Chapter 8

Augustine Margaret Cameron

These three selections from Augustine (354430) make clear the extent to which Augustine was
interested in language and meaning. Before his religious conversion to Christianity, Augustine was
a teacher of rhetoric , which he came to criticize for its empty prose and inattention to truth. After
his conversion, Augustine advocated an intellectual approach to Christian doctrine, which required
him to theorize about the effi caciousness of language and, more broadly, sign theory. At the same
time, Augustine held that on their own humans are imperfect sign users, and there he postulated
the need for divine insight into the meaning of many signs. The value of Augustines contribution
to the history of the philosophy of language lies primarily in the originality of his doctrine of signs.

The first passage, taken from the opening of Book II of On Christian Doctrine , contains Augustines
widely known and highly infl uential distinction between types of signs: natural versus given signs.
On Christian Doctrine is the first hermeneutical treatise in the Christian tradition, in which
Augustine aims to provide guidance for scriptural interpretation . Since he characterizes teaching
in this way All teaching is teaching either of things or signs, but things are learnt through signs
(I.4) Augustine sets forward a taxonomy of signs to assist the interpretation of the semiotics of
scripture.

The main distinction between types of signs appears straightforward. Natural signs are ones that
are not given by anyone or thing as a result of a desire or intention, but they nonetheless cause
something else besides themselves to be known from them. For example, smoke is a sign of fi re,
and facial expressions are signs of certain emotions (to cite Augustines examples). For a sign to
exist requires that there be a knowing subject to grasp it, and repeated exposure to the sign (e.g.,
smoke) and its signifi catum (e.g., fi re) is needed in order for the inferential relation to become
known.

Given signs are intentional ones, although they are not necessarily conventional. Augustine
characterizes them as those which living things give to each other in order to show, to the best of
their ability, the emotions of their minds, or anything they have felt or learnt. Both humans and
animals can produce and receive given signs, although Augustine has little to say about signs
amongst animals. There are two main types of given sign: (i) what are called visible words, e.g.,
movements, facial expressions, and generally signs perceptible to the eyes, touch, and other
senses except the ears, and (ii) audible signs, e.g., the sounds of musical instruments and, most
importantly, spoken words.

Since Augustine is primarily concerned here with Scriptural hermeneutics , the words with which
he deals are written: as noted in the passage below, spoken words cease to exist immediately
after having been uttered. The remainder of Book II outlines and emphasizes the diffi culty with
interpreting the written word, and since he recognizes that many words are unknown or
ambiguous, Augustine provides some theoretical tools to guide the reader. He distinguishes
between literal and metaphorical signs; he emphasises the importance of learning multiple
languages; he underscores the need, in the absence of critical editions and stable manuscripts, to
consult multiple versions and translations of a text; and he urges a vast knowledge of things in the
world (e.g., natural kinds and their behaviours, numbers, seasons, music and poetry; but also
superstitions, prognostications, and other pagan practices; human institutions, history, astronomy,
the arts and crafts, logic and rhetoric ).

Augustines distinction between types of signs was highly infl uential, and on its basis other more
detailed semiotic systems were developed (e.g., Roger Bacon s De signis ). The psycho-causal defi
nition of signifi cation given here and in the other selections became standard throughout the
medieval and early modern traditions in the philosophy of language.

In the lengthy, sometimes convoluted, but engaging dialogue called The Teacher , Augustine and
his son, Adeodatus, take up a number of questions about signs and teaching. The Teacher is often
read alongside another of Augustines early dialogues, Against the Academicians , and together
they contain his response to the epistemic threat of skepticism. While in On Christian Doctrine
Augustine claimed that all teaching (and thereby all learning) is accomplished by using signs, in The
Teacher this claim is thrown into question. In the end, Augustine concludes that nothing, in fact, is
ever taught by signs.

Those familiar with the knowers paradox from Platos Meno will recognize Augustines argument
here:

When words are spoken we either know what they signify or we dont.

If we know, then its because we are reminded of what we already know, rather than because we
are learning.

If we dont know, then it isnt even reminding.

As a Christian, however, Augustine does not hold Platos view according to which all learning is
recollection (i.e., recollecting what we knew before our current incarnation). Rather, for Augustine
learning is a matter of being illuminated by the Truth that presides within over the mind itself,
which is Christ.

The passage begins with an analysis of the 13 words as signs in a passage from Vergil: If nothing
from so great a city it pleases the gods be left Augustine and Adeodatus struggle to discern
what is signifi ed by the words if and nothing, since we do generally call signs all those things
that signify something. Signs can signify things (e.g., a city, the gods) or they can signify states of
mind (e.g., if, nothing, from). Augustine is primarily concerned with signs that are spoken, i.e.,
words, terms, names (since written words are taken to be signs of spoken signs). A word as a sign
is an articulated sound that strikes the ears, and it also conceals or contains some signifi cate or
meaning. Adeodatus and Augustine at fi rst consider why it is that spoken signs are given, and they
at fi rst decide that speaking occurs for the sake of teaching or reminding.
The dialogue is primarily concerned with three questions: (i) Can anything be taught without
signs? (ii) Should certain signs be preferred to the things they signify? (iii) Is knowledge of the
things signifi ed better than the signs themselves? The answers to (ii) and (iii) are handled fairly
straightforwardly: signs ought not to be preferred to the things they signify, and knowledge of
things signifi ed is always better than the signs themselves. But the answer to (i) is more diffi cult
to reach, and after several tentative conclusions according to which some things seem to be able
to be taught without signs (e.g., what walking signifi es by the gesture of walking itself; what the
craft of birdcatching is by engaging in catching a bird in front of an observer), Augustine in the end
concludes that in fact nothing is taught by means of signs. His solution to the paradox of signifying
by signs is that signs cannot teach us what we do not already know, and what we know we learn
either by direct acquaintance with the things themselves or by divine illumination.

The last excerpt, taken from Augustines Confessions , is best known to contemporary readers
because of its appearance in the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein . Augustine does not advance a
robust theory of meaning here, but aims merely to describe the process of learning to use words
in order to signify. On the basis of human desire to express the feelings of [ones] heart, an
infant uses sounds and cries in order to satisfy those desires. But even a young child comes to
recognize that often those cries are misunderstood, which provokes the child to pay attention to
the ways in which others are using vocal signs; specifi cally, the child pays attention to the
relationship between the sounds that are uttered and the things signifi ed by those sounds.
Progress towards communication by speech is made easier in part because it involves the use of
facial expressions, gestures and tones which, according to Augustine, are common to all races.
The universal language of action, therefore, assists in the acquisition of any particular spoken
language.

This passage has attracted attention in part because it suggested to some readers that learning the
names for things was suffi cient for knowing a language. However, Augustine considered that
some signs signify states of mind (e.g., if, from, and other syncategoremata or conjunctions, as
he considered them, described in The Teacher ) and others signify extra-mental things.