U.S.

Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Board ofImmigration Appeals

Qffice ofthe Clerk

5107 leesburg Pike, Suite 2000

Falls Church, Virginia 22041

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TRAIS, DAVID AARON OHS/ICE Office of Chief Counsel - CHI
DAVIDTRAIS 525 West Van Buren Street
4452 N. Kedzie Chicago, IL 60607
Chicago, IL 60625

Name: PUTRO, VERA VALERYEVNA A 099-280-517

Date of this notice: 3/21/2017

Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.

Sincerely,

Cynthia L. Crosby
Acting Chief Clerk

Enclosure

Panel Members:
Malphrus, Garry D.

Userteam: Docket

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Cite as: Vera Valeryevna Putro, A099 280 517 (BIA March 21, 2017)
U.S. Department of Justice Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Executive Office for Immigration Review

Falls Church, Virginia 22041

File: A099 280 517 - Chicago, IL Date:

In re: VERA VALERYEVNA PUTRO MAR 2 J 2017

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IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: David A. Trais, Esquire

CHARGE:

Notice: Sec. 237(a)(l)(D)(i), l&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(l)(D)(i)] -

Conditional resident status terminated

APPLICATION: Removal of conditions on resident status

The case is presently before the Board pursuant to the July 7, 2016, decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Putro v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 2016).
We will remand the record to the Immigration Court for further proceedings and issuance of a
new decision.

We review findings of fact determined by an Immigration Judge, including credibility

findings, under a "clearly erroneous" standard. 8 C.F.R. 1003.l(d)(3)(i). We review questions
of law, discretion, and judgment, and all other issues in appeals from decisions of Immigration
Judges de novo. 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(d)(3)(ii).

On July 18, 2006, the respondent was granted legal permanent residence under a conditional
status based on her marriage to a United States citizen. Putro v. Lynch, supra, at 579.
On November 13, 2006, the respondent's United States citizen spouse died. Id. In June of 2008,
the respondent filed a Form I-751, Petition to Remove Conditions on Residence, checking the
box specifying that she sought a waiver of the joint-filing requirement because her spouse had
died. Id. On February 22, 2010, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
("USCIS") denied the petition, finding that she had failed to refute evidence in her file reflecting
that her marriage was not bona fide, and issued a notice of termination of the respondent's
conditional residence status. Id. at 579-80. On February 24, 2010, the Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS") issued a Notice to Appear that charged the respondent as removable under
section 237(a)(l)(D)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(l)(D)(i)
(Exh. 1). Id. at 580.

On August 16, 2012, the Immigration Judge issued a decision finding the respondent
removable as charged under section 237(a)(l)(D)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(l)(D)(i), and denying her application for a good faith waiver under section
216(c)(4)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1186a(c)(4)(B). On May 30, 2014, the Board dismissed the
respondent's appeal. The respondent moved for reconsideration, and on December 24, 2014, the

Cite as: Vera Valeryevna Putro, A099 280 517 (BIA March 21, 2017)
A099 280 517

Board denied the motion. On March 19, 2015, the respondent moved to reopen, and on July 8,
2-015, the Board denied the motion to reopen.

The respondent filed a petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, and on July 7, 2016, the court issued its decision. The court granted the petition,
finding that the agency misconstrued her petition to remove conditions as a request for a

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discretionary waiver of the joint-filing requirement under section 216(c)(4) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
1186a(c)(4), rather than recognizing that she qualified for an exemption of that requirement
due to the death of her spouse. Putro v. Lynch, supra, at 581 (citing Matter ofRose, 25 l&N Dec.
181, 182 (BIA 2010)). The court found the error to be significant because it erroneously shifted
the burden of proof from the government to the respondent to prove the bona fides of the
marriage. Putro v. Lynch, supra, at 581; section 216(c)(3)(D) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
1186a(c)(3)(D); see also Matter ofRose, supra, at 185. The court remanded to the agency for
a re-evaluation of the respondent's petition under the proper standard of proof. Putro v. Lynch,
supra, at 582.

Further consideration under the proper standard of proof may require additional fact-finding
and analysis. Thus, we will remand the record for the Immigration Judge to consider anew the
respondent's petition to remove the conditions on her resident status. The parties should have an
opportunity to present new evidence and arguments on remand regarding the validity of the
marriage and any other issues deemed appropriate.

Accordingly, the following order will be issued.

ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Court for further proceedings
consistent with the foregoing opinion and for entry of a new decision.

2
Cite as: Vera Valeryevna Putro, A099 280 517 (BIA March 21, 2017)