THE DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS

CASE NO. 1
A.C. No. 7325, January 21, 2015
DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR., Complainant, v. ATTY. ISIDRO L. CARACOL,
Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint for disbarment filed by Dr. Domiciano F. Villahermosa, Sr., against Atty.
Isidro L. Caracol for deceit, gross misconduct and violation of oath under Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court.

Villahermosa is respondent in two land cases involving cancellation of emancipation patents and
transfer certificates of title, cancellation of special power of attorney and deeds of absolute sale
and recovery of ownership and possession of parcels of land derived from Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 433 which covered 23.3018 hectares of land in Valencia, Bukidnon. Counsel on
record for plaintiff was Atty. Fidel Aquino.

OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael Babela who had two sons, Fernando and
Efren. As legal heirs of Micael, Fernando received 53,298 square meters while Efren received
33,296 square meters. Subsequently, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued in their
respective names.

When the agrarian reform law was enacted on October 21, 1972, emancipation patents and titles
were issued to Hermogena and Danilo Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the program, who in turn sold
the parcels of land to complainants spouse, Raymunda Villahermosa. A deed of absolute sale
was executed in favor of Raymunda.

On March 2, 1994, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a
decision ordering the cancellation of the emancipation patents and TCTs derived from OCT No.
433 stating that it was not covered by the agrarian reform law. This decision was appealed to
and affirmed by the DARAB Central Board and the Court of Appeals.

On September 25, 2002, Atty. Caracol, as Addl Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Movant, filed a motion
for execution with the DARAB, Malaybalay, Bukidnon praying for the full implementation of the
March 2, 1994 decision.

On December 20, 2005, Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution
and Demolition which he signed as Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren Babela .

Villahermosa filed this complaint alleging that Atty. Caracol had no authority to file the motions
since he obtained no authority from the plaintiffs and the counsel of record. Villahermosa posited
that Efren could not have authorized Atty. Caracol to file the second motion because Efren had
already been dead for more than a year. He claimed that Atty. Caracols real client was a certain
Ernesto I. Aguirre, who had allegedly bought the same parcel of land. Villahermosa presented
affidavits of Efrens widow and daughter both stating that Efren never executed a waiver of rights
and that the parcel of land was sold to Villahermosa through a deed of sale. Both also stated
that they were familiar with Efrens signature. They state that the signature in the waiver was
different from his usual signature. Villahermosa averred that Atty. Caracol committed deceit and
gross misconduct.

In addition, Villahermosa claimed that Atty. Caracol introduced falsified and manufactured
evidence into the proceedings. Atty. Caracol, in introducing a document denominated as Waiver
of Rights where Efren waived all his rights in favor of Ernesto Aguirre, was able to secure the
execution of the judgment in one of the cases in favor of Ernesto Aguirre. Villahermosa also filed
a case for falsification of public document and use of falsified document against Ernesto Aguirre
and Atty. Caracol.

Atty. Caracol insists that Efren and Ernesto authorized him to appear as additional counsel. He
said that he had consulted Atty. Aquino who advised him to go ahead with the filing. Moreover,
he stated that he was not aware that there was a waiver of rights executed in Ernesto Aguirres
favor.

In its Report and Recommendation, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP CBD) found that Atty. Caracol committed deceitful acts and misconduct. It found
that respondent did not present credible evidence to controvert the allegation that he was not
authorized by plaintiff or counsel of record. Respondent admitted that at the time of the filing of
the second motion, Efren was dead. It noted that Atty. Caracol did not explain how he obtained
the authority nor did he present any proof of the authority. However, there was insufficient
evidence to hold him liable for falsification.

The IBP CBD stated that Atty. Caracol clearly misled and misrepresented to the DARAB, Region X
that he was counsel of Efren to protect the interest of Ernesto Aguirre, his real client, violating his
oath as a lawyer. It thus recommended that Atty. Caracol be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of five years.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation but modified the penalty to
one year suspension from the practice of law. Atty. Caracol moved for reconsideration but was
denied.

Atty. Caracol filed a notice of appeal which this Court returned to him since no legal fees are
required in administrative cases.

We adopt the findings of the IBP.

The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of a lawyers
appearance on behalf of his client, hence:c

SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. An attorney is presumed to be properly

authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney
is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on
motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any
attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority
under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the
person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorney
willfully appearing in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court,
may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions. (Emphases supplied)

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan Devt. Co., this Court said that while a lawyer is not
required to present proof of his representation, when a court requires that he show such
authorization, it is imperative that he show his authority to act. Thus:

A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the client. In fact, the
absence of a formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by the
counsel in his clients name. However, [a] court, on its own initiative or on motion of the other
party may require a lawyer to adduce authorization from the client.

Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a person without
being retained nor may he appear in court without being employed unless by leave of court. If an
attorney appears on a clients behalf without a retainer or the requisite authority neither the
litigant whom he purports to represent nor the adverse party may be bound or affected by his
appearance unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed authority. If a
lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for a party to a case without authority, he
may be disciplined or punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his
official transaction.

We must also take into consideration that even if a lawyer is retained by a client, an attorney-
client relationship terminates upon death of either client or the lawyer.

Here, Atty. Caracol was presumed to have authority when he appeared in the proceedings before
the DARAB. The records are unclear at what point his authority to appear for Efren was
questioned. Neither is there any indication that Villahermosa in fact questioned his authority
during the course of the proceedings.

However, Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time he filed the Motion
for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition. As an honest, prudent and
conscientious lawyer, he should have informed the Court of his clients passing and presented
authority that he was retained by the clients successors-in-interest and thus the parties may
have been substituted.

We also note the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz in People v. Mendoza where he stated:
I am bothered by the improvident plea of guilty made by accused Juan Magalop, presumably
upon the advice of his counsel, Atty. Isidro L. Caracol of the CLAO (now the PAO). It would seem
that this lawyer was less than conscientious when he advised his indigent client to admit a crime
the man did no[t] commit. As the ponencia observes, outside of his improvident plea of guilt,
there is absolutely no evidence against him presented or forthcoming. From the evidence of
the prosecution, there is no way by which Magalop could have been implicated.

It seems to me that if any one is guilty in this case, it is the PAO lawyer who, through an
incredible lack of zeal in the discharge of his duties, was apparently willing, without any moral
compunctions at all, and without proof, to consign an innocent man to prison.

The PAO is supposed to defend the accused, not to condemn them without cause. The defense
counsel in this case did not seem to appreciate this responsibility when he prodded Magalop to
plead guilty and waived the right to submit evidence in his behalf.

While this observation does not serve to exacerbate Atty. Caracols liability under the present
circumstances, we would like to highlight the important role of an attorney in our judicial
system. Because of the particular nature of an attorneys function it is essential that they should
act with fairness, honesty and candor towards the courts and his clients. Under Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:

A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

This flows out from the lawyers oath which each lawyer solemnly swears to uphold the law and
court processes in the pursuit of justice. Thus, a lawyer must be more circumspect in his
demeanor and attitude towards the public in general as agents of the judicial system.

Here, Atty. Caracol, as observed by the IBP CBD, has been less than candid about his
representation. We also observe that he has used underhanded means to attain his purpose.
Atty. Caracols blatant disregard of his duties as a lawyer cannot be countenanced. In view of his
actions of contravening his lawyers oath and in violation of Canons 8 and 10 and Rule 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility we deem it proper to suspend him from the practice of
law for a period of one year.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Isidro L. Caracol GUILTY. Accordingly, we SUSPEND

respondent Atty. Isidro L. Caracol from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective upon finality of
this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be
dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondents personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
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CASE NO. 2

A.C. No. 10135 January 15, 2014

EDGARDO AREOLA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This refers to the administrative complaint 1 filed by Edgardo D. Areola (Areola) a.k.a. Muhammad
Khadafy against Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), from the Public Attorney s Office
(PAO) for violation of her attorney s oath of office, deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct
in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In the letter-complaint dated November 13, 2006 addressed to the Honorable Commissioners,
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Areola stated that he
was filing the complaint in behalf of his co-detainees Allan Seronda, Aaron Arca, Joselito Mirador,
Spouses Danilo Perez and Elizabeth Perez. He alleged that on October 23, 2006, during Prisoners
Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the Antipolo City Jail and called all detainees with pending cases
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 73, Antipolo City where she was assigned, to attend
her speech/lecture.2 Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her speech:
"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging praktikal sana
kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang ang pera
ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay
kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa
drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon." 3
Atty. Mendoza allegedly said that as she is handling more than 100 cases, all detainees should
prepare and furnish her with their Sinumpaang Salaysay so that she may know the facts of their
cases and their defenses and also to give her the necessary payment for their transcript of
stenographic notes.4
Areola furthermore stated that when he helped his co-inmates in drafting their pleadings and
filing motions before the RTC Branch 73, Antipolo City, Atty. Mendoza undermined his capability,
to wit:
(1) Atty. Mendoza purportedly scolded detainee Seronda when she learned that the latter was
assisted by Areola in filing a Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Republic Act No. 8942 (Speedy
Trial Act of 1998) in the latters criminal case for rape, which was pending before the RTC, Branch
73, Antipolo City. She got angrier when Seronda retorted that he allowed Areola to file the motion
for him since there was nobody to help him.
(2) Areola assisted Spouses Danilo and Elizabeth Perez in filing their Joint Motion for
Consolidation of Trial of Consolidated Offenses and Joint Motion to Plead Guilty to a Lesser
Offense. The spouses were likewise scolded for relying on the Complainant and alleged that the
respondent asked for P2,000.00 to represent them.
(3) Areola helped another co-detainee, Mirador in filing an "Ex-parte Motion to Plead Guilty to a
Lesser Offense". When Atty. Mendoza learned of it, she allegedly scolded Mirador and discredited
Areola.5
In her unverified Answer6 dated January 5, 2007, Atty. Mendoza asseverated that the filing of the
administrative complaint against her is a harassment tactic by Areola as the latter had also filed
several administrative cases against judges in the courts of Antipolo City including the jail
warden of Taytay, Rizal where Areola was previously detained. These actuations show that Areola
has a penchant for filing various charges against anybody who does not accede to his demand. 7
Atty. Mendoza contended that Areola is not a lawyer but represented himself to his co-detainees
as one.8 She alleged that the motions/pleadings prepared and/or filed by Areola were not proper.
After both parties failed to appear in the Mandatory Conference set by the IBP on August 15,
2008, the Investigating Commissioner considered the non-appearance as a waiver on their part.
Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, both parties were required to submit their respective
position papers.9
On December 29, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and
Recommendation.10 The Investigating Commissioner stated that the Complainant is
knowledgeable in the field of law. While he may be of service to his fellow detainees, he must,
however, be subservient to the skills and knowledge of a full fledged lawyer. He however found
no convincing evidence to prove that Atty. Mendoza received money from Areolas co-detainees
as alleged. The charges against Atty. Mendoza were also uncorroborated, viz:
There is no convincing evidence that will prove that the respondent received money from the
inmates since the charges are uncorroborated. In fact, the complainant is not the proper party to
file the instant case since he was not directly affected or injured by the act/s being complained
of. No single affidavits of the affected persons were attached to prove the said charges. Hence, it
is simply hearsay in nature.11
Nonetheless, Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her clients and their
relatives to approach the judge and the fiscal "to beg and cry" so that their motions would be
granted and their cases against them would be dismissed. To the Investigating Commissioner,
this is highly unethical and improper as the act of Atty. Mendoza degrades the image of and
lessens the confidence of the public in the judiciary. 12 The Investigating Commissioner
recommended that Atty. Mendoza be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
months.13
In a Notice of Resolution14 dated November 19, 2011, the Board of Governors resolved to adopt
and approve the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Mendoza sought to reconsider the Resolution 15 dated November 19, 2011 but the IBP Board
of Governors denied her motion in its Resolution 16 dated May 10, 2013. The Resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors was transmitted to the Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section
12, Paragraph b17 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The Courts Ruling
After a judicious examination of the records, the Court finds that the instant Complaint against
Atty. Mendoza profoundly lacks evidence to support the allegations contained therein. All Areola
has are empty assertions against Atty. Mendoza that she demanded money from his co-
detainees.
The Court agrees with the IBP that Areola is not the proper party to file the Complaint against
Atty. Mendoza. He is not even a client of Atty. Mendoza. He claims that he filed the Complaint on
behalf of his co-detainees Seronda, Arca, Mirador and Spouses Perez, but it is apparent that no
document was submitted which would show that they authorized Areola to file a Complaint. They
did not sign the Complaint he prepared. No affidavit was even executed by the said co-detainees
to substantiate the matters Areola raised. Consequently, the Court rejects Areolas statements,
especially as regards Atty. Mendozas alleged demands of money.
The Court agrees with the observations of the Investigating Commissioner that Areola initiated
this complaint when he felt insulted because Atty. Mendoza refused to acknowledge the
pleadings and motions he prepared for his co-detainees who are PAO clients of Atty. Mendoza. 18 It
appears that Areola is quite knowledgeable with Philippine laws. However, no matter how good
he thinks he is, he is still not a lawyer. He is not authorized to give legal advice and file pleadings
by himself before the courts. His familiarity with Philippine laws should be put to good use by
cooperating with the PAO instead of filing baseless complaints against lawyers and other
government authorities. It seems to the Court that Areola thinks of himself as more intelligent
and better than Atty. Mendoza, based on his criticisms against her. In his Reply 19, he made fun of
her grammatical errors and tagged her as using carabao english 20. He also called the PAO as "Pa-
Amin Office"21 which seriously undermines the reputation of the PAO. While Areola may have
been frustrated with the way the PAO is managing the significant number of cases it deals with,
all the more should he exert efforts to utilize his knowledge to work with the PAO instead of
maligning it.
Interestingly, Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the judge and
plead for compassion so that their motions would be granted. This admission corresponds to one
of Areolas charges against Atty. Mendozathat she told her clients " Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si
Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon." Atty. Mendoza made it appear
that the judge is easily moved if a party resorts to dramatic antics such as begging and crying in
order for their cases to be dismissed.
As such, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made irresponsible
advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Rule 15.07 states
that "a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of
fairness."
Atty. Mendozas improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal system.
Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors 22
according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendozas careless remark is uncalled for.
It must be remembered that a lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice.1wphi1 To that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and
must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and
honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his clients
cause, is condemnable and unethical. 23
In spite of the foregoing, the Court deems the penalty of suspension for two (2) months as
excessive and not commensurate to Atty. Mendozas infraction. Disbarment and suspension of a
lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great
caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. 24 The Court notes
that when Atty. Mendoza made the remark "Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain
na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or malice. While her
remark was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment is not disparaging and reproachful so
as to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary.
In several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the
presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the respondents length of service, the
respondents acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family
circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, respondents advanced age, among
other things, have had varying significance in the Courts determination of the imposable
penalty.25 The Court takes note of Atty. Mendozas lack of ill-motive in the present case and her
being a PAO lawyer as her main source of livelihood. 26 Furthermore, the complaint filed by Areola
is clearly baseless and the only reason why this was ever given consideration was due to Atty.
Mendozas own admission. For these reasons, the Court deems it just to modify and reduce the
penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza GUILTY of giving
improper advice to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is accordingly meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
**************************************************************************************************

CASE NO. 3

A.C. No. 5581 January 14, 2014

ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose Bunagan-
Bansig (Bansig) against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for Gross Immoral
Conduct.
In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan
(Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the
certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila. Bansig is the sister of
Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.
However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another
marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a
certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San
Juan, Manila.
Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full
legal existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage
had never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.
Bansig alleged that respondents act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still
subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which
renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.
In a Resolution dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a
comment on the instant complaint.
Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt of the copy of the
Court's Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt No. 30639. Thus, the Court, in a
Resolution dated March 17, 2003, resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment on the
complaint against him.
On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion praying that respondent's
failure to file his comment on the complaint be deemed as a waiver to file the same, and that the
case be submitted for disposition.
On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared that an administrative
case was filed against him, he did not know the nature or cause thereof since other than Bansig's
Omnibus Motion, he received no other pleading or any processes of this Court. Respondent,
however, countered that Bansig's Omnibus Motion was merely a ploy to frighten him and his wife
from pursuing the criminal complaints for falsification of public documents they filed against
Bansig and her husband. He also explained that he was able to obtain a copy of the Court's Show
Cause Order only when he visited his brother who is occupying their former residence at 59-B
Aguho St., Project 3, Quezon City. Respondent further averred that he also received a copy of
Bansig's Omnibus Motion when the same was sent to his law office address.
Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel and her younger sister's
husband, Bansig knew his law office address, but she failed to send a copy of the complaint to
him. Respondent suspected that Bansig was trying to mislead him in order to prevent him from
defending himself. He added that Bansig has an unpaid obligation amounting to P2,000,000.00 to
his wife which triggered a sibling rivalry. He further claimed that he and his wife received death
threats from unknown persons; thus, he transferred to at least two (2) new residences, i.e., in
Sampaloc, Manila and Angeles City. He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of the complaint
and be given time to file his answer to the complaint.
In a Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish respondent
with a copy of the administrative complaint and to submit proof of such service; and (b) require
respondent to file a comment on the complaint against him.
In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a copy of the
administrative complaint was furnished to respondent at his given address which is No. 238
Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry Receipt No.
2167.
On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment despite receipt
of the complaint, the Court resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure.
On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation, reiterated that he has yet to receive a copy of
the complaint. He claimed that Bansig probably had not complied with the Court's Order,
otherwise, he would have received the same already. He requested anew that Bansig be directed
to furnish him a copy of the complaint.
Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that he be furnished a copy of
the complaint, and required Bansig to furnish a copy of the complaint to respondent.
On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation, lamented the dilatory tactics allegedly
undertaken by respondent in what was supposedly a simple matter of receipt of complaint.
Bansig asserted that the Court should sanction respondent for his deliberate and willful act to
frustrate the actions of the Court. She attached a copy of the complaint and submitted an
Affidavit of Mailing stating that again a copy of the complaint was mailed at respondent's
residential address in Angeles City as shown by Registry Receipt No. 3582.
On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the Resolution dated
July 7, 2003 despite service of copy of the complaint by registered mail.
On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause Order
dated May 16, 2005 sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subd. under Registry
Receipt No. 55621, with notation "RTS-Moved." It likewise required Bansig to submit the correct
and present address of respondent.
On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently indicated in his
correspondence with the Court No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City as
his residential address. However, all notices served upon him on said address were returned with
a note "moved" by the mail server. Bansig averred that in Civil Case No. 59353, pending before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, respondent entered his appearance as
counsel with mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon
City."
On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order dated May
16, 2005 to respondent at his new address at Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao,
Quezon City.
On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order dated May
16, 2005, for failure to file his comment on this administrative complaint as required in the
Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (a) IMPOSE upon Atty. Celera a FINE of
P1,000.00 payable to the court, or a penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if said fine is not
paid, and (b) REQUIRE Atty. Celera to COMPLY with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by filing the
comment required thereon.
In a Resolution dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent failed to comply with the
Court's Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (1) DISPENSE
with the filing by respondent of his comment on the complaint; (2) ORDER the arrest of Atty.
Celera; and (3) DIRECT the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to (a) ARREST
and DETAIN Atty. Celera for non-compliance with the Resolution dated June 30, 2008; and (b)
SUBMIT a report of compliance with the Resolution. The Court likewise resolved to REFER the
complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
However, the Return of Warrant dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M. Banawa,
Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, showed that respondent cannot be located
because neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City cannot be
located. During surveillance, it appeared that the given address, i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd.,
Cubao, Quezon City was a vacant lot with debris of a demolished building. Considering that the
given address cannot be found or located and there were no leads to determine respondent's
whereabouts, the warrant of arrest cannot be enforced.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's Resolution,
reported that as per their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View
Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.
Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings set by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several
notices. Thus, in an Order dated August 4, 2010, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of the
IBP-CBD, declared respondent to be in default and the case was submitted for report and
recommendation. The Order of Default was received by respondent as evidenced by a registry
return receipt. However, respondent failed to take any action on the matter.
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that
respondent Atty. Celera be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law.
RULING
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. The issue to be determined is whether
respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice.
Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a
complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of
respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial
evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For
the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of
the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second
marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the
certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil
Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted
marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine,
Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of
the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan,
Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998
with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent
entered into a second marriage while the latters first marriage was still subsisting. We note that
the second marriage apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage to Bunagan
which is indicative that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting at the time respondent
contracted the second marriage with Alba.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof,
are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being admissible in
evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second marriage while the first
marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates would
already have been sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages entered into by
respondent. The certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and credence given to
public documents. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates
bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he
committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member
of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly
immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondents defiant
stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its Resolution requiring
him to file his comment on the complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002. In the span of
more than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous directives for respondent's compliance, but
respondent seemed to have preselected only those he will take notice of and the rest he will just
ignore. The Court has issued several resolutions directing respondent to comment on the
complaint against him, yet, to this day, he has not submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to
have not received a copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint against
him. Ironically, however, whenever it is a show cause order, none of them have escaped
respondent's attention. Even assuming that indeed the copies of the complaint had not reached
him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is pending
before this Court which he could have easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.
The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this
case; accommodating respondent's endless requests, manifestations and prayers to be given a
copy of the complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced by numerous affidavits of
service, have relentlessly tried to reach respondent for more than a decade; sending copies of
the Court's Resolutions and complaint to different locations - both office and residential
addresses of respondent. However, despite earnest efforts of the Court to reach respondent, the
latter, however conveniently offers a mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint. When said
excuse seemed no longer feasible, respondent just disappeared. In a manner of speaking,
respondents acts were deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the
disposition of the case and to evade the consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is
apparent is respondents deplorable disregard of the judicial process which this Court cannot
countenance.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension
or disbarment. Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme
Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a
high degree of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Courts Resolution is "not to be
construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively." Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts orders "not only betrays a
recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders
which is only too deserving of reproof."
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful
orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and
good demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, guilty of
grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of
continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice
of law and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith
record it in the personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters.
SO ORDERED.
*************************************************************************************************

CASE NO. 4

FIDELA BENGCO AND TERESITA BENGCO, A.C. No. 6368

Complainants,
-versus-
ATTY. PABLO S. BERNARDO,
Respondent. June 13, 2012

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainants Fidela G. Bengco (Fidela) and Teresita N.
Bengco (Teresita) against respondent Atty. Pablo Bernardo (Atty. Bernardo) for deceit,
malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and violation of his duties and oath as a
lawyer.

The acts of the respondent which gave rise to the instant complaint are as follows:

That sometime on or about the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997, Atty. Pablo Bernardo
with the help and in connivance and collusion with a certain Andres Magat [wilfully] and illegally
committed fraudulent act with intent to defraud herein complainants Fidela G. Bengco and
Teresita N. Bengco by using false pretenses, deceitful words to the effect that he would expedite
the titling of the land belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City who are the acquaintance
of complainants herein and they convinced herein complainant[s] that if they will finance and
deliver to him the amount of [P]495,000.00 as advance money he would expedite the titling of
the subject land and further by means of other similar deceit like misrepresenting himself as
lawyer of William Gatchalian, the prospective buyer of the subject land, who is the owner of
Plastic City at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and he is the one handling William
Gatchalians business transaction and that he has contracts at NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and
REGISTER OF DEEDS which representation he well knew were false, fraudulent and were only
made to induce the complainant[s] to give and deliver the said amount ([P]495,000.00) and once
in possession of said amount, far from complying with his obligation to expedite and cause the
titling of the subject land, [wilfully], unlawfully and illegally misappropriated, misapplied and
converted the said amount to his personal use and benefit and despite demand upon him to
return the said amount, he failed and refused to do so, which acts constitute deceit, malpractice,
conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and Violation of Duties and Oath as a lawyer.
In support of their complaint, the complainants attached thereto Resolutions dated December 7,
1998 and June 22, 1999 of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sto. Tomas and
Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando,
Pampanga, respectively, finding probable cause for the filing of the criminal information against
both Atty. Bernardo and Andres Magat (Magat) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 48, charging them with the crime of Estafa punishable under
Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

The respondent was required to file his Comment. On September 24, 2004, the respondent filed
an undated Comment, wherein he denied the allegations against him and averred the following:

2. He had not deceived both complainants between the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22,
1997 for purposes of getting from them the amount of [P]495,000.00. It was Andy Magat whom
they contacted and who in turn sought the legal services of the respondent. It was Andy Magat
who received the said money from them.

3. There was no connivance made and entered into by Andy Magat and respondent. The
arrangement for titling of the land was made by Teresita N. Bengco and Andy Magat with no
participation of respondent.

4. The acceptance of the respondent to render his legal service is legal and allowed in law
practice.

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

On February 16, 2005, the IBP ordered the respondent to submit a verified comment pursuant to
Rule 139-B, Section 6 of the Rules of Court as it appeared that the respondents undated
comment filed with the Court was not verified.

On March 15, 2005, respondent through counsel requested for an additional fifteen (15) days
from March 17, 2005, or until April 1, 2005, within which to comply due to his medical
confinement.

Thereafter, on April 4, 2005, the respondent filed a second motion for extension praying for
another 20 days, or until April 22, 2005, alleging that he was still recovering from his illness.

On August 3, 2005, the case was set for mandatory conference. The respondent failed to appear;
thus, the IBP considered the respondent in default for his failure to appear and for not filing an
answer despite extensions granted. The case was then submitted for report and
recommendation.

Based on the records of the case, Investigating Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala made
the following findings:

[O]n or before the period from 15 April 1997 to 22 July 1997, respondent with the help and in
connivance and collusion with a certain Andres Magat (Magat), by using false pretenses and
deceitful words, [wilfully] and illegally committed fraudulent acts to the effect that respondent
would expedite the titling of the land belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City, who were
the acquaintance of complainants.

Respondent and Magat convinced complainants that if they finance and deliver to them the
amount of [P]495,000.00 as advance money, they would expedite the titling of the subject land.
Respondent represented himself to be the lawyer of William Gatchalian, the owner of Plastic City
located at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, who was allegedly the buyer of the subject
land once it has been titled. Respondent and Magat also represented that they have contacts at
NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and the Register of Deeds which representation they knew to be false,
fraudulent and were only made to induce complainants to give and deliver to them the amount
of [P]495,000.00. Once in possession of the said amount, far from complying with their obligation
to expedite and cause the titling of the subject land, respondent and Magat [wilfully], unlawfully
and illegally misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to their personal use
and benefit and despite demand upon them to return the said amount, they failed and refused to
do so.
In view of the deceit committed by respondent and Magat, complainants filed a complaint for
Estafa against the former before the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court, of Sto. Tomas and Minalin,
Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. In the preliminary investigation conducted by the said court, it finds
sufficient grounds to hold respondent and Magat for trial for the crime of Estafa defined under
par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The case was transmitted to the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for appropriate action as per Order dated 7
December 1998.

The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga
conducted a re-investigation of the case. During the re-investigation thereof, Magat was willing
to reimburse to complainants the amount of [P]200,000.00 because according to him the amount
of [P]295,000.00 should be reimbursed by respondent considering that the said amount was
turned over to respondent for expenses incurred in the documentation prior to the titling of the
subject land. Both respondent and Magat requested for several extensions for time to pay back
their obligations to the complainants. However, despite extensions of time granted to them,
respondent and Magat failed to fulfil their promise to pay back their obligation. Hence, it was
resolved that the offer of compromise was construed to be an implied admission of guilt. The
Asst. Provincial Prosecutor believes that there was no reason to disturb the findings of the
investigating judge and an Information for Estafa was filed against respondent and Magat on 8
July 1999 before the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga.

The failure of the lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice on several
occasions and appear on the scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting resistance to lawful
orders of the court and illustrates his despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer which
deserves disciplinary sanction x x x.

From the facts and evidence presented, it could not be denied that respondent committed a
crime that import deceit and violation of his attorneys oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility under both of which he was bound to obey the laws of the land. The commission of
unlawful acts, specially crimes involving moral turpitude, acts of dishonesty in violation of the
attorneys oath, grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of
lawyers (Rule 138, Section 27, RRC).

The misconduct complained of took place in 1997 and complainants filed the case only on 16
April 2004. As provided for by the Rules of Procedure of the Commission of Bar Discipline, as
amended, dated 24 March 2004, A complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys prescribes in two (2) years from the date of the professional misconduct (Section 1,
Rule VIII).

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that:

x x x [R]espondent ATTY. PABLO A. BERNARDO be SUSPENDED for a period of TWO YEARS

from receipt hereof from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.

On February 1, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2007-065, viz:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is hereby
ordered, the restitution of the amount of [P]200,000.00 within sixty (60) days from receipt
of notice with Warning that if he does not return the amount with in sixty days from receipt of
this Order then he will be meted the penalty of Suspension from the practice of law for one
(1) year.

On May 16, 2007, the respondent promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid
Resolution of the IBP. The respondent averred that: (1) the IBP resolution is not in accord with the
rules considering that the complaint was filed more than two (2) years from the alleged
misconduct and therefore, must have been dismissed outright; (2) he did not commit any
misrepresentation in convincing Fidela to give him money to finance the titling of the land; (3) he
was hired as a lawyer through Magat who transacted with Teresita as evidenced by a
Memorandum of Agreement signed by the latter; (4) he was denied due process when the
Investigating Commissioner considered him as in default after having ignored the representative
he sent during the hearing on August 3, 2005; and (5) he long restituted the amount of
P225,000.00 not as an offer of compromise but based on his moral obligation as a lawyer due to
Teresitas declaration that he had to stop acting as her legal counsel sometime in the third
quarter of 1997. The respondent pointed out the admission made by Fidela in her direct
testimony before the RTC that she received the amount, as evidenced by photocopies of receipts.

In an Order dated May 17, 2007 issued by the IBP, the complainant was required to comment
within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

In her Comment, Fidela explained that it took them quite some time in filing the administrative
case because they took into consideration the possibility of an amicable settlement instead of a
judicial proceeding since it would stain the respondents reputation as a lawyer; that the
respondent went into hiding which prompted them to seek the assistance of CIDG agents from
Camp Olivas in order to trace the respondents whereabouts; that the respondent was duly
accorded the opportunity to be heard; and finally, that no restitution of the P200,000.00 plus
corresponding interest has yet been made by the respondent.

On June 21, 2008, Fidela filed a Manifestation stating that the RTC rendered a decision in the
criminal case for Estafa finding the accused, Atty. Bernardo and Magat guilty of conspiracy in the
commission of Estafa under Article 315 par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code and both are
sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum.

In a Letter dated March 23, 2009, addressed to the IBP, Fidela sought the resolution of the
present action as she was already 86 years of age. Later, an Ex-parte Motion to Resolve the Case
dated September 1, 2010 was filed by the complainants. In another Letter dated October 26,
2011, Fidela, being 88 years old, sought for Atty. Bernardos restitution of the amount of
P200,000.00 so she can use the money to buy her medicine and other needs.

The Court adopts and agrees with the findings and conclusions of the IBP.

It is first worth mentioning that the respondents defense of prescription is untenable. The Court
has held that administrative cases against lawyers do not prescribe. The lapse of considerable
time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint
will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer. Otherwise, members of the bar would
only be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact
that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of
being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for.

Further, consistent with his failure to file his answer after he himself pleaded for several
extensions of time to file the same, the respondent failed to appear during the mandatory
conference, as ordered by the IBP. As a lawyer, the respondent is considered as an officer of the
court who is called upon to obey and respect court processes. Such acts of the respondent are a
deliberate and contemptuous affront on the courts authority which can not be countenanced.

It can not be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As
vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also
a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the peoples faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined whether in their
professional or in their private capacity for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty,
probity and good demeanor.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services.

There is no question that the respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admitted
in his answer that his legal services were hired by the complainants through Magat regarding the
purported titling of land supposedly purchased. While he begs for the Courts indulgence, his
contrition is shallow considering the fact that he used his position as a lawyer in order to deceive
the complainants into believing that he can expedite the titling of the subject properties. He
never denied that he did not benefit from the money given by the complainants in the amount of
P495,000.00.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money,
is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture,
and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood
should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal
interests or what they owe to themselves.

It is likewise settled that a disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a criminal action
filed against a lawyer despite having involved the same set of facts. Jurisprudence has it that a
finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the
administrative case. Conversely, the respondents acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him
administratively.

In Yu v. Palaa, the Court held that:

Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases against lawyers
belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of
criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same
facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings. Besides, it is not sound
judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer
may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on
admission to, and continuing membership in, the legal profession during the whole period that
the criminal case is pending final disposition, when the objectives of the two proceedings are
vastly disparate. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice law. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. (Citations
omitted)

As the records reveal, the RTC eventually convicted the respondent for the crime of Estafa for
which he was meted the penalty of sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision
Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum.
Such criminal conviction clearly undermines the respondents moral fitness to be a member of the
Bar. Rule 138, Section 27 provides that:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

In view of the foregoing, this Court has no option but to accord him the punishment
commensurate to all his acts and to accord the complainants, especially the 88-year old Fidela,
with the justice they utmost deserve.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is found guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice hereof.

Further, the Court ORDERS Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo (1) to RETURN the amount of P200,000.00 to
Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco within TEN (10) DAYS from receipt of this Decision and (2) to
SUBMIT his proof of compliance thereof to the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant
within TEN (10) DAYS therefrom; with a STERN WARNING that failure to do so shall merit him
the additional penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
**************************************************************************************************

CASE NO. 5
A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014
NESTOR B. FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR., Complainants, v. ATTY. DIOSDADO
B. JIMENEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review filed by Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez assailing the February 19,
2009 Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
suspending him from the practice of law for a period of six months for breach of Rule 12.03,
Canon 12, Canon 17 Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
likewise assails the June 26, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors denying his motion for
reconsideration.

The facts are as follows: c

Congressional Village Homeowners Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the affairs of the
homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon City. On January 7, 1993, the Spouses Federico
and Victoria Santander filed a civil suit for damages against the Association and Ely Mabanag
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104 for building a concrete wall
which abutted their property and denied them of their right of way. The spouses Santander
likewise alleged that said concrete wall was built in violation of Quezon City Ordinance No. 8633,
S-71 which prohibits the closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise refusing to the public or
vehicular traffic the use of or free access to any subdivision or community street. The Law Firm
of Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the legal counsel for the Association, with
respondent as the counsel of record and handling lawyer. After trial and hearing, the RTC
rendered a decision on October 4, 1996 in favor of the Spouses Santander. The Association,
represented by said law firm, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On February 5, 1999, the CA
issued a Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577 dismissing the appeal on the ground that the
original period to file the appellants brief had expired 95 days even before the first motion for
extension of time to file said brief was filed. The CA also stated that the grounds adduced for the
said motion as well as the six subsequent motions for extension of time to file brief were not
meritorious. The CA resolution became final.

Eight years later or on April 11, 2007, complainants Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr.,
as members of the Association, filed a Complaint for Disbarment against respondent before the
IBP Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his negligence
in handling the appeal and willful violation of his duties as an officer of the court.

In his Verified Answer with Counter Complaint, respondent denied administrative liability. He
claimed that although his law firm represented the homeowners association in CA-G.R. CV No.
55577, the case was actually handled by an associate lawyer in his law office. As the partner in
charge of the case, he exercised general supervision over the handling counsel and signed the
pleadings prepared by said handling lawyer. Upon discovery of the omissions of the handling
lawyer, appropriate sanctions were imposed on the handling lawyer and he thereafter personally
took responsibility and spent personal funds to negotiate a settlement with Federico Santander
at no cost to the Association. No damage whatsoever was caused to the Association.

Respondent likewise alleged that after he defeated complainant Figueras in the election for
President of the homeowners association in 1996, Figueras and his compadre, complainant
Victoria, stopped paying their association dues and other assessments. Complainants and other
delinquent members of the association were sanctioned by the Board of Directors and were sued
by the association before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In retaliation,
complainants filed the present disbarment case against him and several other cases against him
and other officers of the association before the HLURB to question, among others, the legitimacy
of the Association, the election of its officers, and the sanctions imposed by the Association.
Thus, he concluded that the disbarment case was filed to harass him. Respondent added that
complainants have no personality to file the disbarment complaint as they were not his clients;
hence, there was likewise no jurisdiction over the complaint on the part of the IBP-CBD.

As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the disbarment case for lack of
merit, the imposition of sanctions on complainants, and the payment of damages for the filing of
the baseless complaint for disbarment.

On October 3, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found respondent liable for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03 of Canon 12, Canon
17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 thereof, and recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of three to six months, with warning that a repetition of the same
or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. crallawlibrary

On February 19, 2009, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2009-14
adopting the recommendation with modifications as follows: chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution [as] Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering Respondents breach of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03 and Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for six (6) months. The Warning imposed against respondent is hereby
deleted.

Respondent sought reconsideration of the resolution but his motion was denied in IBP Resolution
No. XIX-2011-480 dated June 26, 2011. The IBP Board of Governors noted that respondents
motion was a mere reiteration of matters already discussed and there were no substantial
grounds to disturb the February 19, 2009 Resolution.

Respondent now comes to this Court essentially raising the issue whether the IBP correctly found
him administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds that the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law is proper.

The Court finds no merit in respondents contention that complainants have no personality to file
a disbarment case against him as they were not his clients and that the present suit was merely
instituted to harass him.

The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-
interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person who called
the attention of the court to a lawyers misconduct is in no sense a party, and generally has no
interest in the outcome. crallawlibrary

In Heck v. Judge Santos, the Court held that [a]ny interested person or the court motu proprio
may initiate disciplinary proceedings. The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not
confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the
alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis
for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges.

The Court agrees with the IBP that respondent had been remiss in the performance of his duties
as counsel for Congressional Village Homeowners Association, Inc. Records show that
respondent filed the first motion for extension of time to file appellants brief 95 days after the
expiration of the reglementary period to file said brief, thus causing the dismissal of the appeal
of the homeowners association. To justify his inexcusable negligence, respondent alleges that he
was merely the supervising lawyer and that the fault lies with the handling lawyer. His
contention, however, is belied by the records for we note that respondent had filed with the CA
an Urgent Motion for Extension, which he himself signed on behalf of the law firm, stating that a
previous motion had been filed but due to the health condition of the undersigned counselhe
was not able to finish said Appellants Brief within the fifteen (15) day period earlier requested by
him. Thus, it is clear that respondent was personally in charge of the case.

A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latters
interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellants brief on behalf of his client,
respondent had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly
delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the same Code also states that: chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Canon 18A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03.A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

In In Re: Atty. Santiago F. Marcos the Court considered a lawyers failure to file brief for his client
as amounting to inexcusable negligence. The Court held: chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his ability and with utmost
diligence. (Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief for his client
certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. (People vs. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The
respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as
to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice. (Canons 21
and 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; People vs. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People vs. Estocada, 43
SCRA 515).

It has been stressed that the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely
suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion. The penalties for a
lawyers failure to file a brief or other pleading range from reprimand, warning with fine,
suspension and, in grave cases, disbarment. In the present case, we find too harsh the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of six months. Under the circumstances, we deem the penalty of suspension
for one month from the practice of law to be more commensurate with the extent of
respondents violation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is found administratively liable
for violation of Rule 12.04, Canon 12 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month effective from finality
of this Resolution, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar violation shall be dealt
with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its finality, to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all the courts in the Philippines, and spread on the personal record of respondent
lawyer in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
*********************************************************************************************
*****

CASE NO. 6

A.C. No. 7360

JULY 24, 2012
ATTY. POLICARPIO I. CATALAN, v. ATTY. JOSELITO M. SIL VOSA

DECISION
This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio l. Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty. Joselito M.
Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has three causes of action against Atty. Silvosa: ( 1) Atty.
Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case for which he previously appeared
as prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros. Toribio)
for 30,000; and (3) the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case No. 27776 for
direct bribery. Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B.
Funa (Comm. Funa) held Atty. Silvosa liable only for the first cause of action and recommended
the penalty of reprimand. The Board of Governors of the IBP twice modified Comm. Funas
recommendation: first, to a suspension of six months, then to a suspension of two years.

Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as public prosecutor in
Criminal Case No. 10256-00, People of the Philippines v. SPO2 Elmor Esperon y Murillo, et al.
(Esperon case), for the complex crime of double frustrated murder, in which case Atty. Catalan
was one of the private complainants. Atty. Catalan took issue with Atty. Silvosas manner of
prosecuting the case, and requested the Provincial Prosecutor to relieve Atty. Silvosa.

In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private counsel in a
case where he previously appeared as public prosecutor, hence violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.1 Atty. Catalan also alleged that, apart from the fact that Atty. Silvosa
and the accused are relatives and have the same middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest
bias in the accuseds favor. Atty. Silvosa caused numerous delays in the trial of the Esperon case
by arguing against the position of the private prosecutor. In 2000, Provincial Prosecutor Guillermo
Ching granted Atty. Catalans request to relieve Atty. Silvosa from handling the Esperon case. The
RTC rendered judgment convicting the accused on 16 November 2005. On 23 November 2005,
Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as counsel for the accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail
pending finality of judgment of the Esperon case.
In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In a case for
frustrated murder where Atty. Catalans brother was a respondent, Pros. Toribio reviewed the
findings of the investigating judge and downgraded the offense from frustrated murder to less
serious physical injuries. During the hearing before Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio testified that, while
still a public prosecutor at the time, Atty. Silvosa offered her 30,000 to reconsider her findings
and uphold the charge of frustrated murder.

Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayans decision in
Criminal Case No. 27776, convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on 18 May 2006. Nilo Lanticse
(Lanticse) filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa before the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). Despite the execution of an affidavit of desistance by the complainant in a homicide case
in favor of Lanticses father-in-law, Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas still remained in detention
for more than two years. Atty. Silvosa demanded 15,000 from Lanticse for the dismissal of the
case and for the release of Cadinas. The NBI set up an entrapment operation for Atty. Silvosa.
GMA 7s television program Imbestigador videotaped and aired the actual entrapment operation.
The footage was offered and admitted as evidence, and viewed by the Sandiganbayan. Despite
Atty. Silvosas defense of instigation, the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa. The dispositive
portion of Criminal Case No. 27776 reads:

WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M. SILVOSA GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the
crime of direct bribery and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of:

(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, one year, one month and
eleven days of prision correccional, as minimum, up to three years, six months and twenty
days of prision correccional, as maximum;
(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php 10,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and
(C) All other accessory penalties provided for under the law. SO ORDERED.

In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa states that he resigned as prosecutor
from the Esperon case on 18 October 2002. The trial court released its decision in the Esperon
case on 16 November 2005 and cancelled the accuseds bail. Atty. Silvosa claims that his
appearance was only for the purpose of the reinstatement of bail. Atty. Silvosa also denies any
relationship between himself and the accused.

On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismisses Pros. Toribios allegations as self-serving
and purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan] and his puppeteer to pursue persecution.

On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admits his conviction by the Sandiganbayan and
is under probation, he asserts that conviction under the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code, do [sic] not involve moral turpitude since the act involved do [sic] not
amount to a crime. He further claims that it is not the lawyer in respondent that was
convicted, but his capacity as a public officer, the charge against respondent for which he was
convicted falling under the category of crimes against public officers x x x.

In a Report and Recommendation dated 15 September 2008, Comm. Funa found that:

As for the first charge, the wordings and prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility [are] quite clear. [Atty. Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal Case No. 10246-00. [Atty.
Silvosas] attempt to minimize his role in said case would be unavailing. The fact is that he is
presumed to have acquainted himself with the facts of said case and has made himself familiar
with the parties of the case. Such would constitute sufficient intervention in the case. The fact
that, subsequently, [Atty. Silvosa] entered his appearance in said case only to file a Motion to
Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still constitute a violation of Rule 6.03 as such act is
sufficient to establish a lawyer-client relation.
As for the second charge, there is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that occurred
more than seven (7) years ago. In this instance, the conflicting allegations are merely based on
the word of one person against the word of another. With [Atty. Silvosas] vehement denial, the
accusation of witness [Pros.] Toribio stands alone unsubstantiated. Moreover, we take note that
the alleged incident occurred more than seven (7) years ago or in 1999, [l]ong before this
disbarment case was filed on November 2006. Such a long period of time would undoubtedly
cast doubt on the veracity of the allegation. Even the existence of the bribe money could not be
ascertained and verified with certainty anymore.
As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly points out that herein complainant has no personal
knowledge about the charge of extortion for which [Atty. Silvosa] was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan. [Atty. Catalan] was not a party in said case nor was he ever involved in said
case. The findings of the Sandiganbayan are not binding upon this Commission. The findings in a
criminal proceeding are not binding in a disbarment proceeding. No evidence has been presented
relating to the alleged extortion case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty. Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the First Charge in
violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should be given the penalty of
REPRIMAND.
Respectfully submitted.3
In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of Comm. Funa and suspended Atty. Silvosa from
the practice of law for six months. In another Resolution dated 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of
Governors increased the penalty of Atty. Silvosas suspension from the practice of law to two
years. The Office of the Bar Confidant received the notice of the Resolution and the records of
the case on 1 March 2012.

We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first cause of action and modify its
recommendations in the second and third causes of action.

Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service. Atty. Silvosa, on the hand, relies on Rule 2.01 which provides
that A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons the cause of the defenseless or the
oppressed and on Canon 14 which provides that A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the
needy.
We agree with Comm. Funas finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he entered his
appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot
Rule 15.03 which provides that A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of facts.
Atty. Silvosas attempts to minimize his involvement in the same case on two occasions can only
be described as desperate. He claims his participation as public prosecutor was only to appear in
the arraignment and in the pre-trial conference. He likewise claims his subsequent participation
as collaborating counsel was limited only to the reinstatement of the original bail. Atty. Silvosa
will do well to take heed of our ruling in Hilado v. David:4
An attorney is employed that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or
counselor when he is listening to his clients preliminary statement of his case, or when he is
giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his clients pleadings, or advocating his
clients pleadings, or advocating his clients cause in open court.

Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client
as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to
prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest
lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles of public
policy, on good taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the
rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard.
With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesars wife, not only to keep inviolate
the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only
thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.

Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies although the
attorneys intentions were honest and he acted in good faith.

Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribios accusation of bribery and casts doubt on its veracity by
emphasizing the delay in presenting a complaint before the IBP. Comm. Funa, by stating that
there is difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of the facts with certainty, in effect agreed with
Atty. Silvosa. Contrary to Comm. Funas ruling, however, the records show that Atty. Silvosa made
an attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio and failed. Pros. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14 June 1999,
a day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then
President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There was no reason for Pros. Toribio to make false
testimonies against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the other hand, merely denied the accusation
and dismissed it as persecution. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is
not enough that he denies the charges against him. He must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and
integrity which at all times is expected of him.6 Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect.

Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an administrative complaint against a
member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses do
not prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act
complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and
bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.

We disagree with Comm. Funas ruling that the findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding
in a disbarment proceeding.

First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There can be no doubt
of the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and doings of public
officers which a citizen feels are incompatible with the duties of the office and from which
conduct the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences.8 Section 1, Rule 139-B reads:
Section 1. How Instituted. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely
the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal
knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a
Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges
against erring attorneys including those in government service.
It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the complainant in Criminal Case No. 27776, and that
Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not presented as a witness in the present case. There is
no doubt that the Sandiganbayans judgment in Criminal Case No. 27776 is a matter of public
record and is already final. Atty. Catalan supported his allegation by submitting documentary
evidence of the Sandiganbayans decision in Criminal Case No. 27776. Atty. Silvosa himself
admitted, against his interest, that he is under probation.

Second, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral
turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a
man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals. Section 27, Rule 138 provides:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis
supplied)

In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction.
Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v. COMELEC,11
we ruled:

By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of direct
bribery:
1. the offender is a public officer;
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through
another;
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a
view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his
official duty to do; and
4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the
performance of his official duties.

Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to
accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an
official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender
to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that
the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him
by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice,
honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
(Italicization in the original)

Atty. Silvosas representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing Pros. Toribio
merit at least the penalty of suspension. Atty. Silvosas final conviction of the crime of direct
bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138.
Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosas conviction of the crime. We are
constrained to impose a penalty more severe than suspension because we find that Atty. Silvosa
is predisposed to flout the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a member of
the Bar. His excuse that his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer,
is unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. The practice of
law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise this privilege.
Wherefore, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and his name ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the
Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall
be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country.

**************************************************************************************************

CASE NO. 7

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, A. C. No. 5355

Petitioner,
- versus -
ATTY. DANIEL B. LIANGCO,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
December 13, 2011

DECISION

Per Curiam:

The Case

This is an administrative Complaint for Disbarment filed by the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) against respondent Atty. Daniel B. Liangco.
In a per curiam En Banc Resolution in Gozun v. Hon. Liangco, dated 30 August 2000, this Court
ordered the dismissal from service of respondent as judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
San Fernando, Pampanga and as acting judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga. His dismissal was with forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and
accumulated leave credits; and with prejudice to his reinstatement or reemployment in any
branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned or -controlled
corporations. The Court further directed the OCA to initiate disbarment proceedings against him
for misconduct as a member of the bar. Hence, this present case for resolution by the Court.

The Facts

We quote the facts as stated in A. M. No. MTJ-97-1136, as follows:

Complainant Hermogenes T. Gozun (hereinafter referred to as Gozun) was in open and adverse
possession of subject land for a period of more than thirty years. His familys house was erected
on the land. The house was made of old vintage lumber, cement, hollow blocks, G. I. sheet
roofing and other strong materials. Gozun inherited the house and lot from his parents.

The municipality of San Luis, Pampanga claimed to own the same lot.

On January 12, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga issued Resolution No. 26-
96, stating:

RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga do
hereby consider (sic) the lot under Tax Dec. No. 114 owned by the Municipal Government of San
Luis, Pampanga, specifically the lot where Mr. Hermogenes Gozun and family were squatting ( sic)
as the new site of the Rural Health Center will rise (sic).

On May 17, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan issued Resolution No. 34-96 to amend the correct
Resolution No. 26-96.
On May 24, 1996, Romulo M. Batu, Vice Mayor, on behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan, filed with
the MTC, San Luis, Pampanga, a petition for declaratory relief. We quote the petition:

PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF

THE HONORABLE JUDGE DANIEL LIANGCO

In behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, We would like to petition your good
office to render legal opinion on the following matters, to wit:

1. The validity of the attached Resolution.

2. The powers of the Municipal Mayor to enforce said Resolution.

3. To issue an order to the PNP to assist the Municipal Mayor in implementing said Resolution.

These request are (sic) in connection with our plan to construct a new site for the Rural Health
Center of San Luis, Pampanga. However, the designated place thereof is presently being
squatted (sic) by a certain Mr. Hermogenes Gozun and inspite of the official notice of Atty. Benlfre
S. Galang, our Provincial Legal Officer, and personal request of our Municipal Mayor Jovito C.
Bondoc to Mr. Gozun to vacate his (sic) premises, he continues to defy such notices and request
to the detriment of the proposed project.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this petition will merit your favorable consideration
and appropriate action for the sake of public interest.

On the very same day, May 24, 1996, respondent judge issued a resolution, reasoning: First, the
municipality of San Luis, Pampanga through its Sangguniang Bayan may enact resolutions and
ordinances to regulate the use of property within its jurisdiction. Second, Resolution No. 34-96 is
not contrary to law, morals and public policy. Third, the municipal mayor through an executive
order may order the Philippine National Police or any government law enforcement agency to
enforce or implement the resolution, using reasonable force if necessary and justified. Fourth,
squatting in government property is considered a nuisance per se. Respondent judge ruled:

With the issuance by the Municipal Mayor of an executive order, the municipality of San Luis may
order the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in San Luis, Pampanga to effect the eviction
of Hermogenes Gozun and all other persons who may be claiming any right under him from Lot
No. 114 covered by tax Declaration No. 6030 (underscoring ours).

Again, on the same day, March 24, 1996, the municipal mayor, Jovito C. Bondoc, pursuant to the
aforequoted resolution, issued Executive Order No. 1, series of 1996, ordering the PNP to
implement Resolution No. 34-96.

Note that complainant Gozun was not served with summons or given notice of the petition for
declaratory relief.

On June 2, 1996, complainant Gozun learned about the resolution.

On June 3, 1996, complainant Gozuns wife together with other public school teachers went to the
office of the respondent judge. When asked about the resolution, respondent judge answered,
Ing Apung Guinu yu y Mayor Bondoc at kaya ko makisabi (Your God is Mayor Bondoc and you
should talk to him).

On August 8, 1996, agents of the municipal government demolished complainant Gozuns house,
using respondent judges resolution and the mayors executive order as basis.

On December 18, 1996, complainant Gozun filed this administrative complaint with the Office of
the Court Administrator. He averred that respondent judges issuance of the resolution amounts
to gross misconduct, gross inefficiency and incompetence. Complainant Gozun further accused
the municipal mayor of having bribed respondent judge. Mayor Bondoc told complainant Gozun
that the respondent judge is in his pocket because he (Mayor Bondoc) has given him (respondent
judge) a lot of things (dacal naku a regalo kaya).

On January 20, 1997, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted the petition to this Court for
its consideration, recommending that the complaint be given due course.
On March 21, 1997, the Court resolved to require respondent judge to comment thereon, within
ten (10) days from notice.

On May 15, 1997, respondent judge submitted his comment, denying the charges and urging
that the case be dismissed.

On June 23, 1997, we referred the case back to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation.

On April 13, 2000, after investigation, Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo submitted a
memorandum, recommending the dismissal from office of respondent judge.

A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136

Dismissal of Respondent from the Bench

The OCA Resolution was forwarded to this Court for evaluation and action and docketed as A.M.
No. MTJ-97-1136. On 30 August, 2000, the Court En Banc promulgated a per curiam Resolution
adopting the report and recommendation of the Court Administrator. It ruled that respondent had
blatantly ignored the basic rules of fair play, in addition to acting without jurisdiction in
entertaining a Petition for Declaratory Relief despite his being a judge of a first-level court. Court
also pointed out that his ruling on the said Petition resulted in the demolition of the house of
complainant Gozun, thus rendering his family homeless. It described respondents acts as biased
and maleficent and ruled that those acts merited the punishment of dismissal from the service,
viz:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby orders the DISMISSAL of respondent Judge Daniel B.
Liangco, Municipal Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga, and Acting Judge
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga, from the service, with forfeiture
of all retirement benefits and accumulated leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to
reinstatement or reemployment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.

The Court directs the Court Administrator to initiate disbarment proceedings against respondent
Judge for misconduct as a member of the bar within thirty (30) days from finality of his decision.

This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5355

Disbarment

On 10 November 2000, the OCA filed a Complaint for Disbarment against respondent. In its
Complaint dated 06 November 2000, docketed as Administrative Case No. (A.C.) 5355, the OCA
charged him with gross misconduct for acting with manifest bias and partiality towards a party,
as well as for inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of procedure that challenged his
competence to remain a member of the legal profession. Thus, it prayed that he be disbarred,
and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

On 28 November 2000, the Court En Banc promulgated a Resolution requiring respondent to file
his Comment on the Complaint for Disbarment against him. On 01 June 2001, he filed his
Comment on/Answer to Complaint for Disbarment, appealing for understanding and asking that
the Court allow him to continue practicing as a lawyer. He reasoned that when he acted on the
Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Luis,
Pampanga, he was merely rendering a legal opinion honestly and in good faith; and that his
actions were not attended by malice, bad faith or any other ulterior motive. He further pleads for
compassion from this Court and for permission to remain a member of the bar, because the
practice of law is his only means of livelihood to support his family.

On 07 August 2001, the Court En Banc noted the submission of respondent and referred the case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within
ninety (90) days from receipt of the records of the case. [

IBPs Report and Recommendation

The IBP held a series of hearings on the disbarment case with respondents participation. On 03
October 2003, the investigating commissioner issued her Report and Recommendation finding
justification for the disbarment of respondent and recommending that his name be struck off the
Roll of Attorneys. The investigating commissioner found that, based on the facts of the case,
there was clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence to warrant the disbarment of respondent.
She observed that he had exhibited lapses, as well as ignorance of well-established rules and
procedures. She also observed that the present Complaint was not the first of its kind to be filed
against him. She further noted that before his dismissal from the judiciary, respondent was
suspended for six (6) months when he assigned to his court, without a raffle, fifty-four (54) cases
for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1602 a violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated 23
September 1974. Also, pending with the Supreme Court were three (3) administrative cases filed
against him for dishonesty, gross ignorance of the law, and direct bribery. In the bribery case, he
was caught by the National Bureau of Investigation in an entrapment operation.

On 30 January 2009, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP. He alleged that the evidence presented in the proceedings for his
dismissal as judge was the same as that which was used in the disbarment case against him.
Thus, because he did not have the chance to cross-examine the witnesses, he claimed to have
been deprived of due process. In addition, respondent emphasized the submission by Gozun of
an Affidavit of Desistance from the Complaint the latter had originally filed against him and
contended that the case should have been dismissed. Lastly, respondent averred that he had
endeavored to improve himself as a devout Catholic by joining religious organizations. He also
impressed upon the IBP his effort to improve on his knowledge of the law by attending
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

On 12 May 2009, respondent filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration wherein he

implored the IBP to take a second look at his case. He emphasized the submission by Gozun of
an Affidavit of Desistance and the fact that the former had already suffered the supreme penalty
of dismissal as MTC judge. Respondent also reiterated the grounds already stated in his first
Motion for Reconsideration.

On 09 October 2008, the IBP board of governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-525, which
adopted the Report and Recommendation of the investigating commissioner, who found that
respondent had acted with manifest bias and partiality in favor of a party-litigant and shown
inexcusable ignorance of the Rules of Procedure. The Resolution likewise adopted the
recommendation to disbar respondent.

On 30 June 2011, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted the case records of A. C. No.
5355 to this Court, which noted it on 16 August 2011.
The Courts Ruling

The Court affirms in toto the findings and recommendations of the IBP.

The evidence on record overwhelmingly supports the finding that respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct and inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of procedures.

Gross Misconduct

In Sps. Donato v. Atty. Asuncion, Jr. citing Yap v. Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr., this Court
explained the concept of gross misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful
conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct
prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive
behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.

In the case at bar, respondent acted upon the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, without the mandatory notice to Gozun who would
be affected by the action. The records show that respondent, upon receipt of the Petition, had it
docketed in his court, designated Gozun as respondent in the case title, and quickly disposed of
the matter by issuing a Resolution all on the same day that the Petition was filed without notice
and hearing. Respondent admitted that, to his mind, he was merely rendering a legal opinion at
the local governments behest, which he gladly and expeditiously obliged. Without denying this
fact in his Comment, he admitted that he had erred in acting upon the Petition, but emphasized
that his actions were not attended by malice or bad faith.
We find his statements hard to believe.

The undue haste with which respondent acted on the Petition negates good faith on his part.
Moreover, the testimonial evidence on record indicates that he maintained close relations with
the municipal vice-mayor of San Luis, Pampanga, a party-litigant who had an obvious interest in
the outcome of the case. The testimony of Romulo A. Batu, former vice-mayor of San Luis,
Pampanga, showed that respondent denigrated his impartiality as a judge is as follows:

COMM. SANSANO: You dont remember therefore that at any time at all you were with the mayor
in going to see the respondent?

WITNESS: (Mr. Batu) I do not know any instance that the mayor visited the respondent, Your
Honor. I do not know any instance that I was with him.

COMM. SANSANO: But other than the occasion of the filing of this request there were times when
you went to see the respondent also in his office?

WITNESS: There was no other visit, Your Honor.

COMM. SANSANO: So May 24, 1996 was the first time you went to see him in his office?

WITNESS: Before that, Your Honor, nagpupunta na kami doon kung minsan may nagpapatulong
na mga may kaso.

COMM. SANSANO: Yon ang tanong ko kanina sa iyo kung bago May 24 pumupunta ka na sa
opisina niyang datihan?

WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor.

The testimony of respondents own witness clearly showed his wanton disregard of Canon 1,
Sections 4 and 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which requires
the observance of judicial independence and its protection from undue influence, whether from
private or from public interests.
In Edao v. Judge Asdala, we explained the rationale behind this imposition:
As the visible representation of the law and justice, judges, such as the respondent, are expected
to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance the respect and confidence of the people
in the judicial system. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates
that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must
also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the peoples faith in the
judiciary. Integrity and impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof, are deemed essential not
just in the proper discharge of judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor of judges. This
standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is
made. Section 1, Canon 2, specifically mandates judges to ensure that not only is their conduct
above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of reasonable observers. Clearly, it is
of vital importance not only that independence, integrity and impartiality have been observed by
judges and reflected in their decisions, but that these must also appear to have been so
observed in the eyes of the people, so as to avoid any erosion of faith in the justice system.
Thus, judges must be circumspect in their actions in order to avoid doubt and suspicion in the
dispensation of justice. To further emphasize its importance, Section 2, Canon 2 states:

Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the
judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

As early as June 6, 2003, OCA Circular No. 70-2003 has directed judges as follows:

In view of the increasing number of reports reaching the Office of the Court Administrator that
judges have been meeting with party litigants inside their chambers, judges are hereby
cautioned to avoid in-chambers sessions without the other party and his counsel present, and to
observe prudence at all times in their conduct to the end that they only act impartially and with
propriety but are also perceived to be impartial and proper.

Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the
decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made. As such, judges must
ensure that their conduct, both in and out of the court, maintains and enhances the confidence
of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the
judiciary. In the same vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct behooves all judges to avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities, as such is essential to the performance
of all the activities of a judge in order to maintain the trust and respect of the people in the
judiciary.

Also relevant is Canon 3, particularly Section 2 of the new code, which exhorts judges not only to
be impartial in deciding the cases before them, but also to project the image of impartiality.
Unfortunately, as shown by the facts of the case, these rules were not properly observed by
respondent as a judge of a first-level court.

Inexcusable Ignorance of the Law

We are appalled by respondents ignorance of the basic rules of procedure. His wanton use of
court processes in this case without regard for the repercussions on the rights and property of
others clearly shows his unfitness to remain a member of the bar.

A cursory look at the Resolution dated 24 May 1996 issued by respondent would prompt an
ordinary person to conclude that an action in the form of a Petition for Declaratory Relief was
indeed filed, because it bears the name and the branch of the court of law that issued it. It had a
docket number and the names of the parties involved. The Resolution even states the justiciable
question to be resolved and accordingly makes a judicial determination thereof. In reality,
though, there was no notice sent to Gozun, the named respondent in the Petition; nor was a
hearing held to thresh out the issues involved. As far as respondent was concerned, he simply
issued a legal opinion, but one with all the hallmarks of a valid issuance by a court of law,
despite the absence of mandatory processes such as notice especially to Gozun and hearing.
Even this excuse is unacceptable. Judges do not, and are not allowed, to issue legal opinions.
Their opinions are always in the context of judicial decisions, or concurring and dissenting
opinions in the case of collegiate courts, and always in the context of contested proceedings.

What is most unfortunate is that the Sanguniang Bayan, relying on the Resolution respondent
issued, caused the demolition of the house of Gozun and his family, who were thus ejected from
the property they had been occupying for decades. In effect, Gozun was deprived of his property
without due process. To us, this is precisely the injustice that members of the bench and the bar
are sworn to guard against. Regrettably, respondent as judge was even instrumental in its
commission. When his liability for his act was invoked, he casually justifies them as honest
mistakes not attended by malice or bad faith. His justification is unacceptable to us.

As a member of the bar and former judge, respondent is expected to be well-versed in the Rules
of Procedure. This expectation is imposed upon members of the legal profession, because
membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate for public service of the highest order.
Lawyers are oath-bound servants of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible
norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and
justice, for which they have sworn to be fearless crusaders. [
As judge of a first-level court, respondent is expected to know that he has no jurisdiction to
entertain a petition for declaratory relief. Moreover, he is presumed to know that in his capacity
as judge, he cannot render a legal opinion in the absence of a justiciable question. Displaying an
utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he in effect erodes the publics confidence in the
competence of our courts. Moreover, he demonstrates his ignorance of the power and
responsibility that attach to the processes and issuances of a judge, and that he as a member of
the bar should know.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer must uphold the
Constitution and promote respect for the legal processes. Contrary to this edict, respondent
malevolently violated the basic constitutional right of Gozun not to be deprived of a right or
property without due process of law.

Under Canon 10, Rule 10.03, respondent as lawyer is mandated to observe the Rules of
Procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. In this case, however, the
opposite happened. Respondent recklessly used the powers of the court to inflict injustice.

Should the misconduct of respondent as judge also warrant his disbarment from the legal
profession? We answer in the affirmative.

In Collantes v. Renomeron, we ruled therein that the misconduct of the respondent therein as a
public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer:

As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:

"A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon him
his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an officer of the court on whose shoulders rest the
grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration
of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his
every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has
given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase
Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor,
full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility - all of
which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as 'moral character.'

xxx xxx xxx

"A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession." (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.)

This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may
practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue
"only the highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150
SCRA 269, 278).

Recently, in Samson v. Judge Caballero, we ruled that because membership in the bar is an
integral qualification for membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects the
latters moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also
violates the lawyers oath.

We note that on 25 August 2011, respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-525 dated 09 October 2008 promulgated by the IBP board of
governors, which adopted and approved the findings of the investigating commissioner
recommending his disbarment. Respondent alleged therein that he had served as assistant
provincial prosecutor in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for thirteen (13)
years prior to his dismissal as MTC judge of San Luis, Pampanga and as acting MCTC judge of
Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga. He also complains that he was deprived of due process by the IBP
board of governors when it approved and adopted the findings of the investigating commissioner
recommending his disbarment; and he prays for a second look at his case, considering the
withdrawal of the Complaint originally filed by Gozun.

In the light of our ruling in this case, we can no longer consider the undocketed Petition for
Review on Certiorari filed by respondent. In the first place, such kind of petition is not available to
assail the resolution of the IBP in an administrative case. His remedies from an adverse
resolution is to seek a reconsideration of the same, and when denied, to raise the same defenses
against administrative liability before this Court. He has availed of both remedies in this case.

Disbarment proceedings are sui generis. As such, they render the underlying motives of
complainant unimportant and of little relevance. The purpose of disbarment proceedings is
mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court and as
participant in the dispensation of justice an issue which the complainants personal motives have
little relevance. For this reason, upon information of an alleged wrongdoing, the Court may
initiate the disbarment proceedings motu proprio.

Recently in Garrido v. Atty. Garrido, we reiterated the unique characteristic of disbarment

proceedings and their purpose in this wise:

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and
prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of
desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyers qualifications and
fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart
from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of
justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission
qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law.
Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal
cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In this
sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome
of the charge is wholly his or her own; effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who
brought the matter to the attention of the Court.

Thus, despite Gozuns desistance in A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136, from whence this case originated,
respondent is not exonerated.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to DISBAR Atty. Daniel B. Liangco for the following offenses:

1. GROSS MISCONDUCT in violation of Canon 1, Sections 4 and 5 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
 2. INEXCUSABLE IGNORANCE OF THE LAW in violation of Canons 1 and 10, Rule 10.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Daniel B. Liangco in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Bar Confidant is hereby directed to strike out the name of Daniel B. Liangco from the Roll of
Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

DISCIPLINE OF FILIPINO LAWYERS PRACTICING ABROAD

CASE NO. 1

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, A.C. No. 6697

Complainant,
versus -
ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA,
Respondent.
x-------------------------x
RE: OATH-TAKING OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA,
INCOMING PRESIDENT OF THE INTEGRATED BAR
OF THE PHILIPPINES
x-------------------------x
IN THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF ATTY.
LEONARD S. DE VERA FROM THE IBP BOARD OF Bar Matter No. 1227
GOVERNORS AS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND
GOVERNOR

IN THE MATTER OF THE LETTER-COMPLAINT OF

ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA DATED MAY 18, 2005
TO FORTHWITH DENY/DISAPPROVE THE IBP
RESOLUTION UNJUSTLY, ILLEGALLY, ARBITRARILY,
AND ABRUPTLY REMOVING HIM FROM THE BOARD A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC
OF GOVERNORS OF THE IBP FOR ABSOLUTE LACK
OF BASIS AND FOR FLAGRANT DENIAL OF DUE Promulgated:
PROCESS.
July 25, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
Per Curiam:

Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The first pertains to a
disbarment case questioning Atty. de Veras moral fitness to remain as a member of the Philippine
Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Veras letter-request to schedule his oath taking as IBP National
President, and the third case concerns the validity of his removal as Governor and EVP of the IBP
by the IBP Board. The resolution of these cases will determine the national presidency of the IBP
for the term 2005-2007.
A.C. No. 6697
The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an investigation, report and
recommendation on subject case, summarized the antecedents thereof as follows:

In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the suspension
and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following grounds:

1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against

him by the State Bar of California; and
2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule enunciated in Administrative Matter
No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).

Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his
client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the Hearing Referee
Bill Dozier, Hearing Department San Francisco, State Bar of California in Administrative Case No.
86-0-18429. Complainant alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his
license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year
suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to
lead the countrys most noble profession.

Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-called rotation rule
provided for in Administrative Matter No. 491 when he transferred to IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter.
He claimed that the respondent failed to meet the requirements outlined in the IBP By-Laws
pertaining to transfer of Chapter Membership. He surmised that the respondents transfer was
intended only for the purpose of becoming the next IBP National President. Complainant prayed
that the respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President.

Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the issues raised in
above-mentioned Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier administrative case filed by
the same complainant against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were already
extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11
December 2005 in Administrative Case No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De
Vera). Respondent prayed that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the
principle of res judicata.

On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar Confidant for presentation of
evidence in support of their respective allegations.

Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant maintained that there is

substantial evidence showing respondents moral baseness, vileness and depravity, which could
be used as a basis for his disbarment. Complainant stressed that the respondent never denied
that he used his clients money. Complainant argued that the respondent failed to present
evidence that the Supreme Court of California accepted the latters resignation and even if such
was accepted, complainant posited that this should not absolve the respondent from liability.

Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar.
He asserted that the first administrative case filed against the respondent was one for his
disqualification. x x x.

Bar Matter No. 1227

A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC

As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Veras letter-request to this Court to
schedule his oath taking as IBP National President. A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, on the other hand, is a
letter-report dated 19 May 2005 of IBP National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (IBP President
Cadiz) furnishing this Court with the IBPs Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, removing Atty. De Vera
as member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP, for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board and
the IBP in general.

The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the regular meeting
of the IBP Board of Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said meeting, by 2/3 vote (6 voting in
favor and 2 against), the IBP Board approved the withdrawal of the Petition filed before this Court
docketed as Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the
Philippines, et al. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, SC-R165108. The Petition was intended to
question the legality and/or constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9227, authorizing the increase in
the salaries of judges and justices, and to increase filing fees.

The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of the above-
described Petition were herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and Governor Carlos L.
Valdez.

On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision taken by the IBP
Board to withdraw the afore-mentioned Petition. Attached to his letter was a copy of the IBP
Boards 14 January 2005 Resolution.

On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Veras request for oathtaking as
National President, was filed. The same was subsequently consolidated with A.C. No. 6697, the
disbarment case filed against Atty. de Vera.

On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10 th National IBP Convention at the CAP-
Camp John Hay Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at this forum where Atty. de Vera allegedly
made some untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in connection with the IBP Boards
Resolution to withdraw the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227.

On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining Atty. de Vera
from assuming office as IBP National President.

On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz a letter wherein
he prayed for the removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board for having committed acts
which were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP.

On 13 May 2005, in the 20 th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront Hotel, Cebu
City, the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board of
Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President. Quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of
said Resolution:

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that Governor Leonard S. de

Vera is REMOVED as a member of the IBP Board of Governors and Executive Vice President for
committing acts inimical to the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP, to wit:

1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in public about the Supreme
Court and members of the IBP Board of Governors, during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10 th
National Convention of Lawyers, held at CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center on 22 April 2005,
making it appear that the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to withdraw the PETITION
docketed as Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. The Senate of the
Philippines, et al., Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer for the Issuance of A
Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, S.C.-R. 165108, was due to
influence and pressure from the Supreme Court of the Philippines;

2. For making said untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies that brought the IBP Board
of Governors and the IBP as a whole in public contempt and disrepute;

3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers which mandates
that A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others, by making untruthful statements, innuendos and
blatant lies during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10 th National Convention of Lawyers in Baguio
City;

4. For instigating and provoking some IBP chapters to embarrass and humiliate the IBP Board of
Governors in order to coerce and compel the latter to pursue the aforesaid PETITION;

5. For falsely accusing the IBP National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, during the Plenary
Session of the 10th National Convention in Baguio City of withholding from him a copy of Supreme
Court Resolution, dated 25 January 2005, granting the withdrawal of the PETITION, thereby
creating the wrong impression that the IBP National President deliberately prevented him from
taking the appropriate remedies with respect thereto, thus compromising the reputation and
integrity of the IBP National President and the IBP as a whole.

On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon. Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter captioned as Urgent Plea to Correct a Glaring Injustice of the
IBP Board of Governors; Vehement Protest to the Board Resolution Abruptly Removing Atty.
Leonard de Vera from the Board of Governors in Patent Violation of Due Process; Petition to
Deny/Disapprove the Completely Unjustified and Highly Arbitrary Resolution Precipitately Ousting
Atty. de Vera from the Board of Governors in Less Than Twenty Four (24) Hours from Notice and
Judgment Without Formal Investigation.

In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied having committed acts inimical
to the IBP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter-complaint filed by IBP
Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him posthaste, without just cause and in complete
disregard of even the minimum standards of due process. Pertinent portions of his letter read:

It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a grave and serious injustice against me
especially when, as the incumbent Executive Vice President of the IBP, I am scheduled to assume
my position as National President of the IBP on July 1, 2005. x x x

I was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized by the Supreme Court even in
administrative cases:

1. The denial of the right to answer the charges formally or in writing. The complaint against me
was in writing.
2. The denial of the right to answer the charges within a reasonable period of time after receipt
of the complaint.
3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.
4. The denial of the right to confront the accuser and the witnesses against me. I challenged
Gov. Rivera to testify under oath so I could question him. He refused. I offered to testify under
oath so I could be questioned. My request was denied.
5. The denial of my right to present witnesses on my behalf.
6. The denial of my right to an impartial judge. Governor Rivera was my accuser, prosecutor,
and judge all at the same time.
7. Gov. Riveras prejudgment of my case becomes even more evident because when his motion
to expel me was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to his inhibition to vote), Gov. Rivera asked for another
round of voting so he can vote to support his own complaint and motion to expel me (Emphasis
and underscoring in original.)

On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de Vera. In their
Reply, the IBP Board explained to this Court that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera was based
on valid grounds and was intended to protect itself from a recalcitrant member. Among the
grounds cited and elucidated by the IBP Board were the following:

(i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media campaign and solicited resolutions from
IBP Chapters to condemn the IBP Board of Governors for its decision to withdraw the PETITION,
all with the end in view of compelling or coercing the IBP Board of Governors to reconsider the
decision to withdraw the PETITION.
 (ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP
National President in public or during the Plenary Session at the 10 th National Convention of
Lawyers.
(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated solicited speakers (at the plenary session), Atty. de
Vera fanned the fire, so to speak, and went to the extent of making untruthful statements,
innuendos and blatant lies about the Supreme Court and some members of the IBP Board of
Governors. He deliberately and intentionally did so to provoke the members of the IBP Board of
Governors to engage him in an acrimonious public debate and expose the IBP Board of
Governors to public ridicule.
(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies, e.g., that some of
the members of the IBP Board of Governors voted in favor of the withdrawal of the petition
(without mentioning names) because nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme Court, nakakaawa kasi ang
Supreme Court, kasi may mga kaibigan tayo sa Court. He made it appear that the IBP Board of
Governors approved the resolution, withdrawing the petition, due to influence or pressure from
the Supreme Court.

The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Veras actuation during the Plenary Session was the last
straw that broke the camels back. He committed acts inimical to the interest of the IBP Board
and the IBP; hence, the IBP Board decided to remove him.

On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and a position paper
coming from various IBP Chapters all condemning his expulsion from the IBP Board and as IBP
EVP.

On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a special meeting of
the IBP Board held at the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005, the IBP Board took note of the
vacancy in the position of the IBP EVP brought about by Atty. de Veras removal. In his stead, IBP
Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected and declared as IBP EVP.

On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty. Santiago. On 20 June 2005,
Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP position through a letter addressed to the IBP
Board. Thus, on 25 June 2005, during its last regular meeting, the IBP Board elected a new EVP in
the person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar to replace Atty. Santiago.

On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to Chief Justice
Davide, reported to this Court Atty. Salazars election. IBP National President Cadiz also
requested, among other things, that Atty. Salazars election be approved and that he be allowed
to assume as National President in the event that Atty. de Vera is disbarred or suspended from
the practice of law or should his removal from the 2003-2005 Board of Governors and as EVP is
approved by this Court. Also on 28 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested the election of Atty.
Salazar.

In his Extended Comment dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera maintained that there was absolutely
no factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the IBP Board because he
violated no law. He argued that if the basis for his removal as EVP was based on the same
grounds as his removal from the IBP Board, then his removal as EVP was likewise executed
without due notice and without the least compliance with the minimum standards of due process
of law.

Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious charges filed
against him, the speakers at the Plenary Session of the Baguio Convention, although undeniably
impassioned and articulate, were respectful in their language and exhortations, not once
undermining the stature of the IBP in general and the IBP Board of Governors in particular. He
posited that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during the Conventions
Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board
of Governors; and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or
the right to dissent is not recognized by the incumbent IBP Board.

Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy of this Courts
Resolution granting the withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No.
9227, Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such remarks. As regards the election of a new IBP
EVP, Atty. de Vera contended that the said election was illegal as it was contrary to the provisions
of the IBP By-Laws concerning national officers, to wit:

Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a
term of two years from July 1 following their election until 30 June of their second year in office
and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.
In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be performed
by the Executive Vice President, and in the event of death, resignation, or removal of the
President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President for the unexpired portion
of the term. In the event of death, resignation, removal or disability of both the President and the
Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office for
the unexpired portion of the term or during the period of disability.

Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees appointed by the
President with the consent of the Board shall hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such
term as the Board may fix.

To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President and the EVP die,
resign, are removed, or are disabled, the IBP By-Laws only provides for the election of an Acting
President and that no mention for an election for EVP was made. Thus, when such election for
EVP occurs, such is contrary to the express provision of the IBP By-Laws.

Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his replacement
should come from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region, due to the Rotation Rule
embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws.

In response to Atty. de Veras averments, the 2003-2005 IBP Board, through its counsel,
submitted a Reply dated 27 January 2006 and clarified as follows:

i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from
an intractable member by virtue of Article VI, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws;
ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP not because of his
disagreement with the IBP Boards position but because of the various acts that he committed
which the IBP Board determined to be inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP as a whole;
iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking his constitutional right to
Free Speech because, as a member of the Bar, it is his sworn duty to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by others;
iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera, observed the fundamental principles
of due process. As the records would bear, Atty. de Vera was duly notified of the Regular Meeting
of the IBP Board held on 13 May 2004; was furnished a copy of Governor Riveras Letter-
Complaint the day before the said meeting; was furnished a copy of the said Meetings Agenda;
and was allowed to personally defend himself and his accuser, Gov. Rivera;
v). de Vera was validly removed because the required number of votes under Section 44 of the
IBP By-Laws to remove Atty. de Vera as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP was duly
complied with;
vi) Atty. de Veras replacement as IBP EVP need not come from Eastern Mindanao Region
because: (a) the rotation rule under Article VII, Section 47, par. 2 of the IBP By-Laws had already
been complied with when Atty. de Vera, who hails from Eastern Mindanao, was elected IBP EVP;
and (b) the rotation rule need not be enforced if the same will not be practicable, possible,
feasible, doable or viable; and, finally, that
vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus, should now be allowed to take his oath
as IBP National President.

The Courts Ruling

AC No. 6697
In his Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the following issues for the
consideration of the Court:
I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DE VERA (sic) COMMITTED
MALPRACTICE WHICH AMOUNTED TO MORAL TURPITUDE IN THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND
IN THE PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS ATTACHED TO THE PERSON OF
ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DE VERA (sic) WHEREVER HE MAY GO AND NOT NECESSARILY BOUND BY
THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.

III. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE MORAL TURPITUDE, AS
BASIS FOR DISBARMENT OF RESPONDENT IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING.

IV. WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE TO ADMIN. CASE NO. [6052]
The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the fourth issue.
Consequently, we will start with the last issue.
A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the present administrative case.
In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:

To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment against respondent Leonard De
Vera is grounded on the following:

1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against

him by the State Bar in California; and
2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule enunciated in Administrative Matter
No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (In the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).

It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an earlier administrative case
against the respondent. Verily, these issues were already argued upon by the parties in their
respective pleadings, and discussed and ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11
December 2003 in Administrative Matter No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de
Vera).

As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:

As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was practicing
law in California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his California license to practice law,
he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to
run for the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final judgment finding
him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records relied upon by the petitioners are mere
preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are recommendatory findings of an IBP
Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are subject to the review of and the final decision of the
Supreme Court. He also stresses that the complainant in the California administrative case has
retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the complainants money, but unfortunately the
retraction was not considered by the investigating officer. xxx

On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still
practicing law in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California
Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the
discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue
the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It
is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In this
case, the petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaint affects respondent De
Vera's moral fitness to run for governor.

On the other hand, as regards the second issue:

Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really
from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Paraaque and he was originally a member of
the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his
ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver
that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.

The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II, a lawyer included
in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his
preference or choice, thus:

xxx

It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a lawyer
will become a member of the chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He has the
discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he
does not register his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of the place where
he resides or maintains office. The only proscription in registering one's preference is that a
lawyer cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same time.

The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section, transfer of
IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions set forth therein,
thus:

xxx
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not less
than three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to
transfer.

In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan
del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a
letter addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon
J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent de Vera's
transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in their respective records. This
letter is a substantial compliance with the certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as
aforequoted. Note that de Vera's transfer was made effective sometime between 1 August 2001
and 3 September 2001. On 27 February 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were
simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29.a of the IBP By-Laws
which provides that elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday
of February of every other year. Between 3 September 2001 and 27 February 2003, seventeen
months had elapsed. This makes respondent de Vera's transfer valid as it was done more than
three months ahead of the chapter elections held on 27 February 2003.

In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco (Administrative Case No. 2995, 27
November 1996), this Court declared that:

The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the
exercise of the [Courts] administrative powers.

In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from service for grave
misconduct highly prejudicial to the service for surreptitiously substituting the bid price in a
Certificate of Sale from P3,263,182.67 to only P730,000.00. Thereafter a complaint for
disbarment was filed against the respondent on the basis of the same incident. Respondent,
interposing res judicata, argued that he may no longer be charged on the basis of the same
incident. This Court held that while the respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same
misconduct, this does not amount to double jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly
administrative in nature. This Court qualified that, in the first case, the respondent was
proceeded against as an erring court personnel under the Courts supervisory power over courts
while, in the second case, he was disciplined as a lawyer under the Courts plenary authority over
membersof the legal profession.

In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res judicata still applies in
administrative cases. Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera vs. Judge William Layague
(Administrastive Matter No. RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled that:

While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would be contrary to equity and
substantial justice to penalize respondent judge a second time for an act which he had already
answered for.

Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L. Becamon,
Lolita Delos Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative Matter No. MTJ-02-1404, 14 December
2004), this Court held that:

Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present administrative case
becomes dismissible.

xxx

Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction
must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent
litigation between the same parties and for the same cause. It provides that

[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to
the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions
involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Res judicata is based on the ground that
the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated the same matter
in the former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it
again.
This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of unnecessary suits
and repetitious trials. At the same time, it prevents the clogging of court dockets. Equally
important, res judicata stabilizes rights and promotes the rule of law.

In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant had
already been resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative case. The complainants
contention that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar as the first
administrative case was one for disqualification while the instant administrative complaint is one
for suspension and/or disbarment should be given least credence. It is worthy to note that while
the instant administrative complaint is denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it
prayed neither the suspension nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought
to enjoin the respondent from assuming office as IBP National President.

Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, In Re: Petition to
Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being Elected IBP Governor
for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election and promulgated on 11 December 2003 does
not constitute a bar to the filing of Adm. Case No. 6697. Although the parties in the present
administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their capacities in these cases and
the issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the application of res judicata.

In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions must
concur, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the merits, and (4) there must be
between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of
causes of action. In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res
judicata in his favor.

It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and causes of
action. In Adm. Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de Vera to run as
a candidate for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present administrative
complaint, the subject matter is his privilege to practice law. In the first administrative case,
complainants cause of action was Atty. de Veras alleged violation or circumvention of the IBP By-
laws. In the present administrative case, the primary cause of action is Atty. de Veras alleged
violation of lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the
complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for Eastern
Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in his Memorandum, what is being
principally sought is Atty. de Veras suspension or disbarment.

The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved on
the basis of the parties rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein that Atty. de
Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present
IBP By-laws that sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we
stressed that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. Likewise, we held that the
complainants therein were not the proper parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-laws prescribes
that only nominees - which the complainants were not - can file with the IBP President a written
protest against the candidate. The Courts statement, therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be
disqualified on the ground that he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP
By-laws do not allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be
disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of
California suspending him from the practice of law for three years. We held in that case that

There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he
can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a
candidate lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed,
based on each member's standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so
long as the latter possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the
disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment
of an offense which involves moral turpitude.

What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper case
declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional Director is
presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to disagree will not be able to find a receptive
audience in the IBP through a petition for disqualification but must first file the necessary
disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer concerned.

And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his petition is
sufficient in form and substance, we have given it due course pursuant to Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court. And, considering that this case is not barred by the prior judgment in Adm. Case No.
6052, the only issue left for consideration is whether or not Atty. de Vera can be suspended or
disbarred under the facts of the case and the evidence submitted by complainant.

The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing alone, is not
proof of malpractice.

In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G.
Maquera, we were confronted with the question of whether or not a member of the Philippine
Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign jurisdiction and who was suspended from the
practice of law in said foreign jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as member of the Philippine Bar for
the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction.

We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who was
admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.) and
against whom charges were filed in connection with his practice in said jurisdiction. However,
unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted
against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered
his license to practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.

In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign
jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the
acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension in this
jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar
judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign courts action includes
any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the
judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as
lawyer.

The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as
follows:

xxxx

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc., we explained that [a] foreign
judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a
contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of
due notice in the foreign forum.

In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the
recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima
facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial
evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is
successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.

There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. de Vera independent of the
recommendation of suspension by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California
Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie
evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension.

Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the public from the
misconduct of officers of the court and to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men in
whom courts and clients may repose confidence. The statutory enunciation of the grounds for
disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to
suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its officers cannot be restricted.

Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer.

Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term Malpractice. That meaning is in
consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business.

Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his
profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession.

Now, the undisputed facts:

1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California,
docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera
handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera
was authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by the son to control
the case because the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the release of the
funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the case which he
then deposited to his personal account;

2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be
suspended from the practice of law for three years; and
3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the Supreme
Court of California.

Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he misappropriated
his clients funds as the latters father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same and
that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact
that the elder Willis testified under oath that he expected de Vera might use the money for a few
days.

By insisting that he was authorized by his clients father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds,
Atty. de Vera has impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own personal use.

In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainants allegation in the latters memorandum that he (de
Vera) received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited said amount in his
personal account and not in a separate trust account and that, finally, he spent the amount for
personal purposes.

At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies,
a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. It
means such evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be
reasonably inferred.

Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his clients funds is highly unethical. Canon 16
of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this, thus:

CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.

Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.

In Espiritu v. Ulep, we held that:

The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires
utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary
nature is intended for the protection of the client.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all money and
properties of his client that may come into his possession. Accordingly, he shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or from the client. Even more specific is the Canon of
Professional Ethics:

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or
takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.

Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession
of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any
circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.

Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on
behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own
use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in
the legal profession and deserves punishment.

Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional
ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Those who are guilty
of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
(Emphases supplied.)

In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his clients money for
personal use, he has unwittingly sealed his own fate since this admission constitutes more than
substantial evidence of malpractice. Consequently, Atty. de Vera now has the burden of rebutting
the evidence which he himself supplied.

In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to use the
funds intended for the latters son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he had restituted the full
amount of US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the administrative case against him in the
State Bar of California.

Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in the records of
this case proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds of his client. In
Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera we declared that:

When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must
show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of him.

Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis had
indeed testified that he expected de Vera might use the money for a few days. As Atty. de Vera
had vigorously objected to the admissibility of the document containing this statement, he is now
estopped from relying thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis expected de Vera might use the
money for a few days was not so much an acknowledgment of consent to the use by Atty. de
Vera of his clients funds as it was an acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might,
indeed, use his clients funds, which by itself did not speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera
or the way such character was perceived.

In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his clients money without the latters
acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear that Atty. de Vera,
by depositing the check in his own account and using the same for his own benefit is guilty of
deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not only to
himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the respect
of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the profession
betrays their trust and confidence. Respondent violated his oath to conduct himself with all good
fidelity to his client.

Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the practice of
law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Where any lesser penalty can
accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.

In Mortera v. Pagatpatan, we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years suspension from his
practice of law for depositing the funds meant for his client to his personal account without the
latters knowledge. In Reyes v. Maglaya; Castillo v. Taguines; Espiritu v. Atty. Cabredo IV, the
respondents were meted one year suspension each for failing to remit to their clients monies in
the amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00, and P51,161.00, respectively, received by them for their
clients without the latters permission. In Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya, we indefinitely suspended
respondent for failure to remit to his client the amount of the measly sum of P4,344.00
representing the amount received pursuant to a writ of execution. Considering the amount
involved here US$12,000.00, we believe that the penalty of suspension for two (2) years is
appropriate.

Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where the lawyer is not a resident of is not a ground
for his suspension or disbarment

Complainant insists that Atty. de Veras transfer of membership from the Pasay, Paraaque, Las
Pias and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is a circumvention of the
rotation rule as it was made for the sole purpose of becoming IBP National President.
Complainant stresses that Atty. de Vera is not a resident of Agusan del Sur nor does he hold
office therein.

In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Veras act of transferring to another IBP Chapter is
not a ground for his disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as the same is allowed under
Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the qualification only that the transfer be made not less than
three months immediately preceding any chapter election.

As it was perfectly within Atty. de Veras right to transfer his membership, it cannot be said that
he is guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly argue that a legal
act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not see anything wrong in transferring
to an IBP chapter that -- based on the rotation rule will produce the next IBP EVP who will
automatically succeed to the National Presidency for the next term. Our Code of Professional
Responsibility as well as the Lawyers Oath do not prohibit nor punish lawyers from aspiring to be
IBP National President and from doing perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such goal.

Bar Matter No. 1227

Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC

To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the following issues
must be addressed:
I. Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Atty. de
Vera as Governor and EVP of the IBP on 13 May 2005.
i. Whether the IBP Board of Governors complied with administrative due process in removing
Atty. de Vera.
ii. Whether the IBP removed Atty. De Vera for just and valid cause.

II. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25 June 2005, and can
consequently assume the Presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.
The IBP Board observed due process in its removal of Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor
We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP Board is vested with the power to
remove any of its members pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, which states:

Sec. 44. Removal of members. If the Board of Governors should determine after proper inquiry
that any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason become unable to perform his
duties, the Board, by resolution of the Majority of the remaining members, may declare his
position vacant, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three
consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by
two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.

In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from the
region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among the members of the Chapter to
which the resigned governor is a member to serve as governor for the unexpired portion of the
term. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board may be removed for cause by
resolution adopted by two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the
approval of this Court.

In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on procedural and
substantive grounds. He argues that he was denied very basic rights of due process recognized
by the Honorable Court even in administrative cases like the right to answer formally or in writing
and within reasonable time, the right to present witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair
hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he was not able to cross-examine the complainant,
IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera voted as well for his expulsion
which made him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the
fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting on his own motion. However, when his
inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion as the necessary 2/3 votes could not be mustered,
Atty. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he could vote to support his own motion.

The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary session, and
personally witnessed and heard Atty. de Veras actuations, an evidentiary or formal hearing was
no longer necessary. Since they all witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough that he was
given an opportunity to refute and answer all the charges imputed against him. They
emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the complaint and that he was present at the
Board Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against him was part of the agenda.
Therein, he was given the opportunity to be heard and that, in fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his
case.

We are in agreement with the IBP Board.

First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty
and property. It cannot be said that the position of EVP of the IBP is property within the
constitutional sense especially since there is no right to security of tenure over said position as,
in fact, all that is required to remove any member of the board of governors for cause is a
resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members of the board.

Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in administrative
proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side. At the
outset, it is here emphasized that the term due process of law as used in the Constitution has no
fixed meaning for all purposes due to the very nature of the doctrine which, asserting a
fundamental principle of justice rather than a specific rule of law, is not susceptible of more than
one general statement. The phrase is so elusive of exact apprehension, because it depends on
circumstances and varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation.

Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with judicial process for a trial in court
is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial
proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different
principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and its
requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the
right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional
requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established administrative
agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making of a determination
if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the
making of such determination may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all that
due process requires. What is required for hearing may differ as the functions of the
administrative bodies differ.

The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. Nor is an actual
hearing always essential especially under the factual milieu of this case where the members of
the IBP Board -- upon whose shoulders the determination of the cause for removal of an IBP
governor is placed subject to the approval of the Supreme Court all witnessed Atty. de Veras
actuations in the IBP National Convention in question.

It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that he was
present when the matter was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic notes of the 13
May 2005 meeting wherein Atty. de Vera was removed, it is patent that Atty. de Vera was given
fair opportunity to defend himself against the accusations made by Atty. Rivera.

Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty. Rivera, who authored the
complaint against him, also voted for his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor and judge at
the same time. Atty. de Vera likewise laments the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself
from voting but when this resulted in the defeat of his motion for lack of the necessary 2/3 vote,
he agreed to another round of voting and that, this time, he voted in favor of his motion.

For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for Atty. de Veras
expulsion (including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de Vera).

Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three
consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by
two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a resolution adopted by
2/3 of the remaining members. The phrase remaining members refers to the members exclusive
of the complainant member and the respondent member. The reason therefore is that such
members are interested parties and are thus presumed to be unable to resolve said motion
impartially. This being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de Vera should be stricken-off
which means that only the votes of the seven remaining members are to be counted. Of the
seven remaining members, five voted for expulsion while two voted against it which still adds up
to the 2/3 vote requirement for expulsion.

The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor for just and valid cause

All the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for the removal of an IBP
Governor has not been defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws albeit it includes three
consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse. Thus, the IBP Board
argues that it is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from an intractable
member whose removal was caused not by his disagreement with the IBP Board but due to
various acts committed by him which the IBP Board considered as inimical to the IBP Board in
particular and the IBP in general.

Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the
Board during the Conventions Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-
elected member of the IBP Board of Governors and the decision to remove him only shows that
the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the IBP Board.

After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the fundamental objective of the
IBP to discharge its public responsibility more effectively, we hereby find that Atty. de Veras
removal from the IBP Board was not capricious or arbitrary.

Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not animosity, are
inherent in the internal life of an organization, but especially of the IBP since lawyers are said to
disagree before they agree.

However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted if the conflicts are
brought outside its governing body for then there would be the impression that the IBP, which
speaks through the Board of Governors, does not and cannot speak for its members in an
authoritative fashion. It would accordingly diminish the IBPs prestige and repute with the lawyers
as well as with the general public.

As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted within the governing
board itself so as to free it from the stresses that invariably arise when internal cleavages are
made public.

The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting and
resolving conflicts and disagreements within the group after the members have been given an
opportunity to be heard. While it does not efface conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision on a
contentious matter is reached by a majority vote, the dissenting minority is bound thereby so
that the board can speak with one voice, for those elected to the governing board are deemed to
implicitly contract that the will of the majority shall govern in matters within the authority of the
board.

The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the latters
actuations during the 10th National IBP Convention were detrimental to the role of the IBP Board
as the governing body of the IBP. When the IBP Board is not seen by the bar and the public as a
cohesive unit, it cannot effectively perform its duty of helping the Supreme Court enforce the
code of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as improve the administration of
justice.

In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the expulsion of a member
of the board who insists on bringing to the public his disagreement with a policy/resolution
approved by the majority after due discussion, cannot be faulted. The effectiveness of the board
as a governing body will be negated if its pronouncements are resisted in public by a board
member.

Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the majority, he should
resign therefrom so that he could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision to his hearts
content; otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary action by the body.

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal
as EVP as well

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal
as EVP as well. Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:

SEC. 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and
Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional
governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. x x x

Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of Governors. Atty. de
Veras removal from the Board of Governors, automatically disqualified him from acting as IBP
EVP. To insist otherwise would be contrary to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of the IBP Board to remove Atty. de Vera since it
was rendered without grave abuse of discretion

While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of supervision over
the IBP, it is axiomatic that such power should be exercised prudently. The power of supervision
of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not preclude the IBP from exercising its reasonable
discretion especially in the administration of its internal affairs governed by the provisions of its
By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated so as to define the powers
and functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its organizational structure, and govern
relations and transactions among its officers and members. With these By-Laws in place, the
Supreme Court could be assured that the IBP shall be able to carry on its day-to-day affairs,
without the Courts interference.

It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has been vested
in the Board of Governors. The members of the Board are elective and representative of each of
the nine regions of the IBP as delineated in its By-Laws. The Board acts as a collegiate body and
decides in accordance with the will of the majority. The foregoing rules serve to negate the
possibility of the IBP Board acting on the basis of personal interest or malice of its individual
members. Hence, the actions and resolutions of the IBP Board deserve to be accorded the
disputable presumption of validity, which shall continue, until and unless it is overcome by
substantial evidence and actually declared invalid by the Supreme Court. In the absence of any
allegation and substantial proof that the IBP Board has acted without or in excess of its authority
or with grave abuse of discretion, we shall not be persuaded to overturn and set aside the Boards
action or resolution.

There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to remove its members as provided in
Article VI, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises only as to whether the IBP Board abused its
authority and discretion in resolving to remove Atty. de Vera from his post as an IBP Governor
and EVP. As has been previously established herein, Atty. de Veras removal from the IBP Board
was in accordance with due process and the IBP Board acted well within the authority and
discretion granted to it by its By-Laws. There being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the IBP Board, we find no reason to interfere in the Boards resolution to remove Atty. de Vera.

The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as IBP EVP in replacement of Atty. De Vera was
conducted in accordance with the authority granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws

In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of
Governors in holding a special election to fill-in the vacant post resulting from the removal of
Atty. de Vera as EVP of the IBP since the same is a purely internal matter, done without grave
abuse of discretion, and implemented without violating the Rules and By-Laws of the IBP.

With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP Board Resolution dated 13
May 2005, he was also removed from his post as EVP; thus, there was a resultant vacancy in the
position of IBP EVP.

Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority to fill
vacancies, however arising, in the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the
Integration Rule, and Section 11 (Vacancies), Section 44 (Removal of members), Section 47
(National officers Section 48 (other officers), and Section 49 (Terms of Office) of the By-Laws. The
IBP Board has specific and sufficient guidelines in its Rules and By-Laws on how to fill-in the
vacancies after the removal of Atty. de Vera. We have faith and confidence in the intellectual,
emotional and ethical competencies of the remaining members of the 2005-2007 Board in
dealing with the situation within the bounds of the IBP Rules and By-Laws.

The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will assume the
Presidency for the term 2005-2007, was well within the authority and prerogative granted to the
Board by the IBP By-Laws, particularly Article VII, Section 47, which provides that the EVP shall
automatically become President for the next succeeding term. The phrase for the next
succeeding term necessarily implies that the EVP that should succeed Atty. Cadiz as IBP
President for the next succeeding term (i.e., 2005-2007) should come from the members of the
2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors. Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-19-SC, we restrained now IBP EVP
Feliciano Bautista from assuming the position of Acting President because we have yet to resolve
the question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors.

Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP EVP, and thereafter,
Governor Salazar on 25 June 2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the relinquishment of Gov. Santiago
of the position, were valid.

Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming his removal
as IBP Governor and EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP EVP should come from Eastern
Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation rule set forth in Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-
Laws.

According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen by the Board of
Governors from among the nine Regional Governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis.
This is based on our pronouncements in Bar Matter 491, wherein we ruled:

ORDER
xxxx

3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the
Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [9] IBP regions) from among
themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of
automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of
their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar
Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically
succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive
Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated
among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as
Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among
the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.

xxxx
(Emphasis Supplied)

In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated among the
nine Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is merely a result of the
automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in
particular to the position of IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule pertains to the
Presidency. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is but a consequence of the automatic
succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of Atty. De
Vera as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus, the
rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de Veras
removal as IBP Governor and EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP Presidency.
The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-
assumption by Atty. de Vera to the IBP Presidency.

Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the spirit and purpose
of the automatic succession rule, but should be applied in harmony with the latter. The automatic
succession rule affords the IBP leadership transition seamless and enables the new IBP National
President to attend to pressing and urgent matters without having to expend valuable time for
the usual adjustment and leadership consolidation period. The time that an IBP EVP spends
assisting a sitting IBP President on matters national in scope is in fact a valuable and
indispensable preparation for the eventual succession. It should also be pointed out that this
wisdom is further underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is elected from among the members of
the IBP Board of Governors, who are serving in a national capacity, and not from the members at
large. It is intrinsic in the IBP By-Laws that one who is to assume the highest position in the IBP
must have been exposed to the demands and responsibilities of national leadership.

It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule for
Governor Salazar to assume the post of IBP President. By electing the replacement EVP from
among the members of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors, the IBP benefits from the experience
of the IBP EVP of 2003-2005 in this case, Governor Salazar who would have served in a national
capacity prior to his assumption of the highest position.

It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule if the EVP
for the term 2003-2005 will be elected exclusively by the members of the House of Delegates of
the Eastern Mindanao region. This Court notes that the removal of Atty. De Vera in 13 May 2005
was about a month before the expiration of the term of office of the 2003-2005 Board of
Governors. Hence, the replacement Governor would not have been able to serve in a national
capacity for two years prior to assuming the IBP Presidency.

In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase as much as practicable to clearly
indicate that the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in compelling
and exceptional circumstances.

It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the IBP national
presidency should be assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanao region from where he
comes, cannot hold water. It would go against the intent of the IBP By-Laws for such a nominee
would be bereft of the wealth of experience and the perspective that only one who is honed in
service while serving in a national post in the IBP would have.

We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in accordance with the IBP By-Laws, in
electing Atty. Salazar as IBP EVP and in ensuring a succession in the leadership of the IBP. Had
the Board of Governors not done so, there would have been no one qualified to assume the
Presidency of the IBP on 1 July 2005, pursuant to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:

1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS,
effective from the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the
personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts;
2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-
SC, praying for the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the Board of Governors
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing him from his posts as Governor and Executive
Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered
without grave abuse of discretion;
3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar as Executive
Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of the term 2003-2005,
such having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and absent any showing of grave
abuse of discretion; and
4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and assume the
Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with the
automatic succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this
Resolution.

SO ORDERED.
*********************************************************************************************
*****

CASE NO. 2

IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES,

EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner.
B.M. No. 2112
Promulgated:
JULY 24, 2012
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on
March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United
States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003 by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the
Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines
and if granted, to resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition were several documents in
support of his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit:
1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P. Nolasco;
2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;
3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;
4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;
5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a similar
petition filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to resume his practice of
law after availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in
March 1960. In December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek medical attention for his
ailments and eventually became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-
acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance
before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and
intended to resume his practice of law.

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in
fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the
petitioners membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under
R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who
becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the
right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who
intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice.

It can not be overstressed that:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected with public
interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal
education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the
privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy
of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise
of his professional privilege.

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC
required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following
documents in relation to his petition:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;
5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;
7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of
Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good
moral character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and
Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE
Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE.
After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has
met all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC
recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.

Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar to
the petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the
condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to
the payment of appropriate fees.

Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary guidelines for the
re-acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and
Bar.

SO ORDERED.
 REINSTATEMENT AFTER DISBARMENT

CASE NO. 1

[BAR MATTER No. 712. March 19, 1997]

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however
deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In
Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte
during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other
accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later
withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing
on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted
by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's
oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a
resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those
seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and
six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship
foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint
efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on
petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son
was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder
since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence,
taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one
of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992,
literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him
that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's
involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However,
as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice,
he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his
death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He
therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and
moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient
administration o f justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who
have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to
prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of
lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons for
allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings
inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for
admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
"x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a
finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character."
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the
question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character
referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan.
The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes
even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than
natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then
becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no
less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances
in this cases, to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now
morally fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to
take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the
following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not
inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the
general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for
practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn
promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly
according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of
justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving
to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other
services to the more unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's
oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the
legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
************************************************************************************************

CASE NO. 2
RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS B.M. No. 1222

x ---------------------------------------- x

ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN,

Promulgated:
April 24, 2009
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This treats the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated November 10, 2008 filed by
petitioner Danilo de Guzman. He prays that this Honorable Court in the exercise of equity and
compassion, grant petitioners plea for judicial clemency, and thereupon, order his reinstatement
as a member in good standing of the Philippine Bar.

To recall, on February 4, 2004, the Court promulgated a Resolution, in B.M. No. 1222, the
dispositive portion of which reads in part:

WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating Committee, hereby
resolves to

(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon his receipt of this
RESOLUTION;

xxxx

The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in Mercantile Law during the 2003 Bar
Examinations. Petitioner at that time was employed as an assistant lawyer in the law firm of
Balgos & Perez, one of whose partners, Marcial Balgos, was the examiner for Mercantile Law
during the said bar examinations. The Court had adopted the findings of the Investigating
Committee, which identified petitioner as the person who had downloaded the test questions
from the computer of Balgos and faxed them to other persons.

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended the reinstatement of
petitioner in the Philippine Bar. In a Report dated January 6, 2009, the OBC rendered its
assessment of the petition, the relevant portions of which we quote hereunder:

Petitioner narrated that he had labored to become a lawyer to fulfill his fathers childhood dream
to become one. This task was not particularly easy for him and his family but he willed to endure
the same in order to pay tribute to his parents.

Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he already imposed upon himself the duty of
rendering service to his fellowmen. At 19 years, he started his exposure to public service when
he was elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig City.
During this time, he initiated several projects benefiting the youth in their barangay.

Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking up Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and
eventually pursuing Bachelor of Laws. In his second year in law school, he was elected as the
President of the Student Council of the Institute of Law of the Far Eastern University (FEU). Here,
he spearheaded various activities including the conduct of seminars for law students as well as
the holding of bar operations for bar examinees.

Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth and student leader, petitioner still
managed to excel in his studies. Thus, he was conferred an Academic Excellence Award upon his
graduation in Bachelor of Laws.

Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner immediately entered government service as a
Legal Officer assigned at the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig. Simultaneously, he also rendered
free legal services to less fortunate residents of Taguig City who were then in need of legal
assistance.

In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the Associate Lawyers at the Balgos and Perez Law
Offices. It was during his stay with this firm when his craft as a lawyer was polished and
developed. Despite having entered private practice, he continued to render free legal services to
his fellow Taguigeos.

Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate, petitioners flourishing career was cut short as
he was stripped of his license to practice law for his alleged involvement in the leakage in the
2003 Bar Examinations.

Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself inside his house to avoid the rather
unavoidable consequences of his disbarment.

On March 2004, however, petitioner was given a new lease in life when he was taken as a
consultant by the City Government of Taguig. Later, he was designated as a member of the
Secretariat of the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). For the next five (5) years, petitioner
concentrated mainly on rendering public service.

Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of his act which unfortunately,
compromised the integrity of the bar examinations. As could be borne from the records of the
investigation, he cooperated fully in the investigation conducted and took personal responsibility
for his actions. Also, he has offered his sincerest apologies to Atty. Balgos, to the Court as well as
to all the 2003 bar examinees for the unforeseen and unintended effects of his actions.

Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his mistakes and has taken the said humbling
experience to make him a better person.

Meanwhile, as part of his Petition, petitioner submitted the following testimonials and
endorsements of various individuals and entities all attesting to his good moral character:
1) Resolution No. 101, Series of 2007, Resolution Expressing Full Support to Danilo G. De
Guzman in his Application for Judicial Clemency, Endorsing his Competence and Fitness to be
Reinstated as a Member of the Philippine Bar and for Other Purposes dated 4 June 2007 of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, City of Taguig;
2) Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong
Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Southeast Peoples Village Homeowners Association, Inc.
(SEPHVOA) kay Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang
Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo
ng Isang Abogado dated 1 June 2007 of the Southeast Peoples Village Homeowners Association,
Inc. (SEPHVOA), Ibayo-Tipas, City of Taguig;
3) Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong
Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC)
kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang
Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo
ng Isang Abogado dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc.
(SAREMAC), Lower Bicutan, City of Taguig;
4) Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong
Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI)
Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SAMANA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong
Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang
Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahan ng
mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SAMANA), Sta. Ana, City of
Taguig;
5) An Open Letter Attesting Personally to the Competence and Fitness of Danilo G. De Guzman as
to Warrant the Grant of Judicial Clemency and his Reinstatement as Member of the Philippine Bar
dated 8 June 2007 of Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino, Laogan, Trespeses and Llantino Law Offices;

6) Testimonial to the Moral and Spiritual Competence of Danilo G. De Guzman to be Truly

Deserving of Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated 5 July 2007 of Rev. Fr. Paul G. Balagtas,
Parish Priest, Archdiocesan Shrine of St. Anne;
7) Testimonial Letter dated 18 February 2008 of Atty. Loreto C. Ata, President, Far Eastern
University Law Alumni Association (FEULAA), Far Eastern University (FEU);
8) Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong
Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA) kay
G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong
Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang
Abogado dated 8 July 2008 of the Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA);
9) Board Resolution No. 02, Series of 2008, A Resolution Recognizing the Contributions of Danilo
G. De Guzman to the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) Taguig City, Attesting to his Utmost
Dedication and Commitment to the Call of Civic and Social Duty and for Other Purposes dated 11
July 2008 of the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB);
 10) A Personal Appeal for the Grant of Judicial Forgiveness and Compassion in Favor of Danilo G.
De Guzman dated 14 July 2008 of Atty. Edwin R. Sandoval, Professor, College of Law, San
Sebastian College Recoletos;
11) An Open Letter Personally Attesting to the Moral competence and Fitness of Danilo G. De
Guzman dated 5 September 2008 of Mr. Nixon F. Faderog, Deputy Grand [Kn]ight, Knights of
Columbus and President, General Parent-Teacher Association, Taguig National High School, Lower
Bicutan, Taguig City;
12) Testimonial Letter dated 5 September 2008 of Atty. Primitivo C. Cruz, President, Taguig
Lawyers League, Inc., Tuktukan, Taguig City;
13) Testimonial Letter dated 21 October 2008 of Judge Hilario L. Laqui, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trail Court (RTC), Branch 218, Quezon City; and
14) Testimonial Letter dated 28 October 2008 of Justice Oscar M. Herrera, former Justice, Court of
Appeals and former Dean, Institute of Law, Far Eastern University (FEU).

Citing the case of In Re: Carlos S. Basa, petitioner pleaded that he be afforded the same
kindness and compassion in order that, like Atty. Basa, his promising future may not be
perpetually foreclosed. In the said case, the Court had the occasion to say:

Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California and the
Philippine Islands. Recently, he was charged in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila
with the crime of abduction with consent, was found guilty in a decision rendered by the
Honorable M.V. De Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a
period of two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional. On appeal, this
decision was affirmed in a judgment handed down by the second division of the Supreme Court.

xxxx

When come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken by the court,
we do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the criminal law by the
respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the other hand, we are willing to strain
the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in order that so promising a career may not be
utterly ruined.

Petitioner promised to commit himself to be more circumspect in his actions and solemnly
pledged to exert all efforts to atone for his misdeeds.

There may be a reasonable ground to consider the herein Petition.

In the case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyers Oath (Bar Matter 712),
which may be applied in the instant case, the Court said:

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to
take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the
following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyers oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not
inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts, to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the
general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

xxxx

Meanwhile, in the case of Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia (Administrative
Case No. 2984), the Court [in] deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia to the practice of
law stated:

The Court will take into consideration the applicants character and standing prior to the
disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct
subsequent to the disbarment and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the
application for reinstatement.

Petitioner was barely thirty (30) years old and had only been in the practice of law for five (5)
years when he was disbarred from the practice of law. It is of no doubt that petitioner had a
promising future ahead of him where it not for the decision of the Court stripping off his license.
Petitioner is also of good moral repute, not only before but likewise, after his disbarment, as
attested to overwhelmingly by his constituents, colleagues as well as people of known probity in
the community and society.

Way before the petitioner was even admitted to the bar, he had already manifested his intense
desire to render public service as evidenced by his active involvement and participation in
several social and civic projects and activities. Likewise, even during and after his disbarment,
which could be perceived by some as a debilitating circumstance, petitioner still managed to
continue extending his assistance to others in whatever means possible. This only proves
petitioners strength of character and positive moral fiber.

However, still, it is of no question that petitioners act in copying the examination questions from
Atty. Balgos computer without the latters knowledge and consent, and which questions later
turned out to be the bar examinations questions in Mercantile Law in the 2003 Bar Examinations,
is not at all commendable. While we do believe that petitioner sincerely did not intend to cause
the damage that his action ensued, still, he must be sanctioned for unduly compromising the
integrity of the bar examinations as well as of this Court.

We are convinced, however, that petitioner has since reformed and has sincerely reflected on his
transgressions. Thus, in view of the circumstances and likewise for humanitarian considerations,
the penalty of disbarment may now be commuted to suspension. Considering the fact, however,
that petitioner had already been disbarred for more than five (5) years, the same may be
considered as proper service of said commuted penalty and thus, may now be allowed to resume
practice of law.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that the instant Petition for
Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated 10 November 2008 of petitioner DANILO G. DE
GUZMAN be GRANTED. Petitioners disbarment is now commuted to suspension, which
suspension is considered as served in view of the petitioners five (5) year disbarment. Hence,
petitioner may now be allowed to resume practice of law.

The recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant is well-taken in part. We deem petitioner
worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his penalty to seven (7) years suspension from
the practice of law, inclusive of the five (5) years he has already served his disbarment.

Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. While the
Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show
compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose.

In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of disbarment imposed
on the lawyer, we have taken into account the remorse of the disbarred lawyer and the conduct
of his public life during his years outside of the bar. For example, in Valencia v. Antiniw, we held:

However, the record shows that the long period of respondent's disbarment gave him the chance
to purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his
willingness and capacity to live up once again to the exacting standards of conduct demanded of
every member of the bar and officer of the court. During respondent's disbarment for more than
fifteen (15) years to date for his professional infraction, he has been persistent in reiterating his
apologies and pleas for reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show
that he has regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and
unblemished record as an elected public servant, as attested to by numerous civic and
professional organizations, government institutions, public officials and members of the judiciary.

And in Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia, we noted:

Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejias disbarment, it also cannot close its
eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and the
length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure
in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia.
Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has
shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his punishment
has lasted long enough. x x x
Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him considering the gravity of
his transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner has redirected focus since his disbarment
towards public service, particularly with the Peoples Law Enforcement Board. The attestations
submitted by his peers in the community and other esteemed members of the legal profession,
such as retired Court of Appeals Associate Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge Hilario Laqui, Professor
Edwin Sandoval and Atty. Lorenzo Ata, and the ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul
Balagtas testify to his positive impact on society at large since the unfortunate events of 2003.

Petitioners subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some hope that if he were
to reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his achievements as a lawyer would redound to
the general good and more than mitigate the stain on his record. Compassion to the petitioner is
warranted. Nonetheless, we wish to impart to him the following stern warning:

Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their
sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to
trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his position
and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the
body politic.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion is
hereby GRANTED IN PART. The disbarment of DANILO G. DE GUZMAN from the practice of law
is hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7) YEARS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW,
reckoned from February 4, 2004.

SO ORDERED.
*********************************************************************************************
*****

CASE NO. 3

Adm. Case No. 6148 January 22, 2013

FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO, Respondent.
RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO.

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) filed by respondent Edmundo L.
Macarubbo (respondent) who seeks to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.
Records show that in the Decision dated February 27, 2004, the Court disbarred respondent from
the practice of law for having contracted a bigamous marriage with complainant Florence Teves
and a third marriage with one Josephine Constantino while his first marriage to Helen Esparza
was still subsisting, which acts constituted gross immoral conduct in violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The dispositive portion of
the subject Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality and is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. He is likewise ORDERED to show satisfactory
evidence to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and to this Court that he is supporting or has
made provisions for the regular support of his two children by complainant.
Let respondents name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal for Compassion and Mercy
which the Court denied with finality in the Resolution dated June 1, 2004. Eight years after or on
June 4, 2012, respondent filed the instant Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) seeking judicial
clemency and reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. The Court initially treated the present suit
as a second motion for reconsideration and accordingly, denied it for lack of merit in the
Resolution dated September 4, 2012. On December 18, 2012, the same petition was endorsed to
this Court by the Office of the Vice President for re-evaluation, prompting the Court to look into
the substantive merits of the case.
In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37,
Appealing for Clemency, the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for
judicial clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited
to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven
integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or
similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead
of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and
other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency. (Citations
omitted)
Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other candidate for
admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character.
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds the instant petition meritorious.
Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal
profession and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his children by complainant
Teves and maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown by the herein attached pictures.
Records also show that after his disbarment, respondent returned to his hometown in Enrile,
Cagayan and devoted his time tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until her
death in 2008. In 2009, he was appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan
and thereafter, assumed the position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II/ Office-In-Charge
in the Assessors Office, which office he continues to serve to date. Moreover, he is a part-time
instructor at the University of Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas College during the School Year
2011-2012. Respondent likewise took an active part in socio-civic activities by helping his
neighbors and friends who are in dire need.
The following documents attest to respondents reformed ways: (1) Affidavit of Candida P.
Mabborang; (2) Affidavit of Reymar P. Ramirez; (3) Affidavit of Roberto D. Tallud; (4) Certification
from the Municipal Local Government Office; (5) Certification by the Office of the Municipal
Agriculturist/Health Officer, Social Welfare Development Officer; (6) Certification from the
Election Officer of Enrile, Cagayan; (7) Affidavit of Police Senior Inspector Jacinto T. Tuddao; (8)
Certifications from nine (9) Barangay Chairpersons; (9) Certification from the Office of the
Provincial Assessor; (10) Certification from the Office of the Manager, Magsaka ca Multi-Purpose
Cooperative; and (11) Certification of the Office of the Federation of Senior Citizens, Enrile
Chapter. The Office of the Municipal Treasurer also certified that respondent has no monetary
accountabilities in relation to his office while the Office of the Human Resource Management
Officer attested that he has no pending administrative case. He is not known to be involved in
any irregularity and/or accused of a crime. Even the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
attested that he has no record on file as of May 31, 2011.
Furthermore, respondents plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Cagayan Chapter and by his former and present colleagues. His parish priest, Rev. Fr.
Camilo Castillejos, Jr., certified that he is faithful to and puts to actual practice the doctrines of
the Catholic Church. He is also observed to be a regular churchgoer. Records further reveal that
respondent has already settled his previous marital squabbles, as in fact, no opposition to the
instant suit was tendered by complainant Teves. He sends regular support to his children in
compliance with the Courts directive in the Decision dated February 27, 2004.
The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time respondent was
disbarred and recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer product of Lemu National High
School, and his fourteen (14) years of dedicated government service from 1986 to July 2000 as
Legal Officer of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports; Supervising Civil Service
Attorney of the Civil Service Commission; Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer; and State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice. From the attestations and certifications presented, the
Court finds that respondent has sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 58 years of age, he
still has productive years ahead of him that could significantly contribute to the upliftment of the
law profession and the betterment of society. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to
discipline and even remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to
those who have reformed their ways, as in this case.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered reinstated to the practice of law. He is, however,
reminded that such privilege is burdened with conditions whereby adherence to the rigid
standards of intellect, moral uprightness, and strict compliance with the rules and the law are
continuing requirements.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. Respondent Edmundo L.
Macarubbo is hereby ordered REINSTATED in the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
**************************************************************************************************

CASE NO. 4
A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC
RE: LETTER OF JUDGE AUGUSTUS C. DIAZ, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY, BRANCH 37, APPEALING FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY.
Promulgated:
September 19, 2007
x-------------------------------------------------x

In a letter dated July 18, 2007, Judge Augustus C. Diaz, presiding judge of Branch 37 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, informed the Court that he is an applicant for judgeship
in one of the vacant Regional Trial Court branches in Metro Manila. In connection therewith, he
was interviewed by the Judicial and Bar Council on July 10, 2007. He was told to seek judicial
clemency due to the fact that he was once fined P20,000 for not hearing a motion for demolition.
He claims that this lapse happened only once as a result of oversight. He requests judicial
clemency and, in particular, that he be allowed to again be nominated to one of the vacant
branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila or in any of the cities where [his] application [is
being] considered.

In a subsequent letter, Judge Diaz stated that he has been the presiding judge of Branch 37 of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City since March 1, 1995. He expressed deep remorse for
the lapse for which he was held administratively liable in Alvarez v. Diaz. He confessed that [t]he
stain of the penalty has taught [him] a bitter lesson and promised to avoid the commission of the
same or similar acts. He submitted himself to the judicious discretion of this Court for whatever
action the Court may take on his plea for judicial clemency.

In Alvarez, Judge Diaz was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he granted the
following motions: (1) a motion for execution which was fatally defective for lack of notice to the
defendant and (2) a motion for demolition without notice and hearing. His action on the motion
for demolition also made him liable for grave abuse of authority. He was fined P20,000.
Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council provides:
SEC. 5. Disqualification. The following are disqualified from being nominated for appointment to
any judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman:
1. Those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases;
2. Those with pending criminal cases in foreign courts or tribunals; and
3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in an administrative case,
where the penalty imposed is at least a fine of more than P10,000, unless he has been
granted judicial clemency. (emphasis supplied)

Under the said provision, Judge Diaz is disqualified from being nominated for appointment to any
judicial post, until and unless his request for judicial clemency is granted.
Concerned with safeguarding the integrity of the judiciary, this Court has come down hard and
wielded the rod of discipline against members of the judiciary who have fallen short of the
exacting standards of judicial conduct. This is because a judge is the visible representation of the
law and of justice. He must comport himself in a manner that his conduct must be free of a whiff
of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his official duties but also as to his
behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. His character must be able to withstand the
most searching public scrutiny because the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge
are essential to the preservation of the peoples faith in the judicial system.
Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the
preservation of public confidence in the courts. The Court will grant it only if there is a showing
that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable.
In the exercise of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and all
personnel thereof, the Court lays down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial
clemency:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited
to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven
integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or
similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reformation.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead
of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and
other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
In this case, Judge Diaz expressed sincere repentance for his past malfeasance. He humbly
accepted the verdict of this Court in Alvarez. Three years have elapsed since the promulgation of
Alvarez. It is sufficient to ensure that he has learned his lesson and that he has reformed. His 12
years of service in the judiciary may be taken as proof of his dedication to the institution. Thus,
the Court may now open the door of further opportunities in the judiciary for him.

Accordingly, the letter dated July 18, 2007 of Judge Augustus C. Diaz is hereby NOTED. His
request for judicial clemency is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.