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20 PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
Lazerowitz's formulation of the problem invoIves a pet/rio and an emo-
tive use of language. Consider: "This, it seems to me, is the real problem:
to see what it is about the nature of the views and the arguments used in
their support that makes it possible for philosophers to hold them in the
face of plain matter of fact, with which, as seems to be the case, the views
are inconsistent." (P. 4.) The petitio which Lazerowitz makes (and Moore
too) is that there are "plain matters of fact" which do contradict the
views held. The emotive use of language is evident in the word 'plain.'
Who has the temerity to deny "plain" matter of fact? It is not clear what
the word "plain" adds to matter of fact except, perhaps, that even such
sincere (but anxious) philosophers as Bradley ought to admit it. I am
sure that Bradley would be quite willing to admit matters of fact and even
perhaps plain ones, but he would deny that the one to which Lazerowitz
appealed contradicted the statement that time is unreal.
In conclusion, it appears that the question concerning the real nature
of the argument between philosophy and common sense cannot be solved
by any facts either, so it too must be a matter of words. Lazerowitz is dis-
turbed by the use of the word 'argument' in such contexts and wishes to
get rid of it. Others do not, because they are not so easily disturbed by
these divergences and are not so sure they know what the facts are or that
they know facts to confute views.
Received June 14, 1956

On Justifying Induction
by P. F. STRAWSON
OXFORD UNIVERSITY

I SHOULDlike to comment on one point in Mr. Salmon's paper? He refers

to the view that induction cannot be given a general justification, since 'to
question induction in general leaves no canons in terms of which the justi-
fication can occur.'
He says that if this view is true, then it must also be true that inductive
beliefs are conventional; that empirical knowledge is, at bottom, a matter
of convention; that it is a matter of our arbitrary choice, that we recognize
the basic canons of induction which we do recognize.
I find it mysterious that Mr. Salmon should think this. For he refers
 TRUTH TODAY 21
more than once, in the course of his paper, to Hume. Hume, I suppose,
did not think that induction could be given a general justification. He did
not, on this account, think that inductive beliefs were conventional; he
pointed out that they were natural. He did not think that our 'basic canons'
were arbitrarily chosen; he saw that this was a matter in which, at the
fundamental level of belief-formation, we had no choice at all. He would,
no doubt, have agreed that our acceptance of the 'basic eanons' was not
forced upon us by 'cognitive considerations' (by Reason); for it is forced
upon us by Nature.
Was it inconsistent in Hume, then, to frame some 'rules for judging' of
cause and effect? It was not. For Nature does not always force our hand
(our mind); and it is a requirement of Reason that our beliefs should form
a coherent system. Committed by Nature to the 'basic canons' of induc-
tion, we are led by Reason to elaborate our procedures and policies on this
basis. Reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions.
Suppose I am convinced that there is nothing to choose, as far as Reason
goes, between the 'basic canons' of induction, and a consistent counter-
inductive policy. Is an 'arbitrary choice' then really open to me? Is it?
(Just try to make it.)
If it is said that there is a problem of induction, and that Hume posed
it, it must be added that he solved it.
Received April 2, 1957
NOTE
1 Wesley Salmon, "Should W e Attempt to Justify Induction?" PhiIosophical Studies,
8:33-40 (April 1957).

The Semantics of Truth Today and Tomorrow

by PAUL WEISS
YALE UNIVERSITY

TI-IE informal statement of the semantic definition of truth, " 'p' is true
if and only if p," is surely mistaken if it supposes that "'p' is true" is identi-
cal with 'p' or with the fact that p. These cannot be substituted for it
in all cases. Nor does the first entail the second or the third. The phrase
AUTHOR'S NOTE. I have benefited from acute criticisms by my colleagues Rulon Wells
and Alan Anderson, particularly with respect to my formulations.