Case Facts
Austria vs. Masaquel This is a petition for a writ
of certiorari to annul or set
aside the order of
respondent Judge Antonio
Masaquel, dated February
10, 1964, in Civil Case No.
13258 of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan,
declaring petitioner Domingo
V. Austria guilty of contempt
of court and imposing upon
him a fine of P50.00.
Petitioner was one of the
plaintiffs in the above-
mentioned Civil Case No.
132581 against Pedro Bravo
for the recovery of three
parcels of land one parcel
being located at Bayambang
and two parcels in San
Carlos, in the province of
Pangasinan.
On April 19, 1963, after trial,
respondent Judge rendered
a decision declaring the
plaintiffs the owners of the
three parcels of land in
question and ordering the
defendant to vacate the
Issue
Whether or not the petitioner No. We believe that the
was guilty of misbehavior in
the presence of or so near a
court or judge
Ruling
petitioner the layman that
he is did not take a
belligerent or arrogant
attitude toward respondent
Judge. What he did was to
request his lawyer, Atty.
Macaraeg, to approach
respondent Judge in his
chamber and suggest to him
to refrain from hearing the
case on the new trial,
precisely in order that
respondent Judge might not
be embarrassed or exposed
to public odium.
There is nothing in the
record which shows that
when respondent Judge
refused to disqualify himself,
the petitioner insisted in
asking for his
disqualification.
If the request of petitioner for
respondent Judge to
disqualify himself came to
the knowledge of the public
it was because respondent
Judge himself brought up
 lands and pay the plaintiffs
damages only with respect
to the land located at
Bayambang.
On May 23, 1963, Atty.
Mariano C. Sicat, a former
assistant or associate of
respondent Judge when the
latter was still in the practice
of law before his
appointment to the bench,
entered his appearance as
the new counsel for
defendant Pedro Bravo, vice
Attorney Antonio Resngit.
Before the opening of the
court's session in the
morning of February 10,
1964, Atty. Daniel Macaraeg,
counsel for petitioner and his
co-plaintiffs, saw respondent
Judge in his chamber and
verbally transmitted to him
the request of petitioner that
he (the Judge) inhibit himself
from further hearing the
case upon the ground that
the new counsel for the
defendant, Atty. Mariano C.
Sikat, was his former
the matter in open court.
While We consider it
improper for a litigant or
counsel to see a judge in
chambers and talk to him
about a matter related to the
case pending in the court of
said judge, in the case now
before Us We do not
consider it as an act of
contempt of court when
petitioner asked his counsel
to see respondent Judge in
his chamber and request
him to disqualify himself
upon a ground which
respondent Judge might
consider just or valid.
It is one thing to act not in
accordance with the rules,
and another thing to act in a
manner which would amount
to a disrespect or an affront
to the dignity of the court or
judge.
We believe that the
circumstances that led
respondent Judge to declare
petitioner in direct contempt
of court do not indicate any
 associate. deliberate design on the part
The respondent Judge, of petitioner to disrespect
however, rejected the respondent Judge or to cast
request because, according aspersion against his
to him, the reason for the integrity as a judge.
request of his inhibition is
not one of the grounds for
disqualification of a judge
provided for in the Rules of
Court.
When the above-entitled
case was called for hearing,
the Presiding Judge called
on one of the plaintiffs who
was present, namely,
Domingo Austria, and
inquired from the latter if it
was true that he asked his
lawyer Atty. Macaraeg to
approach the Judge in
chambers and to ask him to
disqualify himself from trying
this case because
defendant's lawyer, Atty.
Sicat was formerly
associated with the said
Judge. To this query
Domingo Austria answered
in the affirmative. When he
was also asked as to
 whether the said Domingo
Austria has lost faith in the
sense of fairness and justice
of the Presiding Judge of
this Court simply because of
his former association with
the defendant's lawyer, said
Domingo Austria likewise
answered in the affirmative.
The Court considers the
actuation of the plaintiff
Domingo Austria, in the
premises, as offensive,
insulting and a reflection on
the integrity and honesty of
the Presiding Judge of this
Court and shows his lack of
respect to the Court.
Gallo vs. Cordero Gallo charges that (a) in Whether or not Judge Yes. Cordero opened
violation of art. 207 and art. Cordero is guilty of partiality himself to charges of
208 of the RPC, respondent and bias partiality and bias by
judge ordered the arrest of meeting privately with the
the accused; (b) that four accused. It was
respondent privately improper for him to meet
conferred with the accused them without the presence
in his office which "logically of complainant. He not only
and naturally arouses has shown gross ignorance
suspicion of graft and rank of law and procedure but
favoritism;" and (c) that he has also failed to live up to
acted with bias and the norm that "judges should
 ignorance of the law," and
that even if the accused
were not tenants, "nobody
can eject them."
Martelino vs. Alejandro This case presents another
aspect of the court-martial
proceedings against the
petitioner, Major Eduardo
Martelino, alias Abdul Latif
Martelino, of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines,
and the officers and men
under him, for violation of
the 94th and 97th Articles of
War, as a result of the
alleged shooting on March
18, 1968 of some Muslim
recruits then undergoing
commando training on the
island of Corregidor.
Whether the publicity given
to the case against the
petitioners was such as to
prejudice their right to a fair
trial
not only be impartial but
should also appear
impartial." He violated
Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct which
provides that "a judge
should avoid impropriety and
the appearance of
impropriety in all activities."
Rule 2.01 provides that "A
judge should so behave at
all times as to promote
public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary."
An examination of the cases
cited, however, will show
that they are widely
disparate from this case in a
fundamental sense.
In contrast the spate of
publicity in this case before
us did not focus on the guilt
of the petitioners but rather
on the responsibility of the
Government for what was
claimed to be a "massacre"
of Muslim trainees. If there
was a "trial by newspaper"
at all, it was not of the
 Once before the question
was raised before this Court
whether the general court-
martial, convened on April 6,
1968 to try the case against
the petitioners, acquired
jurisdiction over the case
despite the fact that earlier,
on March 23, a complaint for
frustrated murder had been
filed in the fiscal's office of
Cavite City by Jibin Arula
(who claimed to have been
wounded in the incident)
against some of the herein
petitioners.
The proceedings had to be
suspended until the
jurisdiction issue could be
decided.
On June 23, 1969 this Court
ruled in favor of the
jurisdiction of the military
court.
The jurisdiction question
thus settled, attention once
again shifted to the general
court-martial, but no sooner
had the proceedings
resumed than another hitch
petitioners but of the
Government. Absent here is
a showing of failure of the
court-martial to protect the
accused from massive
publicity encouraged by
those connected with the
conduct of the trial 16 either
by a failure to control the
release of information or to
remove the trial to another
venue or to postpone it until
the deluge of prejudicial
publicity shall have
subsided. Indeed we cannot
say that the trial of the
petitioners was being held
under circumstances which
did not permit the
observance of those
imperative decencies of
procedure which have come
to be identified with due
process.
At all events, even granting
the existence of "massive"
and "prejudicial" publicity,
since the petitioners here do
not contend that the
respondents have been
unduly influenced but simply
 developed. This came about
as the petitioners, the
accused in the court-martial
proceedings, in turn came to
this Court, seeking relief
against certain orders of the
general court-martial.
It appears that at the hearing
on August 12, 1969 the
petitioner Martelino sought
the disqualification of the
President of the general
court-martial, following the
latter's admission that he
read newspaper stories of
the Corregidor incident. The
petitioner contended that the
case had received such an
amount of publicity in the
press and other news media
and in fact was being
exploited for political
purposes in connection with
the presidential election on
November 11, 1969 as to
imperil his right to a fair trial.
After deliberating, the
military court denied the
challenge.
Thereafter the petitioners
that they might be by the
"barrage" of publicity, we
think that the suspension of
the court-martial
proceedings has
accomplished the purpose
sought by the petitioners'
challenge for cause, by
postponing the trial of the
petitioner until calmer times
have returned. The
atmosphere has since been
cleared and the publicity
surrounding the Corregidor
incident has so far abated
that we believe the trial may
now be resumed in
tranquility.
raised peremptory
challenges against Col.
Alejandro, as president of
the court-martial, and Col.
Olfindo, Lt. Col. Camagay,
Lt. Col. Valones, Lt. Col.
Blanco and Col. Malig, as
members. With regard to
peremptory challenges it
was the petitioners' position
that for each specification
each accused was entitled
to one such challenge. They
later changed their stand
and adopted that of the trial
judge advocate that "for
each specification jointly
tried, all of the accused are
entitled to only 1 peremptory
challenge; and that with
respect to the specifications
tried commonly, each one of
the accused is entitled to
one peremptory challenge."
They there contended that
they were entitled to a total
of eleven peremptory
challenges. On the other
hand the court-martial ruled
that the accused were
entitled to only one
 peremptory challenge as the
specifications were being
jointly tried.
The petitioners therefore
filed this petition
for certiorari and prohibition,
to nullify the orders of the
court-martial denying their
challenges, both peremptory
and for cause. They allege
that the adverse publicity
given in the mass media to
the Corregidor incident,
coupled with the fact that it
became an issue against the
administration in the 1969
elections, was such as to
unduly influence the
members of the court-
martial.
In their answer the
respondents assert that
despite the publicity which
the case had received, no
proof has been presented
showing that the court-
martial's president's fairness
and impartiality have been
impaired. On the contrary,
they claim, the petitioner's
 own counsel expressed
confidence in the "integrity,
experience and background"
of the members of the court.
The petitioners argue that
under the circumstances
they could not expect a just
and fair trial and that, in
overruling their challenge for
cause based on this ground,
the general court-martial
committed a grave abuse of
discretion. In support of their
contention they invoke the
rulings of the United States
Supreme Court in Irvin v.
Dowd,5 Rideau vs.
Louisiana,6 Estes v.
Texas,7 and Shepard v.
Maxwell.8
Cruz vs. Salva A certain Manuel Monroy Whether or not Salva No. the members of the
was murdered. CFI Pasay conducted the investigation Court were greatly disturbed
found Castelo, de Jesus, property and annoyed by such
Bonifacio, Mendoza, publicity and sensationalism,
Berdugo et al. guilty of all of which may properly be
murder. They all appealed laid at the door of
and Castelo sought new respondent Salva. In this, he
trial. Castelo was again committed what was regard
found guilty. a grievous error and poor
Pres Magsaysay ordered judgment for which we fail to
 reinvestigation. Philippine
Constabulary questioned
people and got confessions
pointing to persons other
than those convicted.
Castelo et al wrote to Fiscal
Salva to conduct
reinvestigation on basis of
new confessions. Fiscal
conferred w/ SolGen and the
Justice Sec decided to have
the results of investigation
made available to counsel
for appellants.
Chief of Phil Constabulary
furnished Fiscal Salva
copies of the affidavits and
confessions. Salva
organized a committee for
reinvestigation and
subpoenaed Timoteo Cruz,
who was implicated as
instigator and mastermind in
the new affidavits and
confessions. Cruz counsel
questioned jurisdiction of the
committee and of Salva to
conduct preliminary
investigation because the
case was pending appeal in
find any excuse or
satisfactory explanation. His
actuations in this regard
went well beyond the
bounds of prudence,
discretion and good taste. It
is bad enough to have such
undue publicity when a
criminal case is being
investigated by the
authorities, even when it
being tried in court; but
when said publicity and
sensationalism is allowed,
even encouraged, when the
case is on appeal and is
pending consideration by
this Tribunal, the whole thing
becomes inexcusable, even
abhorrent, and the Court, in
the interest of justice, is
constrained and called upon
to put an end to it and a
deterrent against its
repetition by meting an
appropriate disciplinary
measure, even a penalty to
the one liable.
 the SC. Counsel filed this
present petition.
Salva said he subpoenaed
Cruz bec of Cruz oral and
personal request to allow
him to appear at the
investigation. SC issued writ
of preliminary injunction
stopping the prelim
investigation.
Bumunlag vs. Bumunlag Esteban T. Bumanglad, the Whether or not respondent Respondent is hereby
respondent, was found by may be disciplined for gross administered a reprimand for
the Court in its decision of ignorance of the law and of gross ignorance of the law
September 24, 1973 guilty of the Constitution in not and of the Constitution in
gross immoral conduct and observing the protocol of having asked the President
ordered his suspension from separation of power by to set aside by decree the
the practice of law for a asking the President to set Court's decision which
period of two (2) years; aside by decree the decision suspended him for two years
Respondent filed several of the Court imposing from the practice of law, with
motions for reconsideration suspension upon the warning that the commission
but the same were denied; respondent of any transgression in the
As a result of such denial, future of his oath and duties
the respondent wrote a as a member of the bar will
petition to the President of be severely dealt with.
the Philippines that he
promulgate(s) a decree that
the order of suspension by
the Supreme Court be set
aside and that your humble
self be allowed to become
 an active member of the
New Society.
The respondent alleged in
the same petition that he
was deprived of due process
of law;
The Clerk of Court, by way
of an indorsement from the
Assistant Executive
Secretary, received a copy
of the petition and was
requested to comment
and/or appropriate action
on the subject matter;
However, in a subsequent
letter to the President the
respondent retracted and
acknowledged his non
observance of protocol of
separation of powers;
In the end, the respondent
asked for an apology from
the members of the
Honorable Court.
In Re Sycip Petitions were filed by the WON the surviving partners No.
surviving partners of Atty. may be allowed by the court In the case of Register of
Alexander Sycip, who died to retain the name of the Deeds of Manila vs. China
on May 5, 1975 and by the partners who already Banking Corporation, the SC
surviving partners of Atty. passed away in the name of said:
Herminio Ozaeta, who died the firm? o The Court believes
 on February 14, 1976,
praying that they be allowed
to continue using, in the
names of their firms, the
names of partners who had
passed away.
Petitioners contend that the
continued use of the name
of a deceased or former
partner when permissible by
local custom, is not unethical
but care should be taken
that no imposition or
deception is practiced
through this use. They also
contend that no local custom
prohibits the continued use
of a deceased partners
name in a professional firms
name; there is no custom or
usage in the Philippines, or
at least in the Greater
Manila Area, which
recognizes that the name of
a law firm necessarily
identifies the individual
members of the firm.
An able lawyer without
that, in view of the
personal and
confidential nature of
the relations between
attorney and client,
and the high
standards demanded
in the canons of
professional ethics,
no practice should be
allowed which even in
a remote degree
could give rise to the
possibility of
deception. Said
attorneys are
accordingly advised
to drop the names of
the deceased
partners from their
firm name.
The public relations value of
the use of an old firm name
can tend to create undue
advantages and
disadvantages in the
practice of the profession.
connections will have to
make a name for himself
 starting from scratch.
Another able lawyer, who
can join an old firm, can
initially ride on that old firms
reputation established by
deceased partners.
The court also made the
difference from the law firms
and business corporations:
o A partnership for the
practice of law is not
a legal entity. It is a
mere relationship or
association for a
particular purpose.
It is not a partnership
formed for the
purpose of carrying
on trade or business
or of holding
property.
Thus, it has been stated that
the use of a nom de plume,
assumed or trade name in
law practice is improper.
We find such proof of the
existence of a local custom,
and of the elements
requisite to constitute the
same, wanting herein.

Dacanay vs. Baker & In November 1979, Atty.
Mckenzie Vicente Torres sent a letter
to one Rosie Clurman,
represented by Atty. Adriano
Dacanay, asking Clurman to
release some shares to
Torres client. The letterhead
contained the name Baker
& McKenzie. Dacanay
denied Clurmans liability
and at the same time he
asked why is Torres using
the letterhead Baker &
McKenzie, a foreign
partnership established in
Chicago, Illinois. No reply
was received so Dacanay
filed an administrative
complaint enjoining Torres
from using Baker &
McKenzie.
Later, Torres said that he is
Whether or not the use of a
foreign law office name is
allowed.
Merely because something
is done as a matter of
practice does not mean that
Courts can rely on the same
for purposes of adjudication
as a juridical custom.
Petition suffers legal and
ethical impediment.
No. Baker & McKenzie,
being an alien law firm,
cannot practice law in the
Philippines. Such use of
foreign law firm name is
unethical therefore Torres
and his law firm are enjoined
from using Baker &
McKenzie in their practice
of law.
 an associate of the law firm
Guerrero & Torres; that their
law firm is a member of
Baker & McKenzie; that the
said foreign firm has
members in 30 cities all over
the world; that they
associated with them in
order to make a
representation that they can
render legal services of the
highest quality to
multinational business
enterprises and others
engaged in foreign trade and
investment.
Ouano Arrastre Service, Inc. Private respondent
vs CA International
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("IPI")
filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City against Mercantile
Insurance Company, Inc.
("Mercantile") and petitioner
Ouano Arrastre Service, Inc.
("OASI") for replacement of
certain equipment imported
by IPI which were insured by
Mercantile but were lost on
arrival in Cebu City,
allegedly because of
 mishandling by petitioner
OASI.
Petitioner OASI's answer
was filed by the law firm of
Ledesma, Saludo and
Associates ("LSA") and
signed by Atty. Manuel
Trinidad of the Cebu office
or branch of LSA. However,
sometime thereafter, Atty.
Trinidad resigned from LSA
and Atty. Fidel Manalo, a
partner from the Makati
office of LSA, filed a motion
to postpone the hearing
stating that petitioner OASI
had just endorsed the case
to him.
On 12 January 1990, after
trial which Atty. Manalo
handled for OASI, the trial
court rendered a decision
holding Mercantile and
petitioner OASI jointly and
severally liable for the cost
of replacement of the
damaged equipment plus
damages,
totaling P435,000.00.
Petitioner is now before this
 Court alleging that:
1. the honorable Court of
Appeals has decided a question
of substance not theretofore
determined by the Supreme
Court when the former affirmed
the trial court's ruling that the
undisputed timely appeal made
by co-defendant Mercantile
Insurance, Co., Inc., the co-
solidary judgment debtor of
petitioner herein, does not inure
to the latter's benefit,
notwithstanding such ruling's
resultant legal and procedural
"complexities" or "absurdities;"
2. the honorable Court of
Appeals' questioned decision is
contrary to law and the
applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court because its
ruling that the undisputed timely
appeal taken by Mercantile
Insurance does not inure to the
benefit of petitioner, on the
ground that they do not share
common defenses, is contrary
to the provision of Article 1222
of the Civil Code of the
Philippines;
3. the honorable Court of
 Appeals ' questioned decision is
contrary to law and the
applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court since
petitioner's Notice of Appeal
was filed on time, considering
that the period to take an
appeal had not commenced to
run, there having been a
defective service to the
petitioner of the copy of the trial
court's Decision; and
4. granting without admitting
that petitioner's appeal was filed
out of time, the Court of
Appeals' questioned decision is
still contrary to law and the
applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court because it
strictly applied a procedural
technicality over matters
relating to substantial justice
and equity, disregarding thereby
Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules
of Court and the extensive
jurisprudence on the matter.

Antonis vs CA
B.R. Sebastian Enterprises
 Inc vs. CA
In re Tagorda
Atty. Ismael Khan vs. Atty.
Rizalino Simbillo
Linsangan vs. Tolentino
People vs. Cawili
American Home Assurance
Co vs. NLRC