Respondents claim that Janet declined to give any
information as to her personal background even after she
REPUBLIC VS. NOLASCO
220 SCRA 20
FACTS:
Gregorio Nolasco was a seaman. He first met
Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in
Liverpool, England during one of his ships port calls.
Parker lived with Nolasco in his ship for 6 months until
they returned to the Philippines where they got married.
After marriage, Nolasco left for another employment
contract as seaman leaving his wife with his parents in
San Jose, Antique. While working overseas, he received a
letter from his mother informing him that Parker gave
birth to his son, and that Parker had already left Antique.
Nolasco then asked permission to leave his ship to return
home but he arrived in Antique only after 9 months. He
testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever
his ship docked in England proved fruitless.
Nolasco filed a petition for declaration of presumptive
death of his wife Janet Monica Parker. The trial court
granted Nolascos petition. The Republic appealed to the
CA contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent
Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well-
founded belief for such declaration. The CA affirmed the
trial courts decision, hence this petition for review by the
Republic.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief
that his wife is already dead
HELD:
There are 4 requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the FC:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing
for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance
occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Art.
391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to
remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-
founded belief that the absentee is dead;
and,
4. That the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
Here, respondent Nolasco failed to conduct search for his
missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a well-
founded belief that she is dead. The investigation
allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to
ascertain Janet Monica Parkers whereabouts is too
sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded
belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San
Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monicas departure,
instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the
British Embassy, he secured another seamans contract
and went to London, a vast city of many millions of
inhabitants, to look for her there. Walking into a major
city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of
somehow bumping into one particular person there
cannot be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
had married respondent is too convenient an excuse to
justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of
the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his
wife which respondent claims were all returned to him.
Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under
unspecified circumstances.
Moreover, respondent did not explain the delay of 9
months when he allegedly asked leave from his captain
to go back to San Jose, Antique. Also, respondent failed
to explain why he did not even try to get the help of the
police or other authorities in London and Liverpool in his
effort to find his wife.
Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements
of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death must be denied.
CALISTERIO VS. CALISTERIO
330 SCRA 201
FACTS:
The petitioner is the sister of the deceased
husband of the respondent, Marietta. Marietta had a
previous marriage with James William Bounds on January
13, 1946. James disappeared without a trace on
February 11, 1947. Eleven years later, Marietta
married Teodorico Calisterio on May 8, 1958 without the
required judicial declaration of presumptive death as
required in the Family Code.
When Teodorico died, the petitioner filed a petition with
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 104, a petition entitled,
"In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased
Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas,
Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving
heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the
latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being
allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. She
prayed that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be
appointed administrator, without bond, of the estate of
the deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated to
her after all the obligations of the estate would have been
settled.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta
stated that her first marriage with James Bounds had
been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his
whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years
before she contracted her second marriage with
Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of
Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the
estate of the decedent. E
The RTC declared Antonia Armas y Calisterio as the sole
heir of the estate of Teodorico Calisterio. On appeal to
the CA, the CA reversed the RTCs ruling. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent marriage
contracted by Marietta was null and void for lack of
Judicial declaration of presumptive death as required in
the Family Code.
HELD:
 No, the subsequent marriage was valid. The
marriage between the deceased Teodorico and
respondent Marietta was solemnized on 08 May 1958.
The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the
Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988.
Article 256 of the Family Code itself limited its retroactive
governance only to cases where it thereby would not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant
controversy is Article 83 of the New Civil Code which
provides: Kyle
"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted
by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
"(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less
than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is
presumed dead according to articles 390 and
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid
in any of the three cases until declared null and
void by a competent court."
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage
contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal
and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first
annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives
exceptions from the above rule. For the subsequent
marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases
therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present
(not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later
marriage must have done so in good faith.
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse
is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of
absence is met. The marriages in these exceptional cases
are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed
valid "until declared null and void by a competent court."
It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these
cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that
respondent Marietta's first husband, James William
Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more
than eleven years before she entered into a second
marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio.
This second marriage, having been contracted during the
regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid
notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of James Bounds.
However, the petitioner should be entitled to of the
estate of the deceased there being no surviving children.
The other half should be awarded to the respondent.
MANUEL VS. PEOPLE
November 29, 2005
FACTS:
Eduardo married Rubylus in 1975. She went
missing also in the same year and was unheard of since
then. In 1996, he married Tina. When he left Tina in 2001,
the latter became curious and made inquiries with the
NSO in Manila and learned that Eduardo had been
previously married. Sued for bigamy, Eduardo avers that
when he married Tina in 1996, Rubylus had been
absent for 21 years since 1975. He points out that,
under the 1st paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code
she was presumed dead as a matter of law because if
one has been absent for 7 years, whether or not he/she is
still alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except
for succession. Thus, the presumptive death of the
absentee spouse arises by operation of law upon the
satisfaction of 2 requirements: the specified period and
the present spouses reasonable belief that the absentee
is dead. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code does
it require that there must be a judicial declaration of
death before the rule on presumptive death would apply.
ISSUE:
Is the spouse who contracts a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a previous marriage
still liable for bigamy despite the absentee spouse having
been missing for 21 years?
HELD:
It was the burden of petitioner to prove his
defense that when he married Tina in 1996, he was of the
well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead,
as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years
since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a
decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive
death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the
RPC (Bigamy- The penalty x x x x or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means
of a judgment rendered in a proper proceedings.), in
relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial
declaration constitutes proof that petitioner acted in good
faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when
he married Tina and, as a consequence, he could not be
held guilty of bigamy. The requirement of judicial
declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the State shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. Marriage is a social institution of the
highest importance.
ANCHETA VS. ANCHETA
424 SCRA 725
FACTS:
Spouses Rodolfo and Marietta separated-in-fact,
but had their conjugal partnership property dissolved
judicially. One of the properties adjudicated in her favor
was a resort named Munting Paraiso that is now used as
residence of Marietta and the children. Rodolfo intending
to remarry filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of the
wife. Although Rodolfo knew that Marietta is residing at
Munting Paraiso he had the summons served at another
address. For failure to file an Answer, Rodolfo had the
respondent wife declared in default and was allowed to
adduce evidence ex parte. After the grant of the petition,
Rodolfo contracted another marriage with Teresita on
February 14, 1998. Marietta then filed a petition for the
annulment of the order of the RTC of Cavite.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to appear on behalf of the State took steps to
prevent collusion between the parties
HELD:
The public prosecutor condoned the acts of the
trial court when he interposed no objection to the motion
of the respondent. The trial court forthwith rendered
judgment against Marietta without a whimper of protest
from the public prosecutor. The actuations of the trial
court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article
48 of the Family Code which states that In all cases of
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
They also ignored Rule 18, Section 6, 1985 Rules of Court
now Rule 9, Section 3 (e) of the 1997 Rules of Court that
there is no default in actions for annulment of marriage
or legal separation.
KALAW vs. FERNANDEZ
January 14, 2015
FACTS:
In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the
testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who
concluded that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioners experts heavily relied on
petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong
sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with
friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.
Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged
habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of
quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as
mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity
in the form of NPD.
However, the Supreme Court in its September
19, 2011 decision dismissed the complaint for declaration
of nullity of the marriage on the ground that there was no
factual basis for the conclusion of psychological
incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage was void on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
YES. The Court in granting the Motion for
Reconsideration held that Fernandez was indeed
psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed the
previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case.
Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert
opinions were just given much respect in this case.
Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE
The Court held that the guidelines set in the
case of Republic v. CA have turned out to be rigid, such
that their application to every instance practically
condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the
fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code
must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied
given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its
enacted version of less specificity obviously to enable
some resiliency in its application. Instead, every court
should approach the issue of nullity not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but
according to its own facts in recognition of the verity
that no case would be on all fours with the next one in
the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the
nullity of marriage; hence, every trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and
the appellatecourt must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
In the task of ascertaining the presence of
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage, the courts, which are concededly not
endowed with expertise in the field of psychology,
must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in
order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus
enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the
malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable
demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.
Personal examination by party not required;
totality of evidence must be considered
We have to stress that the fulfillment of the
constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage
as an inviolable social institution only relates to a valid
marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage
that is null and void
ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.
There is no requirement for one to be declared
psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined
by a physician, because what is important is the presence
of evidence that adequately establishes the partys
psychological incapacity. Hence, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual
medicalexamination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a
link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition
could possibly result from an assumed state of facts
existed in the record, the expert opinion should be
admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in
interpreting such other evidence on the causation.
Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological
incapacity should be considered as conjectural or
speculative and without any probative value only in the
absence of other evidence to establish causation. The
experts findings under such circumstances would not
constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as
evidence.
Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as
to psychological and emotional temperaments
The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the
trial court deservedcredence because it was in the
better position to view and examine the demeanor of the
witnesses while they were testifying. The position and
role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence
showing the psychological incapacity were not to be
downplayed but should be accorded due importance and
respect.
The Court considered it improper and
unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely
generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to
dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the
declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we
hold that said experts sufficiently and competently
described the psychological incapacity of the respondent
within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We
uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert
witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case
records and affidavits, and should not anymore be
disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of
the petitioners factual premises.
The Court also held that the courts must accord
weight to expert testimony on the psychological and
mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of
the nullity of marriages, for by the very nature of Article
36 of the Family Code the courts, despite having the
primary task and burden of decision-making, must
not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties.
Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes
neglect of parental duties
The frequency of the respondents mahjong
playing should not have delimited our determination of
the presence or absence of psychological incapacity.
Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to
fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of
parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had
she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she
would have known that bringing along her children of
very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose
them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would
erode their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the long-term
effects of the respondents obsessive mahjong playing
surely impacted on her family life, particularly on her
very young children.
The fact that the respondent brought her
children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only
point to her neglect of parental duties, but also
manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of
gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the
culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong
sessions was a very grave and serious act of
subordinating their needs for parenting to the
gratification of her own personal and escapist desires.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard
for her childrens moral and mental development. This
disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and
protect her children.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for
Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES
the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court
declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB
JN/TIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
KALAW vs. FERNANDEZ (FULL TEXT)
January 14, 2015
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife
(respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He
presented the testimonies of two supposed expert
witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of
these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or
behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently
proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners
allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions,
visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends,
adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners
experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when
performed constantly to the detriment of quality and
quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and
wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of
NPD.
But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying
premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In
fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations
of the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played
mahjong and neglected their children as a result. Respondent admittedly
played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so
frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife.
Respondent refuted petitioners allegations that she played four to five
times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and
always with the permission of her husband and without abandoning her
children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that they were
with their mother when she played mahjong in their relatives home.
Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that
the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her
family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second
grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondents mahjong-
playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency
of respondents mahjong-playing during the years when these two
children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is
no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating
frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged
constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive
need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented
to prove her visits to beauty salons orher frequent partying with friends.
Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during
these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other
men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating
other men. Even assuming arguendothat petitioner was able to prove that
respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one
instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive
need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per seis a ground for
legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in
the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for
concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed,
the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair
assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally
remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and
parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were neglected
by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of
them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It
appears that respondent made real efforts tosee and take care of her
children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no
testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial
duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy,
both failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is
nothing to link their academic short comings to Malyns actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis
for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no error in the
CAs reversal of the trial courts ruling that there was psychological
incapacity. The trial courts Decision merely summarized the allegations,
testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually
assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses,
and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual
findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusionof
psychological incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity,
which may have constrained them from dedicating the best of
themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for
legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a
marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
Court of Appeals May 27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004
Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.2
In his Motion for Reconsideration,3 the petitioner implores the Court to
take a thorough second look into what constitutes psychological
incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported by the
testimonies of three expert witnesses; and consequently to find that the
respondent, if not both parties, were psychologically incapacitated to
perform their respective essential marital obligation.
Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
I and solidarity.
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage that is
permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume.
Although the Family Code has not defined the term psychological
incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the
deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee
that had drafted the Family Code in order to gain an insight on the
provision. It appeared that the members of the Family Code Revision
Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they
decided to adopt the provision "with less specificity than expected" in
order to have the law "allow some resiliency in its
application."4Illustrative of the "less specificity than expected" has been
the omission by the Family Code Revision Committee to give any
examples of psychological incapacity that would have limited the
applicability of the provision conformably with the principle of ejusdem
generis, because the Committee desired that the courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions
of church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision
itself having been taken from the Canon Law.5
On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of
Appeals,6 the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee and
the relevant materials on psychological incapacity as a ground for the
nullity of marriage have rendered it obvious that the term psychological
incapacity as used in Article 36 of the Family Code"has not been meant
to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances," and could not be taken
and construed independently of "but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage." Thus correlated:-
x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand,
an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity
of the void marriage to be "legitimate."7
In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court set some guidelines
for the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code,
as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation
of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by
the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical, althoughits
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I
dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
 (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken
by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of
the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983
and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those
who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage
due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including suchprovision in our Family
Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our
law on evidence whatis decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, inview of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of
the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.9
The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their
application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for
declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the
Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied
given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of
"less specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency in its
application." Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity
"not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts" in recognition of the
verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the field
of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage;
hence, every "trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu
and the appellate court must, asmuch as possible, avoid substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court."10
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a
ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not
endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity
rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the
matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being
grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by
experts.11
II
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-
existence of a partys psychological incapacity should be final and
binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of the testimonies of
witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly
erroneous.12 In every situation where the findings of the trial court are
sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence presented during trial,
the appellate court should restrain itself from substituting its own
judgment.13 It is not enough reason to ignore the findings and
evaluation by the trial court and substitute our own as an appellate
tribunal only because the Constitution and the Family Code regard
marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the
fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage
as an inviolable social institution14 only relates to a valid marriage. No
protection can be accordedto a marriage that is null and void ab initio,
because such a marriage has no legal existence.15
In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts
really assiduously defend and promote the sanctity of marriage as an
inviolable social institution. The foundation of our society is thereby
made all the more strong and solid.
Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved
credence because it was in the better position to view and examine the
demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying.16 The position
and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing
the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be
accorded due importance and respect.
Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the
opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates,a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard
Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely based on the
petitioners version of the events.
After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and
unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized
consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as
inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage.
Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently described
the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of
Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by
the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case
records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the
RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioners factual
premises.17
Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the
petitioners testimony, as well as on her interviews of the petitioner, his
sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her findings would seem
to be unilateral under such circumstances, it was not right to disregard
the findings on that basis alone. After all, her expert opinion took into
consideration other factors extant in the records, including the own
opinions of another expert who had analyzed the issue from the side of
the respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled that the courts
must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental
state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullityof marriages,
for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts,
"despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must
not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties."18
The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to
enable the trial court to properly determine the issue of psychological
incapacity of the respondent (if not alsoof the petitioner). Consequently,
the lack of personal examination and interview of the person diagnosed
with personality disorder, like the respondent, did not per se invalidate
the findings of the experts. The Court has stressed in Marcos v.
Marcos19 that there is no requirement for one to bedeclared
psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician,
because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately
establishes the partys psychological incapacity. Hence, "if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to."20
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain
condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in
the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as
an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the
causation.21 Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity
should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any
probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish
causation. The experts findings under such circumstances would not
constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence.22 This
is so, considering that any ruling that brands the scientific and technical
procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be
eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric evaluation had been based
on the parties upbringing and psychodynamics.23 In that context, Dr.
Gates expertopinion should be considered not in isolation but along
with the other evidence presented here.
Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity,
the trial court was expectedto compare the expert findings and opinion
of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the respondents own witness, and those of Dr.
Gates.
In her Psychological Evaluation Report,24 Dr. Dayan impressed that the
respondent had "compulsive and dependent tendencies" to the extent of
being "relationship dependent." Based from the respondents
psychological data, Dr. Dayan indicated that:
In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and
seemingly detached in her ways. Although she likes to be around people,
she may keep her emotional distance. She, too, values her relationship
but she may not be that demonstrative of her affections. Intimacy may
be quite difficult for her since she tries to maintain a certain distance to
minimize opportunities for rejection. To others, Malyne may appear,
critical and demanding in her ways. She can be assertive when opinions
contrary to those of her own are expressed. And yet, she is apt to be a
dependent person. At a less conscious level, Malyne fears that others
will abandon her. Malyne, who always felt a bit lonely, placed an
enormous value on having significant others would depend on most
times.
xxxx
But the minute she started to care, she became a different person
clingy and immature, doubting his love, constantly demanding
reassurance that she was the most important person in his life. She
became relationship-dependent.25
Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon Clinical
Multiaxial Inventory test26 conducted on the respondent, observing that
the respondent obtained high scores on dependency, narcissism and
compulsiveness.
The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere
statement of her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she
can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her
criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is
founded.29 Hence, we should weigh and consider the probative value of
the findings of the expert witnesses vis--vis the other evidence
available.
The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an
advocate before the Manila Archdiocese and Matrimonial Tribunal, and
a consultant of the Family Code Revision Committee. Regarding Father
Healys expert testimony, we have once declared that judicial
understanding of psychological incapacity could be informed by
evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, by
current trends in psychological and even by canonical thought, and by
experience.30 It is prudent for us to do so because the concept of
psychological incapacity adopted under Article 36 of the Family Code
was derived from Canon Law.
Father Healy tendered his opinion onwhether or not the respondents
level of immaturity and irresponsibility with regard to her own children
and to her husband constituted psychological incapacity.
Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon
Law, Father Healys opinions and findings commanded
respect. The contribution that his opinions and findings
could add to the judicial determination of the parties
psychological incapacity was substantive and instructive.
He could thereby inform the trial court on the degrees of
the malady that would warrant the nullity of marriage,
and he could as well thereby provideto the trial court an
analytical insight upon a subject as esoteric to the courts
as psychological incapacity has been. We could not justly
disregard his opinions and findings. Appreciating them
together with those of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan would
advance more the cause of justice. The Court observed in
Ngo Te v. Yu-Te:32
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task
and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological
and mental temperaments of the parties.
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a
psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data
about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were
presented to these experts and they were asked togive professional
opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding.
These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as
decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did
not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was
an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology
during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-
important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital
causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from
that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it
could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could
intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give
valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitmentare now considered a
necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient
psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds
ofpersonality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from
assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For
marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to
each other's body for hetero sexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to
the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing
lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the
meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as
presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the
capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept
the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be `other oriented'
since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and
that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship
because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true
intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations
ofmarriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of
this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal
sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently,
the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital
capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to
the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to
the mature marital relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage
partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional
maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the
ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions
that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal
communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the
psychic factors possibly giving rise to his orher inability to fulfill marital
obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its
fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual
choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses
consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts
whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories
often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a
shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties'
inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of
due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties'
incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as
promised(lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of
lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into
civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promisedat the
time the marriage was entered into."
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting
expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a party's psychological
incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
And as Marcos v. Marcosasserts, there is no requirement that the person
to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by
a physician, if the totalityof evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a
link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that
the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.33
Ngo Tealso emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences of
strictly applying the standards set in Molina,34 the courts should
consider the totality of evidence in adjudicating petitions for declaration
of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, viz:
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-
case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended
by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the
imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, thus:
xxxx
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts
membership concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice (later
Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the
result" and another three--including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero--took
pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice
Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case must be judged, not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all
fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining
the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has
applied the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for the law's
clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as "courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a
rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed
by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was
sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal
divorce procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of
Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with
deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly,
which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their
families, our basic social institutions. Far fromwhat was intended by the
Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and
be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently
applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, tocontinuously debase and
pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled
marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy
provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this
contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the
public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising
number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence
and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological
incapacity, the Court isnot demolishing the foundation of families, but it
is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow
a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply
with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that
sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and
psycho sexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality
anomaly. Let itbe noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak
of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To
indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will
simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
xxxx
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of
Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice
Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant,
we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.35
III
In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court declared as follows:
Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she
engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a
mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioners allegations that she
played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to
three times a week and always withthe permission of her husband and
without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated
this, saying that theywere with their mother when she played mahjong in
their relatives home.Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his
own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that
respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons
repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to
respondents mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was
to prove the frequency of respondents mahjong-playing during the years
when these two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus,
while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged
debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not
proven.36 (Emphasis supplied)
The frequency of the respondents mahjong playing should not have
delimited our determination of the presence or absence of psychological
incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to
fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time
she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and
responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her children
of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a
culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondents obsessive
mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly on her
very young children. We do find to be revealing the disclosures made by
Valerio Teodoro Kalaw37 the parties eldest son in his deposition,
whereby the son confirmed the claim of his father that his mother had
been hooked on playing mahjong.
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her
mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but
also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling.
Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every
occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of
subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own
personal and escapist desires. This was the observation of Father Healy
himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan both explained that the
current psychological state of the respondent had been rooted on her
own childhood experience.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her childrens moral
and mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a parent to
safeguard and protect her children, as expressly defined under Article
209 and Article 220 of the Family Code, to wit:
Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the
person and property of their unemancipated children, parental authority
and responsibility shall includethe caring for and rearing of such
children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of
their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.
Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall
have with respect to their unemancipated children or wards the
following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and
instruct them by right precept and good example, and to
provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) x x x x
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance,
inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-
reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic
affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of
citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical
and mental health at all times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational
materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association
with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them
from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and
morals;
(6) x x x x
(7) x x x x
(8) x x x x
(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)
The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into
consideration the findings of the RTC to the effect that both the
petitioner and the respondent had been psychologically incapacitated,
and thus could not assume the essential obligations of marriage. The
RTC would not have found so without the allegation to that effect by the
respondent in her answer,39 whereby she averred that it was not she but
the petitioner who had suffered from psychological incapacity.
The allegation of the petitionerspsychological incapacity was
substantiated by Dr. Dayan.
Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the
nullity of the marriage, the respondent, as the defendant spouse, could
establish the psychological incapacity of her husband because she raised
the matter in her answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether
it is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes the psychological
incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully substantiated
with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party
alone or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or
both is established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.
More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways.
By now, they must have already accepted and come to terms with the
awful truth that their marriage, assuming it existed in the eyes of the law,
was already beyond repair. Both parties had inflicted so much damage
not only to themselves, but also to the lives and psyche of their own
children. It would be a greater injustice should we insist on still
recognizing their void marriage, and then force them and their children
to endure some more damage. This was the very same injustice that
Justice Romero decried in her erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v.
Court of Appeals:41
It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a
much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner
to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her
marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the
Court makes today.1wphi1 It is not, in effect, directly or indirectly,
facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or
one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women
with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is
denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal
love which he has sought from her and towhich he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a
sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it
to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like
petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his
marriage a nullity by reason of his wifes psychological incapacity to
perform an essential marital obligation. In this case, the marriage never
existed from the beginning because the respondent was afflicted with
psychological incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage. Hence,
the Court should not hesitate to declare the nullity of the marriage
between the parties.
To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the
basic foundation of our society does not preclude striking down a
marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote family life," thus:
Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common legal
guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity in
the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of
the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the
Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the
Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development[t],"
and that [m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions
highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection
accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state
protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the
family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal
aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to
protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper,
and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment
itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the
case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the
constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has
been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code,
which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding
legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life,
as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for
legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition
for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to
protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory
definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what
marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article
XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into
account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity. Indeed, Article
36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a
psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as
an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the
avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the
family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a
corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-
equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article
36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and
family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons
independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply
with the essential obligations of marriage.42(Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration;
REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on September
19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial
Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent
on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the
psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code.
VINAS vs. VINAS
January 21, 2015
On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23
years old, respectively, got married in civil rites held in
Lipa City, Batangas.4 Mary Grace was already pregnant
then. The infant, however, died at birth due to weakness
and malnourishment. Glenn alleged that the infants
death was caused by Mary Graces heavy drinking and
smoking during her pregnancy.
The couple lived together under one roof. Glenn worked as a bartender,
while Mary Grace was a production engineer.
Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she
shared with Glenn. Glenn subsequently found out that Mary Grace went
to work in Dubai. At the time the instant petition was filed, Mary Grace
had not returned yet.
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition5 for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.He alleged that Mary Grace was
insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to regularly resorting to
any pretext to be able to leave the house. She thoroughly enjoyed the
night life, and drank and smoked heavily even whenshe was pregnant.
Further, Mary Grace refused to perform even the most essential
household chores of cleaning and cooking. According to Glenn, Mary
Grace had not exhibited the foregoing traits and behavior during their
whirlwind courtship.6
Glenn likewise alleged that Mary Grace was not remorseful about the
death of the infant whom she delivered. She lived as if she were single
and was unmindful of her husbands needs. She was self-centered,
selfish and immature. When Glenn confronted her about her behavior,
she showed indifference. She eventually left their home without
informing Glenn. Glenn later found out that she left for an overseas
employment in Dubai.7
Before Glenn decided to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with Mary Grace, he consulted the latters friends. They
informed him that Mary Grace came from a broken family and was left
to be cared for by her aunts and nannies. The foregoing circumstance
must have contributed to her sense of insecurity and difficulty in
adjusting to married life.8
To ease their marital problems, Glenn sought professional guidance and
submitted himself to a psychological evaluation by Clinical Psychologist
Nedy Tayag (Dr. Tayag). Dr. Tayag found him as "amply aware of his
marital roles" and "capable of maintaining a mature and healthy
heterosexual relationship."9
On the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Graces personality through
the data she had gathered from Glenn and his cousin, Rodelito Mayo
(Rodelito), who knew Mary Graceway back in college.
Mary Grace is the eldest among four siblings. She is a college graduate.
She belongs to a middle class family. Her father is an overseas contract
worker, while her mother is a housewife. At the time Dr. Tayag prepared
her report, Mary Grace was employed in Dubai and romantically
involved with another man.10
According to Rodelito, Mary Grace verbally abused and physically
harmed Glenn during the couples fights. Mary Grace is also ill-
tempered and carefree, while Glenn is jolly, kind and family-oriented.11
Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with anti-social traits. Dr. Tayag concluded that
Mary Grace and Glenns relationship is not founded on mutual love,
trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag
recommended the propriety of declaring the nullity of the couples
marriage.12
In drawing her conclusions, Dr. Tayag explained that:
The said disorder [of Mary Grace] is considered to be severe, serious,
grave, permanent and chronic in proportion and is incurable by any form
of clinical intervention. It has already been deeply embedded within her
system as it was found to have started as early as her childhood years.
Because of such, it has caused her to be inflexible, maladaptive and
functionally[-]impaired especially with regards to heterosexual dealings.
Such disorder of [Mary Grace]is mainly characterized by grandiosity,
need for admiration and lack of empathy[,] along with her pattern of
disregard for and violation of the rights of others[,] which utterly
distorted her perceptions and views especially in terms of a fitting
marital relationship. Such disorder manifested in [Mary Grace] through
her unrelenting apathy, sense of entitlement and arrogance. Throughout
her union with [Glenn], she has exhibited a heightened sense of self as
seen in her marked inability to show proper respect for her husband. x x
x She is too headstrong that most of the time[,] she would do things her
own way and would not pay close attention to what her husband needed.
She had been a wife who constantly struggled for power and dominance
in their relationship and [Glenn], being too considerate to her, was often
subjected to her control.x x x She is into many vices and loved hanging
out with her friends at night[,] and she even got involved in an illicit
relationship[,] which was still going on up to the present time. x x x.
The root cause of [Mary Graces]personality aberration can be said to
have emanated from the various forms of unfavorable factors in her
milieu way back as early as her childhood years[,] which is the crucial
stage in the life of a person as thisis the time when the individuals
character and behavior are shaped. [Mary Grace] came from a
dysfunctional family with lenient and tolerating parents[,] who never
impose any restrictions [upon] their children. Considering such fact, she
apparently failed to feel the love and affection of the nurturing figures
that she had[,] who were supposed to bethe first to show concern [for]
her. x x x She has acquired a domineering character as she was not
taught to have boundaries in her actions because of the laxity she had
from her caregivers and also because she grew up to be the eldest in the
brood. She sees to it that she is the one always followed with regards to
making decisions and always mandates people to submit to her wishes.
She has not acquired the very essence of morality [and] has certainly
learned set of unconstructive traits that further made her too futile to
assume mature roles. Morals and values were not instilled in her young
mind that as she went on with her life, she never learned to restrain
herself from doing ill-advised things even if she isamply aware of the
depravity of her actions.
The psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is of a juridical
antecedence as it was already inher system even prior to the
solemnization of her marriage with [Glenn]. x x x.13 (Underlining ours)
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed before the RTC a Petition for the
Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace. Substituted
service of summons was made upon Mary Grace through her aunt,
Susana Rosita.14Mary Grace filed no answer and did not attend any of
the proceedings before the RTC.
During the trial, the testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito were
offered as evidence. Glenn and Rodelito described Mary Grace as
outgoing, carefree, and irresponsible. She is the exact opposite of Glenn,
who is conservative and preoccupied with his work.15 On her part, Dr.
Tayag reiterated her findings in the psychological report dated
December 29, 2008.
Issue
Unperturbed, Glenn now raises before this Court the issue of whether or
not sufficient evidence exist justifying the RTCs declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Mary Grace.
In support thereof, Glenn points out that each petition for the declaration
of nullity of marriage should be judged according to its own set of facts,
and not on the basis of assumptions, predilections or generalizations.
The RTC judge should pains takingly examine the factual milieu, while
the CA must refrain from substituting its own judgment for that of the
trial court.23 Further, Glenn argues that in Marcos v. Marcos,24 the
Court ruled that it is not a sine qua non requirement for the respondent
spouse to be personally examined by a physician or psychologist before
a marriage could be declared as a nullity.25 However, if the opinion of
an expert is sought, his or her testimony should be considered as
decisive evidence.26 Besides, the findings of the trial court regarding
the credibility of the witnesses should be respected.27
In seeking the denial of the instant petition, the OSG emphasizes that the
arguments Glenn raise for our consideration are mere reiterations of the
matters already resolved by the CA.
Ruling of the Court
The instant petition lacks merit.
The lack of personal examination orassessment of the respondent by a
psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage. "If the totality of evidence presented
is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to."29
In the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr.
Tayag and Rodelito, and the documentary evidence offered do not
sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of Mary
Graces condition. The evidence merely shows that Mary Grace is
outgoing, strong-willed and not inclined to perform household chores.
Further, she is employed in Dubai and is romantically-involved with
another man. She has not been maintaining lines of communication with
Glenn at the time the latter filed the petition before the RTC. Glenn, on
the other hand, is conservative, family-oriented and is the exact opposite
of Mary Grace. While Glenn and Mary Grace possess incompatible
personalities, the latters acts and traits do not necessarily indicate
psychological incapacity. Rumbaua v. Rumbaua30 is emphatic that:
In Bier v. Bier, we ruled that it was not enough that respondent, alleged
to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his
marital obligations, or was unwilling toperform these obligations. Proof
of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element
in the respondents personality structure that effectively incapacitated
him from complying with his essential marital obligations had to be
shown and was not shown in this cited case.
In the present case, the respondents stubborn refusal to cohabit with the
petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to be
rooted in some psychological illness. x x x Likewise, the respondents
act of living with another woman four years into the marriage cannot
automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when
no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already
existing at the inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted
that respondent was caring and faithful when they were going steady and
for a time after their marriage; their problems only came in later.
x x x To use the words of Navales v. Navales:
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance ofand to assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty,"
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill
will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed,
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the
same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological
illness that is contemplated by said rule.31 (Citations omitted,
underlining ours and emphasis in the original)
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for
more or less seven years from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing established
fact shows that living together as spouses under one roof is not an
impossibility. Mary Graces departure from their home in 2006 indicates
either a refusal or mere difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply
with her obligation to live with her husband.
Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by
Dr. Tayag, there arose a greater burden to present more convincing
evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of
the formers condition. Glenn, however, failed in this respect. Glenns
testimony is wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the other hand, is a
blood relative of Glenn. Glenns statements are hardly objective.
Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito both referred to Mary Graces traits and
acts, which she exhibited during the marriage. Hence, there isnary a
proof on the antecedence of Mary Graces alleged incapacity. Glenn
even testified that, six months before they got married, they saw each
other almost everyday.32 Glenn saw "a loving[,] caring and
well[-]educated person"33in Mary Grace.
Anent Dr. Tayags assessment of Mary Graces condition, the Court
finds the same as unfounded.1wphi1 Rumbaua34provides some
guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the testimonies of
psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, viz:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayags conclusions about the
respondents psychological incapacity were based on the information fed
to her by only one side the petitioner whose bias in favor of her
cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does
notdisqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony
and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set
of standards in the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr.
Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party
account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and
how he would have reacted and responded to the doctors probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioners narrations,
and on this basis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered,
egocentric, and unremorseful person who "believes that the world
revolves around him"; and who "used love as adeceptive tactic for
exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him." x x x.
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and
comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity
existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the
respondents narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed
at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating
nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really
incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a
psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude
that Dr. Tayags conclusion in her Report i.e., that the respondent
suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial
Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable" is an
unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous
characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests
administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to
assess her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be
made with respect to the respondents condition. To make conclusions
and generalizations on the respondents psychological condition based
on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different
from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the
content of such evidence.
xxxx
A careful reading of Dr. Tayags testimony reveals that she failed to
establish the fact that at the time the parties were married, respondent
was already suffering from a psychological defect that deprived him of
the ability to assume the essential duties and responsibilities of marriage.
Neither did she adequately explain howshe came to the conclusion that
respondents condition was grave and incurable. x x x
xxxx
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the
respondents exact condition except in a very general way. In short, her
testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on
particulars, most notably on how the respondent can besaid to be
suffering from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what extent
the disorder is grave and incurable; how and why it was already present
at the time of the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the
respondents awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and
responsibilities of marriage. All these are critical to the success of the
petitioners case.
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis
because it was wholly based on what the petitioner related toher. x x x If
a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason
exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit.
No such independent evidence, however, appears on record to have been
gathered in this case, particularly about the respondents early life and
associations, and about events on orabout the time of the marriage and
immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appearto us to be
no more than a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and meagre
facts that the petitioner related, and were all slanted to support the
conclusion that a ground exists to justify the nullification of the
marriage. We say this because only the baser qualities of the
respondents life were examined and given focus; none of these qualities
were weighed and balanced with the better qualities, such as his focus
on having a job, his determination to improve himself through studies,
his care and attention in the first six months of the marriage, among
others. The evidence fails to mention also what character and qualities
the petitioner brought into her marriage, for example, why the
respondents family opposed the marriage and what events led the
respondent to blame the petitioner for the death of his mother, if this
allegation is at all correct. To be sure, these are important because not a
few marriages have failed, not because of psychological incapacity of
either or both of the spouses, but because of basic incompatibilities and
marital developments that do not amount to psychological incapacity. x
x x.35 (Citations omitted and underlining ours)
In the case at bar, Dr. Tayag made general references to Mary Graces
status as the eldest among her siblings,36her fathers being an overseas
contract worker and her very tolerant mother, a housewife.37 These,
however, are not sufficient to establish and explain the supposed
psychological incapacity of Mary Grace warranting the declaration of
the nullity of the couples marriage.
The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the
statements of witnesses who can attest to the antecedence of a persons
psychological incapacity, but such difficulty does not exempt a
petitioner from complying with what the law requires. While the Court
also commiserates with Glenns marital woes, the totality of the
evidence presented provides inadequate basis for the Court to conclude
that Mary Grace is indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with
her obligations as Glenns spouse.
MALLILIN vs. JAMESOLAMIN
February 18, 2015
The Facts:
Robert and Luz were married on September 6,
1972. They begot three (3) children. On March 16, 1994,
Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage before the RTC, Branch 23, Cagayan de Oro City
(RTC-Br. 23).
On March 7, 1996, RTC-Br. 23 denied the petition.
Robert appealed this judgment before the CA where it
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 54261. On January 29,
1999, the CA reversed the RTC-Br. 23 decision due to
lack of participation of the State as required under Article
48 of the Family Code.3 The case was remanded to the
RTC for further proceedings and its records were
thereafter transferred from RTC-Br. 23 to RTC-Br. 37, as
the latter was designated as Family Court pursuant to the
Family Code Act of 1997.
In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time
of the celebration of their marriage, Luz was suffering
from psychological and mental incapacity and
unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to
comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities.
Such incapacity became even more apparent during their
marriage when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of
immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent
rational judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy
and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.
 Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting
the complaint. She averred that it was Robert who
manifested psychological incapacity in their marriage.
Despite due notice, however, she did not appear during
the trial. Assistant City Prosecutor Isabelo Sabanal
appeared for the State.
When Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz was
already living in California, USA, and had married an
American. He also revealed that when they were still
engaged, Luz continued seeing and dating another
boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He also claimed that from
the outset, Luz had been remiss in her duties both as a
wife and as a mother as shown by the following
circumstances: (1) it was he who did the cleaning of the
room because Luz did not know how to keep order; (2) it
was her mother who prepared their meal while her sister
was the one who washed their clothes because she did
not want her polished nails destroyed; (3) it was also her
sister who took care of their children while she spent her
time sleeping and looking at the mirror; (4) when she
resumed her schooling, she dated different men; (5) he
received anonymous letters reporting her loitering with
male students; (6) when he was not home, she would
receive male visitors; (7) a certain Romy Padua slept in
their house when he was away; and (6) she would
contract loans without his knowledge.
In addition, Robert presented the testimony of
Myrna Delos Reyes Villanueva (Villanueva), Guidance
Psychologist II of Northern Mindanao Medical Center.
On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending
before the trial court, Robert filed a petition for marriage
annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance
for the Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal).
On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal
handed down a decision declaring their marriage invalid
ab initio on the ground of grave lack of due discretion on
the part of both parties as contemplated by the second
paragraph of Canon1095. This decision was affirmed by
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT).
Prior to that, on September 20, 2002, the RTC had
rendered a decision declaring the marriage null and void
on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
Luz as she failed to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
The State, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an appeal with the
CA. The OSG argued that Robert failed to make a case for
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Luz. It pointed
out that the real cause of the marital discord was the
sexual infidelity of Luz. Such ground, the OSG contended,
should not result in the nullification of the marriage under
the law, but merely constituted a ground for legal
separation.
The CA, in its November 20, 2009 Decision,4
granted the petition and reversed the RTC decision. The
decision, including the decretal portion, partially reads:
[W]e find that the trial court committed a reversible error.
Closer scrutiny of the records reveals, as correctly noted
by the Solicitor General, sexual infidelity are not rooted
on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
x x x. x x x x In the case at bar, apart from his self-
serving declarations, the evidence adduced by Robert fell
short of establishing the fact that at the time of their
marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological defect
which in fact deprived [her] of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities.
x x x x We commiserate with the plaintiff-appellees
undeserved marital plight. Yet, Our paramount duty as a
court compels Us to apply the law at all costs, however
harsh it may be on whomsoever is called upon to bear its
unbiased brunt.
FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed Decision dated
September 20, 2002 in Civil Case No. 94-178 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Robert filed a motion for reconsideration, but it
was denied by the CA in its June 1, 2010 Resolution,6
stating that the arguments of Robert were mere rehash of
the same ground, arguments and discussion previously
pointed out by him, and that no new substance was
brought out to warrant the reconsideration or reversal of
its decision.
Hence, this petition.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HOLDING THAT
THE ABSENCE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF
THE WIFE UNDERSCORES THE EVIDENTIAL GAP TO
SUSTAIN THE DECISION OF THE RTC DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE OF PETITIONER TO RESPONDENT NULL AND
VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
II THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO DECLARED BY THE
NATIONAL APPELLATE MATRIMONIAL TRIBUNAL OF THE
CATHOLIC BISHOPS CONFERENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES AS
GUILTY OF GRAVE LACK OF DUE DISCRETION.
III THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO FOUND BY THE
LOWER COURT AS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO
COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
Robert now argues that he has sufficiently proven
the nullity of his marriage even in the absence of any
medical, psychiatric or psychological examination of the
wife by a competent and qualified professional. To bolster
his claim, he avers that the Metropolitan Tribunal already
declared that Luz exhibited grave lack of discretion in
judgment concerning the essential rights and obligations
mutually given and accepted in marriage. The said
decision was affirmed by the NAMT.
Robert further argues that the sexual indiscretion
of Luz with different men coupled with the fact that she
failed to function as a home maker to her family and as a
housewife to him incapacitated her from accepting and
complying with her essential marital obligations. For said
reason, he asserts that the case of Luz was not a mere
case of sexual infidelity, but clearly an illness that was
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition which
incapacitated her to carry out the responsibilities of a
married woman. Robert avers that a sex maniac is not
just a mere sexual infidel but one who is suffering from a
deep psychological problem.
Position of the State
The OSG argues that the CA correctly ruled that
the totality of evidence presented by Robert was not
sufficient to support a finding that Luz was
psychologically incapacitated. His evidence fell short of
establishing his assertion that at the time of their
marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological defect
which deprived her of the ability to assume the essential
duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.
With regard to the findings of the Metropolitan
Tribunal and the NAMT, the OSG claims that the same
were only given persuasive value and were not
controlling or decisive in cases of nullity of marriage.
Further, the decision was based on grave lack of
discretion of judgment concerning matrimonial rights and
obligations due to outside factors other than
psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of
the Family Code. The OSG also raises the strong
possibility of collusion between the parties as shown by
the events that took place after the issuance of the March
7, 1996 RTC Decision. The OSG wrote:
Significantly, the chronological events after the
trial court issued its March 7, 1996 Decision unmistakably
show the collusion between the parties to obtain the
reliefs pleaded. Among others, respondents Retraction of
Testimony was executed without the presence of counsel
sometime in 1998, a few months before she married an
American. This irregularity was even noticed by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54261:
x x x x The involvement and active participation of the
Solicitor General became indispensable, in the present
recourse, when, in a whirlwind turn of events, the
Appellee made a VOLTE FACE executed a Retraction of
Testimony and a Waiver of Custody waiving custody of
Franco Mark J Mallillin, still a minor, her son by the
Appellant. It bears stressing that the Appellee, in the
Court a quo, obdurately denied the material allegations
of the Appellants complaint and declared that it was the
Appellant who was psychologically incapacitated. The
sudden turn-about of the appellee, in the present
recourse, to the extent of disowning her testimony in the
Court a quo and even praying for the reversal of the
Decision of the Trial Court is strongly suggestive, if not
constitutive, of collusion or a modus vivendi between the
parties, outlawed by the Family Code of the Philippines
and the Constitution. x x x
The Courts Ruling
The main issue is whether the totality of the
evidence adduced proves that Luz was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The petition is bereft of merit. A petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article
36 of the Family Code which provides:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligation of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer
to no less than a mental not merely physical
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code,
among others, include their mutual obligations to live
together; observe love, respect and fidelity; and render
help and support. There is hardly a doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. 7
Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable
of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may only
emerge after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even
if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.8
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De
Quintos, Jr.,9 the Court reiterated the well-settled
guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity
of marriage, embodied in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina,10 based on Article 36 of the Family Code.
Thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. x x x. x x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological not
physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. x x x. x x x x
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at
"the time of the celebration" of the marriage. x x
x. x x x x
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. x x
x. x x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. x x x. x x x x
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. x x
x. x x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
 attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. x x x.
Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of
the considered view that Roberts evidence failed to
establish the psychological incapacity of Luz.
First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome
the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage.
Other than his self-serving testimony, no other evidence
was adduced to show the alleged incapacity of Luz. He
presented no other witnesses to corroborate his
allegations on her behavior. Thus, his testimony was self-
serving and had no serious value as evidence.
Second, the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity of Luz was not medically or
clinically identified, and sufficiently proven during the
trial. Based on the records, Robert failed to prove that her
disposition of not cleaning the room, preparing their
meal, washing the clothes, and propensity for dating and
receiving different male visitors, was grave, deeply
rooted, and incurable within the parameters of
jurisprudence on psychological incapacity.
The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as
a wife and as a mother, as well as her emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity, cannot rise to
the level of psychological incapacity that justifies the
nullification of the parties' marriage. The Court has
repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity
contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations," not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.11
Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is
one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's
duties is another. Psychological incapacity refers only to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.12
As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or
perversion and abandonment do not, by themselves,
constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on
psychological incapacity. Robert argues that the series of
sexual indiscretion of Luz were external manifestations of
the psychological defect that she was suffering within her
person, which could be considered as nymphomania or
excessive sex hunger. Other than his allegations,
however, no other convincing evidence was adduced to
prove that these sexual indiscretions were considered as
nymphomania, and that it was grave, deeply rooted, and
incurable within the term of psychological incapacity
embodied in Article 36. To stress, Roberts testimony
alone is insufficient to prove the existence of
psychological incapacity.
In Sivino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A.
Patalinghug and the Republic of the Philippines, 13 the
Court ruled that the respondents act of living an
adulterous life cannot automatically be equated
with a psychological disorder, especially when no
specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait
already existing at the inception of marriage. The
petitioner must be able to establish that the respondents
unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered
personality, which made her completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
Third, the psychological report of Villanueva,
Guidance Psychologist II of the Northern Mindanao
Medical Center, Cagayan de Oro City, was insufficient to
prove the psychological incapacity of Luz. There was
nothing in the records that would indicate that Luz had
either been interviewed or was subjected to a
psychological examination. The finding as to her
psychological incapacity was based entirely on hearsay
and the self-serving information provided by Robert.
Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is
insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity of Luz.
Although it is true that in the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina, 14 the Court stated that
interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts, still it is subject to
the law on evidence. Thus:
Since the purpose of including such provision in
our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal.
Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is
decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly
void x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Pertinently, Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Evidence
provides:
The court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered. The purpose of which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
In this regard, the belated presentation of the
decision of the NAMT cannot be given value since it was
not offered during the trial, and the Court has in no way
of ascertaining the evidence considered by the same
tribunal.
Granting that it was offered and admitted, it must
be pointed out that the basis of the declaration of nullity
of marriage by the NAMT was not the third paragraph
of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a
psychological nature similar to Article 36 of the Family
Code, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095
which refers to those who suffer from grave lack of
discretion of judgment concerning essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually
given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portions
of the NAMT decision are as follows:
The FACTS on the Case prove with the certitude
required by law that based on the deposition of the
petitioner the respondent understandably ignored the
proceedings completely for which she was duly cited for
Contempt of Court and premised on the substantially
concordant testimonies of the Witnesses, the woman
Respondent demonstrated in the external forum through
her action and reaction patterns, before and after the
marriage-in-fact, her grave lack of due discretion in
judgement for marriage intents and purposes basically
by reason of her immaturity of judgement as manifested
by her emotional ambivalence x x x.
 WHEREFORE, this COLLEGIAL COURT OF
APPEALS, having invoked the Divine Name and having in
mind the Law, the Jurisprudence and the Facts pertaining
to the Case, hereby declares and decrees the
confirmation of the nullity decision rendered by the
Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese
of Manil on the Marriage Case MALLILIN JAMISOLAMIN
with Prot. N. 63/2000 on the ground provided by
Canon 1095 par. 2 CIC on the part of the woman
Respondent but NOT on the part of the man Petitioner
for lack of evidence. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)15
In Santos v. Santos,16 the Court referred to the
deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code
Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide
an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code.
It went out to state that a part of the provision is similar
to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code
of Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting
marriage:
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion
of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial
rights and obligations to be mutually given and
accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a
psychological nature, are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In Najera v. Najera,17 the Court was also
confronted with a similar issue of whether to consider an
annulment by the NAMT as also covering psychological
incapacity, the only ground recognized in our law. In the
said case, the NAMT decision was also based on the
second paragraph of Canon 1095. The Court ruled
that it was not similar to, and only annulments
under the third paragraph of, Canon 1095 should
be considered. Elucidating, the Court wrote:
Petitioners argument is without merit.
In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court
of Appeals apparently did not have the opportunity to
consider the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is clear that the
Court of Appeals considered the Matrimonial Tribunals
decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it
resolved petitioners motion for reconsideration. In the
said Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of
the very same issues now raised before this Court and
correctly held that petitioners motion for reconsideration
was devoid of merit. It stated:
The Decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which was
forwarded to this Court only on February 11, 2004, reads
as follows:
[T]he FACTS collated from party complainant and
reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of
Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June
14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect
waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia
followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to
believe with moral certainty required by law and
conclude that the husband-respondent upon contracting
marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital
contract: First, his family was dysfunctional in that as a
child, he saw the break-up of the marriage of his own
parents; his own two siblings have broken marriages;
Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering mother
with whom [he] identified and on whom he depended for
advice; Third, he was according to his friends, already
into drugs and alcohol before marriage; this affected his
conduct of bipolar kind: he could be very quiet but later
very talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even violent,
he also was aware of the infidelity of his mother who now
lives with her paramour, also married and a policeman;
Finally, into marriage, he continued with his drugs and
alcohol abuse until one time he came home very drunk
and beat up his wife and attacked her with a bolo that
wounded her; this led to final separation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of
Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and
having considered the pertinent Law and relevant
Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims,
declares and decrees the confirmation of the
sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the
nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated
under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon
Law.
However, records of the proceedings before the
Trial Court show that, other than herself, petitioner-
appellant offered the testimonies of the following persons
only, to wit: Aldana Celedonia (petitioner-appellants
mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon,
Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates (psychologist).
Said witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful
night of July 1, 1994 wherein the respondent allegedly
made an attempt on the life of the petitioner. But unlike
the hearing and finding before the Matrimonial Tribunal,
petitioner-appellants sister-in-law and friends of the
opposing parties were never presented before said Court.
As to the contents and veracity of the latters
testimonies, this Court is without any clue.
True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,
et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court held that the
interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. However, the Highest
Tribunal expounded as follows:
Since the purpose of including such provision in
our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal.
Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed
as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x
x.
And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the
Rules of Evidence states:
The court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered. The purpose of which the
evidence is offered must be specified.

Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-
appellant should not expect us to give credence to the
Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
when, apparently, it was made on a different set of
evidence of which We have no way of ascertaining their
truthfulness.
Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that
judgments must be based on the evidence presented
before the court (Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430
[2001]). And based on the evidence on record, We find
no ample reason to reverse or modify the judgment of
the Trial Court.[31]
Santos v. Santos18 cited the deliberations during
the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee,
which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the
import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a
part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of
Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting
marriage:
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion
of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial
rights and obligations to be mutually given and
accepted; t
3. hose who, because of causes of a psychological
nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis
of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third
paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes
of a psychological nature, but the second
paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those
who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of
judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights
and obligations to be mutually given and accepted.
For clarity, the pertinent portion of the decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:
The FACTS collated from party complainant and
reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of
Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June
14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect
waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia
followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to
believe with moral certainty required by law and
conclude that the husband-respondent upon
contacting marriage suffered from grave lack of
due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering
nugatory his marital contract x x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of
Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and
having considered the pertinent Law and relevant
Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims,
declares and decrees the confirmation of the
sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the
nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated
under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon
Law. x x x.
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the
factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established
by petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the
decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not
based on the psychological incapacity of
respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that
the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding
the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported
by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in
affirming the Decision of the RTC. (Emphases in the
original; Underscoring supplied)
Hence, Roberts reliance on the NAMT decision is
misplaced. To repeat, the decision of the NAMT was based
on the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which
refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of
discretion of judgment concerning essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually
given and accepted, a cause not of psychological
nature under Article 36 of the Family Code. A cause of
psychological nature similar to Article 36 is covered by
the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon
Law (Santos v. Santos19), which for ready reference
reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting
marriage:
x x x x 3. those who, because of causes of a
psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by
the NAMT under the second paragraph of Canon 1095
should also be covered would be to expand what the
lawmakers did not intend to include. What would prevent
members of other religious groups from invoking their
own interpretation of psychological incapacity? Would this
not lead to multiple, if not inconsistent, interpretations?
To consider church annulments as additional
grounds for annulment under Article 36 would be
legislating from the bench. As stated in Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Molina, 20 interpretations given by the
NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines are given
great respect by our courts, but they are not controlling
or decisive.
In Republic v. Galang,21 it was written that the
Constitution set out a policy of protecting and
strengthening the family as the basic social institution,
and the marriage was the foundation of the family.
Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the
State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden
of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the
plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a
situation where the parties, or one of them, could not
have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave
and serious psychological illness existing at the time it
was celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold the
indissolubility of the marital tie.
In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided
correctly. Petitioner Robert failed to adduce sufficient and
convincing evidence to prove the alleged psychological
incapacity of Luz.

As asserted by the OSG, the allegations of the

petitioner make a case for legal separation. Hence, this
decision is without prejudice to an action for legal
separation if a party would want to pursue such
proceedings. In this disposition, the Court cannot decree
a legal separation because in such proceedings, there are
matters and consequences like custody and separation of
properties that need to be considered and settled.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
78303-MIN, dated November 20, 2009, and its
Resolution, dated June 1, 2010, are hereby
AFFIRMED, without prejudice.