AMUZEGAR Point Four Performance and Prospect

Point Four: Performance and Prospect
Author(s): Jahangir Amuzegar

Source: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 73, No. 4 (Dec., 1958), pp. 530-546
Published by: Academy of Political Science
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POINT FOUR: PERFORMANCE AND PROSPECT
T HE dramatic
enunciation
of thePointFourprogram
in PresidentTruman's inaugural address in Janu-
ary 1949 inspiredinterestand enthusiasmthrough-
out the world thatfewotherpronouncements in the annals
of post-wardiplomacyhave paralleled. For much the same
reason,perhaps,few other United States foreigneconomic
policies have in recentyearsbeen subjectto as manypolem-
ics as has Point Four. Althoughthe programcontinuesto
enjoy the supportof many,its initialpopularity,and its im-
portanceas a cold war weapon,seem to have declined. Crit-
icism of the program,once an exclusiveprerogativeof old-
fashionedRepublicans and ultra-nationalists, has in recent
monthsbecome bipartisanand nation-wide.
The protractedand widespread attacks in and out of
Congresson it,' and the reporteddecisionto reduce Ameri-
can technicalstaffsin the Middle East and in South-East
Asia,2may thusbe construedto reflectAmericandissatisfac-
tion with this programand a setback for this segmentof
United Statesforeignpolicy. If thisinterpretation is valid,
it is appropriateto explore the causes of this cold war re-
treat. The timelinessof such a reviewis furtherevidenced
by the factthattheSovietbloc is reportedto have in the last
threeyearsincreasedits technicalassistanceoffensive in the
underdevelopedworld.3
Point Four operationsparticularlyin the Middle East and
South-EastAsia have been criticizedon political,economic
and administrativegrounds. Politically,the programhas
been accused of supportingundemocraticand nonprogres-
sive governments.Economically,it has been criticizedfor
1 U.S. House of Representatives,Committee on Foreign Affairs,Hearings
on Mutual SecurityAct of 1958, 85th Congress, Second Session, particularly
pp. 837-892,1381-1447.
2 New York Times, December 29, 1957, p. 1.
8 New York Times, January 5, 1958, p. 1; United States Department of
State, The Sino-Soviet Economic Offensivein the Less Developed Countries,
May 1958.
530
No. 4] POINT FOUR 531
hastyplanning,poor selectionof projects,and inadequate

coordinationamong assistanceactivities. Administratively,
it has been chargedwithinefficiency, wasteand irregularities.
It is the contentionof thispaper that,in the natureof the
case, theseand otherdeficienciesof the technicalassistance
programhave been unavoidableand thatno otherprogram
of this nature could have escaped many of the foregoing
criticisms. Beset by the importunityof its conflictingob-
jectivesand pressedby the compellingnecessityof selective
fulfillment, the programcould not have achievedmuchmore
thanit has.
A Programof All Things to All Men
Point Four was presentedto the world communityas an
Americandevice to help the people of economicallyunder-
developed areas in their effortsto develop their resources,
increasetheirproductivecapacitiesand raise theirstandards
of living. The social and economicwelfareof thesepeoples
was in turn expected to serve the enlightenedinterestsof
the United States,thatis, its nationalsecurity,materialpros-
perityand altruisticaspirations.
Trust in theabilityof the Point Four programto promote
these mutual interestswas based on threeassumptions,all
consideredaxiomaticat the time. Assumingthat totalitar-
ianism in general, and communismin particular,would
thrive where ignorance and povertyprevailed, American
technicalassistancewas expected to help combat these ills
and to counteractCommunist promisesand propaganda.
Believing that mutually beneficial trade would flourish
among expanding economies,technical aid was meant to
promoteprofitablemarketsfor Americanexportsand pro-
ductivesourcesfor Americanimports. Expectingaltruism
to resultin friendship
and gratitude,Americanphilanthropic
generositywas meant to demonstratethe willingnessof the
United Statesto shareits wealthwithits needyneighbors.
The realities of the mid-twentieth-century politics,eco-
nomicsand ethicsshowedthattheseassumptionswerelargely
aspirationallyconditionedand somewhatunrealistic. The
correlationbetween povertyand susceptibilityto commu-
nism did not withstandthe test of time. Despite the re-
portedpost-warrisein the levelsof incomeand consumption
53 2 POLIT(:.IC SCIENCE QUAI?R FERI.Y [Vor..ILXXIII
in the Middle East, Afghlanistan,Egypt,Syria and perhlalps

also Iraq wveremorerapidlydriftedtowardthe Fast,and the
lhostility
to commuiiinismii
in the rest of the reg(0ion
was also
somewhiiat attentuated.Thlieforcesof nationalismi,
protected
indutstrialization,and the contintued slhortaoge
of hard ctur-
rencies in the uinderdcvelopedareas representeda g(reat
sttumniblinlg
block to the expectedexpansionof wvorld( trade.
There wvaslardly any real improvementin the l)ilateral
tradeof theseareas wvitlh
the United States: theirexportsto
the United Statesremainedthe same, and the slighltrise in
theirimportswas financedchiiefly by directAmericanaids.
Nor did Uniited States prestige and p)optularity
in the Mi(dle
East an(dSotutlh-East
Asia increasein timel)erioclafterPoint
" pro-XVestern
Fouir. From hiitlherto " Lebanon and Jordan
to " netutral" Laos and Indonesia, anti-Amiierican
denmonstra-
tionswere intetnsified and fewver wverewon.4
grateftl.frienids
Wh%lly hiasthe Point Foturprogramfallenso patentlyslhort
of expectations? XVhlyhiasit not won strongerand morc
grateful.friendsfor the United States? Whiiat hiasbeen the
nattureof its diffictulties?
Whiiat impacthiavethesediflictulties
hiadon itsoperations? 'Manyansversmaybe sotu(glht. Some
are offeredin thispaper.
The essenceof Point Fouir(liffictulties,
it seems,slhotuldbe
soulghltin the elutsiveness
of its concept,the paradoxicalna-
ttureof its objectives,and its involvementin some " uinre-
solved dilemmas" of Americanforeignpolicy. The Act for
International Development 5 whichiestablished the techinical
assistaniceprogramndeclare(dit to be the policyof the United
States to " encotura(rethe flowvof teclinicalknowvledge antd
capital to couintries
wvhichiprovicledcon(litionsuinderwhliichi
suichiteclhinical
assistanceand capital canieffectivelyand con-
struictivelycontributeto raisingstandardsof living." Thlese,
to l)e sture,were vaguteobjectives and undefined terms.
Neitlherthe Congressnor the Presidenttriedto spell otutthe
"necessaryconditions" for economic progressor a rise in
living standards;nor did they ever attemptto clarifythe
exact puirposesthat tImepro(rain was (lesignedto aciiieve.
4 Cf. W1'all
Str-eetJournal,NMav26, 1958, p. 1; The State Jour)nal(Lansing,
Michigaln),May 4, 1958, p). 1.
5 Public Lawv535, 81st Congress,2nd Session.
Interpretedliterally,and froma purelyeconomicstandpoint,
the countriesmostqualifiedto receivesuch assistancewould
have been thoseof WVestern Europe and the Commonwealth.
Instead, technicalaid was offeredto countrieswhich, eco-
nomicallyspeaking,did not quite meet the basic prerequi-
sites of economic growth. Political instability,social up-
heavalsand economicimperfections of a seriousnaturewere
hardly conducive to rapid economic developmentin the
countriesto whichPoint Four was offered.
Adding to the ambiguitiesof the 1950 Act, the Congress,
under the Mutual SecurityAct of 1951,6amended the fore-
goingobjectivesof the Point Four programin favorof pro-
viding " military,economic and technical assistance to
friendlycountries . . . to develop their resources in the in-
terestof theirsecurityand independenceand the national
interestof the United States." The emphasiswas thus no-
ticeablyshiftedfromraisingstandardsof livingin countries
where conditionswere conducive to economic progressto
helpingcountrieswhich would " strengthenthe securityof
the United Statesand promoteworld peace." A year later,
under the Mutual SecurityAct of 1952,7the noneconomic
nature of the Point Four programwas reemphasizedwhen
Congressmade it explicitthat" no countryshall receiveany
assistancehereunderunlessit takesdecisiveactionto marshal
its resourcescollectivelyand participatein programswhich
promotecollectivesecurityin the appropriateareas." Soon
afterward,respondingto widespread criticismsfor having
incorporatedthe technical and militaryassistancein one
package,the Congress,in the Mutual SecurityAct of 1954,
triedto separatethe sheep fromthe lion by adoptingagain
the statementof policy,and using the identicallanguage,of
the 1950 Act. This move did littleto reduce the confusion
and uncertaintysurroundingthe programbecause again in
less than two years the Mutual SecurityAct of 19568 de-
claredit to be " thepolicyof theUnited Statesto continueas
long as the [Communist]danger to the peace of the world
and to the securityof the United States persiststo make
6 Public Law 165, 82nd Congress, 1st Session.
7 Public Law 400, 82nd Congress,2nd Session.
8 Public Law 726, 84th Congress,2nd Session.
534 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [VOL. LXXIII
available to free nations . . . assistance of such nature . . . as

the United States deems advisable. . .." The new act thus
made the Communistthreat a requirementfor receiving
United Statesaid.
In mostof the underdevelopedworld,and particularlyin
the peripheryof the Sino-Sovietaxis, the rationale of the
short-rangepolicy of the United Stateswas thus to obtain
political and strategic gains. Economic and philanthropic
considerationswere ancillaryand incidental. Althoughthe
searchforoverseassourcesof rawmaterials,theestablishment
of marketsfor"surplus " exports,and the discoveryof out-
letsfor" excess savingswerealwayssought,themain intent
of the United States in helping uncommittedareas was to
seek reliable allies in the cause of peace, democracyand also
probably free enterprise. Economic developmentin the
wordsof Mr. Acheson was simplya " materialmeans to a
non-material end."
Most underdevelopedareas,on the otherhand,in so faras
theywelcomedit at all, welcomedUnited Statesaid in the
hope of resolvingtheirimmediateeconomicproblems. The
ideals thatthe United Statesstood for,thatis, peace, democ-
racy and free enterprise,had little value for the illiterate,
poverty-stricken and deprivedmassesof the Middle East and
Asia. These people were not then, and are not yet, pre-
pared to appreciatethe virtuesof Americandemocracy;nor
were they especiallykeen on the promisesof free enter-
prise. Peace theyknew theycould not enjoy as long as the
cold war continued,no matterwhich camp theywere in.
Their main concernwas to improvetheir unenviable and
stagnantlife. They knew little,and cared even less,about
powerpolitics. They feltno real urge to get themselvesin-
volved in the East-Westconflict. Having emerged from
Westerncolonialism,manyof themhad littlesympathyfor
the Western cause. Within the frameworkof their own
values theywere willing to accept any helping hand which
was extendedto them. What theyreallywantedwas a quick
way out of theirmiseryand a shortcut into a richerand
fullerlife. They did not perhapsrealize the price thatthey
would eventuallyhave to pay forsuch shortcuts. But for
themomenttheydid notseemto considerthispricetoo high.
Sacrificesof personalliberty,politicalfreedomand economic
choice which WVestern societies associate with regimented
planningcould not be stronglyfeltby thesepeople. They
had not enjoyed these freedomslong enough really to ap-
preciatethem,and in some cases had neverenjoyedthemat
all. To them,the road thatthe rivalcamp showedthemwas
not alwaysto serfdombut sometimesfromit.
Conflictsof Standards
The standardsset forthe programthusflowedfrommore
thanone hierarchy. There were also conflictsamongstand-
ards set within each hierarchy. Guided by political and
strategicinterestsof the United States, as one hierarchy,
Point Four had to achieve two basic objectives:(1) to serve
as part of a political programdesignedto convincethe peo-
ple in theuncommitted areas thattheirinterestslay in siding
withtheWest; and (2) indirectlyto assista militaryprogram
designedto strengthenthe defenseof the areas against the
threatof Communistaggressionor internalsubversion. The
social and economic interestsof the underdevelopedareas,
championed by a differenthierarchy,demanded that the
program(1) pay greaterheed to improvingsocial and eco-
nomicconditions,and (2) meet theseobjectivesthroughthe
least possibleinterference with the existingpoliticaland so-
cial orders. In so far,therefore, as the Americanpolitical
objectivesof containingcommunismand the recipientcoun-
tries'desirefora quick risein theirplanesof livingcould not
be simultaneouslysatisfied,the Point Four programfaced
some serious and almost insoluble political, economic and
administrative paradoxes.
Increaseddefensivestrength in the Middle East and South-
East Asia was,forinstance,necessaryto underminethe Com-
munistthreatof aggressionor subversion,but furtheruse of
manpowerand materialformilitarybuild-upwould mean a
sacrificein the productionof badly needed consumerand
capital goods. A concrete improvementin the national
standardsof livingwas needed to counteractSovietpromises
of abundance-for-all under communism,but an increasein
living standardswould mean fewerresourcesfor develop-
mentand would thusentail a slow rate of economicgrowth.
Basic changesin the existingpoliticaland social institutions
wererequiredto promotebothmilitarystrength and civilian
economicprogress,but such changeswould involvethe risks

of creatinghazardouspoliticalvacua. Of necessity,
thePoint
Four programtried to move in all directionsat the same
time. The resultof thisambivalencewas thatnone of the
paradoxeswas adequatelymet.
Paradoxes of Policy
Underlyingmost Point Four difficulties was thus a basic
rivalryamong conflicting political and economicobjectives.
A political programdesigned to check the spread of com-
munismmay require certainpracticeswhich,althoughpo-
liticallyjustified,cannot be vindicatedon purelyeconomic
grounds. Often enough,a particularline of action which
is perfectlyrational from the political viewpoint of the
aiding countrymay not be in the long-runeconomic inter-
est of the recipients. Ambitious highwayand/or airfield
projects in Afghanistan,Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Thailand
and Vietnamare cases in point: althoughof great military
and strategicvalue to the defenseof the free world, these
projectshave admittedlyhad littlevalue to the economiesof
these countries.9 Sometimes,also, some " radical" steps
whichmustbe takento help therecipientnationssolve their
long-runeconomic problemsmay have to be ruled out be-
cause theymightinjure the immediatepolitical interestsof
the donor. The alleged supportby the United Statesof dic-
tatorsand unpopularleaders,its toleranceof corruptionand
malpracticesin the recipientgovernments, and its contribu-
tion to the enrichmentof the " exploiting" rich are exam-
ples.10 In the contextof the coexistencestruggle,again, it
maybe deemedessentialto givespecialfavorsto a technically
incompetentbut friendlylocal elite. Or it maybe advisable
to spend sizable fundson psychologically effectivebut eco-
nomicallywastefulpublic relationsactivities. Or it may be
expedientto employtactfuland amiable but professionally
inferior" experts". None of theseactions is wrongper se
9 See "Responses by ICA to Questions Compiled by the House Foreign
AffairsCommittee relating to Criticismsof the Mutual Security Program"
in Hearings on Mutual SecurityAct of 1958, pp. 847, 849, 851, 867, 870.
10 United States Senate, A Review of United States Foreign Policy and Op-
erations, by Senator A. J. Ellender, Document No. 78, 1957, particularly pp.
85-86 and 140-141. See also Wall Street Journal, August 9, 1958, p. 1.
because it does not fall withinthe dicta of economicration-
alism. All of them,however,are more or less beyond the
scope of an economicdevelopmentprogram. The favorsre-
portedlygrantedto politicaland government leadersin Laos
to keep them " friendly " toward the United States,1"the
profitablerate of exchange given Iranian studentsin the
United States,and the dispatchof good party-goers or party-
giversas technicalexpertsare of thiscategory.12
Other paradoxesof thissorthave loomed large in the op-
eration of the Point Four program. In order to achieve
quick, tacticaland strategicresults-thatis, to impressthe
recipient nations with American dynamismand to show
Congressreturnson its investment-theprogramwas forced
to sponsoror supportcertainprojectswhich could not be
givenpriorityon theireconomicmerits-projects whichlater
on provedto be of verylittlevalue. Examplescan be cited
of industrialprojects which failed to operate because of
"poor planning and faulty engineering ",13 dams which did
nothold water,fancyschools,hospitalsor resortshavinglittle
to do withdevelopment,complicatedinstruments leftin the
hands of untrainedoperators.14Electronicmicroscopessent
to the regionsof the Philippineswhereno powerexistedfor
theiruse, a sugarrefinery providedforIran wherebeet sup-
plies were short,and a ferrysystemestablishedfor Laos,
whose revenueslag behind her expensesby four-fifths, are
projectsof thissort.
The Point Four programwas also hamperedby another
politicalparadox. On theone hand,itssuccessas a program
of action, the economic growthof the recipients,and the
long-runinterestsof the United Stateswere based on the in-
troductionof a number of economic reforms,political
changes and social disturbancesin aid-receivingcountries.
On theotherhand,Americanshort-range politicalobjectives,
and the veryacceptanceof the programby the host govern-
11 Wall Street Journal,April 9, 1958, p. 1.
12See Hearings on Mutual Security Act of 1958, pp. 848-871; Wall Street
Journal, April 9, 1958, p. 1.
13 United States House of Representatives, Committee on Government
Operations, United States Aid Operations in Iran (Washington, 1957), p. 4.
14 See Senator T. F. Green, Technical Assistance in the Far East, South-
East Asia, and Middle East (Washington, 1956), p. 6.
mentsin the Middle East and the Far East, required a cau-
tious and conservativestand on manyof theseissues. The
role of the United Statestechnicalmissionsin theseprocesses
of changeand adaptation,therefore, was mostdelicate,quite
complicated,and oftencontroversial.Althoughtraditionally
and philosophicallysympathetic to certainbasic changesin
the structureof beneficiarycountries,the United States
found itselfin the uneasy positionof agreeingto preserve
the politicaland economicstatusquo while tryingto achieve
the kind of economicprogresswhichwas almostimpossible
withinthe existingsocial and politicalorder.15 It was clear
to most Point Four officialsthat in order to launch a self-
sustainingprogramof economic developmenttheyneeded
the enthusiasm, supportand genuinecooperationof the peo-
ple-the peasants,the workers,the rankand file. They also
were aware of the fact that in order to receive such active
participation,theyhad to assurethesepeople thattheUnited
Stateswas interestedin servingthemand not necessarilythe
interestsof theirelite few. It was furtherevident that in
manyfieldsof operation,pure technicalassistancewithinthe
frameworkof existinginstitutionscould not offersuch an
assurance. Yet Point Four was unable to do much toward
changing,for example, land tenure practices,tax systems,
public administration and the like. Ostensiblyunwillingto
be accused of political interference, but in effectavoiding
the creation of a dangerouspolitical vacuum, the United
Statesrefrainedfromundertaking,or even advocating,such
reformsas mighttip the balance of power against the pro-
fessedanti-Communist ruling classes. It has been frankly
admittedthatPoint Four's reluctanceto " speak out forany
principlesof social justice" should be traced" not so much
to any oppositionto reform,or lack of awarenessthat re-
formsmightbe needed, as to a fear of offendingthose in
power." 18
EconomicDilemmas
The economicdilemmasthat the programfaced also in-
volved choices among competingobjectives. A quick and
noticeablerise in the standardsof consumptionand living
15 Green, op. cit., p. 1.
16 Jonathan B. Bingham, Shirt-SleeveDiplomacy (New York, 1954),
p. 216.
(upon which the popularityof the programstood) was in-

compatiblewithboth a rapid rateof economicgrowthand a
strongmilitarypreparedness. A rise in the consumptionof
goods and servicescan be achievedin threeways: a shiftin
domesticincome distributionin favor of the low-income
groups; the diversionof a largerportionof public and pri-
vate effortsinto the productionof more consumergoods;
and theimportationofconsumptiongoodsfromabroad. All
threealternativesworkagainsttheobjectiveof maximumin-
vestmentforlong-rundevelopment.
A " consumption-oriented " redistribution
of income may
resultin a fall in national savingsavailable for productive
investmentand may hence impede maximum net capital
formation. Even if such a redistribution could affectonly
moneyhoardsand not currentsavings,the increasein con-
sumptionwould occur at the expense of potentialsavings,
withsimilardangersformaximumgrowth. The allocation,
furthermore, of a largerportionof the aggregateexpendi-
tureto consumergoodsmaymean a reductionin government
expenditure. This would involveeithera cut in government
welfareservicesuch as healthand education,or a reduction
in defensespending. Reduced public serviceswould hardly
resultin a net increasein national consumptionlevel as it
would simplymean a transfer of somewelfarefunctionsfrom
the public sectorto the privatesector. The onlyalternative
would be a cut in militaryspending. But a reductionin the
defensebudgetlargeenough to affectthe consumptionlevel
would threatenthe recipientcountries'nationalsecurityand
thus run counterto the veryobjectiveof the Americanas-
sistance. In fact,to the extentthatthe associationwith the
Westerncamp necessitates a greatermilitarypreparednessby
the recipientsagainst Communistretaliation,theymay ac-
tuallybe compelled to increase,ratherthan decrease,their
defensebudgets. Finally,a swiftand measurablerise in the
consumptionlevel can be effectedby exportsto the bene-
ficiarycountriesof consumergoods or by using foreignaid
forimportsof thesegoods fromthirdcountries. Grantscan
be used, forexample,to importessentialfood,clothingand
drugsto be distributedamong the population. But again,
the importof consumergoods is achievedat the expense of
moreurgentlyrequiredcapital goods.
540 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol.. LXXIII
The multiplicity of theseobjectivesand theirinherentin-

consistenciesworkedagainst the successof the Point Four
program. In mostcountriesto whichassistancewas offered,
a genuine processof sustainedeconomicgrowthinvolveda
good deal of belt-tightening at the outset. People had to
consume less and diverta good share of theirincome into
productiveinvestment.This bitterfactfewpeople in these
countriesrealized, and fewerstill wished to acknowledge.
Often the very nature of economic underdevelopmentin
these countriesimplied that consumptionwas already too
high to spare enough resourcesfor a rapid rate of growth.
In such cases,and in the absenceof foreigninvestment capi-
tal, economicdevelopmentactuallyrequired an initial cut,
insteadof a rise,in aggregateconsumption. Under the pres-
suLreof circumstances, however,advocatingsuch a policywas
out of the question. Asking for more " sweat, blood and
tears" was obviouslynot the best way forthe United States
to " win friendsand influencepeople." Nor was thisa pol-
icy whichPoint Four could squarelyrecommend. In order
to win popularityamong the deprivedmassesof the Middle
East and South-EastAsia, the United Stateshad to promise,
and deliver,quick and effective risesin the nationallevelsof
consumption. Such promiseswere indeed freely,and some-
timesimprudently, given. But the deliveryproveddifficult.
Withoutexception,theexpectationsthatwereraisedand the
hopes thatwerecreatedin theseareas provedfarbeyondthe
technicaland financialabilityof the United Statesto meet.
Many naive officialsand the majorityof people in these
countriesreallybelieved thatfor" the firsttimein history"
humanitypossessed" the knowledgeand skill" to relieve
their sufferings.'7Interpretingthese words literally,they
widenedthe horizonsof theiranticipationsto such an extent
that no feasibleamount of Americantechnicalor financial
assistancecould ever completelysatisfythem. The result
was not gratitudebut widespreaddissatisfaction with the
"inadequacy" of United Statesaid.
Economic counsels to the underdevelopedareas also ex-
hibitedconflictsof policy on two otheraccounts: inconsist-
ency betweendevelopmentand trade policies, and compe-
17 President H. S. Truman's Inaugural Address, 1949.
titionbetweenprivateand governmententerprise. In most

of the underdevelopedcountries,Point Four missionsplaced
special emphasison furtherspecializationalong " compara-
tive advantage" lines; theycounseled increasedproduction
of agriculturaland primarycommodities. At thesame time,
the missionsfavoreddiversification in the recipientecono-
mies throughthe developmentof import-competing indus-
tries. These counsels were not only inconsistentin them-
selves but were also in conflictwith other United States
economicpolicies. An increasein theoutputof agricultural
exportcrops would, of course,have been advisable if trade
were freethe worldover. But since almostall major indus-
trial countries,and especiallythe United States,had severe
restrictionsagainst their agriculturalimports,Point Four
advice could only resultin largeragriculturalsurplusesin
the recipientnations. Burmese rice and Egyptiancotton
surplusesare casesin point.
The encouragementof product diversification, on the
other hand, while somewhatat odds with the emphasison
agriculture,would involvethe adoptionof strongprotective
measures. No attemptby the underdevelopedareas to pro-
duce substitutesfor imports,and, a fortiori,industrialex-
ports,could succeed under the competitivepressureof for-
eign industrialgiants. Tariffs,exchangecontrol,quotas and
similar restrictionswere indispensableto the survivaland
successof these" infant" industries. The Point Four advo-
cacy of protectionism,however,was in conflictwith the
United Statespost-warpolicyof freermultilateraltradeand
the reductionof tradebarriers.
The competitionbetween private and public planning
was no lessserious. Everyunderdevelopedarea whichasked
forassistancewas engagedin deliberategovernmentalplan-
ning for economic development,and expected the Point
Four missionto help it in thiseffort.The anomalyof the
situationwas indeed curious. The Point Four personnel,
indoctrinatedas theywere in the principlesof privateenter-
prise,were asked to practiceand preach what theyneither
preachednor perhapspracticedat home. Althoughlip serv-
ice was given to the idea of encouragingprivatefreeenter-
prise,missionsin almostall recipientcountrieswere driven
542 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [VOL. LXXII1
toward the promotionof governmentalplanning and the

controland/oroperation.
expansionof government
Administrative Problems
The alleged inadequacies of Point Four administration,
that is, waste and irregularities, hastyplanning,and insuf-
ficientcoordinationamong selectedprojects,also had to be
expected. A systemof conflicting objectivesnecessitatesse-
lectiveachievementofsomeat theexpenseofothers. Admin-
istratorsmust,of necessity, decide whichobjectivesto meet.
Once the priorityamong competingstandardsis known,
agentswho deal withexecutivedecisionscannotbe expected
to adhere to rigid procedures. If " gettingthe job done "
undercertaincircumstances warrantsdeviationfromcertain
formalrules,theyshould be expectedto disregardformality.
This " flexibility " in operationaldecisions,however,is what
manycriticsof Point Four in and out of Congresshave re-
fusedto accept. A formerdirectorof theoperationsin Iran,
for example,was called to task,and severelyreprimanded,
by a congressionalcommitteeforfollowingunorthodoxpro-
cedures,althoughthe committeeagreed thathe had accom-
plishedhis mission. The recenthue and cryover the Inter-
national Cooperation Administration'sallegedly providing
" bathtubsfor Egyptiancamel drivers", sowing wild grass
along Lebanese highways,and flyingMoslems to Mecca 18
are also cases in point. In theseinstancesthe administrators
of the programevidentlybelieved that close adherenceto
specificaccountingor operationalproceduresshould be sac-
rificedin favorof attainingthe program'sover-allobjective;
and since the objective of containingCommunistswas the
mostlikelystandardto be invokedin appraisinga mission's
performance, theydid not hesitateto disregardlow priority
objectives,or to by-passformalizedprocedures,whenever
advantageous. Any action which appeared to counteract
Communist propaganda effectively and immediatelywas
givenpriorityoverotheractions.
Hasty planning and ineffective operation,too, were the
resultof the pressureput on the programto expand itselfall
over the Communist-threatened world. Point Four opera-
18New York Times, March 5, 1958, p. 1.
tionsat the end of 1956 coveredsome two thousandprojects

scatteredover more than fifty-five countriesand overseas
territories.19Consequentlyfew of its technical assistance
missionswerereasonablyequipped to performa coordinated
task. At timesit was necessaryto tailorprojectsto thequali-
ficationsof the available staffinsteadof procuringqualified
techniciansfor more urgentlyneeded projects. To some
extent,too, the lack of coordinationwas the resultof the
familiaradministrativerivalriesamong local state agencies
and withinthe Point Four administration itself. Everygov-
ernmentagencyin the recipientcountry,as a rule, triedto
get a share of Point Four funds,whetherit really needed
themor not. 'Withprojectprioritiesnot workedout before-
hand,and withPoint Four's obligationto " cobperate" with
local agencies,the results,in manycases,were wasteand du-
plication. Similarjealousies and rivalrieswerealso reported
to exist withinthe missionsthemselves. At times,the staff
of a singlemissionreportedlyconsistedof techniciansrepre-
sentingsome forty-five separate United States agencies and
departments.20Although this was probably the exception
ratherthan the rule, the heterogeneousmake-upof the mis-
sions and the somewhatdivided loyaltyof the staffwere fre-
quentlyinimicalto coordinatedwork.
No less importantamong the administrative barriersto a
successfuloperationof the programwas the precariousand
short-runnature of United States foreignpolicy. The as-
sistancethatPoint Four volunteeredto offerwas admittedly
a long-rangetypeof activityand required a long-termap-
proach. It was not and could not be treatedas an emer-
gency,crashprogram. The scientificknowledgewhich was
to be transmitted, the new methodswhichwere to be intro-
duced, the trainingwhich had to be accomplished,and re-
formswhich were to be institutedwould all require time,
and would need adequate planningand carefulco6rdination.
Yet, thePoint Four programlackedbothsuchlong-range con-
sistencyof planningand continuityof operation. Although
19 Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment, Overseas Economic Operations, A Report to the Congress,June 1955
(Washington,1955), p. 52.
20 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on
Technical Assistance Programs (Washington, 1955), p. 91.
544 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [VOL. LXXI1I
consideredas a " permanent"arm of Americanforeignpol-

icy,the programwas givenonly a year-by-year authorization
and appropriation. As projects were to be presentedto
Congressand justifiedon an annual basis,Point Four's pro-
gramingwas frequently piecemealand unbalanced.21 Handi-
capped by the insecurityof futureobjectives,hamperedby
the uncertaintyof congressionalappropriations,and moti-
vatedby a desireto please the hostgovernments,Point Four
missionsoftenlimitedtheiractivitiesto the mere " putting
of patcheson the sick economies" ratherthan offeringthe
recipientcountrieswhattheyreallyneeded.22
Prospectfor Success
The foregoinganalysishas emphasizedsome policydilem-
mas whichresultedfromseveralbasic conflictsamong Point
Four objectives. It has examined the implicationsof the
alternativepolicies. It has shownthedecisionsmade at each
junctureand the difficulties that the programhas run into.
A wordor two should now be said about the coursethatthe
programmighttake in the future. Should it be " junked"
as SecretaryDulles suggestedin 1952? Should it be " pressed
vigorously"as PresidentEisenhowerrecommendedin 1954?
Or should it be " pared drastically " as Vice PresidentNixon
is alleged to be advocatingin 1958?
In all fairnessto the Point Four idea, the guidingcriteria
formakinga rationalchoice amongthesealternativesshould
not be soughtin the accomplishments of the past,but possi-
bly in the promisesof the future. A positiveanswerto the
question of whetheror not the programshould be " vigor-
ouslypressed" dependsupon theextentto whichit promises
to serve the long-runeconomicinterestsof the underdevel-
oped areas forwhichit was initiallydesigned.
An objectiveevaluationof the role of Point Four in the
developmentof the underdevelopedworld should be made
in the light of two concreteand soberinglessonsthat past
experiencehas taughtthe United States and the recipient
countries. The United Stateshas realized thattechnicalas-
21 Hearings on Technical AssistancePrograms,p. 91.
22 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Technical As-
sistance, Final Report (Washington, 1957), p. 273.
sistanceis not a good methodfor obtainingshort-term po-
litical and strategicobjectives. Militaryassistance,defense
supportand information servicesare quicker,more effective
and lesscumbersomewaysof accomplishingimmediateends.
Underdevelopedcountriesalso have recognizedthe factthat
theirproblemsof povertyand economic backwardnesscan-
not be solvedby the Point Four assistancealone. Pure tech-
nical assistancecan solve neitherall their major economic
problemsin the long run, nor any of theirmajor problems
in the immediaterun. Even if thesecountriesexperiencea
net rateof growthcomparableto thatof the SovietUnion in
the last four decades-an unlikelyoccurrenceunder their
present political, economic and demographic trends-it
would be no soonerthan the year2000 when theymay have
a per capita real income one thirdas high as that of the
United Statestoday.
If the AmericanPoint Four programis to become an ef-
fectiveinstrumentin building up underdevelopedecono-
mies,it oughtto be offeredwitha greaterdegreeof farsight-
ednessand patiencethan it has been in the past. For some
timeto come,the United Statesshouldbe preparedto expect
no othergain fromits technicalassistancethan a promiseof
long-runpeace, domestic political stabilityand economic
progressin the aid-receivingcountries. Past experience
seemsto indicatethatPoint Four would be farmoreeffective
if its operation were divorced frompolitical and strategic
programsand particularlyif its administrationwere sepa-
rated fromthe Departmentof State. The technicalassist-
ance portionof United Statesforeignaid could be mostad-
vantageouslyused if administered by an independent,
nonpartisanagencyresponsibleto Congress. Activeinterests
and increasedparticipationof Americanuniversitiesin help-
ing universitiesand governmentsof the underdeveloped
areas suggestan explorationinto the possibilityof making
greateruse of theirfacilitiesand personnelunder a unified
administration.Technical assistanceis nothingbut a proc-
ess of " education" over time. And this may perhaps be
providedbestby institutions of higherlearning.
Universitypeople as a whole are likelyto be more quali-
fiedforoverseasassistancethan mostof the presentexperts.
They can do a more disinterestedjob for underdeveloped

countriesand theywill be more welcomed,respectedand
listenedto. The costto theAmericantaxpayersof technical
assistanceprovidedby universitiesis also likelyto be less for
a numberof operationaleconomies. Universitypeople gen-
erallyreceivelower pay than theircounterpartsin the gov-
ernment;theycan be more readilyinclined to take foreign
assignments;since their position at home is secure, they
could be more easily induced to accept a temporaryduty
abroad, and many of them knowingat least one foreign
language can conversebetterwith their counterpartsand
need less interpreting and translatinghelp.
The underdevelopedcountriesof the Middle East and
South-EastAsia also are likely to receive greaterbenefits
fromthe United Statestechnicalassistanceif theyare ready
to pay the full " costs" of theireconomicdevelopment. A
substantialoverhaulingof old taboos, antiquated institu-
tionsand harmfulattitudesis a partof thesecosts. A frank
realizationof the necessityof such changesis not a radical
viewpoint. A demand foroutside technicalhelp and guid-
ance is ipso factoan admissionof the technicalsuperiority
of the donors. Yet if thistechnicalsuperiorityis eventually
to diminishor vanish,it is not enoughsimplyto imitatethe
techniques,but to bring about the atmospherewhich has
createdthesetechniquesin the firstplace.
Now if Point Four is expectedto do a betterjob than it
has in the past,it should be offeredand acceptedas a modest
long-rangeprogramdesignedto solve some basic long-range
problems. It shouldnot be regardedeitherby thegranteror
the granteeas an emergencyplan to produce short-term re-
sults. The United Statesshould be willingto offerand ad-
ministerthisportionof its foreignaid on a sound economic
basis,hoping to reap some politicaland strategicrewardsin
the future. This is a calculatedriskthatAmericashould be
willing to take. It is only within such a frameworkthat
Point Four aid is worthgivingand perhaps also wortlhre-
ceiving.
JAHANGIR AMUZEGAR
OCCIDENTAL COLLEGE
Los ANGELES

AMUZEGAR Point Four Performance and Prospect

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Point Four: Performance and Prospect

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hastyplanning,poor selectionof projects,and inadequate

in the Middle East, Afghlanistan,Egypt,Syria and perhlalps

available to free nations . . . assistance of such nature . . . as

economicprogress,but such changeswould involvethe risks

(upon which the popularityof the programstood) was in-

The multiplicity of theseobjectivesand theirinherentin-

titionbetweenprivateand governmententerprise. In most

toward the promotionof governmentalplanning and the

tionsat the end of 1956 coveredsome two thousandprojects

consideredas a " permanent"arm of Americanforeignpol-

They can do a more disinterestedjob for underdeveloped

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