EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.
33 "The Court of Appeals shall have the power to receive evidence and perform any and
AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THE JUDICIARY
REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980, AS AMENDED
I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby order:
Section 1. The title of Chapter I of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"THE COURT OF APPEALS"
Section 2. Section 3, Chapter I of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"Sec. 3. Organization. There is hereby created a Court of Appeals which shall consist
of a Presiding Justice and fifty Associate Justices who shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines. The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his
appointment, and the Associate Justice shall have precedence according to the dates
of their respective appointments, or when the appointments of two or more of them
shall bear the same date, according to the order in which their appointments were
issued by the President. Any member who is reappointed to the Court after rendering
in any other position in the government shall retain the precedence to which he was
entitled under his original appointment, and his service in the Court shall, for all
intents and purposes, be considered as continuous and uninterrupted."
Section 3. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 4. Exercise of powers and functions. The Court of Appeals shall exercise its
powers, functions, and duties through seventeen (17) divisions, each composed of
three (3) members. The Court may sit en banc for the purpose of exercising
administrative, ceremonial or other non-adjudicatory functions."
Section 4. Section 8 of the same Act is hereby repealed.
Section 5. The second paragraph of Section 9 of the same Act is hereby amended to
read as follows:
all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in (a) cases falling within its
original jurisdiction, such as actions for annulment of judgments of regional trial
courts, as provided in paragraph (2) hereof; and in (b) cases falling within its
appellate jurisdiction wherein a motion for new trial based only on the ground of
newly discovered evidence is granted by it."
Section 6. Section 11 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 11. Quorum. A majority of the actual members of the Court shall constitute a
quorum for its session en banc. Three members shall constitute a quorum for the
sessions of a division. The unanimous vote of the three members of a division shall
be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision or final resolution, which shall be
reached in consultation before the writing of the opinion by any member of the
division. In the event that the three members do not reach a unanimous vote, the
Presiding Justice shall request the Raffle Committee of the Court for the designation
of two additional Justices to sit temporarily with them, forming a special division of
five members and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary
for the pronouncement of a decision or final resolution. The designation of such
additional Justices shall be made strictly by raffle.
A motion for reconsideration of its decision or final resolution shall be resolved by
the Court within ninety (90) days from the time it is submitted for resolution, and no
second motion for reconsideration from the same party shall be entertained."
Section 7. Subsection (d) of Section 14 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"(d) One hundred seventy-two (172) Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned
for the National Capital Judicial Region. There shall be:
Fifty-five branches (Branches 1 to 55) for the City of Manila, with seats thereat;
Thirty-two branches (Branches 76 to 107) for Quezon City, with seats thereat;
Twelve branches (Branches 108 to 119) for Pasay City, with seats thereat;
Fifty-eight branches (Branches 56 to 74 and 132 to 170) for the municipalities of
Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig,
Marikina, Paraaque, Las Pias, and Muntinlupa; Branches 56 to 66 and 132 to 150
with seats at Makati; Branches 67 to 71 and 151 to 168 at Pasig; and Branches 72 to
74, 169 and 170 at Malabon; and
Three branches (Branches 75, 171 and 172) for the municipality of Valenzuela, with
seats thereat."
Section 8. The terms "Intermediate Appellate Court, Presiding Appellate Justice and
Associate Appellate Justice(s)" used in the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or
in any other law or executive order shall hereafter mean Court of Appeals, Presiding
Justice and Associate Justice(s), respectively.
Section 9. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately. lawphi1.net
DONE in the City of Manila, this 28th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and eighty-six.
Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Ninth Congress
Republic Act No. 7691 March 25, 1994
AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS
PAMBANSA, BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "JUDICIARY
REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled::
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction.
"(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
"(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of
the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;
"(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the
demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim
exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00);
"(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the
gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such
gross value exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00);
"(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations;
"(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;
"(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian Relations as now
provided by law; and
"(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One
 hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in
Metro Manila, where the demand exclusive of the abovementioned
items exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)."
Section 2. Section 32 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases
falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts
and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or
municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial
jurisdiction; and
"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or
other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value
or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving
damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof."
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate
proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of
provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed
One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila
where such personal property, estate, or amount of the demand
does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00),
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be
specifically alleged: Provided, That interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs shall be
included in the determination of the filing fees: Provided, further,
That where there are several claims or causes of actions between
the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the
amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the
causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose
out of the same or different transactions;
"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the
defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings and
the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession; and
"(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein
does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation
purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the
assessed value of the adjacent lots."
Section 4. Section 34 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine
cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no
controversy or opposition, or contested lots where the value of which does
not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be
ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the
respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding
tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these cases shall be
appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts."
Section 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional
amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be
adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided, however,
That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall
be adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four hundred
thousand pesos (P400,000.00).
Section 6. All laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
shall be considered amended or modified accordingly.
Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all civil cases that have not yet
reached the pre-trial stage. However, by agreement of all the parties, civil cases
cognizable by municipal and metropolitan courts by the provisions of this Act may
be transferred from the Regional Trial Courts to the latter. The executive judge of the
appropriate Regional Trial Courts shall define the administrative procedure of
transferring the cases affected by the redefinition of jurisdiction to the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Section 8. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the
Official Gazette or in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: March 25, 1994
 Republic Act No. 8369 October 28, 1997
AN ACT ESTABLISHING FAMILY COURTS, GRANTING THEM
EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER CHILD AND FAMILY
CASES, AMENDING BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 129,AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS ACT OF 1980, APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled::
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997".
Section 2. Statement of National Policies. - The State shall protect the rights and
promote the welfare of children in keeping with the mandate of the Constitution and
the precepts of the United Nations Convention on the rights of the Child. The State
shall provide a system of adjudication for youthful offenders which takes into
account their peculiar circumstances.
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. The courts shall preserve the
solidarity of the family, provide procedures for the reconciliation of spouses and the
amicable settlement of family controversy.
Section 3. Establishment of Family Courts. - There shall be established a Family
Court in every province and city in the country. In case where the city is the capital
of the province, the Family Court shall be established in the municipality which has
the highest population.
Section 4. Qualification and Training of Family Court Judges. - Sec. 15 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 15. (a) Qualification. - No person shall be appointed Regional Trial
Judge or Presiding Judge of the Family Court unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, at least thirty-five (35) years of age, and, for at
least ten (10) years, has been engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines or has held a public office in the Philippines requiring
admission to the practice of law as indispensable requisite.
"(b) Training of Family Court Judges. - The Presiding Judge, as well as the
court personnel of the Family Courts, shall undergo training and must have
the experience and demonstrated ability in dealing with child and family
cases.
"The Supreme Court shall provide a continuing education program on child
and family laws, procedure and other related disciplines to judges and
personnel of such courts."
Section 5. Jurisdiction offamily Courts. - The Family Courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18)
Republic of the Philippines years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age but not less than nine (9)
Congress of the Philippines years of age or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of
Metro Manila the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty,
Tenth Congress the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which
the accused may have incurred.
 The sentence, however, shall be suspended without need of application
pursuant to Ptesidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the "Child and
Youth Welfare Code";
b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation
to the latter;
c) Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof;
d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage
and those relating to marital status and property relations of husband and
wife or those living together under different status and agreements, and
petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains;
e) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment;
f) Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of Executive
Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines";
g) Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent o
neglected children, petitions for voluntary or involuntary commitment of
children; the suspension, termination, or restoration of parental authority
and other cases cognizable under Presidential Decree No. 603, Executive
Order No. 56, (Series of 1986), and other related laws;
h) Petitions for the constitution of the family home;
i) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as
amended;
j) Violations of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act," as amended by Republic Act No. 7658; and
k) Cases of domestic violence against:
1) Women - which are acts of gender based violence that results, or
are likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or
suffering to women; and other forms of physical abuse such as
battering or threats and coercion which violate a woman's
personhood, integrity and freedom movement; and
2) Children - which include the commission of all forms of abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation, violence, and discrimination and all
other conditions prejudicial to their development.
If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer shall be subject to
criminal proceedings and the corresponding penalties.
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any
case pending in the regular courts, said incident shall be determined in that court.
Section 6. Use of Income. - All Family Courts shall be allowed the use of ten per
cent (10%) of their income derived from filing and other court fees under Rule 141
of the Rules of Court for research and other operating expenses including capital
outlay: Provided, That this benefit shall likewise be enjoyed by all courts of justice.
The Supreme Court shall promulgate the necessary guidelines to effectively
implement the provisions of this Sec.
Section 7. Special Provisional Remedies. - In cases of violence among immediate
family members living in the same domicile or household, the Family Court may
issue a restraining order against the accused of defendant upon verified application
by the complainant or the victim for relief from abuse.
The court may order the temporary custody of children in all civil actions for their
custody. The court may also order support pendente lite, including deduction from
the salary and use of conjugal home and other properties in all civil actions for
support.
Section 8. Supervision of Youth Detention Homes. - The judge of the Family Court
shall have direct control and supervision of the youth detention home which the local
government unit shall establish to separate the youth offenders from adult criminals:
Provided, however, That alternatives to detention and institutional care shall be made
available to the accused including counseling, recognizance, bail, community
continuum, or diversions from the justice system: Provided, further, That the human
rights of the accused are fully respected in a manner appropriate to their well-being.
Section 9. Social Services and Counseling Division. - Under the guidance ofthe
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), a Social Services and
Counseling Division (SSCD) shall be established in each judicial region as the
Supreme Court shall deem necessary based on the number of juvenile and family
cases existing in such jurisdiction. It shall provide appropriate social services to all
juvenile and family cases filed with the court and recommend the proper social
action. It shall also develop programs, formulate uniform policies and procedures,
and provide technical supervision and monitoring of all SSCD in coordination with
the judge.
Section 10. Social Services and Counseling Division Staff. - The SSCD shall have a
staff composed of qualified social workers and other personnel with academic
preparation in behavioral sciences to carry out the duties'of conducting intake
assessment, social case studies, casework and counseling, and othersocial services
that may be needed in connection with cases filed with the court: Provided, however,
That in adoption cases and in petitions for declaration of abandonment, the case
studies may be prepared by social workers of duly licensed child caring or child
placement agencies, or the DSWD. When warranted, the division shall recommend
that the court avail itself of consultative services of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
other qualified specialists presently employed in other departments of the
government in connection with its cases.
The position of Social Work Adviser shall be created under the Office of the Court
Administrator, who shall monitor and supervise the SSCD ofthe Regional Trial
Court.
Section 11. Alternative Social Services. - In accordance with Sec. 17 of this Act, in
areas where no Family Court has been established or no Regional Trial Court was
designated by the Supreme Court due to the limited number of cases, the DSWD
shall designate and assign qualified, trained, and DSWD accredited social workers of
the local government units to handle juvenile and family cases filed in the designated
Regional Trial Court of the place.
Section 12. Privacy and Confidentiality of Proceedings. - All hearings and
conciliation of the child and family cases shall be treated in a manner consistent with
the promotion of the child's and the family's dignity and worth, and shall respect
their privacy at all stages of the proceedings. Records of the cases shall be dealt with
utmost confidentiality and the identity of parties shall not be divulged unless
necessary and with authority of the judge.
Section 13. Special Rules of Procedure. - The Supreme Court shall promulgate
special rules of procedure for the transfer of cases to the new courts during the
transition period and for the disposition of family cases with the best interests of the
child and the protection of the family as primary consideration taking into account
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Section 14. Appeals. - Decisions and orders of the court shall be appealed in the
same manner and subject to the same conditions as appeals from the ordinary
Regional Trial Courts.
Section 15. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of
this Act shall be included in the General Appropriations Act of the year following in
its enactment into law and thereafter.
Section 16. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Supreme Court, in
coordination with the DSWD, shall formulate the necessary rules and regulations for
the effective implementation of the social aspects of this Act.
Section 17. Transitory Provisions. - Pending the establishment of such Family
Courts, the Supreme Court shall designate from among the branches ofthe Regional
Trial Court at least one Family Court in each of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay,
Caloocan, Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Muntinlupa, Laoag, Baguio, Santiago,
Dagupan, Olongapo, Cabanatuan, San Jose, Angeles, Cavite, Batangas, Lucena,
Naga, Iriga, Legazpi, Roxas, Iloilo, Bacolod, Dumaguete, Tacloban, Cebu, Mandaue,
Tagbilaran, Surigao, Butuan, Cagayan de Oro, Davao, General Santos, Oroquieta,
Ozamis, Dipolog, Zamboanga, Pagadian, Iligan, and in such other places as the
Supreme Court may deem necessary.
Additional cases other than those provided in Sec. 5 may be assigned to the Family
Courts when their dockets permit: Provided, That such additional cases shall not be
heard on the same day family cases are heard.
In areas where there are no Family Courts, the cases referred to in Sec. 5 of this Act
shall be adjudicated by the Regional Trial Court.
Section 18. Separability Clause. - In case any provision of this Act is declared
unconstitutional, the other provisions shall remain in effect.
Section 19. Repealing Clause. - All other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules or
regulations inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed, amended or modified
accordingly.
Section 20. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
Approved October 28, 1997.
Mauricio Ulep vs The Legal Clinic
July 4, 2012
223 SCRA 378 42 SCAD 287 Legal Ethics Advertisement in the Legal
Profession Practice of Law
In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according
to Nogales was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot
afford the services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint
against The Legal Clinic because of the latters advertisements which contain the
following:
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am 6:00pm
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retirees Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage
to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled Rx for Legal
Problems in Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The
Legal Clinic is composed of specialists that can take care of a clients problem no
matter how complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are
specialists in various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has
specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and
family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors and
attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the
jurisprudence in the US which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of
Arizona). And that besides, the advertisement is merely making known to the public
the services that The Legal Clinic offers.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether
such is allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.
HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such
practice is not allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The
services it offered include various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal
services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate
undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of
law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being offered by Legal
Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a
person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyers
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote
divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law which
their experts can facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way
of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-
product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer
needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees
the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome
result of propaganda. The Supreme Court also enumerated the following as allowed
forms of advertisement:
Advertisement in a reputable law list
Use of ordinary simple professional card
Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO vs ATTY. CARLOS SAGUCIO
Atty. Sagucio was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat
industries,Inc. until his appointment as Asst. Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan in 1992.Employees of Taggat filed a criminal complaint, they alleged that
complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after the death of
her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause.
Complainant now charges respondent with the violationsRule 15.03 of CPR and
engaging in the private practice of law while working as a govt prosecutor.
ISSUE:
WON respondent violated Rule 15.03 of CPR. WON being a former lawyer of
Taggatconflicts with his role as Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
HELD:
The Supreme Court finds no conflict of interests when respondent handled
preliminaryinvestigation of criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997.
The issue in the criminalcomplaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred
from April 1 1996 to July 15, 1997.Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with
Taggat during that period since he resignedsometime in 1992. In order to change
respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidencemust be presented to prove
that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information
acquired thru his previous employment. It does not necessarily followthat respondent
used any confidential information from his previous employment withcomplainant or
Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.As the former Personnel Manager and
Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he resolved asgovt prosecutor was labor-
related is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representingconflicting
interests. A lawyers immutable duty to a former client does not cover
transactionsthat occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client. The
intent of the law is to imposeupon the lawyer the duty to protect the clients interests
only on matters that he previouslyhandled for the former client and not for matters
that arose after the lawyer-client relationshiphas terminated.
Thus, respondent is NOT guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.
As to the second issue, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in Ra 6718 which
constitutes aviolation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful,dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.. The respondent
here performed acts that are usuallyrendered by lawyers with the use of their legal
knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of theterm practice of law.
Respondents admission that he received from Taggat fees for legalservices while
serving as a govt prosecutor is unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of
Rule 1.01

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015
ALVIN S. FELICIANO, Complainant, v. ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA-
LOZADA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated August 2, 2007 filed by Alvin S.
Feliciano (complainant) against respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada (Atty.
Lozada) for violation of Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in A.C. No.
6656 entitled Bobie Rose V. Frias vs. Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada3
suspending Atty. Lozada for violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the dispositive portion of which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada is hereby found guilty
of violating Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of
willfully disobeying a final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals. She is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years from
notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, for their information and
guidance, and let it be entered in respondent's personal records.
SO ORDERED.4
On May 4, 2006, the Court denied with finality Atty. Lozada's motion for
reconsideration.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
However, on June 5, 2007, in an action for injunction with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction docketed as Civil
Case no. 101-V-07 entitled Edilberto Lozada, et.al. vs. Alvin S. Feliciano, et al.,
where complainant was one of the respondents, complainant lamented that Atty.
Lozada appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and her husband, Edilberto Lozada, and
actively participated in the proceedings of the case before Branch 75 of the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela City. To prove his allegation, complainant submitted
certified true copies of the minutes of the hearings, dated June 12, 2007, July 3, 2007
and July 6, 2007, wherein Atty. Lozada signed her name as one of the counsels,6 as
well as the transcript of stenographic notes showing that Atty. Lozada conducted
direct examination and cross-examination of the witnesses during the trial
proceedings.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in appearing as counsel while still
suspended from the practice of law constitutes willfull disobedience to the
resolutions of the Court which suspended her from the practice of law for two (2)
years.
On September 12, 2007, the Court resolved to require Atty. Lozada to comment on
the complaint against him.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In her Comment9 dated November 19, 2007, Atty. Lozada explained that she was
forced by circumstances and her desire to defend the rights of her husband who is
embroiled in a legal dispute. She claimed that she believed in good faith that her
appearance as wife of Edilberto Lozada is not within the prohibition to practice law,
considering that she is defending her husband and not a client. She insisted that her
husband is a victim of grave injustice, and his reputation and honor are at stake; thus,
she has no choice but to give him legal assistance.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On January 30, 2008, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In its Report and Recommendation12 dated March 9, 2009, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Atty. Lozada guilty of
violating Rule 1.01 & 1.02, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the terms of her suspension from the practice of law as imposed by the Court.
Thus, the IBP-CBD recommended the disbarment of Atty. Lozada.
On May 14, 2011, however, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt and
approve with modification the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD such that
it recommended instead that Atty. Lozada be suspended from the practice of law for
three (3) months.
RULING
We adopt the ruling of the IBP-Board of Governors with modification.
Indeed, this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When
this Court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, as in the instant case,
the lawyer must desist from performing all functions requiring the application of
legal knowledge within the period of suspension.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Suffice it to say that practice of law embraces "any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience." It includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal]
profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based on the records, there is
no doubt that Atty. Lozada's actuations, that is, in appearing and signing as counsel
for and in behalf of her husband, conducting or offering stipulation/admission of
facts, conducting direct and cross-examination, all constitute practice of law.
Furthermore, the findings of the IBP would disclose that such actuations of Atty.
Lozada of actively engaging in the practice of law in June-July 2007 were done
within the period of her two (2)-year suspension considering that she was suspended
from the practice of law by this Court in May 4, 2006. It would then appear that, at
the very least, Atty. Lozada cannot practice law from 2006 to 2008. Thus, it is clear
that when Atty. Lozada appeared for and in behalf of her husband in Civil Case No.
101-V-07 and actively participated in the proceedings therein in June-July 2007, or
within the two (2)-year suspension, she, therefore, engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to convince. She knew very well that at the
time she represented her husband, she is still serving her two (2)-year suspension
order. Yet, she failed to inform the court about it. Neither did she seek any clearance
or clarification from the Court if she can represent her husband. While we understand
her devotion and desire to defend her husband whom she believed has suffered grave
injustice, Atty. Lozada should not forget that she is first and foremost, an officer of
the court who is bound to obey the lawful order of the Court.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, willful
disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor.
- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.15
Atty. Lozada would have deserved a harsher penalty, but this Court recognizes the
fact that it is part of the Filipino culture that amid an adversity, families will always
look out and extend a helping hand to a family member, more so, in this case, to a
spouse. Thus, considering that Atty. Lozada's actuation was prompted by her
affection to her husband and that in essence, she was not representing a client but
rather a spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate the severeness of her penalty.
Following the recent case of Victor C. Lingan v. Atty. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy
P. Baliga,16 citing Molina v. Atty. Magat,17 where this Court suspended further
respondents from the practice of law for six (6) months for practicing their
profession despite this court's previous order of suspension, we, thus, impose the
same penalty on Atty. Lozada for representing her husband as counsel despite lack of
authority to practice law.
Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of
unworthy members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the
legal profession. While the Supreme Court has the plenary power to discipline erring
lawyers through this kind of proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as
not to frustrate its preservative principle. The Court, in the exercise of its sound
judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe punishment if, through it, the
end desire of reforming the errant lawyer is possible.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista-Lozada is found
GUILTY of violating Section 27,19 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and is hereby
SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months from the practice of law, with a
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more
severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The
Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to
respondents record as member of the Bar.
Atty. Lozada is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her receipt of this
Decision, so that we can determine the reckoning point when her suspension shall
take effect.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 2387. September 10, 1998]
CLETO DOCENA, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR Q. LIMON, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM
On April 15, 1982, a complaint for disbarment was filed by Cleto Docena against
Atty. Dominador Q. Limon, Sr., on grounds of malpractice, gross misconduct, and
violation of attorney's oath.
It appears that respondent Atty. Limon was complainant's lawyers on appeal in Civil
Case No. 425 for Forcible Entry. While the appeal was pending before the then Court
of First Instance of Eartern Samar, Branch I, respondent required therein defendants-
appellants Docena spouses to post a supersedeas bond in the amount of P10,000.00
allegedly to stay the execution of the appealed decision.
To raise the required, complainant Cleto Docena obtained a loan of P3,000.00 from
the Borongan, Eastern Samar Branch of the Development Bank of the Philippines;
borrowed P2,140.00 from a private individual; and applied for an agricultural loan of
P4,860.00 from the Borongan, Samar Branch of the Philippine National Bank,
wherein respondent himself acted as guarantor (tsn, Session of July 8, 1983, pp. 33-
34). The amount of P4,860.00 was produced by complainant in response to
respondent's letter dated September 2, 1979 (Exh. "C", tsn, p. 26, ibid.) demanding
delivery of the aforesaid amount, thus:
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Docena:
I wish to remind you that today is the last day for the deposit of the balance of
P4,860.00.
Atty. Batica was in court yesterday verifying whether you have deposited the said
balance and the Honorable Judge informed him that you have until today to deposit
the said amount.
I wish to inform you that the Honorable Judge will be in Sta. Fe tomorrow for rural
service.
We will be waiting for you tomorrow September 22, 1979, at Sta. Fe as you
promised.
Very truly yours,
(Signed)
On November 14, 1980, the Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar rendered a
decision on the appealed case in favor of the Docena spouses.
After receipt of said decision, complainant went to the CFI to withdraw the
supersedeas bond of P10,000.00 but he thereupon discovered that no such bond was
ever posted by respondent.
When confronted, respondent promised to restitute the amount, but he never
complied with such undertaking despite repeated demands from the Docena spouses.
In his answer the herein complaint, respondent claimed that the P10,000.00 was his
attorney's fees for representing the Docena spouses in their appeal. But this self-
serving allegation is belied by the letter (quoted above) of respondent himself
demanding from the Docena spouses the balance of P4,860.00 supposedly to be
deposited in court to stay the execution of the appealed decision of the MTC.
Moreover, the fact that he had promised to return the P10,000.00 to the Docena
spouses is also an admission that the money was never his, and that it was only
entrusted to him for deposit.
After due investigation and hearing, the Intergrated Bar of the Philippines
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year
and ordered to return the amount of P8,500.00 (he had earlier paid complainant
P1,500.00, but nothing more) within 1 month from notice, and should he fail to do
so, he shall be suspended indefinitely.
The Court finds the recommended penalty too light. Truly, the amount involved may
be small, but the nature of the transgression calls for a heavier sanction. The Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Canon 1. x x x
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Canon 16. x x x
Canon 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
from the client.
Respondent infringed and breached these rules. Verily, good moral character is not a
condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must also be
possessed at all times in order to maintain one's good standing in the exclusive and
honored fraternity (Villanueva vs. Atty. Teresita Sta. Ana, 245 SCRA 707 [1995]).
It has been said time and again, and this cannot overemphasize, that the law is not a
trade nor a craft but a profession (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983, p. 1). Its basic ideal is
to render public service and to secure justice for those who seek its aid. [Mayer vs.
State Bar, 2 Call2d 71, 39 P2d 206 (1934), cited in Agpalo, id.] If it has to remain an
honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not
only master its tenets and principles but should also, by their live, accord continuing
fidelity to them. (Agpalo, id) By extorting money from his client through deceit and
misrepresentation, respondent Limon has reduced the law profession to a level so
base, so low and dishonorable, and most contemptible. He has sullied the integrity of
his brethren in the law and has, indirectly, eroded the peoples' confidence in the
judicial system. By his reprehensible conduct, which is reflective of his depraved
character, respondent has made himself unworthy to remain in the Roll of Attorneys.
He should be disbarred.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Dominador Q. Limon, Sr. is hereby DISBARRED.
The Office of the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of
Attorneys. Respondent is likewise ordered to return the amount of P8,500.00, the
balance of the money entrusted to him by complainant Docena, within one (1) month
from the finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 155224 August 23, 2006
VINSON B. PINEDA, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. CLODUALDO C. DE JESUS, ATTY. CARLOS AMBROSIO and ATTY.
EMMANUEL MARIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The subject of this petition for review is the April 30, 2002 decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68080 which modified the order2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 151, in JDRC Case No. 2568 entitled Ma. Aurora
D. Pineda v. Vinson B. Pineda.
The facts follow.
On April 6, 1993, Aurora Pineda filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage
against petitioner Vinson Pineda in the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151, docketed as
JDRC Case No. 2568. Petitioner was represented by respondents Attys. Clodualdo de
Jesus, Carlos Ambrosio and Emmanuel Mariano.
During the pendency of the case, Aurora proposed a settlement to petitioner
regarding her visitation rights over their minor child and the separation of their
properties. The proposal was accepted by petitioner and both parties subsequently
filed a motion for approval of their agreement. This was approved by the trial court.
On November 25, 1998, the marriage between petitioner and Aurora Pineda was
declared null and void.
Throughout the proceedings, respondent counsels were well-compensated.3 They,
including their relatives and friends, even availed of free products and treatments
from petitioners dermatology clinic. This notwithstanding, they billed petitioner
additional legal fees amounting to P16.5 million4 which the latter, however, refused
to pay. Instead, petitioner issued them several checks totaling P1.12 million5 as "full
payment for settlement."6
Still not satisfied, respondents filed in the same trial court7 a motion for payment of
lawyers fees for P50 million.8
On April 14, 2000, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay P5 million to Atty. de
Jesus, P2 million to Atty. Ambrosio and P2 million to Atty. Mariano.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced the amount as follows: P1 million to Atty.
de Jesus, P500,000 to Atty. Ambrosio and P500,000 to Atty. Mariano. The motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, this recourse.
The issues raised in this petition are:
(1) whether the Pasig RTC, Branch 151 had jurisdiction over the claim for additional
legal fees and
(2) whether respondents were entitled to additional legal fees.
First, a lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the necessary petition as an
incident of the main action in which his services were rendered or in an independent
suit against his client. The former is preferable to avoid multiplicity of suits.9
The Pasig RTC, Branch 151, where the case for the declaration of nullity of marriage
was filed, had jurisdiction over the motion for the payment of legal fees.
Respondents sought to collect P50 million which was equivalent to 10% of the value
of the properties awarded to petitioner in that case. Clearly, what respondents were
demanding was additional payment for legal services rendered in the same case.
Second, the professional engagement between petitioner and respondents was
governed by the principle of quantum meruit which means "as much as the lawyer
deserves."10 The recovery of attorneys fees on this basis is permitted, as in this
case, where there is no express agreement for the payment of attorneys fees.
Basically, it is a legal mechanism which prevents an unscrupulous client from
running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for it. In
the same vein, it avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the lawyer himself.
Further, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to
avoid controversies with clients concerning their compensation and to resort to
judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect fees
should be avoided and should be filed only when circumstances force lawyers to
resort to it.11
In the case at bar, respondents motion for payment of their lawyers fees was not
meant to collect what was justly due them; the fact was, they had already been
adequately paid.
Demanding P50 million on top of the generous sums and perks already given to them
was an act of unconscionable greed which is shocking to this Court.
As lawyers, respondents should be reminded that they are members of an honorable
profession, the primary vision of which is justice. It is respondents despicable
behavior which gives lawyering a bad name in the minds of some people. The
vernacular has a word for it: nagsasamantala. The practice of law is a decent
profession and not a money-making trade. Compensation should be but a mere
incident.12
Respondents claim for additional legal fees was not justified. They could not charge
petitioner a fee based on percentage, absent an express agreement to that effect. The
payments to them in cash, checks, free products and services from petitioners
business all of which were not denied by respondents more than sufficed for
the work they did. The "full payment for settlement"13 should have discharged
petitioners obligation to them.
The power of this Court to reduce or even delete the award of attorneys fees cannot
be denied. Lawyers are officers of the Court and they participate in the fundamental
function of administering justice.14 When they took their oath, they submitted
themselves to the authority of the Court and subjected their professional fees to
judicial control. 15
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2002 in CAG.R. CV No. 68080 is hereby
MODIFIED. The award of additional attorneys fees in favor of respondents is
hereby DELETED. SO ORDERED.
VINSON PINEDA V. ATTY. DE JESUS, ATTY. AMBROSIO AND ATTY.
MARIANO
Facts:
Aurora Pineda filed for declaration of nullity of marriage against Vinson Pineda.
Aurora proposed a settlement regarding visitation rights and the separation of
properties which was accepted by Vinson. Settlement was approved by the trial court
and their marriage was declared null and void.
Throughout the proceedings the respondent counsels were compensated but they still
billed petitioner additional legal fees in amounting to P16.5M. Vinson refused to pay
the additional fees but instead paid P1.2M.
Respondents filed a complaint with the same trial court.
Trial court ordered Vinson to pay a total of P9M. CA reduced the amount to a total of
P2M.
Issues:
W/N the RTC had jurisdiction over the claim for additional legal fees?
W/N respondents were entitled to additional legal fees?
Held:
A lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the petition as an incident of the
main action. RTC has jurisdiction.
The respondents were seeking to collect P50M which was 10% of the value of the
properties awarded to Vinson. What respondents were demanding was additional
payment for service rendered in the same case.
The professional engagement between petitioner and respondents was governed by
quantum meruit.
Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid
controversies with clients concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial
action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect fees should be
avoided and should be filed only when circumstances force lawyers to resort to it.
In this case, there was no justification for the additional legal fees sought by
respondents. It was an act of unconscionable greed!