The 33rd Regiment

North Vietnamese Army

Their History (1965 - 1989)

(including the Battles of Binh Ba - 1969 and Nui Le - 1971)

 Nui Dat June 1969

Ernie Chamberlain a Vietnamese linguist, served in South Vietnam as an

intelligence officer from April 1969 to November 1970. He later taught the
Vietnamese language for two years at Point Cook, and was the Vietnam desk officer
in the Joint Intelligence Organisation from late 1972 until April 1975 visiting
Vietnam in mid-1974. Ernie Chamberlain later served as the Defence Attache in
Cambodia (1991-1993) and Head of the Australian Defence Staff in Indonesia
(1996-1998). Following retirement from the Australian Defence Force in 1998, he
served in East Timor for several years principally in United Nations appointments.
He has written several books on Timor. His earlier published works on the Vietnam
War include: D440 Battalion (2013), the 33rd NVA Regiment (2014), and the D445
Battalion (2016).
 The 33rd Regiment
North Vietnamese Army:
Their History
(1965 1989)
(including the Battles of Binh Ba - 1969 and Nui Le - 1971)

Ernest Chamberlain 2017

(A translation and commentary on:

The History of The Heroic 33rd Infantry Regiment1965 1989
by The War Veterans Liaison Committee of
The Heroic 33rd Regiment, B Ra - Vng Tu April 2016)
Published in Australia in 2017 by Ernest Chamberlain, Point Lonsdale VIC 3225.
Copyright Ernest Chamberlain 2017 email - chamber@pipeline.com.au

This work is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of private study,
research, criticism or review as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be
reproduced by any process, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any
means, electronic, mechanical photocopying or otherwise, without the prior written
permission of the author. Inquiries should be made to the author/publisher.

The author has also published:

The Struggle in Iliomar: Resistance in rural East Timor; Editions - 2003, 2004 and 2008
(ISBN 9780980562309).
Perjuangan di Iliomar: Perlawanan di Pedesaan di Timor-Leste, 2004 (ISBN 0-9750350-1-
0).
Faltering Steps Independence Movements in East Timor in the 1950s and 1960s; 2005
(ISBN 0 97500350 2 9).
Faltering Steps: Independence Movements in East Timor 1940s to the early 1970s; Editions
2007, 2008 and 2010 (ISBN 9780980562330).
Rebellion, Defeat and Exile: The 1959 Uprising in East Timor; Editions - 2007 and 2009
(ISBN 9780980562316).
Forgotten Men: Timorese in Special Operations during World War II, 2010
(ISBN 978-0-9805623-2-3).
The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story, 2011 (ISBN 978-0-9805623-4-7).
The Viet Cong D440 Battalion: Their Story, 2013 (ISBN 978-0-9805623-5-4).
The 33rd Regiment North Vietnamese Army: Their Story, 2014 (ISBN 978-0-9750350-5-4).
The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story (and the Battle of Long Tan) 2016
(ISBN 978-09805623-4-7).

National Library of Australia : Cataloguing-in-Publication Entry

Chamberlain, Ernest, 1944

The 33rd Regiment (North Vietnamese Army): Their History 2016.

Bibliography and Index

ISBN 978-0-9750350-61

Subjects: Vietnam. Quan oi nhan dan. Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Regimental histories.

Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Participation, Australian.Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Campaigns.
Binh Ba, Battle of, Vietnam, 1969. Nui Le, Battle of, Vietnam, 1971.
Vietnam--Armed Forces--History.

Every effort has been made by the publisher/author to contact holders of copyright to obtain
permission to reproduce copyright material. However, if any permissions have been
inadvertently overlooked, apologies are offered, and should the rightful party contact the
publisher, all due credit and necessary and reasonable arrangements will be made at the
earliest opportunity.
 PREFACE

The Australian War Memorial has published a comprehensive three-volume official

history of the Australian Armys involvement in the Vietnam War.1 Separately, each of the
nine Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) infantry battalions that served in Vietnam has
produced histories of their tour or tours, of duty. Other units have also published histories.
In 2014, I wrote a volume on the 33rd NVA2 Regiment ie on the other side, that hopefully
complemented those publications and the official histories.3 It also complemented the
published histories of its fraternal Vit Cong (VC)4 units - the D445 and D440 Local Force
Battalions that operated in Phc Tuy Province against the 1st Australian Task Force.5
This History of the 33rd NVA Regiment was written by a Vietnamese Writing Team
of serving PAVN officers and 33rd Regiment veterans over the period 2013 to mid-2016.
Their History covers several major engagements: in the Central Highlands (the Battles of
Pleime, Ia rng, and Ban M Thuot), and in Ty Ninh, Bin Ha, Long Khnh, Bnh Tuy,
and Phc Tuy Provinces and later campaigns in Cambodia. The 33rd Regiments 2016
History has used a number of historical monographs published in recent years by the 33rd
Regiment Veterans Association as principal primary source materials.6
The main text of their History only very briefly relates engagements with Australian
forces in Phc Tuy Province ie the Battle of Bnh Ba (early June 1969) and the Battle of

1
McNeill, I., To Long Tan The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950-1966, St Leonards, 1993;
McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, Crows Nest, 2003; and Ekins, A with McNeill, I., Fighting to the
Finish, Crows Nest, 2012. All were published by Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War
Memorial.
2
In this work, the Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN) is referred to as the North Vietnamese Army (NVA);
and the Peoples Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF), guerrillas and infrastructure are termed the Vit Cong (VC)
as the general readership is more familiar with the terms NVA and VC.
3
Chamberlain, E.P. The 33rd Regiment North Vietnamese Army: Their Story (and the Battle of Binh Ba),
Point Lonsdale, 2014 (128,000 words) free-to-read on the Internet:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/217396459/The-33rd-Regiment-North-Vietnamese-Army-Their-Story-and-the-
Battle-of-Binh-Ba .
4
The term Vit Cng is avoided in Vietnamese communist writings. The Vietnamese communists did not
refer to themselves as Vit Cng (Cng Sn Vit Nam - Vietnamese Communists) as this was a pejorative
term initiated and used by the Republic of Vietnam (RVN - ie South Vietnam), the US, and its Free World
allies.
5
See: Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story (and the Battle of Long Tan), Point
Lonsdale, 2014; and Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D440 Battalion: Their Story, Point Lonsdale, 2013.
6
Translations of several of these Vietnamese-language monographs are included as appendices to Chamberlain,
E.P., The 33rd Regiment , op.cit, 2014 including: Tm Tt Truyn Thng Trung on 33 2010; Qu
Trnh Hnh Thnh V Chin u 2010; Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trn nh Ngy 6/6/69 2011;
and Bo Co Tm Tt Qu Trnh Chin u v Hot ong Trung on 33 2010. As sources, that 2014
work also used US and Australian materials including captured documents and the debriefing of prisoners and
ralliers. Such English-language sources have not been accessed by the 33rd Regiments Writing Team with the
exception of some passages in the Australian Army Official History: Fighting to the Finish, 2012 see
footnotes 7 and 9.
Ni Le (late September 1971). However, based on Australian documents, the Writing Team
has included a discrete appendix covering the Battle of Ni Le.7
The 33rd NVA Regiment (E33)8 was a North Vietnamese Army formation that moved
into South Vietnam in early September 1965 and initially engaged United States (US) forces
and the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) in the Central Highlands at
Pleime/Plei Me and in the Ia rng Valley. At the end of January 1968, during the Tt
Offensive, the Regiment attacked the town of Ban M Thuot in the Central Highlands, before
moving south into Ty Ninh Province in mid-1968. In February 1969, the Regiments area of
operations shifted eastwards and under the command of VC Military Region 7, it attacked
bases at Bin Ha/Long Bnh, and briefly clashed with elements of the 1st Australian Task
Force (1 ATF) in that area. Its activities next extended into the provinces of Long Khnh and
Phc Tuy. The Australians major engagement with the 33rd Regiment was the Battle of
Bnh Ba on 6 June 1969, about seven kilometres north of 1 ATFs base at Ni t. 1 ATFs
final engagement with 33rd Regiment elements was at the Battle of Ni Le/Ni Sao9 near the
Long Khnh Province border on 21 September 1971 shortly before 1 ATFs withdrawal.
During the Vietnam War, over 3,000 cadre and soldiers of the 33rd Regiment were
recorded as killed or missing with the Regiments average strength being only about
1,300.10 Following the Liberation of the South on 30 April 1975, the Regiment fought in the
South-West Border War against the Khmer Rouge in both Vietnamese territory and in
Cambodia. Subsequently, the Regiment also fought in Cambodia during the decade-long

7
In late October 2012, Ernest Chamberlain translated into Vietnamese several passages from the Australian
Armys Official History of the Vietnam War (ie: Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, Allen &
Unwin/Australian War Memorial, Crows Nest, 2012 and forwarded the translations to the Mr V Xun Thu of
the 33rd Regiments Liaison Committee a member of their Writing Team. During a visit to Vietnam later in
2012, Chamberlain also met with Mr Thu and passed further Australian writings and film to him related
principally to the Battle of Bnh Ba (early June 1969) and the Battle of Ni Le/Ni Sao (late September 1971)
for possible use by the Regiments Writing Team see V Xuan Thus request at footnote 9.
8
NVA/VC formation and unit nomenclatures included prefix letters to designate size eg A for section/squad;
B platoon; C Company; D battalion; E regiment (also Q); F and CT division; and T
Military Region. B was also used as a prefix for some fronts eg B2, B3. K was often used as a prefix
designation for hospitals. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) also had a 33 rd Regiment in its 21st
Infantry Division.
9
Although this engagement is only very briefly mentioned in the main text and is not mentioned in the 33rd
Regiments 2010 and 2011 historical monographs, the Writing Team has included a discrete12-page
Vietnamese-language account of the Battle of Ni Le/Ni Sao within Annex B (based on the account in the
Official Australian Army History Fighting to the Finish, 2012). In a November 2011 email, the 33rd Regiment
veteran V Xun Thu, advised: At the Sui L and Ni Sao engagement, the unit was the 9th ((ie 3rd)) Battalion
of our 33rd Regiment. I also participated in that battle as well as many of my friends who now live in Vng Tu
and in provinces in North Vietnam including the battalion commander at that time. As we fought many
battles, we dont remember the detail of the events of the battles (khng nh din bin cc trn), so please let
me know about that battle including the casualties on both sides. During the Chamberlains discussions with
33rd Regiment veterans in Vietnam in October-November 2012, they had difficulty remembering the detail of
the engagement against the 1ATF elements at Ni Sao/Ni L in late September 1971 noting that, for them, it
was only a relatively minor engagement in the Regiments history. See also comments by 33rd Regiment
veterans in Davies, B. with McKay, G., Vietnam: The Complete Story of the Australian War, Allen & Unwin,
Crows Nest, 2012, p.533: just another fight not a major firefight .
10
For detail on the Regiments casualties, see Annex F f.151-159 - plus a more than 500 in Cambodia.
Vietnamese occupation. In 1979, following the Chinese border incursions into Vietnam, the
Regiment was deployed to northern Vietnam but did not engage in combat against Chinese
forces.
The 33rd Regiments official Memorial was inaugurated in Bnh c hamlet of Bnh
Ba village on 27 July 2003. There are also active 33rd Regiment veterans groups in the
North - including at Phc Th outside H Noi, and reunions are held regularly.
As comments on the text and to add context, a considerable number of Translators
Notes have been added as footnotes to the translation, creating an exegesis. The original
footnotes in the Vietnamese text (totaling 49) have been retained ie translated, and are
indicated with an asterisk eg 7*. The translators footnotes are intended assist in clarifying
certain aspects for English-language readers: eg - geography, the seasons and climate, and
ethnicity (Cham people, Northerners and Southerners etc), the pacification program, the
Pheonix/Phng Hong program, the Chiu Hi (Returnee/Rallier) program, Routes 2 (now
56) and 15 (now 51), and abbreviated terms such as VCI, RF, PF, PSDF etc. The large
number of Translators Notes in this 79,500-word work also include detailed references to
enable interested readers to readily access some primary source material much of it now
available via the Internet. Many of the comments are based on an examination of captured
NVA and VC documents and the debriefings of NVA/VC prisoners and ralliers (ie
defectors).11 A very large quantity of CIC-V material is held by The Vietnam Center and
Archive (VCAT) at the Texas Tech University, Lubbock Texas, in the United States. Such
material held by Texas Tech University is gratefully acknowledged and cited in this work as
VCAT material.
Signals intelligence (SIGINT) aspects are illustrated with annotated maps of the 33rd
Regiments assessed locations in June 1969 and September 1971 (pp.161-165).
Several Vietnamese-language histories other than 33rd Regiment monographs, have
somewhat different accounts of events - including engagements with the Australian forces,
and many of these have also been noted.12
The combat effectiveness of NVA/VC forces was seriously hampered by high
malarial rates. The effect of malaria in the 33rd Regiment is summarised in the concluding
paragraphs of Annex F 33rd Regiment Casualties at pp.158-159.

Ernie Chamberlain
Point Lonsdale
10 February 2017.

11
During the Vietnam War, this material was collated centrally by the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam
(CIC-V) in Si Gn with the captured documents processed by its Combined Document Exploitation Center
(CDEC). At the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) base at Ni t, captured documents were processed by the
Detachment of the 1st Divisional Intelligence Unit before on-forwarding to CDEC in Si Gn.
12
The VC D440 Battalion History (2011) included an account of the Battle of Bnh Ba in which it fought and
suffered casualties. However, this 33rd Regiment History (2016) mistakenly cites the VC D445 Battalion as
being involved ie instead of D440. For detail, see: Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D440 Battalion: Their
Story (and the Battle of Binh Ba), Point Lonsdale, 2013, pp.61-69. For a D445 History, see: Chamberlain, E.P.
The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story (and the Battle of Long Tan), Point Lonsdale, 2016. The foregoing
are Internet-accessible (free-to-read).
Translators Note: The Party Committee of the 33rd Regiment planning the attack on the
c Thnh-Sui Ngh Sub-Sector (Headquarters; 21st Company; 1st Battalion; and the 6th
Sapper Battalion) - 1971.

Translators Note: Commander of the 33rd Regiment Nguyn Vn Thng,

issuing orders for an attack on Sui Ngh/c Thnh.
 1

The History of
rd
The Heroic 33 Infantry
Regiment
(1965 1989)
The War Veterans Liaison Committee of
The Heroic 33rd Regiment

B Ra - Vng Tu April 2016

(translated by E.P. Chamberlain January 2017)

ISBN 978-0-9750350-61
 2

Steering Committee:

The 33rd Regiment War Veterans Liaison Committee

Implementation

The Military Headquarters of B Ra - Vng Tu Province

The 33rd Regiment War Veterans Liaison Committee

Compilation

H Song Qunh (Editor)

V Vn D

L Ba Lc

Cover: Ngha Qu, Presentation: Vn Hng

Publication Certificate: No. 18/GP-TTTT issued by The Office of Information and

Communications, B Ra - Vng Tu on 22 March 2016 .
Printed by the Vng Tu Fine Arts Company
Phone: 0913957486. Web: mythuatvungtau.com.au
Distributed in 2016.
 3

General V Nguyn Giap (25-8-1991 4-10-2013)

Commander of the Peoples Army of Vietnam.
 4

Held on Staunchly Overcame Difficulties Resourceful and Flexible

Always Fought and Won.

The Noble Award to the 33rd Infantry Regiment.

 5

CONTENTS
Page

Introduction 7

The Beginnings: The Background to the Founding of 101B Regiment 11

The Predecessor to the 33rd Infantry Regiment.

Chapter One - Crossing the Annamite Chain and Fighting on the

Central Highlands Front (July 1965 June 1968). 14

Chapter Two - Deploying to Fight on the Eastern Nam B Battlefield

(June 1968 May 1970). 37

Chapter Three - With the Title of The Resolved to Win Regiment,

Fighting in Bnh Tuy Province and Reinforcing
the B Ra Sub-Region, (1970 1972). 58

Chapter Four - Attacking the Enemy Violating the Paris Agreement

and the General Offensive of Spring 1975 (1973 1975). 74

Chapter Five - Protecting the Fruits of the Revolution, Participating in

the Creation of National Defence Projects on
the South-West Border (1975 1977). 89

Chapter Six - With the Title of the 731st Regiment of the 303rd Division
of Military Region 7, Fulfilling our International Duty
in Cambodia (July 1978 December 1979). 95

Chapter Seven - With the Title of the 793rd Regiment of the 303rd Division
of Military Region 3, Building the Economy and
Defending the Northern Border
(December 1979 August 1989). 103

Conclusion 111

Annexes 117

A. A Summary of the Group and Individual Achievements

Awarded the Title of Hero of the Peoples Armed Forces. 118

B. A Number of Articles Written About the 33rd Regiment. 125

 6

C. A List of Past Headquarters Personnel of the 33rd Regiment. 145

D. Portrait Photographs of a Number of 33rd Regiment Commanders. 147

E. A Number of Photographs of the Regiments Past Activities. 149

Translators Annexes:

F. 33rd Regiment Casualties - including at the Battle of Bnh Ba

- June 1969. 151

G. Headquarters 33rd NVA Regiment: SIGINT Direction Finding (DF)

Locations Battle of Ni Le, September 1971 (annotated map). 161

H. 3rd Battalion/33rd NVA Regiment: SIGINT Direction Finding (DF)

Locations Battle of Ni Le, September 1971 (annotated map). 163

I. 33rd Regiment Headquarters Locations (SIGINT): 29 April - 2 July

1969 - (Battle of Bnh Ba). 165

Bibliography. 167

Index. 169
 7

Introduction

The 33rd Infantry Regiment was established on the 25th of April 1965 at
Tin Hoa village, Tuyn Hoa District in Qung Bnh Province.1 It comprised:
three infantry battalions from three divisions the 308th Division, the 320th
Division, and the 325th Division; and direct support companies of the 1st Regiment
of the 341st Division. After three months training, on the 20th of July 1965, the
Regiment crossed the Annamite Chain and entered the Central Highlands to
operate in the Pleime Campaign.
With the conclusion of the Pleime Campaign, the Regiment deployed to
c Lc to support the local revolutionary movement and participate in the Tt
Mu Thn Campaign of 1968 by attacking Bun M Thut town. In May 1968,
the Regiment deployed to the Eastern Nam B2 (B2) battlefield as part of the 5th
Division and took the title A57 as the peoples Resistance War against the
American imperialists entered its most decisive phase. The Regiment participated
in the fighting on the B Ra-Long Khanh battlefield and the Region 6 Front
changing its title to The Resolved to Win Regiment. Subsequently, it was
ordered back to Military Region 7 and with other units, attacked many enemy
posts and sub-districts and participated in the historic H Ch Minh Campaign,
contributing to the liberation of the South and the unification of the Nation.
With peace returned, the Regiment participated in the pursuit of the enemy
military remnants and the building and defence of the achievements of the
revolution in the Bin Ha and Vng Tu regions, and the construction of border
works in War Zone D. In July 1978, the Regiment was part of the 303rd Division
of Military Region 7 in the international task in Cambodia alongside our friends
and pursuing the genocidal Pol Pot-Ieng Sary elements in the provinces of
Kampong Cham, Kratie, and Kampong Thom. In 1979, when the Border War
broke out in the North, the Regiment deployed to defend the border until 1989.
In honouring the soldiers of the Heroic 33rd Regiment and its 24 years of
combat, development, and coming-of-age and the achievements of its cadre and
soldiers, the Party and the Nation awarded the Regiment the insignia of an Heroic
Unit of the Peoples Armed Forces and many other combat medals. The Regiment
had overcome difficulties and hardships along its journey and had become
stronger with every battle. Coming-of-age, it built a glorious tradition, and was
1
Translators Note: Qung Bnh Province was the southern-most province in North Vietnam in the
Panhandle bordering the 17th Parallel Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and with the Republic of Vietnams
northern-most border province of Qung Tr to the south below the DMZ.
2
Translators Note: Nam B was the communist term for the region of Vietnam south of the Central
Highlands - equating to the earlier French colonial Cochin China region. The US historian and author,
Merle Pribbenow translated Nam B as Cochin China. Eastern Nam B was an area extending from the
Phc Tuy/Bnh Tuy coast north-west to the Cambodian border; and was established in December 1960
coincident with the founding of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. For changes in VC
military and administrative regions, see: Viet Cong Political Geography of South-Vietnam, Viet-Nam:
Documents and Research Notes, Document No.93, US Mission in Vietnam, March 1971.
 8

awarded the 16-word golden title : Held on Staunchly Overcame Difficulties

Resourceful and Flexible Always Fought and Won.
From the Central Highlands battlefield the home of the hero Nup3, a
well-known name that went down in history like Pleime, the Ia rng Valley, Ch
Prng [sic] Mountain, Bun M Thut and later the ng Hng Stream, Lc
Ninh, Du Ting, the Long Bnh Logistics Complex, Bnh Ba, c Thnh Sub-
Sector4, Sui Nghe, H Nai, Ch L, Tanh Linh, Hoi c, Long Khanh, Xun
Lc and up to the place names in the Land of Pagodas ((ie Cambodia)), and the
delta of the Red River were all associated with the feats of arms of the cadre and
soldiers of the 33rd Regiment.
Regardless of place or time throughout our beautiful Vietnam, the soldiers
of the 33rd Regiment were always proud of the units brilliant tradition, and
constantly remembered a youthful time of dedication and sacrifice for the peoples
liberation, for our homeland to recover its unity, and - in a constructive way
defend our Nation and undertake our international responsibility.5 In order to
create this work The History of the Heroic 33rd Infantry Regiment (1965
1989), the 33rd Regiment Veterans Liaison Committee wishes to respectfully
thank the concern and the guidance of the Province Committee, the Province
Peoples Committee, and the Military Headquarters of B Ra-Vng Tu Province
who have created the conditions for the timely publication for its readership on the
71st anniversary of the establishment of the Vietnam Peoples Army and the 50th
anniversary of the founding of the Regiment.
An important aspect worth recognising is that the book has been able to
give expression to the deep gratitude, sentiment, spirit of camaraderie, and sacred
companionship towards the Regiments almost 4,000 martyrs that bravely fought,
shed their blood and died offering up their lives for the Nations independence
and freedom. This is engraved deeply in the infinite gratitude of their fellow
country-men who have provided for and protected the Regiments soldiers on
every past battlefield.
Although the books editorial committee has strived in its research and
examination, it is difficult to avoid shortcomings such as the portrayal of a number
of the Regiments past commanders. The Heroic 33rd Regiment Veterans Liaison
Committee hopes to receive a large number of critical comments and opinions,
and supplementary documents from fellow comrades and readers both far and
near, so that future revised editions can be of higher quality.

3
Translators Note: Bok Nup (1 May 1914 10 July 1944) was a resistance leader of the Ba Na minority
people in Gia Lai District who fought against the French.
4
Translators Note: A Sector (Tiu Khu) was the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) regional
military command covering a province; Sub-Sectors (Chi Khu) were the subordinate district-level ARVN
military commands. For Special Sectors (Yu Khu), see footnotes 112 and 134; for Sub-Sub-Sectors (Phn
Khu, Phn Chi Khu) see footnote 172.
5
Translators Note: International responsibility is a reference to Vietnamese operations in Cambodia
against the Khmer Rouge regime - ie 1979-1989.
 9

We wish to respectfully introduce this book into the hands of our

readership, both within and beyond our armed forces.

The Veterans Liaison Committee

The 33rd Regiment
 10

(This page is intentionally blank)

 11

The Beginnings

The Background to the Founding of 101B Regiment

The Predecessor to The 33rd Infantry Regiment

I. The Historical Setting

On 13 January 1959, the 15th Conference (Term II) of the Central
Executive Committee of the Party passed a Resolution on the path of the
revolution in the South, confirming the way to develop and conduct the revolution
in the South with the aim of liberating the South, defending the North, and
uniting the country. Resolution 15 came into effect in response to the eager
aspirations of that time of the cadre and soldiers of both the South and the whole
nation. This was the flame that vigorously raised up the ng Khi Movement6
that changed the revolution in the South. In the spirt of the Resolution, the 4th
Conference of the Nam B Committee (November 1959) put forward the
following task of the the Nam B Party Chapter: aim to overthrow the ruling Ng
nh Dim puppet clique of the American imperialists. The method to achieve
this was the use of revolutionary violence by political struggle in coordination
with armed struggle.
The political crisis of the season of coups had created serious damage to
the fighting strength of the units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam.
Its generals were overly busy competing for power and were completely passive
in facing the assaults of the Liberation Forces. In only a short period of time, 63%
of the territory in the South was under the influence or control of the Peoples
Liberation Front of South Vietnam. After their continuous defeats, the Armed
Forces of the Republic of Vietnams Special Warfare strategy had been
completely destroyed. In order to save the Si Gn regime from being overthrown
and to change the situation on the battlefield, the American government decided
to send troops to directly participate in our countrys South. On 10 April 1965, the
US Marines 2/3rd Battalion landed at Nng, beginning the large scale
participation by the Americans on the battlefield in Vietnam. In June 1965, the
American President approved a search and destroy strategy, aimed at finding,
pursuing, and destroying the regional main-force units.
After the 9th Central Committee Conference, many high-level military
cadre of the Vietnam Peoples Army were sent to reinforce the Central Highlands,
Military Region 5, and Nam B. A number of main-force regiments were also
ordered to deploy into the South to fight. On 1 April 1964, in the Central
6
Translators Note: The ng Khi Movement or the Simultaneous/Concerted Uprising against the
Dim regime (beginning in very late 1959 and peaking in 1960), is cited by communist sources as the start
of the armed struggle in the South. The Uprising reportedly began in M Cy District of Ben Tr Province
in mid-January 1960.
 12

Highlands, the Central Highlands Front with the cover designator of the B3
Front, was established under the direct leadership of the Central Military
Committee and the Ministry of Defence. The first commander of that Front was
Senior Colonel Nguyn Chanh, and the political commissar was Senior Colonel
on Khu. In the two-year period - 1964 and 1965, many units of the Vietnam
Peoples Army regrouped into the Central Highlands before spreading out to fight
across all the battlefields in the South. In September 1964, the 320th Regiment was
the first main-force regiment to enter the Central Highlands. Subsequently, other
infantry regiments such as the 101A Regiment, the 545th Battalion, and the 952nd
Sapper Battalion successively deployed into the Central Highlands, creating a
strong main-force grouping equivalent to a division, and opposing the puppet 23rd
Division stationed in the Central Highlands.

II. Establishing the 101B Regiment the Predecessor of the

rd
33 Infantry Regiment.

On 25 April 1965, in Bu Ba hamlet of Tin Hoa village, Tuyn Hoa

District in Qung Bnh Province, the 101B Infantry Regiment was established -
comprising three infantry battalions from each of the 308th, 320th, and the 325th
Divisions, and direct command companies of the 1st Regiment of the 341st
Division. The Regiments Headquarters personnel were: Major V Sc the
Regimental commander; Major Nguyn Trng M political commissar; Captain
Nguyn c Khi chief-of-staff; and Captain inh deputy chief-of-staff. The
head of the Political Section was Captain Nguyn Huy Liu, and the deputy was
Captain No. The Rear Service Section was led by Comrade Di, and the Combat
Operations Section was led by Dng Vn Thu. Nguyn Bnh Hy headed the
Reconnaissance Section, and Comrade Ln was in charge of communications.
Comrade Lng commanded the artillery, and the engineers were under Comrade
Huyn. The Chemical Section was led by Comrade Tho, and Comrade Nhn
commanded the cypher ((c yu)) operations element. Comrade Tinh was in
charge of Section 5.7
The battalion headquarters comprised:
st
1 Battalion: ng Quang Nguyt commander; Comrade Phng political
commissar.
2nd Battalion: Comrade Dc commander; inh Vn t political commissar.
3rd Battalion: Comrade Xo - commander; Comrade C political commissar.
Apart from the three infantry battalions, the Regiment also had eight
independent companies: 16th Company (82mm mortars); 17th Company (RCLs);
18th Company (12.8mm anti-aircraft machine-guns); 19th Company (engineers);
20th Company (communications); 21st Company (reconnaissance); 22nd Company

7
* Section 5 was the Office Section.
 13

(transportation); and the 23rd Company (medical support). The Regiment

comprised more than 3,000 cadre and soldiers. Almost all the leadership cadre of
the battalions and the companies had served in the resistance war against the
French colonialists, and had experience in combat and unit leadership. The
platoon and section commanders had basic schooling and had done short training
courses, while the soldiers recruited in 1964 and 1965 had completed basic
training. The Regiment was based in Tuyn Hoa District of Qung Bnh Province
about 20 kilometres west of the banks of the Gianh River. The 1st Battalion was
at Chu Hoa village, the 2nd Battalion at Tin Hoa village, and the 3rd Battalion
was stationed in Mai Hoa village. The cadre and soldiers of the Regiment were
accommodated in the peoples houses - and were provided for, assisted, and cared
for by the people.
On 29 May 1965, the order was received from the Ministry of Defence for
the Regiment to reluctantly farewell its comrades and deploy to Xun Mai village
in Tuyn Hoa District (nowadays Minh Hoa District) where huts were built in an
area of jungle for military and physical training, and political study. The cadre and
soldiers worked from 6 a.m. to midday with each soldier carrying a personal load
of 30-35 kilograms during 10-15 kilometre marches as endurance training, and to
prepare for the long days of difficulties and hardships during deployment in the
days soon-to-come. In the afternoons, there were political and military studies. In
their military training until their day of departure, the units undertook training in
infantry combat techniques, the tactics of attacking strong defences, mobile
attacking tactics, using hand-grenades, and hand-to-hand fighting. During this
period, the Regiments commander V Sc, and a number of the cadre went as
an advance party to study the Gia Lai Central Highlands battlefield in order to
prepare for the Regiments deployment and participation in combat.
.
 14

Chapter One

Crossing the Annamite Chain and Fighting on the

Central Highlands Front (July 1965 June 1968)

I. Deploying to the Central Highlands Front (7/1965

10/1965).

On 10 May 1965, the 101B Regiment received the order from the Ministry
of Defence to prepare to take the road to fight in the South. Before deploying, the
Regiment held an all-levels Party Conference to undertake political and
ideological tasks for the troops, to awaken their love of the homeland and country,
and to instil a deep hatred of the enemy, and the responsibilities of that generation
of H Ch Minh-era youths. To ideologically inspire the soldiers, the commanders
at all levels kept in close touch with the soldiers and built their resolve not to fear
sacrifice and hardships and to be prepared to accept and accomplish every task
given to them. The animated and enthusiastic atmosphere among all the
Regiments cadre and soldiers produced concrete acts all the units wrote
resolutions to send to higher levels with their signatures in blood. Their eager wish
was to be allowed to carry a weapon right into the fighting with the enemy with
everything for our blood brothers in the South. The departure ceremonies that
were organised in the Minh Hoa jungle area moved everyone.
Before 20 July 1965, the Regiment was issued with military equipment to
go to B (ie to go and fight in the South). This comprised: back-packs,
hammocks, canvas tents, Liberation Army uniforms, hats with floppy brims, water
bottles, food for seven days, sufficient equipment, weapons, and base loads of
ammunition. Annamite Chain walking sticks were the travelling companion of
every cadre and soldier on the way down to the battlefield. The deployment plan
for the Regiment was thoughtfully and meticulously planned and comprised three
phases with each wave three days apart.

Stage 1: 1st Battalion departed on 20 July 1965.

Stage 2: 2nd Battalion departed on 22 July 1965.
Stage 3: 3rd Battalion departed on 24 July 1965.

The Regimental Group (comprising the staff, political, and rear service
elements) and the direct support companies were divided up and deployed
following the battalions under Nguyn c Khi the chief-of-staff, Nguyn Huy
Liu head of the political office, and Comrade Thu the head of the combat
operations section.
The Battalions implemented their deployment plans moving through the
way-stations (binh trm) organised by the people. Their reception was well-
 15

prepared with places to rest and cooked midday and afternoon meals prepared for
the troops. The families in the areas of the way-stations gave up their homes to the
troops after their gruellingly hard and tiring night march. After their afternoon
meal, the Womens Association and the Youth Group8 at each way-station would
carry the packs to help those soldiers in weak health. They accompanied the
troops for one to two hours before turning back. After marching for seven days
and nights, they reached Ho Village the last way-station on the territory of their
beloved North. The troops were allowed to rest for a day to restore their strength
and to receive supplementary food. They prepared to move to a new way-station
and face the difficulties and the hardships of crossing the mountain ranges of the
imposing Annamite Chain.
On 2 August 1965, the Regiment began to deploy on the Annamite Chain
track in the west of Laos the land of our friends. From that time, the cadre and
the soldiers cooked their own food and slept in canvas hammocks hung on jungle
trees. By day, the Regiments soldiers moved secretly through the jungle, carrying
over 30 kilograms on their shoulders comprising: military equipment and
supplies, and weapons. Each had a handful of rice; a water bottle; half a kilo of
sugar; 300 grams of sodium glutamate, and a can of shrimp sauce.9* The ration
scale was 700 grams of rice per day. Each section of the route was about 30-35
kilometres. Usually, the troops would march from 7 a.m. until 4 or 5 p.m. in the
afternoon until they reached a communications-liaison station and prepared to
cook their evening meal and to prepare a handful of cooked rice for the next days
march. Sometimes, they reached a commo-liaison station and there was no food -
and they had to pick jungle vegetables and bamboo shoots in lieu of rice for three
days in a row. When it rained and there were strong winds, finding kindling wood
and lighting a fire to cook a meal was very difficult. The trail in the Western
Central Highlands was only wide enough for one person to pass, the trees were
luxuriant with several layers and blocked out the sky. Many times, they went for
hours without seeing sunlight. Further, the slopes were steep, there were abysses,
and in the rainy season the trail was very slippery with many leeches. When there
was a flood, the soldiers were forced to sit and wait for hours for the water to
subside. In crossing floods, our engineers would fell two large trees at the rivers
edge and join them together to make a raft and then stretch cane ropes across for
the troops to hang on to. When crossing the flooded areas in this way, they would
wrap their packs in nylon to make flotation buoys. They would carry heavy items
on their shoulders and use walking staffs in case, inattentively, they slipped and
8
Translators Note: The organisation of the communist Vietnam Workers Party (ng Lao ng) - and
the Peoples Revolutionary Party (ng Cach Mng Nhn Dn) - ie the Workers Partys arm in the South
from January 1962, included Party Labour Youth Groups (on) at all levels whose members aspired to
Party membership. Selected members could graduate to probationary membership of the Party (at about age
24) then full membership of the Workers Party or the People's Revolutionary Party . For detail, see:
Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story (and the Battle of Long Tan), Point
Lonsdale, 2016, Annex H.
9
* At that time, they called it cream sauce ((mm nem)).
 16

fell into the flood and were swept away like our two soldiers: V nh Ngc and
L Duy Lc, incidents that grieved their comrades.
After marching for a month, the hunger and cold began to affect the
troops. The ration scale was 700 grams of rice per day, but they still felt hunger.
Every day, they had to seek out bamboo shoots and jungle vegetables as
supplements. Unfamiliar with such exertion, a number of the cadre and soldiers
caught malignant malaria and had to remain behind to be treated some did not
recover. The units had to organise recovery elements along the march route.
Within these, the assistant political officers of the companies assisted by
encouraging the ill to make it to the commo-liaison post. When the 3rd Battalion
reached Gia Lai, it had to stop for a number of days as the advance party had not
yet finished the terminal camp there was no rice laid aside, and the soldiers had
to eat cassava/manioc provided by the local minority people. At first, everyone
was able to eat quite a lot, but afterwards they became tired of it, ate less, and their
strength weakened.
After three months10 of carrying heavy loads and suffering difficulties and
hardships but with the will and spirit of All for our blood brothers in the
South, the cadre and soldiers of the Regiment had crossed the deep streams,
climbed the high passes, crossed the abysses, and overcome the determined enemy
impediments. On 5 October 1965, the Regiments march reached its concentration
area in the Ty Nguyn Front.11*
The units stopped at An Ta, Ba B, and Br Ring and took out their
nylon sheets and hammocks as cover to construct a camp of huts in order to rest
and recover their health for five days as well as preparing material aspects, food,
rations, weapons and equipment in preparation for the fighting that would be full
of difficulties, hardships, and sacrifices. However, the Regiments soldiers
remained brimful of optimism for victory in battle.

10
Translators Note: Other records note that after a difficult and dangerous 49-day march, the Regiment
arrived in the B3 Central Highlands Front see: L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33 rd
Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.3 Appendix 3 in Chamberlain, E.P., The 33 rd
Regiment , op.cit., 2014. Way-stations (binh trm) with subordinate T-stations, were managed by
Military Region 559. It was reportedly the first fully-manned and equipped NVA regiment to be deployed
into South Vietnam. According to a US summary, the average of earlier infiltration groups was 90
days, the 33d Regiment infiltrated from North Vietnam into the Central Highlands of RVN in about 60 days
confirmed strength 2,000. - USMACV CICV: Order of Battle Study No. 66-1: Enemy Force Build Up
July 1964-December 1965, 18 February 1966.
11
* Another title was Worksite 20-7.
 17

II. Defeating the Americans in Battle in the Pleime Campaign

(October 1965 November 1965). 12

At the beginning of 1965, the American imperialists Special Warfare

strategy had been defeated. Faced with the danger of military disintegration and
the overthrow of the Si Gn government, the American government rapidly sent
military forces to South Vietnam as a critical support for the puppet troops and
government, and implemented a Limited Warfare strategy. In the Central
Highlands, the enemy deployed a large number of well-trained units to engage in
combat because the Central Highlands held an especially important position in
military-strategic terms. At Pleiku, the Si Gn military had placed the
Headquarters of Military Region II and the 4th Air Force Division. At Bun M
Thut were located the 2nd Infantry Division and an Armoured Brigade. Along the
border from Dak Pek to Plei Cn were four Ranger Groups (numbered: 2, 6, 21,
and 22). In particular, the An Khe (Gia Lai) region had a brigade of the South
Korean Brave Tiger Division.13 The balance of forces and technical means
between our forces and the Americans and their puppets had significant changes.
The military strength of the Americans, their vassals, and puppet forces was
greater, and their weapons and technical equipment was much more modern. Our
opponents also had an absolute advantage in airpower, naval power, artillery and
armour. They also had a high degree of battlefield mobility, and the capability to
rapidly provide battlefield support.
Facing this situation, the Military Committee of the Ministry of Defence
had chosen the Central Highlands as the battlefield on which to test the American
forces. In August 1965, Major General Chu Huy Mn was appointed as the
Commander and concurrently the Political Commissar of the Central Highlands
(B3) Front. At an expanded Conference of the Party Committee of the Central
Highlands Front, the commander and political commissar Chu Huy Mn presented
the case, the situation, and direction to the leadership cadre - and discussed and
exchanged ideas with a focus on the problem of: How to fight and defeat the
Americans ?. Through this, the cadre and party members confirmed that first
12
Translators Note: A comprehensive account of the battles at Pleime and in the Ia rng Valley is in:
Pribbenow, M.L., The Fog of War: The Vietnamese View of the Ia Drang Battle (also as Sa Mu cua
Cuc Chin: Cai Nhin Vit Cng v Trn anh Ia rng), Military Review, January-February 2001.
http://www.generalhieu.com/e66pleime-2.htm . An official Vietnamese Army website - includes 15 pages
of discussion - in Vietnamese, of the battles at Pleime, the Ia rng Valley, and Sa Thy see: Dng nc -
Gi nc, Trn Ia Drang v Playme, Sa Thy, 22 June 2008.
http://www.vnmilitaryhistory.net/index.php?topic=2047.0
13
Translators Note: Several Vietnamese communist accounts also contend incorrectly, that a South
Korean regiment was involved in the ((Pleime-Ia rng)) Campaign. Nguyn Minh Nht, Hi ap Lch S
Vit Nam (Questions and Answers on Vietnamese History), Tp 9 (Vol 9), Nh Xut Bn Tr, TP H Ch
Minh, 2013, p.35. BTS-(QDND), Chin dch Plei me, Communist Party of Vietnam On-line, 14 April
2005.
 18

of all we have to dare to strike the Americans and be resolved to fight to win; and
while fighting we must draw on our experiences to ensure that we find a way to
fight and defeat them.
In September 1965, the Americans sent their 1st Air Cavalry Division to
An Khe (Gia Lai), cutting the Central Highlands from the delta areas along the
coast. The puppet military established the 24th Special Zone in the two provinces
of Kontum and Gia Lai and passed the principal combat responsibility for the
Central Highlands to the American forces in order to put into effect their search
and destroy plan within their Limited Warfare strategy.14* As at December
1965, the total number of US troops directly involved in combat in the South had
risen to 184,314. In the Central Highlands as it was an important strategic
region, the strength of US and vassal troops in mid-1965 had reached a total of
130,000 men.
In the Pleime, Bu Cn, and c C areas - about 30 kilometres to the
south-west of Pleiku City, the enemy had the 3rd Air Cavalry Brigade, an airborne
brigade, a Si Gn armoured brigade, and a South Korean regiment - with artillery
and aircraft (including B-52s) in support, to seek out and destroy our main forces,
and to support the puppet forces implementing their pacification program.
The Central Highlands Battlefield Headquarters decided to change its plan
to liberate the northern Central Highlands, and issued directions to begin the
campaign by attacking the entrenched Pleime camp with the aim, in
coordination with the whole battlefield in the South, to wipe out an element of the
US forces and to open and strengthen the liberated regions, build bases, and to
train the troops and the campaign staffs. This would be achieved through
successive battles - and a step-by-step investigation of the Americans tactics
while at the same time creating a belief in our daring to strike the Americans and
our resolve to defeat them.
Major General Chu Huy Mn was the Commander and concurrently the
Campaigns Political Commissar. Senior Colonel Nguyn Chanh and Colonel
Nguyn Hu An were the Deputy Commanders; Comrade Hunh c Hng
held the position of Deputy Political Commissar; and Colonel Nam H was the
Chief-of-Staff. Colonel ng V Hip was the deputy in change of the Political
Office.
At the beginning of October 1965, based on the results of our examination
of the enemy and our preparations, the Campaign Headquarters confirmed its
Resolution and tasked the units to wipe out their objectives: The targets and areas

14
* On 17 July 1965, American President L. Johnson approved the proposal to increase US forces to over 44
battalions and to implement General Westmorelands search and destroy plan. Formations arriving from
July until the end of 1965 were: infantry divisions - (The Big Red One) and the 1st Air Cavalry Division; the
1st Brigade of the Air Cavalry Division (Tropic Lightning [sic]), and the 11 th Armored Cavalry Regiment.
Translators Note: The foregoing footnote lacks a verb. The US 25th Infantry Division (Tropic Lightning)
was not an Air Cavalry Division. The US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment did not arrive in South
Vietnam until early September 1966.
 19

selected to wipe out the enemy were the Ch Ho post; the Pleime defended post
was to be surrounded; and the relief force on Route 21 was to be ambushed as it
deployed to relieve the blockade (from Point 538 to Blu Hill). The area to strike
the Americans was in the Ia rng Valley; the diversionary objective was the
posts at c C and Tn Lc with the sappers target as the Bu Cn post; with
coordination from the east of Route 14 and Kontum.
Ideological guidance and tactical requirements were to surround the
Pleime defensive position and destroy the reinforcements principally to wipe out
the enemy outside their defensive works. The method of attack was to surround
the post in order to draw out the puppet reaction force by road, and create the
conditions to destroy a puppet main-force task force or regiment-level formation.
This would force the Americans to deploy troops to counter-attack, and they
would be successively destroyed by companies as they moved to the rescue. In
concert with the concentrated main-force strike, there would be minor activities by
our other forces to create continuous attacks, and to disperse the enemys
capability to cope.
Before the Campaign began, the Regiments Party Committee met to fully
grasp the Resolution of the B3 Fronts Party Committee, and to build the will of
the cadre and soldiers with a resolve to: Wipe out the puppet Task Force, and
dare to attack and determine to defeat the Americans in this first battle. Political
and ideological activities played an important part in solving troubling and
difficult thoughts and any lack of will among the cadre and soldiers as they sought
ways to attack the Americans. The Regiment organised a force to conduct
reconnaissance, study the terrain, create the combat methods to strike the enemy
immediately, and deploy the forces to go ahead in order to lay a nest egg. The
Regimental Headquarters comprised: Major V Sc as the Regiments
Commander; Major H Trng Ba as the Political Commissar; Captain Nguyn
c Khi as the Chief of Staff; Captain No as the Deputy Political Commissar;
and Captain inh as the Deputy Chief of Staff. For the Campaign, the Front
reinforced the Regiment with a company armed with 12.7mm air defence
machine-guns.
The campaigns plan was divided into three phases;
- Phase 1: Surround the Pleime defensive post and wipe out the puppet
troops.
- Phase 2: Continue to surround the Pleime base and force the Americans
into combat.
- Phase 3: Concentrate our forces to wipe out the American forces in combat
and conclude the Campaign.

On 19 October 1965, the Central Highlands Front Headquarters ordered

the Regiment to surround the Pleime base in order to lure the Americans to come
to their aid. The 1st Battalion had the task to surround the northern area; the 3rd
Battalion surrounded the south, and the 2nd Battalion was the reserve force for the
 20

Campaign together with other units ready to strike the enemy relief troops that
would try to break through on Route 21.
The Campaign15 unfolded as follows: At about 2354hrs, the 3rd Company
of the 3rd Battalion opened the attack using its firepower against the defences of
the Ch Ho post. To begin the battle, section commander Trng Hu Lut
bravely and cleverly used explosives to open the gate.16* Immediately afterwards,
using all the firepower and artillery support of the Regiment, we destroyed a
number of the defences and the soldiers accommodation. At the same time, we
very bravely assaulted and destroy two wire fences defending the north and the
south-west and killed a number of the enemy, captured prisoners, and seized
weapons. In only a few minutes, we had command of the battlefield and then
surrounded the main objective. Under the illumination of parachute flares and
fires, our troops dug defences and quickly developed these into connecting
communications trenches between our fighting positions.
From 20 October, the surrounded enemy employed aircraft to fiercely
attack the Regiments positions continuously for a number of days. However,
unable to achieve their aim, their infantry force moved down Route 21 to break
our encirclement. The enemy then organised reinforcements, and the 320th
Regiment re-configured to its forces to block, attack, and wipe out the enemy. The
2nd Battalion of our 33rd Regiment was ordered to deploy in coordination, but
approaching the area, the enemy had fled completely. At 12 p.m. on 23 October
1965, the enemys 3rd Armored Task Force deployed from Ph M to Pleime. The
Task Force was configured as three squadrons/elements (a squadron of M113s and
tanks, the 21st Ranger Battalion, the 1st Battalion and the 42nd Regiment - together
with two 105mm howitzers).17 In their deployment plan, they did not dare moving
15
Translators Note: The Plei Me/Pleime/PlayMe Campaign (conducted in part of the Dry Season: 19-25
October 1965) was followed in the same region by the Ia rng Campaign (14-18 November 1965) to the
south-west. According to the 304th NVA Divisions history of the Campaign: After the battle at Dak Sut
((the Dak Sut District Town and the Special Forces base was overrun on 18 August 1965)), the 101 st
Regiment was sent down to the B2 Front, and the newly-arrived 101B Regiment was designated the 33 rd
Regiment. Nguyn Huy Ton & Phm Quang nh, S on 304 (304 th Division), Tp II (Vol II),
Peoples Army Publishing House, H Ni, 1990. The US After Action Report noted: By the 27th
((October 1965)), the NVA regiment responsible for the siege of Plei Me was positively identified as the
101B or the 33d, the latter designation used almost exclusively thereafter. 1st Air Cavalry Division,
Combat After Action Report - The Pleiku Campaign, 4 March 1966 (a comprehensive 226-page US report
on the Campaign with annotated maps). See also: 1 st Air Cavalry Division, Operational Report Lessons
Learned 3-66: The Pleiku Campaign, 10 May 1966 (226 pages) including detailed tactical-scale maps
VCAT Item No.1070422001 or DTIC Pdf URL . The PAVN Military History website Dng Nc Gi
Nc (Building and Defending the Nation) includes a discussion blog: Trn Ia Drang v Playme, Sa
Thy with over 30 pages of postings from June 2008 to December 2012 - see
http://www.vnmilitaryhistory.net/index.php/topic,2047.0.html
16
* This was a type of tactic to open up and seize a bridgehead for the infantry to conduct an assault to
seize the internal objective.
17
Translators Note: According to a comprehensive 226-page US report - with annotated maps: The total
relief force consisted of the 3d Armored Cavalry Squadron, the 1/42 Infantry Battalion, the 21 st and 22d
Ranger Battalions, all total : 1,200 men, 16 tanks, and 15 armored personnel carriers. - 1st Air Cavalry
 21

rapidly lest they were ambushed. At about 1630hrs, the enemys leading elements
fell into our ambush site. At 1648hrs, the enemy surprisingly bombed Point 538
where we had sited our blocking force. Then, the enemy used five tanks in a line
to attack and seize the objective. Our unit used its firepower to wipe out the
enemy, setting fire to two vehicles, and holding the position. An enemy element
regrouped at c Lp Hill, and our forces attacked several times but were unable
to seize the feature and the battle was very fierce. Although unable to be
resupplied with rice or water, our cadre and soldiers held on and tightly and
maintained the encirclement. The result of the battle was that we destroyed many
tanks and armoured vehicles, killed many of the enemy, seized a quantity of
weapons, and shot down two aircraft.
Faced by the defeat of the puppet forces, General Westmoreland the
commander of the American expeditionary forces, urgently went to the Central
Highlands, and ordered Major General Harry Kinnard the Commander of the 1st
Air Cavalry Division: You must find the enemy and take the initiative in your
hands. Having received that order, the 1st Air Cavalry Division joined the
fighting in the Central Highlands.

The 33rd Regiment participated in the destruction of the puppet Task Force
on Route 21 the key battle in the Pleime Campaign (23-24 October 1965).

Division, Operational Report Lessons Learned 3-66: The Pleiku Campaign, 10 May 1966, p.27. VCAT
Item No.1070422001 or DTIC Pdf URL AD0855112.
 22

At 7 a.m. on 24 October, the enemy employed a large number of

helicopters to insert the first American battalion to the south-west about two
kilometres from Ph M. At 1500hrs that day, the American Air Force [sic]
continued the use of its helicopters to land a battalion together with 105mm
howitzers and 106.7mm mortars at Ply oat to the north-east about 10
kilometres from the Pleime post. With the support of the American forces, the
remaining enemy of its 3rd Task Force and recent reinforcements (the 22nd Ranger
Battalion and the 91st Special Forces Battalion [sic]18 continued to advance
towards the Pleime defensive position.19 but were blocked by our forces and
struck decisively. After this battle, the American forces began to employ their
attack aircraft in the area to seek and wipe out our troops. The situation on the
battlefield developed violently, and communications between the companies and
the battalions and with the Regimenal Headquarters, were interrupted. The
soldiers took the initiative to drive back the waves of counter-attacks, and killed
hundreds of the enemy. With the impetus of victory, our forces attacked and,
rolling up the barbed wire, engaged the enemy actively with sniper fire and
threatened the helicopter landing area and increased the pressure on the enemy
within the post. Having surrounded the Pleime position for a fifth day, our food
reserves were exhausted. Our soldiers shared each handful of fried rice and each
mouthful of water and Pleime position still remained tightly surrounded.
From 20 until 25 October, the enemy used its air forces and artillery to
fiercely attack the area around Pleime. The enemy infantry within the base

18
Translators Note: The 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion of three or four companies, were all
Montagnards. In 1966, the unit was reportedly purged of non-Vietnamese, and reorganised as the 81st
Ranger Battalion.
19
Translators Note: At the time of the attack, the Pleime base itself was manned by a Vietnamese Special
Forces element (14), 10 US advisors, and a US-advised 250-strong Montagnard (Jarai, Rhade, Bahnar)
CIDG (Civilian Irregular Defence Group Dn S Chin u) force. Another 40 CIDG occupied two
outposts north-east and south of the base, and elements were also on external patrols. Two Vietnamese
Special Forces (Airborne Ranger) companies reinforced the base on 22 October. The armoured relief
column from Pleiku arrived at 1845hrs on 25 October having been attacked by the 32nd NVA Regiment
enroute. For the detailed US 5th Special Forces Group account, see CIDG in Camp Defense (Plei Me) in
the 5th Special Forces Group, Quarterly Command Report, 31 December 1965 - VCAT Item
No.168300010050. That report lists casualties as: US Special Forces 3 killed, seven wounded;
ARVN/CIDG 30 killed, 59 wounded; NVA/VC - 141 confimed killed, 241 estimated killed, 300
estimated wounded. A copy of a US air-dropped PSYOPS pamphlet - in Vietnamese, depicting a Chinese
communist advisor is included in the report: your sacrifices/deaths only satiate your bellicose Chinese
communist advisors. For US and ARVN intelligence collection and reports of communist advisors in NVA
formations (and their intercepted Mandarin communications) including in the 33rd Regiment, see: Nguyn
Vn Tn, Intelligence Gathering at Ia rng, 10 August 2011 -
http://www.generalhieu.com/iadrang_intelligence-2.htm . For a Chinese observers map of the battle at LZ
Albany on 17 November 1965 reportedly published in Beijing in 1971, see: Nguyn Vn Tn, 11 August
2014 at http://www.generalhieu.com/lzalbany_battle-u.htm . A 33rd Regiment POW related the activities
of a Chinese medical technician who visited the Regiments field hospital at Station 5 (YV 838979) in
Pleiku in January 1966. The Chinese technician was reportedly a member of the Chinese medical team at
VC Hospital 2, Region 5 (Kontum Province). VCAT Item No.F034600401345.
 23

counter-attacked to ease the encirclement. However, although liaison had been

lost, our soldiers remained calm, unyielding, and bravely took the initiative to
repel the waves of counter-attacks wiping out hundreds of enemy. By 1600hrs
on 25 October 1965, the 33rd Regiment had completed its task to surround and
pressure the Pleime base and destroy the enemy relief force on Route 21. The
Regiment was ordered to withdraw to the Ia rng Valley20 about 10 kilometres
to the west, and to develop defences. As the Regiments 1st Battalion did not
receive the order to withdraw, it continued to attack the barbed wire and, with
active and deadly sniping fire, wear down the enemy. Indicative were the exploits
of L ng Ng a section command in the 2nd Company, who was tasked to
ambush the enemys airfield. Each soldier carried a water bottle and a container of
fried rice. After the first day, they ran out of water and a medic died of thirst.
His comrades crawled out to retrieve a number of water bottles and had to share
turns in taking sips of water. By the fifth day, a number had been killed and
wounded and taken to the rear leaving only three comrades: Ng, Gng, and
Sinh who resolutely held on despite the bombs, storm of firepower, hunger and
thirst. On the sixth day, the enemy attacked with tanks, and Comrades Ng and
Sinh calmly fired upon the tanks, setting fire to two. The enemy withdrew and
fired straight into our position. However, the three comrades continued to return
fire decisively. By 6 p.m., they had run out of ammunition and, exploiting the
darkness, the three withdrew safely from the battlefield.
On 26 October 1965, the headquarters of the American brigade moved to
Bu Cn and Vnh H. The puppet II Corps Headquarters also used helicopters to
command the relief of the encirclement of Pleime. At that time, the US Air Force
joined the battle, suddenly increasing the intensity of the enemys firepower. The
enemy concentrated on striking the 33rd Regiment in order to assist the counter-
attack by the puppet forces. At midday on 26 October, a fierce battle took place
between 11 of our soldiers pressuring the south-east of the Pleime position led
by the commander of the 1st Platoon of the 3rd Battalions 2nd Company. They
broke up five attacks by an enemy infantry battalion that was reinforced by 22
armoured vehicles and tanks. Under a fierce shelling and outnumbered, our
soldiers gathered up the weapons of their fallen comrades. Some used up to three
different types of weapons to attack the enemy. At difficult times in the fighting,
there were examples of bravery and resourcefulness such as that of Platoon
Commander u Vn Phn. Although wounded, he still bravely bore the pain and
calmly inspired his troops to fight on resolutely with the spirit of Well continue
to fight on. The battle last until darkness fell. As a result, we wiped out 40 puppet
troops, three American advisors, and destroyed three M113s and two tanks.

20
Translators Note: The Ia rng sometimes as the Ya rng (rng River), is a valley in a four-sided
area bounded by Plei Me, Bu Can, c C, and Plei The/Te. This area covers approximately 12 square
kilometres and is about 45 kilometres south-west of Pleiku City. The average elevation of this area is
between 400 and 500 metres. South of the Ia rng is the tall, prominent Chu Pong (Ch Png/Prng)
Mountain Range - 732 metres in height, which lies along the Vietnamese-Cambodian border.
 24

Having completed all tasks outstandingly, u Vn Phn received the order to

lead his platoon in a withdrawal in order to conserve our forces. However, five
soldiers were weak from hunger and thirst and suffering from several wounds,
and they were missing for 10 days before re-joining their unit.
The Central Highlands Campaign Headquarters decided that we would
destroy an important part of the puppets mobile forces and force the Americans
to engage in combat. The task of surrounding the Pleime base had been
accomplished. Our plan was to lift the encirclement and readjust our formations.
The Campaign Headquarters held the 320th Regiment and the 33rd Regiment in
readiness to defeat the expected enemy counter-attacks.
The Campaign Headquarters ordered the 33rd Regiment to lift the whole
encirclement, quickly re-organise its forces, and move to other positions ready to
receive further orders. The 1st Battalion deployed to the area of the Ia Muer
Stream, and the 3rd Battalion moved to the west of Ch Ho ready to attack a
landing of American forces. Following the orders of the Front Headquarters, on 25
October 1965 the 33rd Regiment lifted the encirclement of the Pleime base. After
ten days of fighting, our forces had attacked and wiped out more that 300
Americans21, and struck a warning blow in that curtain-raising operation in the
Central Highlands.22 Having outstandingly completed our task in the first phase of
the Campaign, we withdrew and prepared for future activities.
On receiving the news of their heavy defeat at Pleime, General
Westmoreland the commander of the Americans expeditionary forces in the
South, had to rapidly visit the advance headquarters of the 1st Air Cavalry Brigade
at Ply -mt to assess the situation, and to suspend the American sweeping
operation in Bng Sn (Bnh nh Province) in order to concentrate forces in the
Central Highlands and begin offensive operations deep in our rear areas in order
to try and break the stalemate for the puppet forces.
The enemy discovered the location of the 33rd Regiment and the 66th
Regiment, and deployed the US 1st Air Cavalry Division in a search and destroy
operation. On 31 October, they landed American troops from helicopters at Mi
Village and attacked one of our reconnaissance teams after which they withdrew
21
Translators Note: In this Pleime phase, only about 11 US personnel are noted as killed in action see
Siege at Plei Me Chronology: 191910 thru 280660. This US Air Force report notes that NVA heavy anti-
aircraft fire downed several aircraft: two B-57 Canberra bombers (one of which recovered to Pleiku
airfield); two A-1E Skyraiders (propeller-driven ground attack aircraft); and at least one HU1B [sic]
helicopter. 19 C-123 Provider transport aircraft and two CV-2B Caribou transport aircraft were also hit by
groundfire. VCAT Item No.F031100010247.
22
Translators Note: As noted earlier, the US After Action Report related: By the 27th ((October 1965)),
the NVA regiment responsible for the siege of Plei Me was positively identified as the 101B or the 33d, the
latter designation used almost exclusively thereafter. 1st Air Cavalry Division, Combat After Action
Report - The Pleiku Campaign, 4 March 1966 (a comprehensive 226-page US report on the Campaign with
annotated maps). See also: 1st Air Cavalry Division, Operational Report Lessons Learned 3-66: The
Pleiku Campaign, 10 May 1966 (226 pages) including detailed tactical-scale maps VCAT Item
No.1070422001 or DTIC Pdf URL AD0855112. As noted, a comprehensive account of the battles is in
Pribbenow, M.L., The Fog of War: The Vietnamese View of the Ia Drang Battle see footnote 12.
 25

immediately. Another enemy company landed on an empty field to the north-west

of Ia Bring and attacked a communications element close to the 2nd Battalions
base. The 33rd Regiment ordered the 2nd Battalion to quickly move to the Ia M
Stream. The next day, when an element returned to Ia Bring to recover
equipment and weapons to the new station, they met an American company that
had landed near the 2nd Battalions base. The unit adopted a tactical formation and
attacked the enemy - inflicting heavy losses on the American company, seizing a
number of weapons, and forcing them to flee in panic that very afternoon.
Immediately afterwards, the enemy landed troops to construct a fire support base
at Ia Bring. The 33rd Regiment attacked that fire support base before nightfall,
inflicting heavy damage on the fire support base, and forcing the enemy to move
its forces during that very night. The next day, we seized a large quantity of
105mm rounds and other equipment and weapons. At this time, the 66th Regiment
was deploying to meet the enemy. The 33rd Regiments 1st Battalion joined with
the 66th Regiment and stuck close to the enemy in the Ia rng Valley inflicting
heavy losses on an American brigade. The 2nd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment
continued to fight in the Ia Bring area, and the 3rd Battalion fought in the area of
An Ta and Ba B.
On 1 November 1965, an American company attacked the operating
theatre station of the 33rd Regiment and captured three comrades23 - and a quantity
of documents and medical equipment. On the same day, the 3rd Company of the
3rd Battalion was tasked to carry rice for the unit. As they were preparing to
depart, they were suddenly discovered by an enemy spotter aircraft ((qun ln))
following which a large number of artillery rounds fell near the units position.
When the sound of the shelling had ceased, helicopters landed an American
company. Our units coordinated to attack the puppet troops located about 400
metres from our Battalions position. The situation was extremely desperate, and
Comrade Xo the battalion commander, tasked the deputy commander of the 3rd
Company to abandon the rice-portering task and organise units to immediately
take up a defensive position on a cliff about 300 metres from the Battalion and to
strike the enemy in order to defend our wounded and the headquarters. An
unequal engagement ensued, and Comrade Sn the company commander, and
Comrade Khan the political officer, were wounded and required hospitalization.
With 30 of our men facing 200 Americans and their puppets, the deputy company
commander with his brave and dauntless spirit, led the troops and was
determined not to allow the enemy attack into the hospital. At exactly 9 a.m.,
American troops were observed lining up to attack our position. Allowing the
enemy to advance to within about 30 metres to avoid their artillery fire support,
our unit opened fire all at once, and a great number of the enemy were killed and
wounded. They called in artillery uninterruptedly into the rear of our positions.
The enemy continued to assault, and we fought exhaustingly with them from tree-
23
* The three comrades were: L in charge of the medical facility; Comrade Lc the company
commander of the 2nd Company; and Comrade Sn.
 26

to-tree and bunker-to-bunker. A number of our cadre and soldiers were wounded
like Comrade L a platoon commander, Comrade K a platoon second-in-
command, Comrade Trng a courier; and two comrades died bravely in the
fighting. The 3rd Battalion was nearby and actively came to assist. The battle was
waged fiercely from 6 a.m. until dark, and we had destroyed an American platoon.
Having been sorely defeated and unable to achieve their plan, the enemy used
artillery support and then aircraft, to scoop up their surviving troops back to
their base.
On 2 November, an American battalion assaulted into the c Nghip
plantation and remained there for a day. The next day, an American battalion was
landed at Ply Th and clashed with a company of the 33rd Regiment, and a
violent engagement ensued. The next day, an American company and a puppet
company assaulted the old 2nd Battalion24* camp, and was fired upon and attacked
by our 3rd Battalion wiping out an enemy platoon.
On 6 November 1965, an American company attacked the position of a
company of the 1st Battalion. The 2nd Battalion deployed to assist the 1st Battalion,
and they collectively wiped out almost a full enemy company at South-East Ia-
M. Guided by mottos such as: Whenever we find the Americans, we attack;
As one, or together, we attack; and Grab the Americans by their belts and
strike them25 the Regiments soldiers had given the Americans a hiding and
many blows, forcing them to withdraw from the jungle areas of the Chu Png
Mountain.
On 9 November, after examination and judging the main thrust of the
Americans counter-attack, the Front Headquarters (B3)26* chose the Ia rng
Valley as region to fight the second key battle and wipe out the enemy. The 66th
Regiment joined with our Regiment in the fighting.
On 10 November, the Americans decided to change their 1st Brigade with
the 3rd Brigade and return to Bu Can. In this phase, the Americans employed
elements with the capability to seek us out.
On 11 November, an American battalion landed at Play Ngo, 12
kilometres to the west of Pleime. On hearing this, the Campaign Headquarters
decided to implement Plan 2. To open Phase 2, the sappers of 952nd Battalion used
four mortars to shell the headquarters of the American 3rd Brigade at Bu Cn. In
the following days, the enemy strengthened the intensity of its firepower greatly.
Two 105mm artillery positions fired constantly, and tactical aircraft attacked
several times each day in support of the Americans. Subsequently on 14
November in a heliborne operation, they landed a battalion in the area to the

24
* The 2nd Battalion had moved to another position.
25
Translators Note: Grabbing the enemys belts and striking them was an expression that exhorted
communist fighters to close tightly with the enemy in order to negate the enemys artillery and air support
see footnote 184.
26
* The B3 Front was the Central Highlands Front.
 27

north of Ch Png and to the south-west of Quynh Kla. In the south-east of the Ia
rng, they landed their 2nd Battalion and established two fire support bases.
On 15 November 1965 in a cruel and savage act, the American forces
employed B-52s to attack the Ch Png region with hundreds of tons of bombs.
When the bombing ceased, they landed troops but did not consolidate their
positions before they were immediately and constantly attacked by the soldiers of
the 33rd and 66th Regiments. The US colonel commanding the American 3rd
Brigade was killed in his helicopter.27 General Westmoreland rapidly deployed
strategic bombers in support. Each day, the American artillery shelled heavily, and
they continuously used their jet aircraft to attack us. Throughout the night and
day, the jungle and hills of the Ch Png resounded with the explosions of the B-
52 carpet-bombing and the American artillery. Trees were felled and napalm
fires spread across the Ia rng Valley.
Two days later on 17 November, the Americans continued their B-52
attacks in the Ch Png Mountain area. Next, they landed additional forces: the
2nd Battalion of the 5th Air Cavalry Regiment and a battalion of the 7th Air Cavalry
Regiment, into the Ia rng Valley with the aim of blocking the withdrawal of our
forces. While deploying, the 1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment and the 66th
Regiment contacted the enemy, and our forces quickly adopted combat
formations. Using their air and artillery support, the enemy drove our forces some
distance away but the soldiers of the 33rd Regiment were resourceful, brave, and
dauntless, and were able to strike the enemy at close range and prevent the enemy
from using their supporting firepower. The Regiments 1st and 3rd Battalions
formed attacking columns to strike the enemys flanks. Attacked by surprise, the
enemy regrouped to resist us. In the fighting, Comrade Xo the commander of
the 33rd Regiments 3rd Battalion died heroically; and Comrade C the political
officer, was seriously wounded. Forced by this situation, Comrade Phng the
battalion second-in-command, assessed the circumstances, and resolutely led both
of the battalions but was killed to the great regret of his comrades. Despite not
having leadership with bravery our soldiers still held the battlefield and fought
unyieldingly for eight hours continuously. They destroyed almost all of an
American battalion and inflicted heavy casualties on another of their battalions.
This was the key and decisive battle of the Pleime Campaign. The battle was
tough and fiercely fought and a number of cadre and soldiers died bravely in the
fighting. The soldiers of the Regiments 1st Battalion staunchly held their positions
and continued to attack the enemy. When their ammunition ran out, they fought
on resolutely with bayonets and rifle butts. Comrade Cao inh Th used his
bayonet to courageously stab to death an American soldier and save his comrades
who were struggling with that enemy in the middle of a field. Political Officer
inh Vn D although wounded, still fought on killing five Americans and
using his bayonet to stab to death three others. Comrades L Khc Nga and L
27
Translators Note: Colonel Thomas Brown commanding the 3rd Brigade, was not killed in the Ia rng
Campaign.
 28

Vn u daringly thrust deep into the enemys formation, killing tens of the
enemy. Following the Campaign, a number of comrades were awarded the title of
Brave Killer of Americans.
In these circumstances, the enemy had an absolute advantage in firepower
and in the modern means of waging war. In the frenetic face-to-face fighting in
the Ia rng Valley, the soldiers of the 33rd Regiment exhibited cleverness and
unsurpassable strength, and achieved an outstanding victory in destroying a
battalion of the American air cavalry. Only a small number of the American
survivors were able to flee back to their base. In the face of our pressure, the
enemy air-landed two batteries of 105mm artillery four and a half kilometres to
the east of Landing Zone (LZ) X-Ray28 to coordinate fire support with the fire
support base at Phan Cn ((Falcon))29 and the offensive air support for their 1st
Battalion (Moore30). The commander of the 3rd Brigade ordered the 2nd Battalion
(led by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Tully31), to move to the LZ Victor area32 (the
name given by the enemy) two miles from LZ X-Ray to rescue the 1st Battalion.
At midday on 17 November 1965, the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Air Cavalry
Regiment landed at LZ Albany, and having discovered the 33 Regiments
position on the banks of the Ia rng River, launched an attack on the 33rd
Regiment while our soldiers were a midday rest.

The 33rd Regiment attacking American forces in the Ia rng Valley

the key decisive battle in the Pleime Campaign (14 17 November 1965).

28
Translators Note: LZ X-Ray was at the base of the Ch Png Massif and bordered by a dry creek bed on
the west. The Ia rng River was about 2 kilometres to the north-west.
29
Translators Note: Fire Support Base Falcon was located eight kilometres to the north-east of LZ X-Ray.
30
Translators Note: Lieutenant Colonel Harold G. Moore commanded the 1st Battalion, 7th Air Cavalry
Regiment.
31
Translators Note: Lieutenant Colonel Robert Tully commanded the 2 nd Battalion of the 5th Air Cavalry
Regiment.
32
Translators Note: LZ Victor was about six kilometres to the south-southeast of LZ X-Ray.
 29

The 33rd Regiments reconnaissance element reported that the enemy were
approaching. At the same time, the 1st Battalion also received an order to deploy
to Ch Png. On the way, the Battalion heard the sounds of gunfire, and moved
forward quickly to engage the enemy. The Americans 2nd Airborne [sic] Battalion
was encircled by the 8th Battalion of the 66th Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the
33rd Regiment. Employing close hand-to-hand combat, our troops bravely and
resolutely attacked the Americans who were in utter confusion and many were
wiped out.
On 18 November, the Campaign Headquarters ordered the 33rd Regiment
to attack the Falcon fire support base to the west of the Ia Muer Stream. To
achieve this task, from 1630hrs on 18 November the 2nd and 3rd Battalions
together with a mortar element under the direct command of the Regiments chief-
of-staff, conducted an attack by fire on the American fire support base.33 We
wiped out a number of American soldiers, wounded a number of others, destroyed
weapons and equipment, shot down two aircraft, and seized a large number of
mortar rounds. Having suffered a humiliating defeat, the Americans conducted
carpet-bombing by B-52 aircraft five times each day and our cadre and soldiers
were forced to cross the border into Cambodia to conserve our forces. Only when
the situation had stabilized, did we return to our base.
Next, our 3rd Battalion with our 1st Battalion, attacked an American
group in the Ch Pa Valley. The enemy had blocked a corridor for the two
battalions to cross into Cambodia and afterwards returned to the area of the 27th
of July Bridge to join with the 10th Division to attack the enemy.
When the battles in the Ia rng Valley had concluded, on 18 November
rd
the 33 Regiment again attacked a fire support base and inflicted heavy casualties
on the 2nd Battalion of the American air mobile forces at Ia M. Having suffered
continuous defeats, the Americans and their puppets were alarmed and worried.
On 19 November, the 3rd Brigade of the American air mobile forces suddenly fled
from the battlefield.
On 25 November 1965, the Pleime Campaign concluded34, and the 33rd
Regiment and other units wiped out a combined mechanized infantry task force of

33
Translators Note: US records indicate that Fire Support Base (FSB) Columbus about two kilometres
east of LZ Albany, was attacked by elements of two enemy regiments on 18 November for three hours the
troops and equipment at FSB Falcon were being redeployed on that date.
34
Translators Note: A recent Vietnamese account of NVA casualties relates that: From 19 October to 26
November 1965, the 320th Regiment ((ie the 32nd Regiment)) suffered 166 killed and 197 wounded; the 33 rd
Regiment lost 170 killed, 232 wounded, and 121 missing in action; the 66 th Regiment suffered 208 killed
and 146 wounded. Accordingly, total casualties suffered by our forces in the Campaign were 544 killed,
575 wounded, and 121 missing. So, our total casualties could be counted as 1,240. However, that is for the
whole Plei Me Campaign not just the Ia rng battles. See the Vietnamese military blogsite: Chiangshan,
Trn Ia Drang v Playme, Sa Thy, Dng Nc Gi Nc (Building and Defending the Nation),
op.cit., 22 February 2009. http://www.vnmilitaryhistory.net/index.php/topic,2047.55/wap2.html . These
official figures were earlier reported in: Nguyn Hu An Colonel General, Chin Trng Mi - Hi c
 30

the Si Gn puppet forces; destroyed the 2nd Battalion, and inflicted heavy
casualties on the 1st Battalion of the US 1st Air Cavalry Division. We had driven
from the field more than 1,200 Americans including killing 305 (their names are
recorded on a wall in Washington35*). We had destroyed 89 military vehicles and
shot down 59 aircraft. The 33rd Regiment alone had driven more than 100
American soldiers from the battlefield. Pleime was the first campaign to strike the
Americans in the Central Highlands Front.
The Campaign had been wholly outstanding in completing all given tasks,
and wiping out a part of the American forces right from the first battle. The enemy
was forced to deploy three divisions to fight on the battlefields of the Central
Highlands: the 1st Division (the Big Red One), the 25th Tropic Lightning Division,
and the 4th Marine Division.36 The Pleime Campaign was the most glorious
fought in the spirit of: If we meet the Americans, we attack if we find them, we
wipe them out. The victory of the Campaign had great significance in both
political and military terms. Forces were mobilized and Military Region 5 alone
and the whole country in general, contributed towards strengthening the
confidence of our troops and the people to dare to attack the Americans and defeat
them and to believe in justice and the leadership of the Party in our struggle to
liberate the people. The Ia rng Valley went down in history together with
other glorious military feats. It marked the first defeat of the Americans on the
battlefield in South Vietnam while at the same time raised the curtain for the
movement to kill the Americans across the whole South, from one victory to
another.
After the Pleime Campaign, the Central Highlands Front held a General
Conference, and Comrade Chu Huy Mn assessed the strong and weak points and
our experiences in fighting the Americans. Our units that had participated were
awarded the Military Exploits Medal 1st Class37 - and the 33rd Infantry Regiment
was among those awarded that honour.

(New Battlefield), Peoples Army Publishing House, H Ni, 2002, p.86. VCAT Item No. 16900105001.
In a Campaign history, Nguyn Hu An is noted as a deputy commander of the Campaign. - Phm Vnh
Phc (ed - et al), Operation Ply Me, Operations in the US Resistance War, Nh Xut Bn Th Gii, H
Ni, 2009, p.16.
35
* According to Youth Magazine, No.48, 27 November 2005 on the 40th anniversary of the Pleime
Campaign.
36
Translators Note: Several of the 33rd Regiment history monographs claim that the Regiment engaged
three US divisions in late 1966: the US 1st Air Cavalry Division, the US 25th Division, and the US 4th
Division. However, the US 25th and the US 4th Division arrived in the Central Highlands after the Pleime
and Ia rng battles. The US 4th Infantry Division first deployed to Pleiku on 25 September 1966 and later
engaged in fierce combat with NVA regular troops including the 33rd Regiment, in the mountains around
Kontum Town and Dak To in mid-late October 1967. Several Vietnamese communist accounts also
contend incorrectly, that a South Korean regiment was involved in the ((Pleime-Ia rng)) Campaign.
37
Translators Note: Hun chng Qun cng Hng nht.
 31

III. Deploying for Combat at c Lc (1966-1967).

At the end of the 1966 Dry Season, the revolutionary movement in c

Lc Province had yet to develop. With the completion of the Campaign to
surround the Pleime defensive base, the 33rd Regiment was ordered to move to
c Lc and support the local revolutionary movement to strike the district capital
and sub-sectors. The Regiments command organisation comprised: Ma Vn Minh
Regimental Commander; and Comrade Lim Political Commissar. The
Regiment was called the Vnh Ph Regiment and its 3rd Battalion was termed
Vnh Khang. Subsequently, the 1st Battalion was called Vnh Thin, and later it
was reinforced with the 39th Battalion led by Comrade R with Comrade Kh as
its political officer.
The 3rd Company of the 3rd Battalion was ordered to go ahead and prepare
food and provisions. After more than a month of crossing the jungle, valleys, and
streams from Gia Lai to c Lc, the unit reached that province. In c Lc at
that time, finding food and provisions was difficult, and the 3rd Battalion had to
cross Route 14 to get rice in the Hi An settlement in C Mgar District (District
5).
At the end of the 1966 Dry Season, there were changes in the Regiments
organisation when Comrade V Sc the Regimental Commander, was posted to
B3. T nh Khn became the Regimental Commander with Comrade Hn as the
Political Commissar.
On 28 March 1967, the 3rd Company joined with the armed forces of
District 4 to attack the hamlet of Bun Lung, and forced the 2nd Battalion of the
puppet 23rd Divisions 44th Regiment to break the blockade. We inflicted heavy
losses on the 2nd Battalion. Next, we continued to strike the enemy in Qung
Nhiu Sub-Sector (District 5) and in Cm Ga and Bun H, sub-sectors of c
Lc Province. When attacking the post at Bn n an exposed position with the
river on one side and fields on the other, the enemy reinforced the defenders and
our reconnaissance elements were detected. Our unit was unable to achieve its
aim, and suffering casualties, was forced to withdraw.
Previously in c Lc, only puppet forces were active. When the 33rd
Regiment arrived, the enemy regrouped and did not dare to undertake sweeping
operations as they had done previously and a number of strategic hamlets were
attacked and freed. The Americans had to bring troops directly into District 4.38*
The 3rd Battalion attacked the American post at Bun Ry inflicting heavy
casualties on them and forcing the enemy to withdraw from District 4. The
Regiments base was on the Cambodian border, and our cadre and soldiers both
fought the enemy and were engaged in transporting food, weapons, and
ammunition in preparation for the General Offensive of Tt Mu Thn in 1968.

38
* During the resistance war against the Americans, the districts of c Lc Province were referred to by
their numbered secret cover designators.
 32

IV. Participating in the Tt Mu Thn Campaign in 1968.

1. Joining with the local armed forces to attack the enemy in

Bun M Thut Town in 1968.

With a thorough grasp of achieving the strategic policy of the Party

Politburo and the Ministry of Defence, the Regiment prepared for the Tt Mu
Thn Campaign of 1968. The Standing Committee of the Party and the Central
Highlands Headquarters were united in their resolve to: mobilize the armed forces
and the minority peoples to strive to the utmost in attacking the enemys bases
continuously and comprehensively. To unite our leadership and direction and to
coordinate the two forces and the three types of troops on the battlefield, the
Standing Committee of the Party and the B3 Front Headquarters held a joint
conference with the local leadership to discuss ways of coordination between the
main-force troops and the local armed forces to launch the 1968 Tt Mu Thn
General Offensive.
The confirmed objectives were the three towns: Bun M Thut, Pleiku,
and Kontum. The Party Committee and the Front Headquarters formed a Forward
Headquarters for Kontum, Gia Lai, and c Lc that included the comrades of the
local leadership. The Campaign Headquarters was established north of c Lc
with Trng Cao Dng the deputy chief-of-staff of the Front, as its commander.
Bn o the secretary of the c Lc Province Committee, was the political
commissar. Nguyn C the c Lc Province Unit commander, and Ma Vn
Minh the commander of the 33rd Regiment, were the deputy commanders of the
Campaign. Hunh Vn Cn the political officer of the c Lc Province Unit
was the deputy political commissar. To implement the Politburos strategy, the
Region 5 Committee, the Central Highlands Front, and the c Lc Province
Committee met and discussed the decision to select Bun M Thut Town as the
principal battlefield and directed that the districts were supporting objectives in
the 1968 Tt Mu Thn Campaign.
The 33rd Regiments tasks were to join with a local Sapper Battalion (D14)
to attack Bun M Thut Town. The attack plan was reinforced with a rocket
battalion of the Front and included the support of the c Lc Province armed
forces. The attack on the enemy was to focus on the south of Bun M Thut
Town. The specific battalion objectives were: 101st [sic] Battalion was to attack
into the headquarters of the puppet 23rd Infantry Division; the 39th Battalion was
to strike the radio transmitting station, the prison, and the Lam Xa area; the 3rd
Battalion was to attack the enemys tank and armoured vehicle area at Mai Hc
.
The secondary thrusts were in the north: the Sapper Battalion (a Province
unit) would attack the administrative area, the Ha Bnh airfield, and the Regional
 33

Force battalion. The Campaign guidance was that units were to hold any objective
that they seized.
At the time when the Central Highlands was afire with revolutionary
momentum and awaiting the order from the Front Headquarters, an order was
received from above to delay the opening fire and the launch of the attacks by one
day in order to coordinate with attacks across the whole of the South. That news
was disseminated downwards, and all three provinces responded that: the troops
were ready, the masses were ready and that it was not at all possible to delay.
They proposed that they open fire as previously planned. In a timely manner, the
Standing Party Committee and the Front Headquarters reported back to the
superior authority, requesting that the Central Highlands be allowed to open fire in
accord with their plan on the night of 29/30 May 1968 (according to the Lunar
Calendar). That proposal was accepted by the higher authority.39
At exactly 0030hrs on 30 January (ie: the night of 29-30 Tt Nguyn an
Mu Thn 1968), the Central Highlands Front Command ordered the launch of the
operation. At the same time, when the sound of fireworks lit by the people of
Bun M Thut was just beginning, salvoes of our rockets were violently fired at
our targets in the Town disrupting the enemys firepower and also signalling our
troops on all fronts to simultaneously open fire and attack. In the south the 101st
Battalion joined with the local armed forces guided by a guard of the puppet 23rd
Division, to attack the 23rd Division and captured an American advisor major.40
The 3rd Battalion struck into the enemys armoured area. On the morning of the
first day of Tt, an element of our 101st Battalion attacked the Regional Forces
Sector. In the south-west, the 3rd Company of the 1st Battalion reinforced the 39th
Battalion and swiftly attacked the radio transmitting station and the Popular Force
39
Translators Note: According to the US historian Merle Pribbenow: According to the calendar issued by
the Saigon regime, the first day of the Tet Lunar New Year in 1968 was 30 January on the Western
calendar, one day later than the date for Tet given in the calendars used in North Vietnam. On the afternoon
of 29 January 1968, Military Region 5 received a cable postponing the attack until the night of 30-31
January. Military Region 5 only had time to alert the 2 nd and 3rd Divisions, the 10th Regiment, and Quang
Nam and Quang Ngai provinces of the postponement. The provinces of Quang Da, Phu Yen, Binh Dinh and
Khanh Hoa did not receive the postponement order, so they opened fire during the night of 29-30 January,
according to the schedule in our initial plan. - Pribbenow, M.L., Victory in Vietnam, University Press of
Kansas, 2002, p.466, endnote 15. A recent Vietnamese account relates that: Across all the regions it was
decided that H-hour on D-Day was from 0000hrs to 0200hrs on 31 January 1968, that is the night of 1-2 of
Tt in the old calendar. The Military Regions and the special forces groups were advised 48hrs prior to H-
hour. It was regrettable that because of the change of the calendar in the North that MR5 and the Central
Highlands opened fire beforehand according to the new calendar (The order to postpone was received but
the troops had already taken up their concealed positions and asked to be able to attack before time). The
B2 Front received the order to postpone action, and opened fire in accord with the old calendar. - Nguyn
n T - Major General, Mu Thn 1968 - Cuc i chin lch s, Nh Xut Bn Lao ng, H Ni, 2008.
http://www.vnmilitaryhistory.net/index.php?action=printpage;topic=26599.0.
40
Translators Note: US reports relate that Michael Benge a former US Marine sergeant (1956-1959) and
USAID deputy for Darlac Province, was captured by North Vietnamese forces. Held in Cambodia and
North Vietnam, he was released on 5 March 1973. Benge appears to be the captured US major mentioned
in the 33rd Regiment histories.
 34

Training School wiping out a Regional Force company and seizing and
occupying the radio station. We captured a number of important objectives in the
Town such as: the radio station, the headquarters of the 23rd Division of the Si
Gn forces, the Province Administrative Headquarters, and the Police
Headquarters. We shelled the 43rd Regiment and the Ha Bnh airfield. We next
developed our attack to seize the accommodation and vehicle areas. At 2 a.m. on
the morning of 30 January, the district armed forces joined with the 1st Company
of the 33rd Regiment to strike the Qung Nhiu and Ph Hc settlements; and to
attack the 4th Battalion of the puppet 45th Regiment, killing many of the enemy
troops. On the night of the 6/7th day of Tt, the Regiment received the order to
withdraw from Bun M Thut Town and prepare to strike at counter-attacking
enemy forces. On the night of 3 January [sic] 1968, the 33rd Regiment attacked the
Province capital, but was unable to achieve its objectives because the enemy
counter-attacked fiercely, and we were forced to withdraw.

2. Participating in the Second Phase41 of the 1968 Campaign.

In the first phase of the 1968 Tt Mu Thn attacks, Comrade Phng

the commander of our Vnh Thin Battalion, Comrade Tho the chief of staff,
and 30 other comrades had died heroically. On 17 March 1968, having fought at
Ch Kha Net in Bun M Thut, the Vnh Thin Battalion was ordered to
withdraw and attack enemy forces endeavouring to break through our blockade of
the Town. We had fought throughout the fierce battle without the opportunity to
consolidate our positions or receive troop reinforcements or ammunition.
Suddenly, the 2nd Battalion of the enemys 45th Regiment of the puppets 25th
Division appeared on our flank. The 1st Battalion deployed and opened fire on
them fiercely. Employing our tactic of Grabbing the enemys belt and striking
him, we resolutely attacked. The battle lasted almost two hours and a number
of the enemy were killed and 120 weapons of various types were seized. The 1st
Battalion had defeated the strategic aim of the Americans, the puppets, and the
South Koreans and forced them to change their plan to recapture Bun M
Thut, but to only attack its periphery. Once their infantry had pulled back, the
enemy used their artillery and aircraft to shell and bomb our Battalions position
including with napalm. Meanwhile, the 39th Battalion continued to attack the Lam
Xa area - while an element struck the enemys counter-attack in the Mai Ha
plantation.
The General Offensive and Uprising of Tt Mu Thn 1968 by the forces
and people of c Lc included the direct participation of the 33rd Regiment and
fellow units and had achieved great victories. We had simultaneously attacked
41 important enemy objectives across the Province including almost all of the
41
Translators Note: According to US intelligence staffs, the 1st Phase of the Tt 1968 Offensive concluded
on 6 April; the 2nd Phase - lasting 36 days, ended on 14 June; and the 3 rd Phase lasted 33 days (18 August
until early September 1968). - Sorley, L., Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes, op.cit., 2004, p.173.
 35

nerve-centres of the puppet authorities and military in Bun M Thut Town. We

had wiped out and disintegrated more than 2,000 enemy, destroyed an American
company, three Regional Force companies, a special forces company, and
seriously worn down the 31st FULRO Battalion42, the 23rd Ranger Battalion, the
puppet 23rd Infantry Division and seized a large quantity of weapons and
ammunition and destroyed many aircraft and war-waging materiel. In seizing
and holding a number of important enemy positions in Bun M Thut Town, we
held on for seven days and nights. Following the end of the Campaign, a number
of the 33rd Regiments cadre were posted to the 320th Regiment. Comrade Khi
became the 33rd Regiments commander, and Comrade Liu was its political
commissar. The Regiment formed three new battalions passing the 3rd Battalion
to the 320th Regiment (with Comrade Lnh as the battalion commander, and
Comrade Tng as the political officer).

After three years of development and combat with will and firmness of
purpose, the 33rd Regiment had crossed deep streams, high mountain passes, and
abysses - and faced determined enemy hindrances, to deploy over the Annamite
Chain to fight on the Central Highlands Front. Our units first fought battles in the
Pleime Campaign in which we tested and defeated the American forces that were
equipped with the most modern and up-to-date weaponry. This was a victory
engendered by our love of our country and the resolutely courageous spirit of our
troops and the people in the Central Highlands Front. Our Regiment was part of
that glorious effort. After the Pleime Campaign, the Regiment deployed to c
Lc and inflicted heavy casualties on an American special forces company, and
supported the local movement in destroying a strategic hamlet. When participating
in the Tt Mu Thn Offensive (1968), we attacked and seized a number of
important objectives in Bun M Thut Town: the radio station, the headquarters
of the Si Gn forces 23rd Division, the Administrative Headquarters of the
Province, the Police Headquarters, the Ha Bnh airfield and we attacked
elements of the 43rd Regiment. Expanding our attacks, we seized the Americans
residential area, and the vehicle unit area occupying those objectives for seven
days. Those military exploits and sacrifices are deeply memorialized in the spirit
of comradeship and the spirit of unity between the troops and the people which are
still carried on by the Regiments community of cadre and soldiers that continue
to both train and come-of-age. A new stage in the fighting with hardships and
sacrifice - but full of optimism and confidence, and brimful of our heroic

42
Translators Note: FULRO (Front Unifi de Lutte Des Races Opprimes: The United Front for the
Liberation of Oppressed Races - 1964-1992) sought independence for ethnic minorities in Vietnam and
Cambodia. In early-mid 1968, FULRO was engaged in negotiations with the Si Gn Government on the
recognition of minority rights that were concluded on 11 December 1968.
 36

revolutionary ideology, began when the soldiers of the 33rd Regiment next
deployed to fight on the battlefields of Eastern Nam B.
 37

Chapter Two

Deploying to Fight on the Eastern Nam B Battlefield

(June 1968 May 1970)

I. As part of COSVNs43 5th Division and with the title of

A57, attacking the enemy in Ty Ninh Province.

On 29 May 1968, the Regiment deployed to Eastern Nam B.44* On 14

July 1968 - after two months of arduous marching and hardships over more than
400 kilometres, the Regiment arrived at its concentration area at K10 (ng Ban)
in the Dng Minh Chu base in Ty Ninh Province. The first task was to defend
the COSVN Headquarters and Rear Services C50s route. To guarantee secrecy,
the Regiments title was changed A5745 as a formation of the 5th Division
subordinate to COSVN Headquarters. The 5th Division had four regiments: the
55th Regiment (A55), the 88th Regiment (A56), the 33rd Regiment (A57), and the
74th Regiment (A74). The battalions of our Regiment changed their titles to 7, 8,
and 9. The appointments on our Headquarters were: Ma Vn Minh commander;
43
Translators Note: The Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN Vn Phng Trung ng Cc Min
Nam) - directed from H Ni and located in the Cambodia/South Vietnam border area north-west of Si
Gn, was the communist political and military headquarters responsible for South Vietnam south of the
Central and Southern Highlands - an area termed Nam B (as noted earlier, equating to the French
colonial Cochin China region). Geographically, the COSVN area covered the southern 32 of South
Vietnams 44 provinces reportedly containing 14 million of South Vietnams total population of 17.5
million (ie about 80%); 53% of its land mass; and 83% of the rice-growing areas (in 1968) USMACV
briefing, Saigon, 9 January 1970 - Sorley, L., Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes, 1968-1972 (Modern
Southeast Asia Series), Texas Tech University Press, Lubbock, 2004, p.336. COSVN however, did not
control the area of its geographic coverage described above. Sometimes abbreviated to Min,
COSVNs principal cover designators were R, Nm Trng, and Chn Nam.
44
* When the Regiment deployed to Eastern Nam B, the Regiment left the 39th Battalion behind in c
Lc Province.
45
Translators Note: In July 1968, in a significant order of battle change, the USMACV monthly report
noted that the 33rd NVA Infantry Regiment had probably changed location and was last noted in the
Darlac area on 10 June 1968. That report also listed the 33rd NVA Infantry Regiment with three Letter Box
Numbers (44347BK, 43190KP, 33150) and a large number of cover designators/aka: Vinh Phu; on
Vinh Phu; 101st Song Bac; Song Lam; 324; 520; 2th Regt/325 Div; 101B Infil Gp; Cong Truong 33; 202A;
33/50; 325B; Xa Phu; 520B; A520; 520E; 502C; 20th Regt; 542 Infil Gp; 1st Bn/32nd Regt; Xa 1; 311th
Bn; Nghia Quang; 308th; Xa Cong; 270th Regt; Do An Vinh Phu; Worksite 33; Public Place; 308D; 529D;
D502D; 101D; K-1. Monthly Order of Battle Summary: 1 thru 31 July 1968 Volume I, MACV J-
2/JGS, CICV, Saigon, August 1968. A 1968 report on the PAVN postal and communications system noted
the 33rd Regiments Letter Box Numbers (LBN) as 86.526yk and 7,8231ZC CDEC Log 01-1367-68. The
USMACV Order of Battle Summary: 1-30 September 1968, 30 September 1968 reported the 33 rd NVA
Regiment Headquarters, support units and its 1st Battalion (K1) were located in Ty Ninh Province at XT
425545 on 18 August 1968. For the use of the cover-designator on 84C, see CDEC Log 09-1659-69.
 38

Comrade Lim political commissar; V Tn Nam deputy political commissar;

inh Vn t director of the political section; Cao H - deputy commander; and
Comrade Vng Lu Tham chief-of-staff. The senior battalion commanders and
staffs were: 7th Battalion: Nguyn Huy Thn commander; Nguyn Vn Thng
political officer; 8th Battalion: Comrade Chau commander; Comrade Vnh
political officer; 9th Battalion: Comrade Lnh commander; H S Tng
political officer. Having established our camp, the cadre and soldiers of the
Regiment consolidated their units, organised the staffs, and undertook careful
tactical training ready to enter the fighting on the new battlefield46 that was full of
difficulties. The Party Committee and the Regiments Headquarters met and
discussed ways to focus our efforts, and to bring into play a spirit of unity and
competition among the battalions to achieve outstanding feats from the very first
battle.
After a month in Ty Ninh (August 1968), the Regiment formed a Sapper
Company (C24) of 42 cadre and soldiers allocated from the infantry units. This
was a priority unit chosen from comrades with the most experience who were:
dauntless, resourceful, brave, and active in combat. The Company was organised
into three platoons and each platoon had three sections. When first formed, the
Company only had 14 Party members47*, and the Company political officer was
appointed as the secretary of the Party Chapter. The Companys method of
combat emphasised: Secrecy, surprise, deep infiltration, concealment, striking
within and without, and spreading out within the enemy position. With those
tasks, the Company would attack the enemys main posts and sub-sectors.
In implementing the plan of COSVN Headquarters, the Regiments task
was to join with the local armed forces and begin a campaign of attacks on the
enemy within Ty Ninh and Bnh Long Provinces. We were to strike the outer
defence line of the Americans and their puppets in III Corps Tactical Zone and
wipe out a part of the enemys war-making potential, to push forward the local
revolutionary forces in their attacks to kill the evil enemy, destroy the enemys
grip, and open up areas. The principal focus of the campaign was the territory
of Ty Ninh, with Lc Ninh (Bnh Long Province) as a secondary objective, and
coordinated activities on the edges of towns. The forces consisted of the 9th
Infantry Division and the 33rd Regiment, 5th Regiment48, and 88th Regiment of
the 5th Division, together with the 74th Regiment and COSVN sapper units.
COSVN Headquarters provided a reinforcing COSVN artillery group as fire

46
Translators Note: In July 1968, 1 ATF produced the Outline Orbat Details 32 and 33 Regts, that
noted the 33rd Regiment is presently believed to be in the process of relocating into III CTZ in company
with 32 NVA Regt. The 33rd Regiments strength was cited as 530. see the detail including the
organogram at Appendix 12 to Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment , op.cit., 2014.
47
* A Party Chapter was established.
48
Translators Note: The 5th Vit Cng Main Force Regiment was termed the 275th Regiment by the US,
RVNAF, and the Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF).
 39

support for both the primary and secondary objectives. The Campaign was
conducted in two phases:
- Phase 1 from the night of 15 August to 31 August 1968; and
- Phase 2 from the night of 10 September to 28 September 1968.

The plan was initiated on D-Day when the 9th Division attacked Trng Ln
and Ty Ninh City in order to lure out the enemy. The 88th Regiment ambushed
the enemy on Route 22; the 33rd Regiment ambushed them on Route 2 [sic]49, at
Du Ting, and on the route from Cu Khi to Ty Ninh. The Regiment
developed a thoughtful plan, and was resolved to attack the American mechanised
vehicles. As we did not yet have experience in attacking mechanised vehicles, our
units conducted ideological sessions encompassing every soldier in order to
develop their resolve to wipe out the American mechanised infantry battalions (of
the US 25th Division).
On 15 August 1968, the 5th Division ordered the 33rd Regiment to ambush
and attack American relief forces in the Du Ting area that were moving towards
Cu Khi. This would raise the curtain for the Divisions operations and create the
conditions for our fraternal units to attack the objectives at Trng Ln, Tr Ph,
and Tua Hai and to draw out the Americans and wipe them out. At the same
time in coordination with the 5th ((275th)) Regiment, we would wipe out the
enemy forces and their capabilities at Bn Ci, the Ch L base, the G Da base,
and the enemys outposts along Routes 26 and 22.
On 17 August 1968, the Regiment deployed to develop its fighting
positions in the area of Lng ((Village)) 2, Lng 3, and Bn Ci. In accord with
the combat plan, the 8th Battalion was strengthened with two 75mm RCLs, and
two 82mm mortars and given the task as the forward blocking element with its
forces deployed from the ng Hng Stream to the west of Lng 3. The 7th
Battalion was tasked to attack opposite and, reinforced with six 12.7mm
machine-guns and three 75mm RCLs, was deployed behind the Lng 2 area. The
9th Battalion was strengthened with two 75mm RCLs and two 12.8mm machine-
guns and stationed to the east of Lng 3 to act as the rear blocking force and to
stop enemy relief forces moving from Du Ting and to defend the Regiments
headquarters. The ideological guidance for the ambush battle was for small
elements to strike and wipe out large forces50 - and to attack the enemy by
surprise.

49
Translators Note: This is National Route 2 north of Si Gn ie not Inter-Provincial Route 2 that ran
from B Ra Town north through Phc Tuy Province to join with Route 1 south of Xun Lc Town.
50
Translators Note: This tactics was described in a 2011 article: V Xun Dn, B nh dit ln (A large
killing with little loss), Qun i Nhn Dn - Ngh Thut Qun S Vit Nam, 11 April 2011. The article
relates that in this regimental-level action, 57 M113 and M41 armoured vehicles were destroyed a US
mechanised infantry battalion, a 50-strong commando platoon, and many weapons and equipment of
various types were seized.
 40

At 2200hrs on 17 August 1968, the whole Regiment secretly moved its

forces to the ambush sites from the ng Hng Stream to Lng 3 and Bn Ci. At
daybreak on 18 August, the enemy moved a mechanised infantry battalion and a
large number of tanks along Route 22 towards Ty Ninh in order to come to the
rescue of their comrades. The Americans used helicopters to try and discover our
forces, and sent a small element ahead to reconnoitre their deployment route. At
0930hrs, an enemy company and seven M41 tanks reached our key commanding
position at the Bn Ci T-Junction. At about 1100hrs, the enemy suddenly moved
down Route 22 and hooked in behind the 7th Battalions position.
Faced by this unexpected development, the Regimental Headquarters
determined that the enemy had discovered the 7th Battalion but had not yet
discovered the Regiments combat positions. Regimental commander Ma Vn
Minh ordered the 7th Battalion to concentrate on wiping out the enemys
reconnaissance element. The 8th Battalion and the 9th Battalion continued to
develop and camouflage their battle positions, holding their ground and awaiting
the enemys main force to enter the ambush site where they would
simultaneously open fire and attack the enemy from all directions. Immediately
after receiving the order from the Regiments commander to open fire, the 7th
Battalion opened fire from its positions - driving back the assaults by the enemy
tanks and infantry. Our 12.8mm air-defence machine-guns lowered their barrels
and set fire to an M113 armoured vehicle. The 3rd Company used B-40s to wipe
out two other vehicles, forcing the Americans to withdraw and call for air support
and artillery to strike out positions while they pulled back to their base at Du
Ting and abandoned their plan to come to the rescue of Ty Ninh. After a day of
fighting, we had destroyed a number of tanks and inflicted casualties on an enemy
company but we had not yet been able to destroy a large formation of American
mechanised infantry.
Knowing that the enemy could deploy forces to open up Route 2 [sic], on
19 [sic] August the Regiment Headquarters directed the cadre and soldiers of the
battalions to continue developing their defensive works, to maintain their ambush
positions, and await a convoy of American mechanised infantry advancing to
break through. At about 2400hrs on 17 [sic] August, the Regiments units had
built and camouflaged their positions, and strengthened their observation and
guard posts. The cadre of the platoons and companies directly examined the
situation, and every company assigned two B-40 teams ready to attack the enemy
during the night along Route 239. As anticipated, on 19 August 1968, from 7 a.m.
to 10 a.m., the enemy deployed into two columns of both infantry and armour to
break through on the stretch of Route 2 [sic] from Bn Ci to the ng Hng
Stream. The first column - comprising tanks, M113s, and an American infantry
company, advanced from the t St T-Junction to strike north-west of Bn Ci.
The second column of 46 armoured vehicles and an American infantry company
moved from Du Ting along the axis of Route 2 [sic] to attack the area of Lng
2, Lng 3, and Bn Ci. The time to kill the enemy had arrived, and Ma Vn Minh
 41

the Regiments commander, ordered the 8th Battalion to deploy an element to

open fire and block the enemy column to the north-west and to cut it off from the
second enemy column. The remainder of the Regiment concentrated to wipe out
the enemy advancing from Du Ting.
On the morning of 19 August 1968, the 8th Battalion blocked the enemy at
Trng Trng. With our first volleys, we set fire to four tanks and armoured
vehicles. Struck decisively, the American forces regrouped and organised their
mechanised infantry to focus on attacking the eastern flank of the 8th Battalion
aiming to render our blocking force ineffective. At that moment, the 7th Battalion
came through the enemys rain of bombs and artillery and squarely struck the
enemys mechanised column on Route 2 [sic], setting fire to two M41 vehicles
and three M113s. The Regiments mortars fired accurately into the ranks of the
enemy infantry while they were in panic, confused, and were unable to counter-
attack in time. The enemy was forced to retreat to an area to the north of Lng 3,
regroup their defences, and call in air and artillery support to block our attacking
columns. In this battle, Comrade Sm the deputy commander of our 7th Battalion
set fire to three vehicles; and Comrade Trn Vn Lun set fire to two tanks.
Following the battle, the two comrades were proposed for the award of the
Military Feats Medal.51
Moving through the falling bombs and artillery, the Regiments units held
on tight to the enemy and blocked their retreat on two sides. The 9th Battalion
moved to the east of Lng 2, took up commanding positions on Route 2 [sic] and
prevented the enemy convoy from retreating to Du Ting. The 8th Battalion
blocked the enemy, preventing them from fleeing to Ty Ninh. The 7th Battalion
moved swiftly to the north of Lng 3 and struck squarely into the enemys ranks.
At 1500hrs that day, the Regiment had tightly surrounded the Americans
mechanised convoy and infantry battalion. In accordance with our plan, when the
Americans began to move we all attacked simultaneously. The Regiments plan
was to readjust our combat formations, re-organise our forces into tactical
formations, and wipe out the enemy convoys. Through studying and evaluating
the situation, we noted that to the north of Route 239 the terrain was exposed and
there were many tracks all favourable for the deployment and manoeuvre of the
enemys mechanised elements. Accordingly, the Regiment deployed the 7th
Battalion as an ambushing force on the main axis.
As anticipated, at 1730hrs on 19 August, the enemys convoy fell into our
ambush. The Regiment ordered all elements to open fire: the 7th Battalion, 8th
Battalion, and the 9th Battalion coordinated closely and simultaneously wiped out
all the enemy within their areas of responsibility. At 1920hrs, the Regiment had
complete control of the battlefield. We cleaned up the battle area, and then moved
away from the combat zone. The Americans withdrew towards Du Ting and fell
into an engagement with the 10th Company (of the 9th Battalion) who blocked the

51
Translators Note: Hun chng Chin cng.
 42

enemys leading vehicles setting fire to a number of armoured vehicles and

destroying an enemy platoon. The whole Company opened fire at once, attacked,
and wiped out the mechanised infantry setting fire to six armoured vehicles.
Implementing our combat plan and coordinating to the sound of weapons
firing, the attacking columns of the 7th and 8th Battalions moved down the road to
strike straight into the enemy formations setting fire to seven armoured vehicles
including three M41 tanks. Immediately afterwards, the 7th Battalion deployed
its 1st Company to attack the north-west flank of the Americans, wiping out a
company that was withdrawing in flight to the west of Lng 2. In all three
directions, our battalions attacked the enemy simultaneously.52
The battle lifted the curtain on two days of continuous and coordinated
combat including ambushes, encirclements, and attacks. The 33rd Regiment
joined with its fraternal units to destroy an enemy battalion, and to seize a large
number of weapons, military equipment, and materiel.53* This victory at Bn Ci
fired the enthusiasm of our troops - and aroused and mobilised the movement and
competition to kill Americans across the whole Regiment and within the 5th
Division. Thanks to our resolute will, high fighting spirit, and ideological
guidance, our ambushes did not attack the enemy vehicle convoys piecemeal, but -
by the timely reconfiguring of our forces, we deployed to strike the enemy when
they were withdrawing also. The Regiment had struck the enemy with our plan of
small elements striking and wiping out large forces. Together with our fraternal
units, we had wiped out an American mechanised infantry battalion, a Ranger
platoon (of about 50 men), and seized a large quantity of weapons of all types.
With the impetus of that victory, on the night of 22/23 August, the 8th Battalion
attacked a group of American military vehicles at ng Hng Stream destroying
24 military vehicles, shooting down four aircraft, and driving the enemy from the
battlefield.
On 24 August, after a period of continuous combat, the 7th Battalion of the
33rd Regiment reinforced the 5th ((ie 275th)) Regiment and with a number of
elements of the 8th Battalion, attacked the G Da objective for a second time. The
7th Battalion divided into two forces the first element was a reserve for the 1st
Battalion that attacked an enemy headquarters. The second column acted as a

52 Translators Note: The 5th VC Division Memories relate that on 19 August in a two-day
engagement on Route 2 [sic] between Bn Ci and the ng Hng Stream, the 33rd Regiment ambushed
reinforcements and destroyed a battalion of the US 25 Mechanized Infantry Division. Reportedly, 47
enemy tanks and armoured vehicles were set afire, more than 100 enemy were killed on the spot, and many
weapons were seized. The article also mentions that following the engagement, the Divisions 275th, 88th
and 33rd Regiments successfully attacked the 25th US Division at G Da, Ch L, and Bn Ci Nguyn
Hng Phc Major General, Truyn thng chin u cua s on BB5 Anh hung, op.cit. 2005.
53
* As a result, the 33rd Regiment wiped out an American mechanised infantry battalion, and set fire to a
large number of mechanised vehicles including M41s, M113s and killed more that 100 enemy on the spot,
seized two 12.7mm machine-guns, six heavy machine-guns, six medium machine-guns, 16 M79 grenade
launchers, three M72 rocket launchers, 45 pairs of binoculars, and one PRC-25 radio.
 43

reserve force for the 8th Battalion of the 88th Regiment that attacked an enemy
grouping in the southern area.
On 26 August, the 7th Battalion and fraternal units attacked and wiped out
an enemy grouping and a fire support base - setting fire to a large number of
mechanised vehicles, and destroying three artillery pieces and three blockhouses.
Despite the strong attack on their defences, the enemy stubbornly withdrew into a
second line of defences and resisted strongly. Our battle headquarters ordered the
33rd Regiments 7th Battalion to deploy two attacking columns and concentrate on
striking strongly into the centre of the position. By 0200hrs on 27 August, the
basic objective had been destroyed. The enemy used helicopters and jet aircraft to
fiercely attack the battlefield.
On the night of 31 August, the Liberation Forces decided to conclude the
first phase of the Campaign on both fronts. Each regiment left behind a battalion
to conduct a buffer activities phase, and withdrew to the rear to consolidate, re-
organise, and supplement its troop numbers, weapons and ammunition and to
prepare for the second phase of the Campaign.54
On 2 September 1968, the 9th Battalion wiped out an American
mechanised company at Bn Ci, capturing a prisoner and two M113 vehicles.
While the 10th Companys political officer was binding the prisoner, the political
officer was shot and killed by an American soldier who was hiding nearby.
Overcome by grief, our troops opened fire killing that American and also the
prisoner. Having been attacked uninterruptedly at many locations, the American
forces were tightly stretched as they deployed to break blockades. However, they
were still strong in both numbers and equipment. They attempted to recover the
places that we had seized, and - employing air cavalry forces, launched lightning-
fast operations to strike at our rear areas and headquarters. In concert with their
infantry and mechanised elements, they aimed to drive us from many important
objectives, and to clear the lines-of-communication that had been cut. The 9th
Battalion of the 33rd Regiment was tasked to remain on the battlefield. Faced by
the developments related above, the 5th Division Headquarters directed the 33rd
Regiment to regroup and prepare to attack enemy groups and their
communications routes in the Cu Kho area, and to strike into Trc Mt hamlet,
Bu n Sub-Sector, the t St T-Junction, and Trng Di. The enemy were
forced to deploy six battalions of the Crazy/Mad Buffalo Regiment [sic] to relieve

54
Translators Note: According to the official detailed US account, the US 25th Infantry Division engaged
the 33rd Regiment in late August 1968 in the Battle for Ty Ninh. The US after-action report records a
total of 477 personnel of the 33rd Regiment killed in action. It relates the following communist losses: on
18 August (Bn Ci plantation), 92 KIA six AK-47s, three .50 cal machine guns and one RPG recovered;
19 August (Route 239), 76 killed three AK-47s, one RPG recovered; 21 August (Bn Ci area south,
XT460440), 182 killed (body count); 22 August (Bn Ci area, XT 462468), 24 killed; 23 August (FSB
Schofield, XT 407440), 103 killed (body count) - 13 AK-47s, four machine guns and 11 RPGs recovered.
25th Infantry Division, Combat After Action Report of the Battle for Tay Ninh (approved draft - undated) -
VCAT 2930218006; and 2930218005 (7 February 1969).
 44

our blockade. The 7th Battalion and the 9th Battalion destroyed a battalion at the
Bn Sn Bridge.
After nearly 20 days of continuously having the initiative through our
tactics of ambushes and all types of attacks, and with our dauntless spirit,
cleverness, and bravery, the cadre and soldiers of the 33rd Regiment together
with other units, had wiped out an important portion of the war-fighting potential
of the American mechanised forces, and achieved the basic objectives that had
been set for the Campaign.55
Exploiting our victories, on 26 October 1968 the Regiments 8th and 9th
Battalions fought the battle of T Keng. T Keng was an area of open fields in
which was deployed a battalion of the Big Red One ((ie 1st)) American Division
comprising infantry, artillery, and tanks with outlying posts. Their outer
defences were very solid with four rows of concertina wire. At 10 p.m., our
battalions crept up to the wire, and at about 11 p.m. our RCLs and mortars were
fired into the enemy positions. The enemy returned fire heavily and blocked our
attack. A number of the Regiments cadre and soldiers died and were wounded in
the attack.56* At 8 a.m., we had still not been able to seize the battlefield, so the
Regiment decided to withdraw from T Keng. Seven days later, the American
battalion left the T Keng post, and the Regiment returned and recovered our
dead.
On 28 October 1968, the Liberation Forces concluded Phase 2 that also
ended the whole Campaign. The 33rd Regiment was awarded the Military Feats
Medal First Class.57

II. Attacking the Enemy at the Long Bnh Logistics Complex.

1. Participating in the 1969 Spring Campaign, Attacking the

Long Bnh Logistics Complex and Bu Ci.

After completing our tasks outstandingly in the fighting in the Ty Ninh

area, at the beginning of 1969 the Regiment was ordered to deploy across Route
13, and to cross the Sng B River to Long-B-Bin Province58, and became

55
Translators Note: During 1968, the proportion of NVA troops to VC troops increased. A CIA
memorandum assessed that in III Corps: In the Viet Cong 5th Division, two of its four regiments are
listed as totally North Vietnamese and it two other regiments the Viet Cong 274th and 275th Regiments are
40 and 65 percent North Vietnamese respectively. Thus countrywide, 46 of the 58 known enemy
regiments are completely North Vietnamese, and nine of the 12 Viet Cong regiments are believed to be
50% North Vietnamese. CIA, Research Memorandum: Increasing Role of North Vietnamese in Viet Cong
Units, 17 September 1968.
56
* In the Tn Keng battle, 27 of the Regiments comrades were killed.
57
Translators Note: Hun chng Chin cng Hng nht.
58
Translators Note: The Vit Cngs Long-B-Bin Province encompassed the Republic of Vietnam
provinces of Long Khanh, Phc Tuy, and Bin Ha.
 45

subordinate to Military Region 7. During our deployment, Comrade Lm the

commander of the 3rd [sic] Battalion, was killed in an enemy ambush and replaced
by Comrade Triu Kim Sn. After many days of difficult marching and hardships,
the Regiment arrived at its concentration area in the Rch ng Cha Mountain
area.
There were changes in the Regiments Headquarters. The Regimental
Commander Ma Vn Minh, was appointed as the Deputy Commander of the 5th
Division; Comrade Lim moved to the political office of the 5th Division; and
Comrade Nam was appointed as the Political Commissar of the Divisions
Politico-Military School.
At this time, the Headquarters of the 33rd Regiment comprised the
following comrades: Cao H Regimental Commander; inh Vn t Political
Commissar; Vng Lu Chief of Staff; Comrade Chau Deputy Chief of Staff;
Comrade Ng Deputy Political Commissar; Nguyn Vn Thng Deputy
Director of the Political Office; Nguyn Huy Thn Deputy Chief of Staff; and
Comrade Ph Director of Rear Services. The headquarters of the battalions
comprised - 7th Battalion: L Ba Lc Commander, Trn Thi Thc Political
Officer; 8th Battalion: Quach Thai Sn Commander, Hong Long Ton
Political Officer; 9th Battalion: Comrade Sn Commander, Nguyn Vn Don
Political Officer. The Regiment continued to consolidate its forces, increase its
training, and to learn from the experiences of recent battles. Party activities were
increased, and political work was undertaken in anticipation of future tasks. The
task facing the Regiment was to coordinate activities with the 4th ((274))
Regiment, the 2nd Sapper Battalion, and the Rocket Artillery Battalion in order to
attack the enemys major logistics complex at Long Bnh.
On 28 January 1969, the Regiments Party Committee carefully studied its
tasks and developed resolve for the fighting. According to Region 7s
reconnaissance efforts and COSVN sappers: the Long Bnh Logistics Complex
covered an area of 24 square kilometres; all the warehouses were deep below
ground level; and approximately 1,000 American troops were in the Complex
together with tanks and armoured vehicles reinforcing the defences. The Complex
perimeters to the south and to the east were protected by 10-12 layers of barbed-
wire fences. Between these fences, the enemy had laid alternate rows of mixed
minefields with anti-personnel and anti-tank mines together with a system of
five-metre high guard towers. Each area also had separate fences. With such
enemy arrangements, the Party Committee and the Regiments Headquarters
assessed that: the Long Bnh Complex was a large objective protected and
defended very tightly and stringently. However, these were the orders and tasks
given to the Regiment no matter how difficult, we had to focus our leadership
and mobilise the cadre and soldiers to fulfill the mission.
The 33rd Regiments task was to attack the helicopter airfield and the
chemical warehouses. The battle developed as follows: at about 2 a.m. on 23
February 1969, the 7th and 8th Battalions and the sapper battalion secretly
 46

approached the area surrounding the Long Bnh General Logistics Complex.
Following 3-5 minutes of gunfire, we were able to break through the first fence.
The enemy deployed its tanks to block us and employed their very strong
firepower against us. Our breach-opening teams were unable to implement our
plans because the fences were very dense and high and the gates could not be
opened. Our infantry fired B40s and B41s at the enemy tanks Throughout the
whole of 23 February, the enemy used their aircraft and artillery to fiercely attack
our positions including the RCL and 82mm mortar sites and the Regimental
Headquarters at Highpoint 60 and a number of our comrades were wounded. Up
to the night of 23 February, our battalions continued their attacks, but the enemy
tanks blocked their efforts, and we were unable to break into the base. At about 4
a.m., the Regiment was forced to withdraw its troops by more than 100 metres and
prepare defences to repel the enemy counter-attacks in case they endeavoured to
strike us with their infantry. On the afternoon of 24 February 1969, we received
the order from the higher authority to withdraw our units. However, the
Regiments Headquarters was still unable to make contact with its battalions. The
commander of the sapper company decided to guide four battalions to safety. The
units withdrew to the east of Bu Ci seven to eight kilometres from the Long
Bnh Logistics Complex. The enemy had positioned a battalion of Thai troops59 at
Bu Ci. Comrade Hai Nh of Military Region 7 Headquarters tasked the
Regiment to attack that battalion.60
On 25 February 1969, the Regiment found the enemy, and the 7th and 9th
Battalions were ordered to attack the Thai battalion. The Regiments tactical plan
was for the 7th Battalion to attack from the north-east, with the 9th Battalion to
attack them from the south-east. The Regimental Headquarters was sited behind
the 9th Battalion. The Battalion Commander L Ba Lc, having assigned a
reconnaissance element, reported back to the Regimental Headquarters. He
determined a method of attack, prepared his forces meticulously, and ensured
secrecy and concealment in approaching the enemy. The firepower of our 82mm
mortars fell destructively on the enemy headquarters. When that preparatory
59
Translators Note: The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF - the Queen's Cobras Regiment)
arrived at the US Bearcat base/Camp Martin Cox (YS 1498 - about 35 kilometres south-east of Si Gn;
south of the Long Thnh District capital) in September 1967. The Thai formation operated under the
operational control of the US 9th Infantry Division. In August 1968, the Headquarters of the 9th Infantry
Division departed Bearcat for ng Tm (nine kilometres west of M Tho) - ie as the Divisions operations
were principally in the Mekong Delta region. The strengthened RTAVF force - the Thai Black Panther
Division (5,596 troops six infantry battalions) was complete at Bearcat by mid-February 1969. see:
Sustained pressure on enemy reaps results in Asian Allies in Vietnam, Viet-Nam Bulletin, Series No.26
(3-70), US Embassy Vietnam, March 1970, pp.6-7..
60
Translators Note: A Communist Party history relates that: The 274th and 33rd Regiments were not able
to attack the Long Bnh logistics complex, but were redirected to attack the American military outposts
south of Route 1, the Bu Ci area and then to attack the Thai vassals in Long Thnh together with local
forces and guerrillas and to support the people to destroy pacification within Long Thnh. - Dng Thanh
Tn (ed), Lch s ng b ((ng Cng Sn Vit Nam)) tnh ng Nai (1930-2000) , Tp (Volume) II
(1954-1975), Chng (Chapter) IV, op.cit., 2003. For the Regiments attack at Bu Ci, see footnote 228.
 47

firepower had finished and moved to targets in depth, our element used their
firepower to open the enemys gates, and our infantry assaulted to seize the
objectives within the base. The battle developed as follows: at 2400hrs on 28
February 1969, two 82mm mortars were fired rapidly into the base. The enemy
were surprised and unable to respond in time. Our columns had favourable start
lines for the attack and - in accord with out attack plan, opened fire and assaulted
the enemy. As the bamboo thickets had many hindering thorns, we were not able
to take charge of the battlefield, and we were compelled to withdraw. A number of
the units personnel were killed, and 25 were lightly wounded. After the battle,
Comrade Lng Vn Nho (Hai Nh) commented: The Regiment overcame the
difficulties, rigorously executed their orders, daringly attacked the enemy, and
successfully completed their given tasks. This victory fired our enthusiasm and
motivated the spirits of the cadre and soldiers of the Regiment who were now
ready to achieve their subsequent tasks.
The Regiment suffered personnel losses in the attack on the Long Bnh
General Logistics Complex, and after six months without rest, had not been able
to be reinforced in personnel numbers, weapons, or equipment. Nevertheless, the
cadre and soldiers still maintained their will to fight and to strike the enemy
everywhere, in all weather conditions, and to engage with many different enemies.
Our troops would employ different forms of attack raids, assaults, and
ambushes, and fulfill all given tasks.61

2. Joining with the Local Armed Forces to Destroy Strategic

Hamlets, Wipe Out the Evil Enemy, and Support the Movement
in the Route 2 Area of Cao Su District.

At the beginning of March 1969, the Central Office for South Vietnam
decided to conduct Phase 2 of the K Du Spring Campaign. Our intention was to
draw out the enemy forces occupying areas to the north-east of Si Gn and wipe
them out in the two main regions of Ty Ninh Bnh Long and Long Khanh.

61
Translators Note: For detail on the Regiments attacks on the Long Bnh Complex in February 1969, see
Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment , op.cit., 2014, pp.36-38. Australian forces engaged the 33rd
Regiment on several occasions in Bin Ha Province in late February 1969. On 22 February, elements of 1
ATFs 4RAR engaged a 20-strong NVA group at YT 155080 and wounded and captured a 33rd Regiment
soldier. - 1ATF, INTSUM No.53-69, Ni t, 22 February 1969. On 28 February, 4RAR engaged a group
of 5-6 NVA at YS 183088, capturing a cadre and a soldier - both of the 3rd Company/1st Battalion/33rd
Regiment. - Hall, M.J., Combat After Action Report D 10/10, March 1969; 1 ATF, INTSUM No.59-69,
Ni t, 28 February 1969. The engagement took place about eight kilometres north-east of Bnh Sn
hamlet in Long Thnh District. The two 33rd Regiment soldiers were captured in a defensive position at a
clearing used to launch rockets on the night of 27/28 February 1969. As at 27 February 1969, USMACV
estimated the Regiments strength as only 760. USMAC V, Order of Battle Summary: 1-31 May 1969,
Vol I, 5 June 1969, p.IV-103 (US ID Nr - 32605) VCAT Item No.F015900060147.
 48

In April 1969 62, the Regiment joined with the local armed forces to kill
evil oppressors, destroy the quislings, and support the local people build their
movements organisation in the hamlets, villages and environs. Together with the
peoples militia in the villages, we attacked the bases of the Regional Forces and
the Popular Forces63 in the villages of Tn Lp, An Lc, Hng Gn, Bnh Lc, and
Gia Kim and in Xun Lc Town .
Opening the Campaign, the 7th Battalion coordinated with the local armed
forces to attack Tn Lp hamlet and captured a large number of cruel tyrants.
Faced by this situation, the enemy deployed the 18th Division and the American
199th Brigade. COSVN Headquarters directed the 33rd Regiment to join with the
local forces to attack and destroy the strategic hamlets. On 17 May 1969, the
Regiment attacked the enemy at An Lc (in Long Khanh Town). As our unit
approached the fences of the position, they were discovered and fired upon
fiercely by the enemy, Nguyn Vn O swiftly moved around to the right, and
crawled through the wire behind the enemy. Surprising the enemy, he threw a
grenade and destroyed their firing post. Nguyn Vn Os brave act and
resourcefulness was a timely resolution to the problem, and created the conditions
for the unit to cross through the barbed-wire fences, simultaneously open fire, and
assault into the enemy positions. We destroyed an enemy company and two
Regional Force platoons.
On 19 May 1969, the 33rd Regiment joined with the armed forces of B
Ra - Long Khnh Province comprising D440 Battalion, D445 Battalion, C34
Chu c District Company, C25 Long t District Company, K8 Xun Lc, and

62
Translators Note: In April 1969, a recovered 33rd Regiment security cadres notebook noted that in
accordance with COSVN directives, Regiment personnel were entitled to a monthly rice ration of 25
liters. The notebook also included a reproduction of a on 84C (33rd Regiment) Directive that
complained of misconduct and loose discipline of some 33 rd Regiment cadre at the Vit Cng (YS 4889)
and Quang Minh (YS 459889) supply entry/exit points. The Directive also related that Many personnel of
C12-D3 ((12th Company, 3rd Battalion)) were seen reading enemy publications and leaflets. Many others of
K10 of the 3rd Battalion listened publicly to the enemys radio broadcasts and talked openly about the
enemys Chiu Hi program thereby compromising the morale of the newly assigned recruits ((to K10)).
Also in April 1969, the Regiments political section issued a Directive on relations with civilians and
proselytising. Personnel were directed that under no circumstances should cadre and soldiers purchase
foodstuffs and goods directly from the population; but instead all purchases should be made through the
intermediaries of the local ((communist)) authorities. Also no one should take vegetables or fruit without
authorization of the owners. CDEC Log 10-1921-69. The notebook also included a November 1968
Directive by a senior 33rd Regiment political cadre Phan Lim, that called for all units of the Regiment to
use codewords and cover-designators during upcoming combat missions. CDEC Log 11-1489-69.
63
Translators Note: The Vietnamese text uses the out-of-date terms preferred by the NVA/VC ie Bo
An for the Regional Forces and Dn V for the Popular Forces. In 1964, the Si Gn Governments Civil
Guard/Civil Defence Force (Bo An) was restructured/replaced by the Regional Forces (RF -a Phng
Qun); and the Self-Defence Corps (Dn V ) was replaced by the Popular Forces (PF Ngha Qun).
Collectively, the RF and the PF were termed Territorial Forces.
 49

the two districts of Cao Su and Xuyn Mc (a platoon from each district), to
launch counter-attacks on the enemy along Route 2.64
On 26 May 1969, as our forces were deploying to threaten part of Route 1
from Gia Ray to Xun Lc, we were discovered moving close to our objective at
Gia Ray. The enemy hurriedly moved their 43rd ARVN Task Force to a position
north of Xun Lc, and deployed the 52nd ARVN Regiment to sweep the area to
the north of Gia Ray Town . In this extremely difficult and violent situation,
the Regiments cadre and soldiers moved staunchly through the enemy bombing
and artillery and bravely attacked the enemy.

3. Attacking the Post of the 64th 65 Regional Force Company

at Bnh Ba.

After the Long Khnh Campaign, the Military Region 7 Headquarters

tasked the Regiment to conduct independent operations in c Thnh Sub-Sector,
the areas of Chu Pha, Hc Dch, Phc Thai, Cu Vt and to coordinate with
D445 Battalion local-force troops to launch a campaign on Route 2 66* from the
c Thnh Sub-Sector to the area of Sng Cu.67* Although our units faced many
difficulties and did not have adequate food, the B Ra-Long Khnh Province
Committee supported the Regiment in particular Comrade L nh Nhn (Chn
L) the Committee Secretary. The Province Unit Headquarters (with Comrade
T Lc as Commander of the Province Unit) also assisted the Regiment to
overcome our food difficulties. The Province Committee allowed the Regiment to
64
Translators Note: On 25 May 1969, the headquarters of the 33 rd NVA Regiment was located by signals
intelligence in south-eastern Long Khnh Province - about 16 kilometres north of the My To Mountains
at YS 7508. Through its tactical signals intelligence (SIGINT) unit 547 Signal Troop, 1 ATF intercepted
the Regiments communications and with airborne direction-finding, followed the deployment of the 33rd
Regiment Headquarters as it moved south-west from Long Khnh/Bnh Tuy Provinces towards Bnh Ba
village in Phc Tuy Province see the map at Annex I. 33rd Regiments radio communications to higher
headquarters and to its subordinate units were principally in morse code (HF band) and used the Chinese
102E 15-watt radio (range 2-12 MHz) and sometimes the US-manufactured AN/GRC-9 (2-12 Mhz, 1-15
watt). Their communications security was reportedly impeccable without any operator chatter, and
used a one-time pad (OTP) system that was unsolvable Richards, T.J. Brigadier (Retd), email to the
translator (Chamberlain) - 1 May 2012. For detail including a map of showing the Regiments signals
intelligence-derived locations from 22 April to 2 July 1969, see Chamberlain, E.P., The 33 rd Regiment ,
op.cit., 2014, pp.53-56 and Appendices 11 and 17. Correcting The enemy mystery in the Official History
(Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.237-238), in 2016 the Wartime magazine noted:Task Force
signals intelligence had detected 33 NVA Regiment moving southwards into Phuoc Tuy province.
To save a village, Wartime, Issue 75 Winter 2016, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, p.12.
65
Translators Note: The Regional Force company stationed in Bnh Ba was the 664th Regional Force
Company as noted in other 33rd Regiment summaries and in Nguyn Cng Danh & L Minh Ngha (et
al), Lch s u Tranh Cch Mng Ca ng B V Nhn Dn Huyn Chu c (The History of the
Revolutionary Struggle of the Party Chapter and the People of Chu c District) (1930-2000), Nh Xut
Bn Chnh Tr Quc Gi, H Ni, 2004, pp.173-174.
66
* Route 2 joined B Ra with Long Khanh and is nowadays Route 56.
67
* Nowadays, this is part of Ngha Thnh village, Chu c District, B Ra-Vng Tu Province.
 50

collect green bananas in the southern section of Route 2 to alleviate the troops
hunger. Although the health of the Regiments men had declined, their fighting
spirit was still ready for combat and ready to accept the difficulties in order to
achieve our given mission. The Sub-Region68 and the B Ra-Long Khnh
Province Committee tasked the Regiment to attack an Australian mechanised
battalion that was stationed in the Ni t area of Phc Tuy Province (nowadays
part of Long Phc village of B Ra City).69
The Regimental Headquarters comprised: Cao H Regimental
Commander; inh Vn t Political Commissar; and Vng Lu Chief-of-
Staff. As soon as we arrived in the area, the Regimental Headquarters discussed
the plan to attack the 64th [sic] Regional Force Company in Bnh Ba village with
the aim of luring the Australians at Ni t to rescue the Regional Forces and
then wiping out the Australian force in accord with the direction of the Sub-
Region and the B Ra-Long Khnh Province Committee.
The 64th [sic] Regional Force Companys post in Bnh Ba village was
three kilometres south of c Thnh Sub-Sector and 18 kilometres from the
Phc Tuy Province capital, and about 20 [sic] kilometres70 from the Australians
base at Ni t. Bnh Ba village comprised three hamlets: Bnh Ba Xng, Bnh Ba
Lng71, and Hamlet 4 72 and its extensive rubber plantations bordered mature
jungle.
68
Translators Note: The B Ra Sub-Region was not established by COSVN until May 1971 together
with the Th Bin Sub-Region see footnote 91.
69
Translators Note: On 20 May 1969, the planned meeting on Midway Island scheduled for 10 June
between the US President Nixon and South Vietnamese President Thiu was announced in the US press.
With the formation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) also scheduled for early June, the
communist leadership planned a period of High Point attacks across the South from early to mid-June
1969 to emphasize the enemys ((NVA/VCs)) continuing capability to conduct offensive action. This
required adjustments to - and an intensification of, the ongoing operations of the Summer-Autumn
Campaign and Long Khanh Campaign launched in the first week of May 1969. Within Phc Tuy
Province (the southern half of the VCs B Ra-Long Khnh Province), a major attack was planned
against the village of Bnh Ba and the ambush of any 1ATF relief force, with lesser attacks on both Ha
Long (1 ATF Operation Tong) and Hi M villages. For detail on the communists June 1969 High
Point/Summer Campaign, see Chamberlain, E.P., The 33 rd Regiment , op.cit., 2014, pp.50-52.
70
Translators Note: The 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) base at Ni t was only about seven
kilometres south of Bnh Ba village.
71
Translators Note: Bnh Ba Xng and Bnh Ba Lng were not terms used by 1 ATF nor the Vietnamese
Government. However, captured maps drawn by a K6/D440 Battalion cadre that were recovered in January
1971 showed Bnh Ba Lng at YS 4574 and Bnh Ba Xng YS 4474 ie one kilometre to the west. 1 ATF,
Supplementary Intelligence Report, Ni t, 18-24 January 1971, 26 January 1971.
72
Translators Note: In mid-1969, the official Si Gon Government adminstrative titles for the hamlets of
Bnh Ba village were: Bnh Ba population 1,300; c Trung about 800 metres to the north, population
500; and c M population 350, about 350 metres to the south at YS 445730. The main village of Bnh
Ba was centred at YS 449740 on the western side of Route 2, about 6.5 kilometres north of the 1 ATF base
at Ni t. The village included a large number of masonry and brick houses with tiled roofs, and many of
villagers worked in the surrounding rubber plantations and in the rubber processing facility in c Trung
hamlet (YS 454748) on the northern edge of the village. c Trung was a factory village centred on the
installations of the Gallia rubber enterprise.
 51

In the morning of 4 June 1969, when the D445 [sic] Battalion73 (a main-
force unit of B Ra-Long Khnh Province) had halted and was consolidating its
transit position, an Australian commando74 company attacked their Sui Tre base
near Chu Lc hamlet (X Bang village, Chu c District). Also, at that time,
the Province Assault Youth transport group that was tasked to carry ammunition
for the Campaign, had yet to arrive. The Australian attack into the base camp
squarely struck the Battalions sentry positions and the defences of their
reconnaissance group. Despite being attacked by surprise, as they had the means
to fight, D445 [sic] Battalion was quickly able to turn the situation around and
effectively halt the enemys attacks. As they had been decisively halted and
suffered many casualties, the Australian commandos were compelled to move
away. However, the Battalion was defeated and suffered casualties from the
enemys artillery, helicopters, and jet aircraft attacks on their base continuously
throughout a day and a night. The D445 [sic] Battalion Headquarters ordered its
troops to consolidate their trenches and bunkers and in coordination with tactical
movements, disperse their forces in order to avoid the enemys plan of
extermination. Because of the enemys surprise attack and having to resist the
enemys sweep out-of-the-blue, the Campaign Headquarters changed its plans at
the last minute. At dawn on 5 June 1969, D445 [sic] Battalion crossed through the
jungle and changed places with the 7th Battalion of the 33rd Regiment in the
position to block enemy relief forces on Route 2 (the area adjacent to Bnh Ba)
together with the 8th Battalion.75*
According to the operational plan, the Regiment was to be reinforced by
76
D445 [sic] Battalion to attack the Bnh Ba strategic hamlet including the post
of the 64th [sic] Regional Force Company, the police post, the office of the
Pheonix77 quisling spies, and the Popular Forces positions. Once we controlled
73
Translators Note: The VC D445 Battalion was not involved in the June 1969 engagement at Bnh Ba
village see the D445 Histories of 1991 and 2004. Rather, the D440 Battalion was involved at Bnh Ba
as detailed in its 2011 History, see Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D440 Battalion: Their Story (and the
Battle of Binh Ba), Point Lonsdale, 2013, pp.61-69. For D445 Battalions activity in early June, see the
following footnote 76.
74
Translators Note: 1 ATF infantry patrols were routinely referred to by the NVA/VC as commandos
principally because the Australians routinely operated in smaller elements than the US and ARVN infantry.
*75 The 8th Battalion was led by its Battalion Commander Quach Vn [sic] Sn. Translators Note: Quch
Thi Sn see footnote 85. However note that the following page relates: The 8th Battalion under
Comrade inh Ngc Thp, was sited in the north on Route 2 .
76
Translators Note: As noted at footnote 73, D440 Battalion - not D445, was involved at Bnh Ba. At
0015hrs on 6 June 1969, about 20 kilometres south-southeast of Bnh Ba village, 25-30 82mm mortars
rounds were fired into 9RARs Fire Support Base Thrust at YS 500550 near the Long Hi Mountains one
Australian soldier was killed and seven wounded. This appeared to be in support of an attack by elements of
D445 Battalion on a Rural Development Cadre compound (YS 512544) and an ARVN outpost (of the 2nd
Battalion/52nd Regiment) in the Hi M area. On 7 June 1969, Chu c Districts C41 Company attacked
Ha Long village.
77
Translators Note: The Pheonix (Phng/Phng Hong) program was targeted against the communists
political infrastructure - ie termed the Vit Cng Infrastructure (VCI). South Vietnamese Presidential
Decree Law 280-a/TT/SL of 20 December 1967 formally initiated the Phng Hong (Pheonix) program,
 52

the battlefield, the 7th Battalion would leave a company to hold on and to lure the
enemy at the Long L 78 and c Thnh Sub-Sectors and the Australian forces at
Ni t to dispatch relief forces creating the conditions for the Regiment to
ambush the enemy from Sng Cu hamlet to c M.79 The remaining elements
of D445 [sic] Battalion would strike the enemy in an area adjacent to Bnh Ba.
Chu c80 District troops and local village guerillas would be responsible for a
coordinated attack in the area of p Bc hamlet in Ha Long village.81 The
Campaign Headquarters chose D445 [sic] Battalion to attack Bnh Ba, as that
battalion was familiar with the terrain. Moreover, its tactic of attacking the post,
and destroying any relief force was its fort, and had always achieved good
results for D445 [sic] Battalion the main-force element of B Ra-Long Khnh
Province.82
The situation at that time was that we had no rice, and L nh Nhn
(Chn L) the Secretary of the B Ra-Long Khnh Province Committee had to
mobilise rice for the 9th Battalion to go into combat. The 9th Battalion radioed the
Regiment and proposed that each person have a handful of rice to carry to the
battlefield. The Regiment called the 7th Battalion and proposed that the attack be
postponed, but did not receive a reply so the 7th Battalion decided to attack the
64th [sic] Regional Force Company post.
The attack occurred as follows the Regiment allocated a company from
th
the 7 Battalion to attack and seize the Bnh Ba strategic hamlet; two companies

but delayed, the program was not launched until July 1968. For detail on the Pheonix (Phng/Phng
Hong) program and the VCI, see Chamberlain, E.P. The Viet Cong D445 Battalion, op.cit., 2016,
footnotes 245 and 438.
78 Translators Note: The Long L Sub-District Headquarters was located in Ha Long village
immediately south of 1 ATFs base at Ni t.
79 Translators Note: The Sng Cu stream crosses Route 2 at the bridge at YS 437692 about 100 metres
north of the abandoned p An Ph hamlet on the northern edge of the 1 ATF base at Ni t. c M
hamlet population 350, is to the north of the Sng Cu, on Route 2 at YS 445736. The distance between
the Sng Cu Bridge and c M hamlet is about 3.5 kilometres.
80
Translators Note: The 2014 Chu c District History relates that: In April [sic ie not June] 1969, the
Bnh Ba guerillas and the A57 ((ie 33rd Regiment)) troops attacked the Bnh Ba post a relief force of
tanks was sent from the Phc Tuy Sector [sic] and a number of Bnh Ba village guerillas were killed
and captured . H Song Qunh (ed et al), The History of the Chu c District Peoples Armed Forces
(1945 2014), National Political Publishing House The Truth, H Ni, 2014, p.143.
81 Translators Note: The attack on Ha Long village is also described in the D440 Battalion History (p.90,
2011) see Chamberlain, E.P. D440.. op.cit., 2013, pp.63-68. See also Chamberlain, E.P.. The 33rd
Regiment , op.cit., 2014, footnotes 261, 320, and also footnote 323 for the account in the The History of
the Revolutionary Struggle of the Party Chapter and the People of Chu c District, 2004. While that
2004 Party History of Chu c relates the attack on Ha Long, the attack is not mentioned in the later
Chu c Armed Forces History - ie H Song Qunh (ed et al), The History of the Chu c District
Peoples Armed Forces (1945 2014), op.cit, 2014.
82 Translators Note: This paragraph and the preceding paragraph, are almost identical to the passages in
the D440 History (2011) that describes D440 Battalions activities in relation to the Battle of Bnh Ba see
Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D440 Battalion: Their Story (and the Battle of Binh Ba), op.cit, 2013,
pp.63-64. Note that this 2016 33rd Regiment History includes the D440 History (2011) in its Bibliography.
 53

were sited to provide support and reinforcements for the company in the hamlets
and to strike enemy relief elements. The 8th Battalion under Comrade inh
Ngc Thp, was sited in the north on Route 2; and the 9th Battalion - led by
Comrade Triu Kim Sn as the Battalion Commander was located to the south
between the hamlets of Bnh Ba Lng and Bnh Ba Xng ready to strike the
enemy coming down from the c Thnh Sub-Sector and to coordinate with the
8th Battalion in attacking any enemy relief force coming north from Sui Ngh 83
and attempting to break through.
On the night of 5 June 1969, the 1st and 2nd Companies attacked the hamlet
of Bnh Ba Xng; and the 3rd Company of the 7th Battalion was tasked to attack
the hamlet of Bnh Ba Lng. At first, the 7th Battalion assembled in an area of rice
fields along the edge of the village to dig combat positions. At exactly H-hour, the
Regiment opened fire on its objectives. Surprised by our determined attack, the
enemy in the strategic hamlet in Bnh Ba village were quickly routed a number
fled, and others huddled down to await a relief force. During that night, we took
complete control of the battlefield and captured prisoners for questioning. The
Headquarters raise the Liberation flag. Tn Phat (a section commander of the B
Ra-Long Khnh Armed Propaganda Group led by Comrade Hunh Thnh Nhn)
used four loud-hailers to call upon the enemy in the hamlet to put their guns down,
surrender, and receive the leniency of the Revolution. However, a number of the
remaining enemy in the post were stubborn and continued to resist. Nguyn Vn
By the Battalion second-in-command, ordered the companies to exploit the
terrain and defend against enemy coming from the direction of B Ra. The 1st
Company was deployed in outer positions, and the 2nd Company was sited within
the hamlet. The 3rd Company could not make contact so, after the engagement,
Comrade Mc (the Company Political Officer) withdrew back to our base.
At about 6 a.m. on 6 June 196984 as anticipated, the Australian forces
from Ni t sent their tanks to rescue the situation. Comrade By ordered that
the enemy had to be attacked and not allowed to advance.85 Nguyn Vn Dy a

83
Translators Note: Sui Ngh (at YS 430715) was a resettlement village with a population of 1,040.
84
Translators Note: On 6 and 7 June as a element of the High Point offensive in Phc Tuy Province
see footnote 69, rockets were fired into the 1 ATF base at Ni t - up to 15 107mm rockets impacted in
the base and in the vicinity on the afternoon and evening of 6 June; and four impacted in the base on the
afternoon of 7 June. According to 1 ATF: These rockets were probably fired by an element of 74 NVA
Artillery Regiment 1 ATF War Diary, Enemy Situation in Phuoc Tuy Province, 1 June to 8 June 1969,
Ni t, 10 June 1969, para 2.f. (AWM95, 1/4/156, folio G32). Other rocket firings attempted on 5 June by
Tays unit in the Bnh Ba area were reportedly unsuccessful see Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment
, op.cit., 2014, footnotes 269, 313, and 321.
85
Translators Note: The Regiments 2011 Background Memorial History related that an element of the
Regiment was tasked with attacking any enemy relief force coming north from Sui Ngh and attempting
to break through to Bnh Ba. According to a 33rd Regiment history monograph, the initial plan was for the
33rd Regiment to conduct an ambush battle from the Sng Cu hamlet up to c M hamlet - including
on Australian forces lured north from their Ni t base. That plan was similarly described in the D440
Battalion History (2011). In the revised plan, the 2 nd (ie 8th) Battalion of the 33rd Regiment commanded by
Quch Thi Sn and supported by elements of D440 Battalion, was to conduct the ambush. Several
 54

soldier, and Nguyn Vn Hoan a section second-in-command in the main

position, used a B40 to fire on and damage two M113s entering the hamlet. The
enemy used their vehicles firepower to shoot into the peoples homes as they
knew that the Regiments forces were sited in those houses. Then, the enemys
helicopters attacked (at the time, we did not have our air-defence firepower with
us). At 10 a.m., we reported that our anti-tank ammunition was spent. The
enemys mechanised vehicles advanced in groups of two and three and then
grouped in a total of about 13 vehicles. The Australian infantry followed their
tanks, but they fought in a guerilla style forming small groups moving around on
the jungles edge. They were supported by aircraft and artillery in a massed attack,
and we were completely surprised. At this stage, neither the 8th Battalion nor the
9th Battalion were able to deploy, and the enemy in turn came from behind and
moved to surround Bnh Ba Lng hamlet. From having the initiative, the soldiers
of the 7th Battalion were then on the defensive in circumstances where they had
no pits or trenches in which to shelter. Communications had been lost, and with
the enemys fierce and heavy firepower, our casualties grew by the minute, and
we had exhausted our anti-tank ammunition.
Faced with these difficulties, the Headquarters assigned our RCL Platoon
and an element of an infantry company from the D445 [sic] Battalion to break
through from the direction of Bnh Ba Xng. However, that very direction had
also been blocked by the fierce firing of the Australian tanks from the edge of the
hamlet wounding many of our men. With these indications that the enemy could
wipe us out on the battlefield, we took the initiative to withdraw. The 2nd
Company of the 7th Battalion in the hamlet reported to the Regiment that the 2nd
Company had suffered casualties and surrounded by the enemy, requested that a
force break through to them. The Regiment radioed the 7th Battalion many times,
but their actions were too late and lacked resolve. Consequently, 50 soldiers of the
7th Battalion were killed, including Comrade Nguyn Vn By the Battalion
second-in-command, and Comrade Bi Quang Min the deputy political officer
of the Battalion. Subsequently, the enemy used a bull-dozer to dig a deep pit in
which they buried the bodies of 53 of those killed in a mass grave (three of the

Vietnamese accounts relate that the planned ambush was not initiated. The Australian relief force was
spread out in groups of two-and-three vehicles and did not fall into the Regiments ambush so the
Regiments tactical headquarters decided not to attack. See: L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim Trung
on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.8; The enemy was spread out in
groups of two-and-three vehicles and did not fall into the Regiments ambush bn ch i ri rac tng
tp 2-3 chic v khng trng vo i hinh phc kich cua Trung on. - L Lch Di Tch Khu Tng Nim
Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011, p.9; The Australians did
not enter our ambush as planned Bn c i khng ng i hinh phc kch Chu c History
(2004) - Nguyn Cng Danh & L Minh Ngha (et al), Lch s Chu c (1930-2000), op.cit., 2004,
p.172 this account however is not repeated in the 2014 edition of the Chu c History ie: H Song
Qunh (ed et al), The History of the Chu c District Peoples Armed Forces (1945 2014), op.cit.,
2014. For further detail, see Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment , op.cit., 2014, pp.65-66 and
Appendix 9.
 55

dead comrades were from the armed propaganda group).86* A number of our Bnh
Ba guerilla guides were also captured such as comrades: Nguyn Vn B, Lm
Vn Bch, and Hong Vn Thnh (Thai). Comrade Nguyn Th Xun (T Thin)
the secretary of the Party Chapter of the guerilla unit headquarters, was also
wounded in the face and taken to the Province hospital for treatment.87* These
were great losses for the Regiment, and a battle from which we gained experience
and many lessons.

4. Attacks on Enemy Posts on Routes 1, 2, and 20

In the summer of 1969, following the attack on Bnh Ba hamlet, the

Regiment was ordered to move its activities to the area of Bo Chnh Gia Ray to
the north of Route 1, and to participate in the 1969 Spring Campaign.88 However,
our units had no food, so Comrade Cao H requested that the move be delayed for
some days and this was agreed by the higher authorities. The Regiment sent
nearly 400 troops through the jungle to T M (Lm ng Province) across Route
20 to B Gia Mp to collect 100 tonnes of flour from COSVNs 814th Rear
Service Unit. As they left, each comrade was given one kilogram of fresh cassava
which brought them to tears due to their hunger and the difficulties and
hardships that they had faced. While our battlefield activities had slowly lessened,
the Regiment had many successful ambushes on Route 20. In particular, in the
Long Khnh Campaign, the Regiment inflicted casualties on the puppet 18th
Division and the Americans troops of their 199th Brigade blocking the enemys
pacification program to the east of Si Gn.
On 3 September 1969 when the Regiments base was located in an area
to the north-east of nh Qun Sub-Sector, the patrol of an American commando
platoon encountered the position of one of the Regiments sentry posts. As the
enemys aircraft had been circling earlier, we had been vigilant and prepared a

86
* Translators Note: For clarity, the list of the 50 martyrs in this footnote has been included at Annex F.
The Official Australian Army History Fighting to the Finish (2012), p.225 states: A total of 99 enemy
were eventually reported killed in Operation Hammer. Most were North Vietnamese soldiers of the 33
NVA Regiment; a further six were wounded but escaped (as indicated by blood trails), eight were captured,
one surrendered as a Hoi Chanh, and 28 male suspects were detained. Fifty six of the enemy killed were
credited to territorial troops, who had lost four killed and seven wounded. For a detailed listing of the
casualties and POWs (33rd Regiment, D440 Battalion, C-195 Company, Chu c District Committee,
Bnh Ba Guerilla Unit, B Long Military Proselytising Section) including names and personal details, see
Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment , op.cit., 2014, pp.74-77 and Appendix 9 (14 pages). For comment
on photographs of the interment of those killed, see footnote 224.
87
* According to The History of the Revolutionary Struggle of the Party, the Military, and the People of
Bnh Ba Village (2010).
88
Translators Note: On 27 June 1969, elements of the US 25 th Infantry Division reportedly engaged the
Quyt Thng Regiment (see footnote 90) in Ph Cng (XT 758170) resulting in 44 NVA KIA. See
US 25th Infantry Division, Operational Report Lessons Learnt to 31 July 1969, dated 18 December 1969 -
VCAT 164300010477.
 56

combat plan. The Regimental Headquarters was sitting and listening to the 6 a.m.,
news bulletin from the Voice of Vietnam and heard the news that our beloved
Chairman H Ch Minh had passed away. Everyone was quiet, and their tears
welled up with emotion at the sudden and infinitely grievous news. Immediately
afterwards, our sentries discovered the enemy and opened fire. The enemy fled in
the direction of the ng Nai River, and their aircraft dropped bombs on our base.
Everyone had to remain stationary throughout the whole day. Having waited until
dark, the Regiments units moved and re-established themselves in the Bu C
area.
In the middle of September 1969, one of the Regiments units joined with
a company of D440 Battalion89 to attack a troop of six tanks and a company of
Regional Force troops from the Long Khnh Sector. The enemys objective was to
seize the liberated hamlets at Bo Bnh. Having discovered the enemys plan and
their deployment route from Sui Rm to L Than and Bo Bnh, we set an
ambush at the L Than T-Junction. At about 8 a.m., the whole of the enemys
sweeping force fell into our ambush site. Their leading tank struck a mine and was
set afire, so the enemy stopped and sought a way to counter-attack. The soldiers of
D440 Battalion used their B40s and B41s to set fire to a vehicle. At the same time,
all types of weapons were simultaneously fired intensely into the ranks of the
enemys infantry. Their helicopters came to provide support, but the Regiment
used its firepower to shoot one down, and they were forced to fly at a higher
altitude. Finally, the enemy called for artillery fire support from their base at Sui
Rm to strike our ambush site; and organised a relief force to sweep the area and
recover the bodies of their comrades. Apart from the aim of wiping out some of
the enemys combat potential, this victory provided skills and joint combat
training. It also had greater meaning in defending our base areas and the
liberated zones.
*

As the Resistance War against the Americans moved into its most violent
stage, the soldiers of the Regiment dauntlessly stayed close to the enemy and
attacked them across the battlefields. Together with our militia and the people of
Eastern Nam B, we overcame the times of difficulties and lack of food to strike
the enemy everywhere and achieve all our given tasks. However, in these military
feats, there were losses and painful sacrifices that were carved deeply into
everybodys hearts and minds. The attack on the Regional Force post at Bnh Ba
village became a lesson and an invaluable experience for the soldiers of the
Regiment. This enabled our men to continue to exploit their spirit of overcoming

89
Translators Note: The D440 Battalion History related its Engineer Company joining with the 33 rd
Regiment to ambush Regional Force troops at the L Than T-Junction in mid-September 1969 for detail
see: Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D440 Battalion: Their Story (and the Battle of Binh Ba), Point
Lonsdale, 2013, p.75.
 57

all difficulties and together with their unity, perseverance and resolve, to
continue attacking the enemy and achieve all given tasks.
 58

Chapter Three

With the Title of The Resolved to Win Regiment90, Fighting in

Bnh Tuy Province and Reinforcing the B Ra Sub-Region91
(1970 1972)

I. As The Resolved to Win Regiment, Overcoming Difficulties

and Attacking the Enemy in Hoi c Tanh Linh.

Moving into 1970, the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN)92 and
its Military Committee decided to launch an attack with the aim of enlarging and
extending our regions in the rural areas, accelerating the creation of armed
forces, restoring the peoples war movement, and taking control of the liberated
zones that existed before the 1969 Tt Mu Thn Offensive. The aim was to
change the complexion of the battlefield, and create the conditions to move
towards the greatest of victories. The main point was to destroy the enemys
pacification program in the Mekong River Delta and the Eastern Nam B regions
stretching, extending, and dispersing the enemy in order to wipe them out.
At the beginning of March 1970, COSVN Headquarters tasked the 33rd
Regiment to deploy and operate in the two districts of Hoi c and Tanh Linh93*
and in the south of Bnh Tuy Province (now part of Bnh Thun Province) to
strengthen Military Region 6 and support the local revolutionary movement to
attack the enemy destroying the strategic hamlets and enlarging and extending
our regions. The Regiments title was then changed to The Resolved to Win

90
Translators Note: Resolved to Win ie Quyt Thng. There were several Quyt Thng regiments -
including in the 3rd (Nng Trng, Sao Vng) NVA Division of Military Region 5 operating in coastal areas
of Qung Ngi and Bnh nh Provinces in 1965-67 (CDEC 06-1480-67); in Sub-Region 1 formed after
Tt 1968 (VCAT 2310812003); the 64th Regiment of the 320th NVA Division; the 209th Regiment of the
312th NVA Division; and reportedly a separate regiment operating in Ty Ninh Province in mid-1969.
91
Translators Note: The 1991 D445 Battalion History related that: The B Ra Sub-Region comprised
nine districts (in the provinces of B RaLong Khnh, and Long Thnh, Duyn Hi, Th c and the three
towns of Long Khanh, B Ra and Vng Tu). Through a document captured on 16 June 1971, 1 ATF
became aware of the formation of the B Ra Sub-Region 1 ATF, INTSUM No.169/71, Ni t, 18 June
1971. On 29 October 1971, 1 ATF formally published a report on the formation of the B Ra Sub-Region.
Earlier on 10 October 1971, a captured document identified the units subordinate to the B Ra Sub-Region
and their cover designators - Annex F to 1 ATF INTSUM No.302/71, Vng Tu, 29 October 1971.
Subsequently, as noted above, 1 ATF published a comprehensive 70-page booklet: B Ra Sub-Region,
Vng Tu, 10 December 1971.
92
Translators Note: On 5 January 1970, a visiting COSVN or Military Region 7, cadre wrote a report on
the 33rd Regiment see: Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment , op.cit., 2014, Appendix 10: Cadre
Critique.
93
* Parts of Bnh Tuy Province now Bnh Thun Province.
 59

Regiment.94* The Regimental Headquarters comprised: Commander Nguyn

Vn Thng; Political Commissar - inh Vn t; Deputy Commander - Nguyn
Huy Thn; Chief of Staff - L Ba Lc; Director of the Political Office Lng Ba
Nhm; and Director of Rear Services Comrade Ph. The commander of the 7th
Battalion was Vin nh o, and its political officer was Trn Vn Lun. The 8th
Battalion was commanded by inh Ngc Thp with Hong Long Ton as its
political officer. The 9th Battalion was commanded by Triu Kim Sn, and its
political officer was Phan Trng Dng. The Regiment occupied the Ni ng
base. At this time, our rice was all finished, and the cadre and soldiers had to eat
cassava, vegetables, and jungle roots in lieu of rice and a number of the
comrades were ill. The dry cassava issued to the units was measured in buckets
and cans, so Comrade Bnh the secretary of the Hoi c (now c Linh)
District Committee, was given the name of Bucket Bnh Can Bnh by our
soldiers. The units were organised to go down to Hm Tn to get rice, but each
soldier was only able bring back a few kilograms of rice, so the units relied on the
slash-and-burn fields of the minority people for their food. The enemy became
aware of this and spread poisonous chemicals on the crops. Nguyn Vn Thng
the Regimental Commander, declared: if with eat the cassava roots now and
die, then thats an end to it; but even eating and living for a few more days would
be also be valuable. These were the most difficult days and months of hardship
and lack of food for the Regiment. In order to conserve its forces, the Regiment
usually moved around in the triangular area bounded by the B Ging Stream,
Rng La, and Gia Huynh. The region was difficult, far from our rear areas, and
we were unfamiliar with the terrain. However, the Regiment was still able to
strike the enemy, solve our food problems, overcome difficulties by relying on the
peoples assistance, and join with the local armed forces to attack the enemy and
complete all our given tasks.
Once the enemy had learnt that the Regiment had moved and was located
in Hoi c and Tanh Linh, the enemy viciously bombed the bases and the
liberated zones. B-52 aircraft carpet-bombed the Ni ng base. The American
199th Brigade combined with the Republic of Vietnams puppet forces and
Regional Forces to regularly launch sweeping operations and attacks. In their
areas, the enemy was severe, consolidating and strengthening the militarization of
their oppressive machinery in the strategic hamlets by expanding their police
forces and the Popular Forces, and forcible recruitment. In particular, the enemy
strengthened the Hoi c - Tanh Linh area by establishing six American fire
support bases and shelling our base areas continuously.
In March 1970, the Military Region 7 Party Affairs Committee (Eastern
Region) held a military conference at Rng La (Xuan Lc). The Conference
decided to launch a wave of attacks titled Campaign CD from 26 March to July
1970 in coordination with the battlefields in Ty Ninh and Bnh Long Provinces
94
* The soldiers of the Si Gn Government called our Regiment the Lager Beer Regiment (after the beer
brand 33 Si Gn).
 60

with Xun Lc as a main focus. The Resolved to Win Regiment (the 33rd) and
other armed units were reinforced for the series of attacks to destroy the enemys
pacification activities.
At the beginning of April 1970, the Regiment attacked the V Xu strategic
hamlet, forcing the Americans to deploy relief forces to raise the blockade. On the
night of 7 April 1970, two of the Regiments battalions attacked and wiped out a
combined American mechanised infantry battalion, destroying a large number of
military vehicles. In the following days, the Regiment attacked the Quan H and
i Giang areas, and shelled the Tanh Linh Sub-Sector inflicting many losses on
the enemy.
In mid-April 1970, the Regiment was located at Ni Lp east of Route 3
(now Route 336) to consolidate our forces. The Americans swept into the area,
and the Regiment fought back shooting down a helicopter and killing Major
General William [sic] the commander of the American 199th Brigade.95 As a
result of this series of activities, we were awarded the Military Exploits Medal
First Class by COSVN Headquarters.
At the end of April 1970, the Regimental Headquarters moved from Gia
Ray to the ng Hap Stream and the enemy appeared the following morning.
Their reconnaissance aircraft fired rockets while trying to seek us out. This time,
the enemy used their fire bases at Hong Diu and Dc M to fire intensely on us,
after which their helicopters fired rockets for about 20 minutes. Aircraft from the
Bin Ha airfield landed a company of the Americans 199th Brigade about 300
metres from the headquarters of the Regiment. Our headquarters moved to a
reserve position, leaving behind a defence platoon of 15 personnel led by L Ba
Lc the Regiments chief-of-staff. The enemy surrounded the units base area
and fired their artillery fiercely into the area. At 1030hrs on 10 April 1970, the
enemy divided into two columns and moved secretly to attack us. When the
enemy was close, the platoon opened fired simultaneously killing many of the
enemy. The enemy withdrew about 20 metres - dragging their dead comrades. The
enemy artillery then fired on the base, and their aircraft attacked with napalm
which penetrated some of our bunkers. Our platoon ran through the shells and
bombs and closed with the enemy. At 4 p.m., the enemy withdrew, and their
helicopters lifted the enemy troops back to the Bin Ha Logistics Complex. As a
result of this engagement, we wiped out an American platoon, seized 12 weapons
of various types while we suffered three wounded. Following the battle, the
Defence Platoon and two individuals were awarded the Military Feats Medal
95
Translators Note: According to the 5th VC Division History (2005): Two-star General Uy-li-an-bon
together with the whole headquarters staff of the 199th Brigade and accompanying officers, was killed,
when a battlefield reconnaissance helicopter was shot down in flames by the Regiments air defence
element. US records show that Brigadier General William Ross Bond - commanding the 199th Infantry
Brigade, was killed by a sniper on 1 April 1970 when alighting from a helicopter on the southern edge of
War Zone D about 110 kilometres north-east of Si Gn. He was reportedly the only US general officer to
be killed in actual ground combat during the Vietnam War four other US general officers were killed in
aircraft crashes.
 61

Third Class; and four comrades were honoured with the Killer of Americans
badge.96
In May 1970, the American 199th Brigade conducted an intense sweeping
attack into the Tanh Linh - Hoi c area. The 3rd Company of the 7th Battalion
combined with the local Bnh Thun Province armed forces to attack the Huy
Khim area and wiped out a number of the enemy. In this battle, as the majority of
the men in the unit lacked experience in clearing mines, quite a lot were wounded.
In June 1970, the Regiments Sapper Company was tasked to wipe out the
enemy in the Tanh Linh Sub-Sector a district-level sub-sector occupied by a
battalion. The Sub-Sector was square-shaped, occupied about one hectare, and
was about three kilometres to the north of Route 3. The Sub-Sector was protected
by 11 rows of barbed-wire fences. Each row comprised three rolls of concertina
wire and a single row of barbed-wire. There was also a bund around the Sub-
Sector to defend against direct fire. This base was the general military
headquarters for Tanh Linh District and was carefully and tightly defended. Apart
from the rows of wire, there were also Alsatian dogs (ch bc gi) to sound the
alarm if they detected strange smells. Our sapper unit tried three times to study
and reconnoitre the position and develop an attack plan as the enemy regularly
made changes to the positions communications, headquarters, and barracks area.
However, through their will and resolve, the Sapper Company was able to attack
the Sub-Sector killing and driving from the battlefield 200 enemy, destroying a
military storehouse, and a quantity of war-fighting materiel. This was the first
assault by C24, and their success inspired and elated our cadre and soldiers. For
their achievements related above, the Sapper Company was awarded the Military
Feats Medal First Class and a number of its personnel were awarded the Military
Feats Medal Third Class, and a number were given the Heroic Resolved-to-Win
Soldier insignia.
In November 197097, the Sapper Company was tasked to attack the police
post at La Gi (Bnh Tuy Province). This was a police post that regularly oppressed
the people and hunted those who followed the revolution. The area was not large
and did not have a large number of troops as in other military areas. However, the
people were very resentful because the enemy would arrest people without cause
and repressed the population. The police post covered about 1,000 square metres
in area with three rows of buildings, and had a force of about 100. There were two
rows of barbed-wire fence on two sides with two rolls of concertina wire in
between. With a high resolve, a dauntless spirit, cleverness, and bravery, the unit
96
Translators Note: A US 199th Brigade report details engagements with the 33rd NVA Regiment in Bnh
Tuy Province on 27 February, 1 April, and 17-18 April 1970. On the night of 17-18 April, the 199th
Brigades Fire Support Base Den (YT 8136) was attacked by the 2 nd Battalion/33rd Regiment and
supporting elements 33rd Regiment losses were reportedly 25 killed and 2 POWs. Operational Report
199th Infantry Brigade for the period ending 30 April 1970, 4 September 1970.
97
Translators Note: In late October 1970, 1 ATF reported that - with the advent of the harvest, there was
a predictable drift of 33rd Regiment elements to the Rice Bowl areas (ZT 033307 and YT 81521) of
western Bnh Tuy Province. 1 ATF, SUPINTREP 42/70, Ni t, 27 October 1970.
 62

attacked into the enemys lair wiping out many of the enemy, removing 30 from
the battlefield, and destroying the three rows of buildings in the soldiers camp.
When they heard the news that the police post had been wiped out, the people in
the region were enthusiastic and elated.
At the request of Military Region 6, the Regiment detached a battalion to
operate in the Mng Mang area with Comrade Sau Phc (Commander,
Military Region 6) leading the campaign there against the enemy. We conducted
counter-attacks against the enemy, but there was minimal reaction from the
enemy, and we were only able to destroy part of their forces. In March 1971, the
Regiments Sapper Company attacked the Mng Mang Sub-Sector.98* A number
of the enemy soldiers there were of the Chm minority99 who had been forcibly
recruited, so during the night, almost all went back to their homes, with only a
small number remaining on combat duty. We wiped out a number and destroyed
defensive works and a headquarters and then withdrew not holding the position.
At this time on the B Ra-Long Khnh battlefield, the enemy increased its
sweeping operations to advance their pacification efforts, breaking up our
infrastructure organisations100 and the situation was extremely difficult for the
local revolutionary movement. The 9th Battalion of the 33rd Regiment (E33) led
by its commander Comrade Khanh, was detached to join with the local armed
forces to attack and destroy the enemys pacification program.
In April 1971, a part of the Regiment remained in Hm Tn Sub-Sector to
continue to harass the enemy, and inflicted heavy casualties on three Regional
Force companies. With the direct guidance of Military Region 6, the Regiment
had overcome the extremely difficult hardships of food shortages. Having
overcome its difficulties, we coordinated with the armed forces of the two districts
of Tanh Linh and Hoi c and fought bravely, cleverly, and flexibly to achieve
many outstanding military feats for the Regiments traditions and legacy.

II. Strengthening the B Ra Sub-Region, Attacking the Enemy

and Enlarging and Extending our Regions.

In May 1971101, in order to strengthen our program of attacking the

enemys accelerated pacification program102, COSVNs Standing Committee

98
* Now part of Hm Thun Nam District of Bnh Thun Province.
99
Translators Note: The Chm/Chm minority people remnants of the medieval Hindu Champa empire
in coastal Central Vietnam, are Muslims. In 2016, about 80,000 Eastern Chm reportedly lived in the
coastal provinces of Ninh Thun and Bnh Thun.
100
Translators Note: For the Vit Cng Infrastructure (VCI), see footnote 77.
101
Translators Note: In May 1971, 1 ATF produced a seven-page study on 3 Bn 33 NVA Regt, noting its
strength as 185. Annex F to 1 ATF INTSUM, No.122/71, Ni t, 2 May 1971.
102
Translators Note: In early November 1968 - with significant US support, President Nguyn Vn Thiu
launched the Accelerated Pacification Program/Campaign with the objective of expanding government
control over 1,200 villages and eliminating the communist infrastructure. Initially, it was programed for 90
 63

decided to re-organise the Eastern Nam B battlefield. COSVN Headquarters

decided to disband the Provinces and establish Sub-Regions.
The 33rd Regiment was ordered to reinforce the two Sub-Regions of Th
Bin and B Ra.103 The ((B Ra)) Sub-Region described its mission as:
Focusing the main-forces - in coordination with the local troops, militia, and
guerillas, to strongly attack the enemy forces in the priority areas of Xun Lc and
Long t, wiping out part of the enemys war-fighting potential and means,
liberating a number of villages, and enlarging and extending our regions initially
along Routes 23 and 2.
Beginning the Route 2 Campaign, the 33rd Regiment joined with the 4th
((274th)) Regiment and the armed forces of Cao Su District104 to attack the enemy
and seize their posts and police stations along Route 2 (from Hng Gn, ng Qu,
Cm M to Tn Lp). In June 1971, when the Regiment counter-attacked the
enemy between Hamlet 6 and Hamlet 3 of Bo Bnh, a puppet company moved
between our defence platoon and our 31st Company close to the Regimental
Headquarters. We opened fire and killed some of the enemy, but the remaining
enemy fled for their lives to Hamlet 6 where they ran into the 9th Battalion and the
8th Company. Our units wiped out most of the enemy company. That very night,
the Regiment withdrew to the Cam Tim range of hills to the south of Bo Bnh
Hamlet 3.
In June 1971, the Regiment was based at Ni ng, but left the 9th Battalion
to reinforce B Ra-Long Khnh Province105 to attack the enemys pacification
program, support the local revolutionary movement, and create the situation for
the Regiment to return to B Ra Sub-Region in 1972.
On 23 July 1971, near nh Qun on Route 20, the Regiment joined with
the district troops to ambush and wipe out a Regional Force platoon at the edge of

days. The D440 History (2011- Vietnamese language) noted that in late November 1968, the Military
Region 7 Conference also confirmed and directed that: the important task now faced by B Ra-Long
Khanh Province was the need to concentrate on the destruction of the enemys Accelerated Pacification
plan. To provide support, the Military Region assigned the 33rd Infantry Regiment (E33) to cooperate in
combat actions with the local armed forces.
103
Translators Note: For 1 ATFs knowledge of this development, see footnote 91.
104
Translators Note: In mid-1971, the strength of the Cao Su District Company was 30-40. 1 ATF,
INTSUM No.189/71, Ni t, 8 July 1971.
105
Translators Note: On 3 June 1971, 1 ATFs SIGINT unit 547 Sig Tp, located the 3rd Battalion of the
rd
33 Regiment at YS543867 (1 ATF Int Log Serial 29288) and Operation Overlord was mounted into the
Long Khanh/Phc Tuy border area. On 7 June 1971, 1 ATFs 3RAR engaged elements of 3/33 rd
Regiment in a bunker complex at YS 506936, killing five personnel 1 ATF, INTSUMs No.160/91 and
161/91, Ni t, 9 and 10 June 1971. See also the Official Australian History, Fighting to the Finish, op.cit,
pp. 562-573. A subsequently captured 33rd Regiment cadre described the engagement citing only four
dead and four wounded from C9 Company. - Annex A to 1 ATF INTREP, Vng Tu, 2 December
1971.This engagement is sometimes referred to as the Battle of Long Khanh. The 3/33rd Regiment
elements withdrew north from the bunker system to bunkers in the area of the Sng Vong River (YT 5203)
which were attacked by elements of the 3rd Brigade/US 1st Air Cavalry Division on 17 June 1971.
 64

the Tc Trng rubber plantation and then attack the enemys 110, 114, 116 and
125 posts actively supporting the struggle movement of the masses.
Moving into the 1971 Wet Season106, the Regiment coordinated with the
Chu c District armed forces to strike the enemy in the villages along Route 2,
wiping out much of the enemys war-waging potential. The Military Region
ordered the Regiment to detach the 9th Battalion. Recognising the enemys
capability to bring forces to break through the blockade to the south and for their
artillery and air support to shell the Regiments position and cause many
casualties, Comrade T Lc representing the Military Region, ordered us to
move our units away from our base area. With the nature of the battlefields in the
South changing and after their heavy defeats, the Australian vassal forces decide
to retreat back home to their country. The Regiment was given the task to block
and strike the Australian military within B Ra-Long Khnh Province. At the
beginning of September 1971, in the Ni Le107* area, the Regiment attacked the
Australian Task Force when they swept into the jungle areas searching for the
Regiments base. As a result, we killed five of them and wounded 24. That was
the last of the Regiments battles with the Australians before they pulled their
forces out of Vietnam and back to their own country.108
106
Translators Note: The Dry Season in southern Vietnam begins in November; and the Wet Season begins
in April/May. The season timings are: Spring January/February, March, April; Summer May, June,
July; Autumn August, September, October; Winter November, December, January
107
* Nowadays part of X Bang village in Chu c District of B Ra-Vng Tu Province. Translators
Note: The Australian Official History relates that in the second week of September 1971, signals
intelligence (SIGINT) indicated that 33 Regiment was moving from southern Long Khanh into the
northern part of Phc Tuy, which 4RAR/NZ had dominated since the end of Operation Overlord. ...
Brigadier McDonald knew the task force had to respond. ... On 19 September, the task force mounted
Operation Ivanhoe ... south of the Courtenay plantation. ... ((On 19 September)) as the forward platoons ((of
D/4RAR/NZ)) patrolled through the dark forest, they were advised that signals intercepts had detected two
radios, possibly indicating two enemy battalions close by. Soldiers were on edge and moving cautiously. -
Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.610-612. In his article The last
battle (Wartime Magazine, Issue 55, July 2011, pp.15-19) LTCOL Gary McKay MC (Retd)
(11/D/4RAR/NZ WIA 21 September 1971) noted: We had been previously ((ie before 20 September))
advised by coded radio message that there was a possible large concentration of enemy somewhere close to
those hills ((ie Ni Le and Ni Sao)). For annotated maps showing the SIGINT direction-finding locations
of 33rd Regiment elements in September 1971, see the Translators Annexes G and H. For SIGINT aspects,
see also the following Annex B footnote 196. For further detail, see also Chamberlain, E.P., The 33 rd
Regiment , op.cit., 2014, pp.98-103.
108
Translators Note: The engagement at Ni Le/Ni Sao (YS 513857) with 1 ATF elements in late
September 1971 is related in a discrete addendum to this 33 rd Regiment History (2016) titled: Australian
Military Writings on the Heroic 33 Regiment see the following Annex B, pp.127-133. The official
Australian account is related in the Australian Official History, Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.613-
624. That account claims at p.622: Australian veterans later learnt that the commander of 33 NVA
Regiment had been killed by artillery fire during the battle. Similarly, the then commanding officer of
4RAR/NZ has written: The casualty was buried on site and later his remains were recovered and sent to
North Vietnam. Who was killed? Was it the Commander of 33 NVA Regiment or perhaps the Commanding
Officer of 3 Battalion racing north to help in the defence of the Regimental Headquarters? Because of
interpretation problems, we will probably never know the answer. Major General J. Hughes AO, DSC,
 65

In the two days 15 and 16 September 1971, the 7th Battalion ambushed the
enemy in the Hm Hinh to Bo Chnh area, setting fire to and damaging eight
military vehicles and killing a number of Regional Force and Popular Force
soldiers.109
In October 1971, the Regiment joined in a combined operation with the 4th
((274th)) Regiment to continuously block the enemys sweeping operations and
attacks in the areas of both Route 1 and Inter-Provincial Route 2, in the areas of
Tr Tn and Tn Phong (Long Khanh) and wiped out the enemy (the 4th Battalion
of the 43rd Regiment of the puppet 18th Division) we shot down an aircraft,
killed many Regional Force and Popular Force troops, and set fire to a number of
military vehicles.
In November 1971, the Regiment deployed and blocked areas to the south
of Route 1 about 100 kilometres to the north-east of Si Gn, positioning troops
in Bo Chnh, Bo Bnh, Sui Cat, and Gia Ray. Elements of the puppet 18th
Division under Brigadier L Quang o, were stationed in the area. The
Regiment also deployed and conducted preparatory reconnaissance for a major
attack. Following orders from COSVN Headquarters, the Regiment was only
required to maintain its positions and not conduct operations as the local balance
of forces was unequal. However, the Regiments Sapper Company continued to
conduct assaults to wipe out small posts, destroying Peoples Self-Defence
Force110 elements, and posts at village and hamlet level. At this time, the

MC, The Battle of Nui Le the last Australian battle in South Vietnam, The Fighting Fourth, December
2011, pp.1-6. An article on the 4RAR Association website titled: The Battle of Nui Le by veteran Alan
Price, also claims: D Coy inflicted very heavy casualties on the 33 rd Regiment including the battalion
commander of the 3rd Battalion who was killed by Australian artillery. However, no NVA senior cadre
were killed in the engagement at Ni Le neither Triu Kim Sn commander of the 3rd (9th) Battalion
(see footnote 253), nor Hong Cao H - commander of the 33rd NVA Regiment. For detail see:
Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment , op.cit., 2014, pp.101-102 including a 2009 photograph of H
in uniform.
109
Translators Note: In late September 1971, 1 ATF produced an 11-page study on the 33rd NVA
Regiment. 1 ATF, 33 NVA Regiment Annex F to 1 ATF INTSUM No.264/71, Ni t, 21 September
1971. However, much of that document was noted as being based on material from the US 3 rd Brigade
(Separate) of the 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) - and does not include any mention of the early June
1969 Battle of Bnh Ba. That study was included as Annex F in the 4RAR/NZ Weekly Intelligence Review
718/41, 22 September 1971 (AWM95, 7/4/52). 33 rd Regiments strength was assessed as 1,250 Max
see footnote 199. On Morale, the 1 ATF study noted: 33 NVA Regt is considered to be one of the most
capable units in GVN MR3 and as such is believed to have fairly high morale. This can be attributed to
constant political indoctrination. Very few Hoi Chanhs are received from the Regiment, and it is common to
find that members of 33 Regiment who have been KIA ((Killed in Action)) possess no identifying
documents. Annex F to 1 ATF INTSUM, No.122/71, Ni t, 2 May 1971 see Chamberlain, E.P., The
33rd Regiment , op.cit., 2014, Appendix 13. On recovered 33rd Regiment documents, see footnote 249.
110
Translators Note: The Si Gn Governments Peoples Self-Defence Force (PSDF- Nhn Dn T V -
and termed Phng V Dn S by the communist side) was established in July 1968 after the mid-year
General Mobilisation (ie post-Tt 1968). The PSDF superseded earlier militia ie the Combat Youth, the
Popular Militia, and the Revolutionary Development Peoples Group. Operating under the village chief, the
PSDF encompassed able-bodied males aged 16-17 and 39-50 years. See the PSDF Handbook 1969,
VCAT Item No.14040111001. Women were also allowed to volunteer. PSDF comprised combat defence
 66

Regiment only attacked the posts at Bo Chnh, Bo Bnh, and Sui Cat to reduce
the enemys capabilities, and to expand the liberated zones of a number of
bordering hamlets. The Regiment joined with the 4th ((274th)) Regiment to launch
an attack to seize Bo Bnh hamlet. As planned, a battalion of the 4th ((274th))
Regiment held the hamlet to draw the enemy out in order for the Regiment to
destroy the relief force coming to the rescue. Subsequently, a battalion of the 4th
Regiment was withdrawn and replaced by D445 Battalion of B Ra-Long Khnh
Province as a reinforcement but D445 Battalion only held a blocking position
for one or two days and withdrew. The Regiment deployed our 7th Battalion to
hold the hamlet. The 7th Battalion completed its task successfully, creating the
conditions for the 8th Battalion to wipe out an enemy company and a headquarters,
and seizing a large quantity of weapons and equipment of various types including
a PRC-25 radio and a PRC-10 radio. After several days of fierce fighting, the
enemy eventually discovered that the force within the hamlet was the 7th Battalion
of the 33rd Regiment not a unit of the 4th ((274th)) Regiment and therefore did
not dare to attack into the hamlet.
After the attack on Bo Bnh hamlet, the Regiment moved to block Route
1 to the north of the Ni My Tu [sic].111 The enemy was to be blocked and
prevented from opening Route 1. In the north, the 7th Battalion wiped out an
enemy company seizing many weapons of various types. The 8th Battalion
continued the attacks, wiping out a company to the south of Route 1, and seized a
large quantity of weapons and equipment.
At the end of 1971, the Regiment joined with the 4th ((274th)) Regiment
and D445 Battalion in the Route 23 area where we destroyed the enemys grip,
created many extensions to our base areas, and built up the revolutionary
infrastructure in a number of hamlets in Xuyn Mc and t . In Chu c
District, our strategic corridor and lines of communication east-to-west of Route 2
were cleared and open. The rear services exchange points at Phc Thai, Ngi
Giao, and Ha Long were re-opened, creating the conditions to establish the
activities of COSVNs 814th Rear Services Unit and contributing to advancing the
revolutionary movement to a new stage.

III. Participating in the Nguyn Hu Campaign, Attacking the

Enemy Across the Whole of B Ra-Long Khnh.

(phng v xung kch) and support elements, with the Combat PSDF organised in 134-strong groups
consisting of three inter-teams of 44. In three-man cells, the principal tasks of the PSDF were static
guard-type duties. At the end of 1970, the PSDF reportedly had 3.8 million members country-wide,
comprising 1.4 combat defence members (37%) armed with 463,750 weapons, and 2.4 million support
members (63%).
111
Translators Note: The My To Mountains (704m) straddled the Phc Tuy/Long Khnh/Bnh Tuy tri-
border area with a centre-of-mass at YS 7491. The My To Secret Zone covered: YT 6700 YT 9200-
YS 6784 YS 9284.
 67

1. Participating in the Nguyn Hu Campaign, Wiping Out the

Enemy at the Sui Ngh Special Sector 112, and Surrounding the
c Thnh Sub-Sector.

At the end of January 1972, the Regiment was located and operating in the
Xun Lc area. Our task was to cooperate closely with the district troops and
village guerillas to strike the enemy and support the Sub-Regions priority areas.
Continuously from 28 January to 17 February 1972, the Regiment operated across
a wide area from Cm M (Route 2) up to Tc Trng and nh Qun (Route 20),
and coordinated with the armed forces of B Ra-Long Khnh Province, the local
troops of Cao Su District, and the guerillas of the plantations. Our forces operated
in the centre-of-gravity of the campaign to enlarge and extend our regions in the
priority areas of Route 2, Route 23, and Route 20 - wiping out the enemy in their
Sui Ngh Special Sector and at Bnh Ba, Kim Long, Tc Trng, and nh Qun.
We attacked many posts, Special Sectors and Sub-Sectors, and bases of the 48th
and 52nd Brigades of the 18th Division. Our 24th Sapper Company joined with the
reconnaissance elements of the Chu c District Unit to attack the enemy and
liberate Lang Ln, Quang Minh, Chu Lc, Vit Cng linking with the Bu
Sen base and expanding the springboard for bases from which to operate.113
On 1 April 1972, the Nguyn Hu Campaign broke out across the Eastern
Nam B Region.114* The victories of the Nguyn Hu Campaign at Lc Ninh and
Ty Ninh had a large impact and were a source of encouragement for the spirits of
our forces and the people in the villages along Route 1 and Route 20 in the Trng
Bom area. COSVN Headquarters determined that in the Nguyn Hu Campaign in
B Ra-Long Khnh Province we would attack the enemy from two directions.
The main thrust was by the 4th ((274th)) Regiment in t . The secondary thrust
was by the 33rd Regiment with the task of surrounding the c Thnh Sub-
Sector115* and - attacking the enemy post at Cm M, liberating Route 2 from
Cm M down to Bnh Ba. COSVN Headquarters intention was to task the 33rd
Regiment to attack Bnh Gi hamlet and to liberate the strategic hamlet. However,
our Regimental Headquarters assessed that we lacked the capability to surround
the c Thnh Sub-Sector, block any enemy relief forces, and still attack the Bnh
Gi hamlet a hamlet longer than one kilometre. As a victory would be very

112
Translators Note: Special Sectors (Yu Khu) were established by the government of the Republic of
Vietnam for several key areas including: Sui Ngh, Ph M, Cm M, Trng Bom, Tc Trng, Gia Ray,
Tn Sn Nht etc.
113
Translators Note: According to the Chau Duc District History (2014), In the morning of 26 March
((1972)), the 9th Battalion of the 33rd Regiment was ordered from Bu Sen to replace the 18 th ((Sapper))
Battalion with the task of attacking the Kim Long post. The battle was very violent the 9th Battalion
suffered heavy losses and was forced to withdraw. - The History of the Workers, Public Servants and
Labourers Movement and Trade Union Activities in the Period 1930-2006, Vng Tu, 2011.
114
* The focus of the Campaign was Lc Ninh (Bnh Phc) and Ty Ninh.
115
* The aim was to see whether the American troops would react or not.
 68

difficult, the Regiment proposed reviewing the task of attacking Bnh Gi hamlet
and this was accepted by COSVN Headquarters.
On 5 April 1972 in the Route 20 area, the Regimental Headquarters
ordered the Sapper Company after a three-hour secret approach to the position,
to attack and achieve its task of wiping out the Lc Sn post at nh Qun (ng
Nai). This post was occupied by an enemy company and was called the Ghost
Post by the local people because it was on a high hill, and the enemy would hide
then reappear. The enemy would even disguise themselves as locals working the
fields in order to indicate targets in our bases for their artillery.
On 12 April 1972, the armed forces of B Ra-Long Khnh Province
joined with the 33rd Regiment to commence a new phase of crucial tasks in the
program of enlarging and extending our regions in the priority areas of Route 2
and Route 23.116 Our units unceasingly surrounded and pressured the enemy at the
Sui Ngh Special Sector, at Bnh Ba, and at Kim Long creating the conditions
for the 24th Sapper Company and the Chu c District Units reconnaissance to
attack and wipe out the c Thnh Sub-Sector. In achieving its given task, the
33rd Regiment was resolved to strike the enemy and create self-confidence among
the local committee authorities. After six months of experiencing the situation
and having studied the terrain in detail, C24 Sapper Company constructed a model
for the attack with the resolve to surely attack, and surely win. The plan to
attack the c Thnh Sub-Sector was drawn up: our sapper company reinforced
with the Military Region 7117 sapper battalion would seize the objective during the
night. Afterwards, the 9th Battalion would enter the post and hold the Sub-Sector.
The 7th Battalion and the 8th Battalion would block and attack enemy relief forces.
At 0322 hrs on 23 April 1972, the Sapper Company and the Chu c District
Units reconnaissance element divided into three columns and concealed
themselves close to the c Thnh Sub-Sector. We aimed a B40 round to fire
straight at the communications site, and our soldiers simultaneously opened fire,
assaulted, and seized the objective. The enemy responded decisively, and we were
unable to achieve our goal.118 The 9th Battalion surrounded the Sub-Sector in
accord with Part Two of our plan.
On 25 April 1972, the Nguyn Hu Campaign exploded across all the
battlefields in the South. In the Route 2 area, the village guerillas and the
Regiments reconnaissance element - relying on the Bu Sen base and our

116
* Route 23 joined B Ra with Route 1 at T-Junction 46 in Bnh Thun Province (now Route 55).
117
Translators Note: Disbanded in 1971, Military Region 7 (MR 7) had been re-formed in 1972.
118
Translators Note: According to the Chu c Armed Forces History (2014): On the night 22/23 April
1972, the Bnh Ba and Ngi Giao guerillas together with the 24th Sapper Company of the 33rd Regiment,
attacked the c Thnh Sub-Sector, killing180 of the 220 personnel in the Sub-Sector and seizing a large
quantity of weapons and military equipment. - H Song Qunh (ed et al), The History of the Chu c
District Peoples Armed Forces (1945 2014), op.cit,, 2014, p.158. This is repeated in: The History of the
Workers, Public Servants and Labourers Movement and Trade Union Activities in the Period 1930-2006,
Vng Tu, 2011. That account adds that: The enemy in Post 64 at Bnh Ba fled in terrot to Sui Ngh - and
we liberated Bnh Ba village.
 69

infrastructure ((VCI)), studied the situation and made an operational plan to wipe
out a number of posts: La Vn, Vinh Thanh, and the c Thnh Sub-Sector. We
attacked the posts and blocked relief forces and, wiping out 80 of the enemy,
completely destroyed their communications sites, an ammunition storage facility,
set fire to two M113s, and seized many weapons and pieces of military
equipment. At the same time, the Districts armed forces joined with the village
guerillas to liberate the hamlets of ng Cng and Kim Long.119
In the days from 24 to 28 April, the enemy employed their air power and
artillery to bomb and shell the positions of the 9th Battalion. A force of the enemy
52nd Regiment and a battalion of tanks from the puppet 18th Division launched a
counter-attack to lift our blockade and rescue c Thnh. However, the
Regiments 7th and 8th Battalions blocked them decisively. From the very first day,
we wiped out a company, and inflicted heavy losses on another company, set fire
to five armoured vehicles, and wiped out many of the enemy.120
On 4 May 1972, the enemy reinforced by deploying a battalion of a
Ranger Group and two battalions of the 48th Regiment and counter-attacked the
positions of our 7th and 8th Battalions continuously. However, our two battalions
held their positions bravely, and fought to block the enemys attacking waves. The
enemy deployed a battalion to counter-attack into the rear of the 8th Battalion on
Route 2 opposite the hamlet of Bnh Ba Lng. The soldiers of our 5th Company of
the 7th Battalion held their positions and dislodged the enemys counter-attacking
thrusts. Our 7th Battalion used two 82mm mortars to shell the enemys formations.
With a large number of wounded, the enemy fled back to Sui Ngh. As a result,
we had killed many of the enemy, and seized a number of weapons and
equipment.
From 5 May 1972, the enemy did not dare to counter-attack our positions,
but principally used their aircraft and artillery to bomb and shell the area around
the c Thnh Sub-Sector. We did not advocate continuing to surround and
attack the c Thnh Sub-Sector as we were aware that there were solid bunkers
within the Sub-Sector and at the same time our ammunition was limited, our
soldiers were wounded, and as time passed, the number troops who were ill
increased.121

119
Translators Note: This paragraph is included almost verbatim in: H Song Qunh (ed et al), The
History of the Chu c District Peoples Armed Forces (1945 2014), op.cit,, 2014, p.159. While that
History does not detail the fighting against the 18th ARVN Division elements, it relates that the enemys
shelling including from Ni t, forced refugees to flee from ng Cng to Bnh Gi village.
120
Translators Note: NVA/VC operations in Phc Tuy Province in April 1972 are related in some detail
in Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.647-649. The wide-spread attacks
signalled the return of 33 NVA Regiment, 274 VC Regiment and D445 Battalion, all formerly held at bay
by the Australian task force before it departed four months earlier, leaving the province nominally
pacified. p.647.
121
Translators Note: According to US MACV: On 20 May, one-third of the town of t in southern
Phc Tuy Province was lost to the 33d NVA Regiment. Xuyn Mc and c Thnh remained in friendly
hands, but were isolated and had to be supplied by air. The Province Chief was replaced on 21 May. On the
 70

On 17 June 1972, the Regiment launched an attack on the enemy in the

Sui Ngh Special Sector about 10 kilometres south of the c Thnh Sub-
Sector. This was a solidly-defended Special Sector occupied by about two puppet
companies with a 150mm [sic ie 105mm] howitzer ready to provide fire
support to sweeping troops as necessary. The Special Sector was a distance from
the settlement122, and the peoples fields surrounded the post. The area was flat
and at each of the four corners of the post there were tall towers. Surrounding the
post was a bund about 1.5 metres high with firing slots and a wire fence atop the
bund. The post was guarded throughout the 24 hours with guards rotated every
hour.
In accord with our plan, the 7th Battalion would attack the Sui Ngh
Special Sector. The 9th Battalion would then wipe out the enemy Regional Force
and Popular Force elements stationed in the hamlet. The 8th Battalion was ready to
strike reinforcements moving north from B Ra to break the blockade and rescue
the post. At H-hour, the 9th Battalion attacked the strategic hamlet, killing the
Regional Force and Popular Force troops - and held the hamlet. The Regiments
Sapper Company and a Sub-Region sapper battalion then attacked the Sui Ngh
Special Sector. When the 2nd Company of the 7th Battalion was resolved to attack
this Special Sector and ensure victory, the Company joined with the local armed
forces to conduct the assault. After cutting through 12 rows of fences, the rain
came down like a waterfall, and the night was very difficult for an attack.
However, with an aggressive and dauntless spirit, the 2nd Company of the 7th
Battalion together with the local armed forces, swiftly attacked the Special
Sector, seizing its perimeter and developing the assault into the post. The enemy
command panicked and fled, and our units seized two 105mm howitzers, and two
106mm weapons. On our side, Comrade H ng the political officer of the
Sapper Company, died bravely.123
In July 1972, the Regiments Sapper Company continued to be tasked with
attacks on the post at Kim Long and the Ha Long [sic] Sub-Sector. At these two
locations, the enemy had not concentrated a lot of assets as they had just been
defeated at the c Thnh Sub-Sector and, for that reason, the enemy was also
on a high defensive alert. Our plan was to attack and wipe out some of the
enemys potential but not to seize the objectives. Our units completed this task
given to us by the higher authority.
Accordingly, from the second quarter of 1972, the Region returned once
again to Military Region 7 to take part in the Nguyn Hu Campaign for a period

22d, in a contact east of t an ARVN battalion killed 31 enemy possibly from the 33d Regiment, with
no friendly casualties. MACV, 1972-1973 Command History Volume I, p.59. 1972 ADA995103.
122
Translators Note: Sui Ngh was a resettlement village established in September-October 1967 about
four kilometres north of the 1st Australian Task Force base at Ni t. Its occupants were moved from the
VC-dominated Slope 30 area north of c Thnh Sub-Sector.
123
Translators Note: According to a US report, : On 20 May, one-third of the town of Dat Do lost to the
33d NVA Regiment - MACV Command History Part 2, 1972, p.59 ADA995103.
 71

lasting six months. We joined with the local armed forces, and exploited our
tactics of attacking posts, destroying relief forces, and enlarging and extending
our regions. We inflicted heavy casualties on the 48th and 52nd Regiments of the
puppet 18th Division and the enemys Ranger and Regional Force Groups. In the
10-kilometre long liberated zone of Route 2 from B Ra to Xun Lc, there was
an extensive area of liberated settlements.
At the beginning of July 1972, the Regiment received almost 100 recruits
from Hi Phng as reinforcements but his did not amount to much, so the
Regiments fighting strength decreased. After the Nguyn Hu Campaign, we
withdrew our forces and were based in the area of the Qut Jungle to the north of
X Bang to reconstitute our forces and to prepare to receive new tasks.

2. Cutting Lines of Communication on Route 1 at Trng Bom.

In August 1972, the Regiment was ordered to deploy and establish itself in
the areas of Trng Bom and the Du Giy T-Junction in Long Khanh Province
and to join with the 4th ((274th)) Regiment and two recently-formed battalions (the
500th and the 246th) of B Ra-Long Khnh Province to participate in the minor
battles to liberate four hamlets on Route 15124 and to threaten National Route 1.
Along Route 1, the three battalions of the Regiment the 7th, 8th, and 9th, were
supported by the Trng Bom District troops to attack the enemy at Trng Bom and
Xun Lc. At this time, the Regiment also joined with the K8 mortar unit of Xun
Lc District to attack and force the enemys withdrawal from five watch-towers:
at Trng Sn, Cu Mi, Bo Bnh, Gia Lo, and the Nam H Bridge and at the
same time mobilising the masses to rise up with the guerillas and liberate the
hamlets of Nam H, Bo Lit, and Bo Bnh. The Regiment attacked and inflicted
heavy losses on the 323rd Regional Force Group and a Regional Force company at
the Lc Sn post forcing them to withdraw to the Gia Lo post.
On 12 September 1972, our Sapper Company was tasked to attack the
Sng Thao125* fire support base about 100 metres to the south of Route 1. There,
the enemy has emplaced three 105mm howitzers and an ammunition store with
three sections and an infantry platoon protecting Trng Bom, Bu Hm, Hng
Lc, and Du Giy and coordinating with other fire support bases such as Sui
a, Sui Su, and Bin Ha to pressure our forces at the gateway to Si Gn. To
defend the fire support base, the enemy had nine fences each of three rows of
barbed-wire, a three-metre deep communications trench, and a bund surrounding
the base. When our unit secretly approached the base and cut all the fences and
crossed the communications trench, and were beside the bund they were
discovered, and the enemys firepower fell like rain. Our troops crawled into the
communications trench and used its cover to throw grenades. With that firepower,

124
* Now National Route 51 joining Vng Tu with H Ch Minh City.
125
* Today, part of Sng Thao village of Trng Bom District, ng Nai Province.
 72

we wiped out the enemy within the post. The result of the attack by our Sapper
Company was that we killed many of the enemy, destroyed two howitzers, an
ammunition store, and much of the enemys war-fighting means.
On the night of 3 October 1972, the Regiment used its firepower to wipe
out the Sng Thao post and to destroy the culvert at Hng Ngha. Our 24th Sapper
Company attacked and wiped out a platoon and captured 15 of the enemy at the
Hng Lc post. We seized 18 weapons of various types, two PRC-25 radios, and
created the conditions for our 7th Battalion to attack, seize and take control of
Hng Lc hamlet.126* The 9th Battalion, district troops, and village guerillas
attacked and seized the two hamlets of Sng Thao and Bo Hm. Our
underground Party Chapter mobilised the masses to rise up and together with the
guerillas, to kill the cruel tyrants, destroy the Peoples Self-Defence Forces, and
liberate the two hamlets. The enemy deployed two Regional Force companies of
its 3/26th [sic] Group and two platoons of Popular Forces to lift our siege. Our
Battalion inflicted heavy casualties on a Regional Force company, broke up the
enemys relief operation, and killed many of the enemy. The 8th Battalion
together with district troops and village guerillas, surrounded the L Than post
(Sng Thao) and completely cut Route 1.
On 12 October 1972, the Regiment deployed the 9th Battalion to reinforce
the 5th Company of the 8th Battalion to cut Route 1 to the west of Hng Ngha.127*
On 13 October, an approximate force of an infantry regiment and a mechanised
battalion of the puppet 18th Division with air, artillery, and tank support,
launched a counter-attack. They attacked the 9th Battalions block at Hng Ngha
hamlet, but the 9th Battalion resolutely held its ground, fighting back and stalling
the enemys counter-attack. On the third day, the enemy was forced to move its
vehicles around Sng Thao hamlet to Bu Hm and the Du Giy T-Junction
and follow Route 20 to Lt and Route 1 to Xun Lc and to Bnh Tuy.
On 18 October 1972, the 11th Company of our 9th Battalion was tasked to
ambush and wipe out part of the combat capability of the puppet 18th Division, an
airborne brigade, and the tanks of an armoured group coming to aid the Trng
Bom Sub-Sector and the enemys posts along Route 1. Our Company was
strengthened with a 81mm mortar, a heavy machine-gun from the 12th Company,
and two of the Battalions reconnaissance personnel. In total, our group numbered
29 cadre and soldiers. However, after a long period of fighting on Route 2, the
Company had suffered casualties and its strength had weakened. Accordingly,
before this new task, the Company revitalized its political and ideological spirit
and built up its resolve in order to guarantee victory in the forthcoming ambush.
From about 6 a.m. to 10.30 a.m., the Company deployed and occupied its
positions at the Du Giy T-Junction - about 50-80 metres from Route 1, and

126
* The Company was awarded a Military Feats Medal Class 2, and a Military Feats Medal Class 3 was
also awarded to one of its members following the assessment of the engagement.
127
* The Regiment appointed Comrade Nguyn Minh Thin the Regiments deputy chief-of-staff, to
command the operation.
 73

secretly dug defences until 3 a.m., camouflaged their positions and waited for the
enemy. The following day at 6 a.m., their reconnaissance element reported that the
enemy was moving towards them with tanks in support. Waiting until the enemy
got close at about 7 a.m. the whole Company simultaneously opened fire and
wiped out a number of the enemy. Having been struck by surprise, the enemy
withdrew and waited for fire support from their artillery at Hong Diu, Long
Khanh, Dc M, and Gia Kim to rain shells into our positions. When their
artillery ceased firing, their aircraft attacked fiercely and their infantry advanced.
Although our 11th Company had lost contact with their higher command - and
they lacked fire support and additional forces, the Company still held on staunchly
and broke up the many enemy counter-attacks until 3.30 p.m. the same day.
Because of the imbalance of the two opposing forces, almost all of our 11th
Company were wounded only three comrades were not wounded: H Xun
Thnh and c Chi of the Battalions reconnaissance element, and Comrade u
a section cadre.
After four days, the enemy moved a Ranger battalion forward to counter-
attack our flank to the rear of Hng Ngha hamlet. The 5th Company of our 8th
Battalion deployed to fire on the enemy. After 30 minutes of combat, we had
killed many of the enemy, seized two PRC-25 radios, and five AR-15 rifles and
the remainder of the enemy fled to Route 1. For 23 [sic] days we had blocked and
cut the enemys lines of communication, wiped out an enemy company
conducting a sweeping operation in the area of the Regiments Headquarters
base, and seized a number of weapons and equipment including a PRC-25 radio.
Next, the Battalion moved to Regiments position north of Bu Hm.

From the beginning of 1970 to the middle of 1973, the Eastern Nam Bo
battlefield was really very violent. The Regiment had to regularly move its
location, and was trusted with many tasks by our higher authority. Silently
enduring everything without complaint, there were times that it appeared as if we
would not be able to overcome the difficulties but we bore and overcame all the
hardships. With the assistance of the people of B Ra-Long Khnh and Bnh Tuy
Provinces, the Regiment deployed to continuously attack the enemy everywhere,
and - together with the local armed forces, participated in the Route 2 Campaign,
the Nguyn Hu Campaign, and the campaign to extend and expand our liberated
zones that seized the initiative on the battlefields. We interdicted the enemys
lines of communications on Route 1 and in the Trng Bom area. Appropriately:
Wherever it was difficult the 33rd Regiment was there!.
 74

Chapter Four

Attacking the Enemy Violating the Paris Agreement - and the

General Offensive of Spring 1975 (1973 1975)

I. Participating in attacks on the enemy violating the Paris

Accords at Trng Bom.

On 27 January 1973, the Paris Accords128 on Ending the War and

Restoring Peace in Vietnam were signed in Paris. The Accords required that the
United States had to withdraw all American forces - and those of its vassals, from
South Vietnam and promise to honour the basic rights of our people for
independence and sovereignty across the whole territory, and cease military
involvement and interference in the internal affairs of the people of South
Vietnam. This was an extremely great victory, creating an important turning point,
changing the balance of forces between us and the enemy on the battlefield, and
creating a basic advantage that allowed our people to continue on the decisive
road to liberating the South and uniting the country.
Before the signing of the Accords, we had advocated springing up,
planting flags, and holding our ground. The Regiment was tasked to attack the
enemy encroaching on and seizing the liberated zone from Du Giy to Trng
Bom. This included our Sapper Company and the 7th Battalion attacking and
seizing the Trng Bom Sub-Sector (north of Route 1). The 8th Battalion
surrounded the enemy and opposed their encroachment in the Bu Ca area; and
the 9th Battalion reinforced by a 75mm RCL company, seized and held the Du
Giy T-Junction and Hng Lc hamlet. The 19th Company and the 21st Company
seized a number of hamlets on Route 1 from Trng Bom to the Sng Thao T-
Junction. On the night of 27 January, we opened fire, attacked, and took control of
the objectives. At about 5 a.m. on 28 January, the 7th Battalion contacted an
enemy company - and they held a conversation: Peace has come, lets not fire on
one another. The 1st Company of the 7th Battalion was on the edge of a rubber
plantation and on the other side of the road were a number of Republic of Vietnam
soldiers. Our side took out some cigarettes and offered them to the soldiers. Near
our 1st Company, there was a flag of the South Vietnam Liberation Front on the
top of a rubber tree about 50 metres from Route 1. The people of H Nai and
Trng Bom came out to look at it, but the puppet soldiers pushed them back.
Seeing such, our troops encouraged the people to stay and look at it.
With the Paris Accords achieved, our peoples happiness was not yet
complete as the enemy immediately launched a campaign to: flood the territory

128
Translators Note. The Accords were officially titled: The Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring
Peace in Vietnam.
 75

and implement their plot to win the people, and to encroach upon and seize the
revolutionary zones that we had previously owned. The enemy returned to and
retook a number of liberated zones held by us prior to the day of the signing of the
Paris Accords.
On 5 February 1973 that is the first day of Tt on the Lunar Calendar,
our troops still continued to hold their ground. Everyone was able to celebrate Tt
on the scale of each cell of three men having a can of fish, and each soldier having
a handful of rice and a cigarette.
On the night of 5 February 1973, the 52nd Task Force of the puppet 18th
Division counter-attacked the positions of our 7th and 8th Battalions at the Du
Giy T-Junction. The enemy used their firepower to fire heavily for more than
three hours, and their aircraft bombed continuously. Afterwards, their tanks
massed to surround us on three sides, and their infantry assaulted our positions.
From dawn until dark, our battalions had to fight back against more than 10
attacks.129* Our units were able to wear down the enemys capabilities. Five days
later on 10 February 1973, the puppet 52nd Regiment and a tank and armoured
vehicle battalion launched a counter-attack into the 7th and 9th Battalions areas.
Both Battalions resisted fiercely, wiping out over 100 of the enemy. The enemy
withdrew and used their aircraft and artillery to attack our positions. On the 9th
Battalions front - as we had not tightly coordinated our infantry and firepower
support, the 75mm RCL Company suffered many casualties, and we lost some
75mm RCLs. As we lacked anti-tank ammunition, Comrade L Vn S the
deputy commander of the Military Region, agreed for the 9th Battalion to
withdraw. Having withdrawn, the whole unit returned to the north of Trng Bom
(near Cy Gao on the ng Nai River) to consolidate, rebuild, and train. At this
time, the Regimental Headquarters decided to establish the 25th Company with a
mission to train corporals for our units. Led by Nng Vn Thai as its Company
Commander, the first training course was conducted on the banks of the ng Nai
River.

3. Fighting in the Route 2 Campaign, and Resisting the

Enemys Encroachments.

On 25 February 1973, the Regiment was ordered to return to the B Ra-

Long Khnh battlefield and to establish itself in the area of the Chu Lc Stream
in Chu c District.130* The Regimental Headquarters comprised: Commander
Nguyn Vn Thng, Political Commissar inh Vn t, Deputy Commander
Nguyn Huy Thn, and Chief-of-Staff/Deputy Commander L Ba Lc.
On 15 March 1973, the enemy deployed the 48th Task Force, the 3rd
Battalion, and the 43rd Task Force of the 18th Division together with three

129
* At this time, the 9th Battalion lost some 75mm RCLs.
130
* Nowadays part of X Bang village in Chu c District of B Ra-Vng Tu Province.
 76

squadrons of armoured vehicles, to encroach into and occupy villages along Route
2. Faced with this situation, the Military Region ordered the 33rd Regiment to
move from Route 1 to strengthen the D445 Battalion of B Ra-Long Khnh
Province, the 500th Battalion, and the Cao Su District troops to attack the Kim
Long post, and to resist the enemys encroachments. The plan was to establish
liberated zones along Route 2 such as in the areas of Vit Cng, Cm M,
Quang Minh, and Tm B and to open up the Vit Cng exchange point to join
B Ra with Long Khnh.
On the night of 23 March 1973, the 33rd Regiment was reinforced with the
Military Region 7 Sapper Battalion. The Regiment deployed its 9th Battalion
together with the Sapper Battalion, to attack the Kim Long post but was
unsuccessful. The 7th Battalion and the 8th Battalion surrounded the post and
struck an enemy relief force and the Ranger group [sic] from the 48th Regiment of
the 18th Division that had advanced to break through our encirclement. We
blocked the enemy and inflicted heavy casualties on them before they were forced
to withdraw. The enemy in the Kim Long and Tm B posts fled and we
surrounded and liberated Kim Long, isolating c Thnh Sub-Sector. As a result
of our operations, we wiped out a company, inflicted heavy casualties on two
other companies, set fire to and damaged five tanks, and seized all the weapons in
the Kim Long and Tm B posts. On 24 March 1973, the 9th Battalion was
ordered to return to Trng Bom and to attack the enemy encroaching on Route
24131*, and to strike i An hamlet (Vnh Cu). Next, the Battalion was to attack
the enemy blocking Route 24. The Regiments remaining elements continued to
occupy positions in Chu c District.132* At 5 a.m. on 4 April 1973, the enemy
in the Kim Long post [sic] wavered, panicked, and fled towards c Thnh. Our
7th and 8th Battalions immediately deployed along the road and, by surprise,
opened fire and attacked the fleeing enemy killing 67 about 50 metres from the
gate of the Kim Long post. Together with the 4th ((274th)) Regiment, we liberated
Cm M and Route 2. Subsequently, the Regiment was ordered to establish itself
in the area of the Nc c Stream - about 15 kilometres to the east of Bo Bnh
hamlet.
In August 1973, the 26th Company was formed consisting principally of
cadre and soldiers in the units who were wounded or disabled, to increase our
food production activities. At first, the unit grew cassava and corn in the areas of
Cy Gao and Bu Hm in Trng Bom District but afterwards moved to the Ba
Mu area of the My Tu [sic] Mountains in Xuyn Mc District133* in order to
resolve part of the Regiments food supply difficulties.
At the end of November 1973, a part of the Regiment joined with B Ra-
Long Khnh Provinces D445 Battalion to attack the enemy - effectively passing
the initiative to the revolutionary forces. In the first half of this phase of attacks in
131
* Route 24 linked Route 1 toTr An in Vnh Cu District.
132
* In B Ra-Vng Tu [sic] Province.
133
* Nowadays in B Ra-Vng Tu Province.
 77

this Springing Up Campaign, our forces principally faced the enemys

encroaching and pacification efforts. In the second half, we moved to more
decisive attacks in which we struck into the areas of control and strongholds from
which they launched their operations. We recovered liberated areas along Route
23 joining the Minh m base with our larger liberated zones in B Ra-Long
Khnh Province. During this period, our sapper company attacked the enemy
position at Sui Ngh, wiping out 25 enemy and seizing a number of weapons.
Moving into 1974, there were many changes in the complexion of the
battlefield. The enemy strengthened its pacification efforts, and seized a number
of priority objectives. They reinforced a number of new pacification initiatives
such as establishing military sub-sectors at village level134, and setting up
integrated committees and Pheonix centres. They expanded their new
intelligence networks with the aim of finding and terrorising our infrastructure,
and misrepresenting and slandering us as having violated the Paris Accords.
Fierce fighting continued between us and the enemy. To implement the Directive
of the Central Office for South Vietnam on striking firmly against enemy
encroachments, B Ra-Long Khnh Province expanded its campaign on Route 2
with the aim of securely retaining our liberated zones and blocking the enemys
sweeping operations. Military Region 7 Headquarters tasked the 33rd Regiment to
join with the local troops of B Ra-Long Khnh Province to hobble the enemy
forces in those two areas.
On 26 March 1974, Military Region 7 decided to launch a Campaign on
the B Ra-Long Khnh battlefield in order to expand the liberated zones. The
Campaign would retake control, wipe out an important part of the enemys war-
making capabilities, contribute towards a strengthening of the guerilla war,
recover ground and population, and expand the liberated areas along Route 2. In
the first phase of operations in the 1973-1974 Dry Season, the following forces
would participate in the campaign; the 33rd Regiment, the 18th Sapper Battalion,
the D445 B Ra-Long Khnh Battalion, and the 34th Chu c District
Company.135 The Campaign Headquarters comprised the following comrades:
Colonel L Vn Ngc the commander of Military Region 7 as the Campaign
Commander; Phm Vn Hy the secretary of the B Ra-Long Khnh Committee
as the Political Commissar; and Comrade Phm Lc the commander of the B

134
Translators Note: As noted earlier, beginning in 1972, Special Sectors (Yu Khu) were established by
the government of the Republic of Vietnam for several key areas including: Ph M, Cm M, Trng Bom,
Tc Trng, Gia Ray, Tn Sn Nht etc. For Sub-Sub-Sectors (Phn Khu, Phn Chi Khu), see footnote 172.
135
Translators Note: According to the Military Region 7 History, the following elements participated in the
Route 2 Campaign that began on 27 March 1974: 33 rd Regiment, 44th Regiment, 18th Sapper Battalion,
445th Battalion, 25th Company (Long t) and 43rd [sic] Company (Chu c). The Campaign began on 27
March 1974 and after three months of fighting, the first campaign by Military Region 7 in the resistance
war against the Americans achieved great victories completely liberating 100 [sic should be 10]
kilometres of Route 2 from north of c Thnh to Cm M and restoring the situation on the B Ra-Long
Khanh battlefield to the situation before 28 January 1973. The Campaign was led by Colonel L Vn
Ngc, the MR7 Commander. Disbanded in 1971, Military Region 7 had been re-formed in 1972.
 78

Ra-Long Khnh Province Unit as the Deputy Commander. The Campaign

Headquarters was situated in rubber plantation area to the east of Cm M village
(Long Thnh [sic]). The Campaign was carefully prepared. The plan was for the
18th Sapper Battalion to be tasked to seize the Kim Long post ((YS 4584)) after
which it would be taken over and held by the 33rd Regiment.
At 2 a.m. on 26 March 1974, when the 18th Sapper Battalion was secretly
cutting the posts minefield fences, it was discovered. The situation then forced us
to change to a sudden attack and fierce fighting ensued. We seized a number
of important positions but were unable to seize the whole of the Kim Long post.
The 9th Company of the 9th Battalion was ordered to move from the Bu Sen base
and replace the 18th Sapper Battalion and was tasked to seize the Kim Long
post.136* The Campaign Headquarters moved to its second plan to surround and
pressure the post, force the defenders to surrender, or force the enemy to abandon
the post.
On the morning of 28 March 1974, the 8th Battalion blocked and
surrounded the relief force moving from c Thnh north to Kim Long. The
Campaign Headquarters ordered our forces to change their method of attack and
cut the Route at both ends - isolating two battalions of the 372nd Regional Forces
[sic] in between. Our two battalions together with the guerillas and the Chu
c District troops established blocks south of Kim Long. The 8th Battalion (33rd
Regiment) attacked directly into the Kim Long post. With a tactic of: tightly
encircling, and attacking strongly, our forces surrounded the enemy for three
days, but the enemy was still able to reinforce the post with another company. We
had cut both ends of Route 2 and isolated two Regional Force battalions the
372nd and the 324th, in between. After seven days, our forces were able to seize the
posts at Mi Tng, B Ci, and R Be. The 372nd Regional Force Battalion was
surrounded at Tm B and Kim Long, and the enemys relief force continued to
be blocked on Route 2. The Regional Forces at c Thnh (Phc Tuy) attempted
to break through, and a company was wiped out.
The Route 2 Campaign concluded we had killed many of the enemy,
captured 37 prisoners including a lieutenant colonel, six officers of more junior
rank, seized over 200 weapons and 20 radios, set fire to 17 aircraft and 16 tanks,
liberated Route 2, and forced the withdrawal from 12 posts. An extremely large
area had been liberated, and B Ra-Long Khnh had been connected to Bin
Ha.137

136
* As the Sapper Company [sic] had suffered a lot of casualties.
137
Translators Note: The ng Nai Monograph similarly relates: At the conclusion of the Route 2
Campaign, we had killed 890 of the enemy, captured 37 prisoners including a full colonel, six
lieutenants/captains, seized 200 weapons and 20 radios, shot down 17 aircraft, destroyed 16 tanks, and
liberated Route 2 forcing the withdrawal of 12 enemy posts. The liberated areas of B RaLong Khnh
Bin Ha were now connected. See: a Ch ng Nai, Tp 3 (Vol 3) Chng 6, op.cit., 2001. The
Route 2 Campaign is also related in detail in Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment Their Story, op.cit.,
2014, pp.112-113.
 79

On 5 April 1974, the enemy sent its 43rd and 48th Task Forces of the
puppet 18th Division to lift the blockade on Route 2 from the north southward.
After a long period of being surrounded tightly, the enemy had not been able to
rescue the situation. At 1700hrs on 16 April 1974, their 372nd ((Regional Force))
Battalion fled from Kim Long. The following day, their 655th Company fled but
was struck by the 4th ((274th)) Regiment and the Ngi Giao village guerillas and
suffered heavy casualties in the L M area and at the Dinh nh Bridge. At that
time, fighting was still intense on Inter-Provincial Route 2, and we were able to
block the relief operations of three infantry task forces of the 18th Division -
inflicting heavy casualties on a large number of their companies, and setting fire
to tens of tanks and armoured vehicles. The 3rd Battalion of the enemys 43rd Task
Force was significantly worn down, and the remainder refused to go on
operations. After three months, on 31 April 1974, the Campaign ended in victory,
achieving all set objectives. We had recovered the liberated zone from Kim Long
to the B Ci plantation, wiped out 12 enemy posts, set fire to 17 aircraft and tens
of tanks, and killed 890 of the enemy. Our logistic rear services exchange points at
Bnh Ba, Ha Long, and Phc Thai had been re-opened and re-shaped the
battlefield.

II. Joining the 6th Division of Military Region 7 and

Liberating Route 3.

1. Blocking the enemy on Route 3 in the Hoi c Tanh

Linh Campaign.

At the beginning of November 1974, the 6th Division of Military Region 7

was established comprising: the 4th ((274th)) Regiment, the 33rd Regiment, a
sapper battalion, and four support battalions (artillery, engineers, communications,
and reconnaissance). Although only newly-formed, the 6th Division inherited units
that were unyielding, dauntless, and brave. The 33rd Regiment became a core unit
of the 6th Division. Preparations for the 1974-1975 Dry Season and other large
campaigns in the East Nam B Region, soon unfolded. After a time consolidating
its forces, the 6th Division deployed to Bnh Tuy for the campaign to liberate the
two districts of Hoi c and Tanh Linh. Our forces to participate in this
Campaign were: Military Region 6, an infantry regiment, a sapper battalion, and
the local armed forces.
On 20 November 1974, Major General Nguyn Minh Chu the COSVN
Chief-of-Staff, directly led the Campaign together with Dng C Tm (the
Political Commissar of Military Region 7), through a combat plan and a decision
to form a Campaign Headquarters comprising the following comrades: L Vn S
Commander of the 6th Division, as the Commander; L Vn Hin the Deputy
Political Commissar of Military Region 6 as the Political Commissar; Bi Vn B
 80

the Deputy Commander of Military Region 6; L Khc Thnh the Secretary of

the Bnh Tuy Province Committee; and Comrade By Mai the Political
Commissar of the 6th Division as Deputy Commanders and Deputy Political
Commissars of the Campaign. The Campaign plan put forward by Military Region
6 was to use our sapper forces and our infantry to seize the Tanh Linh Sub-Sector
and V Xu hamlet. The 6th Divisions sappers and the 4th ((274th)) Regiment
would seize the Hoi c Sub-Sector. The 33rd Regiment was tasked to block a
stretch of Route 3 about two kilometres to the south of the Gia Huynh Bridge 10
kilometres north of Gia Ray, with the aim of holding the enemy at that location at
any price, and wiping out the enemys main-force elements counter-attacking
from Gia Ray into the V c [sic ie Hoi c] Sub-Sector.
The Regiments combat plan was to use the 10th Company of the 9th
Battalion to establish a blocking position east of Route 3, with two companies in
the rear ready to be deployed. The 7th Battalion set up a block to the west of Route
3 to the south of the Gia Huynh Bridge opposite the 8th Battalions blocking
position. The two remaining companies of the 9th Battalion were tasked as the
Regiments mobile force ready to take the role of the 8th Battalion.138* Our
82mm Mortar Company and the 12.8mm Mortar [sic but probably anti-aircraft
machine gun] Company were directly controlled by the Regiment. At this time,
the Battalion Headquarters was led by Nguyn Huy Thn as the Regimental
Commander (Comrade Nguyn Vn Thng had gone to study at COSVN).
Comrade V Phat the Staff Assistant for Political Affairs at Military Region 7,
returned as the Political Commissar replacing inh Vn t who had gone for
training at COSVN. The Regiments second-in-command was L Ba Lc, and the
Chief-of-Staff was Vin nh o. The Battalion commanders and staffs were: 7th
Battalion commander: Comrade Thuyt139*, and Nguyn Thai Lim was the
political officer; the 8th Battalion was commanded by inh Ngc Thp, with
Hong Long Ton as its political officer; Trn ng Phong commanded the 9th
Battalion with Comrade Hoan as the political officer.
At about 0235hrs on the evening of 9-10 December 1974, we launched the
Tanh Linh Hoi c Campaign.140 As the 4th ((274th)) Regiment was unable to
attack and seize V c [sic ie Hoi c] Sub-Sector, that task was changed to
encirclement. The enemy then deployed Rangers and 18th Division forces to break

138
* The Regiment reinforced the 7th Battalion with two 75mm RCLs, and the 9th Battalion with two RCLs.
139
* After Comrade Thuyt had been wounded and captured by the enemy, he committed suicide. He was
replaced by Comrade Nguyn Hu Sanh. Translators Note: Thuyts capture during a reconnaissance
mission is noted in the Region 6 History (2002). - Trn Dng, Senior Colonel (ed), Khu VI khang chin
chng M cu nc 1954-1975, Nh xut bn Chnh tr quc gia, 2002.
140
Translators Note: According to the Region 6 History (2002), the Campaign began on 5 December. That
history relates that the following forces participated in the Campaign: 6th Division (33rd Regiment; 4th/274th
Regiment; 18th, 19th and 20th Sapper Battalions; and an 85mm artillery company of the 6 th Division); 812th
Infantry Regiment; 130th Artillery Battalion; 200C Sapper Battalion; 88th Bnh Tuy Province Infantry
Company; and the local forces of Tanh Linh and Hoi c Districts. Trn Dng, Senior Colonel (ed),
Khu VI , op.cit., 2002.
 81

through. Our Regiment counter-attacked and halted the 18th Division, puppet III
Corps troops, a squadron of tanks and armoured vehicles, and a puppet
mechanized battalion at Gia Ray. The blocking elements of the 7th Battalion had
to be given replacements each day as the enemy attacks were fierce, and a number
of cadre and soldiers were wounded. The enemy air-landed troops by helicopter to
the south of Route 20, crossed the La Ng River, and moved to relieve the siege of
Hoi c.
From 12 to 23 December 1974, the enemys 52nd Regiment, a Ranger
Group, and a tank battalion of the puppet 18th Division with air and artillery
support, attacked the blocking positions of our 7th and 8th Battalions. However,
our soldiers fought resolutely, driving back many of the enemys counter-attacks -
inflicting heavy casualties on the 1st Battalion of the 52nd Regiment, setting fire to
and damaging four tanks, and killing nearly 120 of the enemy.
On 22 and 24 December 1974, the enemy strengthened its forces and its
firepower and fiercely attacked our blocking positions. The sound of bombs,
artillery, and small-arms roared in our ears, and we suffered many wounded. Each
day we had to replace soldiers at the blocking positions. Two battalions of the
puppet 48th Regiment moved deep into the surrounding jungle. We concentrated
on attacking the enemy on Route 3 as the priority (to prevent the enemy diverting
us from the task), and used small forces comprising an infantry section and two
60mm mortars (with 30 rounds) and a reconnaissance team to closely follow the
enemy and, if discovered, use their 60mm mortar to concentrate their fire on the
enemy and force the enemy back to the road where we could destroy them.
At the 33rd Regiments blocking positions on Route 3, all the enemys
counter-attacks were defeated, and they were unable to achieve their aim of
breaking through and saving the two Sub-Sectors. With the enemy in the Sub-
Sectors panicking, we were able to seize-the-day on 28 and 29 December when
the Campaign Headquarters decided to concentrate its forces, increased its
artillery firepower, and wiped out all of the enemy forces in the Sub-Sectors.141
On 30 December 1974 when concluding Phase 1 of the Campaign at
Tanh Linh Hoi c, the Campaign Headquarters praised the 33rd Regiment
assessing that the Regiment had been the steel block on Route 3. COSVN
awarded our Regiment the Liberation Military Feats Medal 1st Class.

2. Joining with our forces for the Route 3 Campaign

in Xun Lc.

141
Translators Note: The Tanh Linh Sub-Sector fell on 25 December 1974. The Hoi c Sub-Sector (at
V c village) was defended by the 344th Regional Force Battalion (commanded by Captain L Phi )
and other elements under Major Xinh - the Sub-Sector commander. The post did not fall in December 1974,
but was again attacked in March 1975 and abandoned on 23 March 1975. The translator (Chamberlain) was
the Vietnam desk officer in the Joint Intelligence Organisation (Canberra) in 1973-1975.
 82

On 23 February 1975, COSVN Headquarters tasked our armed forces and

the people of Eastern Nam B for Phase II of the 1974-1975 Dry Season
Campaign. Assessing the situation, COSVN Headquarters summarised:
Having liberated Phc Long, the revolutionary movement has developed
strongly, and our liberation forces are stronger that those of the puppet forces.
Accordingly, COSVN Headquarters has directed Military Region 7 to attack Gia
Ray and the Lc Ninh Sub-Sector142 at all costs and liberate Route 3 and Route 1,
and a stretch of Route 2 in B Ra in order to create a whole corridor from
COSVN to the south-east of Si Gn and prepare for the General Offensive and
the liberation of Si Gn.
In January and March 1975, the 33rd Regiment joined with the local armed
forces to conduct continuous Campaign activities on Route 3 and Route 1 with the
aim of liberating the Special Sector, destroying the Gia Ray strategic hamlet, the
Ng Ba (T-Junction) post, Sui Cat, and Bo Bnh and create an encirclement of
Xun Lc Town from the north and the south. At that time, the 4th ((274th))
Regiment attacked the ng n T-Junction, but were unsuccessful. The following
day, the 6th Division directed the 33rd Regiments 8th Battalion to reinforce that
attack and the enemy fled. On that night also, the 9th Battalion attacked the Gia
Ray Special Sector. The following night, we liberated the whole of Route 3 from
Tr Tn 1 and Tr Tn 2 to the ng n T-Junction. On 14 March 1975, one of
our elements attacked the Lc Ninh Sub-Sector beside Route 3 in Bnh Tuy and
struck the puppet 52nd Regiment. As soon as we opened fire, the enemy fled and
we seized a large amount of weapons and military equipment. Also on that day,
our 7th Battalion, 8th Battalion, and the Regiments direct support companies
attacked an enemy company, seized the Gia Ray Special Sector, and held the
positions.
On 15 March, the Regiment opened fire and attacked the enemy from Base
1 to Base. 4. However, as we were deploying, the enemy occupied their defences
and fired on us causing us great difficulties and many casualties. Our battalions
moved swiftly and controlling our firepower, surrounded the enemy. Seeing that
they were encircled on several flanks, the enemy fled into the jungle.
On 19 March 1975, the Regiment used its firepower to support the infantry
attacking Hoi c Sub-Sector. On 22 March 1975, the Campaign concluded in
victory with the complete liberation of the two districts of Hoi c and Tanh
Linh.143* The Regiment together with the local armed forces, destroyed a large
part of the enemys capability for war-fighting, separated the enemys Military
Region 2 from their Military Region 3, and joined our southern Central Region
((Trung B)) with Eastern Nam B. On 20 March 1975, the Regiment attacked
and liberated Base 1 completely.

142
Translators Note: Lc Ninh Sub-Sector in Long Khanh Province not the Lc Ninh Sub-Sector in Bnh
Phc/Long Province.
143
* This Sub-Sector [sic] had a population of about 60,000.
 83

On 25 March 1975, with the enemy in a shaky situation, the Regiment was
ordered to attack Base 2. Before it became dark, our 85mm artillery and 120mm
mortars shelled the enemy in the Base. The enemy fled, and we blocked their
flight and wiped them all out and seized two 105mm howitzers. With the loss of
Base 2, the enemy in Base 3 became panic-stricken and fled. The Regiment
prepared to attack Base 4, but the Division gave that task to the 4th ((274th))
Regiment. With the impetus of our continuous victories, the 33rd Regiment
together with other forces and the masses in the villages along Route 1, rose up
and liberated an area more than 20 kilometres long from the ng n T-Junction
to Base 5, completely isolating Xun Lc from the Central Region.
Before these strong attacks and victories of the Liberation Armed Forces
in B Ra-Long Khnh, the Regiment coordinated with the district troops and
guerillas to attack the hamlets of: Lu Xanh, Sui Cat, Vit Kiu, Mai Th Bch,
and Bnh Ph and completed the liberation of the villages of: Gia Ray, Bo
Bnh, cutting Route 1 for five kilometres, and repelling counter-attacks from the
332nd and 324th Battalions of Long Khanh Sector that attempted relief operations.
With the support of the 33rd Regiment, our resettlement teams and the village and
hamlet guerillas mobilised the masses to seize the isolated Lc Vinh [sic
probably Lc Ninh] Sub-Sector we seized 81 weapons (including nine 81mm
and 60mm mortars) and liberated more than 10,000 people who had been forced
by the enemy into these concentration areas.

III. Participating in the General Offensive and Uprising of

Spring 1975.

1. Blocking the withdrawal of the enemy on Route 1 at Base 10

in Bnh Tuy.

After the fall of the Central Highlands, Hu, Nng, Nha Trang the
military forces of the Republic of Vietnam in disorder, sought a route to flee
southwards. The 33rd Regiment Headquarters tasked an element to block the flight
of the puppet troops at Base 10 on Route 1 in Hm Tn District of Bnh Tuy
Province as the enemy sought to reach Long Khanh.
On 2 April 1975, enemy forces fleeing from the Central Region to Si Gn
arrived at the Regiments blocking position. At 10 a.m., our 7th Battalion soldiers
fired a B-40 setting fire to a GMC truck. The enemy fled the vehicle was full of
weapons, and the unit recovered 50 weapons of various types, 10 radios, and a
large quantity of food and provisions. The following day, the enemy was unable to
move along Route 1, but deployed in another direction. At about 6.30 the next
day, our observation post reported about 50 tanks, armoured vehicles, and other
military vehicles were moving towards our position. Our blocking position to the
west of Route 1 opened fire and set fire to 10 vehicles including three tanks. The
 84

enemy were in panic, and returned fire while attempting to flee. At 1030hrs, the
enemy vehicles massed in larger group, but did not dare to advance on Route 1,
but moved to the east of Route 1 where our 1st Company was obstructing that axis.
Our soldiers opened fire, setting fire to two tanks, three armoured vehicles, and a
large number of military vehicles. Despite hearing the sounds of our weapons
lessening and guessing that we had suffered many casualties and were low on
ammunition, the enemy still did not dare to move forward. At 1400hrs, the enemy
defying the dangers, flooded forward with their tanks and over-ran our defences.
45 of our cadre and soldiers died beneath the wheels of the enemy vehicles. At
1900hrs the same day, we were able to evacuate six of our seriously wounded to
the rear. Although we had suffered many killed, our force had held up the enemy
for many hours and wiped out a notable amount of their combat capability. The
Regiment withdrew from the battlefield during the day along Route 1 - then
through the jungle to Route 2. and back to our concentration area. We signalled
the 7th Battalion to withdraw swiftly from the battlefield back to Base 4. Taking a
vehicle with them back to their new base, they prepared to receive their next task.

2. Blocking the enemy at the Du Giy T-Junction and

participating in the Xun Lc Campaign.

On 6 April 1975, with the enemys Phan Rang defensive line shattered,
from 17 March to 3 April the puppet Si Gn militarys forward posts in Ty
Ninh, An Lc, Du Ting, Chn Thnh, and nh Qun also fell in succession.
The Xun Lc Front fell into a situation of being exposed on three flanks to the
north, west, and south. Developments on the battlefields in the South changed by
the day and by the hour.
Xun Lc was a critical area for the defence to the north-east of Si Gn in
the basic defensive line (Bin Ha Xun Lc B Ra Vng Tu) held by the
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces to obstruct the eastern gateway to Si Gn
and to hold its remaining ground in their plan titled: Maximum Effort.
Accordingly, the Republic of Vietnam authorities concentrated all their final
efforts into the Xun Lc defensive line. On this line, they organised a force of
infantry, air force elements, Rangers, and Regional Forces to block us and to hold
on until the death.
The 33rd Regiment was ordered to abandon its blocking positions on Route
1 and to prepare for other tasks. At first, we sent a group of the Regiments cadre
to attack the enemy on Route 2 but the plan changed and another group was
sent. The Regiment received orders to deploy to block the Du Giy T-Junction
and to join the Xun Lc Campaign.
Our task was to block the Du Giy T-Junction and to attack the enemy
coming from the direction of Si Gn - Bin Ha to reinforce Xun Lc, and for
us to create favourable conditions for the units to liberate Xun Lc. On the night
 85

of 8-9 April 1975, the Regiments sappers were ordered to attack and seize Hng
Lc hamlet at the Du Giy T-Junction, and to block enemy counter-attacks from
attempting to break through. The 8th and 9th Battalions set up blocking positions to
the south; and the 7th Battalion set up positions to the north of Route 1. That very
night, the Regiment occupied those objectives related above, and seized two
105mm howitzers at Hng o hamlet.
For three days (11, 12, and 13 April), the Regiment continuously held off
enemy counter-attacks from Bin Ha Trng Bom, while at the same time
coordinating with the 4th ((274th)) Regiment to strike the enemy in the Route 20
area where the main enemy formation was the 52nd Task Force.
On the night of 13-14 April, we destroyed a battalion of the 52nd Task
Force, destroying six tanks at the Du Giy T-Junction - while at the same time
joining with the 4th ((274th)) Regiment to wipe out the whole 52nd Task Force.
This was the key battle that isolated Long Khanh Sector.
Faced with the danger that its Xun Lc position could be broken through,
on 16 and 17 April the enemy had to deploy its 8th Task Force, the 5th Division,
the 7th Ranger Group, and three battalions of armour from Bin Ha to Trng Bom
and launch several series of counter-attacks aimed at retaking the Du Giy T-
Junction. The 33rd Regiment joined with our fraternal units to wipe out two enemy
battalions at the M Bng Con pass in the Hng Ngha area. At this time, inh
Vn t was posted to become the Director of the 6th Division Political Office.
In the Xun Lc area, we continue to launch several series of attacks to
force the enemy to abandon their external defensive positions and to fall back to
their last-ditch defences in the Town. Our forces joined with infantry to seize
ground house-by-house and street corner-by-street corner, and our artillery
destroyed many of the enemys defences forcing them into a passive mode.
Although the enemy had launched strong and frenzied counter-attacks from both
Xun Lc and Trng Bom and even used heavy CBU bombs, our forces still
forced them to withdraw, and the enemy was unable to retake the Du Giy T-
Junction. Xun Lc was cut off, Bin Ha was besieged, and a number of the
puppet military and government positions within Xun Lc had been seized.
Faced with this situation, the puppet III Corps was forced to order its forces to
abandon Xun Lc. Some enemy elements withdrew by helicopter and reinforced
the defences of Bin Ha, while the remainder secretly fled during the night of 20-
21 April 1975 from Xun Lc down Route 2 to B Ra. On 21 April 1975, the
steel door of Xun Lc was broken open and the enemy had fled from Xun
Lc.144

144
Translators Note: For a succinct history of the defence of Xun Lc, see: Veith, G.J. and Pribbenow,
M.L. II, Fighting is an Art: The Army of the Republic of Vietnams Defense of Xun Lc - 9-21 April
1975, The Journal of Military History, Vol 8, No.1, January 2004, pp.163-213. The article includes clear
annotated maps of key locations and deployments.
 86

3. Participating in the H Ch Minh Campaign, seizing Bin

Ha.

Before the storm-like victory of our forces and the people that shattered
the iron gate of Xun Lc, on 14 April 1975 the Politburo had approved a plan to
liberate Si Gn Gia nh and had agreed to title the campaign The H Ch
Minh Campaign. On 26 April 1975, The H Ch Minh Campaign began.
The 33rd Regiment of the 6th Division, was among the main-force units
allocated the task to attack the enemy on the axis of Route 1, and to open the way
for units to attack and liberate Si Gn. Our Regiment was strengthened with a
tank company and supported by the Divisions firepower. At the same time
before commencing the Campaign, the Regiment also received additional
personnel at the Un-named rubber factory.
The Regiments Headquarters comprised: Commander: Nguyn Huy
Thn; Acting Political Commissar: V Phat; Deputy Political Commissar: Trn
Thi Thc; Deputy Commanders: L Ba Lc and Triu Kim Sn; Director of the
Political Office: Phan Trng Dng; Deputy Director of the Political Office: Trn
Vn Lun; Chief-of-Staff: Vin nh o; Deputy Chief-of-Staff: H c Nhau;
Director of Rear Services: Phan Vn Vnh; Deputy Director: Trng Vng.
Commanding the Battalions were: 7th Battalion: Bi Ngc B
Commander, Nguyn Thai Lim Political Officer; 8th Battalion: Nguyn Trng
Ha Commander, Phan Ngc Don Political Officer; 9th Battalion: Phan S
Tm Commander, Nguyn Ngc Th Political Officer.
The independent [sic] companies were:
16th Company (82mm mortars): Nguyn Vn An, Company Commander;
17th Company (RCL): Comrade Thch, Company Commander;
18th Company (Air Defence): Hong Vn Hoa, Company Commander;
19th Company (Engineers): Comrade Xuyn, Company Commander;
20th Company (Communications): Comrade Huan, Company Commander;
21st Company (Reconnaissance): Nguyn Vn Mn, Company
Commander;
22nd Company (Transportation): Comrade Xi, Company Commander;
23rd Company (Medical): Dng Phm Phng, Company Commander;
24th Company (Sappers): Comrade Nhn, Company Commander.

On 21 April 1975 - after we had liberated Long Khanh ((ie Xun Lc))
Town, a large enemy force moved to Trng Bom to block the way to Si Gn and
to fight to the death. On the morning of 26 April 1975, the Regiment sent a force
to attack the Trng Bom Sub-Sector and contacted the enemy grouped in a banana
grove near Route 1 blocking our advance towards Bin Ha. The Regiment fought
resolutely throughout the day resulting in our forces wiping out that whole
enemy group, and the remainder fleeing in panic.
 87

At 1700hrs on 27 April, the Regiments firepower impacted violently on

the enemys armoured area and the Rangers area. That night, the Regiment
attacked the enemy in locations to the south of Route 1. Comrade Trn Thi Thc
the Regiments Deputy Political Commissar, was directly commanding the 7th
Battalion when he was killed by an enemy mine together with many of his
comrades, while fighting heroically against an enemy group at the Long Lc
railway station.145*
On 28 April, Comrade Ha commanding the 8th Battalion, led an attack
on an enemy group to the south of Trng Bom in which the enemy suffered heavy
casualties and the remainder fled. The Regiment then continued towards the Ch
St T-Junction (H Nai) before halting. The 7th Division was blocked at the Sui
Mau Bridge and counter-attacked strongly, but suffered heavy losses and was
unable to advance. The next morning, L Vn S the Commander of the 6th
Division, ordered the 33rd Regiment to task our 9th Battalion reinforced with
tanks, to follow the H Ni [sic] Highway146 to join with the 7th Division and
attack the enemy at the Sui Mau Bridge. At 0600hrs on 29 April, the Regiment
received an order to attack and seize the puppet III Corps Headquarters and the
Bin Ha airfield in order to open up a favourable route for our IV Corps to
prepare to attack and liberate Si Gn. At about 10 a.m., the Regiment attacked
and seized the Ranger base. On 29 April, we took the Ch St T-Junction to the
south of H Nai. The enemy group at the Sui Mau Bridge counter-attacked, and
the Regiments forces were unable to exploit further. On the night 29-30 April,
with the fire support from the 6th Division, we were then able to seize the Sui
Mau base and open the way for the advance into Bin Ha.
At 1030hrs on 30 April 1975, puppet President Dng Vn Minh
announced the unconditional surrender of the enemy. The puppet military and
administration in the Bin Ha and H Nai areas completely disintegrated.
Happiness at our victory shone brightly in the battle-seasoned faces of the 33rd
Regiments soldiers. It was an hour engraved in the important history of our
people as we had liberated the whole of the South and united our country.

From the beginning of 1973 to May 1975, in fact the Eastern Nam B
battlefield including after the Paris Accords, had evidenced that for the
revolution in the South there was no other route than the use of revolutionary
violence to defend the Paris Accords. Synonymous with the necessity to resolutely
punish the enemy for wilfully violating the Accords, the 33rd Regiment
executing the orders of higher authority, swiftly stabilised its structure. From 28
January to mid-February 1973, we had attacked the enemy on Route 1 from Trng
145
* Now part of Trng Bom District.
146
Translators Note: The 32-kilometre Bin Ha Highway (to Si Gn) was renamed the H Ni Highway
in 1984.
 88

Bom and Bu Hm to Du Giy and joined with the armed forces of Bin Ha
Province and Trng Bom to give a deserved hiding to the encroaching enemy. We
had firmly maintained the liberated zones and defended the Paris Accords.
Operating within the 6th Division and Military Region 7, we fought on
many different types of terrain (in cities, deltas, mountains, and jungles). We had
to fight many different opponents such as the 43rd and 48th Task Forces of the
puppet 18th Division, the Ranger Groups, Regional Forces, Popular Forces, spies,
and cruel tyrants. The Regiment used many types of tactics: attacking the enemy
in their solid defences (storming attacks), ambushes, raids, mobile attacks
encircling tightly and attacking strongly. We coordinated closely with the local
armed forces, rose up and killed the cruel tyrants, destroyed oppressors, and built
up our revolutionary infrastructure and created a foundation for their existence.
We seized opportunities - and with initiative and creativity, we prevailed in each
battle and in every campaign. Within Long Khanh, the Regiment coordinated with
the district troops and the village guerillas to attack the hamlets of Lu Xanh, Sui
Cat, Vit Kiu, Mai Th Bch, and Bnh Ph and completely liberated the
villages of Gia Ray, Bo Bnh, and Bo nh. We cut all of Route 1 over a
distance of more than five kilometres, and drove back the waves of counter-
attacks by the reinforcing 332nd and 324th Battalions from Long Khanh Sector.
With the support of the Regiment, the village guerillas mobilised the masses to
attack and seize the Lc Vinh [sic] Sub-Sector, completely liberating 10,000
people who had been forced into that resettlement area. We liberated Route 3 from
Tr Tn 1 and Tr Tn 2 to the ng n T-Junction. On 30 April 1975, we seized
the Bin Ha airfield, contributing to the complete liberation of the South
bringing our nation together as a whole.147

147
Translators Note: Non sng thu v mt mi.
 89

Chapter Five

Protecting the Fruits of the Revolution, Participating in the

Creation of National Defence Projects on the South-West Border
(1975 1977)

I. Pursuing military remnants and defending the fruits of the

revolution in Bin Ha, B Ra-Long Khnh, and Vng Tu.

The General Offensive and Uprising of Spring 1975 culminating in the

historic H Ch Minh Campaign, concluded the war of liberation of our whole
people having been drawn out over nearly a third of a century. Now, the
revolution in Vietnam moved forward into a new era, a time when the whole
country advanced to build and defend the nation. As troops of Uncle H - who had
been born and come of age in the times of fire and sword during the War, the
cadre and soldiers of the 33rd Regiment were elated and proud of the fruits of the
revolution that they had achieved and were ready to accept all new tasks given to
them by the Party and the armed forces.
On 1 May 1975, the Regimental Headquarters and the 8th Battalion were
stationed at H Nai (the fire support base and position previously occupied by the
puppet powers Rangers); the 7th Battalion was in the Sui Mau area (the base of
the puppet III Corps military police); and the 9th Battalion was in the former
enemy headquarters in the Long Bnh General Logistics Complex. The cadre and
soldiers of the Regiment together with the Military Administration Sections at
all levels, maintained order and security in the local areas, and took over and
protected the recently-occupied military bases.
On 8 May 1975, the Military Standing Committee of COSVN held a
Conference that promulgated the tasks facing the armed forces in general.
Regarding the enemy situation, the Conference assessed that: the enemy had
disintegrated and surrendered, but we have yet to fully sweep them away. While
they have fled, they are seeking means of opposing us in one way or another .
On tasks for our armed forces, the Conference clearly announced that we were to
continue to implement our functions the first of which must be to fight against
and wipe out the enemy to the finish. Concretely, we had to pursue and quell
reactionary forces in order to defend the fruits of the revolution while being
ready to strike against enemy sabotage in the areas of our responsibility, defend
our administrative authorities, and protect property, material infrastructure,
technical facilities, and warehouses . The principal task was to clear out the
cities, towns, and the peripheries as these were previously our weak areas. At this
time, our tasks required changes in the Regiments organisation: the 25th
 90

Company ((Training Company)) was disbanded, and the 26th Company was
deployed to increase production in Cm ng village.148*
After a month of being stationed in Bin Ha, on 2 June 1975, the
Regiment was ordered to move to Long t District and Vng Tu City to
conduct civilian proselytising and to pursue enemy military remnants. Together
with the District Unit, the cadre and the soldiers of the Regiment were broken up
into groups and tasked to go to each ward and hamlet. We ate with the people and
went from house-to-house in order to understand the situation giving rice to
poor families, mobilising the people to denounce puppet military and civilian
elements still on the loose and making those elements report for re-education and
accept the lenient policy of the revolution. In the month of June, the Regiment
joined with the local armed forces in 83 sweeps in the Ni Ln, Ni Nh, and Ch
Linh Forest areas of Vng Tu capturing 118 individuals, and seizing: a 60mm
mortar, a M79 grenade launcher, seven M16 sub-machine [sic] guns, an
assassination pistol, and a container of mines.
In July 1975, the 6th Division was disbanded with only the 33rd Regiment
and the 4th ((274th)) Regiment still stationed in the provinces of Bin Ha, B Ra-
Long Khnh, and Vng Tu City. Those two formations continued with the task
of pursuing the enemy military remnants and undertaking the re-education of the
puppet soldiers and officers that had surrendered and reported to the revolutionary
authorities. The Regiment was tasked to join with the armed force of Vng Tu
City to pursue military remnants and to defend the coastline.
Also in July 1975, the Regiment was given the additional task of re-
educating puppet officers - who had reported, in two camps. The first camp was at
L Li Hill149* in Long Khanh Town where Comrade Trn Vn Lun the
Political Officer, was concurrently the Camp Commandant. Comrade Nguyn Vn
Th was the Deputy Commandant, and Nguyn Vn Ha was responsible for
military matters. The camp comprised five companies, and 220 of our cadre and
soldiers had the task of warden-educators for 500 puppet officers. The second
camp was at Base 4 (now part of Xun Ha village, Xun Lc District, ng Nai
Province) and was commanded by Comrade Nguyn Vn Li. That camp also had
five companies as warden-educators for more than 300 puppet officers.150*
Moving into 1976, after more than 15 years of developing, fighting and
coming-of-age, on 15 January 1976 at Ngc Tc Hill in Vng Tu Town, the
cadre and soldiers of the 33rd Infantry Regiment were honoured by being awarded
the insignia: Hero of the Peoples Armed Forces by the Party and the Nation.
This was the highest award that the Party, the Nation, and the Armed Forces could
award to the cadre and soldiers of the Regiment. They had fought heroically and
overcome difficulties and hardships to complete all given tasks outstandingly.

148
* Cm ng village was in Long Thnh District of ng Nai Province ((vicinity YS 355949)).
149
* It was also called L Li camp.
150
* We operated those two re-education camps for 21 months. In February 1977, the camps were
transferred to the Public Security Service (Cng An) and administered by that Service.
 91

This award gave added strength to the soldiers of the Regiment and for future
and earlier generations, who resolved to stoutly maintain and bring into play the
traditions of our heroic unit that always completed its given tasks in an
outstanding manner.
At the end of February 1976, the ng Nai Province Unit began a program
to pursue and sweep away the puppet military remnants in a number of areas in
the Province. A Headquarters was established led by Comrade Sau Ngc the
Province Unit Commander. The area of the Districts of Long t, Chu Thnh,
Xuyn Mc, and Vng Tu City were commanded by our Regiment Commander
Nguyn Huy Thn; with the District Commanders of the Districts as the Deputy
Commanders. In Long t, a battalion of the 33rd Regiment undertook the task in
the Phc Tnh area, with another battalion covering Vng Tu City. The pursuit
and sweeping operations began on 26 February 1976 in three phases.
Phase 1: lasting one day, to resolve the issue of ringleaders; Phase 2: over
four days, to broaden the sweep; and Phase 3: lasting 10 days. As a result, after
the three phases of the sweep, the security situation in the region became more
stable in steps, and the peoples faith in the revolutionary authorities and the
leadership of the Party entered a new period.
On 20 April 1976, to prepare for creating a plan to protect the coastline,
the ng Nai Province Unit held a Conference to discuss combined activities by
the units in the four Districts along the coast in particular from Bnh Chu to
Vng Tu, a distance of 70 kilometres. The elements participating were
representatives of the Military Region 7 Staff, the 33rd Regiment, the 218th
Regiment, the Navy, the Air Force, the 121st Battalion, Security [sic], the 24th
Regiment, the 10th Sapper Group, and the Districts of: G Cng, Duyn Hi, Vng
Tu, Long t, and Chu Thnh. As practical measures, in the those areas with a
coast, the Province Unit advocated creating combined organisations by
establishing a united headquarters among those districts beside the sea with units
and armed forces stationed in each area to complete the task of organising forces
operating on the border and coordinating when a situation arose. Parallel with the
tasks to defend essential objectives within the Province, at this time the Regiment
had an important mission to defend the North-South railway line that passed
through the Province for a distance of 78 kilometres. Together with other units,
we protected the security of the organisations and units of the Province and their
facilities concentrating on: warehouses, principal enterprises . At the same
time, we continued to pursue, attack and breakup the reactionary FULRO groups
and implemented preventative measures against unrest occurring within ng Nai
Province.
Having firmly determined the principal objectives needing absolute
security protection and the standing basic facilities within the districts, the
battalions, regiments, and divisions of the Military Region and the Headquarters
within the Province were organised and able to guarantee that the present and
 92

long-term requirements and actions were ready and able to mutually support one
another.

II. Consolidating the Regiment while training and constructing

works on the South-West Border.

Within the area covered by Military Region 7, there was a common border
with the Kingdom of Cambodia adjacent to the Provinces of Sng B 151*, Ty
Ninh, and Long An. From the day after the South was liberated, the reactionary
Khmer Rouge daily exposed their reactionary nature to their neighbouring nation,
Vietnam. The Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique regularly conducted provocative actions
and created tensions on the road to an invasionary border war.
On 2 July 1976, Military Region 7 was brought to full strength after a
decision to disband the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) and the
COSVN Headquarters. The 33rd Regiment part of the 6th Division, was
transferred to the 476th Engineer Group (equivalent to a division). Each battalion
was reduced to a unit without combat support companies.
The Regiments Headquarters comprised: Commander Chu Kim Thch;
Political Commissar V Phat; Deputy Commander Comrade Thanh (from
Military Region 7 Engineers); Chiefs-of-Staff Triu Kim Sn, L Dng Khan;
Deputy Chief-of-Staff Bi Ngc B; Director of the Political Office Nguyn
Thai Lim; and Director of Rear Services Phan Vn Vnh.
The situation on the South-West Border continued to be strained.152 Our
tasks of training and combat readiness were the first priority parallel with our
economic development tasks. The Regiment organised recruitment and the
training of recruits for the first time since the day of liberation. This was organised
by Nguyn Hu Qunh a battalion commander, and o Duy on a political
officer. The Regiment prepared its material infrastructure, build drill grounds, and
training grounds and created a battalion of cadre structured to train the new
soldiers and to receive the 600 recruits from ng Nai and take them back for
training at C Chi. After six months of training for the new soldiers, the Battalion
had completed its tasks well and was awarded a commendation certificate by the
476th Division.153*
151
* Nowadays the two Provinces of Bnh Dng and Bnh Phc.
152
Translators Note: Serious border tensions with Democratic Kampuchea (ie the Khmer Rouge
government of Cambodia) began almost immediately post-War. On 3 May 1975, Khmer Rouge forces
attacked Ph Quc Island in the Gulf of Thailand long-claimed by the Cambodians as Koh Tia, followed
on 10 May 1975 with the Cambodian seizure of the island of Th Cho. 520 Vietnamese civilians were
reportedly killed in the attacks. The 5th Division History (2005) notes that there were 18 cross-border
violations by Pol Pot-Ieng Sary troops in 1975, and 191 in 82 separate locations in 1976. - Phm Quang
inh, Lch S S an B Binh 5, op.cit., 2005. The major Cambodian ground attacks occurred in mid-
March to May 1977 in Kin Giang and An Giang Provinces, precipitating significant Vietnamese military
deployments.
153
* Comrade Qunh was the Battalion Commander, and Comrade on was its Political Officer.
 93

Faced with this new situation, the Regiments cadre and soldiers were
ordered by Military Region 7 to move and be stationed in the two Districts of B
ng and B p in Sng B Province 154* with tasks of economic development
in concert with national defence tasks. On arriving in the new area, our first task
was to set to building a hutted camp in the wild and mountainous forest (the
Regiment had sent three sections ahead as an advanced party). After consolidating
the barracks and the soldiers accommodation, the units began construction of a
number of communications works such as Route 13 from Ban M Thut to Tn
Bin in Cambodia; Route 10 from Route 14 to Sc Bom and joining Route 7 with
Cambodia; and the Trn L Xun Route155 that was a strategic road supporting our
rear services and the defensive line along the South-West Border. At that time, the
main activity was manual labour, but - with an industrious spirit for such work
and creativity, the Regiment completed its given task. To improve and lift-up the
lives of our cadre and soldiers, the units grew corn, cassava, and beans and
raised pigs, cattle, poultry, and fish and green vegetables of many types. In a
short period of time, from a being a deserted area, through the efforts of our cadre
and soldiers the economic and social look of the area had changed considerably.
Apart from our tasks to develop the economy, the Party Committee and
Headquarters of the Regiment strengthened political and ideological education
activities for the cadre and soldiers, lifting up their morale156 ready for combat.
After the War, a number of cadre had evidenced a relaxation in their
ideological focus. Clearly understanding the innermost feelings and aspirations of
our cadre and soldiers, the cadre at every level paid attention to the lives of the
soldiers with a sentiment to fully achieve the Partys and the Nations policies
towards them. There were regular reports concerning war on the South-West
Border, and this confirmed for the cadre and the soldiers the need to heighten their
revolutionary vigilance and their readiness to accept the task of defending every
piece of ground of our beloved nation when the enemy rashly violated the
sovereignty of the nations territorial borders.
In the middle of 1977, there were changes of appointments in the
Regiments Headquarters. Comrade V Vit Cam held the position of Regimental
154
* Nowadays part of Bnh Phc Province.
155
Translators Note: The Trn L Xun Route built in 1956, was named after Madame Nhu (the wife of
Ng nh Nhu the younger brother of South Vietnams President Ng nh Dim). Ng nh Nhu was
President Dims principal political advisor.
156
Translators Note: For a discussion of morale in the Regiment, see Chamberlain, E.P., The 33 rd
Regiment , op.cit., 2014, pp. 40-43 ie ideological problems, homesickness, letter-writing,
awards, and visits by cultural groups etc. On Morale, a 1971 study by 1 ATF that also drew on US
material, noted: 33 NVA Regt is considered to be one of the most capable units in GVN MR3 and as such
is believed to have fairly high morale. This can be attributed to constant political indoctrination. Very
few Hoi Chanhs are received from the Regiment. 1 ATF, 33 NVA Regiment 1 ATF INTSUM
No.264/71, Ni t, 21 September 1971, p.6. A Hoi Chanh - ie Hi Chanh, was a rallier/returnee/
defector under the Si Gn Governments Chiu Hi programme begun in 1963. Statistics for Hi Chnh
in Phc Tuy Province were: 1965 77; 1966 278; 1967 317; 1968 45; 1969 121; 1970 196; 1971
37: for seven years 1,071 see Chamberlain, E.P., D445 Battalion , op.cit., 2016, footnote 402.
 94

Commander; Comrade V Phat returned to the North; and Comrade Trn Vn

Lun became the Political Commissar. Comrade Vin nh o departed for
study, and Comrade H c Nhau became the Chief-of-Staff. The Deputy Chiefs-
of-Staff were Comrades Khn and Hin.157

Reviewing those two years (1975 1977), the Regiment had undertaken
tasks of pursuing the military remnants, defending the coast, building up the
economy, consolidating its organisation, coaching its cadre and training new
soldiers. The scale of the Regiments military activities was not large and the
intensity of combat had not been high, and its sacrifices and difficulties were not
as great - when compared with the recent Resistance War against the Americans.
However, circumstances had been complicated especially with regard to
thoughts and ideology, as almost all the cadre and soldiers had served through the
extremely violent Resistance War against the Americans with its losses and
sacrifices and that agony was still felt. They had the right to reunite with their
families and enjoy a life of happiness in peacetime. However, because of duties
and the responsibilities as a soldier, the 33rd Regiment had to pick up arms and
go into dangerous places while the lives and economic conditions of the soldiers
families were still difficult. With these negative impacts on thoughts and ideology
but with the firm leadership of committees at each level and the direct leadership
of the Party and the Regimental Headquarters, we mobilised our brilliant tradition
of wherever its difficult, the 33rd Regiment will be there. With the help of the
people, the men carried their weapons forward, pursuing the enemy military
remnants and protecting the peoples property knowing that, in carrying out
their tasks, there would be losses and sacrifices that could not be avoided. With
the soldiers given their tasks and responsibilities, the Regiment and its committees
- together with the local government authorities, contributed to maintaining
political security and social order creating the conditions to restore and develop
the economy and to stoutly defend the fruits of the revolution.

157
* Comrade Hin - the Head of the Technical Office, was appointed.
 95

Chapter Six

With the Title of the 731st Regiment of the 303rd Division of

Military Region 7, Fulfilling our International Duty in Cambodia
(July 1978 December 1979)

I. Entering a new war.

On 30 April 1977, the reactionary Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique launched a

surprise division-level attack on the whole border of An Giang Province in
Military Region 9, killing more than 1,000 of our comrades, setting fire to homes
and property, schools, and hospitals and stealing the peoples property. Faced by
this serious situation, the Current Affairs Committee of the Military Region 7
Headquarters Military Committee issued Directive No.21 that tasked the Military
Regions armed forces: In any situation, the Military Regions armed forces must
be ready to fight, and immediate and complete attention must be given to all
preparations to defend the whole border of the Military Region in order to protect
the lives and property of the people, production facilities, and warehouses. In
order to avoid casualties for the people and armed forces - and being passively
caught by surprise, we must be ready to confront any situations that could arise.
In August 1977, the Regiment together with our fraternal units of the
303 Division (the Phc Long Group)158, took the opportunity to train and
rd

prepare all aspects in order to be ready to receive our tasks. In October 1977, the
303rd Division occupied its positions, was ready, and awaited orders. With its
tasks changing from that of engineers to infantry, the Regiment had to re-organise
itself as three battalions and direct support companies as before. The Regiment
had to return to Vng Tu to re-organise and receive recruits, so it was ordered to
remain for a time to complete its re-organisation and conducted detailed training.
This included infantry tactical training and political and ideological training for
the troops. It was unavoidable that most of the new soldiers had not yet had the
time to reach a high standard of skills or to have undergone much tactical training
as previously the principal training focus had been on engineer training. In regard

158
Translators Note: The 303rd Division - also titled as the Phc Long Group (on Phc Long), was
formed at Bu C, ng Ban, Ty Ninh Province on 19 August 1974. See: Thai Phng Huy (et al/dtg),
S on 303 - on Phc Long, Qun i Nhn Dn, H Ni, 1989. The Division consisted of three light
infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and a number of direct support units. For secrecy, when deploying
to Cambodia, the regiments of the 303rd Division were given cover titles: the 33rd Regiment was the 731st
Regiment (E731), the 55th Regiment the 732nd Regiment (E732), the 316th Regiment the 733rd Regiment
(E733), and the 77th Artillery Regiment became the 734th Regiment (E734). Recollections in 2014 of
E33/E731 operations in Cambodia with maps, can be found on-line at Lnh S on 303 B Binh (A
Soldier of the 303rd Infantry Division) at: http://www.nghiatinhnguoilinh.com/threads/linh-su-doan-303-b-
binh.53/
 96

to command and leadership aspects, these had to be cultivated and standards

improved as our combat opponents - and their way of fighting, was completely
different to that of the Americans and their puppets previously. We had to
thoroughly understand the enemys tricks and actively include these in our
training. We had to enter this new fighting with guidelines of: sweating on the
training ground, reduces shedding blood on the battlefield.
Accordingly, only two years after our victory in the resistance war of
national salvation against the Americans, the cadre and soldiers of the Regiment
had to enter a new war undertaking our lofty international mission. In July 1978,
the Regiment trained more that 1,000 new soldiers. After three months of training,
on 23 October 1978 the Regiment deployed by vehicle to undertake its
international task in Cambodia and, beside our friends159, wipe out the Pol Pot
military in the Provinces of Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, and Kratie.160 To
maintain secrecy, the titles of regiment-level combat elements were changed. The
33rd Regiment was retitled as the 731st Regiment of Military Region 7s 303rd
Group.
When deploying into Cambodia, the Regiment was tasked to replace the
316 Regiment stationed in the Mimot area.161 We had just arrived and had not
th

had time to stabilize, when we contacted the 260th Pol Pot Division.162 On the way
to Mimot on Route 7, the enemy continuously attacked the Regiment on some
days five to seven times. However, under the quick-minded and resourceful
leadership of the Regimental Headquarters, our cadre and soldiers fought and
firmly held our critical positions guaranteeing communications along Route 7
and a movement corridor for the Division and the Military Region. For the first
days, we were on the defensive in the face of the enemys harassing tactics, our
unfamiliarity with the terrain, the harsh climate, and the different language.
159
Translators Note: Friends is a euphemism for the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation
(KUFNS) led by Heng Samrin - formerly a member of the Khmer Rouge and commander of the
Kampuchean 4th Division. Previously, the Vietnam-sponsored KUFNS was known as the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Kampuchea (PRGK) - which consisted of 300 former Khmer Rouge cadre
who had defected to Vietnam.
160
Translators Note: The Vietnamese full-scale military drive into Cambodia was launched on Xmas Day
1978 - with Phnom Penh occupied soon after on 7 January 1979.
161
Translators Note: The 33rd Regiment (ie as the 731st Regiment) was reportedly the last of the 303rd
Divisions regiments to cross into Cambodia when the advance began on 13 November 1978 to Snuol (at
the crossroads of Routes 13 and 7) defended by the 260th Khmer Rouge Division. The 33rd Regiment was
believed to have deployed cross-country from Snuol directly along Eastern Route 13 to Svay Cheak.
Source: http://www.quansuvn.net/index.php?topic=7742.295;wap2 . minhchau_d2e551978 trong 29 Thng
Nm, 2010, 04:58:08 PM .
162
Translators Note: A published history of the Cambodian campaign relates that The 5 th Division and the
303rd Division advanced northwards along Route 13 and attacked Kratie that was defended by the ((Khmer
Rouge)) 260th Division and two local force regiments of the 505 th Special Region. In the advance, the 1st
and 2nd Battalions of the 303rd Divisions 316th Regiment were caught in a surprise ambush and destroyed.
After a month of operations, that Regiment and also the 33rd Regiment, had been reduced by half. Hong
Dung, Chin tranh ng dng 3 (The Third Indochina War), Vn Ngh, California, 2000.
http://lichsuvn.net/forum/showthread.php?t=7977 .
 97

However, as our cadre and soldiers had experienced the reality of combat
throughout the times of fighting the Americans and their puppets, the Regiment
swiftly retook control and deployed forces in both commanding defensive
positions and in mobile operations. We ambushed the enemy and also attacked
them from a distance, and defeated the enemys schemes. In November 1978,
when the Regiment was operating in the forest area of Phum Svay Chek, the 2nd
Company of the 55th Regiment replaced an element of the Regiment with the
responsibility to defend an area to the south of Route 13. At the beginning of
December 1978, the town of Skuon was liberated and freed from the yoke of the
genocidal Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique. The Regiment continued its operations to
pursue their remnants to the east of the Sa Long River in order for the 303rd
Division to commence Phase 2 of the Campaign. When Phase 2 began, the
Division was ordered to wipe out the enemy on Highpoint 182 about three
kilometres from the Xoi Tra T-Junction (on the axis of Route 13). There, a battle
ensued between the 55th Regiment and Khmer Rouge. Over the many days of
fighting, the 55th Regiment suffered a large number of casualties and had not
seized the enemy Highpoint. Our 9th Battalion swiftly deployed to seize the
position and launched an assault. Through its initiative, flexibility, and courageous
fighting spirit and the fire support of the Regiments 77mm [sic] artillery
together with our 37mm air defence guns in a direct-fire role, our assaulting
infantry seized Highpoint 182, wiping out the enemy and pursuing the Pol Pot
forces. After the violent battle, two comrades: Bi Quang Sau the deputy
commander of the 10th Company, and Nguyn Quang T a section commander,
gave a symbolic report to the whole of the Division and the Military Region. This
was an example for all of the Regiments cadre and soldiers to follow.
At this same time, the 5th Division of Military Region 5 attacked the
enemy from the east. The 303rd Division advanced to the north-west from Snuol
and encircled Kratie that was occupied by the enemys 260th Division and two
local regiments of the Khmer Rouge 505th Special Region. The forces of our two
divisions were faced with heavy resistance from the Khmer Rouge troops.
Additionally, after a month of operations and being in combat, the manpower
strength of our Regiment had declined by one half.
On 18 January 1979, the Regiment pursued the enemy in the Ba Ray area.
On 27 January 1979, the Regiment and the 316th Regiment continued to sweep up
the enemy in the area to the north-east of Chamka An Dong and Sa Pu. After more
than 20 days of combat employing many different kinds of attacks planned and
unplanned, regardless of the situation the Regiment always strictly executed its
combat orders and together with our friends units, liberated a large area
completely fulfilling the tasks given to us by the higher authorities.
On 27 January 1979 (ie the 29th day of Tt K Mi), all of our units rested
to prepare to celebrate our peoples traditional Tt in the land of Angkor. That
very afternoon at 1600hrs, Comrade L c An the Commander of Military
 98

Region 7, visited us and tasked the Regiment to continue to pursue the Khmer
Rouge at Phum Paket.
On 28 January (ie the first day of Tt), the Regiment deployed to pursue
the enemy. Throughout that night until dawn, we wiped out a number of the
enemy, captured a platoon commander (who was carrying two weapons: a B40
and an AK); and captured 13 other fleeing enemy troops. In the three days of
fighting there, the Regiment pursued the defeated enemy remnants and seized 16
105mm howitzers and a GMC truck. Those days were at the height of the Dry
Season, and there was no water to shower - and drinking water was extremely
scarce. An unintentional event that we only learnt of three days afterwards, was
that a direct command unit of the Regiment had drunk toilet water unknowingly.
On 6 February 1979, the Regiment attacked Phum Rung and Phum Lech
killing 12 enemy and seizing two weapons and a transport vehicle. On 7 February
with the conclusion of Phase 1 of the pursuit campaign, the units examined their
experiences to date.
Continuing with Phase 2 operations, on 15 February 1979 the whole
Regiment was based at Phum Cha. On the way to our positions, the Regiment
pursued and captured 300 of the enemy military remnants (including two women)
including two regiment commanders. The next day, a number of these enemy
remnants were taken to the Military Region Headquarters located in Kampong
Cham Town for re-education this was a significant military feat by our Region
operating in our friends country.
On 17 February 1979, at the conclusion of pursuit operations, the
Regiment occupied a temporary position but met with fierce resistance from
Khmer Rouge remnants. The 9th Battalion led by Comrade San, was surrounded.
Short on ammunition and lacking food, the Regiment coordinated with the 77th
Regiment to employ 105mm fire support. The 8th Battalion was ordered to assist
by breaking through and dislodging the Khmer Rouge. As a result, the 8th and 9th
Battalions together killed a large number of the enemy and seized weapons.
At the end of February 1979, the cadre and soldiers of the Regiment
halted, reconstituted our forces, and re-equipped while undertaking military
training and studying the Resolution of the Central Military Committee and
preparing to traditionally celebrate Tt after the days of combat and hardships.

II. Continuing our task of pursuing the Khmer Rouge

remnants.

At the beginning of March 1979, the 2nd Company and the 55th Regiment
replaced the 731st (33rd) Regiment stationed in Stung Treng District of Kampong
Cham Province on the banks of the Mekong River with the task of pursuing and
destroying the military base of the Pol Pot remnants in the extensive rubber
plantations to the west. At the end of March 1979, the Regiment was tasked to
 99

join with units of our friends to attack and wipe out the remnant Khmer Rouge
forces and to recover completely their weapon storehouses, create local
government structures, and build armed forces for our friends in the allocated
districts. The Regiment was given the task and the principal responsibility for
Stung Treng District (Kampong Cham) from the Sui Ha Sa La Stream T-Junction
to Route 81-67 and from Route 67 to the Mekong River. The conduct of our task
was divided into two phases:
Phase 1: Sweeping the area to the north-west of the Chi Nc River and
following the Sui Ha Sa La Stream to the south until Route 67 then to the west to
Route 55 and to the north to meet the Chi Nc River.
Phase 2: Activities in the remaining areas of Stung Treng. In the two days
2 and 3 March 1979, the 7th and the 8th Battalions reached Pham Po when their
forward reconnaissance elements discovered the enemy. All the battalions forces
surrounded the enemy and - using loudhailers, successfully called on 42 of the
enemy to surrender. Also at this time, the 9th Battalion mobilised the local
Cambodian masses to go into the jungle and call upon family members to return,
surrender their weapons, and re-join their families.
On 1 March 1979, the Regiment prepared to commence its tasks. On 4
February [sic] at midday, the Regiment launched an attack on the enemy and
killed seven on the spot, capturing another 23, and seizing 16 weapons of various
types and six vehicles.
In April 1979, the Regiment held a conference and celebration during the
conference however the cadre and soldiers had to go without food as no
provisions could be supplied.
On 23 April 1979 when the Regiment was undertaking its tasks to the
north of Bn Kt, we discovered an enemy force to the south-east of So Phia (this
was a break-away force that had taken the opportunity to regroup). The Regiment
encircled the enemy force and used loudhailers to call upon them to surrender. A
total of 539 handed-in their weapons and accepted re-education. On 13 May 1979,
Mong Yan the leader of a break-away group, concentrated his forces and joined
with Pol Pot remnants to oppose us. The Regiment deployed its 7th and 8th
Battalions to surround them and employed armour to threaten them. They did
not dare resist us, and we captured Mong Yan and completely dispersed all his
forces. Over 200 gave up their weapons and surrendered. On 17 May 1979, the 7th
Battalion returned to the Pra Pa area and joined with the 316th Regiment to
continue eliminating the enemy.
On 23 July 1979, the 8th Battalion surrounded the enemy at Prey An Dong.
We had secretly moved through the jungle, encircled them, and simultaneously
opened fire while calling on them to surrender. After 30 minutes of fighting, the
8th Battalion was in control of Prey An Dong having killed 32 of the enemy,
capturing 3, and seizing tens of weapons. At the same time, the 7th Battalion
opened fire and attacked an unnamed hill occupied by about a company. Having
found the enemy, the 1st Company divided into three groups to closely encircle the
 100

hill. The Battalion ordered fire support to fire heavily into the enemy position
then to fire in depth. The infantry simultaneously opened fire and assaulted. After
twenty minutes, all three of the 1st Companys elements attacked together and
seized the whole area, wiping out 29 of the enemy and seizing 29 weapons of
various types. This was an engagement of high performance a swift attack that
killed many of the enemy.
Moving into August 1979, the 731st (33rd) Regiment together with the
units of the 303rd Division, continued to pursue the enemy with company and
platoon-level operations. The climate at the height of the Wet Season did not
allow the exploitation of our military firepower. The enemy forces dispersed,
withdrawing deep into the distant and remote mountainous and jungle areas. Also
in August, the Regiment was reinforced by the 3rd Battalion of the 316th Regiment
in the Bn Kt and Cooc Xi Ma areas to pursue the enemy remnants. After a series
of sweeps, the enemy remnants dispersed but with a number of enemy teams
mixing among the people in order to make contact with their infrastructure that
attempted to destroy the revolution. Our units continued to launch a series of
sweeps while at the same time strongly mobilising the masses movement in the
local areas, and having them call on their relatives to surrender to the
revolutionary authorities.
On 11 September 1979, the Regiments units began to move. For nearly
four days and nights, they crossed the jungle and climbed mountains only
reaching their concentration area at 1600hrs on 14 September. The Regiment and
a number of the battalions of the 205th Regiment established positions at Rum un
south-east of K Ky Thm and O T St. At 6 a.m. on 15 September 1979, the 1st
Company of the Regiments 7th Battalion encircled and attacked Rm un [sic]
while one group ambushed the enemy at K Ky Thm. The enemy there were
caught completely by surprise, and the 1st Company killed 29 while the
remainder threw down their guns and fled into the jungle. Our ambush group at
K Ky Thm returned to O T St and found the terrain completely burnt out. The
troops closed the trap and wiped out the enemy remnants.
At this time it was the height of the Wet Season, and the health of the
cadre and soldiers of the Regiment had declined. Up to more than half of the cadre
and soldiers suffered malaria, and the unit mobilised the people in the area in
which we were stationed to construct a hutted camp in order to have a resting and
treatment location for our ill soldiers. On 29 September 1979, Comrade L Tn
Phc the deputy commander of the 8th Battalion, was travelling from his unit to
the Regiment for a meeting when he was ambushed by enemy remnants. Fighting
bravely, he was killed and this was a great loss to the cadre and soldiers of the
Battalion and left them grieving.
At the end of October 1979, the series of pursuits during the Wet Season
concluded. Together with the Regiments series of military sweeping and pursuit
operations, we successfully participated in mobilising the masses and building the
local armed forces for our friends country. The cadre and soldiers of the
 101

Regiment also successfully undertook civilian proselytising tasks, and maintained

battlefield discipline and our military regulations while undertaking our
international mission. We billeted our troops in houses in clean and spacious
villages, where we dug wells, constructed thousands of metres of roads, repaired
infirmaries and schools, built homes for the people, cured illnesses, redressed
hunger, contributed money to maintain the aged, purchase stationery, and cut the
hair of the children etc. We disseminated the propaganda and policies of the
Cambodian Peoples Revolutionary Party. We propagandised that the people
should not supply food to the enemy, but call upon their relatives - who had erred
and had been forced to follow the enemy, to return to their families. Such
emotionally-charged work further bonded the feelings of unity between the armed
forces and the people of the two nations of Vietnam and Cambodia. At this time,
the Regiments personnel strength declined as we had not yet received
replacements and, on average, each battalion only had about 150 riflemen.
However, the Regiments cadre and soldiers clearly recognised and resolutely
fulfilled, their tasks in an outstanding manner in the heroic tradition of the
Regiment.
The continuing task of pursuing the enemy military remnants in the last
days of 1979 was divided into two short phases:
Phase 1: from 1 to 6 December 1979, we continued sweeps and the pursuit
of the enemy in the area of Chamkar An Dong and after operating to the north,
we concentrated on destroying the enemy to the south of Chi Nic [sic] and east of
Route 6.
Phase 2 of the pursuit campaign lasted from 7 to 12 December 1979 with
the Regiment conducting sweeping operations, in turn, in Phum Tra and R Linh.
Having seized Phum Tra, a battalion was ordered to attack Phum Rung. The
Regiments 8th Battalion discovered the enemy at Lnh R Linh, surrounded them,
and wiped out a group and fired upon others calling for them to surrender. After
attacking for 30 minutes and conducting civilian proselytising, the Battalion had
wiped out 29 enemy and a further 292 had surrendered. A large quantity of
ammunition was recovered, together with 20 tonnes of rice. In those eventful days
in the Land of Pagodas, the country was completely liberated, and the Regiment
was ordered to return to our homeland to undertake a new mission. The good
feelings for Uncle Hs troops in the hearts of the people and our friends armed
forces would never fade as we had helped the Cambodian people escape from the
genocide and the piles of ashes - and had joined hands with them in the work of
resuscitating and building the country.

During our international mission in Cambodia (July 1978 December

1979), the Regiment had been titled as the 731st Regiment of Military Region 7s
303rd Division. We next entered a new period of combat full of difficulties and
 102

hardships. However our efforts had been prodigious. For almost a year, we had
assisted and worked side-by-side with our friends pursuing the genocidal Pol Pot-
Ieng Sary clique in the Provinces of Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, and
Kratie. We had successfully conducted civilian proselytising and had called upon
an armed Pol Pot regiment to surrender and return to the revolutionary authorities.
Those place-names mentioned above are deeply engraved - together with the
military feats of the Regiments soldiers and cadre who completed their tasks in
an outstanding manner assisting our friends to swiftly build the peoples
governing authorities and to stabilize their lives. However, in that time, 500 cadre
and soldiers of the Regiment had bravely fought and died while saving the Land
of Pagodas. That will forever be part of the Regiments legacy - embellishing the
deeply-felt spirit of unity between the armed forces and the people of the two
countries: Vietnam and Cambodia.
 103

Chapter Seven

With the Title of the 793rd Regiment of the 303rd Division of

Military Region 3, Building the Economy and Defending the
Northern Border (December 1979 August 1989)

I. Deploying to the North, re-organising, and training in

readiness for combat.

China is one of our neighbouring countries, and - during two resistance

wars against the French colonialists and the American imperialists, the peoples of
our two nations were closely bound and united in helping one another. However
when the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary reactionary clique acted to destroy the Vietnamese
revolution, China surprisingly fully supported the genocidal Khmer Rouge. China
also took action to damage the feelings between the two peoples such as
allowing their military to conduct military provocations along the border. When
the people crisis163 event occurred, aid from China was cut off, and their
specialists were withdrawn with the aim of creating difficulties for Vietnam.
More seriously, from 17 February 1979, China sent a force of about 32 divisions
to launch attacks invading our territory along the northern border from Mng Cai
(Qung Ninh) to Phong Th (Lai Chu) a distance of more than 100 kilometres.
To defend all our territory, our military and the people of the six provinces in the
North stood and fought to defend each piece of our homelands sacred ground.164
Faced with this situation, the Ministry of Defence strengthened our forces
in Military Region 1 and Military Region 2 and deployed the 3rd Corps to Thai
Nguyn to defend the border in the North. The 303rd Division of Military Region
7 was deployed from Cambodia to establish the 9th Corps in Military Region 3 to
defend the delta area in the North.
After almost a year of doing our international duty and returning to our
beloved homeland because of the requirements of combat duty and the extremely
tense situation on the northern border, we did not have one day of rest. In
December 1979, the headquarters elements and the soldiers of the Regiment
moved from the railway station at H Nai (Bin Ha) by train for four nights and
three days until the Regiment reached its concentration position in Ngha Hng
District of H Nam Ninh Province.165* As we did not then have a camp, about 800

163
Translators Note: Literally "nn kiu". The Chinese Government accused Vietnam of ill-treating the
Chinese minority in Vietnam ie the Hoa kiu.
164
Translators Note: On 17 February 1979, a People's Liberation Army (PLA) force of about 200,000
troops supported by 200 Type 59, Type 62, and Type 63 tanks entered northern Vietnam in the PLA's first
major combat operation since the end of the Korean War in 1953.
165
* Nowadays the Provinces of Ninh Bnh, H Nam, and Nam nh.
 104

cadre and soldiers were billeted in the peoples houses.166* The Regimental
Headquarters was billeted in Nhn Hu hamlet of Ngha Thai village in Ngha
Hng District. With the troops accommodated in the peoples houses, many
difficulties and complications arose in the administration and training of the
troops. So education and study on civilian proselytising was conducted by the
Party Committee and the Regimental Headquarters as a priority. The units had
fought in Cambodia and were therefore very esteemed by the people who gave up
their best places for the troops and cherished and helped them as if they were
close members of their families.
At the end of December 1979, the 33rd Regiment that had changed its
title to the 793rd Regiment of the 303rd Division167* had changes in its
Headquarters personnel: the Regimental Commander was Nguyn Vn Thanh168*;
the Political Commissar was Trn Vn Lun; and the Regiments second-in-
command was Bi Ngc B. The senior Battalion Headquarters staff were: the 7th
Battalion: Commander - Nguyn Vn V, Political Officer - Phm Vn S; 8th
Battalion: Commander - Nguyn Vn Phc, Political Officer - Trn Vn Hon; 9th
Battalion: Commander Vn San, Political Officer Hong Vn Lon. When
the 303rd Division was moved to the North with the mission of defending the
south of the Red River Delta, the Ninh C River, and the y River, the axes of
the national routes, provincial routes, and preventing any opponents attack on the
coast, our Regiment was tasked with field reconnaissance of the mouths of the
rivers, and the routes within Nam nh Province running to the sea. We
coordinated with the Divisions 77th Artillery Regiment that was stationed in
defences on both banks of the Red River and the Ninh C River. Based on our
given tasks, the Regiment constructed a defensive project and a plan for a mobile
force for when a situation arose. We coordinated closely with the local military
headquarters in accord with the concept of peoples warfare.
Moving into 1980, the situation developing in the country including in
our area, was complicated by the enemys imperialist ideology and the impact of
their continued strategy of peaceful developments, then riots and upheavals.
Warfare broke out in two places on the border, and the bureaucratic mechanism of
budget subsidies continued - holding back economic development. Consequently,
the lives of the people and the armed forces were impacted by this general
situation. This included the issue of military accommodation under which the
government authorities and the people assisted with housing and food. After a

166
* Before December 1979, a number of our Regiments cadre went up to H Nam Ninh as an advance
party to make preparations for accommodation for the Regiment deploying up from the South. The
Regimental cadre were led by Trn Vn Lun the Political Commissar.
167
* Subordinate to the 68th Corps or the 9th Corps (the Corps had two titles). It comprised the 329 th Division
stationed in Thai Bnh; the 349th Division in Nam nh and the 303rd Division was a mobile force
stationed in the north and south of the Nam nh canal.
168
* Nguyn Vn Thanh replaced V Vit Cam as the Commander of the Regiment. Comrade V Vit Cam
was appointed as Chief-of-Staff, and after that became the Deputy Commander of the 303rd Division.
 105

long period of fighting, the health of our men had declined in part, malaria was
widely spread, and many people lay paralysed because of recurring malarial fever.
However, the units set to work preparing for their given tasks.
On 1 January 1980, the 303rd Divisions Party Committee held its first
session and promulgated a Resolution to guide the units in implementing the tasks
allocated by the Corps. These included concentrating on a number of tasks such
as: training well, and being ready to fight, attacking and defeating the enemy
from all directions - while at the same time actively preparing all facets to create
units that are advancing in both their revolutionary and regular warfare
capabilities.
Based on the Divisions Resolution, the Regiment swiftly re-organised and
successfully conducted political education for the troops in order to build their
will and resolve to concentrate on three tasks;
First strictly maintain discipline, achieve good unity, create a high level
of resolve, acquire combat methods, and attack to win the first battle to defend
every sacred inch of the homeland.
Second - foster and raise up the leadership strength at every level in the
Party organisations, lead the masses organisations, improve the quality of military
training and the standard of managing the troops, administer the units material
assets to create a regular routine.
Third organise the material lives and the morale of the troops well, create
a regular life and avoid any unsettling thoughts.
On 1 February 1981, the Regiment commenced training for combat
situations, and in the field received tasks to undertake in accordance with the
directions of the Ministry of Defence. Our organisation and methods of training
were based on the training content and objectives issued each year by the
Ministry. Through these training objectives, the Regiment created a training
program. Before commencing training, we organised coaching for the cadre at
company and platoon level in order to compile teaching plans, to prepare the
matters related to the drill and exercise fields , equipment for each unit, and
combat objectives. As a result of adequate preparations of all aspects, the whole
Regiment achieved immediate results from the beginning of the subjects being
undertaken. After two months of training, the Regiment held tactical manoeuvres
to practise combat methods, and achieved the principal targets that had been set.
The Regiment paid attention to Party and political activities and made
these a first priority especially the creation of strong and effective cells. We
increased political and ideological education with the aim of raising the
revolutionary vigilance of the cadre and soldiers in readiness to crush any
destructive plots or influences of the enemy. Apart from military training and
political education, the Regiment also successfully conducted cultural and
literature activities, physical activities and sport, exchanged relations with the
local Womens Association and the Youth Association, and created a very good
image of the Soldiers of Uncle H. Civilian proselytising activities were
 106

regularly undertaken in close association with the local civilian authorities and
were effective in mobilising the masses.
During 1981, the Regiment received the following tasks directly form the
rd
3 Corps Headquarters:
One: Actively build up the units, achieve a high quality of training in all
facets; and ensure that when ordered to recover, the Regiment re-organises
immediately. Build strong and complete unit organisations.
Two: In cooperation with local organisations participate in the creation of
reserve forces to be mobilised, and train recruits as ordered by the Military
Region.
Three: Prepare combat plans in anticipation of the enemy landing from the
sea into the Red River Delta.
Four: Together with local elements join in resisting a war of internal
sabotage, and maintain political security, order, and safety.
Five: Actively produce food and provisions in accord with targets and, in
steps, raise the living standards of the cadre and soldiers.169*
Based on the tasks directed by the Military Region - and together with the
leading priority task of training for combat, the cadre and soldiers of the Regiment
always grasped thoroughly and deeply the task of participating in productive
labour coordinating economic aspects with national defence. The whole
Regiment enthusiastically achieved the four targets of the movement launched by
the Secretariat to: exploit the essential good qualities of the soldiers of Uncle H,
and raise the fighting strength of our armed forces. This included tasks of
productive labour to build the economy and to improve the lives of our troops.
The Regiment also took in hand the task of training our cadre, and reserve troops
were mobilised in Nam Ninh District. At the end of June 1981, the cadre and
soldiers of the Regiment went into the field to undertake such tasks as examining
the reserve troops that had been mobilised. The Regiments cadre visited and
examined each production team, checking each military reservist to understand
their family circumstance, to allocate them to specialist units and corps while they
were in the ranks of the armed forces, and screening them to return to the armed
forces when having received an order from the local authorities or the General
Mobilisation Agency in a situation where the border in our North was becoming
tense. After a month of positive activity, the units had successfully completed
their tasks. The lists in the district military sections had been fully compiled, and
the training organisations had been raised in accordance with the disseminated
plan.
When the situation on the border in our North was less tense, the Ministry
of Defence decided to no longer operate the Corps, and the 303rd Division was
deployed to become directly subordinate to Military Region 3. A number of our
soldiers whose homes were in the South (the majority of whom were from H Ch

169
* The Military Region 3 self-sufficiency targets were issued to units as one month in a year.
 107

Minh City) ended their service obligation and were released from the military. A
number of cadre from the South were transferred to Military Region 7 or went for
training in schools and institutes. To strengthen our military numbers, the
Regiment recruited personnel in the districts of Trc Ninh, Nam Trc, and Ngha
Hng in Nam nh Province and continued to train intakes of new soldiers.

II. Building the economy in coordination with creating strong

and complete units.

In 1982, main-force units of Military Region 3 were stationed on the

border. The units remaining in the rear had a tendency to reduce their structures in
accordance with the directions of the Ministry of Defence. The Regiments
strength was only 200-300 cadre and soldiers. Areas of Yn District of Nam
nh Province were allotted for construction, management, and the training of
military reservists. Lists of local military organs were made, and the files
completed of thousands of previously-serving cadre and soldiers from a full range
of corps who had left the military and returned to their local areas to work. Each
quarter, the Regiment had to organise Type A (Standing Type) elements to return
to the local areas and to inspect the structure of their units. To successfully
undertake this task Type A elements had to be extremely practical: Going from
street-to-street, from house-to-house, and from person-to-person. After having
examined the lists, in accordance with the plan the Regiment joined with the
district military headquarters, issued the mobilisation orders in order to check the
military strengths given by the local military headquarters, and accept each unit
for battalion to company. The troops were taken back and looked after, assessed,
and their current circumstances discussed after which they returned to their
local areas. Only specialist elements were retained and underwent technical
training in accord with regulations. Those troops who were kept for training were
loaned military clothing, equipment, weapons, and material. The system of
accommodation and messing followed the unit standards. At the conclusion of the
training and examination phase, they were given an allowance in accordance with
their rank, assessment, and evaluation of their results and returned to their local
areas. At the end of the year, the Regiment conducted an exercise on a model at
3rd Corps. The exercise had the code-name of T 82. Following the exercise, the
Military Region was given a high grading.
In 1983, the Regiment took over the camp of the 3rd Corps convalescence
group at Gia Sinh village in Gia Vin District of Ninh Bnh Province. Material
facilities were still lacking ie there was insufficient accommodation for the troops,
so a number of units still had to be billeted in the peoples homes. At this time,
Comrade Bi Ngc B was the Regimental Commander, and Trn Vn Lun was
the Deputy Regimental Commander for Political Affairs. In September 1983,
there was a change in the Regiments organisation with Comrade Trn Vn Lun
 108

being appointed to study at the High Level Military Institute170*, and Comrade
Trn Ngc Hng replaced Comrade Trn Vn Lun as the Deputy Regimental
Commander for Political Affairs.
In 1984, the Regiment directed the Committees and the Yn District
authorities to order and conduct a mobilisation and large exercise in H Nam Ninh
Province. The military mobilisation of the reserves was assessed as achieving 92%
in military professional skills. The units attained 100% of their requirements.
Following training and assessments, there were two failures in weapons firing;
for Lesson 3 on the AK, units were assessed as fair; on the B40 and B41, they
were assessed as good; and on live grenade-throwing, they were assessed as fair.
The Regiment, the 303rd Division, and Military Region 3 were assessed as
formations that had successfully achieved the training mission for their mobilised
reserve forces.
In 1985, Military Region 3 underwent restructuring, cadre were appointed,
and organisations strengthened. Recruits were trained in order to prepare to
reinforce Military Region 2. Once the recruits had been trained, the Ministry of
Defence decided that the Division would no longer go to Military Region 2, so a
number of the recruits were posted to reinforce the units while the remainder
undertook both training and economic tasks - with targets as directed by Military
Region 3. The Regiment continued to retain an element to increase production at
Cn Thoi. The produce was sold to government enterprises. The lives of the cadre
clearly improved, rations were increased, there were treats on holidays and at Tet,
and a number of cadre who had returned officially for recuperation were issued
with things such as two-drawer wardrobes, wooden beds, tables and chairs.
In 1986, the cadre at the Regimental Headquarters comprised: Commander
Comrade Trnh Vnh Long; Deputy Commander for Political Matters
Comrade inh Duy Chnh; and Chief-of-Staff Comrade nh Nho. In March
1986, the Party Committee and the Regimental Headquarters thoroughly and
deeply studied the content and the spirit of the Politburos Resolution 26/BCT on
strengthening the Partys leadership in work with youth. The content focused
on: raising the quality of the cadre in the Party Groups, incorporating younger
cadre, making regulations more orderly, the leadership (the Resolution set forth
the process and tenure periods), paying attention to creating material
requirements, a spirit to positively support the activities and movements of the
young and coordination with youth groups in local areas, and to strongly push
forward the emulation movement to strive to welcome the achievements of the
Party Conferences at all levels.
In July 1987, together with the 303rd Division, the Regiment was moved to
the 1st Corps. At this time, Comrade Nguyn Vn Thanh held the position of
Regimental Commander. The principal task of the Regiment was training in
170
* At the conclusion of his studies, Comrade Trn Vn Lun moved to Military Region 7 and was
appointed as the Commander of the Cn o Military Unit subordinate to the Vng Tu - Cn o Special
Region.
 109

readiness for combat and training mobilised reserves. At the request of Sn La

Province, one of our elements went to assist the minority people develop their
economy and reduce hunger and poverty. The main task was to help the people
dig canals so that the water would flow to make hydraulic power for the fields in
Hat Lt District - as had been proposed locally.
Moving in to 1988, the Party Committee and the Regimental Headquarters
concentrated on building internal unity, and creating good and viable Party
Chapters. We stablished an orderly and regular routine, disciplined training, and
routinely maintained regulations. Accordingly, there was much progress in
implementing the discipline of the cadre and soldiers. The Regiments leadership
increased political and ideological education, the study of our history, and
instruction on our mission to publicise laws. We pushed forward strongly with the
movement to emulate and set peoples minds on victory, and stepped up the
completion of our allocated tasks.
Parallel with the mission of creating strong and complete units, the
Regiment continued to receive new projects constructing dams and lakes to hold
water in Ph Yn District. This was a large project requiring a high standard of
execution. The Regiment mobilised comrades and officers with specialist skills to
participate in the projects supervision and execution. After almost a year, the lake
was completed, filled, and brought into use. The Lng Sn Province Peoples
Committee presented us with a Certificate of Commendation, and the people
praised us stating: The soldiers of Uncle H are not only skilled fighters, but are
also skilled in economic labour projects.
On 19 August 1989, the Ministry of Defence decided to disband the 33rd
Regiment, and a number of cadre were posted to reinforce the 1st Corps. A number
of cadre also changed their specialities, some were demobilised, and some retired
and returned to the home areas to work in the economy after years of service in
the armed forces.

Since returning to the beloved homeland and receiving a new mission

and looking over almost a ten year period (December 1979 August 1989), the
Regiment had deployed to the North, built economic projects, and defended the
border in the North. After re-organising and restructuring, the Party Committee
and the Regimental Headquarters conducted its training mission and economic
tasks. We moved from a situation of combat training to a training program
directed by Ministry of Defence regulations. We did Party and political work,
creating strong and efficient Party Chapters and ranks of Party members and cadre
- while building strong units.
The unfamiliar first steps in our new mission with interwoven difficulties
and advantages, the large changes in locations of the Regiment, the straitened
circumstances in materials these were all large obstacles impacting on our
 110

program to build and achieve the Regiments tasks. However, with the close
attention of the Party Committee and the leadership of the Division and the 3rd
Corps and the deep attachment and assistance of the local authorities and the
people - as well as the efforts and striving of the cadre and soldiers, we overcame
the difficulties and successfully completed all given tasks.
From 1982 to 1986, apart from our combat-preparedness training mission,
the Regiment was tasked to build dykes to prevent the encroachment of the sea.
We constructed dykes in the Cn Thoi area of Binh Mnh village in Kim Sn
District of H Nam Ninh Province. Doing economic work in conjunction with
national defence tasks, we built up the mobilised reserve forces. These new tasks
were difficult and arduous. Everyone had to do manual work, and race against
time in competition with the rising tides. Soldiers - who only knew how to carry a
gun, had to then also become experienced in building dykes to hold back the sea.
Principally with its own manpower, the Regiment dug thousands of metres of
earth to construct a dyke over 30 kilometres long, creating a region of marshy land
and mangroves - of hundreds of hectares, that became rice fields. The Regiment
had created an area of marsh and mangroves for the people of hundreds of
hectares that became good rice fields giving comfortable lives to the people.
The production movement in the units immediate area was widely
received. The leaderships at all levels contacted the local officials to request
ground to sow and plant, to prepare seedlings, and to spread fertilizer .
Through these days of productive labour and the results achieved, the units
became partially self-sufficient for some of their food and provisions. The daily
meals of the cadre and soldiers included additional meat, fish, and green
vegetables. The material lives of the Regiments cadre and soldiers was clearly
improved and this was an impetus to drive the activities of the units to
successfully complete all its given tasks. No matter where or in what position, the
cadre and the soldiers of the 33rd Regiment always brought into play the heroic
traditions of their units.

*
 111

CONCLUSION

The 25th of April each year has become the anniversary of The Heroic 33rd
Infantry Regiment. The War has faded into the past, but whenever the 33rd
Regiment is mentioned or its different titles (101B, A57 Regiment, The
Resolved to Win Regiment, the 731st Regiment, or the 793rd Regiment), it
references a mobile main-force regiment of the Ministry of Defence. Over 24
years of working, fighting, and coming-of-age, generations of the Regiments
cadre and soldiers have given their sweat and labour and their blood that has
been shed everywhere: in the Central Highlands, at Gia Lai, c Lc, the Eastern
Nam B, the far south of Trung B, the battlefields of Cambodia, and in the Red
River Delta building dams. All this is in our tradition of: Holding on Staunchly,
Overcoming Difficulties Resourcefulness and Flexibility, Always Fighting and
Winning.
Looking back over the 33rd Infantry Regiments beginnings and its journey
from a plot of land in Bnh Tr Thin, we have been staunch and indomitable
through the sword and fire. We have had the affection and the help of our
countrymen in all the places that the Regiment has served. As a main-force unit
of the Ministry of Defence, we fought actively on many difficult and violent
battlefields with the leadership of the Party and the unbounded love of our country
and unlimited loyalty to our homeland. The community of cadre and soldiers of
the Regiment held on resolutely. We held our ground for the people and fought
because of our deep longing for our homelands independence and freedom. The
Regiment had overcome all difficulties and hardships without worrying about the
sacrifices. We achieved many outstanding military feats, contributing together
with the entire nations people, to concluding the victory of the sacred peoples
resistance war against the American imperialists. Calculated from the day that the
South was completely liberated (30 April 1975), the Regiment was forged for
more than 15 years in the fires of war not including the time of our international
duty in Cambodia. Of the great majority of the Regiments cadre and soldiers,
almost all were students who had just left their school benches. From many
regions across our country, they followed the sacred call of our homeland to take
the road to the South and fight. After three months of training, they deployed over
the Annamite Chain a region full of hardships, and fought in the Pleime
Campaign and the Tt Mu Thn Campaign of 1968 on the Central Highlands
battlefields. In the middle of 1968, the Regiment deployed south to the B2
battlefield and joined the 5th Division at a time when our peoples resistance war
against the Americans entered its most violent period. The Regiment fought on the
battlefields of B Ra-Long Khnh and - with the title of the Resolved to Win
Group, fought on the Region 6 Front (1970 1971). Subsequently, we were
ordered to Military Region 7 and participated in the Nguyn Hu Campaign, the
Route 2 Campaign , and the historic H Ch Minh Campaign that liberated the
Province of B Ra-Long Khnh. With peace restored, the Regiment joined in the
 112

pursuit of the enemys military remnants, and constructed public works in Military
Region D. In July 1978, the Regiment was honoured to join the 303rd Division of
Military Region 7 and undertake our international duty in Cambodia beside our
friends wiping out the Pol Pot military forces in the Provinces of Kampong
Cham, Kampong Thom, and Kratie.
On 17 February 1979, warfare broke out on the northern border. In
December 1979, the 33rd Regiment changed its title to the 739th Regiment,
deployed to the North, and was located in H Nam Ninh Province to reinforce
Military Region 3 defending the border in the North while both conducting
combat-readiness training and undertaking economic tasks and creating strong and
complete units.
As a mobile main-force unit of the Ministry of Defence, the Regiment had
participated in combat on many battlefields and against many opponents. The
blood-thirsty soldiers in battle-tested enemy battalions such as the Mad Buffalo
Battalion, the Green Dragon Battalion171 of Park Chung-Hee, Thai troops,
Australian troops were lucky to survive and throughout their lives were still
terrified when hearing the name of the soldiers of the 33rd Regiment that was
associated with such place names as: Pleime, Ch Prng Mountain, the Ia rng
Valley, Bun M Thut, ng Hng Stream, Ch L, the Long Bnh General
Logistics Base, Bnh Ba, c Thnh Sub-Sector, Sui Ngh, Tanh Linh, Hoi
c, Hm Tn, Trng Bom, Long Khanh, and Xun Lc . These achievements
and military feats by the Regiment, by one battalion, by one company, and by two
individuals were honoured by the Party, the Nation, and our Armed Forces with
the highest and most noble award of Hero of the Peoples Armed Forces.
How glorious were the soldiers of the Heroic 33rd Infantry Regiment ! The
outstanding military feats and the great sacrifices of a generation of cadre and
soldiers of the 33rd Regiment had embellished the Resolved-to-Fight-and-Win flag
of the armed forces of Military Region 7 in particular, and of the Vietnam Armed
Forces in general and built up the brilliant tradition of the unit. From the reality
of our 24 years of development, fighting, and coming-of-age, the Regiment had
inferred the following lessons from their experience:

One maintain absolute loyalty to the Party, the Nation, and the people;
take the initiative and actively overcome difficulties; create a sense of self-will,
and strength through ones own efforts.

171
Translators Note: According to 33rd Regiment history monographs, while subordinate to Military
Region 6, the Regiment took the title of The Resolved to Win Regiment (Trung on Quyt Thng) and
defeated two battalions of the Korean Blue Dragon formation in Hm Thun District. See the Summary
History ie Cu Chin Binh, Tm Tt Trung on 33, op.cit., July 2010; and Ban Lin Lc Truyn
Thng Trung on 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison Committee of the 33rd Regiment (A57) ), Qu Trnh
, op.cit., 2010. Hm Thun District of Bnh Thun Province was the southernmost district in coastal
Military Region II. This is probably a reference to the Republic of Koreas Blue Dragon Brigade (2nd
Marine Brigade) ie the Cheongryeong (Blue Dragon, /) Brigade.
 113

We crossed the Annamite Chain to the Central Highlands Front at a time

when the Limited War was reaching its peak and the level of violence was
more than people could stand. However, the resolutely courageous soldiers of the
Regiment always maintained their confidence and optimistic spirit, and their will
for revolutionary attack in order to fight and defeat the invading enemy. The 33rd
Regiment regularly evolved its structure and organisation, and as a main-force
unit of the Ministry of Defence, was routinely tasked to reinforce and coordinate
with our fraternal units, and to deploy to fight on many different battlefields and
regions. We fought when concentrated or when dispersed, depending on the
requirements of our mission. Although we faced very many difficulties and
challenges and there were times when it seemed that we would not prevail, but
the cadre and soldiers of the Regiment were always absolutely loyal to the Party,
the Nation, and the people. We always complied with the orders from above, and
were unafraid of sacrifices and hardships and always completed our given tasks
in an outstanding manner. During the months and years of the war on the
battlefields, the troops had to eat jungle vegetables and green bananas in lieu of
rice for months at a time. They had to withstand the rainstorms in the remote
jungles and bouts of malaria . Those were the difficulties and hardships, but
our revolutionary soldiers never lost heart and still continued to attack and wipe
out the enemy. Our commanders leading the Regiment were always exemplary
models, very close to their units, and encouraging the morale of the troops in a
timely manner. They organised the training and the study, raising the standard of
skills and tactics, and guaranteeing that the units would attack and defeat every
opponent and enemy. With the requirements for continuous combat, guaranteeing
the supply of rear services and logistic support faced many difficulties. The
Regiments cadre always promoted the standpoint of self-reliance and strength
through ones own efforts and relying on the people to overcome difficulties.
As a main-force unit, we always had to be ready to deploy. Accordingly, political
and ideological education for the cadre and the soldiers was given special and
deep attention by the leadership. The conduct of Party and political work and
activities was thoughtfully addressed and effective. Every cadre and soldier was
guided by their absolute loyalty to the Party, the Nation, and the people. That was
the main source of strength,and one of the Regiments most valuable lessons and
experiences in the years of combat and coming-of-age.

The second was: creating a high resolve, fighting with courage and
determination, and achieving outstanding results.

Our armed forces are of the people, from the people, and for the people
led, organised, educated, and trained by the Vietnam Communist Party. The
objective of creating the armed forces was to build a pillar for all the people to
advance the revolutionary struggle and to unyoke and overthrow the cruel
domination of the colonial and imperial ideologies and to create and protect the
 114

Socialist Nation of Vietnam. The resolute will to fight of our troops was created
and solidly reinforced as a result of the combination of many factors: the correct
political and military line of the Party; and the motive force of emphatically
sharing hardships by the cadre and Party members with the soldiers. With the
good work of the Party and political work, the community of cadre and soldiers
voluntarily accepted all challenges, fought bravely, and were ready to sacrifice
their bodies to achieve the final victory.
In building the fighting will of the troops, their belief in victory was
reinforced through each battle and each campaign - until the final triumph of the
revolution. This was especially important when we met difficulties or suffered
losses. If we lost our confidence or trust, our fighting spirit would decline and
pessimism and vacillation could lead to deviations in political perceptions and
social ties that oppose the ideals of our Party. Accordingly, more than anything
else, the routine education of the political spirit and skill of the Soldiers of Uncle
H and the building of the fighting will of our cadre and soldiers, was a
prerequisite condition for the Regiment to complete its principal political missions
in each historical period.
After three months of deploying over a long distance with heavy packs, the
Regiment fought in the curtain-raising Campaign on the Central Highlands Front.
A number of new cadre and soldiers participated in the Campaign, and displayed
an unparalleled courageous spirit sacrificing their lives for our revolutionary
ideology. In a frenzy, the enemy forces used their air and artillery support to strike
our soldiers - but they held their ground resolutely, breaking up each of the
enemys counter-attacks in the Pleime Massif. In those decisive battles, many
examples evidenced the heroic ideological commitment - and the will to fight and
to win, of the 33rd Regiments soldiers. Throughout all the fighting, the Regiment
and our fraternal units and the local armed forces, had participated in 1,210
battles both large and small; overcame a Sector, five Sub-Sectors, three Special
Sectors, six Sub-Sub-Sectors172, 235 posts both large and small, destroyed two
water-borne convoys, 103 artillery pieces, set fire to 133 aircraft, 1,345 military
vehicles (including 601 tanks and armoured vehicles), wiped out 32 battalions
(including an American battalion and a Thai battalion), 50 companies (including
21 American companies, two Australian companies173, and two Thai companies),

172
Translators Note: Sub-Sub-Sectors (Phn Khu, Phn Chi Khu) were village and hamlet complexes
established in late 1973 with a small ARVN staff (initially one officer and two NCOs, later increased to two
officers and four NCOs). The senior ARVN officer also acted as the deputy village chief. By late 1974,
2,200 Sub-Sub-Sectors had reportedly been established. US Defence Attache, RVNAF Quarterly
Assessment 1st Qtr FY 75, Saigon, 1 November 1974.
173
Translators Note: According to the Australian Official History, approximate Australian losses in
engagements with the 33rd Regiment numbered about nine KIA ie: Operation Hammer (5RAR: 6-8 June
1969) one KIA, 10 WIA (99 NVA/VC KIA); Operation Lavarack (6RAR: 30 May -30 June 1969) three
KIA, 29 WIA (NVA/VC KIA 99); Operation Ivanhoe (3RAR, 4RAR: 19 September 2 October 1971)
five KIA, 30 WIA (NVA/VC KIA 15). Some Australian casualties may have been inflicted by NVA/VC
elements other than the 33rd NVA Regiment. See: Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit.,
 115

and seized: 2,454 weapons of various types, 342 radios, 20 military vehicles and a
large quantity of other military equipment and materiel. We wiped out 30,047 of
the enemy and captured 787.174
During more than eight years of fighting on the Eastern Nam B battlefield
(1969 - 1975), thousands of our cadre and soldiers died bravely in combat. These
extreme sacrifices are an example and an undying refrain of our will to wipe out
the enemy so that generations of todays cadre and soldiers and in the future, can
study, train and contribute to the building and defence of the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam. Almost 4,000 cadre and soldiers of the Regiment are lying on the
battlefields of the South and more than 500 of our comrades fell in Cambodia
during the period of our international duty. Almost 1,000 comrades still carry on
them the wounds and the after-effects of the war. Many of our cadre and soldiers
fell without knowing the joy of our historic victory on 30 April 1975.

The third is: unity, strict and clear discipline, both fighting and building,
and a deep and close sentimental attachment to the people.

In both combat and tasks of physical labour, unity is a great strength. The
Regiments cadre and soldiers always focussed on improving unity and unifying
not discriminating between Northerners and Southerners175; eschewing partiality,
factionalism, and regionalism; and all being of one mind for the greater ideal. We
undertook criticism and self-criticism, especially when bringing into play
democracy in the military, economic, and political fields to create unanimity and
combat resolve and seeking the best way to fight and to lessen losses and
casualties. Another expression of unity that the Regiment always pressed was the
creation of a unity with the people as are fish in the water. The soldiers of the
Regiment came from the people, and they understood that they always must have
a close sentimental attachment to the people because it was for the people that
we fought, and it was the people who brought us up. In times of difficulties and
violence during the war, the affection of our minority comrades in the Central
Highlands - and the people in the provinces and the regions through which the

2012, p.735, p.736, and p.762. See also: Fairhead, F., A Duty Done: A Summary of Operations by the
Royal Australian Regiment in the Vietnam War 1965-1972, Linden Park, 2014, pp.86-91 and pp.156-159.
174
Translators Note: These claimed figures appeared in a media article in December 2010 on the website
of the national War Veterans Association ie: Hng Quc Vn, Gp g mt chin s cua Trung on 33
Anh hung (Meeting a Combatant of the 33rd Heroic Regiment) ie the venerable monk i c Thch
Tm Vng, Bao cu chin binh online (War Veterans On-line Magazine), 17 December 2010.
http://www.cuuchienbinh.com.vn/index.aspx?Menu=1333&Style=1&ChiTiet=7151 . The foregoing figures
were cited in a 2010 33rd Regiment historical monograph - Cu Chin Binh Trung on 33, Tm Tt
Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (The 33rd Regiment A Summary History), For a discussion of these figures
including sources, see: Chamberlain, E.P., The 33 rd Regiment , Their Story, op.cit., 2014, footnote 555
- and a translation of a July 2010 account at that works Appendix 1.

175
Translators Note: For accounts of Tensions between North Vietnamese and Southern Communist
Troops, see pp.38-40 in Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment , op.cit., 2014.
 116

Regiment passed, had helped us and shared the difficulties during the rains of
bomb, storms of shells, and food shortages. Thanks to our reliance on the people,
and our fighting heart and soul to serve the people and their love and assistance
for us, in any and all circumstances, the community of the Regiments cadre and
soldiers were always secure within the embrace of our motherland and widely
proclaimed: When away, think of the people when with them, cherish them.
The cadre and soldiers of the Regiment were firmly and closely connected to the
people. The unity of the people and the military was a fine tradition of the
Regiment throughout the whole time of fighting and building the Regiment, and
its coming-of-age. As a main-force unit, we always had to be mobile and
accordingly needed to create a love of our country, a hatred of the enemy, and a
spirit of unity with the people as basic factors in order that our cadre and soldiers
could successfully achieve all our given tasks.
The history of the 33rd Infantry Regiment is a journey of combat and
economic development that has been full of hardships and sacrifices over nearly a
quarter of a century. From a small unit, we became a large one, from weak to
strong, and from being out of our element to being experienced. Such culminated
in the Regiment, a battalion, a company, and two individuals being honoured with
the highest reward given by the Party and the Nation the title of Hero of the
Peoples Armed Forces.
Today, returning to normal lives - and in whatever position or status in our
beloved homeland, the soldiers of the 33rd Regiment have the right to feel very
proud indeed of our brilliant history. We remember times of youth, heroism,
dedication, and sacrifice that contributed in a small way, to all the blood shed
for our nations independence and freedom. Leaving an example for following
generations also motivates the Regiments veterans to continue to promote the
ideals of a Soldier of Uncle H and to contribute throughout their lives to the
building and protection of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in these times of
extensive economic and international integration.176

176
Translators Note: Regarding extensive integration (hi nhp su rng ), see the statement by
Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Vng nh Hu on 26 August 2016 - http://vtv.vn/chinh-tri/viet-nam-
dang-o-giai-doan-hoi-nhap-sau-rong-nhat-20160826192456325.htm
 117

ANNEXES

A. A Summary of the Group and Individual Achievements

Awarded the Title of Hero of the Peoples Armed Forces.
pp.118-123.

B. A Number of Articles Written About the 33rd Regiment.

pp.125-144.

C. A List of Past Headquarters Personnel of the 33rd Regiment.

pp.145-146.

D. Portrait Photographs of a Number of 33rd Regiment

Commanders. p.147.

E. A Number of Photographs of the Regiments Past

Activities. pp.149-150.

Translators Annexes:

F. 33rd Regiment Casualties - including at the Battle of Bnh

Ba - June 1969. pp.151-159.

G. Headquarters 33rd NVA Regiment: SIGINT Direction

Finding (DF) Locations Battle of Ni Le, September 1971
(annotated map). p.161.

H. 3rd Battalion/33rd NVA Regiment: SIGINT Direction Finding

(DF) Locations Battle of Ni Le, September 1971
(annotated map). p.163.

I. 33rd Regiment Headquarters Locations (SIGINT): 29 April -

2 July 1969 (Battle of Bnh Ba). p.165.
 118

Annex A

A SUMMARY OF THE GROUP AND INDIVIDUAL

ACHIEVEMENTS AWARDED THE TITLE OF
HERO OF THE PEOPLES ARMED FORCES

33rd Infantry Regiment, Military Region 7

From 1965 to April 1975, the 33rd Regiment fought continuously on the
battlefields of the Central Highlands, the far south of Trung B, and the Eastern
Nam B regions either independently or under higher main-force command. The
Regiment created a resolve and a dauntlessness to hold on and coordinate with our
fraternal units and the local armed forces to overcome every difficulty and violent
hardship, fight continuously, and defeated a large number of enemy opponents.
The Regiment flexibly applied many tactics. Throughout all the fighting, the
Regiment and our fraternal units and the local armed forces, had participated in
1,210 battles both large and small; overcame a Sector, five Sub-Sectors, three
Special Sectors, six Sub-Sub-Sectors177, 235 posts both large and small,
destroyed two water-borne convoys, 103 artillery pieces, set fire to 133 aircraft,
and 1,345 military vehicles (including 601 tanks and armoured vehicles), wiped
out 32 battalions (including an American battalion and a Thai battalion), 50
companies (including 21 American companies, two Australian companies178, and
two Thai companies), and seized: 2,454 weapons of various types, 342 radios, 20
military vehicles and a large quantity of other military equipment and materiel.
We wiped out 30,047 of the enemy and captured 787.
The Regiment was awarded seven Liberation Military Exploits Medals179
(one 1st Class, two 2nd Class, and four 3rd Class); and four Liberation Military
Feats Medals180 (three 1st Class, one 2nd Class). A battalion, a company, and two
comrades were awarded the Hero Title.
On 15 January 1976, the 33rd Infantry Regiment was awarded the Title:
Heroic Unit of the Peoples Armed Forces by the President of Vietnam.

(As one of the Heroic Units in

The H Ch Minh Campaign)

177
Translators Note: For village and hamlet-level Sub-Sub-Sectors (Phn Khu, Phn Chi Khu), see
footnote 172.
178
Translators Note: See footnote 174.
179
Translators Note: Hun chng Qun cng Gii Phng Liberation Military Exploits Medal.
180
Translators Note: Hun chng Chin cng Gii Phng Liberation Military Feats Medal.
 119

Annex A

The 8th Battalion

From 1965 to April 1975, the 8th Battalion of the 33rd Infantry Regiment
fought in Military Region 5 and the Eastern Nam B. The unit overcame many
difficulties, hardships, and violence. The Battalion fought while coming-of-age,
launched attacks, ambushes, and held positions. Fighting independently or under
regimental command, it was equally successful. The Battalions cadre and soldiers
fought courageously and cleverly, and achieved many outstanding combat feats.
In the Regiments combat actions and those of the Battalions fraternal
units, the Battalion destroyed six enemy battalions, 26 enemy companies, and
inflicted heavy casualties on nine battalions and 11 other companies. The
Battalion killed more than 8,000 of the enemy, captured 300, destroyed 200
enemy military vehicles (including 169 armoured vehicles) and 14 artillery pieces,
shot down many aircraft, and seized many weapons of various types including
31 artillery pieces.
The Battalion was awarded nine Liberation Military Feats Medals ((Hun
chng Chin cng Gii Phng)) 1st Class, five 2nd Class, and two 3rd Class.
On 3 June 1976, the 8th Infantry Battalion was awarded the Title: Hero of
the Peoples Armed Forces by the National Assembly.

(See: Heroic Units of the Peoples Armed Forces,

Volume 3, Armed Forces Publishing House, 1996)
 120

Annex A

The 2nd Company, 7th Battalion

From 1965 to 1973, the 2nd Company of the 7th Battalion fought on the
battlefields of Military Region 5 and the Eastern Nam B Region. The Unit was
usually given tasks that were more difficult and violent than those given to other
companies in the Battalion. As they fought, the cadre and soldiers matured and
became more steadfast. They were flexible - employing many different types of
tactics, and they fought successfully in many different types of terrain in the
mountains, in the delta, and in the towns. The Company operated independently
and within the structure of their Battalion, the Regiment, and other units.
The company killed 3,200 enemy (including many American, Thai, and
South Korean troops), The Company captured 87 puppet troops, wiped out and
inflicted heavy casualties on 22 enemy companies (including six American and
vassal companies). They destroyed many military vehicles, two artillery pieces,
two petroleum and ammunition storage areas, 19 barracks they shot down
seven aircraft, seized 148 weapons, eight radios, and much military equipment.
The Company was awarded six Liberation Military Feats Medals of
several classes as a Resolved to Win Citadel Unit; and was awarded the title
of a Courageous American-killing Unit five times.
On 20 December 1973, the 2nd Infantry Company of the 7th Battalion was
awarded the title of Hero of the Peoples Armed Forces by the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam.

(See: Heroic Units of the Peoples Armed Forces,

Volume 2, Armed Forces Publishing House, 1994)
 121

Annex A

THE MARTYR AND HERO: NGUYN VN O

Nguyn Vn O was born in 1946 a low-land ethnic Vietnamese, in Duy

Tn village, Kinh Mn District of Hng Yn Province. He enlisted in July 1967.
At the time of his death, he was the commander of the reconnaissance section of
the 7th Battalion of the 33rd Regiment subordinate to COSVN Headquarters. He
was a member of a H Ch Minh Communist Youth Group.181
Nguyn Vn O was the only child in his family. As his parents were old
and weak, his military service obligation was temporarily deferred - but he was
determined to enlist.
From April 1968 to May 1969, Nguyn Vn O participated in combat on
the Eastern Nam B battlefields. Together with his comrades, he fought in three
battles and achieved high combat outcomes killing 65 enemy (including many
Americans and five Thai soldiers), and seizing eight weapons. He was a model
soldier symbolising our resolute spirit to attack the enemy expending little for
large victories, and inspiring everyones enthusiasm and eagerness to fight.
In January 1969, Nguyn Vn O together with two other comrades, were
tasked to defend the Regiments storage base south of the Sng B River. When
two American companies swept into the base area, Nguyn Vn O ordered his
team to secretly await the enemy and only open fire when they were really close.
In their very first volleys, the team wiped out a number of the enemy, forcing the
remainder to withdraw some distance. Next, Nguyn Vn O dispatched two of his
men to attack the enemy from two flanks, while he awaited the approaching
enemy only firing on them when they were very close. Comrade O and his team
fought resolutely throughout the whole day against the two American companies
killing 90 of the enemy, and holding their ground. Apart from killing the enemy,
he also seized eight weapons.
On 3 March [sic] 1969, Nguyn Vn O participated in the attack on the
enemy at Bu Ci (Bin Ha). Leading a reconnaissance team, he overcame many
difficulties and dangers while successfully reconnoitring the enemy positions and
assisting the Battalion to accurately and decisively attack the enemy. During the
attack, he led a group that attacked directly into the enemy post, playing an import
part in the Battalion wiping out a battalion of Thai soldiers. Comrade O himself
killed five of the enemy.
In the Battle of An Lc (Long Khanh Province) on 17 May 1969, the unit
had reached the wire of the enemy post when they were discovered and fired upon

181
Translators Note: See footnote 8. The communist Vietnam Workers Party Youth Groups (on) at
all levels had members who aspired to Party membership. Selected members could graduate to probationary
membership of the Party (at about age 24) then full membership. For detail, see: Chamberlain, E.P., The
Viet Cong D445 Battalion, op.cit., 2016, Annex H.
 122

fiercely. Comrade O swiftly moved around to the right of the position, crawled
through the wire behind the enemy and, taking them by surprise, wiped out their
firing post with grenades. Thanks to Comrade Nguyn Vn Os courageous and
timely act, the unit was able to pass through the wire and directly assault the
enemy position. They wiped out a puppet company and two platoons of Regional
Forces. Comrade O died bravely.
During his life, Nguyn Vn O was always a volunteer and a model in all
his work - and was loved heart and soul by all his comrades. Once, when he came
across a severely wounded comrade, he carried him throughout the night and
reached the rear aid post in time.
Comrade Nguyn Vn O was awarded the Liberation Military Feats
Medal, was twice given the title of Model Combat Soldier, and received five
Certificates of Commendation.
On 20 December 1973, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Peoples
Liberation Armed Forces of the South by the Provisional Revolutionary
Government of the Republic of South Vietnam.182

(See: Heroes of the Peoples Armed Forces,

Armed Forces Publishing House, 1994)

182
Translators Note: For Nguyn Vn O, see also the Vietnam Peoples Army website:
http://www.vnmilitaryhistory.net/index.php?topic=25083.90 .
 123

Annex A

THE HERO L NG VN BING

Comrade Lng Vn Bing was born in 1944 of the Mng minority

people, in Nam Tin village in Quan Ha District in Thanh Ha Province. When
awarded the title of Hero of the Armed Forces, he was a section commander in the
19th Engineer Company of the 33rd Regiment (Military Region 7) and a member of
the Communist Party of Vietnam.
From 1968 to 1974, Lng Vn Bing fought on the battlefields of Eastern
Nam B. Whenever directly in combat against the enemy or when transporting
rice or ammunition, or transporting our troops by ferry across a river, Comrade
Bing always completed his tasks in an outstanding manner. Together with his
section, Lng Vn Bing killed hundreds of the enemy, and ferried our troops
safely across rivers hundreds of times under heavy enemy fire. Individually, he
killed many of the enemy (including American troops and five Australians) and
set fire to two tanks, and destroyed an ammunition depot.
In the attack on Tanh Linh airfield (Bnh Tuy Province) in June 1970,
Lng Vn Bing led his team to attack directly into the enemys airfield. In the
very first minutes, Comrade Bing wiped out a number of the enemy manning a
mortar position that included two heavy machine-guns, and using explosives,
also destroyed an ammunition depot. The enemy outnumbered his team many-fold
and fought back resolutely, but Lng Vn Bing inspired his team to fight and
wipe out almost all of an American company, destroying a large quantity of war-
making facilities, and creating favourable conditions for his fraternal elements to
wipe out the Tanh Linh area.
In August 1971 - having conducted a successful propaganda operation in a
strategic hamlet, as they were leaving his team came up against an enemy vehicle
convoy. Lng Vn Bing led his team in destroying two vehicles, and mobilised
his men to drive back many counter-attacks by the enemy killing 30. Comrade
Bing individually killed 17 of the enemy. From June to August 1974, Lng Vn
Bing led his platoon in four battles on Route 1 and in the Bo Bnh area, killing
more than 100 of the enemy. Individually, he killed many of the enemy, seizing
six weapons of various types. Lng Vn Bing was loved heart and soul by all
his comrades. Many times he saw an enemy bomb explode nearby and he
shielded our wounded by protecting them with his own body.
Comrade Bing was awarded a Liberation Military Feats Medal 2nd Class,
a Liberation Military Feats Medal 3rd Class, was elected a Model Soldier four
times, and five times as a Courageous Soldier. He was awarded 24 Certificates of
Commendation and Letters of Appreciation. On 15 January 1976, Lng Vn
Bing was awarded the title of Hero of the Peoples Armed Forces.
(See: Heroes of the Peoples Armed Forces, Volume 3)
 124

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 125

Annex B

A NUMBER OF ARTICLES WRITTEN ABOUT

THE 33rd REGIMENT

THE BATTLE OF IA RNG

CAUSING A STIR IN AMERICA183

My face followed the clouds of grey smoke that were dispersing and
leaving a long streak along the slope of the hills where the fallen tree trunks lay
tangled. From the time when I was still in the North, I had read many documents
that examined the United States military, and now before my eyes I could see and
was engaging them. A B-52 could carry 25 tonnes of bombs and today they used
24 aircraft in succession to mass around the Ch Png area. I thought about our
new combat opponent as a military force with very strong weapons that were very
modern that faced a rival whose troops were hungry and whose equipment was
backward. Consequently objectively, in a short time they would break the
backbone of the Vit Cng, and these present impetuous landings intended to
hit the rear of the main-force in the Central Highlands was something that was
easy to understand. I ordered a halt in the area that the enemy had just bombed in
order to engage the enemy and command the battle.
That afternoon, I first met the cadre commanding the 66th Regiment L
Ngc Chu, the Regiments political commissar, and was told that the enemy had
disrupted their formation and that they were not in contact with all their units.
They were only in contact with their 7th Battalion and were aware of the enemy
situation in that Battalions area.
Grasping the situation through Political Commissar Chu and
reconnaissance reports, we knew that the enemy unit very close to our 7th
Battalion was the 1st Battalion (minus) of the 3rd US Air Cavalry Brigade. ng
V Hip the Political Commissar of the Forward Headquarters, and I exchanged
ideas and in a flash decided to use the 7th Battalion to quickly deploy and attack
the Americans 1st Battalion
The 7th Battalion opened fire and attacked the enemy from 0530hrs on 15
November ((1965)). In the first 15 minutes, the enemy was in chaos but then
resisted resolutely. We could clearly hear the fierce sounds of machine guns and

183
Translators Note: This article by the late Colonel General Nguyn Hu An appeared on a Vietnamese
website dedicated to the late H Ch Minh on 19 September 2012 - ie
https://tennguoidepnhat.net/2012/09/19/ia-drang-tran-danh-lam-chan-dong-nuoc-my/ For the Plyme
Campaign see also Nguyn Hu An Colonel General, Chin Trng Mi - Hi c (New Battlefield),
Peoples Army Publishing House, H Ni, 2002 - VCAT Item No. 16900105001 ; and Nguyn Vn Tn,
Commenting on General Nguyn Hu Ans Account of the Plyme Campaign, 19 August 2013
http://www.generalhieu.com/iadrang_huuan-2.htm .
 126

exploding grenades. In the sky - both day and night, there wasnt a minute without
the roar of all types of aircraft, and the noise of their bombs drowned out all other
sounds.
The flares were so brilliant that they lit up each blade of grass. The
battlefield seemed as if we were in a boiler, the pressure was beyond measure -
and yet continued to build. Everyones mind and body even if they were sitting
in the one place, all felt fully stretched and tense, like a stringed musical
instrument.
The 7th Battalion continued to attack the enemy. At about 1200hrs, the
enemy aircraft attacked, even dropping napalm on the American military
formations. The 7th Battalion positioned a company with the task of encircling and
threatening the Americans, and preventing their escape or redeploying to another
position. The remainder of the Battalion temporarily left the battlefield and
withdrew to the rear to re-organise. After bombarding for a long time, the enemy
landed an additional company of their 1st Battalion.
At our forward headquarters, at that time we had a better grip on the
situation. The 66th Regiment reported that the 9th Battalion had made contact with
the 7th Battalion. Accordingly, the balance of forces in that small area was now
that each side had two battalions and, on numbers of personnel, the Americans
were dominate (not including their two artillery companies and their air support).
On the evening of the 15th ((November 1965)), I ordered L Ngc Chu
the Political Commissar (the Regimental Commander was lost and had yet to
return) to swiftly consolidate his force and try to set an ambush at Landing Zone
X-Ray on the morning of the 16th. At that time, I also sent ng Thoi one of
our assistant directors of operations, to contact the 33rd Regiment and, if he met
any battalion, to task that battalion to attack the enemys fire support base at
Quynh Kla in order to coordinate with the 66th Regiment.
I sent a reconnaissance team to take an order to the 8th Battalion (of the
66th Regiment) directing that it swiftly return on its tracks and be ready to strike
the enemy moving in the opposite direction of the 8th Battalion.
The 7th Battalion opened fire at about 3 a.m. on 17 November. After a few
minutes of decisive combat, the 7th Battalion had struck directly at the enemys 1st
Battalion and inflicted heavy casualties on two American companies. The 1st
Battalion of the 33rd Regiment became lost and was not able to achieve its
objective of attacking the enemys fire support base.
Seeing that its 1st Battalion was in danger of being annihilated, the 3rd Air
Cavalry Brigade ordered the Battalions remaining troops to flee on foot to the
west of the Ia M (((Ia Muer River)) and to group together near the fire support
base and await orders.
I ordered the units (the 1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment) that - to avoid
getting lost or dislocated, they had to continuously attack the enemy both by day
 127

and by night. Engaging the enemy required their immediate attention. They had to
attack the enemy immediately grabbing the enemys belts and striking them.184
At midday on 17 November 1965, the 8th Battalion (of the 66th Regiment)
received its order to turn around and was having their meal beside the Ia rng
River when their reconnaissance element reported: The American forces are
getting really close. The Battalion Commander L Xun Phi, calmly moved
his Battalion to swiftly take up an advantageous position to the front and two
sides. Such a formation would encircle the enemy who would be caught and
squeezed between the Battalions two pincers. After using the firepower of our
mortars to put pressure on the enemys position, our forces courageously assaulted
simultaneously cutting through them and engaging in hand-to-hand fighting with
the enemy. At this time, both sides were mixed with one another to the extent we
could only use sub-machineguns, bayonets, and grenades in the fighting.
The journalist Galloway185 described the battle186: When their mortars
began firing, the regular North Vietnamese soldiers were manoeuvring beside the
Americans, and then wheeled around and attacked. In the centre of the American
column, Charlie Company suffered the worst consequences with 20 killed and
many more wounded in the very first minute. Some men fired wildly in every
direction, and another company complained that it was being hit by friendly fire.
At that point, as the enemy pressed the attack, ((Lieutenant Colonel))
McDade the Battalion Commander of the 2nd Battalion of the US 3rd Brigade,
apparently believed that what was happening was a shootout between the
Americans. Lieutenant S. Lawrence Gwin wrote that McDade radioed orders
for everyone to cease fire. A bad situation got worse. By now, the North
Vietnamese were in among the Americans and up in the trees. Anyone who
moved got shot. Major Henry and the artillery observer got on their radios and
began calling in artillery and air bombardments. That prevented a massacre, but
with the column stretched out for almost 1,000 yards in the tall grass, the artillery
shells and napalm that killed the North Vietnamese also killed Americans. The
lead unit - Alpha Company, had spread out around the edge of the clearing before
184
Translators Note: Grabbing the enemys belts and striking them was an expression that exhorted
communist fighters to close tightly with the enemy in order to negate the enemys artillery and air support,
and was popularized by COSVN head General Nguyn Ch Thanh in his Nguyn Vnh directive ie:Take
them by the belt and kill them 17 February 1966. He reportedly borrowed the expression from General
Chu Huy Mn Bam/Nm tht lng ch m anh, Battle of Vnh Huy (MR5) in April 1965 see: i
tng Chu Huy Mn: Mnh ch huy, mnh chnh tr, http://baodatviet.vn/quoc-phong/dai-tuong-chu-huy-
man-manh-chi-huy-manh-chinh-tri-2219633/ .
185
Translators Note: The journalist cited is Joseph W. Galloway of United Press International, who was
with the 457-strong 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry Regiment in the Ia rng battles. The next two
paragraphs were translated from Galloways article: The word was the Ia Drang would be a walk. The
word was wrong., U.S. News & World Report, 29 October 1990. See also: Moore, H.G. and Galloway,
J.W., We Were Soldiers Once and Young: Ia Drang the Battle that Changed the War in Vietnam,
Presidio Press, 2004.
186
Translators Note: This passage describes the NVA attack on the 2 nd Battalion/7th Air Cavalry Regiment
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert McDade, near Landing Zone Albany on 17 November 1965.
 128

the attack had lost two platoons, 50 men, in the first few minutes. It would emerge
from that area ((Landing Zone Albany)) with only 20 men left out of 100. Charlie
Company which set off from X-Ray with 110 men, lost 50 killed and 50
wounded. 187
On receiving my order, the 33rd Regiment deployed a battalion at a very
fast march back in the direction of Ch Png. On the way, the 1st Battalion (of the
33rd Regiment) heard the sound of gunfire ahead, and knew for sure that our
forces were blocking and attacking the enemy. No one had to tell anyone that they
had to move forward faster. On reaching close to the enemy, a company of the 1st
Battalion met the enemy fleeing in the direction of Ch Png. Accordingly, our
two units joined to strike the rear of the American battalion.188 The masterly
coordinated action of our two battalions caused the already confused Americans to
be swiftly annihilated by our forces.
The battle lasted from 1400hrs on 17 November to 2000hrs on 18
November 1965 when it concluded. According to the journalist Galloway who
accompanied the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the US 3rd Brigade, the 2nd Battalion
((McDades Battalion)) had lost 155 killed, 125 wounded and at least five men
missing in action.189 Accordingly, in three hours, the American 2nd Battalion lost
285 soldiers from its total strength of 400 although that number is actually far
from the truth. General Westmoreland had to immediately admit that they suffered
very serious casualties. On the 18th the enemy suddenly deployed its forces to
many locations with the hope of lessening the critical losses of the 2nd Air Cavalry
Battalion. At Quynh Kla, the enemy landed an additional battalion the 3rd
Battalion, and two artillery companies.
Two puppet airborne regiments of their General Strategic Reserve were
urgently moved up from Si Gn together with an American battalion deploying
by vehicle and moving to the south-east of c C (to the north of the Ch Png
Massif) for subsequent support. At the same time, the enemy tried to create a fake
pressure by giving tranquillizers to the American troops. It is very unfortunate that
the 320th Regiment in that area only attacked to wear down the enemy, and was
not able to wipe out any American battalion.
On 19 November 1965, tens of enemy aircraft flew in to bomb and attack
for quite a long period around Quynh Kla, and then helicopters landed to pick up
all the remaining enemy troops and fly them to Bu Cn. The Americans first
operation in the Central Highlands ended in tragedy.
The final result was that we had won a very large victory far exceeding
what we had initially anticipated. American casualties were about 1,200, and we

187
Translators Note: The extract from Joseph W. Galloways 1990 article ends here.
188
Translators Note: According to a detailed US account, it was the 3 rd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment that
attacked the US column see Head, W., A Re-Assessment of the Battle of Ia Drang Valley, 1965: The Role
of Airpower, Heroic Soldiers and the Wrong Lessons, Virginia Review of Asian Studies, Vol 16, 2014,
pp.27-55.
189
Translators Note: This sentence is from J.W. Galloways 1990 article see footnote 182.
 129

wiped out the 1st and 2 Battalions of the 3rd Air Cavalry Brigade and seriously
wore down the 3rd Battalion and a number of companies. We shot down 26
aircraft and seized a large quantity of weapons and ammunition. The Battle of Ia
rng caused a stir across all of America, foreshadowing the unavoidable defeat
of the American expeditionary forces. I would like to borrow the words of the
American journalist Galloway who wrote the following for the United States
Weekly News190: The battle in the Ia rng Valley made the United States
recede into a decade-long bloody quagmire that led 58,000 Americans into their
military-produced shiny aluminium coffins. It ruined the term of one President,
and created a deep stain on the term of another President - and even drove all the
people to oppose their very own policies.

Colonel General Nguyn Hu An

(Former Deputy Commander of the Pleime Campaign,
Direct Commander of the Battle of Ia rng)
Peoples Armed Forces Sunday, 24 October 2010.

190
Translators Note: This is probably a reference to J.W. Galloways article - "Fatal Victory", U.S. News
& World Report, 29 October 1990, pp.3236.
 130

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*
 131

Annex B

Australian Military Writings on

The Heroic 33rd Regiment191
Surrounded by the Enemy in the Last Fighting in
Vietnam

In September 1971, only a few weeks before the day of returning to their
country, the forces of the Australian Task Force fought their last battle in
Vietnam. In that battle, known as the Battle of Nui Le 192, 24 Australian soldiers
were wounded and five killed they were the last Australian troops to die in
Vietnam.

Of the communist North Vietnamese forces engaged by Australian units,

the 33 Regiment was the most dangerous.193 According to an intelligence officer
rd

Captain R.N. Sayce, these North Vietnamese troops were very well prepared;
they conducted careful reconnaissance, and moved very carefully. Regarding their
ambushes, they were masters. They placed snipers in the tree-tops, built very solid
bunkers in their defensive positions, and their firing lanes were very efficient.
They were generally well disciplined, making little noise during movement or
while in camp, and strictly adhered to the doctrine of evacuating their wounded
and dead after an engagement if possible.194
191
Translators Note: In late October 2012, Ernest Chamberlain translated into Vietnamese passages from
the Australian Armys Official History of the Vietnam War (ie: Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the
Finish, Allen & Unwin/Australian War Memorial, Crows Nest, 2012 including p.610 and p.857); and
forwarded the translations to Mr V Xun Thu of the 33rd Regiments Liaison Committee. During a visit to
Vietnam later in 2012, Chamberlain also met with Mr Thu and passed further Australian writings and film
to him related principally to the Battle of Bnh Ba (early June 1969) and the Battle of Ni Le/Ni Sao
(late September 1971). Mr Thu reciprocated with several historical monographs/summaries written by 33 rd
Regiment cadre and these were translated and included in annexes to Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd
Regiment North Vietnamese Army: Their Story (and the Battle of Binh Ba), Point Lonsdale, 2014 see
also footnotes 468 and 471 in that 2014 work for notes on the prospective future use by 33 rd Regiment
historians of Australian writings in the Regiments History. In subsequent emails, to Mr Thu, Australian
signals intelligence (SIGINT) coverage of the 33rd Regiment (email - 26 May 2014) and other issues,
were also described.
192
Translators Note: For the Battle of Ni Le/L also as Ni Sao (YS 513857) in September 1971 - see
the brief description in the main text - footnotes 107, 108 and 109. The Battle of Ni Le was not mentioned
in the 33rd Regiments historical monographs of 2010 and 2011 and Vietnamese veterans have
commented that the engagement was just another fight not a major firefight . - see footnotes 6 and
9 in the Preface.
193
Translators Note: The Operation Order 9/71 dated 19 September 1971 for 1 ATFs Operation Ivanhoe
stated: 33 Regiment is generally regarded as the most capable enemy force at present in GVN MR3.
Annex A. See file: AWM95, 1/4/234, September 1971.
194
Translators Note: This paragraph is an almost word-for-word translation of the assessment by Captain
R.N. Sayce intelligence officer 4RAR/NZ in the Australian Army Official History ie Ekins, A. with
 132

The 33rd Regiment195 was the only enemy main force unit in the region
with the military capability to exploit the withdrawal of the Royal [sic] Australian
military forces from Phuoc Tuy and this they were apparently directed to do. In
the middle of September 1971, signals intelligence (SIGINT) indicated that the
33rd NVA Regiment was moving from southern B Ra-Long Khanh196 into the
north of Phuoc Tuy Province.
The threat materialised very quickly. Brigadier McDonald the Task
Force commander, knew that the Task Force had to respond immediately. He
believed that he must keep the enemy forces at a distance and not allow them time
to establish themselves in the Province as they might conduct ambushes or
launch surprise attacks against increasingly vulnerable targets. But, he said: It
was very difficult for me to commit my whole force consisting of 3RAR, which
at that time had only about two more weeks before going home.197
On 18 [sic] September 1971198, the Task Force launched Operation
Ivanhoe, a search-and-destroy sweep in the area south of the Courtenay rubber

McNeill, I, Fighting to the Finish, Allen & Unwin/The Australian War Memorial, Crows Nest, 2012, p.610
see footnote 191 above. Chamberlain provided a Vietnamese-language translation of the passage to Mr
V Xun Thu in an email of 23 October 2012.
195
Translators Note: On 6 September 1971, 1 ATF reported that: maximum Sniffer ((E-63 Airborne
Personnel Detector)) readings suggest that a group from the ((33 rd)) Regiment may be east of Nui Le (area
YS5388). 1 ATF SUPINTREP: 30 August 5 September, Ni t, 6 September 1971.
196
Translators Note: P.610 of Fighting to the Finish uses from southern Long Khanh . For SIGINT
aspects, see also the preceding footnote 64 (June 1969) and for 1971: footnotes 107 and 110. The 1 ATF
Intelligence Log noted the SIGINT fixes as: 10 September: HQ 33 Regt - YS 645948 and eight days later
on 18 September: HQ 33 Regt - YS 542825; 2/33 Regt - YT 567143; 3/33 Regt - YS 513922. 19
September: 2/33 Regt - YT 574145; 3/33 Regt - YS 498855. 20 September: HQ 33 Regt - YS 483832; 3/33
Regt - YS 488849/YS 509854/YS 506868. 21 September: HQ 33 Regt - YS 523877; 3/33 Regt - YS
504852. 27 September: 3/33 Regt - YT 545007. 28 September: 3/33 Regt - YT 524013. 29 September: HQ
33 Regt - YT 572000; 3/33 Regt - YT 569004. 30 September: HQ 33 Regt - YS 556985; 2/33 Regt - YT
497193; 3/33 Regt - YS 577975. See the annotated maps at Translators Annexes G and H. 547 Signal
Troops subsequent Operational Report to DMI (Mi8) in Canberra for September 1971 (SIGS684 of 8
October 1971) related SIGINT fixes of 33rd Regiment transmitters: On 18/19 Sep, both HQ 33 NVA Regt
and 3rd Bn 33 NVA Regt relocated to northern Phuoc Tuy in a km overnight move Other terminals
remained stable. Bravo. 1ATF Reaction. The relocation of Reg HQ and 3rd Bn of 33 Regt (as fixed by
ARDF on 18 Sep which confirmed VR results) precipitated Operation Ivanhoe on 19 Sep. In a series of
contacts (some within 100 yds of ARDF fixes) over the period of the operation 22 en were confirmed KIA
with 5 Aust KIA and 24 WIA. The terminals were next located by ARDF at the end of the month once more
north of the Province border. Report provided by Major R.W. Hartley AM (Retd), 30 June 2015.
197
Translators Note: This paragraph is taken from p.611 of Fighting to the Finish.
198
Translators Note: At p.611 of Fighting to the Finish, the date is recorded as 19 September. The 1 ATF
Operation Order 9/71 (Op Ivanhoe), Ni t, 19 September 1971 included an Annex A titled: Likely
Enemy Presence in North-Eastern Duc Thanh District. The Annex noted that at least the 3 Bn 33 NVA
Regt and The Headquarters group of 33 Regt and some support weapon companies are at present
believed likely to be in north-eastern Duc Thanh District and some elements of 1 Bn 274 VC Regt could
also be in the area. documents captured by ((the US)) 3 Bde (Sep) 1 Cav Div (AM) suggest that the
main element of 1 Bn ((33rd Regiment)) may be located north of Xuan Loc. A following 1 ATF
SUPINTREP reported: It is believed that 3 Bn of 33 Regiment are [sic] now located in the Nui Sao area
(centre of mass YS 5184) while the Headquarters elements of the Regiment are probably east of Route 2 in
 133

plantation.199* The battalions were deployed into the area of the northern border
of the Province with the support of M113 APCs, artillery, and engineers
although lacking the fire support of the tank unit that had departed from Vung Tau
five days earlier.
200
As the rifle companies of 4RAR searched the jungle, they came across
and discussed the signs that hundreds of enemy were using the muddy foot tracks.
A large number of trees had been knocked down and their trunks used to disguise
a number of recently constructed bunkers. Second Lieutenant Gary McKay - the
11 Platoon commander, recalled: It began to look very odd/spooky. Major Jerry
Taylor201 the commander of D Company, remembered: The whole Battalion
felt uncomfortable like a premonition. In the afternoon of 20 September, D
Companys 11 Platoon had the first contact with the enemy when they
encountered a group of about 15 enemy on a track about one kilometre to the
north202 of Nui Sao. The Platoon opened fire first, and the enemy returned heavy
fire immediately including with automatic weapons. The Australian troops
killed two enemy in that short engagement without incurring casualties
themselves. Corporal [sic] Warren Dowell commanding the support section of D
Company Headquarters, recalled that in this first contact the enemy had showed
they were looking for a fight.
203
The platoons of B and D Companies harboured overnight in their
defensive positions, and early in the morning of 21 September began searching.

the Xa Bang area. The estimated strengths of 33 Regt elements are: Headquarters and support companies
375; 1 Bn 250; and 3 Bn 300. 2 Bn, which is believed to be north of Xuan Loc, has an estimated strength
of 270. Some elements of the Headquarters group could be located further east in the Tam Bo area (centre
of mass YS5482) where maximum sniffer readings were recorded earlier in the month. The move of 33
Regt elements into Phuoc Tuy may be in response to pressure from 3 Bde (Sep) 1 Cav Div, combined with
a belief that a vacuum may have been created because of the future withdrawal of 1 ATF troops. 1 ATF,
SUPINTREP 38/71 13-19 September 1971, 20 September 1971.
199
* That is todays Cm M rubber plantation in Cm M District of ng Nai Province. Translators
Note: Operation Ivanhoe was conducted in the period 19 September 1971 to 2 October 1971 see
4RAR/NZ ANZAC Bn After Action Report, Operation Ivanhoe, 4 November 1971 AWM95, 7/4/52 and
7/4/53. That Report noted the strength of 33rd NVA Regiment Headquarters and its support companies as
378, and its 3rd Battalion to be 300 strong. The 1st Battalion was not thought to be in the area and had
been identified in central Long Khnh Provinces by captured documents on 15/16 September. 10 NVA
were reportedly killed-in-action in the Ni Le/Ni Sao area by 4RAR/NZ on 21 September 1971. On 22
September 1971, the 4RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Weekly Intelligence Review 718/41 assessed 33 rd Regiment
strengths as: 33 NVA Regt/MR7: 1,250 Max; HQ Elm and Spt Units: 378; 1 Bn: 300; 2 Bn: 270; 3 Bn:
300 AWM95, 7/4/52. These strength figures are very similar to the MACV/RVNAF, Order of Battle
Summary Vol I, September 1971 (as at 30 September) ie: 33 rd Regiment - total 1,245; HQ and support
elements 380; K1 Battalion 300; K2 Battalion 265; K3 Battalion 300. VCAT Item No.
F015900150007 .
200
Translators Note: This paragraph translates p.613 in Fighting to the Finish.
201
Translators Note: Major Jerry Taylor is the author of: Last Out: 4RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalions
second tour in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, 2001.
202
Translators Note: P. 613 of Fighting to the Finish states north-east of Nui Sao.
203
Translators Note: P.613 of Fighting to the Finish but after the first sentence, the detail of several
contacts from 1600hrs onward is omitted.
 134

((details of the contacts are not included in this 2016 33rd Regiment History but
are related in Fighting to the Finish - 2012)). That afternoon, B Company
concentrated in a very strong defensive position to enable them to receive
resupply by helicopter and to evacuate their casualties.
204
Meanwhile, four kilometres to the north-east, D Companys search had
met heavy opposition. At about 9 a.m., 12 Platoon came under heavy fire from an
enemy bunker just 10 metres away. Private Jimmy Duff a machine-gunner, was
killed immediately and two other soldiers were wounded, including platoon
commander Graham Spinkston. Private Colin Kemp crawled forward several
times under very heavy enemy fire to retrieve Duffs body until he was ordered to
abandon his efforts.
With the leading elements pinned down, artillery and air fire support were
called in while other platoons moved in closer to assist. As 11 Platoon
approached, they encountered another enemy group - but after a short engagement
drove them off. In the following two hours, the Platoon repelled a number of
enemy attacks. Pinned down by the enemy, 11 Platoon began to run short of
ammunition when finally 4RARs Lieutenant Colonel Jim Hughes dropped
supplies to them from his observation helicopter.
205
From the air, it appeared that D Company had struck the western edge
of an area full of bunkers. Major Taylor ordered his platoons to hold their
positions while artillery and air fire support was called in. The American forces
quickly provided air support with 30 aircraft of different types.206
While aircraft and artillery fired upon and bombed the enemy positions, 11
Platoon moved closer to the main unit [sic], and Major Taylor was able to
concentrate his company. At that time, his plan was to attack once the enemy had
left their bunkers and begun to withdraw. At about 3 p.m., after four hours of
fierce bombardment, pilots reported that a large number of the enemy were
leaving their bunkers and withdrawing to the north. Taylor called his platoon
commanders together and told them that the company would immediately attack
the enemys bunker system. They did not expect to encounter enemy resistance as
they were fleeing. All of the soldiers were issued with a larger amount of
ammunition and grenades than normal, and the platoons began to advance with
two platoons leading in assault formation.
At exactly 3.40 p.m., D Company attacked. Only 10 minutes later, when
they had only moved about 50 metres into the bunker system, 11 Platoon was
attacked from the front and both sides. The leading section was fired on by both
submachine-guns and heavy machine-guns. The enemy were clearly prepared for
an engagement as they were in deep pits in a fan formation, and aimed their fire at
D Companys heavy weapon elements. In the enemys first burst of fire, four

204
Translators Note: P.613 of Fighting to the Finish.
205
Translators Note: P.614 of Fighting to the Finish.
206
Translators Note: The detail of the support by US Air Force, US Army, and RAAF aircraft is omitted
ie as related in pp.614-615 of Fighting to the Finish.
 135

Australians were hit including the two leading machine-gunners. Privates Brian
Beilken and Rod Sprigg were killed immediately, about 15 metres from the
nearest enemy bunkers. Machine-gunner Ralph Niblett was severely wounded in
the chest. Moments later, as Private Keith Kingston-Povvles [sic ie Powles]
attempted to move his machine-gun to a better firing position, he was killed
immediately.
The attack stalled. The soldiers were pinned down and did not have
sufficient firepower to retaliate. Without supporting tanks or M-72 rocket
launchers (which had been withdrawn due to malfunctions), the soldiers only had
their rifles, M-79 grenade launchers, and two of their machine-guns had been
damaged and were unusable. Second Lieutenant McKay recalled: We were
caught in the enemy fire, and any even the smallest move forward would mean
suffering further casualties. At that time, we reckoned that we would have given
anything to have back the tanks that had already been taken back to Australia.207
Sergeant Daryl Jenkin although wounded, tried to command his sections
providing fire support to one another while withdrawing. He was ordered to
abandon the three bodies of his dead comrades as the enemy fire was too intense
trying to extract the bodies of the three would mean further casualties.
The Platoon withdrew first followed by the rest of the Company. The
Company regrouped, and the wounded were evacuated by helicopter. Despite
treatment by Corporal OSullivan the company medic, Niblett died in the
helicopter 30 minutes after he was wounded. Meanwhile, enemy troops left their
bunkers to pursue the Australians. They closed with the Australians to avoid the
artillery and air fire support. With the advantage of the jungle, the North
Vietnamese moved very quickly and fired upon the Australians from two sides
at the same time firing on the supporting helicopters and observation aircraft.
At 6.15 p.m., it was slowly becoming dark. Major Taylor ordered his
company to withdraw about 400 metres to the south and establish a night
defensive position. Aircraft would then drop napalm onto their position. Almost
immediately, the enemy followed up. The Australians went to ground and
returned fire, hitting almost ten enemy. Not long afterwards, the troops in the
south discovered that they were in another bunker system. Corporal Warren
Dowell recalled: We were in contact with the enemy on all fronts. Consequently,
while both 11 and 12 Platoon were fighting, they had to withdraw out of the
enemy position. The enemy had an observation post in a tall tree over 10 metres
tall that directed the fire of the enemy on the ground into the positions that the
Australians had intended to occupy overnight.
D Company was reduced to 85 men and was in a circular defensive
position with a diameter of about 35 metres. The soldiers were now low on
ammunition and engaging with a very strong and very aggressive enemy unit that
207
Translators Note: The Australian Army Official History Fighting to the Finish, 2012 , p.619 notes:
There was some bitterness among the soldiers over their casualties and the governments decision to
withdraw the tanks before the end of combat operations.
 136

had almost completely surrounded them. Corporal Dowell continued: We were in

all-round defence. However, once fighting beside each other, we were able to
maintain a very high morale/spirits.
The enemy continued to harass the unit until it was completely dark.
Messages sent by D Company to the Battalion Headquarters on Courtenay Hill
showed the units dangerous situation:
6.51 p.m.: We are tightly surrounded and we need ammunition.
6.58 p.m.: We need every type of support; the enemy situation is becoming
heavier.
7.03 p.m.: Every time we move, they fire. We have to lie flat to the
ground. We cant accept the Iroquois helicopter, its too dangerous.

Laying quietly under the enemy fire and unable to read his map in the dark
night, Lieutenant Gregory Gilbert D Companys forward observation officer,
had to rely on [sic should be recall] the grid references on his map to calculate
the distances and angles to call down the close artillery fire support. Gilbert called
in the artillery rounds, controlling the fire falling to within 100 metres of the units
perimeter. Meanwhile, the enemy fired automatic weapons and threw grenades
into the position208, but Major Taylor ordered the men under his command not to
fire in order to conserve their ammunition. However, the incoming artillery rounds
had an effect, and the enemy began to withdraw. When it was completely dark,
the enemy weapons ceased firing.
Soon long after 9 p.m., Second Lieutenant McKay was shot by a sniper in
a tree and seriously wounded. As helicopters could not land that night, McKay
had to wait until the following day. Throughout that night, although he was
wounded and lost a lot of blood, McKay and his comrades fought bravely. As a
result, he was later awarded the Military Cross for his bravery and outstanding
leadership.
The enemy guns were silent, but the Australians were still in an unsettling
situation, as no one knew clearly whether the enemy would attack again. At that
time, the artillery fire support ceased, and the Australians spent a long night with
their wounded comrades beside them and waiting for dawn.209
At first light, D Company sent out patrols. They found the dead body of
an NVA soldier armed with a loaded RPG-2, and long blood trails showing that
bodies had been dragged off. The enemy troops had withdrawn during the night
and only left those few marks.210

208
Translators Note: Fighting to the Finish - 2012, p.617 includes the firing of RPGs. On 20 November
2016, Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert (Retd) related that he had brought the artillery in to between 25 and 30
metres. Danger Close Artillery, Community Notes, Australias Vietnam War website, UNSW/ADFA.
209
Translators Note: At pp.617-618 of Fighting to the Finish - 2012, this sentence is in direct speech
citing Warren Dowell in Army, 21 October 2004, pp.16-17.
210
Translators Note: P.618 the following was not included in the Vietnamese translation: once again
demonstrating their skill in withdrawing undetected from the battlefield and carrying off their dead and
 137

The New Zealand 5th [sic V ieVictor] Company arrived to reinforce

D Company on 23 September, and the two companies returned to the bunker
complex. In torrential rain, they found the material that they had left behind two
days previously including the bodies of their three comrades.211 The 5th [sic]
Company prepared a landing pad for a helicopter that removed the bodies.
The engagement left a mark on the Battalion. Throughout the 14-hour
battle, they lost five killed and 24 wounded including three platoon
commanders.212 The enemy left nine bodies on the battlefield, and the number of
wounded is unknown. The five soldiers killed were the last lost in combat by the
Battalion and by the Australian forces in Vietnam.213
214
There was some bitterness among the soldiers over their casualties and
the governments decision to withdraw the tanks before the end of combat
operations. A soldier of 4RAR complained: The Army should not have taken
away the tanks while we were still in the bush if we had the tanks in support, we
would not have lost our comrades, and we would have been able to kill more of
the enemy.
A number of commanders believe that the engagement related above
although it didnt end in a victory or a defeat, had bloodied the noses of the
enemy and forced them to abandon their intentions of attacking Australian units in
the final stages of the withdrawal of their forces. However the number of
casualties caused a number of others to question whether such sacrifices resulted
in any advantages in that stage of the War. Survivors believe that they were lucky
no to have been slaughtered215 by a well-trained enemy regiment equipped with
modern weapons. Major Taylor believed that it was a near thing: D Company
attacked, withdrew, and defended and came close to being annihilated, just like
another small Australian unit, at the Battle of Long Tan.216
217
Deputy Opposition Leader Lance Barnard argued in the Parliament
that: the tragic engagement related above had shown that the Government was
deluded to think that Australian forces could withdraw from Phuoc Tuy safely. It
also showed that the Australian Task Force was still conducting search-and-
destroy operations against enemy units. If the Task Force with its reduced troop

wounded. 33 NVA Regiment had also shown that they were capable of moving long distances and
preparing a major installation in a very short time, reported Lieutenant Colonel Hughes, CO of 4RAR/NZ.
211
Translators Note: Fighting to the Finish 2012, p.618 the following was not translated into
Vietnamese: The bodies had apparently not been disturbed in one pocket was a set of radio codes that
could have been a valuable intelligence find for the enemy.
212
Translators Note: P.618 cites: the commanders of 6, 11, and 12 Platoons.
213
Translators Note: P.619.
214
Translators Note: P.619.
215
Translators Note: P.621 escape a heavy mauling.
216
Translators Note: P.621: Major Taylor also references soldiers having also been handicapped by a lack
of proper infantry weapons with which to attack fortified positions such as the battles of Operation Bribie
near Hoi My and Operation Ballarat near Suoi Chau Pha.
217
Translators Note: P.629.
 138

strength and firepower, continued to seek out and engage the enemy, the number
of casualties would increase. All these problems he continued, including the
Governments decision to withdraw the Task Force piece-meal in several stages in
the past year, had clearly not achieved its main aim of allowing the Regional
Forces218 to develop in time and take control over the whole territory of the
Province.
219
The reality was not lost on knowledgeable commentators. Creighton
Burns of the Melbourne Age, wrote that when the Australians began to
withdraw: The military efforts of the Australians in Phuoc Tuy were worthy of
more credit than has been given. With a limited number of troops and without
sufficient support, the Task Force had struck staggering blows on many of the
enemys important units, cut their supply routes and occasionally caused them
heavy losses in life.
However, the Australian forces did not drive away completely the enemy
cadre from the villages, as that was the responsibility of the South Vietnamese
Regional Forces. Burns noted: Still, the Government insists Phuoc Tuy is a
symbolic example of resistance to infiltration.220 Its quite possible that after the
Australians have withdrawn completely, Phuoc Tuy will slowly come under Viet
Cong control. At that time, Australians should ask themselves why their soldiers
are being sent to the front line, had they changed anything, had they achieved
anything while participating in the War in Vietnam. And, with 400 Australian
troops killed and more than 2,000 wounded, did their presence make any
difference - or not ?221

218
Translators Note: The Official Australian History: Fighting to the Finish 2012, p.623 states territorial
forces ie encompassing the Regional Forces and the Popular Forces.
219
Translators Note: P.632.
220
Translators Note: P.632: maintaining the myth that Phuoc Tuy is a model of counter-insurgency
security.
221
Translators Note: Fighting to the Finish 2012, p.632 and p.1050 Endnote 121: Creighton Burns,
The war we didnt win, The Age, Melbourne, 15 November 1971.
 139

Annex B

SOME MEMORIES OF THE HISTORY

OF THE HEROIC 33rd INFANTRY REGIMENT

Every drop of water converges to form the sea

We are like a dop of water from the sky in the South
From a poor thatch-roofed hut we return to our homeland
Joining together to become the Liberation Forces
Beneath the umbrella of the wide and long jungles of the Annamite Chain
Here our troops were trained
The heat burnt our skin, bleaching our clothes and round hats
It rained in torrents, the mud held back our steps
The cold penetrated our bones, sharp pains to our very core
With shoulders numb, weary knees, and tired dazed eyes
We set our minds to overcoming all hardships
Our love for our country guides us young men in wartime
Young men of twice ten years, of eighteen years
While farmers we had not yet the physique of strong peasants
Students, we were not scholars
Manual workers, we were not yet skilled tradesmen
We became soldier combatants but our skills were yet to be honed
We had to train from the basics to the unattainable
From shuffling along to crawling, lifting enemy mines, crossing barbed wire
We had to be proficient with any weapon we had
Storming fortified posts, chance encounters, penetrating deeply
We dared to confront any and all enemies
Beat them to a pulp, and made them afraid
Even if they have a hundred thousand stratagems
Even if they are superpower imperialists
And even if they have masses of modern weapons
After our training, we deployed
Advancing straight in the direction of the South
Some of the route was completely unknown
Over streams, over rivers, over deep chasms and high mountains
Wall-like cliffs, tortuous and bristling rugged rocks
Long sandy moors held back our footsteps
Empty areas with bombs scattered everywhere
Cloud-wrapped mountain passes and slopes hurt our knees and chins
In one day we had all four seasons spring, winter, autumn, and spring
Mosquitos, animals, flies hunger, malaria
Carrying one another in the soaking rain and poisonous atmosphere
 140

Nylon covers were not enough to prevent our trembling

We suffered hardships and achieved a lofty aim in both the past and now
Yes, that was the way of a life at war
On the edges of the borders Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, we went there
To the Central Highlands B3 battlefield
Our whole formation swiftly deployed
We reinforced those places that needed increased strength
Some went to the flanks, some thrust deeply, others frontally
Some served on the Headquarters
Our Regiment still continued forward
Joining our main-force 33rd Regiment
A regiment synonymous with battle exploits
The Regiment came into being on 25 April 1965
Comprising battalions from three divisions
The 320th, 341st, and the 308th Divisions
We took the name of Regiment one zero one B (101B)
We left on our journey from Qung Bnh
Our first battle was at Pleime, lifting the Campaigns curtain
We wiped out the Ch Ho post, encircling the special forces
We wiped out an American battalion at the base of the Ch Png Mountain
Set fire many aircraft and tanks at Ia M ((Ia Meur)) and Ia rng
The Regiment returned to its genuine title
The Three Three Regiment (33)
We moved to the Ch Pa Valley
Clashed with the enemy at C Bi and ia M
We wiped out two battalions of the 4th Division222 and the American 1st Air
Cavalry Division
At Qung Nhiu, Cm Ga, Bun H
We wiped out two battalions of the 14th Regiment of the puppet 23rd Division
And also an American company at c Sc and at c Lung
At Bun M Thut we launch a general offensive
We fought and beat the puppet 23rd Division
Took the Ha Bnh airfield, the armoured area, the radio station, and the Mai Hc
depot.
We occupied Bun M Thut for seven days
We killed Americans, puppets, and Park Chung-Hees ((South Korean)) forces

222 Translators Note: The US 4th Infantry Division first deployed to Pleiku on 25 September 1966 and was
not engaged in the Pleime and Ia rng battles in late 1965. Later, the US 4th Division engaged in fierce
combat with NVA regular troops in the mountains around Kontum Town and Dak To in October 1967
including the 33rd Regiment. Several of the 33rd Regiment history monographs claim that the Regiment
engaged three US divisions in the Pleime and Ia rng battles: the US 1st Air Cavalry Division, the US
25th Division, and the US 4th Division. However, neither the US 25th nor the US 4th Division were
engaged in the Pleime and Ia rng battles. Several Vietnamese communist accounts also contend
incorrectly, that a South Korean regiment was involved in the ((Pleime-Ia rng)) Campaign.
 141

Killing hundreds, capturing hundreds including an American major

Our force reinforced the attack right at that time
After that we were redeployed and fought the battle at Chu Kne
We wiped out the 2nd Battalion of the puppet 45th Regiment
Seizing many prisoners and many weapons
Following that, we struck B p, c Lp, and Bun Ma Chi
c C, Bun Kla, Bun Gia, R, and Ch Kram.
We were sad, happy, victorious, and miserable
Sometimes we were short of troops, at other times we had enough
After every battle, we returned to our base
Where we supplemented and re-organised our forces
From the Central Highlands, we moved deeper into the South
We confronted the enemy across the expanse of the resounding Eastern Region
For secrecy and surprise, the Regiment changed its title to A57
We were part of the 5th Division, and also changed our battalion titles from 1, 2,
and 3 to 7, 8, and 9.
Our battles began in Ty Ninh
We destroyed an American infantry battalion and a fire support base at Ch L
At ng Hng, we attacked and wiped out 12 enemy vehicles
And the 2nd Mechanised Battalion at Lng ((Village)) 2 Bn Ci
Where we captured three Americans and two tanks.
The more the enemy, the more enthusiastically we attacked
We wiped out a further battalion in the Bn Sn area
At Bu n and Sac Lo, we had great victories
These enthused the troops
We advanced deeper
Attacking the General Logistics Base at Long Bnh, the airfield, and the chemical
warehouses
The enemy counter-attacked in a frenzy
We attacked Cm ng, Sui Kt, and i Du
And wiped out a Thai battalion at Bu Ci
We attacked at Bnh Ba and Kim Long in B Ra destroying 24 armoured vehicles
We encircled and attacked the Tn Lp Sub-Sector, Sui Ngh, Ni t, and
Route 2
The enemy was forced to huddle together in their defences for a long time
While our victories were great, our sacrifices were not small.
For six months in a row, we were short of ammunition, provisions, and men
We had less than 200 troops
However we still held our ground firmly
The people looked after us, and we were self-supporting
We encircled the enemy, encroached on their territory, attacked and destroyed
them and conducted joint operations
To consolidate the Regiment, we raised an additional two companies
 142

One company was employed in self-sufficiency and portering tasks

The other company was a Sapper Company
We increased our training of commanders and medics
Our 9th Battalion remained with Military Region 7 and joined in encircling and
encroaching operations, and attacks
Together with our local forces
We stayed close to the enemy, close to the people, and firmly held our areas
The whole Regiment moved to Military Region 6
We wiped out the Tanh Linh Sub-Sector
And we wiped out the Hoi c Sub-Sector
We forced six puppet battalions and the American 199th Brigade
To land from the sea to save the puppets
We defeated many enemy counter-attacks
On Route 3 at Tr Tn near V c
We killed an American general a brigade commander
We attacked and blocked the Americans at Quan H, Sng i, and the Hm Tn
Sub-Sector
Then defeated two battalions of the South Korean Green Dragon223 force
In the Hm Thun region
The enemy were collapsing, we continued to fight
We struck the Americans on Route 3, and at Ba Thi, ng nh Mountain, and in
Bnh Tuy
Wiping out and wearing down much of the Americans war-making potential
For more than six months we confronted the enemy in the Nguyn Hu Campaign
We inflicted heavy casualties on the 48th and 52nd Regiments of the puppet 18th
Division
And Ranger and Regional Force Groups
We hobbled the American 199th Brigade and their 1st Air Mobile Division
We were ready to strike for a great victory
And liberated a 10 kilometre length of Route 2 from B Ra to Xun Lc
And also Routes 1, 2 and 15 and Route 23 to Xuyn Mc
And the posts at Ba T, Trng Bom, c Thnh, and V c
The Lc Ninh Sub-Sector, Tanh Linh, Sui Cao, the ng n T-Junction
On Route 2 and Route 1
The enemys Bases 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5
Striking into Si Gn, we opened the Campaign
So that our 7th Battalion blocked the Trng Tin T-Junction
We prevented the enemy moving down from Central Vietnam to Hm Tn and La
Di
We continued with large and heavy attacks

223
Translators Note: This is probably a reference to the Republic of Koreas Blue Dragon Brigade (2nd
Marine Brigade) ie Cheongryeong (Blue Dragon, /) Brigade. see footnote 171.
 143

The enemy disintegrated and ran away

We blocked the Route 1 axis
From the Trng Tin T-Junction to the West , to the East, and to Xun Lc
And the Hm Tn T-Junction
A length of 30 kilometres
We did not let the enemy huddle in Si Gn
We continued to block Routes 1 and 2 to the West and South of the Du [sic]
Dy T-Junction at Xun Lc
In the H Ch Minh Campaign, the Regiment attacked and seized the Sui Mac
Bridge
And the Long Lc Railway Station
The Regiment moved into Si Gn from the North-West Railway Station
We seized the puppet III Corps Headquarters and the Bin Ha airfield
The City of Bin Ha was liberated.
At 10.30 a.m. on 30 April, we were completely victorious
The Regiment then turned to its task of assisting the people
To bandage the wounds of war
Across all of Military Regions 6 and 7
Not only did we fight skillfully
But we also did military, enemy, and civilian proselytising
We completed every given task outstandingly
Our land no longer has enemies and foreign aggressors
The Regiment opened roads, built bridges, and culverts
While in the 476th Division on the Vietnam-Cambodia border
We did both national defence and economic tasks in Sng B and Ty Ninh
Next we joined the 303rd Infantry Division of the 9th Corps
Throughout our service during the war
Sometimes we were detached, sometimes incorporated
At times, we had a title and a settled and determined base
No matter whether at war or in peace
We still never forget and 33rd Regiments name that is replete with a solid pride
Whenever there were enemy, the Regiments soldiers fought them
When ordered, we went
We went to Cambodia to do our duty
In place names that everyone still remembers
Kratie, Kampong Cham, and Kampong Thom
We next returned to Vietnam
And were deployed to the North
On returning, the Regiment joined the 1st Corps of Military Region 3
Our Regiment had to divide into small elements
And the title of the 33rd went into history
There was only a period to remember
But it will be invoked eternally ever-after and never forgotten
 144

Almost four thousand gave up their lives

There are thousands of wounded war invalids and those affected by poisons
We feel deep grief for those who lie scattered about
Its not easy for us to speak of them
Battle feats mix with other battle feats
Are there any history books that record all those individual and joint feats ?

Translators Note: 33rd Regiment troops crossing the Sng Ray River
in northern Phc Tuy Province.
 145

Annex C

A LIST OF PAST HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL

OF THE 33rd REGIMENT

REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS
V Sc (4/65 12/66)
T nh Khn (12/66 1967)
Ma Vn Minh (1967 8/1968)
Cao H (9/1968 4/1969)
Nguyn Vn Thng (1/1970 12/1973)
Nguyn Huy Thn (1/1974 12/1976)
Chu Kim Thch (1/1977 3/1978)
V Vit Cam (4/1978 1979)
Bi Ngc B (1980 1986)
Trnh Vnh Long (1986 1987)

POLITICAL COMMISSARS
Nguyn Trng M (4/1965 8/1965)
H Trng Ba (1965 1966)
Comrade Hn (1966 1967)
Phan Vn Lim (1967 1968)
inh Vn t (1968 4/1974)
Trn Thi Thc Deputy Commissar (4/1975)
V Phat acting Political Commissar (1975 1977)
Trn Vn Lun (7/1978 1983)
Trn Ngc Thng (1983 1984)
inh Duy Chnh (1985 1989)

DEPUTY COMMANDERS
Ng Vn Co (1965 1967)
Cao H (1969 1971)
Quach Thai Sn (1971 5/1972)
L Ba Lc (6/1972 6/1974)
Triu Kim Sn (1972 1976)
V Ngc Thch (1977 11/1979)
Bi Ngc B (1978 1979)
Trnh Vnh Long (1980 1985)
Trn Ngc Hng (1986 1989)
 146

CHIEFS-OF-STAFF
Nguyn c Khi (1965 1966)
Comrade Hi (12/1966 8/1967)
Vng Lu (1968)
Nguyn Huy Thn (1969 1970)
L Ba Lc (1970 6/1973)
Vin nh o (1974 7/1978)
H c Nhau (1977 1979)
L Dng Khan (1980 1981)
Bi Ngc B (1981 1984)
Trnh Vnh Long (1985 1986)
nh Nho (1986 1989)

Translators Note: Hong Cao H, Commander of the 33rd Regiment 1969-1971

- including at the Battle of Bnh Ba in June 1969 (a photograph taken in 2009).
 147

Annex D

PORTRAIT PHOTOGRAPHS OF A NUMBER OF

33rd REGIMENT COMMANDERS

Comrades: inh Vn t; V Phat; Nguyn Vn Thng; Nguyn Huy Thn;

Vng Lu; L Ba Lc; Triu Kim Sn; Trn Vn Lun; Trn Thi Thc; Vin
nh o; nh Nho; (sic) Duy Chnh ((Translators Note: probably inh
Duy Chnh)).

Although we the editors, have made efforts to search for documents, these
photographic portraits of the Regiments leaders are incomplete. We trust that
readers will understand and give forebearance.

((Translators Note: The photographs have not been included in the publication.))

*
 148

Translators Note: 33rd Regiment troops with an National Liberation Front (NLF) flag
(a damaged photograph).
 149

Annex E

A NUMBER OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF
THE REGIMENTS PAST ACTIVITIES
((Translators Note: The photographs have not been included in this publication.))

1. Deploying to c Lc (1966).
2. The Regiment Headquarters Base (1972).
3. The Regiments Reconnaissance Soldiers At Their Tasks.
4. The Regiment Crossing the La Ng River in the Winter-Spring Campaign
(1971 1972).
5. Deploying to the Battlefield.
6. Australian Casualties in the Battle of Bnh Ba (6 -1969).224
7. Developing a Plan for a Combined Operation (1972).
8. Firepower Elements Crossing the Sng Ray River (1972).
9. Participating in the Winter-Spring Campaign and Wiping Out the Enemys
Base on Route 2 (1972).
10. The 1st Battalion Prior to Going into Battle (1972).
11. Model Soldiers at the COSVN Base: Comrade Trn Vn Lun is Seated
Beside Mdme Nguyn Th nh (second from the left).
12. The Regiments Reconnaissance Unit Before Going into Battle.
13. The Regiments Party Committee Considering a Combat Plan to Attack the
Sui Ngh Sub-Sector (1971).
14. Comrade Nguyn Trng Minh of the Technical Reconnaissance Element in
Combat Operations with the 33rd Regiment.
15. The B Ra-Long Khnh Cultural Group During a Visit to the Regiment
(1972).
16. Taking Over Bin Ha City (1975).
17. The Regiment Receiving the Insignia of Hero of the Peoples Armed Forces
(January 1976).

224
Translators Note: The photograph shows Vietnamese communist casualties not Australian casualties.
The photograph is from the Australian War Memorial collection (AWM Neg. No. BEL/69/0388/VN) and
included in the Australian Official History: Fighting to the Finish, 2012, at p.225 titled: From the turret of
a Centurion tank, crew members reflect as the bodies of Vietnamese killed in the battle are collected in the
square in front of the Binh Ba school house. That 2012 Australian Official History at p.225 also states: A
total of 99 enemy were eventually reported killed in Operation Hammer. This photograph is also displayed
in the 33rd Regiments Memorial and Museum Complex in Bnh Ba village and captioned: Casualties after
the Battle on 6/6/1969 at Bnh Ba. The photograph taken on 7 June 1969, was also included in Wartime
magazine identifiying the two Australian crewmen sitting in the turret of Centurion tank 24 Charlie as
Trooper Ken Wilson and Trooper Laurie Sullivan. Ekins, A., To Save a Village, pp.10-21 in Wartime,
Issue 75 Winter 2016, Australian War Memorial, Canberra (a copy of the article - with passages
translated into Vietnamese, was passed to the 33rd Regiment Veterans Liaison Committee in August 2016
by the translator).
 150

18. The 8th Battalion Having Received the Insignia of Hero of the Peoples Armed
Forces (1976).
19. The Deep Affection Between the Troops and the People in the Land of
Temples ((Cambodia)).
20. Comrade Phm Quang Khai the Deputy Permanent Secretary of B Ra-
Long Khnh Province Presenting Certificates Establishing the Bnh Ba
Memorial and Historical Site (27 July 2012).
21. Comrade Nguyn Vn Thng - a Former Regimental Commander,
Exchanging Souvenirs with Comrade Trn Vn Khanh the Secretary of the
B Ra-Long Khnh Province Committee.
22. The Communal Hall of the Veterans Liaison Committee of the 33rd
Regiment at Bnh Ba, Chu c District, B Ra-Vng Tu Province.
23. Editorial Conference for the 33rd Regiment History (October 2013).
24. Working Group for the 33rd Regiment History (July 2015).
25. Working Group for the 33rd Regiment History at Vinh City, Ngh An Province
(December 2015).
26. Final Examining Conference for the 33rd Heroic Infantry Regiment History
(March 2016).

Translators Note: A meeting of the Party Committee ((of the 33rd Regiment)) approves
the plan for the attack on Sui Ngh Sub-Sector. For detail including personalities
present, see Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment , op.cit., 2014, p.106 and f.489.
 151

Translators Annex F

33rd Regiment Casualties

- including at the Battle of Bnh Ba (June 1969)
(Translators analysis)

The Regiments Combat Actions - Summarised

As noted, in late 2010, a 33rd Regiment veteran related that the Regiment had:
participated in 1,210 battles225 both large and small, brought down one Sector, five
Sub-Sectors, three Special Sectors226 ((yu khu)), six Sub-Sub-Sectors227, 235 posts
large and small, destroyed two convoys of vessels, 103 mortars and artillery pieces, and
had set fire to 133 aircraft and 1,345 military vehicles including 601 tanks and
armoured vehicles, had wiped out 32 battalions (including one American battalion and
one Thai battalion228), 50 companies (including 21 American companies, two Australian
companies, two Thai companies), seized 2,454 weapons of various types, 32 radios, 20
military vehicles and a large amount of other military equipment, and had wiped out
30,047 enemy and captured 787. These figures are included verbatim in the 2016 33rd

225
Translators Note: Interview with the venerable monk i c Thch Tm Vng in Trc Ninh District,
Nam nh Province - Hng Quc Vn Gp g mt chin s ca Trung on 33 Anh hng Meeting a
combatant of the heroic 33rd Regiment, Bao cu chin binh online (War Veterans On-line Magazine), 17
December 2010. As noted, more detailed claims of the Regiments successes and enemy casualties are
listed in Cu Chin Binh Trung on 33, Tm Tt Truyn Thng Trung on 33: n V Anh Hng Lc
Lng V Trang Nhn Dn (A Summary of the Heritage of the 33 rd Regiment: A Heroic Unit of the
Peoples Armed Forces), H Ni, July 2010 see Appendix 1 in Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment ,
op.cit., 2014.
226
Translators Note: As noted, Special Sectors (yu khu) were established by the government of the
Republic of Vietnam for several key areas including: Ph M, Cm M, Trng Bom, Tc Trng, Gia Ray,
Tn Sn Nht etc.
227
Translators Note: The system of village-level Sub-Sub-Sectors (phn chi khu) was implemented across
the Si Gn Governments Military Region 3 in early 1973 and a conference was held at Vn Kip (B
Ra) to launch the programme. The Sub-Sub-Sectors were established at village level and commanded by a
junior ARVN officer as the assistant village chief for security. That officer was responsible for the PF,
PSDF and the National Police see Ng Quang Trng Lieutenant General, Territorial Forces, Indochina
Monographs, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington D.C., 1981, p.19. By late 1974, the ARVN
staff had been increased to two officers and four NCOs; and 2,200 Sub-Sub-sectors had reportedly been
established. US Defence Attache, RVNAF Quarterly Assessment 1st Qtr FY 75, Saigon, 1 November
1974.
228
Translators Note: This 33rd Regiment History claims to have wiped out a Thai battalion at Bu Ci in
late February 1969. A Liberation Radio broadcast on 7 March 1969 lauded: on 28 February dealing a
deadly blow at the Thai mercenary troops at Bu Ci completely annihilating a reinforcement [sic]
battalion, killing or injuring more than 900. However, the detailed US MACV Monthly Report for
February 1969 (VCAT Item No. 7390112001) makes no mention of any such engagement involving either
the 33rd NVA Regiment or Thai forces see footnotes 59 and 60. Note that in the story of Nguyn Vn O
(Annex A), the date of the Bu Ci engagement is 3 March 1969.
 152

Regiment History in its main text (see footnote 174); and in the Achievements
Awarded annex, Annex A.
At a Regimental reunion near H Ni on 21 July 2013, the Regiments
achievements were similarly recounted as having fought in 1,210 battles (both large and
small); killed 30,047 enemy; captured 787 Americans [sic]; destroyed 32 battalions and
50 companies; wiped out 235 posts; captured 2,454 weapons; destroyed 1,345 military
vehicles; and liberated 475,000 people.229

33rd Regiment Casualties Documentation

In 2010, a 33rd Regiment history monograph related that 3,050 members of the
Regiment had been killed/martyred 230, comprising:
- 718 comrades on the Central Highlands battlefields in the period 1965-1968;

- 2,008 comrades in Eastern Nam B in the years 1969-1975; and

- 327 comrades on the South-Western Border in the period 1976-1979.231

A July 2012 media report cited 3,056.232

229
Translators Note: T Tng Mnh, Gp mt CCB Trung on 33 , 21 July 2013, published 6
October 2013.
230
Translators Note: The Vietnamese term lit si is translated as martyr, and their deaths ie hy
sinh, is translated in dictionaries as to be sacrificed. Following the First Indochina War against the
French, Vietnamese regulations defined martyrs as only those killed in direct combat with the enemy.
Subsequently, qualifications were broadened considerably to include those who were killed in indirect
actions eg by enemy artillery and air power, and those who died from wounds, injury, illness, or in prison.
Regulations were recently re-promulgated by the Vietnamese Government in its Decision No.31/2013/N-
CP Defining Details for Guidance on Implementing a Number of Articles Regarding the Law on
Privileges for Those Who Served the Revolution, H Ni, 9 April 2013 (see particularly Article 17). In
some 33rd Regiment Martyrs Lists, the deceased is noted as having died in hospital or, for example, died as
a result of malignant/pernicious malaria (b st rt c tnh).
231
Translators Note: Ban Lin Lc Truyn Thng Trung on 33 (A57) - (The Heritage Liaison
Committee of the 33rd Regiment (A57) ), Qua Trnh , op.cit., 2010, p.11 see Appendix 2 in
Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment , op.cit., 2014. Also: The Regiment had 3,050 martyrs - including
2,008 who bravely fell on the Eastern Nam B battlefield. In particular, in the fighting to liberate Bnh Ba
in the 1969 Spring Campaign, close to 50 cadre and fighters bravely died." - Thanh Tng, "L cu siu v
dng hng tng nh cac anh hng lit s Trung on 33 (A Buddhist Mass and Ceremony to
Remember the Heroic Martyrs of the 33rd Regiment"), B Ra-Vng Tu Television, late August 2009.
232
Translators Note: Quang Vit, 250 on vin, thiu nin huyn Chu c rc nn tri n cac anh hng
lit s ti Nh tng nim trung on 33, B Ra-Vng Tu Television website, 29 July 2012. Stating: ni
53 chin s cua trung on 33 hy sinh trong trn anh ngy 6 thang 6 nm 1969 v xung quanh nh bia, ni
ghi danh 3.056 lit s cua trung on 33 hy sinh trn chin trng min Nam. (where the 53 soldiers
of the 33rd Regiment died in the battle on 6 June 1969 and around the memorial where the names of 3,056
33rd Regiment martyrs who died on the southern battlefields are recorded.). The remains that were buried
in a mass grave by Australian forces in Bnh Ba village immediately after the battle were disinterred and
reburied in the Province martyrs cemetery in 1986. Each year on 24 April (Lunar Calendar) a
remembrance ceremony is held at the Memorial in Bnh c hamlet of Bnh Ba village - L Lch Di Tch
 153

A H Ni-based website relates that a total of 2,181 personnel of the 33rd

Regiment died in the Anti-American Resistance War.233

Most recently, this 2016 33rd Regiment History relates: Almost 4,000 cadre and
soldiers of the Regiment are lying on the battlefields of the South and more than 500 of
our comrades fell in Cambodia during the period of our international duty. Almost 1,000
comrades still carry on them the wounds and the after-effects of the war. The number of
formally-classified invalid veterans (thng binh) of the Regiment is not known.
There are two comprehensive and thick Martyrs List documents for the 33rd
Regiment: a Southern Version sponsored by the Military Region 7 Headquarters and
the B Ra-Vng Tu Chapter of the 33rd Regiment Veterans Association; and a
Northern Version on the Internet sponsored by H Ni-based Nguyn S H. There are
also three far shorter subsequent sub-lists:
- List of 33rd Regiment Martyrs killed/missing in Chu c District of Phc Tuy
Province 234;
- List of 33rd Regiment Martyrs Sacrificed on the B3 Front; and
- List of E33 (A57) Martyrs Sacrificed in the South-West Border (1978-1979)/List
of Martyrs of a Number of Provinces Who Served in the 33rd Regiment (303rd
Division).

Additionally, the names of the Regiments deceased and missing are inscribed on
the nine stelae in the Regiments Memorial Complex in Bnh c hamlet of Bnh Ba
village.

Casualties at the Battle of Bnh Ba June 1969

Pages 73-74 of the 33rd Regiments 2016 History relate:

With these indications that the enemy could wipe us out on the battlefield, we
took the initiative to withdraw. The 2nd Company of the 7th Battalion in the hamlet
reported to the Regiment that the 2nd Company had suffered casualties and surrounded
by the enemy, requested that a force break through to them. The Regiment radioed the 7th
Battalion many times, but their actions were too late and lacked resolve. Consequently, 50
soldiers of the 7th Battalion were killed, including Comrade Nguyn Vn By the
Battalion second-in-command, and Comrade Bi Quang Min the deputy political
officer of the Battalion. Subsequently, the enemy used a bull-dozer to dig a deep pit in
which they buried the bodies of 53 of those killed in a mass grave (three of the dead
comrades were from the armed propaganda group). Nguyn Vn B, Lm Vn Bch, and
Hong Vn Thnh (Thai). Comrade Nguyn Th Xun (T Thin) the secretary of the

Khu Tng Nim Trung on 33 (33rd Regiment - Background Memorial History), op.cit., 2011 see
Appendix 3
233
Translators Note: Nguyn S H - see Appendix 9 and the posting dated 9 October 2013 at:
http://teacherho.vnweblogs.com/mobile.php?op=ViewArticle&blogId=9313&articleId=435083
234
Translators Note: Danh Sch Lit S E33 (A57) Hy Sinh ti Huyn Chu c Tnh B Ra-Vng
Tu. This eight-page list of 263 names was compiled by Nguyn Tun Khanh on 16 October 2008.
 154

Party Chapter of the guerilla unit235 headquarters, was also wounded in the face and taken
to the Province hospital for treatment.236* These were great losses for the Regiment, and a
battle from which we gained experience and many lessons. The list of the 50 martyrs is
(see footnote 86* in the main text):

1. Nguyn Vn Bn, born in Vnh Ph; 2. Nguyn Vn By, born in Ph Th; 3. L ng

Bit, born in Thanh Ha; 4. V nh Cht, born in Thanh Ha; 5. V Cng Chin, born
in Hi Phng; 6. Trn Vn Chin, born in Thai Bnh; 7. Nguyn Vn C, born in H Ty;
8. B Xun Cc, born in Hng Yn, 9. Hong Vn Dm, born in Ha Bnh; 10. Hong
Vn Dn, born in Ha Bnh; 11. Phm Minh o, born in Vnh Ph; 12. Nguyn Vn
ng, born in Bc Giang; 13. Phng Vn n, born in H Ty; 14. Hong Bi ng,
born in Thanh Ha; 15. Bi Vn , born in Hi Dng; 16. Nguyn Vn ng, born in
Bc Giang; 17. Nguyn Hu Gia, born in Thanh Ha; 18. Ng Vn H, born in Hi
Dng; 19. Nguyn Vn H, born in Hi Hng; 20. Lc Vn Ht, born in Thanh Ha; 21.
Nguyn Vn Hu, born in Thanh Ha; 22. Phm Vn Khn, born in Hi Phng; 23. o
Bch Kim, born in H Ty; 24. Dng Vn Khoat, born in H Ty; 25. Hong nh
Khng, born in Thanh Ha; 26. V Vn Kch, born in Nam nh; 27. T Xun Lng,
born in Ph Th; 28. Nguyn Vn Liu, born in Nam nh; 29. Trn Ngc Mnh, born in
Thanh Ha; 30. Bi Quang Min, born in Hng Yn; 31. Phan Trng Ngha, born in H
Tuyn; 32. Trng Vn Nhung, born in H Ty; 33. Phi Vn Ph, born in Thai Bnh ; 34.
Hong Vn Phc, born in Tuyn Quang; 35. Nguyn Trng Quyt, born in H Ni; 36.
Nguyn Xun Sang, born in H Tnh; 37. inh Xun Soan, born in Qung Bnh; 38. Trn
Vn Ti, born in Nam nh; 39. Trn Vn Tp, born in Bc Giang; 40. on Mnh Thi,
born in Ngh An; 41. L Vn Thc, born in H Nam; 42. L Vn Tiu, born in Thanh
Ha; 43. Nguyn Thng Tri, born in Vnh Ph; 44. T Vn Trn, born in H Ty ; 45. L
Vn Tr, born in H Nam; 46. Nguyn Vit Trung, born in Tuyn Quang; 47. Bi c
Tng, born in Tuyn Quang. 48. Hong Kim Tuy, born in Hi Dng; 49. Hong Vn
Vng, born in Lng Sn; 50. Nguyn nh Xinh, born in Ph Th.

33rd Regiment Casualties: Battle of Bnh Ba Places of Birth

The birthplaces of the 50 casualties listed above, were in the following

provinces of North Vietnam:
Vnh Ph 4, Ph Th 3, L 4, Thanh Ha 8, Hi Phng 2, Thai Bnh 2, H Ty 6, Hng
Yn 2, Ha Bnh 2, Bc Giang 3, Hi Dng 3, Hi Hng 1, Nam nh 3, H Tuyn 1,
Tuyn Quang 3, H Ni 1, H Tnh 1, Qung Bnh 1, Ngh An 1, H Nam 2, Lng Sn 1.
Casualty surnames: 14 Nguyn, 3 V, 4 Trn, 7 Hong, 2 Phm, 1 Ng; middle
name: Vn 27.
235
Translators Note: According to the 2014 Chu c History: a number of Bnh Ba village guerillas
were killed and captured such as Nguyn Vn B, Lm Vn Bch, Hong Vn Thnh and Nguyn Th
Xun (T Thin) was wounded. - H Song Qunh (ed et al), The History of the Chu c District
Peoples Armed Forces (1945 2014), National Political Publishing House The Truth, H Ni, 2014,
p.143.
236
* According to The History of the Revolutionary Struggle of the Party, the Military, and the People of
Bnh Ba Village (2010).
 155

Casualties at the Battle of Binh Ba: Australian Accounts

The Australian 5RAR After-Action Report for the Battle of Bnh Ba 237 claimed
43 enemy were killed (1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment). 1 ATF contemporary reporting
identified the 1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment together with the Regiments heavy
machine gun and recoilless rifle elements and listed 71 enemy killed, six wounded and
12 POWs.238 Subsequently a few years after the Battle, 1 ATF reported enemy
casualties at Bnh Ba as 51 NVA KIA (BC), 11 POWs.239 According to a 5RAR
Regimental History, the enemy casualty figure was later amended to 126 killed after
Popular Forces troops reportedly found many more bodies beneath the rubble of
destroyed houses in the village.240 The official Australian military history records: A
total of 99 enemy were eventually reported killed in Operation Hammer. Most were North
Vietnamese soldiers of the 33 NVA Regiment; a further six were wounded but escaped
(as indicated by blood trails), eight were captured, one surrendered as a Hoi Chanh, and
28 male suspects were detained. Fifty six of the enemy killed were credited to territorial
troops ((Regional Forces and Popular Forces)), who had lost four killed and seven
wounded. That official Australian military history also notes: 6 wounded/escaped, PW
8, rallier 1, detainees 28.241 A 2008 history of the Royal Australian Regiment cites at

237
Translators Note: Khan, C. N. Lieutenant Colonel, 5RAR Combat After Action Report 6/69, op.cit., 11
June 1969, p.3. 43 KIA (BC), 6 WIA (blood trails), 8 PW, 1 Hoi Chanh. Weapons recovered were: 1 x
75mm RCL, 1 x RPD machine gun, 6 x AK-47, 3 x SKS, 1 x Garand rifle, 1 x Mosin Nagant rifle, 3 x K-54
pistols, 2 x RPG-7, 1 x RPG-2, 1 x 60mm mortar tube, 1 x 82mm mortar base plate and tripod.
COMUSMACV also subsequently reported 43 KIA in the Battle COMUSMACV, Quarterly Evaluation
Report (Second Quarter 1969: 1 April 1969 30 June 1969), MACJ3-051, Saigon, 20 August 1969.
238
Translators Note: 1 ATF, Vietnam Digest, Issue No. 22-69 (period 1st to 6th June 1969), Ni t. Not all
12 prisoners were necessarily processed by 1ATF. As noted in the footnote above, the report by the
commander of 5RAR Lieutenant Colonel C.N. Khan, stated: 8 PW, 1 Hoi Chanh. Subsequent official
Australian records indicated that only the following POWs were captured at Bnh Ba by Australian forces
on 7 June 1969: Nguyn Vn Dy, Pte - C2/1/A/ 57B [sic - more probably 3/2/1/A57) , NVA; Bi Vn Lai
(sometimes incorrectly as Bi Vn Lan) see also the following footnote , C2/B2/A1/D1/33 Regiment -
wounded; Trn Vn Thanh - a platoon leader, K1 Battalion/33 Regiment (hospitalised died of wounds on
26 June 1969); Trn Voi, Pte - C25 Transport Coy, NVA; Lam Vn Bach, Bnh Ba Guerrilla Unit; and
Hong Vn Thanh, Bnh Ba Guerrilla Unit. AWM98, 493 HQ AFV (Barcode 904597). In mid-2013,
Nguyn Vn Dy was living in Phc Th District, H Ni; but Bi Vn Lai and Trn Voi had deceased in
about 2011 advice to author from 33rd Regiment veterans (28 May 2013).
239
Translators Note: 1 ATF, INTSUM 268/71, Ni t, 25 September 1971. A Bi Vn Lai - b.1937 in
H Sn Bnh Province is also listed in the 33rd Regiments Martyrs List as KIA at Bnh Ba on 6 June 1969
(see Appendix 9).
240
Translators Note: Battle, M.R. & Wilkins, D.S. (eds), The Year of the Tigers, op.cit., 2009, p.346,
p.350.
241
Translators Note: Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, 2012, p.225 and p.736. Australian
POW records show six POW captured by Australian forces at Bnh Ba: four members of the 33rd Regiment
(including a platoon commander of K1 Battalion) and two members of the Bnh Ba Guerrilla Unit see
footnote 238 - above. In summary, NVA/VC histories, captured documents, and rallier reports indicate the
following casualties: 33rd Regiment: 53 killed; D440 Battalion: possibly 1 killed, or about 60 casualties
(rallier L Vn Nhanh), or two WIA Annex A to de Cure, P.F. Major, D440 LF Battalion, HQ 1ATF
 156

least 91 enemy soldiers killed.242 In 2009, at the 40th Anniversary of the Battle, an
Australian commemorative booklet assessed: it seems that more than 100 VC and
NVA, possibly many more, lost their lives in the battle.243

A US Report

In August 1969, the US Headquarters II Field Force Vietnam reported that: One
company of the 5th RAR plus Regional Forces and Popular Forces cordoned the village,
while another company, supported by tanks and armored personnel carriers, assaulted the
enemy in the village. Results of the operation were 43 enemy killed, 8 prisoners and 8
small arms, 3 rocket launchers and 1 mortar captured.244

Casualties Personal Details

For a detailed listing of the casualties and POWs (33rd Regiment, D440 Battalion,
C-195 Company, Chu c District Committee, Bnh Ba Guerilla Unit, B Long Military
Proselytising Section) including names and personal details, see: Chamberlain, E.P.,
The 33rd Regiment , op.cit., 2014, pp.74-77 and Appendix 9 (14 pages). 33rd Regiment
personnel assessed as killed at the Battle of Bnh Ba are approximately 60245. Three
crew-served weapons were captured including two 75mm RCLs (one from D440
Battalion), and 17 small arms.
Australian casualties at the Battle comprised: one killed (Private Wayne Teeling.
5RAR) and 10 wounded.

Ni t, 29 September 1969 ; C195 Company: 12 killed and 11 wounded ; Chu c District Committee: 1
killed; Bnh Ba Guerrilla Unit and Village Committee: about 7 killed; B Long Province cadre: one killed.
241
Translators Note: 40th Anniversary , op.cit., 2009, p.17.
242
Translators Note: Haines, R. and Breen, B, Chapter 10 Main Force Operations Vietnam 1968-69 -
in Horner, D. & Bou, J., Duty First: A history of the Royal Australian Regiment, Allen & Unwin, Second
Edition, 2008, p.218.
243
Translators Note: 40th Anniversary , op.cit., 2009, p.17.
244
Translators Note: II Field Force Vietnam, Operational Report Lessons Learned, Period ending 31 July
1969, 17 December 1969. For the Australian force, results were: 43 enemy KIA, eight prisoners, six AK-
47s, three rocket launchers, two K-54 pistols, one 82mm mortar base plate and bipod see:
COMUSMACV, Quarterly Evaluation Report (Second Quarter 1969: 1 April 1969 30 June 1969),
MACJ3-051, Saigon, 20 August 1969, Annex E, p.63.
245
Translators Note:That list at Appendix 9 includes several cadre and soldiers not included in the 33 rd
Regiments 2016 list of 50 above but included on the Northern List of martyrs eg: Nguyn Vn Bnh,
CT D7 , b.1935, d. 6 June 1969 at Bnh Ba; Bi Vn Lai, AP C2, d. 6 June 1969 at Bnh Ba (or possibly
captured); Bi Vn Ln AP D8*, d. 8 June 1969 at Bnh Ba (noted as d. 6 August 1969 on the Chu c
District List); Hong Kim Cng, AT D7, d. Bnh Ba, 6 June 1969; Nguyn Duy Tc AT C19, d. Bnh Ba
on 6 June 1969 (also on the Southern Version, but as d.6 July1969 on the Chu c List*); Trn Quang
nh, CS C19, d. 7 June 1969 at Bnh Ba (or 6 July 1969 on the Chu c List - Southern Version notes d.
7 June 1969 at Bnh Ba; Nguyn Quc Hng, BT E33, d. June 1969 (no date) at Bnh Ba; V nh Tht,
AT C18, d. 6 June 1969 at Bnh Ba; V Cng Chin (b.1935 Hi Phng, Platoon 2ic), d. 6 June 1969; 2
V Ngc Anh, AT D7, d. 6 June 1969 at Bnh Ba; Nguyn Hu C, AP D7, d. 6 June 1969 at Bnh Ba;
Nguyn Hu C, AP D7, d. 6 June 1969 at Bnh Ba; and Dng Vn Vng, AT C19, d. 7 June 1969 at
Bnh Ba.
 157

Operation Lavarack (6RAR) June 1969.

During this Operation in northern Phc Tuy, 6RAR engaged elements of the
274 VC Main Force Regiment, the D440 VC Battalion, and the 33rd NVA Regiment.
th

Casualties claimed were: 5 June (six killed D440/274th/33rd Regiment), 11 June

(probably nine killed 33rd Regiment), and 12 June (three killed 33rd Regiment).246

Casualties at the Battle of Ni Le/Ni Sao September 1971

On 20-21 September 1971, the Australian 4RAR/NZ Battalion (Operation

Ivanhoe) engaged the 3rd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment in a bunker complex north-east
of c Thnh in the Ni Le/Ni Sao area (YS 513857).247 . Five Australians were killed
in action248 and 29 wounded; and according to a 1 ATF report, the 33rd Regiment
suffered 16 confirmed killed (four AK-47s, one RPG-2, and one Mauser rifle were
recovered by Australian forces.249 Subsequently, 1ATF reported that: During the period
of contact with 33 Regt 20-22 Sep 71, there were 20 confirmed enemy KIA and an
unknown number WIA.250 The 4RAR/NZ After Action Report cited 14 NVA KIA (BC)
and 9 NVA KBA for the duration of Operation Ivanhoe ie 12 September to 2 October
1971 - with 10 NVA personnel reportedly killed-in-action on 21 September 1971.251 The
Official Australian History records enemy casualties during Operation Ivanhoe (19

246
Translators Note: The Australian Army Official History ie Ekins, A. with McNeill, I, Fighting to the
Finish, Allen & Unwin/The Australian War Memorial, Crows Nest, 2012, pp.209-210, and pp.231-233.
247
Translators Note: See: 4RAR/NZ ANZAC Bn After Action Report, Operation Ivanhoe, 4 November
1971 AWM95, 7/4/52 and 53. Also: 1 ATF, SUPINTREP No.39/71, Period 20-26 September 1971, Ni
t, 27 September 1971. See also Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.613-
624; Davies, B. with McKay, G., Vietnam: The Complete Story of the Australian War, Allen & Unwin,
Crows Nest, 2012, pp.521-534; and McKay, G., The last battle ,Wartime Magazine, Issue 55, July 2011,
pp.15-19.
248
Translators Note: The five soldiers four of whom were national servicemen, were the last Australian
soldiers to die in combat in Vietnam. - Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012,
p.619.
249
Translators Note: A 1 ATF SUPINTREP reported In the area of the D Coy 4RAR/NZ (ANZAC)
during the day ((21 September)), 16 enemy were confirmed killled, of whom nine were killed by air.
No documents were able to be obtained from the enemy bodies, but there is no doubt that the enemy were
members of 3Bn of 33 NVA Regt. 1ATF, SUPINTREP No.39/71, Period 20-26 September 1971, Ni
t, 27 September 1971. Note however that the 4RAR/NZ Operations Log (Sheet 12, Serial 84 1130hrs
21 September 1971) reported documents evidencing C9/3/33 Regiment were recovered at YS 487832. As
noted, for a detailed analysis and discussion of the Battle of Ni Sao/Ni L, see Davies, B. with McKay,
G., Vietnam: The Complete Story , op.cit., 2012, pp.521-534. A 4RAR/NZ review of the engagement
assessed that 33rd Regiment elements encountered in the Ni Le/Ni Sao battle comprised: Regt HQ -
including some support companies, and 3 Bn. 4RAR/NZ Weekly Intelligence Review No.718/42 to 29
September 1971, para 23 including detail on the enemy bunker complexes at YS 4883, YS 4983, and YS
5185.
250
Translators Note: 1 ATF, Annex A to INTSUM No.313/71, Vng Tu, 10 November 1971.
251
Translators Note: 4RAR/NZ ANZAC Bn After Action Report, Operation Ivanhoe, 4 November 1971
AWM95, 7/4/52. None of the NVA KIA were identified by name.
 158

September 2 October 1971) as VC: KIA 15, wounded/escaped 15 and seven

weapons captured252
In a detailed review and analysis of the Battle of Ni Le/Ni Sao, author and
Vietnam veteran Bruce Davies cites Triu Kim Sn (commanding the 33rd Regiments 9th
Battalion): The battalion suffered seven killed, including a platoon commander. A
further 25 comrades were wounded. The bodies were taken to a stipulated hill and the
battalion withdrew safely and secretly .253
Only three personnel noted in the 33rd Regiments Martyrs Lists (3,000 names) as
having been killed-in-action during late September 1971 ie L c Hoa killed on 19
September 1971, L S Ch killed on 20 September 1971, and Ng Xun Kiu killed on
20 September 1971.254

Malaria

While the causes of death are not routinely included in the Martyrs Lists, a
number are noted as having died as a result of malignant/pernicious malaria (st rt c
tnh). The dangerous faliciparum strain was endemic in the Central Highlands255 and
later became increasingly prevalent in the Nam B Region. The diary of Nguyn Tun
Ty of C26/E33 a reinforcement element for the 33rd Regiment, notes the high

252
Translators Note: Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.619, p.762.
253
Translators Note: Davies, B. with McKay, G., Vietnam: The Complete Story , op.cit., 2012, p.534.
Bruce Davies had corresponded with 33rd Regiment veterans Triu Kim Sn and V Xun Thu in late 2011.
See also footnote 108 for reports of 33 rd Regiment senior cadre purportedly killed in the Battle.
254
Translators Note: These are probably the two unidentified KIA engaged by 4RAR/NZ at YS 511856
see 1 ATF Intelligence Log Serial 33822, 1330hrs 20 September 1971. Only L c Hoa is listed in
Danh Sch Lit S E33 (A57) Hy Sinh ti Huyn Chu c Tnh B Ra-Vng Tu (The List of the 33rd
Regiment (A57) Martyrs killed in Chau Duc District - Tnh B Ra-Vng Tu). This eight-page list of 263
names was compiled by Nguyn Tun Khanh on 16 October 2008. Ng Xun Kiu and L S Ch appear
to have been killed in Long Khanh Province. In discussions with 33rd Regiment veterans in Vietnam in
2011, Dr Bob Hall (UNSW/ADFA)queried why the Regiments listings did not include any casualties
suffered at the Battle of Ni Le and was told that their lists were incomplete about 1,000 had yet to
be included, and the Ni Le casualties would be among that number. Email advice from Dr Hall to
Translator (Chamberlain), 23 November 2011.
255
Translators Note: According to a 33rd Regiment medic a senior non-commissioned officer in the 1st
Battalion, in mid-1966 about 500 ill and lightly wounded personnel including 33rd Regiment and cadre,
were being treated at the L Li Division (ie 325th Division) Hospital across the border in Cambodia
following operations in the Central Highlands. Most deaths were caused by malaria. Patients reportedly
received two anti-malarial quinine tablets each week. Sometimes four paludrine or two nivaquine tablets
were given as a substitute. Malaria incidence in the Division was about 90%. More deaths were caused
from malaria than battle wounds. VCAT No.F034601482497. According to a US study based
principally on captured documents, the diagnostic rate for malaria in the 33 rd Regiment in Pleiku in the
period September to November 1965 was 300 per 1000 per month; and in Kontum in May 1966, it was
1000 per 1,000 per month - Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam, Medical Causes of Non-
Effectiveness among VC and NVA Troops, Technical Intelligence Study ST 67-018, 15 February 1967
VCAT Item No.F015900300918.
 159

incidence of malaria suffered by the troops.256 While COSVN - the communist command
covering most of the South, had directed a system of malarial prophylaxis based on
paludrine, chloroquine, and nivaquine tablets, medicines were always in very short
supply. Even when available, such chloroquine-based prophylaxis was not particularly
effective. A comprehensive US study - based on captured communist medical records,
assessed that 11 percent of a communist units strength would routinely be bedridden
with malaria and and for diseases and illnesses, almost 50% of hospitalizations were for
malaria.257 An analysis of 274th VC Regiment documents recovered from its
Convalescent Company indicated that, of those hospitalised in late 1968 and early 1969,
70 percent were for malaria and only 13 percent were patients wounded in action.258.
The 33rd Regiments 2016 History relates that - in September 1979, during the 33rd
Regiments operations in Cambodia (ie as the 731st Regiment): At this time it was the
height of the Wet Season, and the health of the cadre and soldiers of the Regiment had
declined. Up to more than half of the cadre and soldiers suffered malaria, and the unit
mobilised the people in the area in which we were stationed to construct a hutted camp in
order to have a resting and treatment location for our ill soldiers.

256
Translators Note: i tm kim v quy tp 14 lit s ca C26, E33 hy sinh ti x c (Searching
for and Recovering the 14 Martyrs of the 26 th Company of the 33rd Regiment at c village ), H Ni,
18 March 2013. Extracts from the diary of Nguyn Tun Ty on the Nhn Tm ng i (MARIN)
Website that notes a large number of casualties to malaria. For malaria in the 33rd Regiment, see also
footnotes 63, 69, 77, 99, 101, and 451 in Chamberlain, E.P., The 33 rd Regiment , op.cit., 2014..
257
Translators Note: The US Study assessed that: 44% of a units strength will have malaria at any given
time, 20% of these will be hospitalized for an average of 13 days; 2% will die. 11% of a units strength
will be hospitalized (or in a dispensary, convalescent center, or aid station) at any given time. USMACV,
Medical Causes of Non-Effectiveness Among VC/NVA Troops, op.cit., 31 August 1969.
258
Translators Note:1 ATF, INTSUM No.199-69, Ni t, 18 July 1969.
 160

Translators Note: A 33rd Regiment mortar crew.

 161

Translators Annex G

Headquarters 33rd NVA Regiment: SIGINT Direction Finding (DF) Locations

Battle of Ni Le, September 1971.
(Map: Special Sheet S.E. Asia 1: 100,000 Sheet 6430, Series L607)

The following SIGINT DF fixes for the Headquarters 33rd Regiment were recorded in
the 1 ATF Intelligence Log:

11 August: YT 859106; 26 August: YS 498943; 28 August: YS 496944;

10 September: YS 645948; 18 September: YS 542825; 20 September: YS 483832;
21 September: YS 523877; 29 September: YT 572000 (3.5km north of the map);
30 September: YS 556985.

Note: The DF fix locations are joined by straight lines and do not indicate the exact
march route of the 33rd Regiment Headquarters. Map grid squares are 1km x 1km.
 162

Translators Note: 33rd Regiment radios: two US PRC-25 VHF radio sets
Operator: Nguyn Trng Minh (in an intercept ie technical reconnaissance, role).
 163

Translators Annex H

3rd Battalion/33rd NVA Regiment: SIGINT Direction Finding (DF) Locations

Battle of Ni Le, September 1971.
(Map: Special Sheet S.E. Asia 1: 100,000 Sheet 6430, Series L607)

The following SIGINT DF fixes for the Headquarters 3rd Battalion/33rd Regiment ie
9th Battalion/33rd Regiment, were recorded in the 1 ATF Intelligence Log:

13 August: YS 487925; 17 August: YS 505905; 23 August: YS 505988;

25 August: YS 518935; 29 August: YS 573946; 30 August: YS 543934;
18 September: YS 513922; 19 September: YS 498855;
20 September: YS 488849/YS 509854/YS 506868; 21 September: YS 504852;
27 September: YT 545007; (4.5km north of the map); 28 September: YT 524013;
29 September: YT 569004; 30 September: YS 577975.

Note: The DF fix locations are joined by straight lines and do not indicate the exact
march route of the 3rd Battalion/33rd Regiment Headquarters. Map grid squares are
1km x 1km.
 164

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 165

Translators Annex I

33rd Regiment Headquarters Locations (SIGINT): 29 April - 2 July 1969

(Battle of Bnh Ba)

In April 2011, the Australian Department of Defence declassified and released

several of their weekly Summary of V.C. and N.V.A. Military Activities in Bien Hoa,
Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces (Summaries 9/69 to 17/69). These indicative
locations of the Headquarters of the 33rd NVA Regiment in the period 29 April to 2 July
are shown on the composite map above with dates indicated as day/month. They
represent the end-of-the week locations - based on SIGINT direction-finding
information provided by 1ATFs 547 Sig Tp, of the 33rd Regiment Headquarters
principal radio communications site (Chicom 102E HF radio 15w, a copy of the US
AN/GRC106) which was routinely sited at least one kilometre distant from the
Regiments Headquarters. On the map, while these locations have been connected by
straight lines, they do not represent the actual movement routes of the Regiment
between the weekly summarised locations of the Headquarters.
For further detail, see pp.79-80 and Appendix 17 in Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd
Regiment North Vietnamese Army: Their Story, Point Lonsdale, 2014.
 166

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 167

BIBLIOGRAPHY 259

Books:

- Heroes of the Peoples Armed Forces, Armed Forces Publishing House.

- Heroic Units of the Peoples Armed Forces.
- The History of COSVN Headquarters (1961 1976), National Political Publishing
House, 2004.
- The History of the Armed Forces of ng Nai Province 1945 1995, Armed
Forces Publishing House, 1999.
- The History of the Armed Forces of B Ra-Vng Tu Province.
- The History of the Revolutionary Struggle of the Party Chapter and the People of
Chu c District (1930 2000).
- The History of the 440th Battalion - B Ra-Long Khnh (1967 1979), National
Political Publishing House, 2011.
- The History of the Military Region 7 Armed Forces (1945 2010), National
Armed Forces Publishing House, 2010.
- The History of the Armed Forces of Chu c District, National Political
Publishing House, 2014. ((Translators Note: ie H Song Qunh (ed et al), The
History of the Chu c District Peoples Armed Forces (1945 2014), National
Political Publishing House The Truth, H Ni, 2014)).
- The American Killing Belt in Eastern Nam B and the Far South of Trung B in
the Liberation War Summary of a Scientific Working Group, Military Region 7
Ty Ninh Province Committee, National Political Publishing House, December
2004.
- The 101st Cao Vn Regiment (1945- 1975), Armed Forces Publishing House,
1995.

Documents:

- The Development, Combat History and Coming-of-Age of The Heroic 33rd

Regiment (1965 2010) computer-printed A4 copy of 35 pages provided by the
33rd Regiment Veterans Liaison Committee (from the Liaison Committees
Thanh Ha Branch - 2005).

- A Summary of the Achievements in the Combat Development and Coming-of-

Age of The Heroic 33rd Regiment (1965 1980) computer-printed A4 copy of

259
A more comprehensive bibliography is available in: Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment , op.cit.,
2014.
 168

16 pages provided by the 33rd Regiments Veterans Liaison Committee (from the
Liaison Committees Ngh An Branch).

- A Summary of the Achievements in the Combat Development and Coming-of-

Age of The Heroic 33rd Regiment (1965 1980) computer-printed A4 copy of
13 pages provided by the 33rd Regiments Veterans Liaison Committee (from the
Liaison Committees Branch in the South).

- A Summary of the History of The Heroic 33rd Regiment. A computer-printed A4

copy of 8 pages provided by the 33rd Regiments Veterans Liaison Committee
(from the Liaison Committees H Ni Branch, July 2010).260

- Documents in the Archives of the Veterans Liaison Committee in the South

provided by Comrades L Ba Lc Branch Head, and V Xun Thu Deputy
Branch Head.261

- Photographs from the Display at the Memorial Building in the Bnh Ba Historical
Vestiges Area witnessed and provided by the Regiment.

Video:

Translators Note: In April 2013, the 33rd Regiment Veterans Association

published a video: Trung on 33 (A57): Mt Thi Ho Hng (The 33rd (A57)
Regiment: An Heroic Time)262 that related the Regiments history including
engagements in the Central Highlands in 1965 and in Phc Tuy Province.

260
Translators Note: A translated copy of this document is in Chamberlain, E.P., The 33 rd Regiment ,
op.cit., 2014, Appendix 1.
261
Translators Note: Several of these documents are included in appendices to Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd
Regiment , op.cit., 2014.
262
Translators Note: Trung on 33 (A57): Mt Thi Ho Hung (The 33rd Regiment (A57): An Heroic
Time) 26 April 2013, 21 minutes. The video features several 33rd Regiment veterans as speakers: L B
Lc, Nguyn Hu im/m, and V Xun Thu with L Ba Lc outlining the Regiments involvement
in the Plei Me-Ia rng Campaign in the Central Highlands. The video and is available on You Tube as:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mqFZp42kwJE .
 169
INDEX
(entries are listed by Prefix reference,
text page number, then footnote number)
1st ATF losses to 33rd Regiment
f.173.
1st Air Cavalry Division p.18, 21, 24,
30, 140, 142, f.44*, 15, 17, 22, 36, 105,
222.
2nd Company/7th Battalion/33 Regiment
p.54 (Annex A p.153), p.70, p.154.
2nd Sapper Battalion p.45
3rd Air Cavalry Brigade (US) p.18,
126, 129.
3rd Battalion/33 p.12, 13, 14, 16, 19,
20, pp.23-27, pp.29-35, Annex H p.163,
f.62, 105, 108, 188, 196, 199*.
3rd Battalion RAR p.132, f.105, f.109.
3rd Brigade (Sep) 1st Air Cav Div (US)
p.26, 27, 29, 125, 127, 128, f.27, f.105,
f.109.
3rd Corps (NVA) p.104, 106, 107, 110.
III Corps Headquarters (RVNAF) p.38,
81, 85, 87, 89, 143, f.55.
4th ((274h)) VC Regiment p.45, 63, 65,
66, 71, 76, 79, 80, 82, 83, 85, 90, 157,
159, f.55, f.60, f.119, f.140, f.198.
4th Battalion RAR/NZ (ANZAC)
p.133, 134, 137, 157, f.61, 107, 108,
109, 173, 194, 199, 201, 210, 247, 249,
251, 254.
4th Marine Division (US) p.30, f.36.
5th Battalion RAR p.155, 156, f.173,
237, 238.
5th ((275th)) VC Regiment p.38, 39, 42,
f.48, 52, 55.
5th Air Cavalry Regiment [.27, f.31.
5th ARVN Division p.85.
5th VC Division p.7, pp.37-39, p.43,
43, 45, 97, 111, f.55152, 162.
6th Battalion RAR p.157, f.173.
6th Division p.79, 80, 82, pp.85-92,
f.139*.
7th Air Cavalry Regiment p.27, 28, 30,
f.186.
7th Battalion/33 pp.38-46, p.48, pp.51-
54, p.59, 61, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 72, 74,
76, pp.80-89, p.99, 100, 104, 120, 121,
125, 126, 142, 153, f.138.
7th Division (VC) p.87.
7th Ranger Group p.85.
8th Battalion/33 pp.39-45, p.51, 53, 54,
59, 66, 68, pp.69-82, p.86, 87, 89, pp.98-
101, p.104, 119, 126, 127, 150, f.75*.
8th Task Force p.85.
9th Battalion/33 pp.38-48, pp.52-55,
pp.59-64, pp.68-89, pp.97-99, p.104,
126, 142, 158, f.113, f.129*, f.138*.
9th Corps p.103, p.144, f.167*
9th Division (US) f.59.
9th VC Division p.38.
10th Sapper Group p.91.
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment f.14.
18th Sapper Battalion pp.77-78, f.135.
23rd ARVN Division p.12, pp.31-35,
p.140.
23rd Ranger Battalion p.35.
246th Battalion p.71.
24th Regiment p.91.
24th Sapper Company pp.67-68, p.72,
f.118.
24th Special Zone p.18.
25th Company/ 33 p.75.
25th Company VC see C25.
25th ARVN Infantry Division p.34.
25th US Infantry Division p.35, f.36,
f.52, f.222.
26th Company/33 p.76, p.90, f.256.
31st Company/33 p.63.
31st FULRO Battalion p.35.
33rd Regiment 1st ATF losses to
f.173.
 170
33rd Regiment battle summary and
results p.114, 118, 151, 152, f.173.
33rd Regiment Casualties Preface f.9,
f.10; Annex F pp.151-159.
33rd Regiment, disbanded - p.109.
33rd Regiment, communications f.64,
f.107*, Annexes G, H, and I (pp.161-
165).
33rd Regiment, Support Companies 1975
p.7, 14, 82, 92, 95, f.198, f.199*, f.249.
33rd Regiment, photographs of activities
Annex E p.149-150.
34th Chu c District Company p.77.
39th Battalion/ 33 pp.31-34, f.44*.
43rd ARVN Regiment/Task Force p.34,
35, 49, 65, 75, 79, 88.
48th ARVN Regiment/Task Force p.67,
69, 71, 75, 76, 79, 81, 88, 142.
52nd ARVN Regiment/Task Force
p.49, 67, 69, 71, 75, 81, 82, 85, 142,
f.76.
55th Regiment (A55) p.37, 97, 98,
f.158.
66th Regiment pp.24-29, pp.125-127,
f.34.
68th Corps f.167*
74th Artillery Regiment f.84.
74th Regiment (A74) p.37, p.38.
77th Artillery Regiment p.104, f.158.
88th Regiment (A56) pp.37-39, p.43,
f.52, f.140.
101A Regiment p.12.
101B Regiment p.11, 12, 14, 111, 140,
f.15, f.22, f.45.
121st Battalion p.91.
199th US Brigade p.48, 55, pp.59-61,
p.142, f.95, f.96.
205th Regiment p.100.
218th Regiment p.91.
260th Division (Pol Pot/Khmer Rouge)
pp.96-97, f.261, f.262.
303rd Division p.7, pp.95-97, pp.100-
108, p.112, 143, 153, f.158, f.161, f.162,
f.167, f.168*.
308th Division
316th Regiment pp.96-100, f.158, 162.
320th Division p.7, 12, 140, f.90.
320th Regiment p,12, 20, 24, 35, 128,
f.33.
323rd Regional Force Group p.71.
324th Regional Forces Battalion p.78,
83, 88.
325th Division p.7, 12, f.255.
329th Division f.167*
332nd Regional Force Battalion p.83,
88.
341st Division p.7, 12, 140.
344th Regional Force Battalion f.141.
349th Division f.167*
372nd Regional Forces Battalion p.78,
79.
476th Division p.92, 153*.
476th Engineer Group p.92.
500th Battalion p.71, p.76.
505th Special Region (Khmer Rouge)
p.97, f.162.
545th Battalion p.12.
547 Sig Tp f.64, f.105, f.196, Annexes
G, H, and I: pp.161-165.
655th Regional Force Company p.79.
664th Regional Force Company f.65.
731st Regiment (E731) p.95, 96, 98,
100, 101, 111, 159, f.158, f.161.
732nd Regiment (E732) f.158
733rd Regiment (E733) - f.158.
734th Regiment (E734) f.158.
793rd Regiment p.103, 104, 111.
814th Rear Services Unit p.55, p.66.
952nd Sapper Battalion p.12, p.26.
1,210 Battles/33 p.114, 118, 151, 152.
1974-75 Dry Season Campaign p.82.
4,000 martyrs/33 p.8, 115, 153.

A57 (33rd Regiment) p.7, 37, 111, 141,
153, 166, f.79, 171, 231, 234, 238, 254,
262.
Activities, 33rd Regiment: photographs
Annex E p.149.
Alsatian dogs p.61.
An Giang Province p.95, f.152.
An Lc (Long Khanh Province) p.48,
84, 121.
Annamite Chain p.7, 14, 15, 35, 111,
113, 139.
Annexes, listing of p.117.
Articles written on 33rd Regiment
Annex B pp.125-143.
ARVN remnants, pursuit of p.7, 89,90,
91, 94.
Assault Youth p.125.
Australian Army official histories
Preface f.1, f.6.
Australian companies (two), wiped out
Annex A, p.114. Annex A p.118, f.151.
Australian losses v 33rd Regiment
f.173.
Australian Military Writings on the 33rd
Regiment Annex B pp.131-138.
B ie the South p.14.
B3 Front p.12, 17, 19, 26, 31, 32, 140,
153, f.10, f..26*.
B-52 bomber p.18, 27, 29, 59, 125.
B-57 Canberra bomber f.21.
B Ra Sub-Region p.58, 62, 63, f.68,
f.91.
B Ra-Long Khnh Province p. 7, 49,
50, 51, 52, 53, 89,, 90, 111, 132, 149,
150, 165, f.69, f.102, f.135.
B Ra-Vng Tu p.8, 153, 165, f.67*,
f.107*, f.130*, f.132*, 132*, f.232,
f.234, f.254.
Bo Bnh p.56, 63, 65, 66, 71, 76, 82,
83, 88, .
Bo Chnh p.55, 65, 66.
Barnard L. politician p.p.137.
Base 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10 p.82, 83, 84, 90.
171
Bu C p.56, p.74.
Bu Cn p.18, 19, 23, 26, 128.
Bu Ci p.44, 46, 121, f.60, f.228.
Bu Hm p.71, 72, 73, 76, 88.
Bu Sen p.67, 68, 78, f.113.
Bearcat Base (US) f.59.
Beilken B. Private p.135.
Belts, grab by their p.26, 34, 127, f.25,
f.184.
Bn Ci p.39, 42, 43, 141, f.52, f.54.
Benge, Michael f.40.
Bibliography p.167.
Bin Ha p.7, 71, 84, 85, 87, 88, 143,
149, f.61, f.137, f.146.
Bin Ha airfield p.60, 87, 88, 143.
Bin Ha Logistic Complex p.60
Bnh Tr Thin p.111.
Bnh Ba pp.67-68, 79, 112, 146, 150,
pp. 153-156, 166, f.65, 72, 73.
Bnh Ba, Battle of p.8, pp.50-56, 141,
f.64, 76, 85, 109, 118, 191.
Bnh Ba, Battle of SIGINT Annex I.
Bnh Ba, burials pp.54-55, f.86*, f.224.
Bnh Ba, casualties Annex F pp.151-
159, p.166, f.86*, 224, 232, 245.
Bnh Ba, guerillas p.55,156, f.80,
f.86*, f.118, f.235, f.241.
Bnh Ba Lng p.50, 53, 54, 69, f.71.
Bnh Ba, POWs f.238, f.240.
Bnh Ba Xang p.50, 53, 54, f.71.
Bnh Chu p.91.
Bnh Gi p.67, 68, f.119.
Bnh Long Province p.38, 47, 59.
Bnh Thun p.58, 61, f.9.3*, 98*, 99.
Bnh Tuy p.58, 61, 72, 73, 79, 80, 82,
83, 123, 142, f.2, f.64, f.93*, f.96, f.97,
f.111, f.140.
Black Panther Division (Thai) f.59.
Bok Nup p.8, f.3.
Bond W.R. Brigadier p.60, f.95
Border War (China) p.7, p.92.
Brave Killer of Americans p.28.
Brown, Thomas Colonel f.27.

B ng District p.93.
B p District p.93, p.141.
Bi Ngc B - p.86, 92, 104, 107, 134,
146.
Bi Quang Min p.54, p.153.
Bi Vn B p.79.
Bun M Thut p.7, 8, 17, pp.32-35,
p.112, p.140.
Burns C. journalist p.138, f.221.
C24 Sapper Company p.38, p.61, p.68.
C25 Company (Long t) p.48.
C25 Transport Company f.238.
C34 Company (Chu c) p.48.
C41 Company f.76.
C195 Company f.240.
Cadre Critique, by COSVN f.92.
Cm ng p.90, p.141, f.148*.
Cm M - p.63, 67, 76, 78, f.112, f.134,
f.135, f.199*, f.226.
Cambodia p.7, 8, 29, 31, 92, 93, 95,
96, 99, pp.101-104, p.111, 112, 115,
140, 143, 150, 153, 159, f.5, 20, 42, 43,
152, 158, f.160-162, f.255.
Cambodian Peoples Revolutionary
Party p.101.
Campaign CD p.59.
Cao H - see Hong Cao H.
Cao Su District p.47, 49, 63, 67, 76,
f.104
Cassava/Manioc p.16, 55, 59, 76, 93.
Casualties, 33rd Regiment Annex F
pp.151-159.
CBU bombs p.85.
Central Highlands p.7, 8, pp.11-21,
p.24, 30, 32, 33, 35, 83, 111, 113, 114,
115, 118, 125, 128, 140, 141, 152, 158,
168, f.2, 10, 26*, 36, 39, 255, 262.
Certificate of Commendation p.92,
109, 122, 123.
Ch L p.8, 39, 112, 141, f.52.
Cham/Chm/Chm, ethnic minority
f.99.
172
Chamberlain E.P. Preface f.7, f.9.
Text: f.141, f.191, f.194.
Chamka An Dong p.97.
Chu c District Unit p.67, p.68.
Chu Lc p.51, 67, 75.
Chu Thnh District p.91.
Chemical Section
Chiefs-of-Staff, 33rd Regiment Annex
C p.146.
Chiu Hi Program f.62, f.156.
China p.103, f.163.
Chinese advisors f.19.
Chinese, mistreatment of (nn kiu)
f.163.
Ch Ho p.19, 20, 24, 140.
Chu Huy Mn p.17, 18, 30, f.184.
Chu Kim Thch p.92, 145.
Ch Png/Ch Prng p.8, 27, 29, 112,
125, 128, 140, f.20, f.28.
Ch Pa Valley p.29, p.140.
Civilian Irregular Defence Group
(CIDG), RVN - f.19.
Civilian proselytising p.90, 101, 102,
104, 105, 143, f.62.
Commanders - 33rd Regiment, List
Annex C p.145.
Commanders - 33rd Regiment,
Photographs Annex D p.147.
Commandos, Australian p.51, f.74.
Cn o Military Unit f.170*.
Cn o Special Region f.170*.
Cn Thoi p.108, p.110.
COSVN p.37, 38, 45, 48, 55, 58, 60,
62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, pp.79-82, 89, 92,
121, 149, 159, 167, f.43, 62, 68, 92, 184.
Courageous American-Killing Unit
p.120.
Crazy/Mad Buffalo Regiment/Battalion
p.43, p.112.
C Chi p.92.
D14 Sapper Battalion p.32.

D440 Battalion Preface f.12. Text:
p.48, 56, 157, f.71, 73, 76, 81, 82, 85,
86*, 89, 102, 241.
D445 Battalion Preface f.12. Text:
p.48, 49, 51, 52, 54, 66, 76, 77, f.8, f.73,
f.76, f.77, f.91, f.119.
Nng p.11, p.83.
c Lc (Darlac) p.7, pp.31-35, p.111,
149, f.38*, f.44*.
i c Thch Tm Vng f.174.
Dak Pek p .17.
Dak Sut f.15.
ng Quang Nguyt p.12.
ng V Hip p.18, p.125.
Du Ting p.8, pp.39-41, p.84.
Davies, B. p.158, f.247, 249, 253.
Demobilisation p.109.
Democratic Kampuchea f.152.
Deputy Commanders - 33rd Regiment,
List Annex C p.145.
inh Duy Chnh p.108, p.145, p.147.
inh Ngc Thp p.53, 59, 80, f.75*.
nh Qun p.55, 63, 67, 68, 84.
inh Vn t p.12, 38, 45, 50, 59, 75,
80, 85, 145, 147.
Discipline p.101, 105, 109, 115, 131,
f.62.
nh Nho p.108, 146, 147.
Vn San p.104.
on 84C f.45, f.62.
on Khu p.12.
ng Khi Movement p.11, f.6.
ng Nai Monograph f.137.
ng Nai Province p.90, 91, 92, 167,
f.60, f.125*, f.148*, f.188*.
ng Nai Province Unit p.91.
ng Nai River p.56, p.75.
Dowell W. Corporal p.133, p.135,
p.136, f.209.
c C p.18, 19, 128, 141, f.20.
c M - p.52, f.72, f.79, f.85.
173
c Thnh p.8, 49, 50, 52, 53, pp.68-
70, pl76, 78, 112, 142, 157, f.118, f.121,
f.122, f.135.
c Trung f.72.
Duff J. Private p.134.
Dng C Tm p.79.
ng Cng p.99, f.119.
Dng Minh Chu base p.37.
Dng Vn Minh p.87.
Duyn Hi District p.91, f.91.
Eastern Nam B - f.2, p.7, 36, 37, 56, 63,
67, 73, 82, 87, 111, 115, 118, 110, 120,
121, 123, 152, 167, f.2, f.44*, f.231.
Economic integration f.176.
f.188.
Food, incl shortages pp.14-16, p.22,
31, 49, 55, 56, 59, 62, 76, 83, 98, 99,
101, 104, 116, f.62.
Food, production p.76, 90, 106, 108,
110.
Friends (ie KUFNS, Cambodia) f.159,
p.7, pp-96-102, p.112.
Friends (Laos) p.5.
Fire Support Base (FSB) Columbus
f.33.
FSB Falcon p.28, 29, f.29, f.33.
FSB Thrust (9th RAR) f.76.
FULRO p.35, p.91, f.42.
Galloway J.W., journalist p.127, 128,
129, f.185, f.187, f.189, f.190.
Gia Huynh p.59, p.80.
Gia Lai p.13, 16, 17, 18, 31, 32, 111,
f.3.
Gia Ray p.49, 55, 60, 65, pp.80-83,
p.88, f.112, f.134, f.226.
Gilbert G. Lieutenant [sic] p.136,
f.208.
G Cng District p.91
G Da p.39, 42, f.52.
Group and Individual Achievements,
titles awarded Annex A pp.118-123.
Gwin S.L. Lieutenant, p.127.
H c Nhau p.86, 94, 146.
 174
H Nam Ninh Province p.103, 108,
110, 112, f.116*.
H Ni p.152, 153, f.43, 238.
H Ni Highway p.87, f.146.
Hi Phng p.71.
Hm Tn p.59, 62, 83, 112, 142, 143.
Hm Thun District p.142, p.98*,
f.171.
Hat Lt District f.109.
Heng Samrin f.159.
Hero of the Peoples Armed Forces
award p.90, 112, 116, 119, 120, 122,
123, 149, 150.
High Point, June 1969 f.69, f.83.
H Ch Minh Campaign p.7, 86, 89,
111, 143.
H Ch Minh City pp.106-107, f.124*.
H Ch Minh, death p.56 f.183.
H Nai p.8, 74, 87, 89, 103.
H Trng Ba p.19, p.145.
Ha Long p.52, 66, 70, 79, f.69, f.76,
f.78, f.81.
Hoi c p.8, 58, 59, 61, 62, pp.79-82,
p.112, 142, f.140, f.141.
Hong Cao H - p.38, 45, 50, 55, 145,
f.108; photograph (2009) at p.146.
Hong Long Ton p.45, 59, 80.
Hi Chanh (Rallier) f.156.
Hughes J.C. Lieutenant Colonel p.134,
f.210.-
Hughes J.C. Major General f.108.
Hng Lc p.71, 72, 74, 85.
Hunger p.16, 23, 24, 50, 55, 101, 109,
139.
Hunh Thnh Nhn p.53.
Ia rng Campaign p.112, 129, 140,
f.13, 15, 19, 27, 34, 36, 185, 262
Ia rng Valley p.8, 19, 23, pp.25-30,
p.127, 129, f.12, f.20, f.28.
Ia M /Muer Stream p.24, 25, 29, 55,
126, 140.
Ideology p.14m 19, 36, 39, 42, 72,
pp.93-95, p.104, 105, 109, 113, 114,
f.156 (problems)..
III Corps (CTZ) Headquarters RVNAF
p.38, 81, 87, 89, 143, f.55.
Indoctrination f.109, f.156.
Infiltration p.138, f.10.
International Mission/Duty (July 1978
) p.7, 8, 95, 96, 101, 103, 111, 112,
115, 153, f.5.December 1979)
Jenkin D. Sergeant p.135.
Johnson, L. President f.14*.
K8 Company p.48, p.71.
Kampong Cham p.7, 96, 98, 99, 102,
112, 143.
Kampong Thom p.7, 96, 102, 112,
143.
Kampuchean United Front for National
Salvation f.159.
Kemp C. Private p.134.
Khmer Rouge p.92, pp.97-99, p.103,
f.5, f.159, f.161, f.162 .
Kin Giang Province f.152.
Killer of Americans badge p.61, f.96.
Kingston-Powles K. Private p.135.
Kinnard H. General p.21.
K Ky Thm p.100.
Kratie p.7, pp.96-97, p.102, 112, 143,
f.162.
K Du 1969 Campaign p.49.
La Gi p.61.
La Ng River p.81, p.149.
L Ngc Chu p.125, p.126.
La Vn p.69.
Lager Beer Regiment f.94*
Lm ng Province p.95.
Landing Zone (LZ) X-Ray p.28, 126,
128, f.28, f.29. f.32.
Lng 1, 2, 3 p.39, p;40, p.41.
Lng Sn Province p.109, p.154.
Large killing, with little loss (tactic)
f.50.

L Ba Lc p.2, 45, 46, 59, 60, 75, 80,
86, 145, 146, 147, 168.
L nh Nhn (Chn L) p.49, p.52.
L c An p.97.
L Dng Khan p.92, p.146.
L Duy Lc p.16.
L Quang o, Brigadier ARVN p.65.
L Tn Phc p.100.
L Vn Hin p.79.
L Vn Ngc p.77, f.135.
L Vn S p.75, 79, 87.
L Xun Phi p.127.
Lnh R Linh p.101.
Letter Box Numbers f.45.
Letter of Appreciation p.123.
Limited Warfare p.17, p.18, p.113.
L Than p.56, 72, f.89.
Lc Ninh (Bnh Phc/Long) f.114*,
f.142.
Lc Ninh (Long Khanh) p.8, 38, 67,
82, 83, 142, f.142.
Lc Vinh p.83, 88.
Long Bnh Logistics Complex p.8,
pp.44-46.
Long t District p.48, 63, 90, 91,
f.135.
Long Khanh p.8, 47, 48, 56, 71, 73, 76,
83, 85, 86, 88, 90, 112, 121, f.58, 64,
66*, 71, 105, 107*, 111, 142, 196.
Long Khanh, Battle of f.105.
Long Khanh Campaign p.49, 55, f.69.
Long L Sub-District p.52, f.78.
Long-B-Bin Province p.44, f.58.
Lng Ba Nhm p.59.
Lng Vn Bing p.123.
Lng Vn Nho (Hai Nh) p.46, 47.
LZ Albany p.28, 128, f.19, 33, 186.
LZ Falcon p.28, 128, f.29, f.33.
LZ Victor p.28, f.32.
LZ X-Ray p.28, 126, 128, f.28, f.29.
f.32.
Ma Vn Minh p.31, 32, 37, 40, 45,
145.
175
Malaria Preface, Text: p.16, 100, 105,
113, 139, 158, 157, f.232, 235, 256, 257.
My To Mountains/Secret Zone p.66,
p.76, f.64, f.111.
McDade R. Lieutenant Colonel p.127,
128, f.186.
McDonald B.A. Brigadier p.132,
f.107*.
McKay G. Second Lieutenant p.133,
p.135, p.136, f.107*, f.247, f.249, f.253.
Memorial, Bnh Ba village Preface.
Midway Meeting (Thiu/Nixon) f.69.
Military Region 3 (North) p.82, 103,
106, 108, 112, 143, f.169*.
Military Region 3 (RVN) f.227.
Military Region 5 (VC) p.11, 30, 32,
97, 119, 120, f.19. f,39, f,90.
Military Region 6 (VC) p.7, 58, 62, 79,
80, 111, 142, f.139, 140, 171.
Military Region 7 (VC) p.7, 45, 46, 49,
59, 68, 70, 76, 77, 79, 80, 82, 88, 91-93,
95-96, 98, 101, 103, 107, 111, 112, 118,
123, 147, 153, 167, f.117, 135, 170*.
Military Region 9 p.95.
Military Region 559 f.10.
Military Region D p.112.
Misconduct f.62.
Model Soldier p.121, 123, 149.
Mong Yan p.99
Monographs, historical 33rd Regiment
Preface f.6. Text: p.152, f.36, f,85, f.137,
f.171, f.174, f.191, f.192, f.222.
Montagnards f.18, f.19.
Moore, H. Lieutenant Colonel p.28,
f.30, f.85.
Morale p.93, 105, 113, 136, f.62, f.109,
f.156.
Mortar crew, photograph p.160.
Mng Mang p.62.
Nam B - p.11, p.37, p.158, f.2, f.43.
Nam nh Province p.104, 107, 154,
f.165*, f.167*, f.225.
Nam Ninh District p.106.

National Liberation Front (NLF) p.11,
p.53, p.74, p.178.
New Zealand troops, Victor Company
/4RAR/NZ (September 1971 p.137.
Ng Ba p.82,
Ngi Giao p.66, f.118.
Ngha Hng District p.103, 104.
Ng nh Dim, President p.11, f.155.
Nguyn Chanh, Senior Colonel p.12,
18.
Nguyn Ch Thanh General f.184.
Nguyn c Khi p.12, 14, 19, 146.
Nguyn Hu An p.18, 129, f.34, 183.
Nguyn Hu Qunh p.92.
Nguyn Hu Sanh f.139*.
Nguyn Huy Liu p.12, 14.
Nguyn Huy Thn p.32, 45, 59, 75, 80,
86, 91, 145, 146, 147.
Nguyn Minh Chu, Major General
p.179.
Nguyn Minh Thin f.127*.
Nguyn Ngc Th p.86.
Nguyn Thai Lim p.80, 86, 90.
Nguyn Th Xun (T Thin) p.55,
153, f.235.
Nguyn Trng Ha p.86.
Nguyn Trng Minh p.149, p.162
(photograph).
Nguyn Trng M - p.12, 145.
Nguyn Vn By p.53, 54, 153, 154.
Nguyn Vn Don p.45.
Nguyn Vn Dy p.53, f.238.
Nguyn Vn Li p.90.
Nguyn Vn O p.48, 121, 122, f.182,
228.
Nguyn Vn Phc p.104.
Nguyn Vn Thanh p.104, 108, 168*.
Nguyn Vn Th p.90.
Nguyn Vn Thng p.38, 45, 59, 75,
80, 145, 147, 150. Preface photograph.
Nguyn Vn V p.104.
Niblett R. Private p.135.
176
North Vietnamese Army (NVA)
Preface f.2.
North Vietnamese troops, proportion of
f.55,
Ni t p.50, 52, 53, 141, f.61, 70, 72,
78, 79, 84, 85, 119, 122.
Ni t, rocketed f.84.
Ni Le p.64, 157, 158, Annex G,
Annex H, f.107, 108, 191, 192, 199*,
249, 254.
Ni Lp p.60.
Ni ng base p.59, 63.
Ni Sao p.157, 158, Annex G, Annex
H, f.107*, 108, 191, 192, 199*, 249.
OSullivan M. Corporal p.135, f.224.
ng n p.82, 83, 88, 142.
ng Hng Stream p.8, 39, 40, 42, 112,
141, f.52.
ng Qu - p.63.
Operation Ballarat f.216.
Operation Bribie f.216.
Operation Hammer p.155, f.86, 173,
224.
Operation Ivanhoe p.132, 157, f.107,
173, 193, 196, 198, 199*, 247, 251.
Operation Lavarack Annex F, p.157,
f.173.
Operation Overlord f.105, 106.
Operation Tong (Ha Long) f.69/
Pacificatiion Program p.18, 55, 58, 60,
62, 63, 77, f.60, 102.
Paris Accords p.74, 75, 77, 87, 88.
Party p.7, 11, 14, 17, 19, 30, 32, 33,
38, 45, 55, 59, 72, pp.89-94, p.104, 105,
pp.108-116, p.123, 149, 154, 167, f.8,
47*, 60, 181.
Party Committee, attack planning;
photographs Preface; p.150.
Peoples Liberation Army (China)
p.14, f.164.
Peoples Revolutionary Party f.8.
Peoples Self Defence Force (RVN)
p.65, 73, f.110.
 177

Personnel List: Senior Cadre, HQ 33rd Provisional Revolutionary Government

Regiment Annex C, pp.145-146. (PRG) p.120, 122, f.69.
Phm Vn Hy p.77. Provisional Revolutionary Government
Phan Ngc Don p.86. of Kampuchea f.159.
Phan S Tm p.86. Public Security Service (Cng An)
Phan Trng Dng f.150.
Phan Vn Vnh p.86, 92. Quch Thi Sn f.75*, 85.
Pheonix (Phng Hong) program p.51, Quach Vn [sic] Sn f.75*.
77, f.77. Qung Bnh p.7, 12, 13, 140, 154, f.1.
Ph M (Central Highlands) p.20. 22. Quang Minh p.67, 76, f.62.
Ph M (Route 15) - f.112, 134, 226. Quyt Thng Regiment f.88, 90, 171.
Ph Quc Island p.152. Quynh Kla p.27, 126, 128.
Ph Yn District p.109. Radios p.152, p.162 (photograph),
Phum Cha p.98. f.64, f.107*.
Phum Lech p.98. Ralliers/Returnees p.155, f.156, 241.
Phum Rung p.98, 101. Rangers (ARVN) p.17,20, 22, 35, 42,
Phum Tra p.101. 69,71, 73, 76, 80, 81, 84, 85, pp.87-89,
Phc Long Group p.95, f.158. p.142, f.17, 18, 19.
Phc Long Province 82. Rations p.16, 108.
Phc Tnh p.91. Rear Services C50 p.37.
Pleiku p.17, 18, 32, f.15, 19, 20, 21, Red River p.8, 104, 106, 111.
22, 36, 222, 255. Re-education p.90, 98, 99, f.150*.
Pleime/Plei Me base p.18, 19, 20, 22, Regional Forces (RVN) p.33, 34, 35,
23, 24, 26, 31, 112, 114, 140, f.12, 13, pp.48-52, 56, 59, 62, 63, 65, pp.70-72,
19, 20, 21, 22, 36, 222. 78, 79, 84, 88, 122, 138, 142, 155, 156,
Pleime Campaign p.7, 8, 18, 20, 27, f.63, 65, 89, 141, 218.
28, 29, 30, 35, 111, 129, f.13, 15, 34, 36, Reservists (NVA) pp.106-107.
262. Resolved to Win (Quyt Thng)
Pol Pot/Ieng Sary forces p.7, 92, pp. Regiment p.7, 58, 60, 111, 120, f.90,
95-99, pp.102-103, p.112, f.152. 171.
Political Commissars, 33rd Regiment Rice p.15, 16, 21, 22, 23, 25, 31, 52,
Annex C p.145. 53, 59, 75, 90, 101, 110, 113, 123, f.43.
Popular Forces (RVN) p.33, 48, 51, 59, Rice Bowl f.97.
65, 70, 72, 88, 155, 156, f.63, f.218. Rice, ration p.15, 16, 75, f.62.
POWs, 33rd Regiment p.155, 156, Route 1 p.49, 55, 65, 67, pp.71-76,
f.86*, 96, 238, 241. pp.82-88, p.93, 123, 142, f.116*, 131*.
Prefix letters/unit titles NVA/VC Route 2 (now 56) p.47, 49, 50, 51, 53,
Preface f.8. 63, pp.64-69, p.71, 72, 75-79, 82, 84, 85,
Prey An Dong p.99. 141, 142, 149, f.49, 66*, 72, 75*, 79,
Pribbenow M.L. f.2, 12, 22, 39, 144. 198.
Proselytising - p.90, 101, 102, 104, 105, Route 2 [sic] (Ty Ninh) pp.49-42,
143, 156, f.62, f.86*. f.52.

Route 2 Campaign p.63, 73, 75, 78,
111, f.135, 137.
Route 3 (now Route 336) p.60, 61, 79,
80, 81, 82, 88, 142.
Route 13 p.44, 93, 97, f.161, 162.
Route 14 p.19, 31, 93.
Route 15 (now 51) p.71, p.142, f.124*.
Route 20 p.55, 63, 67, 68, 72, 81, 85,
Route 21 p.19, 20, 21, 23.
Route 22 p.39, 40.
Route 23 (now Route 55) p.66, 67, 68,
77, f.116*.
Route 24 p.76, f.131*.
Rng La p.59.
Rural Development Cadre f.76.
Sayce R.N. Captain p.131, f.194.
Seasons p.139, f.15, f.106 (all).
Sector (Tiu Khu) f.4.
Senior Cadre, HQ 33rd Regiment
Annex C, pp.145-146.
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) p.132,
f.64, 105, 107, 191, 196; Annexes G, H,
and I ie: p.161, 163, and p.165.
Signals Intelligence (33rd Regiment
Technical Reconnaissance) - p.149,
p.162 (photograph).
Skuon (Cambodia) p.97.
Slope 30 f.122.
Sniffer (E-63, airborne) f.195, 198.
Snuol (Cambodia) p.97, f.161.
Soldiers of Uncle H - p.105, 106, 109,
114.
Sn La Province p.109.
Sng B Province p.92, 93, 143,
f.151*, 154*.
Sng B River p.41, 121, f.151, 154*.
Sng Cu hamlet, p.52, f.85.
Sng Cu stream f.79.
Sng Cu - c M ambush f.85.
Sng Ray River 33rd Regiment troops
crossing p.144 (photograph).
Sources, history Preface f.6, f.11, f.12.
178
South Korean troops p.17, 18, 34, 120,
140, 142, f.13, 36, 171, 222, 223.
Special Sector (Yu Khu) p.67, 68, 70,
82, 114, 118, 151, f.4, 112, 134, 226.
Special Warfare p.11, 17.
Sprigg R. Private p.135.
Strength: 33 Regiment about 1,300
Preface f.10.
Strength: 33rd Regiment 3,000 : p.13.
Strength: 33rd Regiment less than 200
troops p.141.
Stung Treng p.98, 99.
Sub-Sector (Chi Khu) p.8, 31, 38, 43,
49, 50, 52, 53, 55, 60, 61, 62, 67, 68, 69.
70, 72, 74, 76, 77, 80, 81, 82, 83, 86, 88,
112, 114, 118, 141, 142, 149, 151, f.4,
118, 122, 141, 142, 143.
Sub-Sub-Sector (Phn Khu) p.114,
118, 151, f.4, 134, 172, 177, 227.
Sui Ngh - p.53, 67, 68, 69, 70, 77,
112, 141, 149, f.83, 85, 112, 118, 122.
Sui Rm p.56.
Svay Cheak p.197, f/161.
T Keng p.44.
Tm B p.76, 78.
Tanh Linh p.8, pp.58-62, p.79, 80, 112,
123, 142, f.140, 141.
Tanh LinhHoi c Campaign p.61,
62, pp.79-82, f.140.
Tank, Centurion p.53, 54, f.224.
Ty Nguyn Front p.16, f.11*.
Ty Ninh, Battle for (August 1968)
pp.37-41, p.44, 141, f.45, 54, 90.
Ty Ninh (1972) p.67, f.114*.
Ty Ninh (1975-76) p.84, 92.
Taylor J. Major pp.133-137, f.201,
216.
Technical Reconnaissance (SIGINT) -
p.149, p.162 (photograph).
Tensions, between NVA and VC f.175.
Territorial Forces f.63, 218, 217.
Tt 1968, postponement f.39.
 179

Tt Mu Thn 1968 p.7, pp.31-35, V Xun Thu Preface f.7, f.9,Text:

p.111, f.39, 41, 90, 110. p.168, f.191, 194, 253, 262.
Tt 1969 p.58. V Sc p.12, 13, 19, 31, 145.
Tt 1973 p.75. V Vit Cam p.93, 145, f.168*.
Tt 1979 p.97, 98. Vng Tu p.7, 89, 90, 91, 150, f.124*,
Thai Forces p.46, 112, 114, 118, 121, 170*.
141, 151, f.59, 60, 228. Vng Lu p.45, 50, 146, 147.
The Age (Melbourne) f.221. Vng Lu Tham p.48.
Th Cho Island f.152. War Zone D p.7, f.45.
Th Bin Sub-Region p.63, f.58. Warden-educators p.90.
T nh Khn p.31, 145. Way-Station (Binh trm) p.14. 15,
Tr Tn p.65, 82, 88, 142. f.10.
Trn ng Phong p.80. Womens Association p.15, 105.
Trn L Xun Route p.93, f.155. Workers Party f.8, f.181, see also
Trn Ngc Hng p.108, 145. Party.
Trn Thi Thc p.45, 87, 145. Workers Party Youth Groups p.15,
Trn Vn Lun p.41, 59, 86, 90, 94, 105, 108, 121, f.8, 181.
104, 107, 108, 145, 147, 149, f.166*, Writing Team 33rd Regiment Preface
170*. f.6, f.7, f.9.
Trng Trng p.41. X Bang p.51, 71, f.107*, 130*.
Triu Kim Sn p.45, 53, 59, 86, 92, Xun Lc p.8, 48, 60, 63, 67, 71, 72,
145, 147, 158, f.108, 253. pp.82-85, p.90, 112, f.49, 144.
Trnh Vnh Long p.108, 145, 146. Yn District p.107, 108.
Tc Trng p.64, 67, p.112, 134, 226. Youth Group - p.15, 105, 108, 121, f.8,
Tully R. Lieutenant Colonel p.28, f.31. 181.
Veterans Liaison Committee Title
page, p.2, 8, 9, 150, 167, 168, f.224.
Vin nh o p.94, 146.
Vit Cng Preface f.2, f.4.
Vit Cng Infrastructure (VCI) p.62,
66, 69, 77, 88, 89, 100, f.77, 100, 102.
Vit Cng p.67, 76.
Vietnam Workers Party f.8, 181, see
also Party.
Vnh Khang Battalion p.31.
Vnh Ph Province p.154.
Vnh Ph Regiment p.31.
Vinh Thanh p.69.
Vnh Thin Battalion p.31, 34.
V c p.80, 142, f.141.
V nh Ngc p.16.
V Tn Nam p.38.
V Xu p.60, 80.
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