SURVEY OF CASES IN CRIMINAL LAW

January-December 2013
Atty. Ramon S. Esguerra

Book II

FALSIFICATION BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS OF A PRIVATE, PUBLIC, OR

COMMERCIAL DOCUMENT: ELEMENTS

Tanenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448, 26 June 2013.

On different occasions, accused Tanenggee affixed, forged, or caused to be signed

the signature of Tan as endorser and payee of the proceeds of the checks at the back of
the same to show that the latter had indeed endorsed the same for payment. He handed
the checks to the loans clerk for encashment. Once said documents were forged and
falsified, Tanenggee released and obtained from the bank

All the elements of the crime of estafa through falsification of commercial

documents were established in this case.

First, Tanenggee is a private individual. Second, the acts of falsification consisted in

Tanenggees (1) counterfeiting or imitating the victims handwriting or signature and
causing it to appear that the same is true and genuine in all respects; and (2) causing it to
appear that victim has participated in an act or proceeding when he did not in fact so
participate. Third, the falsification was committed in promissory notes and checks which
are commercial documents.

USURPATION OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS: ELEMENTS

Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan and People, G.R. Nos. 186739-960, 17 April 2013.

As mayor, accused Ruzol issued permits to transport salvaged forest products to

various recipients. An information for usurpation of authority or official functions was
filed against him on the ground that he was not lawfully entitled to issue said permits,
such authority properly belonging to the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).

The Supreme Court acquitted Ruzol.Good faith is a defense in criminal prosecutions

for usurpation of official functions. The term good faith is ordinarily used to describe
that state of mind denoting honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. It is actually a question of
intent and although something internal, it can be ascertained by relying not on ones self-
serving protestations of good faith but on evidence of his conduct and outward acts.
 In this case, Ruzol should be acquitted because he acted in good faith. Contrary to
the conclusions made by the Sandiganbayan, Ruzols act of consulting with the public
through an organizational meeting was not a badge of bad faith. Rather, it was a sign
supporting Ruzols good intentions to regulate and monitor the movement of salvaged
forest products to prevent abuse and occurrence of untoward illegal logging.

MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS: PRESUMPTION, MODES OF

COMMISSION

Cantos v. People, G.R. No. 184908, 3 July 2013.

Accused Cantos was convicted of the crime of malversation of public funds.

Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) states that the failure of a public officer
to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, isprima facie evidence that he has put such
missing fund or property to personal uses. This presumption, however, may be rebutted
upon evidence that can nullify any likelihood that the accused put the funds or property to
personal use.

Cantos failed to overcome this prima facie evidence of guilt. He failed to explain the
missing funds in his account and to restitute the amount upon demand. His claim that the
money was taken by robbery or theft is self-serving and has not been supported by
evidence. In fact, Cantos even tried to unscrew the safety vault to make it appear that the
money was forcibly taken. Moreover, Cantos explanation that there is a possibility that
the money was taken by another is belied by the fact that there was no sign that the steel
cabinet was forcibly opened. Finally, it was only Cantos who had the keys to the steel
cabinet.

ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: CONSPIRACY

Bacasmas v. People, G.R. Nos. 189343, 189369, and 189553, 10 July 2013.

A Commission of Audit (COA) report showed that petitioners Bacasmas, Gaviola,

Cesa, and Jaca not only signed, certified, and approved the City Government of Cebus
cash advance vouchers, but also signed and countersigned the checks despite the
deficiencies, which amounted to violations of R.A. 7160, P.D. 1445, and COA Circular
Nos. 90-331, 92-382 and 97-002.2.

Petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.
3019. Gross and inexcusable negligence is characterized by a want of even the slightest
care, acting or omitting to act in a situation in which there is a duty to act not
inadvertently, but wilfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences
insofar as other persons are affected. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious
doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that
partakes of the nature of fraud.

Petitioners were well aware of their responsibilities before they affixed their
signatures on the cash advance vouchers. Yet, they still chose to disregard the
requirements laid down by the law, rules, and regulations by approving the vouchers
despite the incomplete information therein, the previous unliquidated cash advances, the
absence of payroll to support the cash requested, and the disparity between the requested
cash advances and the total net pay. Worse, they continue to plead their innocence,
allegedly for the reason that it was "common practice" in their office not to follow the
law and rules and regulations to the letter.

ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: SECTION 3(E)

Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 187340, 14 August 2013

Petitioner Sanchez, a city engineer, approved and submitted documents concerning
the improvement of an existing canal to the Cebu City Council. In the course of the
project preparation, however, Sanchez never ordered any of his subordinates to verify the
ownership of the land through which the canal would pass because, according to him, it
appeared to be public land. The City Council consequently passed a resolution,
authorizing the city mayor to enter into a contract for and on behalf of the city for said
canals construction.
A certain Nadela discovered that a canal was being constructed on her lot without her
consent. Despite the governments assurances, it never initiated efforts to remove the
canal, promptingNadela to file the instant complaint against Sanchez.
Sanchez conviction was proper.Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either
by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality or by
culpa as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence.

There is manifest partiality when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or

predilection to favour one side or person rather than another. Evident bad faith
connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest
purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill
will. Finally, gross inexcusable negligence refers to negligence characterized by want
of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to
act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.

Sanchez failure to validate the ownership of Nadelas land on which the canal is to
be built because of his unfounded belief that it is public land constitutes gross and
inexcusable negligence. Sanchez even impliedly admitted that it fell squarely under his
duties to check the ownership of the land with the Register of Deeds. Yet, he concluded
that it was public land solely on his evaluation of its appearancethat Nadelas land
looked swampy.

Plameras v. People, G.R. No. 187268, 4 September 2013; Posadas and Dayco
v. People, G.R. Nos. 168951 and 169000, 27 November 2013. (same doctrine
as discussed above)

MURDER: ELEMENTS

People v. Peteluna, G.R. No. 187048, 23 January 2013.

On the way home, appellants followed the victim and his companion. The
companion saw the appellants place their arms on the victims shoulder, after which they
struck the latter with stones. The victim pleaded appellants to stop, but they did not.
When the victim fell to the ground, one of the appellants smashed his head with a stone
as big as the victims head. Afterwards, appellants dragged him downhill toward a farm.

Appellants claim that the crime committed is only homicide because of the absence
of the circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, which would have qualified
the killing to murder, and that their respective defenses of denial and alibi were
meritorious.

The Supreme Court upheld appellants conviction. As a qualifying circumstance to

the crime of murder, the essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording
the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape, and that
it may still exist even if the attack is frontal so long as the same is sudden and
unexpected.

It was clear that the victim, an elder, had no inkling of the impending danger against
him. The attack was sudden notwithstanding the prior act of placing the assailants arms
on the shoulder of the victim because such was done in a friendly manner.

People v. Zapuiz, G.R. No. 199713, 20 February 2013. (same doctrine as

discussed above)

HOMICIDE: ELEMENTS

Escamilla v. People, G.R. No. 188551, 27 February 2013.

The victim was about to ride his tricycle when petitioner Escamilla shot the former
four times, hitting him once in the upper portion of his right chest.

Escamilla was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide, which
the Supreme Court upheld on appeal. Intent to kill, as an essential element of homicide at
whatever stage, may be before or simultaneous with the infliction of injuries. The
evidence to prove intent to kill may consist of, among others:

1. the means used;

2. the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; and

3. the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the
killing of the victim.

Escamillas intent to kill was simultaneous with the infliction of injuries. Using a
gun, he shot the victim in the chest. Despite a bloodied right upper torso, the victim still
managed to run towards his house to ask for help. Nonetheless, Escamilla continued to
shoot at him three more times, albeit unsuccessfully.

The attending physician, finding that the bullet had no point of exit, did not attempt
to extract it; its extraction would just have caused further damage. The doctor further said
that the victim would have died if the latter were not brought immediately to the hospital.
All these facts belie the absence of Escamillas intent to kill the victim.

RAPE: ELEMENTS

People v. Buado, Jr., G.R. No. 170634, 8 January 2013; People v. Zafra, G.R.
No. 197363, 26 June 2013; People v. Manalili, G.R. No. 191253, 28 August
2013.

Carnal knowledge of a female simply means a male having bodily connections with
a female. The presence or absence of injury or laceration in the victims genitalia is not
decisive of whether rape has been committed. Such injury or laceration is material only if
force or intimidation were an element of the rape charged. Otherwise, it is merely
circumstantial evidence of the commission of the rape.

People v. Penilla, G.R. No. 189324, 20 March 2013; People v. Vitero, G.R.
No. 175327, 3 April 2013; People v. Cabungan, G.R. No. 189355, 23 January
2013; People v. Lomaque, G.R. No. 189297, 5 June 2013; People v. Zafra,
G.R. No. 197363, 26 June 2013; People v. Basallo, G.R. No. 182457, 30
January 2013; People v. Candellada, G.R. No. 189293, 10 July 2013; People
v. Cedenio, G.R. No. 201103, 25 September 2013; People v. Galagar, Jr.,
G.R. No. 202842, 9 October 2013.

By the very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost
entirely on the credibility of the complainants testimony because of the fact that, usually,
only the participants can directly testify as to its occurrence. Since normally only two
persons are privy to the commission of rape, the evaluation of the evidence thereof
ultimately revolves around the credibility of the complaining witness.
 The moral character of the victim is immaterial. Rape may be committed not only
against single women, but also against those who are married, middle-aged, separated, or
pregnant. Even a prostitute may be a victim of rape.

Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are
employed, and the victim submits herself to her attacker because of fear. It is not the sole
test to determine whether a woman has involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused.
It is not an essential element of rape.

Delay in revealing the commission of a crime, such as rape, does not necessarily
render such charge unworthy of belief. This is because the victim may choose to keep
quiet rather than expose her defilement to the cruelty of public scrutiny. Only when the
delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it work to discredit the complainant.

People v. Bacatan, G.R. No. 203315, 18 September 2013

In rape cases, the law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove
resistance because it is not an element of rape. Hence, the absence of abrasions or
contusions in AAAs body is inconsequential. Also, not all victims react the same way.
Some people may cry out, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while
others may appear to yield to the intrusion. Some may offer strong resistance while others
may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. The failure of a rape victim to offer
tenacious resistance does not make her submission to accuseds criminal acts voluntary.
What is necessary is that the force employed against her was sufficient to consummate
the purpose which he has in mind.

Sufficient force does not mean great or is of such character that is irresistible; as long
as it brings about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less
irresistible are beside the point.

People v. Espenilla, G.R. No. 192253, 18 September 2013.

When a rape victims testimony is straightforward and marked with consistency

despite grueling examination, it deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be
discarded. If such testimony is clear, consistent and credible to establish the crime beyond
reasonable doubt, a conviction may be based on it, notwithstanding its subsequent
retraction. Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate her
original testimony.

A retraction is looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. It is

exceedingly unreliable for there is always the probability that such recantation may later
on be repudiated. It can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or
monetary consideration. Like any other testimony, it is subject to the test of credibility
based on the relevant circumstances and, especially, on the demeanor of the witness on
the stand.

People v. Caoile, G.R. No. 203041, 5 June 2013; People v. Monticalvo, G.R.
No. 193507, 30 January 2013.

The law provides that there are two circumstances for the carnal knowledge of a
woman with mental disability to be considered rape. It may either be rape of a person
deprived of reason or rape of a demented person.

The term deprived of reason pertains to those suffering from a mental abnormality,
deficiency, or retardation. Meanwhile, a demented person pertains to one having
dementiaa form of mental disorder in which cognitive and intellectual functions of the
mind are prominently affected and where total recovery is not possible.

People v. Gaduyon, G.R. No. 181473, 11 November 2013

In rape under paragraph 1 or rape through sexual intercourse, carnal knowledge is

the crucial element which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. This is also referred
to as organ rape or penile rape and must be attended by any of the circumstances
enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1. There must be evidence to
establish beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators penis touched the labia of the
victim or slid into her female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof,
to ensure his conviction of rape by sexual intercourse.

Rape under paragraph 2 of the above-quoted article is commonly known as rape by

sexual assault. The perpetrator, under any of the attendant circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1, commits this kind of rape by inserting his penis into another persons mouth
or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another
person. It is also called instrument or object rape, also gender-free rape, or the
narrower homosexual rape.

CONSUMMATED RAPE

People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 173307, 17 July 2013; People v. Manalili, G.R. No.
191253, 28 August 2013; People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 190622, 7 October
2013; People v. Guillen, G.R. No. 191756, 25 November 2013.

Slightest penetration of the labia of the female victim's genitalia consummates the
crime of rape. As the text of the law itself shows, the breaking of the hymen of the victim
is not among the means of consummating rape. All that the law requires is that the
accused had carnal knowledge of a woman under the circumstances described in the law.
By definition, carnal knowledge was "the act of a man having sexual bodily connections
with a woman." This understanding of rape explains why the slightest penetration of the
female genitalia consummates the crime.

In objective terms, carnal knowledge, the other essential element in consummated

statutory rape, does not require full penile penetration of the female. The mere touching
of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to
constitute carnal knowledge. All that is necessary to reach the consummated stage of rape
is for the penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual act to come into
contact with the lips of the pudendum of the victim. This means that the rape is
consummated once the penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual act
touches either labia or the pudendum.

Also, the touching that constitutes rape does not mean mere epidermal contact, or
stroking or grazing of organs, or a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external
layer of the victims vagina, or the mons pubis, but rather the erect penis touching the
labias or sliding into the female genitalia. Accordingly, the conclusion that touching the
labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape
proceeds from the physical fact that the labias are physically situated beneath the mons
pubis or the vaginal surface, such that for the penis to touch either of them is to attain
some degree of penetration beneath the surface of the female genitalia. It is required,
however, that this manner of touching of the labias must be sufficiently and convincingly
established.

People v. Guillen, G.R. No. 191756, 25 November 2013

Rape may be committed even in places where people congregate. Thus, it is not
impossible or unlikely that rape is perpetrated inside a room adjacent to a room occupied
by other persons, as in this case.

RAPE: WHEN COMMITTED WITH A DEADLY WEAPON

People v. Basallo, G.R. No. 182457, 30 January 2013.

The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her
will or without her consent. Relating thereto, when a victim is threatened with bodily
injury as when the rapist is armed with a deadly weapon, such as a knife or bolo, such
constitutes intimidation sufficient to bring the victim to submission to the lustful desires
of the rapist.

The victims failure to shout for help does not negate rape. Even the victims lack of
resistance, especially when intimidated by the offender into submission, does not signify
voluntariness or consent. The law does not impose an obligation on the part of the victim
to exhibit defiance or to present proof of struggle.

People v. Penilla, G.R. No. 189324, 20 March 2013.

 Rape victims react differently. Some may offer strong resistance, while others may
be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. The use of a weapon, by itself, is strongly
suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and threatening the victim with a knife, much
more poking at her, as in this case, is sufficient to bring her into submission.

People v. Veloso, G.R. No. 188849, 13 February 2013; People v. Dela Cruz,
G.R. No. 183091, 19 June 2013.

Due to its intimate nature, rape is usually a crime bereft of witnesses and, more often
than not, the victim is left to testify for herself. Thus, in the resolution of rape cases, the
victims credibility becomes the primordial consideration.

It is settled that when the victims testimony is straightforward, convincing, and

consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any material
or significant inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility. The accused then may be
convicted solely on the basis thereof.

Also, the law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance. What
has to be proved by the prosecution is the use of force or intimidation by the accused in
having sexual intercourse with the victim.

RAPE THROUGH FORCE OR INTIMIDATION

People v. Vitero, G.R. No. 175327, 3 April 2013; People v. Deligero, G.R. No.
189280, 17 April 2013; People v. Amistoso, G.R. No. 201447, 9 January
2013; People v. Diaz, G.R. No. 200882, 13 June 2013.

In rape committed by close kin, such as the victims father, stepfather, uncle, or the
common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be
employed. Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.

RAPE THROUGH SEXUAL ASSAULT

Pielago v. People, G.R. No. 202020, 13 March 2013.

The gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual assault is the insertion of the penis into
another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another persons
genital or anal orifice. In this case, this element is clearly present when the minor victim
has straightforwardly testified in court that accused Pielago has inserted his forefinger in
her vagina and anus.

STATUTORY RAPE: ELEMENTS

 People v. Rayon, Sr., G.R. No. 194236, 30 January 2013; People v. Lomaque,
G.R. No. 189297, 5 June 2013; Caballo v. People, G.R. No. 198732, 10 June
2013; People v. Manalili, G.R. No. 191253, 28 August 2013; People v.
Gaduyon, G.R. No. 181473, 11 November 2013.

Sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 has three elements:

1. The accused commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;

2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to
other sexual abuse; and
3. The child is below 18 years old.

Corollarily, the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child
Abuse Cases define the following terms:

1. Sexual abuse, which includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement,

enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in or assist another person to engage
in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or
incest with children; and
2. Lascivious conduct, which means the intentional touching, either directly or
through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or
the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus, or mouth, of any person,
whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.

Notably, previous jurisprudence has held that a child is deemed subjected to other
sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of an adult.

Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section

5, Article III, R.A. No. 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing
lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual
abuse constitutes the offense.

QUALIFIED RAPE

People v. Rayon, Sr., G.R. No. 194236, 30 January 2013; People v. Lomaque,
G.R. No. 189297, 5 June 2013; People v. Candellada, G.R. No. 189293, 10
July 2013.

Rape is qualified and the penalty is death, pursuant to Article 266-B of the RPC,
when the victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

To justify the imposition of the death penalty, however, it is required that the special
qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the appellant be
properly alleged in the information and duly proved during the trial. Needless to say,
these two circumstances must concur.

People v. Hilarion, G.R. No. 201105, 25 November 2013.

For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC, the prosecution must prove that

1. the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and

2. he accomplished this act through force, threat or intimidation,
when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
when she was under 12 years of age or was demented.

RAPE: SWEETHEART DEFENSE

People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 201728, 17 July 2013.

As to the "sweetheart defense", it is said that love is not a license for lust. "A love
affair does not justify rape for a man does not have the unbridled license to subject his
beloved to his carnal desires against her will." In this case, Cruzs argument that they are
lovers may be true; however, the sexual incidents between him and AAA have not been
proven to be consensual.

People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 200508, 4 September 2013

In determining whether the act was consensual and that no force of any kind and
degree was employed, circumstances as to the age, size and strength of both parties must
also be looked into because force in rape is relative. The sweetheart defense is an
affirmative defense that must be supported by convincing proof.

As correctly ruled by the CA, such defense is "effectively an admission of carnal

knowledge of the victim and consequently places on accused-appellant the burden of
proving the alleged relationship by substantial evidence." Independent proof is required.

People v. Cayanan, G.R. No. 200080, 18 September 2013

For the Court to even consider giving credence to the sweetheart defense, it must be
proven by compelling evidence. The defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in
support of the theory. Independent proof is required such as tokens, mementos, and
photographs. And while Cayanan produced two love letters allegedly written by AAA,
the CA correctly sustained the finding of the RTC that these letters were unauthenticated
and therefore, bereft of any probative value.

People v. Alcober, G.R. No. 192941, 13 November 2013.

When the accused in a rape case claims, as in the case at bar, that the sexual
intercourse between him and the complainant was consensual, the burden of evidence
shifts to him, such that he is now enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the
relationship. Being an affirmative defense, it must be established with convincing
evidence, such as by some documentary and/or other evidence like mementos, love
letters, notes, pictures and the like. The sweetheart theory as a defense necessarily admits
carnal knowledge, the first element of rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the
burden to prove only force or intimidation, the coupling element of rape. This admission
makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it is not only an affirmative
defense that needs convincing proof; after the prosecution has successfully established a
prima faciecase, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused, who has to
adduceevidence that the intercourse was consensual.

KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION: ELEMENTS

People v. Salvador, G.R. No. 201443, 10 April 2013.

Here, the Supreme Court affirmed the accuseds convictions. Based on the victims
clear and categorical testimony, the accuseds overt acts were undoubtedly geared toward
unlawfully depriving the victim of his liberty and extorting ransom in exchange for his
release. That no ransom was actually paid does not negate the fact of the commission of
the crime, it being sufficient that a demand for it was made.

KIDNAPPING WITH RANSOM: ELEMENTS

People v. Niegas, G.R. No. 194582, 27 November 2013

In countering the charge against him, Niegas contends that the victims testimonies
do not prove that he has kidnapped them. He denies all allegations against him and
furthers that it is not him who has demanded or received the ransom money.

Niegas defenses cannot be upheld. The victims testimonies proved that the
offenders detained them for more than three days, for the purpose of extorting ransom.
Also, the mere circumstance that Niegas did not personally perform all the acts necessary
to consummate the crime of murder would be irrelevant when conspiracy was proven
here since, in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.

ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE: ELEMENTS

 People v. Cachuela, G.R. No. 191752, 10 June 2013.

Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if,
for instance, it was committed:

1. To facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit;

2. To preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot;
3. To prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or
4. To eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime.

In this case, the victim was killed to facilitate the robbery. The fact that the cartridge
bullet shells found at the firing range where the victims lifeless body was discovered
matched with one of the guns found from one of the accused during an entrapment
operation clinches the case against accused insofar as establishing the nexus between the
robbery and the victims killing. Also, the gunshot wounds suffered by the victim also
came from the same caliber of gun recovered from said accused.

THEFT: SIMPLE THEFT AND QUALIFIED THEFT DISTINGUISHED

Almuete v. People, G.R. No. 179611, 12 March 2013.

This case is an offshoot of an earlier case, convicting petitioner Almuete for violating
Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, as amended. A person
violating said section shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.

Accordingly, Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC provide:

Art. 309. Penalties.Any person found guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceed[s] the latter
amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in
this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but
the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which
may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code,
the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion perpetua, as the
case may be.
 XXX

Art. 310. Qualified theft.The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties
next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next
preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of
confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle
or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken
from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident
or civil disturbance. XXX

Perusal of the records would show that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) imposed the
penalty prescribed in Article 310, which is two degrees higher than those specified in
Article 309. This is erroneous considering that Article 310 only applies if the theft were
committed under the circumstances provided therein. In this case, however, none of these
circumstances were present. The proper imposable penalty then is that provided in Article
309.

QUALIFIED THEFT

Viray v. People, G.R. No. 205180, 11 November 2013

The crime charged against petitioner Viray is theft qualified by grave abuse of
confidence.

The elements constituting the crime of simple theft are present here. First, it was
proved that the subjects of the offense were all personal or movable properties, consisting
as they were of jewelry, clothing, cellular phone, a media player and a gaming device.
Second, these properties belong to private complainant Vedua. Third, circumstantial
evidence places petitioner in the scene of the crime during the day of the incident, as
numerous witnesses saw him in Veduas house and his clothes were found inside the
house. He was thereafter seen carrying a heavy-looking sack as he was leaving private
complainants house. All these circumstances portray a chain of events that leads to a fair
and reasonable conclusion that petitioner took the personal properties with intent to gain,
especially considering that, fourth, Vedua had not consented to the removal and/or taking
of these properties.

Notably, however, the very fact that Viray forced open the main door and screen
because he was denied access to Veduas house negates the presence of such confidence
in him by Vedua. Without ready access to the interior of the house and the properties that
were the subject of the taking, it cannot be said that Vedua had a firm trust on Viray or
that she relied on his discretion and that the same trust reposed on him facilitated
Virays taking of the personal properties justifying his conviction of qualified theft.
ANTI-FENCING LAW: ELEMENTS

Ong v. People, G.R. No. 190475, 10 April 2013.

As to the element of the crime that the accused knew or should have known that the
said article, item, object, or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft, the words should know denote the fact that a person of
reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty
to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists.

Circumstances normally exist to forewarn a reasonably vigilant buyer that the object
of the sale may have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such
circumstances include the time and place of the sale, both of which may not be in accord
with the usual practices of commerce. The nature and condition of the goods sold, and the
fact that the seller is not regularly engaged in the business of selling goods may likewise
suggest the illegality of their source, and therefore should caution the buyer.

Accused Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past 24 years,
ought to have known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown
seller. Nevertheless, Ong bought the tires subject of this case without even asking for
proof of ownership thereof and allowing the entire transactionthat is, from the proposal
to buy until delivery of the tires, to happen in just one day. His experience from the
business should have given him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the tires,
considering that it was his first to transact with the seller of the tires and that the sellers
conduct as if he were peddling said tires on the streets.

Also, while for all practical purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is
proof of a legitimate transaction and may be raised as a defense in the charge of fencing,
this defense is disputable. Ong failed to overcome the evidence presented by the
prosecution in rebutting this presumption.

CARNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE: ELEMENTS

People v. Mallari, G.R. No. 179041, 1 April 2013.

The Supreme Court sustained Mallaris conviction for the special complex crime of
carnapping with homicide.To prove this special complex crime, there must be proof not
only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal
design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of
the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.

Mallari stole the FX taxi driven by the victim after he agreed to illegally supply his
co-accused with this type of vehicle. It was correctly found that Mallari killed the victim
in the course of the commission of the carnapping.

ESTAFA THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF A PRIVATE, PUBLIC, OR

COMMERCIAL DOCUMENT: ELEMENTS

Tanenggee, G.R. No. 179448.

The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of

committing estafa because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud
another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to
cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official, or
commercial document. In other words, the crime of falsification has already existed.

Actually utilizing that falsified public, official, or commercial document to defraud

another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the
falsification of the document. Therefore, as a special complex crime, the falsification of
the public, official, or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit estafa.

The elements of estafa are obtaining in this case. By falsely representing that the
victim requested accused Tanenggee to process purported loans on the latters behalf,
Tanenggee counterfeited or imitated the victims signature in the cashiers checks. Thus,
Tanenggee succeeded in withdrawing money from the bank. Clearly, he employed deceit
in order to take hold of the money, and misappropriated and converted it to his own
personal use and benefit, resulting to the damage and prejudice of the bank.

ESTAFA: MODES OF COMMISSION

Espino v. People, G.R. No. 188217, 3 July 2013

Article 315, paragraph 1(b) provides for the liability for estafa committed by
misappropriating or converting to the prejudice of another money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though that obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property. This is clearly
shown by the factual allegations of the Informations.

Applying these standards to this case, first, accused Espino received personal
property in the form of checks in trust or on commission, with the duty to deliver it to
another. Even though Espino misrepresented the existence of a deliverable commission, it
is a fact that he was obliged by the injured party, to deliver the check and account for it.
Second, Espino rediscounted the checks to his aunt-in-law. Third, this rediscounting
resulted in the wrongful encashment of the checks by someone who was not the payee
and therefore not lawfully authorized to do so. Finally, this wrongful encashment
prejudiced the injured party, which lost the proceeds of the check. When accounting was
demanded from the accused, he could not conjure any justifiable excuse.

ESTAFA WITH ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE: ELEMENTS

Jandusay v. People, G.R. No. 185129, 17 June 2013.

Misappropriation or conversion may be proved by the prosecution by direct evidence

or by circumstantial evidence. The failure to account upon demand, for funds or property
held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.

In the instant case, it cannot be denied that accused Jandusay, as CALAPUPATODA

treasurer, received and held money for administration of and in trust for the association.
He was thus under an obligation to turn over the same upon conclusion of his term as
treasurer. Instead, he misappropriated the money to the prejudice of the association and,
despite demand, failed to account for or return them. Such failure to account, upon
demand, of funds or property held in trust is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.

ESTAFA: ELEMENTS OF SECTION 2(D)

People v. Wagas, G.R. No. 157943, 4 September 2013

Accused Wagas placed an order for 200 bags of rice from complainant Ligaray.
Ligaray accepted Wagas proposed payment of the order by postdated check, upon the
latters assurance of his lending business and money with the bank. Upon Ligarays
deposit of the check, it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.

Wagas countered that it was a certain Canada and not him who had transacted with
Ligaray. While he admitted to receiving a letter from the prosecution regarding his
outstanding liability against Ligaray, he signed it only to accommodate the pleas of his
sister and Canada and to avoid jeopardizing Canadas application for overseas
employment.

Wagas should be acquitted here, however. It is the criminal fraud or deceit in the
issuance of a check that is punishable, not the non-payment of a debt. Prima facie
evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit
the amount necessary to cover his check within three days from receipt of the notice of
dishonor.

But, in every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself,
must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the prosecution did
not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by
issuing the check.
ESTAFA: TRUST RECEIPTS LAW

Hur Tin Yang v. People, G.R. No. 195117, 14 August 2013

The fact that the entruster bank, Metrobank in this case, knew even before the
execution of the alleged trust receipt agreements that the covered construction materials
were never intended by the entrustee, accused Yang, for resale or for the manufacture of
items to be sold would take the transaction between petitioner and Metrobank outside the
ambit of the Trust Receipts Law.

The subject transactions in the instant case are not trust receipts transactions. Thus,
the consolidated complaints for Estafa in relation to P.D. No. 115 have no leg to stand on.
The practice of banks of making borrowers sign trust receipts to facilitate collection of
loans and place them under the threats of criminal prosecution should they be unable to
pay it may be unjust and inequitable, if not reprehensible. Such agreements are contracts
of adhesion which borrowers have no option but to sign lest their loan be disapproved.
The resort to this scheme leaves poor and hapless borrowers at the mercy of banks and is
prone to misinterpretation.

BOUNCING CHECKS LAW (B.P. 22): ELEMENTS

San Mateo v. People, G.R. No. 200090, 6 March 2013.

Petitioner San Mateo issued postdated checks in partial payment of the assorted
yarns bought from ITSP International. When Sehwani deposited one of the checks, it was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds. San Mateo failed to settle her outstanding account,
despite Sehwanis requests for payment.

Relating to the second element of violation of B.P. 22, Section 2 of said law creates
the presumption that the issuer of the check has been aware of the insufficiency of funds
when he has issued a check and the bank dishonors it. This presumption, however, arises
only after it has been proved that the issuer has received a written notice of dishonor and
that, within five days from receipt thereof, has failed to pay the amount of the check or to
make arrangements for its payment.

In this case, there is no basis in concluding that San Mateo knew of the insufficiency
of her funds. While she may have requested to Sehwani to defer depositing all checks,
this did not amount to an admission that, when she issued the checks, she knew that she
would have no sufficient funds in the drawee bank to pay for them.

BIGAMY: ELEMENTS

Capili v. People, G.R. No. 183805, 3 July 2013

 All the elements of the crime of bigamy were present in this case when the
Information was filed on 28 June 2004. It is undisputed that a second marriage between
petitioner and private respondent was contracted on 8 December 1999 during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili
contracted on 3 September 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the
bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus,
the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature
does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Capili may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still
subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.

What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. Parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage
is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption that the marriage exists.

ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS: ELEMENTS

People v. Lomaque, G.R. No. 189297, 5 June 2013.

Accused Lomaque was convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness against his
stepdaughter for acts prejudicial to the childs psychological and emotional development,
and which debase, demean, and degrade her intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being.

The elements of acts of lasciviousness are:

1. that the offender commits any acts of lasciviousness or lewdness;

2. that it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age.
3. that the offended person is another person of either sex.

To obtain conviction for the same, the prosecution is bound to establish the elements
of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious

conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
 subjected to other sexual abuse; and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

Lascivious conduct is defined under Section 2 (H) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 7610 as a crime committed through the intentional touching,
either directly or through the clothing of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh or
buttocks with the intention to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade or arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of any person, among others. In this case, it is undisputed that appellant
committed lascivious conduct when he smelled the victims genital area and inserted his
finger inside her vagina to gratify or arouse his sexual desire. At the time this happened,
the victim was barely eight years old. Without a doubt, all the said elements are obtaining
in this case.

People v. Velasco, G.R. No. 190318, 27 November 2013.

The Supreme Court upheld accused Velascos conviction. The victims testimony
was made in a straightforward and convincing manner. Her testimony detailed how she
was forced and intimidated by Velasco and how the latter succeeded in molesting her by
kissing and touching her private parts, thus, satisfying the required elements of the crime
charged.

DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT: ILLEGAL SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS

People v. Linda, G.R. No. 200507, 26 June 2013; People v. Lucio, G.R. No.
191391, 19 June 2013; People v. Resurreccion, G.R. No. 188310, 13 June
2013; People v. Dumalag, G.R. No. 180514, 17 April 2013; People v. Aguilar,
G.R. No. 191396, 17 April 2013; People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 189843, 20
March 2013; People v. Adrid, G.R. No. 201845, 6 March 2013; People v.
Secreto, G.R. No. 198115, 22 February 2013; People v. Diwa, G.R. No.
194253, 27 February 2013; People v. Tapere, G.R. No. 178065, 20 February
2013; People v. Galido, G.R. No. 192231, 13 February 2013; People v. Alviz,
G.R. No. 177158, 6 February 2013; People v. Manalao, G.R. No. 187496, 6
February 2013; People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 198794, 6 February 2013;
People v. Seraspe, G.R. No. 180919, 9 January 2013; People v. Hong Yeng E,
G.R. No. 181826, 9 January 2013; People v. Somoza, G.R. No. 197250, 17
July 2013; People v. Blanco, G.R. No. 193661, 14 August 2013; People v.
Salonga, G.R. No. 194948, 2 September 2013; People v. Enriquez, G.R. No.
197550, 25 September 2013; People v. Monceda and Lai, G.R. No. 176269,
13 November 2013; People v. Spouses Gani, G.R. No. 198398, 27 November
2013; People v. Loks, G.R. No. 203433, 27 November 2013.

The elements necessary to successfully prosecute an illegal sale of drugs case are:
 1. The identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
2. The delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

It is material in this crime that the sale has actually taken place. What consummates
the buy-bust transaction is the delivery of the drugs to the poseur-buyer and, in turn, the
sellers receipt of the marked money. While the parties may have agreed on the selling
price of the shabu and delivery of the payment was intended, these do not prove
consummated sale.

People v. Aguilar, G.R. No. 191396, 17 April 2013; People v. Seraspe, G.R.
No. 180919, 9 January 2013.

When the accused is charged with the sale of such drugs, the following defenses
cannot be set up:

1. That facilities for the commission of the crime were intentionally placed in his
way;
2. That the criminal act was done at the solicitation of the decoy or the poseur-
buyer seeking to expose his criminal act; or
That police authorities feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently
assisted in its commission.

People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 182417, 3 April 2013; People v. Lagos, G.R. No.
184658, 6 March 2013.

To secure a conviction of the accused of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the

following elementsmust concur:

1. The transaction or sale took place between the accused and the poseur buyer;
and
2. The dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale is presented in court as
evidence of the corpus delicti.

As to the second element, it is indispensable for plaintiff to establish that the

dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale and subsequently examined in the
laboratory are the same dangerous drugs presented in court as evidence. The identity of
the dangerous drug is essential to prove the corpus delicti.

People v. Langcua, G.R. No. 190343, 6 February 2013.

To establish the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the material proof is that the
transaction or sale has actually taken place, coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of the corpus delicti. The commission of illegal sale merely consummates the
selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the
seller.

As long as the police officer went through the operation as a buyer, whose offer was
accepted by the seller, followed by the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the former, the
crime is already consummated.

People v. Bartolome, G.R. No. 191726, 6 February 2013.

The crime of illegal sale of shabu is committed simply when the selling transaction
has been consummated, which happens at the moment the buyer receives drugs from the
seller. In short, what is material is the proof showing that the transaction or sale has
actually taken place, coupled with the presentation in court of the thing sold as evidence
of the corpus delicti.

As in the instant case, if the police officer would go through the operation as a buyer,
the crime is consummated when the police officer makes an offer to buy that is accepted
by the accused, and there is an ensuing exchange between them involving the delivery of
the dangerous drugs to the police officer.

People v. Somoza, G.R. No. 197250, 17 July 2013.

Illegal sale of dangerous drugs is committed when the sale transaction is

consummated, that is, upon delivery of the illicit drug to the buyer and the receipt of the
payment by the seller. While the marked money may be used to prove payment, it is not
material in proving the commission of the crime. What is material is the proof that the
sale transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti, the dangerous drug subject of the sale.

DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT: ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS

People v. Lucio, G.R. No. 191391, 19 June 2013; People v. Resurreccion,

G.R. No. 188310, 13 June 2013; People v. Dumalag, G.R. No. 180514, 17
April 2013; People v. Aguilar, G.R. No. 191396, 17 April 2013; People v.
Soriano, G.R. No. 189843, 20 March 2013; Marquez v. People, G.R. No.
197207, 13 March 2013; People v. Secreto, G.R. No. 198115, 22 February
2013; People v. Diwa, G.R. No. 194253, 27 February 2013; People v. Galido,
G.R. No. 192231, 13 February 2013; Sales v. People, G.R. No. 191023, 6
February 2013; People v. Manalao, G.R. No. 187496, 6 February 2013;
People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 198794, 6 February 2013; Valleno v. People,
G.R. No. 192050, 9 January 2013; People v. Hong Yeng E, G.R. No. 181826,
9 January 2013; People v. Somoza, G.R. No. 197250, 17 July 2013; People v.
Enriquez, G.R. No. 197550, 25 September 2013.
 When prosecuting an illegal possession of dangerous drugs case, the following
elements must be established:

1. The accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a

prohibited drug;
2. Such possession is not authorized by law; and
3. The accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.

Possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or

animus possidendi, which is sufficient to convict him, unless there is a satisfactory
explanation of such possession.

People v. Quesido, G.R. No. 189351, 10 April 2013.

Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental
act of possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together
with the fact that the same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes
the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of
conviction. Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be
established beyond doubt. Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will
not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding
of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally
possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of
guilt.

DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT: TRANSPORTATION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS

People v. Laba, G.R. No. 199938, 28 January 2013.

Transport, as used under R.A. No. 9165, means to carry or convey from one place
to another. The essential element of the charge is the movement of the dangerous drug
from one place to another.

Appellant Laba was apprehended in the airport, as he had intended to board a certain
flight with a substantial amount of shabu in his possession. While it may be argued that
Laba has yet to board the aircraft or travel, it cannot be denied that his presence at the
airport at that particular instance is for the purpose of transporting or moving the
dangerous drugs from one place to another.

DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT: CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE

People v. Abdul, G.R. No. 186137, 26 June 2013; People v. Rebotazo, G.R.
 No. 192913, 13 June 2013; People v. Adrid, G.R. No. 201845, 6 March 2013;
People v. Sadidia, G.R. No. 191263, 16 October 2013.

The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it was offered in evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the
chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had
been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same.

Hence, every link the chain of custody must not show any possibility of tampering,
alteration, or substitution. But, it is accepted that a perfect chain is not the standard.

Nevertheless, two crucial links must be complied with:

1. The seized illegal drug must be marked in the presence of the accused and
immediately upon confiscation; and
2. The turnover of the seized drugs at every stagefrom confiscation from the
accused, transportation to the police station, conveyance to the chemistry lab,
and presentation to the courtmust be shown and substantiated.

People v. Quesido, G.R. No. 189351, 10 April 2013; People v. Langcua, G.R.
No. 190343, 6 February 2013; People v. Manalao, G.R. No. 187496, 6
February 2013; People v. Spouses Oniza, G.R. No. 202709, 3 July 2013;
People v. Clara, G.R. No. 195528, 4 July 2013; People v. Enriquez, G.R. No.
197550, 25 September 2013.

The prosecution must prove the following links in order to establish the chain of
custody in a buy-bust operation:

1. The seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer;
2. The turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer;
3. The turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and
4. The turnover and submission of the marked illegally drug seized by the
forensic chemist to the court.
 People v. Lucio, G.R. No. 191391, 19 June 2013; People v. Dumalag, G.R.
No. 180514, 17 April 2013; People v. Aguilar, G.R. No. 191396, 17 April
2013; People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 182417, 3 April 2013; Marquez v.
People, G.R. No. 197207, 13 March 2013; Sales v. People, G.R. No. 191023,
6 February 2013; People v. Langcua, G.R. No. 190343, 6 February 2013;
People v. Manalao, G.R. No. 187496, 6 February 2013, People v. Somoza,
G.R. No. 197250, 17 July 2013; People v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 197550, 25
September 2013; People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 190180, 27 November 2013;
People v. Loks, G.R. No. 203433, 27 November 2013.

Failure to strictly comply with the chain of custody rule under Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 will not render an arrest illegal or the items seized from the accused
inadmissible in evidence. What is crucial is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are preserved, for they will be used in determining the guilt or innocence of
the accused.

Rontos v. People, G.R. No. 188024, 5 June 2013.

In illegal drugs cases, the identity and integrity of the drugs seized must be
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that required to arrive at a finding of
guilt.

The chain of custody rule under R.A. No. 9165 is intended precisely to ensure the
identity and integrity of the dangerous drugs seized. This provision requires that upon
seizure of illegal drug items, the apprehending team having initial custody of the drugs
shall:

1. conduct a physical inventory of the drugs;

2. take photographs thereof;
3. in the presence of the person from whom these items were seized
or confiscated and;
4. a representative from the media and the Department of Justice and
any elected public official; and
5. who shall all be required to sign the inventory and be given copies
thereof.

People v. Somoza, G.R. No. 197250, 17 July 2013.

"Marking" is the placing by the apprehending officer of some distinguishing signs

with his/her initials and signature on the items seized. It helps ensure that the dangerous
drugs seized upon apprehension are the same dangerous drugs subjected to inventory and
photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station or at some other
practicable venue rather than at the place of arrest.
 People v. Dumalag, G.R. No. 180514, 17 April 2013; People v. Somoza, G.R.
No. 197250, 17 July 2013; People v. Ocfemia, G.R. No. 185383, 25
September 2013.

Consistency with the chain of custody rule requires that the marking of the seized
itemsto truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually
the ones offered in evidenceshould be done:

1. in the presence of the apprehended violator; and

2. immediately upon confiscation.

To be able to create a first link in the chain of custody then, what is required is that
the marking be made in the presence of the accused and upon immediate confiscation.
Immediate confiscation has no exact definition. Notably, previous jurisprudence has
held that testimony that includes the marking of the seized items at the police station and
in the presence of the accused is sufficient in showing compliance with the rules on chain
of custody. Marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the
nearest police station or office of the apprehending team.

People v. Octavio, G.R. No. 199219, 3 April 2013; People v. Calumbres, G.R.
No. 194382, 10 June 2013.

To be admissible in evidence, the prosecution must be able to present through

records or testimony the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the time these were
seized from the accused by the arresting officers, turned over to the investigating officer,
forwarded to the laboratory for determination of their composition, and up to the time
these were offered in evidence.

The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved, unless there is a
showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with.
Appellants bear the burden of showing that the evidence has been tampered or meddled
with in order to overcome the presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by
public officers and the presumption that public officers have properly discharged their
duties.

People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 182417, 3 April 2013.

The law on dangerous drugs pertinently provides for the chain of custody rule. The
provisions defining it obviously demand strict compliance, for only by such strict
compliance may be eliminated the grave mischiefs of planting or substitution of evidence
and the unlawful and malicious prosecution of the weak and unwary that they are
intended to prevent. Such strict compliance is also consistent with the doctrine that penal
laws shall be construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the
accused.

The first stage in the chain of custody is the marking of the dangerous drugs or
related items. Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by
the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials or signature or other
identifying signs, should be made in the presence of the apprehended violator
immediately upon arrest.

The importance of the prompt marking cannot be denied because succeeding

handlers of the dangerous drugs or related items will use the marking as reference. The
marking also operates to set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs or related items from
other materials from the moment they are confiscated until they are disposed of at the
close of the criminal proceedings, thereby forestalling switching, planting, or
contamination of evidence. Otherwise stated, the marking immediately upon confiscation
or recovery of the dangerous drugs or related items is indispensable in preserving their
integrity and evidentiary value.

People v. Adrid, G.R. No. 201845, 6 March 2013.

Coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) is likewise not
an indispensable requirement. While it is true that Section 86 of R.A. No. 9165 requires
the NBI, PNP, and the Bureau of Customs to maintain close coordination with the PDEA
on all drug-related matters, the provision does not make PDEAs participation a condition
sine qua non for every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust operation is just a form of
an in flagrante arrest sanctioned by Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, which the
police authorities may rightfully resort to in apprehending violators of R.A. No. 9165 in
support of the PDEA.

People v. Secreto, G.R. No. 198115, 22 February 2013.

In the prosecution of dangerous drugs offenses, the primary consideration is to

ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs and other related articles have
been preserved from the time they have been confiscated from the accused until their
presentation as evidence in court.

Pertinently, a buy-bust operation resulting from the tip of an anonymous confidential

informant, although an effective means of eliminating illegal drug-related activities, is
susceptible to police abuse. Worse, it is usually used as a means for extortion. It is for this
reason that procedures to counter these abuses are provided in R.A. No. 9165.

In the instant case, the Supreme Court found meritorious accused-appellant Secretos
appeal. With the requirements of the chain of custody rule not being followed, the
prosecution has the burden to prove that, despite this non-observance, the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are nonetheless preserved.
 This was not done in this case. The prosecution failed to show how SPO1 Pamor had
ensured the integrity of the seized items from time they had been entrusted to him at the
place of confiscation until the team had reached the police station, as well as until he had
handed them over to PO2 Lagmay for the marking of the sachets. The prosecution did not
likewise show to whom the confiscated articles were turned over and how they were
preserved after the laboratory examination and until their final presentation in court as
evidence of the corpus delicti. Clearly, these lapses raise doubt on the integrity and
identity of the drugs presented as evidence in court.

The prosecution also did not follow the proper marking of the seized evidence,
pursuant to the chain of custody rule. Consistency with the chain of custody rule requires
that the marking of the seized itemsto truly ensure that they are the same items that
enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidenceshould be done:

1. in the presence of the apprehended violator; and

2. immediately upon confiscation.

This step initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and
concocted searches, and of protecting as well the apprehending officers from harassment
suits based on planting of evidence under Section 29 of R.A. No. 9165 and on allegations
of robbery or theft.

People v. Alviz, G.R. No. 177158, 6 February 2013; People v. Salonga, G.R.
No. 194948, 2 September 2013.

Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals, or plant sources of dangerous drugs, or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure or confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.

Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time
when such transfer of custody was made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as
evidence, and the final disposition.

This rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It
would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was
picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was
and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was
received, and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no
change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to
have possession of the same.

People v. Nacua, G.R. No. 200165, 30 January 2013.

Sale or possession of a dangerous drug can never be proven without seizure and
identification of the prohibited drug. In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic
substance itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. The fact of its existence is
vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Of paramount importance in these cases therefore is that the identity of the

dangerous drug be likewise established beyond reasonable doubt.

There must be strict compliance with the prescribed measures to be observed during
and after the seizure of dangerous drugs and related paraphernalia, during the custody and
transfer thereof for examination, and at all times up to their presentation in court. This is
considering the unique characteristic of dangerous and illegal drugsthat is, they are
indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily susceptible to tampering, alteration, or
substitution, either by accident or otherwise.

Relating thereto, previous jurisprudence has settled that the marking of seized drugs
must be done immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is
the starting point in the custodial link; thus, it is vital that the seized contraband are
immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings
as reference.

Failure to do so suffices to rebut the presumption of regularity in the performance of

official duties and raises reasonable doubt as to the authenticity of the corpus delicti.

Valleno v. People, G.R. No. 192050, 9 January 2013; People v. Somoza, G.R.
No. 197250, 17 July 2013; People v. Ocfemia, G.R. No. 185383, 25
September 2013; People v. Spouses Gani, G.R. No. 198398, 27 November
2013.

The failure to submit the required physical inventory of the seized drugs and the
photograph, as well as the absence of a member of the media or the DOJ, does not make
the arrest of the accused illegal or the seized items inadmissible in evidence. What is of
utmost importance is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have
been preserved. These characteristics would be utilized in determining the guilt or
innocence of the accused.

People v. Spouses Oniza, G.R. No. 202709, 3 July 2013.

Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 prescribes certain procedures in keeping

custody and disposition of seized dangerous drugs like the shabu that the police
supposedly confiscated from the accused. Compliance with the law, especially the
required physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs in the presence of the
accused, the media, and responsible government functionaries, would be clear evidence
that the police had carried out a legitimate buy-bust operation.

o0o