Comparative

Sociology
CompSoc
Comparative Sociology 6 (2007) 114–135 www.brill.nl/coso

Political Elite Circulation: Implications for Leadership

Diversity and Democratic Regime Stability in Ghana

Johanna Odonkor Svanikier

Department of Politics and International Relations,
University of Oxford, UK
johanna.svanikier@politics.ox.ac.uk

Abstract
This article proposes that elite theory is at the heart of understanding political
conflict in Africa. A case study of Ghana analyses the historical origins of elite
conflict in Ghana before and after independence. The article links high levels of
political elite circulation resulting from the transformation of traditional social
structures with high levels of political elite differentiation and instability in the
post-colonial era. Since 1992 Ghana’s new liberal democratic regime has flourished.
There are indications that there is a gradual increase in unity amongst competing
political elites. Diversity amongst political elites has resulted in greater representa-
tion at the leadership level. These factors may explain the sustained period of
political stability and the gradual deepening of liberal democracy in Ghana.

Keywords
political elites, elite circulation, elite transformation, democratization, Ghana

Introduction
This article is based on the premise that political processes in Africa are
driven by the same logic as politics elsewhere. Therefore general theories
which aim to explain the persistence of democratic regimes are equally
applicable to Africa. Here, I aim to highlight the importance of modern
elite theory in understanding the dynamics of political conflict and regime
stability in Africa. This will be done by using the case study of Ghana to
examine the processes of political elite formation, circulation, differentiation
and transformation in an historical context. The goal is to shed light on the
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2007 DOI: 10.1163/156913307X187423

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new consensus for democracy amongst competing political elites which is

evidenced by the remarkable persistence and stability of Ghana’s liberal
democratic regime from 1992 to the present time.1
Since undergoing decolonisation the continent of Africa has endured
violent political struggle and conflict. Various paradigms have been put
forth to explain the politics of the continent. (Bayart 1993; Chabal and
Daloz 1999; Van de Walle 2001). These are generally characterised by
Afro-pessimism or motivated by a repudiation of dependency theory. The
emphasis on neo-patrimonialism as a cause rather than a symptom of Afri-
can political instability has often led to the marginalisation of Africa from
the mainstream of contemporary scholarly debate. Moreover, there is little
attempt to account for different political trajectories in African countries
within a unified theoretical framework.
Some writers like Fatton (1991), Samatar (1997, 1999) and Ake (1967,
2000) have portrayed African political elites from a more multi-dimen-
sional perspective and in the process recognised the critical role they play
both in regime change and stability. In this article, the focus on the role of
political elites in analyzing the progress of democracy in Ghana is based on
historical accounts and empirical observation of events in Ghana which
indicate that the major conflicts amongst Ghanaians for control of the
state during the period of decolonisation and subsequently, took place at
the political elite level (Apter 1955).
A consensus for democracy has existed amongst Ghanaian political elites
since Ghana’s formal transition to democracy under the 4th Republican
Constitution in 1992 and particularly in the period between 1996 and the
present. This is evidenced by a dramatic expansion of political freedoms,
successive free and fair elections, the gradual institutionalisation of consti-
tutional bodies, the peaceful alternation of power and public shows of
unity amongst politicians from opposing sides. Previous to this period,
Ghana experienced a series of military overthrows of government, author-
itarian and repressive military rule and fierce conflict amongst competing
political elites. This paper explores the dynamics of this evident transfor-
mation in political elite competition from habitual conflict and political
instability to consensus and democratic regime stability.

1)
It is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate the quality of democracy in Ghana.
Nevertheless, problems as to definition and quality of democracy are not limited to

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Theoretical Background
One of the most compelling recent attempts to create a universally appli-
cable elite theory comes from John Higley and Michael Burton (2006).
They distinguish between united and disunited political elites and propose
a typology of elites which they suggest may apply in all cases. They define
political elites as ‘persons who are able, by virtue of their authoritative
positions in powerful organizations and movements of whatever kind, to
affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially’ (Burton and
Higley 2001:8). Burton and Higley have developed a systematic theory of
elites which aims to establish the connections between political elite unity
and regime stability.
‘Only after elites have entered into and sustained peaceful competitions
for mass support under agreed rules do constitutions and other political
institutions embodying representative principles and practices strengthen
and citizens become more self-confident and sophisticated in their politi-
cal participation. At varying speeds, relatively inclusive ‘democratic’ politi-
cal orders emerge. But the starting point is the taming of politics by
elites.’(Burton and Higley 2001:91)
The key role of political elites in sustaining political stability and liberal
democratic regimes is echoed by several other writers (Aron 1950; Ake
1967; Miller 1974; Fatton 1992; Samatar 1999). What emerges is that in
order to sustain a liberal democratic regime, there is the need for a balance
between both diversity and cohesiveness amongst political elites to main-
tain political stability and an enabling environment for political and eco-
nomic progress. Ake aptly describes this as:

a paradigm of elite accommodation by which the elites from the different

social groups could reach a consensual arrangement and rule as a coalition.
Under this arrangement, some integration and political stability can be
achieved by virtue of the fact that members of the diverse social groups can
identify with the ruling elite or part of it and even feel that they have a stake
in the government. (Ake 2000:43).

This article draws from Burton and Higley’s (2001, 2006) elegant theory
linking consensually united elites to stable liberal democratic regimes.

African democracies. For a comprehensive and animated statement on the matter see
Claude Ake. 2002. The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa.

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Direct links between political elite circulation and political elite unity are
rightly discounted by Burton and Higley (2001, 2006). However, links
between elite circulation, levels of differentiation and regime stability
though alluded to are not fully explored. The revision of their typology in
Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy (Higley and Burton 2006) further
loses the nuances emanating from their concept of elite ‘differentiation’ in
“The Study of Political Elite Transformations”.

Differentiation is the process through which groups making up political

elites become more numerous, organizationally diverse, functionally spe-
cialised and socially heterogeneous. (Burton and Higley 2001:183–184)

The outcome of higher levels of elite circulation and differentiation is

greater representation of different sectors of society at the political elite
level. Higley and Burton (2001:25–26) point out the importance of high
levels of representation for regime stability. However they lose this sense of
the meaning of representation in their new typology2 by focusing exclu-
sively on elections to signify representation (2006:18). A state may hold
regular multi-party elections that are not fully representative for reasons
that are not immediately obvious to a casual observer. For example lack of
education could act as a barrier to the full participation of social or ethnic
groups in political parties and electoral competitions.
This article aims to demonstrate the importance of exploring links
between elite differentiation and democratic regime stability, by examin-
ing circulation and differentiation amongst Ghana’s political elites in terms
of their diversity in social status and background, from an historical per-
spective. I suggest here that political elite circulation may lead to higher
levels of political elite differentiation which could impede political elite
unity in the short to medium term. “The proliferation of elite groups
implies a dispersion of power and ensuing turf wars that make integration
difficult to reach or sustain.” (Burton and Higley 2001:184). This may
account for the frequent military coups experienced by Ghana in the six-
ties, seventies and eighties. However, if political elite transformation sub-
sequently takes place, giving rise to consensually united elites, the higher
levels of elite differentiation result in a more representative and therefore
more stable regime. On the other hand, it may be argued that low levels of

2)
See Higley and Burton (2006:18), Table 1.1.

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political elite circulation lead to low levels of differentiation which may

enhance integration and lead to regime stability in the medium but not the
long term.
Any inferences that one could make regarding other African countries
can only be very tentative at this stage. However, examining Ghanaian
political elite struggles may shed some light on the causes of the instability
and regular military coups that occurred in some African countries follow-
ing independence on the one hand and the relative stability and longevity
of one-party regimes on the other. In some African countries, the political
power of relatively (socially and/ or ethnically) homogenous political elites
became entrenched following independence. However it may be argued
that the exclusive and unrepresentative nature of such long-lasting regimes
eventually creates political instability in the longer term and leads to deeper
social and ethnic divisions. On the other hand, higher levels of political
elite circulation can lead to more representative political leadership. There-
fore when elite transformation does occur resulting in greater unity
amongst highly differentiated political elite groups, there is a greater likeli-
hood of stability under a liberal democratic regime.
In this article, I shall establish the historical antecedents of political elite
conflict in Ghana by examining political elite formation and circulation in
the Gold Coast and Ghana. I propose that the main political conflict has
centred on demands by newly educated commoners for political inclusion
and their largely successful attempts to wrest power from more established
political elites. This has resulted in an identifiable cycle of elite circulation
spawning successive generations of political elites. The consequences have
been that political elite groups have become more numerous, more socially
and ethnically diverse and for the greater part of the nation’s history dis-
united. More recently, signs of political elite unity and consensus over
democratic rule may account for the remarkable stability of the liberal
democratic regime of the past 14 years.

Elite Formation in the Gold Coast

The Notion of Class

In traditional Akan society, although social differentiation was often based
on descent, it did not equate to the type of social stratification born out

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of feudalism and the industrial revolution that exists in some European

societies. This view is supported by Arhin (1983) in his article “Rank
and Class among the Asante and the Fante”. Both by demographic, socio-
economic and cultural standards the Akan are the most dominant of
Ghana’s ethnic groups. Many Akan norms have therefore been adopted
as representative of traditional Ghanaian society. According to Maxwell
Owusu:

Though many of the symbols of the state are Akan in origin, they are often
shared by other societies in Ghana who may have similar symbols and tradi-
tions. . . . During the colonial period, as the Gold Coast Chiefs List of 1936
stressed, the Akan paradigm of state-craft was, with some local modification,
adopted by nearly all other ethnic groups in the country. (1986:81)

In his book Nkrumah and the Chiefs, Richard Rathbone (2000:12) states
that some cultures in Ghana, “most notably that of the Akan, had a long
tradition of powerful monarchs supported by extensive aristocracies.” He
further explains that the colonial and anthropological convention of using
the word “chief ” rather than “king” diminished the status of the position
of such traditional rulers to avoid the absurdity of having “a British king
with imperial subjects who were also kings”. Within the social structure of
the Akan there was also the notion of commoners (asafo or nkwankwaa in
Twi) literally meaning ‘young men’. As Allman (1993:29) points out the
sense of the term was not that they were necessarily young but it distin-
guished them from elders (mpanyinfu) and political office holders (chiefs)
who were their superiors in traditional social hierarchy. Several writers
have recognised the role of organised commoner associations (e.g. asafo
companies) as a means of checks and balances on chiefly power, especially
in the context of the destoolment of chiefs (Rathbone 2000, Li 1995,
Owusu 1986, Austin 1970, Apter 1955). The traditional rights of protest
and rebellion by commoners have been linked to the protests of ‘young
men’ in the nationalist struggle for independence (Rathbone 2000) and
military coups in the post-colonial era (Owusu 1986).
Ivor Wilks wrote of the nineteenth century Nkwankwaa as men who
“belonged to old and well-established families but whose personal expecta-
tions of succeeding to office or even of acquiring wealth were low” (Wilks
1989). In his landmark study of Education and Social Change in Ghana,
Philip Foster (1965) highlights how a new kind of status system emerged

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in the Gold Coast during the colonial period due to the critical impact
of Western-style education, and the implications that this had for the
configuration of political power in the independent state of Ghana. The
importance of education to social mobility is also emphasised by Dennis
Austin (1970). When talking about Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party,
he observes that:

the demand made by the party for self-government was bound up with a
struggle for power which had many of the characteristics of a class struggle –
provided the words were widened in scope to connote a level determined as
much by education, and by social standing within a traditional political sys-
tem, as by economic criteria. (Austin 1970:13)

In the pre-independence Gold Coast colony, the principal routes to elite

status occurred through aristocratic connections, commercial activity and
formal Western-style higher education. The corresponding elite types were
neo-traditional elites, coastal merchants/intelligentsia and educated com-
moners. These categories are oversimplified for the sake of clarity and dis-
tinctions could sometimes be more blurred than the typology suggests.

Neo-Traditional Elites – the First Generation

Aristocrats form the first category of elites that I discuss in this article and
I describe members of this group as the first generation of political elites
that emerged in the colonial era. The authority and legitimacy of neo-
traditional elites lay on the one hand in their role as indigenous traditional
rulers and on the other, in their role as partners of the colonial government
in the administration of the colonial policy of indirect rule. I shall further
sub-divide royal elites into those who had a Western-style education and
those who did not. Foster (1965) suggests that from an early date British
policy had aimed at the enrolment of the sons of chiefs into schools in the
hope of co-opting them to the British side. However the British failed to
take into account the fact that the Akan matrilineal system of inheritance
excluded the sons of chiefs from the assumption of chiefly office. Indeed,
the distinction they failed to make was between ahenemma and adehye.
Ahenemma were the off-spring of the king or chief. However they were not
in the line of succession. Adehye on the other hand were siblings of the
chief (who had the same mother) or his sister’s children and were therefore
in the direct (matrilineal) line of succession. Some chiefs’ sons did attend

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schools but since they were not eligible to inherit their fathers, the main
motive for educating them was thwarted (Foster 1965). Moreover such a
reforming role as the British hoped future chiefs would play would have
been in direct conflict to their conservative role as the guardians of cus-
toms and traditions within their own societies. Indeed for this very reason,
before independence, a Western-style education was generally not deemed
suitable for a potential traditional ruler.3

.... early recruitment into the schools was from groups who were not primar-
ily associated with traditional activities but were rather connected with
the exchange economy and European-type functions; it would also appear
that most of them were not eligible for traditionally prestigeful office.
In functional terms, the schools by operating increasingly as the gateway to
new occupational categories constituted an alternative avenue of mobility
operating independently of traditional modes of status acquisition. (Foster
1965:63)

This trend had a profound impact on the future balance of political power
within Ghanaian society and resulted in what Foster (1963) describes as
the “dysfunctional consequences of Western education”. Here I argue that
the social phenomenon created by the introduction of formal Western
education formed the basis of political elite circulation, differentiation
and subsequent fragmentation in the run up to independence and after.
As a more immediate consequence however, the failure of traditional
authorities to take up Western education for their future rulers meant that
instead of the hereditary authority and power of chiefs being mutually
reinforced through such education, a new breed of political elites whose
high status was inextricably linked to their close connections with Euro-
pean merchants and colonial officials on the coast as well as their high
levels of Western education, emerged to challenge the authority of the
chiefs. Foster writes:

The position of traditional elites in the Gold Coast was progressively weak-
ened by their inability to perceive the necessity for European education. For,
once European political control became effective, there was always the

3)
Ironically the exact opposite is now true in modern day Ghana where a higher education
is now seen as a prerequisite for potential traditional rulers.

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possibility that the locus of power would shift from the chiefs in favour of
alternative groups which had earlier recognised the potential significance of
schooling. (Foster 1965:64)

Nevertheless, the fact that some chief ’s sons and lesser aristocrats were
educated meant that some royals of that period did receive education to
high levels helping to bridge the gap between neo-traditional elites and the
coastal elites who had begun to challenge their political role. A subsequent
political alliance diffused the potential conflict between these two groups.
This fusion of vocal coastal elites and educated royalty formed the core of
what came to be known as the “intelligentsia”. Austin asserts,

To be sure, the Colony chiefs and the intelligentsia had been close rivals for
power and position on the legislative council. . . . But there was little sense of
permanent hostility between any section of what constituted (by 1946) a
triple ruling elite – the officials, chiefs and intelligentsia. (Austin 1970:9)

Indeed because the educated aristocrats straddled the neo-traditional elites

and the professional coastal elites they are not clearly defined in the litera-
ture as a unique group. However their distinctive role is central to the
arguments made here as they came to form the core of a nationalist con-
servative faction which lay at the heart of political elite disunity in an
independent Ghana. Most prominent amongst this group was Dr J.B.
Danquah the younger half-brother of Nana Sir Ofori-Atta I, paramount
chief of Akyem Abuakwa an area between the Gold Coast Colony and
Ashanti.4 He was a prominent lawyer and politician who had acted as his
brother’s secretary before earning a PhD and a law degree in the UK.

Coastal Elites – the Second Generation

The political sophistication of the Gold Coast’s coastal elites is well-documented
in D.B. Kimble’s A Political History of Ghana (1963). They consisted of
wealthy coastal merchant families whose offspring typically travelled to
Europe for their higher education. These families due to their early and
direct contact with Europeans and their role in the exchange economy had

4)
They shared the same father which meant that Danquah was not in the line of succession.

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by independence been educated for several generations and together with

the neo-traditional elites came to form part of an established indigenous elite.
By contrast, commoners who had acquired secondary school education in
the decades preceding independence would tend to be the first generation
to be educated in their families. According to Foster (1965:68), “[t]he
great merchant families constituted a highly educated minority who to a
great extent identified themselves with and were accepted by Europeans on
terms of parity.” Some of this group came from Fante aristocratic back-
grounds or were the descendants of European merchants and officials.
From this group emerged what I categorise as the second generation of
political elites. Political tensions arose between such intellectual elites and
traditional rulers as to which group was more qualified to represent the
people on the Gold Coast Legislative Council,

However [t]he passage of time had softened the earlier disputes of the 1920s
and Danquah had worked hard throughout the 1930s and the war years to
form a common front between the two sets of leaders. (Rathbone 2000:50)

The United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) was initially created as a

coalition of lawyers and coastal merchants with the aim of advancing the
cause of the intelligentsia for increased representation in the Legislative
Council (Foster 1965; Austin 1970). Several of the founding committee
members of the UGCC were highly-educated as well as having aristocratic
connections. As already mentioned, Dr J.B. Danquah was the younger
half-brother of the paramount chief of Akyem, Abuakwa, Nana Sir Ofori-
Atta I and William Ofori-Atta another prominent member of the UGCC
was the paramount chief ’s son. Edward Akuffo-Addo yet another promi-
nent member, was married to a daughter of the paramount chief. Therefore
characterising this particular struggle as between chiefs and commoners as
Austin (1970) does is an over-simplification. Indeed, the main political
struggle prior to independence was not amongst indigenous elite factions
or between indigenous elites and British colonial elites who had already
begun to prepare the colony for a gradual political hand over, but between
a coalition of neo-traditional and professional elites on the one hand and a
coalition of educated and semi-educated commoners on the other. The
driving force behind the radical nationalist movement was the educated
and semi-educated commoners who by dint of their education aspired to

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political, economic and social elite status themselves. To achieve this they
would need to mobilise a mass following and the charismatic Kwame
Nkrumah was just the man for the job.

Educated Commoners – the Third Generation

Although widely used in the literature on politics in Ghana, it is important
to clarify the use of the word “commoner”. In this context it refers to those
who were not traditionally of aristocratic birth. Therefore in the traditional
system of social differentiation commoners could not generally have
aspired to equal political and social elite status as royals. However this
article seeks to highlight the dramatic nature of the social changes trig-
gered by the introduction and expansion of Western-style education dur-
ing the colonial period which made this possible. In this new context,
education through its close association with the process of upward social
and career mobility played an increasingly significant role in emergent
conceptions of social status (Foster 1965). Since education and occupation
were becoming the new determinants of social status, for the first time
commoners could potentially become members of the political elite and
eventually did. Such educated commoners some of whom obtained higher
education up to university level could be categorised as the third genera-
tion of political elites.

Economic Transformation and the Expansion of Education

There is a popular misconception that the level of provision of education
in particular regions of Ghana before independence was determined by the
Christian missions or by colonial officials. However it is one of Foster’s key
arguments that the expansion of schooling in the Gold Coast was demand
driven. Demand for education determined where schools were established
and this was in turn contingent on prospects for social mobility through
available occupational opportunities and increased levels of wealth. There-
fore, the progressive development of a large-scale exchange economy and
the accompanying creation of a differentiated occupational structure, led
to an increased demand for education in the urban areas particularly along
the coast where European trade was centred. This increased demand led to
the provision of basic primary education to an increasing number of chil-
dren in that area. Hence a group emerged which came to be known as the

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“Cape Coast Scholars” (Foster 1965). Foster contrasts them with the intel-
ligentsia of the coast:

At the other extreme were the ‘Cape Coast Scholars’ poorly educated and
regarded with disdain both by the Europeans and the more highly educated
Africans. There is a curious ambivalence in fact about the whole European
attitude towards the lesser products of the schools. Urged to emulate European
behaviour, they were, at the same time, an object of derision for attempting to
do so and Europeans were particularly critical of the results of a process which
they themselves were responsible for setting in motion. (Foster 1965:68)

This group of semi-educated commoners expanded dramatically after the

“take off ” of cocoa as a major cash crop in Ghana at the beginning of the
20th century. According to Polly Hill (1997), most of the cocoa that was
produced in Ghana up to 1911 was grown on land which had been bought
outright by migrant farmers for the purpose of growing cocoa: “These
migrants, who in their general outlook surely had more in common with
‘capitalists’ than with ‘peasants’ were familiar with the cash economy, their
principal source of wealth being the oil palm.” (Hill 1961:209)
Therefore there appears to be a correlation between increased domestic
purchasing power and the demand for schools as many commoners in the
cocoa growing areas of the Eastern Province (predominantly Akwapim and
Akyem) acquired increased wealth through the expansion of their cash
cropping activities and could therefore increasingly afford Western-style
education for their children. Indeed Foster argues that the demand for
education tended to follow the movement of cocoa production with
increasing educational activity in the Akwapim area quite early in the cen-
tury but no real evidence of mass demand in Ashanti until the thirties,
when cocoa was becoming firmly established there (Foster 1965:126). This
partly accounts for the Ashanti and particularly the Northern Regions lag-
ging behind the South in the extent and level of educational provision. The
rapid expansion of the cash-crop economy and increases in incomes that
followed, undermined traditional structures of social status because the
new wealth acquired opened new channels for acquiring prestige and sta-
tus outside of the traditional one. Kwame Arhin (1983) discusses the con-
trasting contemporary Asante and Fante views about the ‘ideal’ man. In
the case of Asantes, to be chief-like is most esteemed whereas in Fante
society being a scholar and a gentleman is the model for social excellence.

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This contrast in outlook of the two groups is attributed to different experi-

ences with regard to “changes in the economy, the European presence and
formal Western education as sources of new life styles” Arhin (1984). The
effects on Fantes were more pronounced because of their coastal location.
Traditional structures became more fluid allowing for the acceptance of
Western education more readily which then became an alternative mode of
achieving elevated social status. A considerable proportion of the earnings
derived from cocoa production was utilised in the education of children,

in such a way as to qualify them for any other occupation than cocoa farm-
ing. . . . It is therefore appropriate to regard the extension of Western educa-
tion and the enlargement of the exchange sector of the economy as mutually
reinforcing factors leading to the progressive disintegration of traditional
structures and their successive replacement by new concepts of social status
and new modes of acquiring it. (Foster 1965:127)

Moreover the provision of education was dominated by Christian mission

schools who offered a predominantly academic education in response to
demand. Since their main mission was to proselytise within the communi-
ties, Christian religion formed a significant part of the education which
further undermined traditional beliefs and social structures. A result of the
expansion of basic education was increased pressure on secondary schools.
Achimota College was set up in 1927 by the colonial government as a
response to this pressure. It was set up as a non-fee paying highly, selective
educational establishment which would allow the brightest and the best
from around the country to attend secondary school in a boarding environ-
ment with no emphasis on any particular religion, ethnicity or social back-
ground. It became a training ground for the future leaders of Ghana many
of whom used it as a stepping stone for further studies abroad. In this way
many commoners were given the opportunity for education on a par with
the privileged coastal elites and educated aristocrats. By 1950 the “strate-
gic” sector of education so far as social mobility was concerned had shifted
from the primary to the secondary level (Foster 1965). Indeed, “the Gold
Coast had developed a more extensive system of schooling than any other
African territory outside the Union of South Africa.” (Foster 1965:171)

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Political Implications of Social Change

The impact of this unprecedented mass extension of education to com-

moners particularly at the basic level, led to social tensions between elites
and commoners as the economy did not grow to meet the supply of school
graduates. This led to increased unrest around the country as commoners
challenged the authority and legitimacy of traditional rulers. There was
widespread resistance by some traditional commoner associations or asafo
companies that were organised into youth organisations against the over-
bearing and corrupt practices of some traditional rulers whose powers were
protected by the colonial authority (Rathbone 1970). In addition to the
social divisions that had developed through education, there were high
levels of discontent in the Gold Coast following the Second World War,
due to economic hardship triggered by general inflation and the swollen
shoot disease which had infected a quarter of cocoa trees. There was anger
and despair amongst cocoa farmers who had seen large numbers of their
trees felled under a government directive to control the disease. To add
further to this social unrest, ex-service men who had been exposed to
new ideas during the Second World War had now returned and expected
fair compensation for their contributions to the War effort. By Austin’s
(1970) account economic grievances abounded and people were demand-
ing a change.

The Role of Political Agency

Having highlighted some major structural factors that led to social and
political change and unrest in the Gold Coast, the picture would be incom-
plete without a discussion about the role and importance of certain per-
sonalities and their agency in the evolving political process. Nana Sir
Ofori-Atta I was the Okyehene or paramount chief of Akyem Abuakwa
between 1912 and 1943 based in their capital town of Kyebi.5 The Akyem
Abuakwa stool had a record of close cooperation with the colonial govern-
ment and had collaborated in the campaign for the submission of the
Ashanti King to the British Crown. “Military contingents from Akyem
Abuakwa were involved in both the alliances which fought in the 1874 and
1900 wars against Asante.” Rathbone (1996:508). The rule of Ofori-Atta I
coincided with the heyday of the doctrine of indirect rule and Nana Ofori
5)
This is written “Kibi” in the older literature.

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Atta’s relationship with the British illustrated the policy operating at its
best with him skilfully combining elements of both the traditional and the
modern within his court. His authority and prestige were greatly enhanced
by his close relationship with the British and his “political and economic
shrewdness protected and enriched his immediate family in Akyem
Abuakwa” (Rathbone 1989:446). In 1927 at the age of 46, he was hon-
oured by the British Crown as a Knight Commander of the British Empire.
He was a member of the Gold Coast Legislative Council from 1916 to
1943 where he represented the interests of the chiefs and was one of the
first two Africans to sit on the Executive Council in 1942.
After Nana Ofori-Atta’s death in 1943, the Odikro or sub-chief of a
small town in Akyem Abuakwa was allegedly murdered at the royal palace
in Kyebi by 8 members of the royal family as part of the funeral rites asso-
ciated with the death of a paramount chief. The colonial government
arrested, prosecuted and convicted these members of the Akyem royal
family for murder. One of the counsels for the defence was Dr. J.B. Dan-
quah the half-brother of Nana Sir Ofori-Atta I. In the end 3 of the 8 men
were hung despite all efforts of Danquah to obtain a pardon from the Gov-
ernor and the colonial government. This event soured the relationship between
the colonial government and the royal house of Akyem Abuakwa.
Danquah went on to form the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC)
in 1947 with seven others initially to agitate for increased representation of
the merchant class and intelligentsia on the Legislative Council. However
their overall goal was “self-government in the shortest possible time” and it
is likely that the outcome of the Kyebi murder trial created the impetus for
a new nationalism amongst this normally moderate group which included
the late king’s brother, son and son-in-law (Rathbone 1989). They recruited
Kwame Nkrumah a doctoral student at the London School of Economics
to be the Secretary-General of their newly formed political organisation.
Nkrumah had been active in student movements in the US and the UK
and had belonged to the anti-imperialist Pan-African movement which
called for independence and unity amongst African States.
It is arguable that Nkrumah’s interest in Pan-Africanism in the US and
the UK was bolstered by the fact that he was not a member of the established
elite within his own home country and did not therefore immediately see
a leading political role for himself at the national level. However his return
to the Gold Coast coincided with an increased politicisation of the country

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 J. O. Svanikier / Comparative Sociology 6 (2007) 114–135 129

particularly amongst cocoa farmers, ex-service men and the semi-educated

youth. His charisma, organisational skills and common touch hit a high
note with this group but his increasing radicalism made the generally
sedate members of the UGCC extremely uncomfortable. Amidst increas-
ing acrimony he broke away from the UGCC to form the Convention
People’s Party. With the increasing prospect of democratic elections a mass
following was the key to political victory. His radical message of “Self-Gov-
ernment Now!” and his hostility towards the African and colonial estab-
lishment made him appear to be the more likely candidate to fulfil the
aspirations of the commoners in their new heightened state of politicisa-
tion. The tension created by the murder trial between the highly influential
Akyem royal family and the colonial government may have created the
political space for these events to unfold with such dramatic speed.
Nkrumah harnessed all the pent up frustration of the semi-educated
commoners, many of whom were unemployed, who swept him to victory
in elections held in 1951 (Austin 1970). Thus the stage was set for open
political conflict between aristocratic, educated, conservative political elites
and educated and semi-educated commoners who now replaced the colo-
nial elite to become the new ruling elite. Commenting about the period of
transition from colonial rule to full self-government where Nkrumah
worked closely with the colonial officials, Sir Arden-Clarke the Gold Coast
Governor stated,

It was indeed, unnerving at times to observe as we worked from one Consti-

tution to the next, how much depended upon the personal relationships
between a few leading personalities. (Arden-Clarke 1958:32)

Politics in Independent Ghana

Diversity in Leadership
The events described above account for the extreme disunity that existed
amongst Ghanaian political elites prior to and after independence, foster-
ing a politics of fierce conflict and instability. Although indigenous politi-
cal confrontation in Ghana prior to independence has been characterised
in the literature as one between chiefs and commoners the real battles since
independence have raged at the political elite level. Unlike other African

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countries where civil wars have involved the masses as combatants or victims,
the casualties of political struggles in Ghana have predominantly been
amongst political elite groups themselves.
Elite circulation leads to diversity and differentiation amongst political
elites both in terms of social status and ethnicity. This can result in a sense
of increased representation even where political elites are not united.
Higher levels of representation prevent a situation where certain social or
ethnic groups feel completely excluded from the political process. As a
result, political conflict is largely contained at the elite level where different
groups struggle for pre-eminence. A situation where there is a low level of
elite circulation and a non-representative or non-diverse group of elites
monopolise political power for a long period, may lead to political stability
in the medium term but widespread and violent conflict in the long term.
Political elite disunity has characterised Ghanaian politics since indepen-
dence. This has been evidenced by assassination attempts, imprisonment of
dissidents, deaths of opposition politicians in prison, successive military
coups, political persecution and the execution of leaders. Further elite circula-
tion and differentiation occurred with the entry of the military into the polit-
ical fray. The intrigues, rivalries and turf wars of the various elite factions
which emerged after the military overthrow of Nkrumah are documented by
Austin and Luckham (1975) in Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana.
This period saw the crystallization of the two main political traditions
which represent the two main political cleavages in the country. They are
the Nkrumahist tradition which is perceived as ethnically and socially
inclusive, broad-based, populist and left-wing and the Busia/Danquah tra-
dition which is perceived as elitist, ethnically exclusive, liberal-democratic
and right-wing. At the leadership level both traditions have representatives
from all the main ethnic groupings although political parties in the
Nkrumahist tradition have tended to have more diversity at the top. How-
ever the political cleavages that divide Ghanaian politics go beyond ethnic-
ity and include historical, social and ideological ones.
Colonel I.K. Acheampong the military Head of State between 1972 and
1976 was derided by established elite groups for not being a university
graduate or even attending one of the more academic secondary schools.
Under his regime the role of education as a vehicle for upward social mobil-
ity was deeply undermined. Suddenly kalabule had become the main chan-
nel to secure the lifestyles which had formerly been guaranteed by a
university degree and a civil service job. Kalabule was a word coined to

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describe the rampant corruption, rent-seeking and profiteering of the

Acheampong era. In this period for the first time in the 20th century Ghana-
ians begun to question the value of education as a vehicle for social and
economic mobility. Suddenly professionals such as university lecturers,
doctors, nurses, teachers and civil servants were obliged to start up small
side-line businesses like poultry farming, catering and dress-making to
make ends meet.

The Fourth Generation of Elites

The June 4th 1979 military mutiny coupled by the 31st December 1981
military coup led by Flight Lieutenant J.J, Rawlings acted as a catalyst in
the conflict amongst Ghana’s disunited political elites. In 1979, during its
brief 3 month rule, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led
by Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings, executed several members of the
government and some former heads of state before handing over to an
elected civilian government. However economic conditions did not
improve significantly under the new government and by December 1981
Rawlings staged a military coup which returned him to power. Rawlings’
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) regime attracted a new
generation of home-grown left wing intellectuals who had been politicised
by the economic chaos and corruption that had ensued in the seventies.
These were predominantly commoners who had benefited from the expan-
sionist and inclusive education policies of the Nkrumah era. These policies
involved the building of new secondary schools around the country as well
as the expansion of domestic, free, tertiary education. Therefore Ghanaians
no longer needed to bear the cost of going abroad to acquire university
degrees and this increased the number of commoners who could now
benefit from a university education.
However with the rapidly deteriorating economic conditions particu-
larly under the materialistic and profligate regime of Acheampong the life-
style and prestige which a good education was expected to deliver did not
materialise creating a new generation of disaffected educated commoners
ready to challenge the status quo. The return of Rawlings provided this
group with the opportunity to join the ranks of the political elites. How-
ever the width and depth of elite circulation was not as far-reaching as
might have been expected as links with some former politicians were not
completely broken. Some of Rawlings’ new ministers and advisors had

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been connected with past governments in both the Nkrumahist and the
Busia/Danquah traditions. Indeed the current President, J.A. Kufour
served as Minister for Local Government for a brief period.
Rawlings declared a people’s “revolution” and lashed out at former poli-
ticians as well as the business and professional classes. The many human
rights abuses which occurred under an increasingly lawless climate included
the murder of three judges who by their rulings were deemed to be unsym-
pathetic to the regime. This marked a turning point for the Ghanaian
middle-classes in general and previous generations of political elites in par-
ticular who by then felt they were living under siege. Most of their patron-
client networks were broken and most who had not left the country already
scuttled into exile. Rawlings’ “revolution” swept away past structures of
political power and created new ones featuring a new set of political elites.
Nugent documents the desperate scramble of the PNDC hierarchy to define
the role and will of “the people” in the early days of the “revolution”:
“Whereas Rawlings insisted that it was the people who should govern, the
fact of the matter was that the real decisions were made in Accra by PNDC
functionaries who were not, strictly speaking, accountable to anyone.”
(Nugent 1995:48)

A Shared Sense of Destiny: Coalitions, Alliances and Inclusion

For the first time, political elites belonging both to the Busia/Danquah
tradition as well as the Nkrumahist tradition, whether in exile or at home
began to perceive each other as victims and potential allies. The shared
trauma of persecution and human rights violations many of them had
directly or indirectly experienced under the AFRC/PNDC had finally
given them a sense of a shared destiny. They now came together to become
an established elite united in opposition to the new ruling elite. Some
of them worked together in agitating for a return to democratic rule
which eventually bore fruit when multi-party elections were scheduled
for 1992. However the two dominant political traditions failed to form
a coalition and Rawlings won the election amidst protests of fraud from
the opposition.
For the 1996 elections, the “Great Alliance” was formed between the
National Patriotic Party representing the Busia/Danquah tradition and the
Nkrumahist People’s Convention Party, an offshoot of the CPP. Due to a
lack of resources and effective organisation the alliance lost once again to

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Rawlings’ NDC and he became President for a second term. By 2000 the
NPP had made the necessary reforms within their party and built up the
confidence to enter the elections in their own right once again. None of
the parties received the 50% plus one of the valid votes cast for an outright
victory in the first round. In the runoff between the NDC and the NPP
however, the opposition parties most of which were in the Nkrumahist
tradition put their weight behind the NPP by calling on their supporters
to vote for the NPP presidential candidate, J.A. Kufour helping the NPP
to sweep to victory with a convincing margin of 56.9 votes to the NDC’s
43.1. The victory of the NPP in the 2000 elections signified a joint effort
between two traditionally opposed political sides in their bid to oust the
newcomers and bears witness to an emerging integration of Ghana’s estab-
lished elites. Recognising the role the NPP’s erstwhile political opponents
had played in their victory, President Kufour promised an inclusive gov-
ernment and in the first term of office the NPP appointed a token number
of ministers from other parties to symbolise a new era of political unity.
One of these was Dr. Paa Kwesi Ndoum who survived as a minister into the
second term of President Kufour’s government. On his website it states:

It is indeed historic and significant that Dr. Nduom, a leading member of the
Convention People’s Party can serve as a Cabinet Minister in a New Patriotic
Party government. (www.ndoum.com).

Dr. Ndoum the current Minister of Public Sector Reform has also held the
portfolios of Minister of Economic Planning & Regional Cooperation and
Minister of Energy in President Kufour’s government.
Significantly however the NPP no longer see the CPP or other offshoots
of the original CPP as a major political threat but rather as potential
allies or coalition partners. This may be due to the fact that in the pro-
cess of becoming established elites themselves the educated commoners
of the Nkrumah era and their heirs have lost their common touch. In
achieving increased acceptance and integration with political elites of the
Busia/Danquah tradition they have lost the political edge required to
attract a mass following. The divisions within the Nkrumahist group led to
the emergence of several CPP off-shoot parties which have become increas-
ingly politically marginalised, allowing the NDC to take over the mantle as
the dominant party in the Nkrumahist tradition. The question therefore is
how much unity exists between the established political elites of the two

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opposing traditions and the new elites of the NDC. This issue is the subject
of on-going research.

Conclusion
This article has chartered the history of social change, political elite forma-
tion, competition, conflict and disunity which existed in Ghana prior to
the current liberal democratic regime under the 4th Republic. It has argued
that the initial source of political conflict were the changes in traditional
social hierarchy created by increased wealth amongst commoners and the
introduction of Western-style education during the pre-colonial and colo-
nial eras. It has further striven to illustrate how political elite circulation
was fuelled by the emergence of successive generations of political elites
resulting in increased differentiation amongst political elites. The ensuing
disunity led to insecurity amongst political elites and a cycle of military
coups interspersed with brief periods of multi-party civilian government.
Nevertheless, elite differentiation also resulted in political elites becoming
more heterogeneous and representative of the different interest groups
within Ghanaian society compared to for example the Ivory Coast, Sierra
Leone or Liberia in the same period. After almost 50 years of indepen-
dence, competing Ghanaian political elites are finally beginning to show
signs of unity. The emerging political elite unity combined with the exist-
ing diversity amongst Ghanaian leadership may account for the persistence
and deepening of the liberal democratic regime under the 4th Republic
over more than a decade; a record in the history of Ghanaian politics.

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