RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION

US V JAVIER

We find the proven facts as brought out in the trial of this case to be as follows:

Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of October 22, 1915, fastened his carabao valued at P150 in his
corral situated in thebarrio of Trapiche municipality of Tanauan, Province of Batangas. On the following
morning when he went to look afterthe animal, he found the gate to the corral open and that the
carabao had disappeared. He reported the matter to theConstabulary, and a patrol of the Constabulary
under the leadership of sergeant Presa, now deceased, on the 20th of November following,
encountered the accused Lazaro Javier, Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido de Chavez leading thecarabao.
When the ladrones saw the Constabulary, that scattered in all directions. On the following day, the
Constabularyfound this carabao tied in front of the house of one Pedro Monterola in the barrio of Santa
Clara, municipality of SanPablo. The carabao was identified by Doroteo Natividad as the one which had
been taken from his corral on the night of October 22, 1915, and by the Constabulary as the one seen in
the possession of the accused.

As corroborative of such evidence, we have the well-known legal principle, which as applied to cases of
this character isthat, although the persons who unlawfully took a certain carabao are not recognized at
the time, and their identityremains entirely unknown, nevertheless, if the stolen animal is found in the
possession of the accused shortly after thecommission of the crime and they make no satisfactory
explanation of such possession they may be properly convictedof the crime. (See U. S. vs. Divino [1911],
18 Phil., 425.) In the present instance, the attempt of the accused to insinuatethat one of the
Constabulary soldiers testified against them falsely because of enmity is hardly believable.

The foregoing statement of the facts and the law disposes of all but one assignment of error, namely,
that the lower courterred in admitting Exhibit B of the prosecution as evidence. Exhibit B is the sworn
statement of sergeant Presa, nowdeceased, whose signature was identified, before the justice of the
peace of the municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas. Appellant's argument is predicated on
the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which says, "That in allcriminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face," and the provision of theCode of Criminal
Procedure, section 15 (5), which says that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled: .
.. to be confronted at the trial by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him." With reference to
the clause of the Billof Rights, which we have quoted, Justice Day said in a case of the Philippine origin
(Dowdell vs. U. S. [1911], 221 U. S.,325) that it "intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so
far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned,by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the
trial, who give their testimony in his presence, and give to theaccused an opportunity of cross-
examination. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon deposition orex parte
affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in
theexercise of the right of cross-examination." In other words, confrontation is essential because cross-
examination is essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the
department and appearance of thewitness while testifying. (U. S. vs. Anastacio [1906], 6 Phil., 413.) The
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has appliedthis constitutional provisions on behalf of accused
persons in a number of cases. (See for example U. S. vs. Tamjuanco[1902], 1 Phil., 374; U. S. vs. Bello
[1908], 11 Phil., 526; U. S. vs. De la Cruz [1908], 12 Phil., 87.) It is for us now todetermine whether the
present facts entitle the accused to the protection of the Bill of Rights or whether the facts fallunder
some exception thereto.

The sworn statement of Presa was not made by question and answer under circumstances which gave
the defense anopportunity to cross-examine the witness. The proviso of the Code of Criminal Procedure
as to confrontation is thereforeinapplicable. Presa's statement again is not the testimony of a witness
deceased, given in a former action between thesame parties relating to the same matter. Consequently,
the exception provided by section 298, No. 8, of the Code of Civil Procedure and relied upon by the
prosecution in the lower court is also inapplicable. Nor is the statement of Presa adying declaration or a
deposition in a former trial or shown to be a part of the preliminary examination. Under
thesecircumstances, not to burden the opinion with an extensive citation of authorities, we can rely on
the old and historiccase of R. vs. Paine (1 Salk., 281 [King's Bench Div.]) occurring in the year 1696. It
appears that a deposition of B.,examined by the Mayor of Bristol under oath, but not in P's presence,
was offered. It was objected that B, being dead, thedefendant had lost all opportunity of cross-
examining him. The King's Bench consulted with the Common Pleas, and "itwas the opinion of both
courts that these deposition should not be given in evidence, the defendant not being presentwhen they
were taken before the Mayor and so had lost the benefit of a cross-examination." Although we are
faced withthe alternative of being unable to utilize the statements of the witness now deceased, yet if
there has been noopportunity for cross-examination and the case is not one coming within one of the
exceptions, the mere necessity aloneaccepting the statement will not suffice. In fine, Exhibit B was
improperly received in evidence in the lower court.

With such a resolution of this question, we could, as has been done in other cases, further find this to be
reversible errorand remand the case for a new trial. We are convinced, however, that this would gain
the accused nothing except delayfor the testimony of the owner of the carabao and of the two
Constabulary soldiers, rebutted by no reasonable evidenceon behalf of the accused, is deemed sufficient
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The facts come under article 518, No. 3, in connection with article 520, as amended, of the Penal Code.
Accordingly thedefendants and appellants are each sentenced to four years, two months, and one day
of presidio correccional, with theaccessory penalties provided by law, and to pay one-third part of costs
of both instances; the carabao shall be returnedto Doroteo Natividad, if this has not already been done.
So ordered.

TALINO V SANDIGANBAYAN

BANGAYAN V RCBC

Facts:
Petitioner Ricardo Bangyan had 2 bank accounts with RCBC (Respondent) , one savings account and one
current account. Both accounts had auto-transfer feature.

The petitioner also signed a Surety Agreement with RCBC in favor of 9 corporations. This Surety
Agreement was to be used as a security guarantee for any loan obligations, advances, credits and other
obligations.

Petitioner contests the authenticity of the surety agreement and claims that it has to be notarized.

Respondent had also issued Letters of Credit LCs to 3 of the corporations guaranteed by petitioner. The
LCs were used for payment for imports.

Bureau of Customs sent a letter to RCBC demanding remittance of import duties for 3 shipments for
which RCBC had issued 3 LCs.

RCBC had informed Petitioner that the BOC had sent a letter demanding outstanding duties. Petitioner
told RCBC that he will take care of matter.

RCBC froze funds in Petitioners accounts due to the BOC demand, since the latter had given authority
under the Surety Agreement. RCBC would only draw from petitioners accounts upon order from the
BOC.

Petitioner issued 2 checks, but were returned to with notation of Refer to Drawer.

One of the Corporations included in the Surety Agreement had a LC that was due and demandable,
RCBC went ahead and debited petitioners account to partially satisfy the loan. After the debit the
petitioners passbook reflected a balance of 45.46.

Thereafter the petitioner had issued 5 more checks, but were also dishonored. The payees of the
dishonored checks were demanding immediate payment.

Petitioner demanded that RCBC restore all the funds debited from his account and indemnify him for
damages.

ISSUES:

WON RCBC was justified in dishonoring the checks and whether petitioner is entitled to indemnity.

WON the Surety Agreement was valid.

WON RCBC violated the Bank Secrecy Law RA 1406, when the BOC made an investigation of 3 of the
companies included in the Surety Agreement and if petitioner is can claim damages.

HELD/RATIO:

RCBC was not in bad faith when it dishonored the checks. The actions of RCBC were justified by the
stipulations of the Surety Agreement. Since the petitioner had guaranteed the corporations stipulated in
the Surety Agreement, RCBC had a fiduciary duty to debit the funds from the petitioners account to
settle the loans and duties of the said corporations.

The Surety Agreement was a valid contract between the Petitioner and RCBC. The petitioner could not
prove his allegations of forgery and lack of consent of the agreement. The petitioner signed the Surety
Agreement in behalf of the 9 Corporations. The petitioner also acknowledged the Surety Agreement
when he was informed by RCBC of the demand from the BOC and he assured the bank that he was going
to solve the problem.

RCBC and its representative did not divulge any information in the Affidavit submitted to the BOC.

The petitioner failed to prove that there was wrong doing on the part of respondent RCBC, since the
dishonoring of the checks was the product of an surety agreement for the 4 corporations LCs which he
voluntarily contracted.

FACTS: Petitioner Bangayan had a savings account and a current account with one of the branches of
respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). Bangayan purportedly signed a
Comprehensive Surety Agreement with respondent RCBC in favor of nine corporations. Under the Surety
Agreement, the funds in petitioner Bangayans accounts with RCBC would be used as security to
guarantee any existing and future loan obligations, advances, credits/increases and other obligations,
including any and all expenses that these corporations may incur with respondent bank. Bangayan
contests the veracity and due authenticity of the Agreement on the ground that his signature thereon
was not genuine, and that the agreement was not notarized. Respondent RCBC refutes this claim.

Then occurred different transactions between RCBC with other entities in relation to the Surety
Agreement. RCBC issued commercial letters of credit in favor of different corporations. Mr. Lao, of
RCBC, claimed that the bank would not have extended the letters of credit in favor of the three
corporations without petitioner Bangayan acting as surety. After all the transactions in relation to the
letters of credit issued by RCBC in relation to the Surety Agreement, Bangayans account was depleted.

Two of the seven checks that were drawn against petitioner Bangayans Current Account were
presented for payment to respondent RCBC were returned by respondent RCBC with the notation
"REFER TO DRAWER. Five other checks of petitioner Bangayan were presented for payment to
respondent RCBC. These five checks were dishonored by respondent RCBC on the ground that they had
been drawn against insufficient funds ("DAIF") and were likewise returned.

Thus, Bangayan, demanded that respondent bank restore all the funds to his account and indemnify him
for damages. Bangayan filed a complaint for damages against respondent RCBC. In its defense, RCBC
claims that Bangayan signed a Surety Agreement in favor of several companies that defaulted in their
payment of customs duties that resulted in the imposition of a lien over the accounts. Also, it funded a
letter of credit of Lotec Marketing with the account of petitioner Bangayan, who agreed to guarantee
Lotec Marketings obligations under the Surety Agreement; and, that the bank applied Bangayans
deposits to satisfy part of Lotec Marketings obligation which resulted in the depletion of the bank
accounts.

ISSUE: Whether respondent RCBC was justified in dishonoring the checks, and, consequently, whether
petitioner Bangayan is entitled to damages arising from the dishonor.

HELD: Yes. RCBC was justified in dishonoring the checks. Bangayan is not entitled to damages.

Whatever damage to petitioner Bangayans interest or reputation from the dishonor of the seven checks
was a consequence of his agreement to act as surety for the corporations and their failure to pay their
loan obligations, advances and other expenses.

First, there was no malice or bad faith on the part of respondent RCBC in the dishonor of the checks,
since its actions were justified by petitioner Bangayans obligations under the Surety Agreement. Both
the trial and the appellate courts gave credence to the Surety Agreement, which categorically
guaranteed the four corporations obligations to respondent RCBC under the letters of credit. As
petitioner failed to discharge his burden of demonstrating that his signature was forged, there being no
positive and convincing evidence to prove such fact, there is no reason to overturn the factual findings
of the lower courts with respect to the genuineness and due execution of the Surety Agreement.
Second, the mere absence of notarization does not necessarily render the Surety Agreement invalid.
Third, that the annex of the Surety Agreement does not bear petitioner Bangayans signature is not a
sufficient ground to invalidate the main agreement altogether. Fourth, petitioner Bangayan never
contested the existence of the Surety Agreement prior to the filing of the Complaint. It must be also be
emphasized that petitioner Bangayan did not complain against the four corporations which had
benefitted from his bank account.

With respect to the first two dishonored checks, respondent RCBC had already put on hold petitioner
Bangayans account to answer for the customs duties being demanded from the bank by the BOC. On
the other hand, the five other checks were subsequently dishonored because petitioner Bangayans
account was by that time already depleted due to the partial payment of Lotec Marketings loan
obligation.

Under Articles 2199 and 2200 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in
satisfaction of or in recompense for loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice
and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done.

In all seven dishonored checks, respondent RCBC properly exercised its right as a creditor under the
Surety Agreement to apply the petitioner Bangayans funds in his accounts as security for the obligations
of the four corporations under the letters of credit. Thus, petitioner Bangayan cannot attribute any
wrong or misconduct to respondent RCBC since there was no malice or bad faith on the part of
respondent in dishonoring the checks. Any damage to petitioner arising from the dishonor of those
checks was brought about, not by the banks actions, but by the corporations that defaulted on their
obligations that petitioner had guaranteed to pay. The trial and the appellate courts, therefore,
committed no reversible error in disallowing the award of damages to petitioner.
COMPULSORY PROCESSES

ROCO V CERVANTES

Facts:

Five informations were filed by Cal's Corporation against Domingo Roco for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22. The cases were remanded by the RTC to the MTCC for the reception of petitioners evidence.

During the pendency of the remanded cases, petitioner filed with the MTCC a "Request for Issuance of
Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Subpoena Duces Tecum", requiring Cals Corporation or their duly
authorized representatives, to appear and testify in court oand to bring with them certain documents,
records and books of accounts for the years 1993-1999. However, the judge denied his request on the
following grounds: (a) the requested documents, book ledgers and other records were immaterial in
resolving the issues posed before the court; and (b) the issuance of the subpoenas will only unduly delay
the hearing of the criminal cases.

Issue:

WON the denial of the request for the issuance of the subpoenas is violative of the constitutional right
of the accused as enshrined in Art. III, Sec. 14 (2) of the Constitution.

Held:

Before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be satisfied that the following requisites
are present: (1) the books, documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to
the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must be reasonably
described by the parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness).

In determining whether the production of the documents described in a subpoena duces tecum should
be enforced by the court, it is proper to consider, first, whether the subpoena calls for the production of
specific documents, or rather for specific proof, and secondly, whether that proof is prima facie
sufficiently relevant to justify enforcing its production. A general inquisitorial examination of all the
books, papers, and documents of an adversary, conducted with a view to ascertain whether something
of value may not show up, will not be enforced.

In order to entitle a party to the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, it must appear, by clear and
unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be produced contains evidence relevant and
material to the issue before the court, and that the precise book, paper or document containing such
evidence has been so designated or described that it may be identified. In the case at bar, the books and
documents that petitioner requested to be subpoenaed are designated and described in his request
with definiteness and readily identifiable. The test of definiteness, therefore, is satisfied in this case.
SEC 15 SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

LANSANG V GARCIA

Abandonment of the Doctrine Held in the Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Case

FACTS: Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of
8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos
urged that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were
invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the
validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional
requisites.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.

HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this case
where the SC declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground
could be established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this matter,
including two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the
government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after
satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to
overthrow the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold t5he
suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Facts: On the evening of August 21, 1971, two grenades were thrown at the miting the avance of the
Liberal Party killing 8 persons and injuring many. Thus, on August 23 then President Marcos issued
proclamation 889, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Herein petitioners were apprehended by
members of the Philippine Constabulary having invoked the said proclamation. In effect the
proclamation implies that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension
of the writ belongs to the President and it expressly states that such declaration is deemed final and
conclusive upon the courts and all other persons
August 30: the president issued proclamation 889-A, amending the previous proclamation.
September 18: proclamation 889-B issued; lifting the suspension on selected provinces/cities.
September 25: proclamation 889-C issued; lifting the suspension on selected provinces/cities.
October 4: proclamation 889-D issued; same as 889-C on selected areas.
In view thereof, 18 provinces, 2 sub-provinces and 18 cities are still under the suspension of writ of
habeas corpus
Issue: Whether the court would adhere to its previous decision in Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro
vs. Castaneda?

Held: First, Proclamation 889-A superseded the original proclamation and that flaws attributed thereto
are formal in nature. Which actually emphasize the actuality of the intent to rise in arms. Second, The
court intervention: In Sterling vs. Constantin, Chief Justice Hughes declared that when there is a
substantial showing that the exertion of state power has overridden private rights secured by the
Constitution, the subject is necessarily one for judicial review. Thus, the grant of power to suspend the
privilege of writ is neither absolute or unqualified
The declaration of a rebellion as argued by the petitioners need not to be a wide-scale event, it may be
declared even if it only involves a small part of the country. The president decision to suspend the writ
was by fact constitutional hence VALID, as he has three available courses to suppress rebellion. First, to
call out the military, second to suspend the privilege of writ and lastly to declare martial law.

Petitions DENIED; the CFI is directed to conduct preliminary investigations

Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was
holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general
elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the platform where said
candidates and other persons were. Eight persons were killed and many more injured. Proclamation 889
was issued by the President suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus stating that there is a
conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in order to forcibly seize political power. Petitions for writ of
habeas corpus were filed by persons (13) who have been arrested without a warrant.

It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is to be applied to persons
caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment, inserting the word
actually staging. Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces, 3 sub-
provinces and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and
cities(mostly in Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only 18
provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose privilege was suspended. Petitioners maintained that
Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or
imminent danger thereof, however it became moot and academic since it was amended. Petitioners
further contend that public safety did not require the issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that there is
no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was
functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-
August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged
apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces in
the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may
inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the proclamations. Now the
Court resolves after conclusive decision reached by majority.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive
upon the courts and upon all other persons.

(2) Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
decreed in Proclamation No. 889-A.

Held: The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. Two conditions must concur
for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the
suspension of the privilege. President has three (3) courses of action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b)
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces, proved inadequate. Of the two other
alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.

Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability, is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors, 20 barrio
captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the
Greater Manila Area in 1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine major labor
organizations; has exploited the (11) major student or youth organizations; about thirty (30) mass
organizations actively advancing the CPP.

JACKSON V MACALINO

Facts:

Am information was filed against an American citizen, Raymond Jackson for violation of Article 176 of
the Revised Penal Code. Summary deportation proceedings were initiated at the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) against the petitioner. However, he could not be deported because
he filed a petition to lift the summary order of deportation with the CID which had not yet been
resolved. The CID then issued an order for his arrest for being an undesirable alien, based on the hold
departure order in one of the criminal cases.

Jackson filed a petition for habeas corpus against the Commissioner of the CID. The court directed its
issuance as well as a return of the writ by the respondents. In their return , the respondents alleged
inter alia that the detention was on the basis of the summary deportation order issued and the hold
departure order of the Makati RTC.

Issue:

WON the Commissioner of the CID can issue warrants of arrest and if so, WON such warrants can only
be issued to enforce a final order of deportation.

Held:

The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is
essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which he is detained. The term court
includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.

As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondents rests on the petitioner who
attaches such restraints. Whether the return sets forth process where on its face shows good ground
for the detention of the petitioner, it is incumbent on him to allege and prove new matter that tends to
invalidate the apparent effects of such process. If it appears that the detained person is in custody under
a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered prima facie evidence of
the cause of restraint. In this case, based on the return of the writ by the respondents, Jackson was
arrested and detained based on the order of the BOC which had become final and executory. His
passports were also cancelled by the US consul on the ground that they were tampered with. Based on
previous jurisprudence, such constitute sufficient grounds for the arrest and deportation of aliens from
the Philippines. Hence, the petition was dismissed.

RULES IN HABEAS CORPUS

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C ROXAS

[G.R. No. 189155. September 7, 2010.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND

THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS,

MELISSA C. ROXAS, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,

GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME
VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA
CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO
 LACADIN, AND CERTAIN PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC
AND ROSE, respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J p:

At bench is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the Decision 2 dated 26

August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA a petition that was
commenced jointly under the Rules on the Writ of Amparo(Amparo Rule) and Habeas
Data (Habeas Data Rule). In its decision, the Court of Appeals extended to the petitioner,
Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data but denied the
latter's prayers for an inspection order, production order and return of specified personal
belongings. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. This Court hereby

grants Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.

Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from distributing or causing

the distribution to the public of any records in whatever form, reports,
documents or similar papers relative to Petitioner's Melissa C. Roxas, and/or
Melissa Roxas; alleged ties to the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to the
complained incident. Petitioner's prayers for an inspection order, production
order and for the return of the specified personal belongings are denied for
lack of merit. Although there is no evidence that Respondents are responsible
for the abduction, detention or torture of the Petitioner, said Respondents
pursuant to their legally mandated duties are, nonetheless, ordered to
continue/complete the investigation of this incident with the end in view of
prosecuting those who are responsible. Respondents are also ordered to
provide protection to the Petitioner and her family while in the Philippines
against any and all forms of harassment, intimidation and coercion as may be
relevant to the grant of these reliefs. 3

We begin with the petitioner's allegations.

 Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent. 4 While in the United States,
petitioner enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a
member. 5 During the course of her immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and
towns of Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-
Tarlac 6 in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical
mission. 7

In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with Fifteen
Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop
computer, external hard disk, IPOD, 8 wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and
medicines. 9

After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito
Carabeo (Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one
Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo) in Sitio Bagong Sikat, BarangayKapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac. 10 At
around 1:30 in the afternoon, however, petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were
startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding
that they open up. 11

Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside
and ordered petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face down. 12 The armed
men were all in civilian clothes and, with the exception of their leader, were also wearing
bonnets to conceal their faces. 13

Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up
on her and tied her hands. 14 At this juncture, petitioner saw the other armed men herding
Carabeo and Jandoc, already blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van.
Petitioner started to shout her name. 15 Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men
dragged petitioner towards the van bruising her arms, legs and knees. 16 Once inside
the van, but before she can be blindfolded, petitioner was able to see the face of one of
the armed men sitting beside her. 17 The van then sped away.

After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped. 18 Petitioner, Carabeo and
Jandoc were ordered to alight. 19 After she was informed that she is being detained for
being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (CPP-
NPA), petitioner was separated from her companions and was escorted to a room that
she believed was a jail cell from the sound of its metal doors. 20 From there, she could
hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing and some
construction bustle. 21 She inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort
Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija. 22

What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with
torture. 23 The thrust of the interrogations was to convince petitioner to abandon her
communist beliefs in favor of returning to "the fold." 24 The torture, on the other hand,
consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and suffocating the petitioner. 25

Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in blindfolds
even in her sleep. 26 Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds when she was allowed
to take a bath, during which she became acquainted with a woman named "Rose" who
bathed her. 27 There were also a few times when she cheated her blindfold and was able
to peek at her surroundings. 28

Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the
names of three of her interrogators who introduced themselves to her as "Dex," "James"
and "RC." 29 "RC" even told petitioner that those who tortured her came from the "Special
Operations Group," and that she was abducted because her name is included in the "Order
of Battle." 30

On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncle's house
in Quezon City. 31 Before being released, however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular
phone with a SIM 32 card, a slip of paper containing an e-mail address with
password, 33 a plastic bag containing biscuits and books, 34 the handcuffs used on her,
a blouse and a pair of shoes. 35 Petitioner was also sternly warned not to report the
incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her
family. 36

Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the
cellular phone given to her. 37 Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and
also fearing for the safety of her family, petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a
SIM card.

Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of
any existing government files or records linking her to the communist movement,
petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before this Court on
1 June 2009. 38 Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons
of the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was government
agents who were behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner likewise included in her suit
"Rose," "Dex" and "RC." 39

The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be enjoined
from harming or even approaching petitioner and her family; (2) an order be issued
allowing the inspection of detention areas in the 7th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay,
Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents be ordered to produce documents relating to any report
on the case of petitioner including, but not limited to, intelligence report and operation
reports of the 7th Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during and subsequent to
19 May 2009; (4) respondents be ordered to expunge from the records of the respondents
any document pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name
which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be ordered to return to petitioner her journal,
digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch,
sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and her P15,000.00 cash. 40

In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and referred
the case to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate
action. 41 The Resolution also directed the respondents to file their verified written
return. 42

On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return of the
Writs 43 on behalf of the public officials impleaded as respondents.

We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents.

The public respondents label petitioner's alleged abduction and torture as "stage
managed." 44 In support of their accusation, the public respondents principally rely on
the statement of Mr. Paolo, as contained in the Special Report 45 of the La Paz Police
Station. In the Special Report, Mr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction,
petitioner and her companions instructed him and his two sons to avoid leaving the
house. 46 From this statement, the public respondents drew the distinct possibility that,
except for those already inside Mr. Paolo's house, nobody else has any way of knowing
where petitioner and her companions were at the time they were supposedly
abducted.47 This can only mean, the public respondents concluded, that if ever there was
any "abduction" it must necessarily have been planned by, or done with the consent of,
the petitioner and her companions themselves. 48

Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate 49 of the petitioner, as

actually belying her claims that she was subjected to serious torture for five (5) days. The
public respondents noted that while the petitioner alleges that she was choked and boxed
by her abductors inflictions that could have easily produced remarkable bruises
her Medical Certificate only shows abrasions in her wrists and knee caps. 50

For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in question the very
authenticity of petitioner's alleged abduction and torture, more so any military or police
involvement therein. Hence, public respondents conclude that the claims of abduction and
torture was no more than a charade fabricated by the petitioner to put the government
in bad light, and at the same time, bring great media mileage to her and the group that
she represents. 51

Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the public
respondents insist on the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas Data petition based on the
following grounds: (a) as against respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in
particular, because of her immunity from suit, 52 and (b) as against all of the public
respondents, in general, in view of the absence of any specific allegation in the petition
that they had participated in, or at least authorized, the commission of such atrocities. 53

Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty to
ascertain the truth behind the allegations of the petitioner. 54 In both the police and
military arms of the government machinery, inquiries were set-up in the following manner:

Police Action

Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around 4:30 o'clock in
the afternoon of 19 May 2009, when Barangay Captain Michael M. Manuel came to the
La Paz Municipal Police Station to report the presence of heavily armed men somewhere
in Barangay Kapanikian. 55 Acting on the report, the police station launched an initial
investigation. 56

The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Mr. Paolo, who informed
the investigators of an abduction incident involving three (3) persons later identified as
petitioner Melissa Roxas, Juanito Carabeo and John Edward Jandoc who were all staying
in his house. 57 Mr. Paolo disclosed that the abduction occurred around 1:30 o'clock in
the afternoon, and was perpetrated by about eight (8) heavily armed men who forced
their way inside his house. 58 Other witnesses to the abduction also confirmed that the
armed men used a dark blue van with an unknown plate number and two (2) Honda XRM
motorcycles with no plate numbers. 59

At 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the investigators sent a Flash
Message to the different police stations surrounding La Paz, Tarlac, in an effort to track
and locate the van and motorcycles of the suspects. Unfortunately, the effort yielded
negative results. 60

On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation were included in a Special
Report 61 that was transmitted to the Tarlac Police Provincial Office, headed by public
respondent P/S Supt. Rudy Lacadin (Supt. Lacadin). Public respondent Supt. Lacadin, in
turn, informed the Regional Police Office of Region 3 about the abduction. 62 Follow-up
investigations were, at the same time, pursued. 63

On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon Nilo Dela Cruz, as Director of
the Regional Police Office for Region 3, caused the creation of Special Investigation Task
Group CAROJAN (Task Group CAROJAN) to conduct an in-depth investigation on the
abduction of the petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc. 64

Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a series of background

examinations on the victims of the purported abduction, in order to reveal the motive
behind the abduction and, ultimately, the identity of the perpetrators. 65 Task Group
CAROJAN also maintained liaisons with Karapatan and the Alliance for Advancement of
People's Rights organizations trusted by petitioner in the hopes of obtaining the
latter's participation in the ongoing investigations. 66 Unfortunately, the letters sent by
the investigators requesting for the availability of the petitioner for inquiries were left
unheeded. 67

The progress of the investigations conducted by Task Group CAROJAN had been
detailed in the reports 68 that it submitted to public respondent General Jesus Ame
Verzosa, the Chief of the Philippine National Police. However, as of their latest report dated
29 June 2009, Task Group CAROJAN is still unable to make a definitive finding as to the
true identity and affiliation of the abductors a fact that task group CAROJAN attributes
to the refusal of the petitioner, or any of her fellow victims, to cooperate in their
investigative efforts. 69

Military Action

Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of National Defense, first came to
know about the alleged abduction and torture of the petitioner upon receipt of the
Resolution of this Court directing him and the other respondents to file their
return. 70 Immediately thereafter, he issued a Memorandum Directive 71 addressed to
the Chief of Staff of the AFP, ordering the latter, among others, to conduct an inquiry to
determine the validity of the accusation of military involvement in the abduction. 72

Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public respondent General Victor

S. Ibrado, the AFP Chief of Staff, sent an AFP Radio Message 73 addressed to public
respondent Lieutenant General Delfin N. Bangit (Lt. Gen. Bangit), the Commanding General
of the Army, relaying the order to cause an investigation on the abduction of the
petitioner. 74

For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the amparo petition, public
respondent Lt. Gen. Bangit instructed public respondent Major General Ralph A. Villanueva
(Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the Commander of the 7th Infantry Division of the Army based in
Fort Magsaysay, to set in motion an investigation regarding the possible involvement of
any personnel assigned at the camp in the purported abduction of the petitioner. 75 In
turn, public respondent Maj. Gen. Villanueva tapped the Office of the Provost Marshal
(OPV) of the 7th Infantry Division, to conduct the investigation. 76

On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry Division released an Investigation
Report 77 detailing the results of its inquiry. In substance, the report described petitioner's
allegations as "opinionated" and thereby cleared the military from any involvement in her
alleged abduction and torture. 78

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision, 79 the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration to the
petitioner's version that she was indeed abducted and then subjected to torture for five
(5) straight days. The appellate court noted the sincerity and resolve by which the
petitioner affirmed the contents of her affidavits in open court, and was thereby convinced
that the latter was telling the truth. 80
 On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded the argument of the public
respondents that the abduction of the petitioner was "stage managed," as it is merely
based on an unfounded speculation that only the latter and her companions knew where
they were staying at the time they were forcibly taken. 81 The Court of Appeals further
stressed that the Medical Certificate of the petitioner can only affirm the existence of a
true abduction, as its findings are reflective of the very injuries the latter claims to have
sustained during her harrowing ordeal, particularly when she was handcuffed and then
dragged by her abductors onto their van. 82

The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against
the security of the petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of "RC" to contact and monitor
her, even after she was released. 83 This threat, according to the Court of Appeals, is all
the more compounded by the failure of the police authorities to identify the material
perpetrators who are still at large. 84 Thus, the appellate court extended to the petitioner
the privilege of the writ of amparo by directing the public respondents to afford protection
to the former, as well as continuing, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, their
existing investigations involving the abduction. 85

The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to informational

privacy of the petitioner, noting the existence of "records of investigations" that concerns
the petitioner as a suspected member of the CPP-NPA. 86 The appellate court derived the
existence of such records from a photograph and video file presented in a press
conference by party-list representatives Jovito Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor Alcover
(Alcover), which allegedly show the petitioner participating in rebel exercises.
Representative Alcover also revealed that the photograph and video came from a female
CPP-NPA member who wanted out of the organization. According to the Court of Appeals,
the proliferation of the photograph and video, as well as any form of media, insinuating
that petitioner is part of the CPP-NPA does not only constitute a violation of the right to
privacy of the petitioner but also puts further strain on her already volatile security. 87 To
this end, the appellate court granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data mandating
the public respondents to refrain from distributing to the public any records, in whatever
form, relative to petitioner's alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her
abduction and torture. 88

The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not convinced
that the military or any other person acting under the acquiescence of the government,
 were responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner. 89 The appellate court
stressed that, judging by her own statements, the petitioner merely "believed" that the
military was behind her abduction. 90 Thus, the Court of Appeals absolved the public
respondents from any complicity in the abduction and torture of petitioner. 91 The
petition was likewise dismissed as against public respondent President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, in view of her immunity from suit. 92

Accordingly, the petitioner's prayers for the return of her personal belongings were
denied. 93 Petitioner's prayers for an inspection order and production order also met the
same fate. 94

Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.

AMPARO

A.

Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the public
respondents from any responsibility in her abduction and torture. 95 Corollary to this,
petitioner also finds fault on the part of Court of Appeals in denying her prayer for the
return of her personal belongings. 96

Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried
out, as well as the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she heard while in
detention, as these were detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court,
are already sufficient evidence to prove government involvement. 97

Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of command

responsibility to implicate the high-ranking civilian and military authorities she impleaded
as respondents in her amparo petition. 98 Thus, petitioner seeks from this Court a
pronouncement holding the respondents as complicit in her abduction and torture, as well
as liable for the return of her belongings. 99

Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings

It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of
command responsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents in
her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command
responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account,
cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition. 100
 The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo, 101 which was the first to examine command
responsibility in the context of an amparo proceeding, observed that the doctrine is used
to pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes that: 102

The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the
development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas,
"command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed
forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict." 103 In this sense, command responsibility is properly a
form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the
doctrine of command responsibility, 104 foreshadowing the present-day
precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his
subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then
formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual
criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes
committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the
perpetrators 105 (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (Emphasis in the original,
underscoring supplied)

Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of

individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case
rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the
writ itself:

The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief

consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the
court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional
rights to life, liberty or security. 106 While the principal objective of its proceedings is
the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or
threats thereof had transpired the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such
disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative
under the applicable substantive law. 107 The rationale underpinning this peculiar
nature of an amparo writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case
of The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo: 108
 . . . The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate
reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal
guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings. 109 (Emphasis supplied)

It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command

responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading
military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition
were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders
may be impleaded not actually on the basis of command responsibility but rather
on the ground of theirresponsibility, or at least accountability. In Razon v.
Tagitis, 110 the distinct, but interrelated concepts of responsibility and accountability were
given special and unique significations in relation to an amparo proceeding, to wit:

. . . Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by

substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or
omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this
Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal
and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper
courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies
that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to
the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those
who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence
in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.

Responsibility of Public Respondents

At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner
in impleading the public respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibility on their
part, based on her assumption that they, in one way or the other, had condoned her
abduction and torture. 111
 To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was government
agents who were behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the
circumstances surrounding her abduction and torture i.e., the forcible taking in broad
daylight; use of vehicles with no license plates; utilization of blindfolds; conducting
interrogations to elicit communist inclinations; and the infliction of physical abuse
which, according to her, is consistent with the way enforced disappearances are being
practiced by the military or other state forces. 112

Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military camp Fort
Magsaysay a conclusion that she was able to infer from the travel time required to
reach the place where she was actually detained, and also from the sounds of construction,
gun-fire and airplanes she heard while thereat. 113

We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner
does not inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police
personnel and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay.

First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of

abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does
not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such
abduction. We opine that insofar as the present case is concerned, the perceived similarity
cannot stand as substantial evidence of the involvement of the government.

In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances

as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability
of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and
affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be
preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the
former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it
could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain.

In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of
Exhibits, 114 the cartographic sketches 115 of several of her abductors whose faces she
managed to see. To the mind of this Court, these cartographic sketches have the
undeniable potential of giving the greatest certainty as to the true identity and affiliation
of petitioner's abductors. Unfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has not been
realized in view of the fact that the faces described in such sketches remain unidentified,
much less have been shown to be that of any military or police personnel. Bluntly stated,
the abductors were not proven to be part of either the military or the police chain of
command.

Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not
adequately established by her mere estimate of the time it took to reach the place where
she was detained and by the sounds that she heard while thereat. Like the Court of
Appeals, We are not inclined to take the estimate and observations of the petitioner as
accurate on its face not only because they were made mostly while she was in
blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a mere sojourner in the Philippines,
whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the travel time required to reach it is in itself
doubtful. 116 With nothing else but obscure observations to support it, petitioner's claim
that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.

In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her
abductors were actually affiliated, whether formally or informally, with the military or the
police organizations. Neither does the evidence at hand prove that petitioner was indeed
taken to the military camp Fort Magsaysay to the exclusion of other places. These
evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually impossible to determine whether the
abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact committed with the acquiescence
of the public respondents. On account of this insufficiency in evidence, a pronouncement
of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be made.

Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings

This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her personal
belongings.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above prayer of the petitioner by
reason of the failure of the latter to prove that the public respondents were involved in
her abduction and torture. 117 We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, but
not entirely with the reason used to support it. To the mind of this Court, the prayer of
the petitioner for the return of her belongings is doomed to fail regardless of whether
there is sufficient evidence to hold public respondents responsible for the abduction of
the petitioner.
 In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal
belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of
liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of
the public respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already
discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable in a mere
summary amparo proceeding. 118

But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner,
lies with the fact that a person's right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed
under the general rubric of property rights which are no longer protected by the writ
of amparo. 119 Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, 120 which defines the scope and extent of
the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property rights.

B.

The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of Appeals of her
prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay. 121

Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military involvement

in petitioner's ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in
denying an inspection of the military camp at Fort Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate
court that a contrary stance would be equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition,"
which was never intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of
inspection order. 122Contrary to the explicit position 123 espoused by the petitioner,
the Amparo Rule does not allow a "fishing expedition" for evidence.

An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the

claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a
decision. 124 A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order
is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the
party seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does not require that the place to be
inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the
issuance of an inspection order that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in
itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do.

Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough
to make out aprima facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of
the military camp cannot be ordered. An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of
allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful.

HABEAS DATA

As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of
the writ of habeas data, by enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing
the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar
papers" relative to the petitioner's "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related
to her abduction and torture." Though not raised as an issue in this appeal, this Court is
constrained to pass upon and review this particular ruling of the Court of Appeals in order
to rectify, what appears to Us, an error infecting the grant.

For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of Appeals in
granting the privilege of the writ of habeas data, We quote hereunder the relevant
portion 125 of its decision:

Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence
reports and reports on the investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or
Melissa Roxas be produced and eventually expunged from the records.
Petitioner claimed to be included in the Government's Order of Battle under
Oplan Bantay Laya which listed political opponents against whom false
criminal charges were filed based on made up and perjured information.

Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify

before Us, Ex-army general Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and Pastor
Alcover of the Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy party-list held a
press conference where they revealed that they received an information
from a female NPA rebel who wanted out of the organization, that
Petitioner was a communist rebel. Alcover claimed that said information
reached them thru a letter with photo of Petitioner holding firearms at an
NPA training camp and a video CD of the training exercises.

Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioner's denial that she was the person
in said video, there were records of other investigations on Melissa C.
Roxas or Melissa Roxas which violate her right to privacy. Without a doubt,
reports of such nature have reasonable connections, one way or another, to
petitioner's abduction where she claimed she had been subjected to cruelties
 and dehumanizing acts which nearly caused her life precisely due to allegation
of her alleged membership in the CPP-NPA. And if said report or similar
reports are to be continuously made available to the public, Petitioner's
security and privacy will certainly be in danger of being violated or
transgressed by persons who have strong sentiments or aversion against
members of this group. The unregulated dissemination of said unverified
video CD or reports of Petitioner's alleged ties with the CPP-NPA
indiscriminately made available for public consumption without evidence of
its authenticity or veracity certainly violates Petitioner's right to privacy which
must be protected by this Court. We, thus, deem it necessary to grant
Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data. (Emphasis supplied).

The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right
to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. 126 The writ
operates to protect a person's right to control information regarding himself, particularly
in the instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in
order to achieve unlawful ends.

Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ

may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. 127 This,
in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do.

The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually
no evidence on record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or
threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals
to the public respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of
the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other reports about the
petitioner's ties with the CPP-NPA, was not adequately proven considering that the
origin of such records were virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by
the appellate court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan
and Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the
public respondents had access to such video or photograph.

In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining
the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any
records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioner's
"alleged ties with the CPP-NPA," appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public
respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the first
place, it was not proven to have.

Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be actually
responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the
existence of reports being kept in violation of the petitioner's right to privacy becomes
farfetched, and premature.

For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant
of the privilege of the writ of habeas data.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE

Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate insufficiency
to impute any form of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, revealed two
important things that can guide Us to a proper disposition of this case. One, that further
investigation with the use of extraordinary diligence must be made in order to identify the
perpetrators behind the abduction and torture of the petitioner; and two, that the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to its Constitutional mandate to
"investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to
provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights," 128 must be
tapped in order to fill certain investigative and remedial voids.

Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken

Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not
able to adduce substantial evidence proving her allegations of government complicity in
her abduction and torture, may be attributed to the incomplete and one-sided
investigations conducted by the government itself. This "awkward" situation, wherein the
very persons alleged to be involved in an enforced disappearance or extralegal killing are,
at the same time, the very ones tasked by law to investigate the matter, is a unique
characteristic of these proceedings and is the main source of the "evidentiary
difficulties" faced by any petitioner in any amparo case. 129

Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent safeguard
requiring the "respondent who is a public official or employee" to prove that no less
than "extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was
observed in the performance of duty." 130 Thus, unless and until any of the public
respondents is able to show to the satisfaction of the amparo court that extraordinary
diligence has been observed in their investigations, they cannot shed the allegations of
responsibility despite the prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect.

With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by

the Amparo Rule, was not fully observed in the conduct of the police and military
investigations in the case at bar.

A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group CAROJAN shows

modest effort on the part of the police investigators to identify the perpetrators of the
abduction. To be sure, said reports are replete with background checks on the victims of
the abduction, but are, at the same time, comparatively silent as to other concrete steps
the investigators have been taking to ascertain the authors of the crime. Although
conducting a background investigation on the victims is a logical first step in exposing the
motive behind the abduction its necessity is clearly outweighed by the need to identify
the perpetrators, especially in light of the fact that the petitioner, who was no longer in
captivity, already came up with allegations about the motive of her captors.

Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely on the
cooperation or non-cooperation of the petitioner who, they claim, was less than
enthusiastic in participating in their investigative efforts. 131While it may be conceded
that the participation of the petitioner would have facilitated the progress of Task Group
CAROJAN's investigation, this Court believes that the former's reticence to cooperate is
hardly an excuse for Task Group CAROJAN not to explore other means or avenues from
which they could obtain relevant leads. 132 Indeed, while the allegations of government
complicity by the petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up as adequate evidence before
a court of law they are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable investigative leads that
must be pursued and verified, if only to comply with the high standard of diligence
required by the Amparo Rule in the conduct of investigations.

Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJAN's reports

still failed to explain why it never considered seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolo
who, along with the victims, is a central witness to the abduction. The reports of Task
Group CAROJAN is silent in any attempt to obtain from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch
of the abductors or, at the very least, of the one who, by petitioner's account, was not
wearing any mask.

The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to the
sketches included in petitioner's offer of exhibits that, it may be pointed out, were prepared
under the direction of, and first submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the latter's independent
investigation on the abduction and torture of the petitioner. 133 But as mentioned earlier,
the CHR sketches remain to be unidentified as of this date.

In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals that further
investigation under the norm of extraordinary diligence should be undertaken. This Court
simply cannot write finis to this case, on the basis of an incomplete investigation
conducted by the police and the military. In a very real sense, the right to security of the
petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy because of the deficient investigation that
directly contributes to the delay in bringing the real perpetrators before the bar of justice.

To add teeth to the appellate court's directive, however, We find it fitting, nay,
necessary to shift the primary task of conducting further investigations on the abduction
and torture of the petitioner upon the CHR. 134 We note that the CHR, unlike the police
or the military, seems to enjoy the trust and confidence of the petitioner as evidenced
by her attendance and participation in the hearings already conducted by the
commission. 135 Certainly, it would be reasonable to assume from such cooperation that
the investigations of the CHR have advanced, or at the very least, bears the most promise
of advancing farther, in terms of locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus,
vital for a final resolution of this petition. From this perspective, We also deem it just and
appropriate to relegate the task of affording interim protection to the petitioner, also to
the CHR.

Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation,
as follows

1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further
investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner.
Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence,
take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons
described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as
 well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant
to petitioner's abduction and torture.

2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or
his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his
successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the
CHR, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its
personnel records circa the time of the petitioner's abduction and
torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the
Constitution and existing laws.

3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to
furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her
representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their
recommendations, other than those that are already part of the
records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this
decision.

4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within
ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on
its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and to (b)
provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her
stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be
determined by this Court.

Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the
purposes of monitoring compliance with the above directives and determining whether,
in light of any recent reports or recommendations, there would already be sufficient
evidence to hold any of the public respondents responsible or, at least, accountable. After
making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit its own report with
recommendation to this Court for final action. The Court of Appeals will continue to have
jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its tasks under this decision.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We hereby render

a decision:
1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner's prayer for the return of her
personal belongings;

2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner's prayer for an inspection of the
detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.

3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice,
however, to any modification that this Court may make on the basis
of the investigation reports and recommendations submitted to it
under this decision.

4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken,

as follows

a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency

tasked with conducting further investigation regarding the
abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the
Commission on Human Rights shall, under the norm of
extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary
steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic
sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their
whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to
petitioner's abduction and torture.

b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police,

or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, or his successor, to extend assistance
to the ongoing investigation of the Commission on Human
Rights, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy
of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioner's
abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations
consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.

c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National

Police, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of
Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the
reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other
 than those that are already part of the records of this case,
within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.

d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish

to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of
this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its
corresponding recommendations; and (b) to provide or
continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay
or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be
determined by this Court.

5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for the
following purposes:

a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by the PNP, AFP,

and the CHR;

b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and

recommendations of the CHR, the abduction and torture of the
petitioner was committed by persons acting under any of the
public respondents; and on the basis of this determination

c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of the
report and recommendation of the Commission on Human
Rights its own report, which shall include a recommendation
either for theDISMISSAL of the petition as against the public
respondents who were found not responsible and/or
accountable, or for the APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL MEASURES,
AS MAY BE ALLOWED BY THE AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA
RULES, TO BE UNDERTAKEN as against those found
responsible and/or accountable.

Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this

petition to answer for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred
during their incumbencies.

Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August 2009 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA that are not contrary to this decision are AFFIRMED.
RULES IN WRIT OF AMPARO

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF AMPARO IN FAVOR OF ATTY.
LILIBETH O LADAGA

[G.R. No. 189689. November 13, 2012.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF

AMPARO IN FAVOR OF LILIBETH O. LADAGA:

LILIBETH O. LADAGA, petitioner, vs. MAJ. GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU,

COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY'S 10TH INFANTRY
DIVISION (ID); COL. LYSANDER SUERTE, CHIEF OF STAFF, 10TH ID, LT.
COL. KURT A. DECAPIA, CHIEF, 10TH ID, PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; COL.
OSCAR LACTAO, HEAD-TASK FORCE-DAVAO; SR. SUPT. RAMON
APOLINARIO, DAVAO CITY POLICE OFFICE DIRECTOR; AND SEVERAL
OTHER JOHN DOES, respondents.

[G.R. No. 189690. November 13, 2012.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF

AMPARO IN FAVOR OF ANGELA A. LIBRADO-TRINIDAD:

ANGELA A. LIBRADO-TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. MAJ. GEN. REYNALDO

MAPAGU, COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY'S 10TH ID;
COL. LYSANDER SUERTE, CHIEF OF STAFF, 10TH ID, LT. COL. KURT A.
DECAPIA, CHIEF, 10TH ID, PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; COL. OSCAR LACTAO,
HEAD-TASK FORCE-DAVAO; SR. SUPT. RAMON APOLINARIO, DAVAO
CITY POLICE OFFICE DIRECTOR; AND SEVERAL OTHER JOHN
DOES,respondents.

[G.R. No. 189691. November 13, 2012.]

 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
AMPARO IN FAVOR OF CARLOS ISAGANI T. ZARATE:

CARLOS ISAGANI T. ZARATE, petitioner, vs. MAJ. GEN. REYNALDO

MAPAGU, COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY'S 10TH ID;
COL. LYSANDER SUERTE, CHIEF OF STAFF, 10TH ID, LT. COL. KURT A.
DECAPIA, CHIEF, 10TH ID, PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; COL. OSCAR LACTAO,
HEAD-TASK FORCE-DAVAO; SR. SUPT. RAMON APOLINARIO, DAVAO
CITY POLICE OFFICE DIRECTOR; AND SEVERAL OTHER JOHN
DOES,respondents.

The Facts

Petitioners share the common circumstance of having their names included in what is alleged
to be a JCICC "AGILA" 3rd Quarter 2007 Order of Battle Validation Result of the Philippine
Army's 10th Infantry Division (10th ID), 3 which is a list containing the names of organizations
and personalities in Southern Mindanao, particularly Davao City, supposedly connected to the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the New People's Army (NPA).
They perceive that by the inclusion of their names in the said Order of Battle (OB List), they
become easy targets of unexplained disappearances or extralegal killings a real threat to
their life, liberty and security.

The petitioner in G.R. No. 189689, ATTY. LILIBETH O. LADAGA (Atty. Ladaga), first came to
know of the existence of the OB List from an undisclosed source on May 21, 2009. This was
after the PowerPoint presentation made public by Bayan Muna Party-List Representative Satur
Ocampo (Representative Ocampo) on May 18, 2009 during the conclusion of the International
Solidarity Mission (ISM) conducted by various organizations. The following entries bearing
specific reference to her person were reflected therein: EaCDAT

7. ON 12 NOV 07, MEETING AT SHIMRIC BEACH RESORT, TALOMO, DC

PRESIDED BY ATTY. LILIBETH LADAGA SEC GEN, UNION OF
PEOPLE'S LAWYER MOVEMENT (UPLM) AND KELLY DELGADO-SEC
GEN, KARAPATAN:
 PRESENTED THE NATL GOAL/THEME WHICH STATES THAT "THE
STAGE IS SET, TIME TO UNITE AGAINST ARROYO, STEP UP PROTESTS
AND ARMED OFFENSIVE."

DISCUSSED THE FOLLOWING ISSUES WHICH WILL BE CAPITALIZED

ON THEIR PLANNED ACTIVITIES ON 30 NOV 07:

ISSUES:

1. OUTREACH PROGRAMS/MEDICAL MISSION IN RURAL

AREAS;

2. OUT OF SCHOOL YOUTH RECRUITMENT;

3. P125 DAILY WAGE HIKE OR P3,000 ACROSS THE BOARD

HIKE;

4. SCRAP ANTI-TERRORISM BILL;

5. OIL DE-REGULATION LAW;

6. ANTI-LARGE SCALE MINING;

7. CORRUPTION AND ANTI-POVERTY/ZTE ISSUES AND

BRIBERY;

8. ANTI-POLITICAL AND EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLINGS;

9. CARP ISSUES AND LAND DISPUTES; AND

10. LATEST GLORIETA BOMBING

COMPOSITION: CIVIC, RELIGIOUS, TRANSPORT, LABOR AND

PEASANT, YOUTH SECTOR, PROGRESSIVE GROUPS, BUSINESS SECTOR,
ANTI-PGMA, BLACK AND WHITE MOVEMENT AND ANTI-POVERTY
MOVEMENT.

ULTIMATE GOAL: TRY TO OUST PGMA ON 30 NOV 07 4

In her Affidavit, 5 Atty. Ladaga substantiated the threats against her life, liberty and security
by narrating that since 2007, suspicious-looking persons have been visiting her Davao City
law office during her absence, posing either as members of the military or falsely claiming to
be clients inquiring on the status of their cases. These incidents were attested to by her law
office partner, Atty. Michael P. Pito, through an Affidavit 6 dated June 16, 2009.

On the other hand, the petitioner in G.R. No. 189690, Davao City Councilor ATTY. ANGELA
LIBRADO-TRINIDAD (Atty. Librado-Trinidad), delivered a Privilege Speech 7 before the
members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Davao City on May 19, 2009 to demand the
removal of her name from said OB List. Subsequently, the Davao City Council ordered a formal
investigation into the existence of the alleged OB List. The Commission on Human Rights
(CHR), for its part, announced the conduct of its own investigation into the matter, having
been presented a copy of the PowerPoint presentation during its public hearing in Davao City
on May 22, 2009.

According to her, in the course of the performance of her duties and functions as a lawyer,
as a member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Davao, as well as, of Bayan Muna, she has
not committed any act against national security that would justify the inclusion of her name
in the said OB List. In her Affidavit, 8 she recounted that sometime in May 2008, two
suspicious-looking men on a motorcycle tailed her vehicle as she went about her day going
to different places. She also recalled that on June 23, 2008, while she was away from home,
three unidentified men tried to barge into their house and later left on board a plate-less,
stainless "owner type-vehicle." Both incidents were duly reported to the police. 9 AHCcET

In fine, petitioners were one in asserting that the OB List is really a military hit-list as allegedly
shown by the fact that there have already been three victims of extrajudicial killing whose
violent deaths can be linked directly to the OB List, to wit: Celso B. Pojas, who was assassinated
in May 2008 13 purportedly because he was Secretary General of the Farmers Association of
Davao City 14 and Spokesperson of the Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP), 15 which
organizations were identified as communist fronts in the subject OB List; Lodenio S. Monzon,
who was a victim of a shooting incident in April 2009 16 due to his supposed connection to
the known activist party-list group Bayan Muna 17 as Coordinator in the Municipality of
Boston, Davao Oriental; and Dr. Rogelio Peera, who was shot to death in June 2009 allegedly
because he was a member of RX Against Erap (RAGE), 18 a sectoral group also identified in
the OB List.

Petitioners further alleged that respondents' inconsistent statements and obvious

prevarication sufficiently prove their authorship of the subject OB List. Supposedly sourced
from their own Press Releases, 19 respondents have been quoted in several newspapers as
saying: 1) that the "10th ID has its Order of Battle, and, it is not for public consumption"; 2)
that the Order of Battle "requires thorough confirmation and validation from different law
enforcement agencies, and from various sectors and stakeholders who are the ones providing
the information about the people and organizations that may in one way or the other, wittingly
or unwittingly, become involved in the CPP's grand design"; 3) that an "order of battle does
not target individuals; it is mainly an assessment of the general threat to national security"; 4)
that Representative Ocampo "utilized the material to disrupt the ongoing government efforts
in the area by raising issues and propaganda against the military"; 5) that "[t]he public viewing
of the "falsified" document of the OB was a deliberate act of Representative Ocampo . . . to
mar the image of the military forces, gain media mileage and regain the support of the masses
and local executives"; 6) that Representative Ocampo "'twisted' the data and insinuated names
as targets of the AFP/10ID when in fact these are targets (for infiltration) by the CPP/NPA";
and 7) that this "attempt of the CPP to attribute human rights violations to the Philippine
government is a cover to mask their record of killing people." According to petitioners, there
is no question that these Press Releases came from the 10th ID. Its source email
address, dpao10id@yahoo.com, has been identified by regular correspondent of
the Philippine Daily Inquirer Jeffrey Tupas as the same one used by respondent Lt. Col.
Decapia in sending to him previous official press statements of the 10th ID, including the
Press Release entitled, "CPP/NPA demoralized, ISM on the rescue." 20

On June 16, 2009, petitioners separately filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Amparo with Application for a Production Order, 21 docketed as Special Proceeding
Nos. 004-09, 22 005-09 23 and 006-09. 24 On June 22, 2009, the RTC issued separate Writs
of Amparo 25 in each of the three (3) cases, directing respondents to file a verified written
return within seventy-two (72) hours and setting the case for summary hearing on June 29,
2009.

In their Returns, 26 respondents denied authorship of the document being adverted to and
distributed by Representative Ocampo to the media. They claimed that petitioners miserably
failed to show, by substantial evidence, that they were responsible for the alleged threats
perceived by petitioners. Instead, they asserted that petitioners' allegations are based solely
on hearsay, speculation, beliefs, impression and feelings, which are insufficient to warrant the
issuance of the writ and, ultimately, the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo.
In her Reply, 27 Atty. Librado-Trinidad averred that the present petition substantially
conformed with the requirements of the Amparo Rule, as it alleged ultimate facts on the
participation of respondents in the preparation of the OB List, which naturally requires utmost
secrecy. The petition likewise alleged how the inclusion of their names in the said OB List
substantiates the threat of becoming easy targets of unexplained disappearances and
extrajudicial killings. On the other hand, Attys. Zarate and Ladaga commonly asserted 28 that
the totality of the events, which consists of respondents' virtual admission to the media of the
existence of the OB List, as well as, the fact that known victims of past extrajudicial killings
have been likewise labeled as communist fronts in similar orders of battle, more than satisfies
the standard required to prove that petitioners' life, liberty and security are at risk. HESCcA

During the scheduled summary hearing on June 22, 2009, Representative Ocampo's oral
testimony on the circumstances surrounding his obtention of the alleged military document
was dispensed with and, instead, the Affidavit 29 he executed on June 30, 2009 was presented
in the hearing held on July 1, 2009 to form part of the documentary exhibits of petitioners. 30

After submission of the parties' respective Position Papers, 31 the RTC issued on August 14,
2009 the three separate but similarly-worded Orders finding no substantial evidence to show
that the perceived threat to petitioners' life, liberty and security was attributable to the
unlawful act or omission of the respondents, thus disposing of each of the three cases in this
wise:

Prescinding therefrom, and in . . . light of all the pieces of evidence presented,

this Court is of the considered views [sic] that petitioner failed to prove, by
substantial evidence, that indeed, (her/his) perceived threat to (her/his) life,
liberty and security is attributable to the unlawful act or omission of the
respondents. Accordingly, this Court has no other recourse but to deny the
instant petition.

WHEREFORE, the privilege of the Writ is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED. 32

The RTC rejected the sworn statement of Representative Ocampo for being hearsay, holding
that with no direct or personal knowledge of the authenticity of the subject OB List, even an
oral testimony from him on the circumstances surrounding its obtention through a
"conscientious soldier" would still be of no probative weight. It likewise found that the violent
deaths of Celso Pojas, Lodenio Monzon and Dr. Rogelio Peera, and other incidents of threat
have no direct relation at all to the existence of the present OB List.

In their Joint Motion for Reconsideration, 33 petitioners argued that the existence and veracity
of the OB List had already been confirmed by respondents themselves through their
statements to the media, hence, respondents' personal authorship thereof need not be proven
by substantial evidence, as it is, after all, "not the crux of the issue." Petitioners explicated that
since respondents were being impleaded as the responsible officers of the 10th ID the
military unit that supposedly prepared the OB List PowerPoint presentation, their general
denials on the existence of the OB List without taking serious steps to find the persons actually
responsible for the threat could not discharge respondents from the standard of diligence
required of them under the Amparo Rule.

The RTC, however, rejected petitioners' arguments in the September 22, 2009 Order, hence,
these petitions for review on certiorari raising the following issues:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO

ADDUCE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE GRANT OF
THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT, I.E., PROTECTION;

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE

RESPONDENTS LIKEWISE FAILED TO DISCHARGE THE DILIGENCE
REQUIRED BY THE AMPARO RULES BY THEIR SWEEPING AND
GENERAL DENIALS; AND

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE NATURE AND

CONCEPT OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT. 34

Commenting on the petitions, respondents argue 35 that the purported OB List could not
have come from the military because it does not have the "distinctive marks and security
classifications" of military documents. They quickly defend the correctness of the RTC's denial
of the privilege of the writ and the interim relief of a protection order as petitioners have not
presented any adequate and competent evidence, much less substantial evidence, to establish
that public respondents are threatening to violate their rights to life, liberty and security or
that, at the very least, were involved in the preparation of the OB List.

We deny the petitions.

The writ of amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rule-making powers in
response to the alarming rise in the number of cases of enforced disappearances and
extrajudicial killings. 36 It plays the preventive role of breaking the expectation of impunity in
the commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, as well as the curative role
of facilitating the subsequent punishment of the perpetrators. 37 In Tapuz v. Del
Rosario, 38 the Court has previously held that the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy
intended to address violations of, or threats to, the rights to life, liberty or security and that,
being a remedy of extraordinary character, it is not one to issue on amorphous or uncertain
grounds but only upon reasonable certainty. Hence, every petition for the issuance of the writ
is required to be supported by justifying allegations of fact on the following matters:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b)The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for

the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the
respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent,
and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal

circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as
well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate
or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person
responsible for the threat, act or omission; and

(f) The relief prayed for. The petition may include a general prayer for other
just and equitable reliefs. 39 (Underscoring supplied)

The sole and common issue presented in these petitions is whether the totality of evidence
satisfies the degree of proof required under the Amparo Rule. Sections 17 and 18 of the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo provide as follows:
 SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties
shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 18. Judgment. The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days
from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the
petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the
privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate;
otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (Emphasis supplied)

Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing
or violation that would warrant a finding of liability against the person charged. 40 The
summary nature of amparo proceedings, as well as, the use of substantial evidence as
standard of proof shows the intent of the framers of the rule to address situations of enforced
disappearance and extrajudicial killings, or threats thereof, with what is akin to administrative
proceedings. 41

Suitable to, and consistent with this incipiently unique and informal treatment
of amparo cases, the Court eventually recognized the evidentiary difficulties that
beset amparo petitioners, arising as they normally would from the fact that the State itself,
through its own agents, is involved in the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing that
it is supposedly tasked by law to investigate. Thus, in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the Court laid down
a new standard of relaxed admissibility of evidence to enable amparo petitioners to meet the
required amount of proof showing the State's direct or indirect involvement in the purported
violations and found it a fair and proper rule in amparo cases "to consider all the pieces of
evidence adduced in their totality" and "to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible
under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence
adduced." 42 Put simply, evidence is not to be rejected outright because it is inadmissible
under the rules for as long as it satisfies "the most basic test of reason i.e., relevance of
the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced
evidence." 43

This measure of flexibility in the admissibility of evidence, however, does not do away with
the requirement of substantial evidence in showing the State's involvement in the enforced
disappearance, extrajudicial killing or threats thereof. It merely permits, in the absence of hard-
to-produce direct evidence, a closer look at the relevance and significance of every available
evidence, 44 including those that are, strictly speaking, hearsay where the circumstances of
the case so require, and allows the consideration of the evidence adduced in terms of their
consistency with the totality of the evidence. 45

As emphasized by Justice Arturo D. Brion (Justice Brion) during the deliberations on this case,
in cases of enforced disappearance, the evidence that would directly establish a violation of
the right to life, liberty and security is indubitably in the State's possession. The same is not
equally true in cases where the amparo petitioner alleges (as in this case) a threatened
violation of his/her rights since the facts, circumstances and the link between these that
create an actual threat to his/her life are measurably within the ability of
the amparo petitioner to prove. These include, among others, the alleged documented
human rights violations by the military in Mindanao; documentary and/or testimonial evidence
on the military's counter-insurgency operations; corroborative evidence to support the
allegations on the presence of suspicious men; and presumptive evidence linking the deaths
of Celso Pojas, Ludenio Monzon and Dr. Rogelio Peera to their political affiliation and the
similarity of their situation to those of petitioners. A mere inclusion of one's name in the OB
List, without more, does not suffice to discharge the burden to establish actual threat to one's
right to life, liberty and security by substantial evidence.

The statement of Representative Ocampo that the respondents are the real source of the OB
List is unquestionably hearsay evidence because, except for the fact that he himself received
the OB List from an unnamed source merely described as "a conscientious soldier," he had
no personal knowledge concerning its preparation. But even if the Court were to apply the
appropriate measure of flexibility in the instant cases by admitting the hearsay testimony of
Representative Ocampo, a consideration of this piece of evidence to the totality of those
adduced, namely, the Press Releases issued by the 10th ID admitting the existence of a
military-prepared Order of Battle, the affidavits of petitioners attesting to the threatening visits
and tailing of their vehicles by menacing strangers, as well as the violent deaths of alleged
militant personalities, leads to the conclusion that the threat to petitioners' security has not
be adequately proven.

Petitioners sought to prove that the inclusion of their names in the OB List presented a real
threat to their security by attributing the violent deaths of known activists Celso Pojas, Lodenio
Monzon and Dr. Rogelio Peera to the inclusion of the latter's names or the names of their
militant organizations in the subject OB List. Petitioner Atty. Librado-Trinidad even attributed
the alleged tailing of her vehicle by motorcycle-riding men and the attempted entry by
suspicious men into her home to the inclusion of her name in the OB List. The RTC, however,
correctly dismissed both arguments, holding that the existence of the OB List could not be
directly associated with the menacing behavior of suspicious men or the violent deaths of
certain personalities, thus:

"Anent petitioner's revelation that sometime in 2008, a number of unidentified

men attempted to forcibly enter the premises of her dwelling and that at one
occasion, the vehicle she was riding was tailed by motorcycle-riding men, the
same could not led [sic] to the conclusion that indeed, those incidents were
related to the existence of the "OB List." There appears not even an iota of
evidence upon which the same assumption can be anchored on. 46

This Court likewise sees no direct relation between the violent deaths of Celso
Pojas, Ludenio Monzon and Dr. Rogelio Peera and the subject "OB List."
There is no evidence pointing to the claim that they were killed because their
names or the organizations they were involved in were mentioned in the same
"OB List." More importantly, there is no official finding by the proper
authorities that their deaths were precipitated by their involvement in
organizations sympathetic to, or connected with, the Communist Party of the
Philippines, or its military arm, the New People's Army. Lastly, and more
telling, the existence of the subject "OB List" has not been adequately proven,
as discussed heretofore, hence, reference to the same finds no basis." 47

The Court holds that the imputed pattern of targeting militants for execution by way of
systematically identifying and listing them in an Order of Battle cannot be inferred simply
from the Press Releases admitting the existence of a military document known as an Order of
Battle and the fact that activists Celso Pojas, Lodenio Monzon and Dr. Rogelio Peera have
become supposed victims of extralegal killings. The adduced evidence tends to bear strongly
against the proposition because, except for Celso Pojas, the names of the supposed victims
of extrajudicial killings are manifestly absent in the subject OB List and the supposed
connection of the victims to the militant groups explicitly identified in the OB List is nothing
short of nebulous.
Moreover, while respondents may have admitted through various statements to the media
that the military has its own Order of Battle, such an admission is not equivalent to proof that
the subject OB List, which was publicly disclosed by Representative Ocampo by way of a
PowerPoint presentation, is one and the same with the Order of Battle that the military has
in its keeping. And, assuming that the Press Releases do amount to an admission not only of
the existence but also the authenticity of the subject OB List, the inclusion of petitioners'
names therein does not, by itself, constitute an actual threat to their rights to life, liberty and
security as to warrant the issuance of a writ of amparo.

In the case of Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 48 the Court ruled that a person's
right to security is, in one sense, "freedom from fear" and that any threat to the rights to life,
liberty or security is an actionable wrong. The term "any threat," however, cannot be taken to
mean every conceivable threat in the mind that may cause one to fear for his life, liberty or
security. The Court explicated therein that "[f]ear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a
stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless
to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to
another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past
experience with the stimulus." Certainly, given the uniqueness of individual psychological
mindsets, perceptions of what is fearful will necessarily vary from one person to another.

The alleged threat to herein petitioners' rights to life, liberty and security must be actual, and
not merely one of supposition or with the likelihood of happening. And, when the evidence
adduced establishes the threat to be existent, as opposed to a potential one, then, it goes
without saying that the threshold requirement of substantial evidence in amparo proceedings
has also been met. Thus, in the words of Justice Brion, in the context of the Amparo rule,
only actual threats, as may be established from all the facts and circumstances of the case,
can qualify as a violation that may be addressed under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

Petitioners cannot assert that the inclusion of their names in the OB List is as real a threat as
that which brought ultimate harm to victims Celso Pojas, Lodenio Monzon and Dr. Rogelio
Peera without corroborative evidence from which it can be presumed that the suspicious
deaths of these three people were, in fact, on account of their militant affiliations or that their
violent fates had been actually planned out by the military through its Order of Battle.

The Court may be more yielding to the use of circumstantial or indirect evidence and logical
inferences, but substantial evidence is still the rule to warrant a finding that the State has
violated, is violating, or is threatening to violate,amparo petitioners' right to life, liberty or
security. No substantial evidence of an actual threat to petitioners' life, liberty and security
has been shown to exist in this case. For, even if the existence of the OB List or, indeed, the
inclusion of petitioners' names therein, can be properly inferred from the totality of the
evidence presented, still, no link has been sufficiently established to relate the subject OB List
either to the threatening visits received by petitioners from unknown men or to the violent
deaths of the three (3) mentioned personalities and other known activists, which could strongly
suggest that, by some identifiable pattern of military involvement, the inclusion of one's name
in an Order of Battle would eventually result to enforced disappearance and murder of those
persons tagged therein as militants. caCSDT

Emphasizing the extraordinary character of the amparo remedy, the Court ruled in the cases
of Roxas and Razon, Jr. that an amparo petitioner's failure to establish by substantial evidence
the involvement of government forces in the alleged violation of rights is never a hindrance
for the Court to order the conduct of further investigation where it appears that the
government did not observe extraordinary diligence in the performance of its duty to
investigate the complained abduction and torture or enforced disappearance. The Court
directed further investigation in the case of Roxas because the modest efforts of police
investigators were effectively putting petitioner's right to security in danger with the delay in
identifying and apprehending her abductors. In Razon, Jr., the Court found it necessary to
explicitly order the military and police officials to pursue with extraordinary diligence the
investigation into the abduction and disappearance of a known activist because not only did
the police investigators conduct an incomplete and one-sided investigation but they blamed
their ineffectiveness to the reluctance and unwillingness of the relatives to cooperate with the
authorities. In both of these cases, the incidents of abduction and torture were undisputed
and they provided the evidentiary support for the finding that the right to security was violated
and the necessity for further investigation into such violation. Unlike Roxas and Razon,
Jr., however, the present petitions do not involve actual cases of abduction or disappearance
that can be the basis of an investigation. Petitioners would insist that respondents be
investigated and directed to produce the Order of Battle that they have admitted to be in
their safekeeping and Justify the inclusion of petitioners' names therein. However, without
substantial evidence of an actual threat to petitioners' rights to life, liberty and security that
consists more than just the inclusion of their names in an OB List, an order for further
investigation into, or production of, the military's Order of Battle, would have no concrete
basis.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby DENIED. The assailed Orders
dated August 14, 2009 and September 22, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Branch 10, are AFFIRMED.

SEC 16 RIGHT AGAINST A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

PADUA V ERICTA

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL; SHOULD NOT RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OR TO BEING NON-SUITED. The desideratum of a speedy
disposition of cases should not, if at all possible, result in the precipitate loss of a party s
right to present evidence and either in plaintiff's being non-suited or the defendant's being
pronounced liable under an ex parte judgment.

Courts should not brook undue delays in the ventilation and determination of causes. It
should be their constant effort to assure that litigations are prosecuted and resolved with
dispatch. Postponements of trials and hearings should not be allowed except on meritorious
grounds; and the grant or refusal thereof rests entirely in the sound discretion of the Judge.
It goes without saying, however, that discretion must be reasonably and wisely exercised, in
the light of the attendant circumstances. Some reasonable deferment of the proceedings
may be allowed or tolerated to the end that cases may be adjudged only after full and free
presentation of evidence by all the parties, specially where the deferment would cause no
substantial prejudice to any party. The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should
not, if at all possible, result in the precipitate loss of a party's right to present evidence and
either in plaintiff's being non-suited or the defendant's being pronounced liable under an ex
parte judgment. LLjur

In the civil action at bar, the Trial Court rejected the plaintiff's plea for cancellation of one of
three (3) hearing dates, the very first such plea made by that party, upon a ground not
entirely unmeritorious in the premises, and under such circumstances as would not be
productive of any appreciable delay in the proceedings or any substantial prejudice to the
defendants, and summarily dismissed the complaint. Such a dismissal was unwarranted and
relief therefrom must be accorded. prLL
The action that was thus summarily dismissed had been brought by Domingo Padua
(petitioner herein) in the Court of First Instance at Quezon City 1 In that action Padua
sought to recover damages for the injuries suffered by his eight-year old daughter,
Luzviminda, caused by her being hit by a truck driven by Rundio Abjaeto and owned by
Antonio G. Ramos (private respondents herein). Padua was litigating in forma pauperis.

Trial of the case having been set in due course, Padua commenced presentation of his
evidence on December 6, 1973. He gave testimony on direct examination in the course of
which reference was made to numerous documents, marked Exhibits B, B-1 to B-109. 2 At
the close of his examination, and on motion of defendants' counsel, the previously
scheduled hearing of December 12, 1973 was cancelled, and Padua's cross-examination was
reset on December 17, 1973. 3 However, the hearing of December 17, 1973 was also
cancelled, again at the instance of defendants' counsel, who pleaded sickness as ground
therefor; and trial was once more slated to "take place on March 6, March 7 and 13, 1974,
all at 9:00 o'clock in the morning." 4

After defendants' attorney had twice sought and obtained cancellation of trial settings, as
above narrated, it was plaintiff Padua's counsel who next moved for cancellation of a
hearing date. In a motion dated and filed on March 1, 1974, 5copy of which was personally
served on defendants' lawyer, 6 Padua's counsel alleged that he had "another hearing on
March 6, 1974 in Tarlac Court of First Instance entitled: Salud Dupitas vs. Mariano Abella,
Civil Case No. 4904 which is of 1966 stint, and said court in Tarlac is anxious to terminate
said case once and for all," and that the cancellation would "at any rate . . . leave plaintiff
and defendants two (2) hearing dates on March 7 and 13, 1974;" and on these premises, he
asked "that the hearing on March 6, 1974 . . . be ordered cancelled ." No opposition was
filed by the defendants to the motion, whether on the ground that the motion had not
been properly set for hearing, the clerk having merely been requested to "submit the . . .
motion upon receipt . . . for the consideration of the Court," 7 or some other ground. Apart
from filing this motion on March 1, 1974, plaintiff's counsel took the additional step of
sending his client's wife to the Court on the day of the trial, March 6, 1974, to verbally
reiterate his application for cancellation of the hearing on that day. This, Mrs. Padua did. The
respondent Judge however denied the application and dismissed the case. His Honor's
Order, dictated on that day, March 6, 1974, reads as follows: 8
 "When this case was called for hearing today, neither plaintiff nor counsel
appeared. The plaintiff's wife, however, appeared in Court and informed the
Court that the plaintiff's counsel had to attend to a very important case in
the province.

"The hearing for today was fixed by the plaintiff himself in open court after
consulting his calendar and hence the Court will not grant the
postponement on the ground that the plaintiff's counsel had a very
important case in the provinces. Neither did the plaintiff himself appear.

"In view hereof, let this case be dismissed.

Padua moved for reconsideration, 9 but this was denied. 10 Hence, this petition.

The Trial Court unaccountably ignored the fact that defendants' counsel had twice applied
for and been granted postponements of the trial; that plaintiff's counsel had filed a written
motion for postponement five (5) days prior to the hearing sought to be transferred, and
this was the very first such motion filed by him; that although the motion for postponement
could have been objected to, no opposition was presented by defendants, which was not
surprising considering that their counsel had himself already obtained two (2)
postponements; that the ground for cancellation was not entirely without merit: the counsel
had a case in the Tarlac Court scheduled on the same day, March 6, 1974, which had been
pending since 1964 and which the Tarlac Court understandably was anxious to terminate;
that the Padua motion for postponement sought cancellation of only one (1) of three
settings, leaving the case to proceed on the two (2) subsequent hearing dates; and the
motion had been verbally reiterated by plaintiff's wife on the day of the hearing sought to
be cancelled. Under the circumstances, and in the light of the precedents set out in the
opening paragraphs of this opinion, the respondent Judge's action was unreasonable,
capricious and oppressive, and should be as it is hereby annulled.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the Order of the Court a quo dated March
6, 1974, dismissing the petitioner's complaint, and the Order dated March 13, 1974 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE; Civil Case
No. Q-17563 is hereby REINSTATED and the Regional Trial Court which has replaced Branch
XVIII of the Court of First Instance in which the action was pending at the time of dismissal,
is DIRECTED to continue with the trial of the petitioner's action and decide the same on the
merits in due course.

FLORES V PEOPLE

Facts: Petitioners plea for their constitutional rights to a speedy trial by certiorari where the proceeding
of the case for robbery against petitioners dragged on for over a decade without any final judgment
rendered by the court. Petitioners sought for the dismissal of the case due to inordinate delay in its
disposition. The People in its affirmative defense raised the facts that the case was not properly
captioned, as the People of the Phils. against whom it is filed was not a tribunal exercising judicial
functions and without the Court of Appeals being made a part to the petition there are insufficient facts
to constitute a cause of action. Moreover it defends that the CA took all necessary steps to complete the
transcript of stenographic notes of the original trial.

Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy trial was violated.

Held: The court referred to previous jurisprudence upholding the constitutional rights of the accused to
a speedy trial. It re-affirmed with emphasis that such right is more significant than the procedural
defects pointed out by the People of the Philippines that the CA should have been made party-
respondent to the petition. Technicalities should always give way to the reality of the situation and that
in the absence of a valid decision the stage trial was not completed and the accused should be accorded
with the right to contend that they had not been accorded their right to be tried as promptly as
circumstances permit. Thus the SC finds merit to dismiss the case against the petitioners.

FACTS:

Petitioners, Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel, were accused for robbery. Information was filed in
December 1951. They were found guilty of the crime charged in November 1955. Notice of appeal was
file in December 1955. It was until February 1958 that action was taken by CAa resolution remanding
the records of the case to the lower court for a rehearing of the testimony of a certain witness deemed
material for the disposition of the case. Such resolution was amended dated August 1959 which granted
the petitioners to set aside the decision so that evidence for the defense on new facts may be received
and a new decision in lieu of the old one may be rendered. The case was returned to the lower court
but nothing was done for about a year because the offended party failed to appear despite the 6/7
dates set for such hearing. Furthermore, when the offended party took the witness stand, his testimony
was characterized as a mere fiasco as he could no longer remember the details of the alleged crime and
even failed to identify the 2 accused.

The trial court instead of rendering a decision sent back the records to the appellate tribunal. 5 more
years elapsed without anything being done, petitioners sought dismissal of the case against them due to
inordinate delay in the disposition (from December 1955- May 1965). CA was unresponsive
notwithstanding the vigorous plea of the petitioners, its last order being a denial of a second MR dated
January 1966. CAs defense is that the case was not properly captioned as People of the Philippines
and without Court of Appeals being made a party to the petition.

ISSUE: WON constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.

HELD: YES. Petition for certiorari was granted. Orders denying Motion to dismiss as Motion to
Reconsideration are set aside and nullified. Criminal Case against petitioners was dismissed.

Constitutional right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
An accused is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. He cannot be oppressed by delaying the
commencement of the trial for an unreasonable length of time. The Constitution does not say that such
right may be availed only where the prosecution of a crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal.
It does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private individuals. Where a person is
prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the
manner in which it is authorized to be commenced.

Technicalities should give way to the realities of the situation. There should not be too much
significance attached to the procedural defect (refer to CAs defense). CA failed to accord respect to this
particular constitutional right amounting at the very least to a grave abuse of discretion.