CLASSICS 1>-

O/
PUB LIC
ADMINISTRATION
Fifth Edition

J ay M. Shafritz .
University 01Pittsburgn

Albert C. Hyde
The Brookings Institutioti

S andra J. Parkes
University 01 Utah

TI-IOMSON
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\J\JADS\J\JORTH
Australia > Canad Mexico > Singapore Spain
Llnired Klnsdom Hnited States
 Implcmcntation
Jeffrey L Pressman alld Aarall WldavJky
Preface
Late in 1968 our attention was drawn to lhe
Econornic Development Adrninistration's em-
ployrnent effort in Oakland by the appenrance
of a book with the arresting tille, Oakland's No'
for Buming. Written by a major pnrticpant
in the EOA's Oakland venture, I lhe book ap-
peared to suggest thst the cty had recenlly
been saved frorn riot and ruin by the infusin of
.$23 millon in federal funds, Because it created
minority employment-t-thus sending out a bea-
con light of hope to a Iroubled natlon=-the
EOA program was toutedas a model worthy of
imitation. Since Oaldand Projecl members were
. not aware lhat lhe city had been delivered from
evil, we inquired into lhe status of the program
and discovered that in 1969, three years after it
began, approxmately .$3 millon had actuaIly
been spent. Al lhat rate, another twenty years
would pass before this .emergency operation
would have spent the money to create lhe jobs
to employ lhe people who would prevenl (or al
leasl not participate in) riots. Pnrt of lhe $3 mil-
lion had gone to the cty for the Hegenberger
overpass lo the coliseum (which we sornehow
lhoughl would hav been built anyway), and
the rest had been spent on architects' fees: We
indulged briefty in mild Iantasies depicting lo-
cal nrchitects about to overtlirow lhe Oakland
City Council in a suave coup d' etat, only to be
bought off at lhe last minute by EOA funds.
But further investigation suggested that there
were no easy targets or evident villains. Imple-
mentation of lhe EOA's program was just more
difficult than any of us had thought. _
$0",: From ''''p/r,nttttnrimt, by J. L P'usnuU\ and A. WII
dnvsky, pp. xI-lIVU, COPynlht e 191) Tbe Rtlcnu orthe Unl
vcnlty o( caUromf , Reprinled by pcmlis.slon of th.e Univerlhy
of C.llrOrnJll Ptess.
339
This book begins al the end: We will concen-
!r1It~o.n.lhat p~ of a public program CoUowing
the initial settmg of goals, securing oC agree-
rnent, and cornmitment of funds. A new agency
caIled the Econornic Deve\opmenl Administra-
tion (EDA) is established by Congress. The
EDA d~c.des lo go nto cities for the purpose
of providing permanent new jobs to minori-
ties through economic development. Oakland is
chosen as an experirnenl in showing how lhe
provision of public works and building lonns
can provide incentives for employers lo' hice
minorities. Congress appropriates the neces-
sary funds, the approva! of city officials and
employers is obtained, and lhe program is an-
nounced to lhe public amidst lhe usual fanrare.
Years later, construction has onIy been partiaIly
compleled, business loans have died entrely,
and lhe results in lerms of minority employ-
ment are meager and disappointing. Why7
Some programs are aborted becuuse politi-
cal agreemenl cannot be obtaincd, Others lan-
guish because funds cannot be secured, StiU
others die becnuse the nitial agreernent of local
officials or private concerns is not forthcornina
A1Ithese conditions were rnet in the EDA e';;~
ployrnent program in Oakland, but the program
could not be implernented in time to secure lhe
desired results.
In our study oC implernentation, we have de-
liberately chosen case material in which dramatc
elernents that are essentially self-explanatory
are ruled out. There was no great conftct. Every-
one agreed, There was only mnimum publicity,
:me issue was not one of overriding politicnl
rrnportance. Essential funds wcre on hand al
the righl time -. The evils lhat affiicted lhe
EDA program in Oakland were of a prosaic
and everyday character, Agreements had to be
mainlnned after they were reached. Numerous
approvals and clearances had to be obtained
Irorn B variety of participants. Failure to recog-
nize that these perCecllyordinary circumstances
present serious obstacles to implementation
inhibits lenming. lf one is always looking Cor
unusunl circumstances nnd dramntic events, he
 :1:
340 Part Three From 1FK lo Civil Service Reform (1960s and 19709) Article 35 Implementation 341

cannot appreciate how difficult it ls to make Ihe
ordinary happen. . tives. Nothing s said about what might be done
People now appear to think Ihat lrnplemen-
tation should be easy; Ihey are, therefore, upset
when expected events do not occur or turn out
badly. We would considerour elfort a success
if more people began with the un~erstanding
that implementation, under the best of circurn-
stances, is exceedingly difficult They. would
therefore, be pleasantly surprised when a few
good things really happened.
Implementation in recent years has been
rnuch dlscussed but rarely studied. Presidents
treated as a broad statement of goals and objec-
or whether anything has been or will be done lo
accomplish that purpose. Other times we speak .
of policy as if it were equivalent to actual be-
havior: Our policy s.to hire minorities, mean-
ing Ihat we actually do hire them. Policy in this
sense signifies the goal and its achievement,
Both these meanings of poliey rule out the pos-
sibility of studying implementation, When pol-
icy remains a disembodied objective, wthout
specifying actors or the acts in which Ihey must
engage to achleve the desired result, there Is no
whose attainment is problernatical, A program sponslble both for the nitial conditions and for
exlsts when the initial conditions-Ihe "if the objectives toward which Ihey are supposed -,
stage of the policy hypolhesis-have been meto lo lead.'
The word "prograrn" signifies the conversin The longer Ihe chain of causality, Ihe more
of a hypothesis lnto govemmental action, The numerous the reciprocal relationships among
';(:~'; initial premises of the hypothesis have been au- the Jinks and the more cornplex implementa-
~.l thorized. The degree to which the predicted con- tion becomes. The first four chapters llustrate
i.
;;;l
sequences (the "then" stage) take place we will lhemovemenlfromsimplicitylocomplc,uty.The
: call implementation. Implementation may be
vewed as a process of interaction between UJe
reader interested in implementation should,
therefore, be conscious of the steps required to
r~
:J~J
settng of goals and actions geared to achiev-
ing them, .
Considered as a whole, a program can be
aceomplish eaeh link in the chain. Who had lo
act lo begin implementation7 Whose consent
was required lo continue it7 How many partici-

and their advisers, department secretaries and
their subordinates, local officials III1dgroups in
their cornmunities complain Ihat good ideas are
dissipated in the process of execution. Yet, ex-
cept for an excellent book by Martha Derthick,!
we have not been able to locate any thorough-
.going analysis of lmplementation.' Complaints
about implementation do not constitute serious
eorts to grapple wlth the problem.
No doubt a comparative approach to prob-
lerns of implementatlon would ideally be pref-
erable lo Ihe one we have adopted. But not
enough ls known about the subject to develop
appropriate categories, and thereis no previous
literature on whch lo rely Iorguidance, We do
not make any claim to have undertaken a com-
prehensive analysis of implementation. We are
not certain we know whBt alI Ihe problems are,
let aloneprovide solutions to Ihem. But a start
must be made somewhere and we hope this
is It.
Implementation, to us, means just what
Websler and Rogel say it does: to carry out, ae~
complish, fulfiU, produce, complete. But what .
15 it Ihat is being implemcnted7 A policy, natu-
rally. There must be something out Ihere prior
to implementation; olherwiselhere would be
nothing to move toward in Ihe process of im-
plementation. A verb like "implement" must .
have an object like .policy ..But pdlicies nor-
mally contain bolh goals and Ihe means for
acleving Ihem. How, Ihen, do we distinguish
belween a policy and its implementntion7
In everyday discourse we use policy (when
referring to decisions) in several strikingly dif-
Cerent ways. Sometimes policy means B stllte-
implementation to study. When the statement
. of the objective inc1udes its attainment, irnple-
mentation ls unnecessary.
We can worknelther wilh a definition of pol-
icy that excludes any mplementaton nor one
Ihal includes alI implementation. There must
be astarting point. If DO action is begun, lmple-
mentation carmot take place. There must also be
an end point. Implementatioo carmot succeed
or faiJ wthout a goal against whch to judge t,
Let us agree to ta\k about policy as a hypoth- .
esis containing initial conditions and predicted
consequences. If X is done al time th then Y
will result at time t2 If the federal government,
through the Economic Development Adminis-
. tration, provides $23 million in loans and grants
to enterprises in Oakland, and if thes enter-
poses agree lo hire minorities after spending
Ihe money, Ihen facilities will be built leading .
to Ihe creation of new jobs that will go to 1ninori-
tieso Implementation would here constitute fue
ability to achieve Ihe predicted consequences al-
ler Ihe initial conditions havo been meto
Implementation does not refer!o crenting Ihe
initial eonditions. Legislation has lo be passed
and funds eornmilted before implementation
takes place lo secure Ihe predieted m,ltcome.
Similarly, agreements wilh Ulelocal enletprises
would have to be reaehed before anempts are
made to carry Ihem out. Alter alI, Ihe world is
full of policy proposals Ihat are aborted. You
CM'! finish wha! you haven'! sl:lrted. Lack oC
implementation should not refer to fallure lo
gel going bul to inability lo follow through.
To emphasjze Ihe actual e,ustence of inilia!
conditions we must disting\sh Bprogrnm from
i
conceived of as a system in wruCh each element
is dependent on the oiher, Unless money is sup-
plied, no facilities can be built, no new jobs can
llow from them, and no minority personnel can
~\~ be hired lo Iill them, A breakdown at one stage
'jJ must be repaired, therefore, before it is possible
~ to move 00 lo the next. The stages are related,
however, from back lo front as weU as from
fronl lo back. FaiJure lo agree on procedures
.~
for hiring minorities may lead the-governrnent
lo .withhold funds, thus halting the construc-
;~
~J~
tion. Program implementation thus becomes a
searnless web.
Policies imply theories. Whether staled ex-
~~ plicitly or not, policies point lo a chain of cau-
~~~_ .
..~ ... sation between .initia! conditions and future
.:#~ consequences, If X, then Y. Policies become
programs when, by authoritative actlon, the ini-
~l.'~~.
tia! conditions are created. X now elsts. Pro-
grams make Ihe Iheories operationa! by forging
,~j Ihe first link in Ihe causal chain connecting ac-
tions lo objeetives. Given X, we aet to obtain Y.
.~~ ImplementatioiJ, Ihen; is Ihe ability lo forge
.:IZ:.'. subsequenl Jinks in Ihe causal chain so as lo
. .::!(-
.!,~ obtain Ihe desired results. Once Ihe funds are
.~..lli.
cornmitted and Ihe local agreements reached,
.~:
...:.:.: Ihe lask is to build facilities to create new jobs
so Ihal minorities will be hired.
;:fJ:
;:h'ft. We oversimplify. Our working definition of
<~
.i;#.
....~.-
imple~enlDlion will do as a skelch of Ihe ear-
liest stages of Ihe program, bul Ihe passage of
time Yireaks havoc wilh etforts lo malntain tidy
.:~
';I~
distinctions. As circumstances ehange, .gols
.-:-~ alter and initial condilions are subjeet to slip-
page. In Ihe mlilst of action Ihe distinction be-
~.~:
tween Ihe jnitial conditions and Ihe subsequenl
pants were involved7 How long did they take lo
ae!? Each time an act of agreement has to be
registered for the program lo continue, we call
a decision point Eaeh instance in which a sep-
arate participant is required to give rus consent,
we call a c1earanee. Adding fue nurnber of nec-
essary clearances involved in decision points
throughout the history of the program will give
the reader an idea of the task involved in se-
curing implementation. We will pcrform this
chore for him in chapter 5.
When objectives are not realized, one ex-
planation is the assertion of faulty implemen-
tation. The activities that were supposed lo be
carried out were not executed or were subject
to inordinate delays. Another appropriate ex-
planation may be that aspirations were set too
high. Instead ot asking why Ihe process of im-
plementation was faulty, we asK why 100 much
was e1;pected of it. Sludying Ihe process of
implementation, Iherefore, includes Ihe.setling
'of goals (poliey, aceording to its earlier mean-
ing) loward wruch implementation is directed .
By paying attention to Ihe st.nJeturnl posilion
of Ihose who sel targets-top federal officinls
who wish large aecomplishments from smaIl
resources in a short time-and Ihosc' whb must
implement Ihem-career bureaucrats and local
participants characteozed by lgh needs and
)ow cohesion-we seek in chapter 6 to uncover
Ihe causes of setting t:Jrgets Ihat are unlikely lo
bemet. .
The possibility of a mismalch between means
and ends c;ills into question. Ihe adequacy of Ihe
.original policy designo Perhaps implementation
WQS good but Ihe Iheory on wruch it was b~sed

ment of intention: Our policy is to incrense
employrnent Bmong minorities. Policy here is
a policy. A progrnm consists of governmen-
tal action initialed in order lo secure objeclives
~ chriin of enusality begins to erode. Qnce n pro- WQS bad. Could a ditferent set oe inilial condi-
'-.~
:.;>.~
'-;ri'
grnm is underway implemenlers become re- tions have acrueved Ule predicted results7 To
 J42 Part Three From JFK lo Civil Service Reform (1960s and 1970s)
explore this possibility, we end the book with
an analysis of the economic theory underlying
the EDA program in Oakland. Perhaps, we
suggest in chapter 7, it might have been better
to subsidize the wage bill of private firms di-
recUy in order to inerease employment instead
of the more roundabout rnethod of providing
grants andloans to construct facilitie~ to create
jobs for which minorities would then be hired.
The study of implernentation requires un-
derstanding that apparently simple sequences
of events depend on cornplex chains of recipro-
cal interaction. Hence, each par! of the chain
must be built with fue others in view. The sepa-
ration of policy design from implementation is
fatal. It is no better than mindless implernenta-
tion without a sense of direction, Though we
can isolate policy and implernentation for sepa-
rate discussion, the purpose of our analysis is to
bring thern into closer correspondence with
one another,
Notes
1. Amory Bradford, Oakland's Not for Burning
(New York: McKay, 1968).
2. Martha Derthick, New Townsln- Town (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1972).
3. The splendid account of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act by Stephen Bailey
and Edith Mosher reveals acute sensitivity lo
problems of implernentation, But it is not
ther purpose to analyze implementation as a
distinct phenomenon. See their ESEA: The
Office of Education Administers a Law
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968).
Jerome T. Murphy, in the article "Title 1 of
ESEA: The Politics oflmplementing Federal
Education Before," Harvard Educational
Review 41 (1971): 35-63, does address him-
self direcUy to the question of implernenta-
tion. Although this article does not contain as
thoroughgoing an analysis of implernenta-
.... ~
~'.;
..(;
tion as is found in the Derthick study, the au- -re
thor does provide a nurnber of insights into
the problern.
4. After numerous discussions, we have come
to understand why no one else has appar-
ently tried lo distinguish policy from imple-
mentation. One person says that he llkes to
think of implementation as problems that
arise when goals are set at high levels of or-
ganizational decision but are not realized be-
cause of resistance or distortion at lower lev-
els of organization performance. We cannot
force. anyone lo accept our choice of words
or concepts, but we do think it makes more
sense lo conceive of organiza/ion in an ex-
tended sense so that it encompasses those
whose cooperation is necessary for a pro- .
grarn to be carried out To us, it seems strange
to taIk of a prograrn as being implemented
rnerely because lower level participants in
fue sponsoring organization attempted to
carry it out though essential support from
others was not forthcoming, Support for a
prograrn within an organization is but one
stage of implementation as we understand it.
Another person claims that policy and
implementation are DOtdistinguishable, Pol-
icy includes intended effects-s-i.e., policy in-
eludes implementation. Hence, a policy .is .
not real until fue intended changes have taken
place. Again, we do not gainsay others the
vocabulary with which they are comfortable.
But we think that this choice of words con-
fuses rather than clarifies. If policy ineludes
its own implementation, then by definition
alone it is not possible to carry out an inves-
tigation concerning the implementation of a
policy. The important thing, we suppose, is
that there are differences between deriving
goals or objectives, working out a theory of
how to achieve thern, embodying that theory
in governrnental action, and executing it as
intended, We think that Webster is on our
side, but anyone else is we\come to translate
rus vocabulary into our concerns.