters, 15th
Infantry. The trial lasted 19 days up to April 10, 1945; the jury found
Borjal guilty on all accounts and imposed upon him instruction from his
superiors. Mayor Beronilla forwarded the records of the case to the
Headquarters of the 15th Infantry for review. Said records were returned
by Lt. Col. Arnold to Beronilla on April 18, 1945 with the following
instructions:
 HEADQUARTERS 3RD MILITARY DISTRICT asked to administer the last confession to the prisoner, while Father
15TH INFANTRY, USAFIP Filipino Velasco of the Aglipayan Church performed the last rites over
In the Field Borjal's remains. Immediately after the execution, Beronilla reported the
matter to Col. Arnold who in reply to Beronilla's report, sent him the
following message:
16 April 1945
HEADQUARTERS 3RD MILITARY DISTRICT
15TH INFANTRY, USAFIP
In the Field
Msg. No. 337
Subject: Arsenio Borjal, Charges Against
To: Military Mayor of La Paz, Abra.
22 April 1945
1. Returned herewith are the papers on the case of Arsenio Borjal.
2. This is a matter best handled by your government and whatever
disposition you make of the case is hereby approved. Msg. No. 398
Subject: Report and information Re Borjal case
To: Military Mayor Beronilla
(Sgd.) R. H. ARNOLD
1. Received your letter dated 18 April 1945, subject, above.
Lieut.-Colonel, 15th Inf., PA
2. My request that you withhold action in this case was only
Commanding
dictated because of a query from Higher Headquarters regarding
same. Actually, I believe there was no doubt as to the treasonable
acts of the accused Arsenio Borjal and I know that your trial was
Received April 18, 1945, 10:35 a.m. absolutely impartial and fair. Consequently, I Can only
compliment you for your impartial independent way of handling
(Sgd.) MANUEL BERONILLA the whole case.
Military Mayor, La Paz, Abra

(Exhibit 8, 8-a) (Sgd.) R. H. ARNOLD

Lieut.-Colonel, 15th Inf., PA
and on the night of the same day, April 18, 1945, Beronilla ordered the Commanding
execution of Borjal. Jacinto Adriatico acted as executioner and Antonio
Palope as grave digger. Father Luding of the Roman Catholic Church was
 Received April 26, 1947 7:00 a.m.
(Sgd.) MANUEL BERONILLA
Military Mayor, La Paz, Abra
(Exhibit 21, 21-a)
Two years thereafter, Manuel Beronilla as military mayor, Policarpio
Paculdo as Clerk of the jury, Felix Alverne and Juan Balmaceda as
prosecutors, Jesus Labuguen, Delfin Labuguen, Filemon Labuguen,
Servillano Afos, Andres Afos, Benjamin Adriatico, Juanito Casel, Santiago
Casel, Mariano Ajel, Felix Murphy, Benjamin Abella, and Pedro Turqueza
as members of the jury, Jacinto Adriatico as executioner, Severo Afos as
grave digger, and Father Filipino Velasco as an alleged conspirator, were
indicted in the Court of First Instance of Abra for murder, for allegedly
conspiring and confederating in the execution of Arsenio Borjal. Soon
thereafter, the late President Manuel A. Roxas issued Executive
Proclamation No. 8, granting amnesty to all persons who committed acts
penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to
the enemy against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
Defendant Jesus Labuguen, then a master sergeant in the Philippine Army,
applied for and was granted amnesty by the Amnesty Commission, Armed
Forces of the Philippines (Records, pp. 618-20). The rest of the defendant
filed their application for amnesty with the Second Guerrilla Amnesty
Commission, who denied their application on the ground that the crime
had been inspired by purely personal motives, and remanded the case to
the Court of First Instance of Abra for trial on the merits.
Upon motion of defense counsel, the case against defendant Jesus
Labuguen, who had been granted amnesty by the Amnesty Commission of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was ordered provisionally dismissed:
defendant Juan Balmaceda was discharged from the information so that he
might be utilized as state witness, although actually he was not called to
testify; while the case against defendants Antonio Palope (the grave
digger) and Demetrio Afos( a boloman) was dismissed for lack of
sufficient evidence.
Trial proceeded against the rest of the defendants; and on July 10, 1950,
the Court below rendered judgment, acquitting the members of the jury
and the grave digger Antonio Palope on the ground that they did not
participated in the killing of Arsenio Borjal; acquitting defendants Jesus
Labuguen, Felix Alverne, Severo Afos, and Lauro Parado upon
insufficiency of evidence to establish their participation in the crime; but
convicting defendants Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino
Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico as conspirator and co-principals of the
crime of murder, and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of from 17
years, 4 months and 1 day ofreclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs of Arsenio Borjal jointly and severally in the amount
of P4,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to
pay one fourth of the costs. In convicting said defendants the Court a
quo found that while the crime committed by them fell within the
provisions of the Amnesty Proclamation, they were not entitled to the
benefits thereof because the crime was committed after the expiration of
the time limit fixed by the amnesty proclamation;: i.e., that the deceased
Arsenio Borjal was executed after the liberation of La Paz, Abra.
In view of the sentence meted by the Court below, the accused Beronilla,
Paculdo, Velasco and Adriatico appealed to this Court.
The records are ample to sustain the claim of the defense that the arrest,
prosecution and trial of the late Arsenio Borjal were done pursuant to
express orders of the 15th Infantry Headquarters. (Exhibit 9 and 12-a),
instructing all military mayors under its jurisdiction to gather evidence
against puppet officials and to appoint juries of at least 12 bolomen to try
the accused and find them guilty by two thirds vote. It is to be noted that
Arsenio Borjal was specifically named in the list of civilian officials to be
prosecuted (Exhibit 12-b).
In truth, the prosecution does not seriously dispute that the trial and
sentencing of Borjal was done in accordance with instructions of superior
military authorities, altho it point to irregularities that were due more to
ignorance of legal processes than personal animosity against Borjal. The
state, however, predicates its case principally on the existence of the
radiogram Exhibit H from Col. Volckmann, overall area commander, to Lt.
Col. Arnold, specifically calling attention to the illegality of Borjal's
conviction and sentence, and which the prosecution claims was known to
the accused Beronilla. Said message is as follows:
"Message:
VOLCKMANN TO ARNOLD CLN UNDERSTAND THAT
MUNICIPALITIES OF ABRA HAVE ORGANIZED JURY
SYSTEM PD BELIEVE THAT THIS BODY IS ILLEGAL AND
CANNOT TRY PUNISHMENTS THEREOF PD SPECIFIC
INSTANCE IS BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION FRO
PROPER AND IMMEDIATE ACTION ON ONE ARSENIO
BORJAL OF LA PAZ WHO HAS BEEN TRIED CMA
CONVICTED AND SENTENCED TO BE HANGED PD
REPORT ACTION TAKEN BY YOU ON THIS MATTER PD
MSG BEGINS CLN"
(EXH. H)
The crucial question thus becomes whether or not this message, originally
sent to Arnold's quarters in San Esteban, Ilocos Sur, was relayed by the
latter to appellant Beronilla in La Paz, Abra, on the morning of April 18,
1945, together with the package of records of Borjal's trial that was
admittedly returned to and received by Beronilla on that date, after review
thereof by Arnold (Exhibit 8-8-a). Obviously, if the Volckmann message
was known to Beronilla, his ordering the execution of Borjal on the night
of April 18, 1945 can not be justified.
We have carefully examined the evidence on this important issue, and find
no satisfactory proof that Beronilla did actually receive the radiogram
Exhibit H or any copy thereof. The accused roundly denied it. The
messenger, or "runner", Pedro Molina could not state what papers were
enclosed in the package he delivered to Beronilla on that morning in
question, nor could Francisco Bayquen (or Bayken), who claimed to have
been present at the delivery of the message, state the contents thereof.
The only witness who asserted that Beronilla received and read the
Volckmann message, Exhibit H, was Rafael Balmaceda, a relative of
Borjal, who claimed to have been, as Beronilla's bodyguard, present at the
receipt of the message and to have read it over Beronilla's shoulder. This
testimony, however, can not be accorded credence, for the reason that in
the affidavit executed by this witness before Fiscal Antonio of Abra
(Exhibit 4), Balmaceda failed to make any mention of the reading, or even
the receipt, of the message. In the affidavit, he stated:
Q. In your capacity as policeman, do you know of any usual
occurrence that transpired in La Paz, Abra? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you state what is the event? A. On April 17, 1945, I was
assigned as guard at the Presidencia where Mayor Arsenio Borjal
is confined. On the 18th of April, 1945, six bolomen came to me
while I was on duty as guard, that Mayor Borjal should be tied, on
orders of Mayor Beronilla, Mayor Borjal wanted to know the
reason why he would be tied, as he had not yet learned of the
decision of the jury against him. Mayor Borjal wrote a note to
Mayor Beronilla, asking the reason for his being ordered to be
tied. I personally delivered the note of Borjal to Mayor Beronilla.
Mayor Beronilla did not answer the note, but instead told me that I
should tie Mayor Borjal, as tomorrow he would die, as he cannot
escape. I returned to the Presidencia, and Mayor Borjal was tied,
as that was the ordered of Mayor Beronilla.
The plain import of the affidavit is that the witness Rafael Balmaceda was
not with Beronilla when the message arrived, otherwise Beronilla would
have given him his orders direct, as he (Balmaceda) testified later at the
trial. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that having learned of the contents
of the Volckmann message, Balmaceda should not have relayed it to Borjal
, or to some member of the latter's family, considering that they were
relatives. In addition to Balmaceda was contradicted by Bayken, another
prosecution witness, as to the hatching of the alleged conspiracy to kill
Borjal. Balmaceda claimed that the accused-appellants decided to kill
Borjal in the early evening of April 18, while Bayken testified that the
agreement was made about ten o'clock in the morning, shortly after the
accused had denied Borjal's petition to be allowed to hear mass.
Upon the other hand, Beronilla's conduct belies his receipt of the
Volckmann message. Had he executed Borjal in violation of superior
orders, he would not have dared to report it to Arnold's headquarters on the
very same day, April 18th, 1945, as he did (Exhibit 20), half an hour after
the execution. And what is even more important, if Borjal was executed
contrary to instructions, how could Lt. Colonel Arnold on April 21, 1945,
write in reply (Exhibit 21, 21-a) "I can only compliment you for your
impartial but independent way of handling the whole case" instead of
berating Beronilla and ordering his court martial for disobedience?
Our conclusion is that Lt. Col. Arnold, for some reason that can not now
be ascertained, failed to transmit the Volckmann message to Beronilla. And
this being so, the charge of criminal conspiracy to do away with Borjal
must be rejected, because the accused had no need to conspire against a
man who was, to their knowledge, duly sentenced to death.
The state claims that the appellants held grudges against the late Borjal.
Even so, it has been already decided that the concurrence of personal
hatred and collaboration with the enemy as motives for a liquidation does
not operate to exclude the case from the benefits of the Amnesty claimed
by appellants, since then "it may not be held that the manslaughter
stemmed from purely personal motives" (People vs. Barrioquinto,* G. R.
Nos. L-2011 and 2267, June 30, 1951). Actually, the conduct of the
appellants does not dispose that these appellants were impelled by malice
(dolo). The arrest and trial of Borjal were made upon express orders of the
higher command; the appellants allowed Borjal to be defended by counsel,
one of them (attorney Jovito Barreras) chosen by Borjal's sister; the trial
lasted nineteen (19) days; it was suspended when doubts arose about its
legality, and it was not resumed until headquarters (then in Langangilang,
Abra) authorized its resumption and sent an observer (Esteban Cabanos, of
the S-5) to the proceedings, and whose suggestions on procedure were
followed; and when the verdict of guilty was rendered and death sentence
imposed, the records were sent to Arnold's headquarters for review, and
Borjal was not punished until the records were returned eight days later
with the statement of Arnold that "whatever disposition you make of the
case is hereby approved" (Exhibit 8), which on its face was an assent to
the verdict and the sentence. The lower Court, after finding that the late
Arsenio Borjal had really committed treasonable acts, (causing soldiers
and civilians to be tortured, and hidden American officers to be captured
by the Japanese) expressly declared that "the Court is convinced that it was
not for political or personal reason that the accused decided to kill Arsenio
Borjal" (Decision, p. 9; Record, p. 727).
It appearing that the charge is the heinous crime of murder, and that the
accused-appellants acted upon orders, of a superior officers that they, as
military subordinates, could not question, and obeyed in good faith,
without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence on
their part, we can not say that criminal intent has been established (U.
S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507; Peo. vs. Pacana, 47 Phil., 48; Sent. of the
Tribunal Supremo of Spain, 3 July 1886; 7 January 1901; 24 March 1900;
21 Feb. 1921; 25 March 1929). Actus non facit reum nisi mens si rea.
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made
such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such
negligence or indifference to duty or to consequence, as, in law, is
equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum,
nisi mens rea-a crime is not committed if the minds of the person
 performing the act complained of be innocent. (U. S. vs. Catolico,
18 Phil., 507).

But even assuming that the accused-appellant did commit crime with they
are charged, the Court below should not have denied their claim to the
benefits of the Guerrilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 (42 Off. Gaz.,
2072)on the ground that the slaying of Arsenio Borjal took place after
actual liberation of the area from enemy control and occupation. The
evidence on record regarding the date of liberation of La Paz, Abra, is
contradictory. The Military Amnesty Commission that decided the case of
one of the original accused Jesus Labuguen, held that La Paz, Abra, was
liberated on July 1, 1945, according to its records; and this finding was
accepted by Judge Letargo when he dismissed the case against said
accused on March 15, 1949. On the other hand, Judge Bocar and Hilario,
who subsequently took cognizance of the case, relied on Department Order
No. 25, of the Department of the Interior, dated August 12, 1948, setting
the liberation of the Province of Abra on April 4, 1945, fifteen days before
Borjal was slain. The two dates are not strictly contradictory; but given the
benefit of the Presidential directive to the Amnesty Commissions (Adm.
Order No. 11, of October 2, 1946) that "any reasonable doubt as to
whether a given case falls within the (amnesty) proclamation shall be
resolved in favor of the accused" (42 Off. Gaz., 2360), as was done
in People vs. Gajo, Phil., 107 46 Off. Gaz., (No. 12) p. 6093.

For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the
appellants are acquitted, with costs de oficio.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo,

Bautista Angelo and Concepcion, JJ.,concur.
 This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated July 28, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00187-MIN, which affirmed with
modifications the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) conviction2 of appellants
Jojo Sumilhig (Jojo), Ricardo Sumilhig alias Carding Sumilhig (Carding),
and Pasot Saloli (Pasot) in Criminal Case No. 3(99).

Factual Antecedents

Appellants, together with the accused Eric Enoc, Warlito Montibon and
Cio Limama, were charged with double murder and double frustrated
murder in an Amended Information,3 the accusatory portion of which
reads:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT That on or about October 31, 1998, inthe Municipality of Kiblawan,
Manila Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
SECOND DIVISION helping one another, armed with assortedfirearms, with intent to kill with
treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there willfully,
G.R. No. 178115 July 28, 2014 unlawfully and feloniously, simultaneously strafe the house of Eugenio
Santander resulting to death of [Cresjoy] Santander and RollySantander
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, and seriously wounding Marissa Santander and Micel Santander, which
vs. would have caused their death had there been no timely and able medical
JOJO SUMILHIG, RICARDO SUMILHIG alias CARDING assistance rendered to them, to the damage and prejudice of the offended
SUMILHIG, PASOT SALOLI, ERIC ENOC, WARLITO parties.
MONTEBON,* and CIO LIMAMA, Accused,
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
JOJO SUMILHIG, RICARDO SUMILHIG alias CARDING
SUMILHIG, and PASOT SALOLI, Accused-Appellants. Only Jojo, Carding and Pasot, who entered separate pleas of "not guilty"
during their arraignment,5 faced trial. The other accused could not be
DECISION located and remain at-large to this day.

DEL CASTILLO, J.: Factual Antecedents

The prosecution established that onOctober 31, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m.,
Jerry Masaglang (Jerry), together with Eugenio Santander (Eugenio) and
his son Mario, were in the living room of Eugenios house in
SitioOverland, Kimlawis, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. Suddenly, they heard
gun bursts and saw six persons firing at the kitchen where members of the
Santander family werehaving dinner. Jerry and Mario recognized the
assailants to be the appellants and their co-accused.
The strafing of the kitchen lasted for about two minutes. Before the
gunmen dispersed, Jojo shouted, "At last, I have retaliated!" In the
aftermath, the children of Eugenios other son Remegio6 Santander
(Remegio), 3-year old Cresjoy,7 8-year old Rolly, and teeners Marissa and
Micel, sustained gunshot wounds. Unfortunately, Cresjoy expired while on
the way to the hospital while Rolly was pronounced dead-on-arrival.
Marissa sustained gunshot wounds atthe right breast area and left wrist,
while Micel was wounded inthe left sternal area and elbow.
Jojo denied involvement in the incident and interposed the defense of alibi.
At the time of the incident, he claimed to be in the house of his parents-in-
law in SitioOlogo-o, BarangayTacub, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. He further
asserted that it was impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime on
October 31, 1998 since he could not walk briskly due to a gunshot wound
he earlier sustained in his left knee and anus. He maintained that it was
only in January 1999 that he was able to walk without the aid of crutches.
However, Jojo admitted harboring ill-will against the Santander clan since
he believed that they were the ones responsible for the massacre of his
family in February 1998.
Carding, for his part, claimed to be illiterate and unaware of the incident.
He contended that at the time of the shooting, he was in Dalmandang,
Tacub, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, which is four-hours walk away from the
crime scene. Pasot, on the other hand, maintained that he was withhis wife
at the house of Pablo Mot in Lampara, Balasiao, Kiblawan, Davao atthe
time the crime was committed. Bothclaimed total ignoranceof the incident.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC convicted the appellants ofthe complex crime of double murder
and double frustrated murder and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
death. It further ordered them to indemnify, jointlyand severally, the heirs
of Cresjoy and Rolly the sum of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, and the
surviving victims, Marissa and Micel, the sums of P50,000.00
and P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, respectively.8
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA did not find any reason to disturb the findings of the
RTC. However, it found merit in appellants argument that the crime
committed could not have been a complex crime since the death and
injuries complained of did not result from a single act but from several and
distinctacts of shooting. And as treachery was alleged in the Amended
Information and sufficiently proven during trial, appellants should be
convicted instead of two counts of murder and two counts of frustrated
murder. Thus, in rendering its Decision9 dated July 28, 2006, the CA
disposed ofthe case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of appellants Jojo Sumilhig,
Alias Carding Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli is affirmed butmodified as
follows
Appellants Juan "Jojo" Sumilhig, Alias Carding Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli,
are found guilty beyondreasonable doubt of:
a. Murder for killing Crisjoy Santander, and x x x are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
b. Murder for the killing of Rolly Santander, and x x x are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
 c. Frustrated Murder for the shooting of Marissa Santander and x x
x are sentenced to suffer an imprisonment ofsix (6) years, four (4)
months and [ten] (10) days of prision mayoras minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of
reclusion temporalas maximum; d. Frustrated Murder for the
shooting of Micel Santander and x x x are sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment ofsix (6) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of
prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporalas maximum. All
accused are ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of
Crisjoy Santander and Rolly Santander the sum of P100,000.00
and the surviving victims Marissa Santander and Micel
Santander P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal.
Since there is no more dispute that appellants should not have been
convicted of the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder as
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) already concedes to the
same,11 the only error left from those raised by appellants in their brief is
as follows:
GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE
GUILTY, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
CONSPIRACY WAS PRESENT AND INFINDING THAT THE CRIMES
COMMITTED WERE MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER.12
It must be noted at the outset that Carding diedon June 24, 2011 during the
pendency of this appeal.13 "[I]n view of [this] supervening event, it is
unnecessary for the Court to rule on [Cardings] appeal. Whether x x x he
was guilty of the [crimes] charged has becomeirrelevant since, following
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, x x x, even assuming [that
Carding] had incurred any criminal liability, it was totally extinguished by
his death. Moreover, because [the] appeal was still pending and no final
judgment of conviction had been rendered against him [before] he died,
his civil liability arising from the crime, being civil liability ex delicto,was
likewise extinguished by his death."14
Appellants Arguments
Appellants claim that the RTC erred in relying heavily on the ill-feelings
and vendetta Jojo harbored against the Santander family. They contend
that this motive for committing the crime is not a substitute for proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, Jojosalibi that it was impossible for
him to be at the crime scene due to the gunshot wounds in his knee and
anus is amply corroborated by a medical prognosis.
Anent Pasot, appellants argue that although the trial court found his claim
of total ignorance on almost about everything to beincredulous, still, his
conviction must not rest on the weakness of his defense but on the strength
of the prosecutions evidence.
Appellants likewise question the finding of conspiracyand treachery.
Our Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Appellants conviction was based on
their positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses.
True, the RTC noted in its Decision the existence of motive on the part of
Jojo for committing the crime as well as Pasots incredulous claim of
ignorance on almost about everything. It is well to note, however, that the
said court neither based the appellants conviction on the existence of such
motive nor on Pasots weak defense of ignorance alone, but upon the
prosecution witnesses identification of appellants as the assailants, viz:
Assessing the evidence presented by both [P]rosecution and defense, we
see a less than glaring hint of vendetta. As part of his defense, the accused
Jojo Sumilhig narrated that his family was massacred by Jerry Santander,
brother of Remigio Santander [in] February 1998. Short of admitting the
crime, Sumilhig stated that because of this, he harbored ill feelings not
only against Jerry and Carlos Santander but also against their family. Thus
a clear motive for killing the Santander family has been established giving
credence to prosecution witnesses allegation that after the strafing Jojo
Sumilhig shouted"Nakabalos na ko!" The likelihood of his intention to
wipe out the said family became even more apparent.
Despite his positive assertion that it was the Santanders that killed his
family, he did not file any case against them. It was only after he was
arrested that he filed a complaint against Jerry and Carlos Santander.
His alibi likewise failed to meet the stringent requisites of the Rules. Even
as Dr. Quirapas appeared determined to rule out the possibility that he
could walk without crutches five months after his discharge, the same was
based on general medical prognosis. Such prognostication admits certain
exception[s], as could be gleaned from the testimony of the doctor himself
that the healing period may vary depending on the age and physical
condition of the patient. Notably Jojo Sumilhig was then 23 years old.
What was certain was the positive identification made by Jerry Masaglang
and Remegio Santander of all of the accused.
The "overkill" by which the accused Pasot Saloli and Carding Sumilhig
claimed total ignorance of almost anything only served to arouse
incredulity. Both accused claimed they could not read, write, tell time, day,
month or year. Neither could [they] allegedly speak [or] understand
Visayan, which is of common knowledge to be widely spoken in almost
every part of Mindanao. Saloli claimed he did not know what day [it] was
when he was testifying, or the day before and after that. Both claimed they
did not know the complainants or of the massacre that took place.
xxxx
More importantly, these claims [of] utter ignorance are belied by the
evasiveness by which all three accused answered in obvious effort to avoid
criminal responsibility. Behind the faade of ignorance and lack of
education lurks a calculating mind. We find [it] difficult to ascribe
innocence to the accused when traces of ingenuity and craftiness
characterize their testimonies.
All these observations however become insignificant in the face of the
positive and spontaneous identification of the assailants/accused by
credible witnesses Jerry Masaglang and Remigio Santander.15
There is no reason to doubt Jerry and Marios identification of the
appellants considering that (1) Jerry was just six meters away from
them;16 (2) the moon was bright and Jerry was familiar with all the accused
as most of them are his relatives;17 and, (3) Mario knows Jojoever since he
was small.18 Besides, "[t]ime-tested is the rulethat between the positive
assertions of prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the
accused, the former undisputedly [deserve] more credence and [are]
entitled to greater evidentiary weight."19
Anent the respective alibis interposed by appellants, suffice it to say that
"[a]libi cannot prevail over the positive identification of a credible
witness."20
There was conspiracy among the accused.
"[C]onspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." 21 It is not
necessary to adduce evidence of a previous agreement to commit a
crime.22"Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial evidence,
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated,
or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such leadto a
joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest." 23
Here, there is no proof of a previous agreement among the accused but
there is a series of events that clearly established conspiracy among them.
First, they were all armed with firearms. Second, they surreptitiously
approached the crime scene. Third, when they were within close range of
the intended victims, they simultaneously discharged their firearms.
Fourth, they ceased firing at the same time and fled together. Undoubtedly,
their acts before, during and immediately after strafing the house of
Eugenio evince their unanimity in design, intent and
execution.24 Treachery attended the commission of the crime.
"There is treachery whenthe offender commits any of the crimes against
the person, employing means, methods orforms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure the execution, without risk to
himself arising from [any] defense which the offended party might
make."25
Treachery is evident in this case as the suddenness and unexpectedness of
the assault deprived the victims of an opportunity to resist it or offer any
defense of their persons. This is considering that the victims were unaware
that they would be attacked by appellants with a hailof bullets from their
firearms fired at close range. Indeed, "[t]he suddenness of the attack,
without the slightest forewarning thereof, placed the [victims] x x x in
such a position that they could not have defended themselvesfrom the
aggression x x x."26
The crime committed is two counts of
murder and two counts of frustrated
murder.
As earlier discussed, treachery attendedthe commission of the crime. This
qualifies the killing of Cresjoy and Rolly to murder.
With regard to Marissa and Micel, the Court notes that while the RTC was
silent as to the nature of injuries sustained by them, the CA correctly ruled
on the seriousness thereof. The Medico Legal report of Marissa shows that
she suffered multiple gunshot wounds in her right breast and left
wrist27 while the Certificate of Treatment/Confinement of Micel states that
she sustained gunshot wounds in the area of the sternum and elbow.28 As
aptly found by the CA, the girls would have died if not for the timely
medical attention provided to them. The crimes committed by the
appellants against them were thus frustrated murders.
The Penalty
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of
murder is reclusion perpetuato death.1wphi1With both penalties being
indivisible and there being no aggravating circumstance other than the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, the lower of the two penalties which
is reclusion perpetua was properly imposed by the CA on appellants for
each count of murder.29 However, appellants are not eligible for parole. 30
As regards the frustrated murders of Marissa and Micel, the penalty lesser
by one degree shall be imposed on appellants.31 Accordingly, the penalty
that must be imposed is reclusion temporalfor each count of frustrated
murder. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and in the absence of
modifying circumstances other than the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of
reclusion temporal, which has a range of fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while
the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is
prision mayorin any of its periods, the range of which is from six (6)
years,one (1) day to twelve (12)years. The prison term imposed by the CA
on appellants must therefore be modified to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporalas maximum, which is within these
ranges,32 for each count of frustrated murder.
Awards of Damages
For the murders of Cresjoy and Rolly, the CA correctly held that their heirs
are entitled to an award of civil indemnity, however, the amount of the
award must be P75,000.00 for each death pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence.33 The awards of moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00 each and exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00
each are proper.34 In addition, the heirs of the victims are entitled to
temperate damages in the sum of P25,000.00 for each death in lieu of
actual damages.35
For the frustrated murders of Marissa and Micel, the awards of moral and
exemplary damages by the CA must be decreased to P40,000.00
and P20,000.00, respectively for each victim. 36 They are likewise entitled
to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 each in lieu of actual
damages.37
All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annumfrom
the date of finality of thisjudgment until fully paid. 38
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRH.C.
No. 00187-MIN which affirmed withmodification the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of DigosCity, Davao del Sur, Branch 19, finding
appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two counts of murder and two counts offrustrated murder is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONSas follows:
For the murders of Cresjoy Santander and Rolly Santander:
(1) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall suffer the
prison tenn of reclusion perpetua for each count of murder without
eligibility for parole;
(2) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall pay the heirs of
the victims the amount of P5,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
death of each victim;
(3) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall pay the heirs of
the victims P25,000.00 as temperate damages for each death.
For the frustrated murders of Marissa Santander and Micel Santander:
(1) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli are sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for
each count of frustrated murder; and,
(2) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli are ordered to pay
moral damages and exemplary damages to each of the victims in
the reduced amounts of P40,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively.
All amounts of damages awarded shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6%
per annum commencing from the date of finality of judgment until fully
paid.
Due to the death of Ricardo Swnilhig alias Carding Sumilhig prior to final
judgment, his criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto as found by the
Regional Trial Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
extinguished. Consequently, Criminal Case No. 3(99) is ordered dismissed
insofar as Ricardo Sumilhig alias Carding Sumilhig is concerned.
Costs against appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli.
SO ORDERED.