BORJA VS COMELEC

Facts:
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending on June 30, 1992. On
September 2, 1989, he became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja.
Thereafter, Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. On March 27, 1998,
Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U.
Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the ground that Capco would
have already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve for
another term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but the Comelec en banc reversed
the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as
mayor.

Issue:
Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of
the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

Held:
No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to
serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive
terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of
times before the disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election because
he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of
law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the
deceased mayor. The vice-mayors assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is more a matter of
chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.

The policy embodied in the constitutional provision is not only to prevent the establishment of political
dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the people. A consideration of the historical background of
Art. X, Sec 8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much
concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of
political power. In discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials
concerned were serving by reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore
ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of
the people to choose whom they wish to govern them.
SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MELO

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring
the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The said law originated from House Bill No. 4264
and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.

To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional
legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona,
Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a
new second legislative district.

Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the constitutional
standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000) for the creation of a
legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only
176,383.

ISSUE:

Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province.

HELD:

NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: Each city with a population of
at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a representative, there is
nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in
order to be similarly entitled.

It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a
city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.

SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MELO

FACTS:

On 12 October 2009, Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and
Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District
From Such Reapportionment" was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and took effect on 31
October 2009.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit
constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the
creation of a legislative district. The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first
and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a
population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum
population standard.

ISSUE

Whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province.

HELD

There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a
legislative district. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative." The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that
the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. Thus, Section 5(3) of the
Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so
for a province.

To be clear about the judgment, the Court do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and second legislative
districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be considered.
The ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the
additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so
very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this petition.

Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which, by virtue
of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code
states:

Requisites for Creation.

(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not
less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National
Statistics Office.

Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition
to the indispensable income requirement.
ADAZA V PACANA
Facts:
Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980
elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980.
Fernando Pacana, Jr. was elected vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under the law, their
respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of
candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing
elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as
Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said office. On July 23,
1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and started to
perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governors office, Adaza
has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of
six years, that he remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided
by law, and that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a
local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member
of Parliament.

ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province
simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original position and
as such can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.

HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:
Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other office
or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .
The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law practices
abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one
office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he became a private citizen
because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left
vacant by petitioners election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the
election of members of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that governors,
mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be
considered on forced leave of absence from office. Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this
provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code.

ADAZA VS PACANA, JR.

Facts:

Petitioner HomobonoAdaza and respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr. were elected to the positions of governor and
vice-governor, respectively, of Misamis Oriental, in 1980. Their terms were to expire on March 3, 1986.
In 1984, both petitioner and respondent ran for a seat in the BatasangPambansa. Petitioner won and respondent
lost.
Petitioner started serving his term in the BP beginning July 14, 1984, while respondent assumed petitioners
previous position of governor on July 25, 1984.
This caused petitioner to file the present action against respondent, claiming that:
He should still be the governor as his term was supposed to expire in 1986, as provided by law, and that
parliamentary systems in Europe allow for a local government official to also hold a seat in Parliament
Respondent reverted to being a private citizen after he lost in the BP elections, disqualifying him not just from
being governor, but also from his previous position as vice-governor

Issues:

WON petitioner can hold both positions

WON respondent is disqualified from being governor or vice-governor after losing in the BP elections

Held:

Petitioner cannot hold both positions. Art. VIII, Sec. 10 of the 1973 Constitution is clear in saying that members of
the BatasangPambansa shall not hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision,
agency, instrumentality, or GOCCs during his tenure
Respondent is not disqualified from being governor, as he was acting within the law. BP 697, the law governing BP
elections, provides that governors, mayors, members of sangguniang or barangay officials are only considered to
be on forced leave upon filing their certificates of candidacy for the BP elections.
Sec. 204 (2a) of the Local Government Code provides that the vice-governor assumes the office of the governor for
the latters unexpired term in this particular case.