Critical Sociology

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Class Consciousness and the Everyday World in the Work of Marx & Schutz
David Sallach
Crit Sociol 1973 3: 27
DOI: 10.1177/089692057300300403

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 Class Consciousness and the Everyday
World in the Work of Marx & Schutz

David Sallach
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
ST. LOUIS

The delicate interplay between 1971) and, consequently, discovered

materialism and idealism has long been
the hallmark of creative Marxist thoug-
ht. As is well known, Marx used Hegel
as one springboard for his thought
(Hook, 1962; Marcuse, 1960; McLellan,
the &dquo;rational kernel within themystical
shell&dquo; of the dialectic (Marx, 1967:20).
Marxs debt to idealism is shared by
Lenin who spent close to a year study-
ing Hegel (cf. Dunayevskaya, 1971 :167-

27
176), by Lukacs who learned German
idealism from Weber and Simmel (Lich-
theim, 1970), and Gramsci who engaged
in prolonged interchange with Croce
a that world, life is practical and the
(Cammet, 1967; Hughes, 1961:96-104;
Gramsci, 1971:xvii-xcvi). Under the
circum stance s , it is not surprising
that a theoretical encounter developed
between Marxism and the phenomeno-
logical tradition which emanate s fr om
Husserl.
What is surprising is that existen-
tialism has been the phenomenological
in this 1 of praxis and is directly analogous to
representative interchange.
The centrality of &dquo;ego&dquo; in existential
philosophy would appear to be incom-
patible with Marxisms emphasis upon
socio-historical forces (which, of
course, take their form in human ac-
tors and actions). Desan (1966 :286-
288) makes the same point regarding
Sartres synthesis of Marxism and ex-
istentialism : the focus upon social
forces in the former conflicts with the
emphasis upon a free and autonomous
ego in the latter, thereby creating an
explosive theoretical combination. To
the extent that such a difficulty exists,
the work of Alfred Schutz provides a
perspective which is more capable
than is existentialism of invigorating
Marxist thought. Such invigoration can
emerge (as in the past) through a cri-
tique. It is the modern interplay be-
tween the perspectives of Marx and
Schutz to which the present discussion
addresses itself.
MARX AND SCHUT Z
Marx and Schutz are similar in
their attempt to locate their respective
thought systems in the empirical
world. For Schutz this involves a re-
turn to the &dquo;actor in the social world
whose doing and feeling lies at the bot-
tom of the whole system&dquo; (Schutz,
1964:7). Similarly, Marx states (1947 :
14), &dquo;We do not set out from what
men say, imagine, conceive, nor
from men as narrated, thought of,
imagined, conceived in order to ar-
rive at men in the flesh. We set out
from real active men... , &dquo;
28
Starting from the existence of hu-
mans in an empirical world, both
Marx and Schutz conclude that, in
thrust of the members purposive
action is to alter and control his im-
mediate circums tance s . In Natan-
sons words (Schutz, 1971:xxvii), the
purpose of the member &dquo;is not so
much the interpretation or understand-
ing of the world but the effecting of
changes within it. &dquo; Such a conception
closely correponds to Marxs notion
his conclusions in the theses on Feuer-
bach ( 1947 :199 ). 2
One final point of fundamental con-
currence between the two theorists is
that the practical activity of humans
is subjective and inter subjective. For
Schutz, the foundation of all socially
derived knowledge is the assumption
of intersubjectivity (cf. Schutz 1964:
131, 134). Similarly Marxs major
criticism of mechanical materialism
(such as Feuerbachs ) is that it fails
to conceive of reality subjectively--
and therefore fails to comprehend the
significance of (practical) human ac-
tivity (Marx, 1947:197).
One draws out the parallels of the
two theories at the risk of concealing
basic differences. The point of de-
parture for Marx and Schutz differs
in two fundamental ways which sig-
nificantly influence subsequent theo-
retical development. Schutz, by
starting with the member in the every-
day world, (1) postulates the existence
of an abstract, isolated individual
whose social relations are problema-
tic (1971:306-311); and (2) assumes
the facticity and &dquo;givenne s s &dquo; of the
modern world. Such a point of de -
parture contains assumptions which
determine the subsequent course of
Schutzs theory.
Marxs starting point (and therefore
as sumptions ) are quite different. In
the first place, be begins with social
man. As against Feuerbachs individu-
ated conception of humans, Marx
states &dquo;But the essence of
(1947:198),
man is abstraction inherent in each
no
separate individual. In its reality it
is the ensemble of social relations. &dquo;
Ollman (1971) emphasizes this fact by
pointing out that all of Marxs concepts
are rational: social objects are not
seen as things but, rather, as clus-
ters of relations. The individual for
Marx does not exist apart from the
complex and intertwined set of social
relationships which create and sustain
him. The concept of &dquo;member, &dquo;
Marx would regard as ahistorical and
abstract.
The latter comment leads directly
to the second major distinction between
Marx and Schutz: the empirical humans
with whom Marx fir st concerns himself
are the very first of the species, those
who differentiate themselves from ani-
mals. Consequently, he is forced to
trace the way in which human actions
and energies accumulate, become insti-
tutionalized and, in a word, create the
&dquo;everyday world&dquo; of the member.
Schutz is aware that structural con-
straints go far to define the everyday
world. However, their existence is
viewed as external to the member in
,the form of &dquo;imposed relevances. &dquo;
The latter concept refers to those in-
terests which are not freely chosen by
the member. Schutz recognizes that
whether an interest is freely chosen
(and, therefore, an intrinsic relevance)
or not (and, therefore, animposed rel-
evance) is acomplex and fluid process
in the everyday world. &dquo;Imposed rele-
vance s may be transformed into intrin-
sic relevance s &dquo; ( 19 64:127 ); similarly,
an intrinsic choice may be accompanied
by a system of imposed relevances.
The system of relevances refers
then to a wide range of phenomena from
the subjective apprehension of illness/ /
health to the subjective apprehension of
law or economic privation. Clearly,
there is frequently an objective or struc.
tural component to the imposed rele-
vance ; however, it is concealed within
Schutzs theoretical orientation which
apprehends it only from the subjective
standpoint of the member. And, like
the concept of &dquo;member, &dquo; the concept
of imposed relevance is quite abstract.
By heightening our awareness of the
subjective existence of the member,
Schutz extracts all concreteness from
the imposed relevances. Paradoxically,
extracting concreteness results also in
the removal of subjectivity from the
concept. Laws are enforced by police-
men and courts; workers are fired by
supervisors, etc. The objectified
structures of society that form the ba-
sis of many of the members imposed
relevance,s are the product of members
who are (also) assembling meanings
and accounting for their flow of activi-
ties ; they are maintained through the
same processes. The concept of &dquo;im-
posed relevance&dquo; fuses environmental,
structural and idiosyncratic impositions
into a common category and thereby
transforms the social process. An ab-
stract and atomized &dquo;member&dquo; is buf-
feted by powerful &dquo;imposed relevances&dquo;
which (although the member subjectively
constructs their meaning) have no sub-
jectivity of their own.
In contrast, Marx employs the meth-
od of abstraction that Sweezy (1942 :11-
22) calls successive approximation.
That method involves retaining the fun-
damental characteristics of a context
(e. g. , historical epoch, conjucture)
while allowing superficial characteris-
tics to drop out. When moving from a
high level of generalization to the con-
crete, Marx removes simplifying as-
sumptions and undertakes to analyze the
historical situation in its full complexi-
ty. Thus, rather than employ general
categories to house a changing content
(e.g., imposed relevances), the Marx-
ist method requires that generaliza-
tions &dquo;must always have a specific his-
torical element&dquo; (Korsch, 1963:43).
The result is that a sophisticated Marx-
-
ist analysis of a specific situation takes
into account the per sonal and subjective
aspects of social structure. Marxs
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis
29
-Bonaparte *(1963) serves as an excellent
illustration of such a specific analysis.
Returning to the first major differ-
ence between Marx and Schutz, the fact
that the latter begins his analysis from
the standpoint of the individuated mem-
ber constitutes not only a point of de-
parture but also an assumption about
the nature of human existence. Fur -
ther, it is (by Schutzs own standards)
an objective definition of the member.3
Marxs alternative conception holds
that every member is created by social
processes and continues to be defined
by social processes. By extension,
the intrinsic and imposed relevances, of
necessity, can no longer be defined ab-
.stractly but, rather, must be defined
in concrete social and historical
terms.
But, it may be objected, the most
significant and consistent of the impos-
ed relevances, in Schutzs view, take
the form of social structures, not the
form of other members of the every-
day world. Quite so. However, two
further considerations help clarify the
relationship between social structure
and members of the everyday world.
First, as has already been noted, even
the most powerful social structures
do not exist abstractly. Rather they
are staffed, administered, maintained
and modified by members who can
exist in the everyday world (the afore-
mentioned policemen, judges and
supervisors). Second, even in their
most objectified forms (e. g. , the capi-
talist market), social structures re-
flect social relationships. Marx dem-
onstrated this first and most powerful-
ly in his attempts to go behind hypostati-
zed forms in order to ascertain the con-
cealed social relationship. Thus he
says (1968:79):
A Negrois a Negro. He only be-
comes a slave in certain rela-
tions. A cotton- spinning jenny is
a machine for spinning cotton. It
becomes capital only in certain re-
lations. Torn from these rela-
tionships it is no more capital
30
than gold itself is money or sugar
the price of sugar.
Both of these considerations demon-
strate that imposed relevances--even
in the form of social structures=-pos-
sess a concrete content which is nei-
ther mechanical nor, totally, a con-
struction on the part of the member.
Moore addresses himself to the latter
point with some force. Critiquing the
contention that exploitation (in feudal
social relations) is a subjective con-
cept he states (1967:470-471):
Within the framework of this
position, force and deception
can be the only possible an-
swers to this question because
one set of rewards is just as
arbitrary as any other. It
seems to me that at this point
the whole subjective interpre-
tation of exploitation breaks
down and becomes flagrantly
self-contradictory. How can
nine-tenths of the peasants
crop be no more and no less
arbitrary an extraction than a
third? The opposite point of
view, that exploitation is in
principle an objective notion,
I submit, makes better sense.
... The thesis put forward
here merely holds that the
contributions of those who
fight, rule, and pray must be
obvious to the peasant and the
peasants return payments
must not be out of
grossly
to the service s
proportion re-
ceived.
By positing exploitation as an ob-
jective circumstance, Moore, like
Marx, acknowledges the possibility
and probability that in their common
(social) circumstances the oppressed
already form a social group. Al-
though Schutz would not deny such an
assertion, he emphasizes instead the
.divergence of interest created by
unique biographical backgrounds. The
difference, again, lies in whether one
defines the member apart from his
network of social relations (as Schutz
does) or in terms of his social rela-
tions (as Marx does).
The is sue has been addre s sed most
cogently by Merleau-Ponty (1955:43-80)
who identified the problem within the
subject/object dichotomy. The theo-
retical mind, he suggests, always pos-
es the proletariat as either subject or
object. Human actors must be either
active and dominating or pas sive and
inert. Marxism, in contrast, &dquo;avoids
the alternative because it does not
consider passive consciousnesses
which are silent and sovereign, but
the exchange between workers who
are also articulate men able to as sim-
ilate the theoretical views offered to
them, and theoreticians who are also
living men capable of transposing into
their theses what others experience&dquo;
(Merleau-Ponty, 1970:155).
If, as Merleau-Ponty appears to
suggest, the concepts of worker and
theorist are not mutually exclusive
(and recent educational and occupa-
tional trends seem to increase the
likelihood that such a conclusion is
warranted), then it would seem that
Schutz, by failing to relativize the
subject/object distinction, inadver-
tently places himself within the world
of Scientific Theory (cf. Schutz,
1971:245-259) and sets himself apart
from the everyday world.
Now, it is well-known that Schutz
felt science should be included in
&dquo;the world of life&dquo; (1971:259); how-
ever, as we have seen, &dquo;the world
of life&dquo; includes (subjectively estab-
lished and maintained) social struc-
tures which are both historical and
concrete and serve as an important
component of the intrinsic and im-
posed relevances of the member.
Thus science, too, takes place in the
context of these structures. Further-
more, the member, through his ac-
tions and interpretations directly and
indirectly influences the relevance
systems of other members. There-
31
fore, for Schutz to fully reintegrate
the everyday world and the world of
Scientific Theory, it is necessary
that he consider the way in which he
(Schutz), as a subjectively active
member, is located within the larger
social structure and, by extension,
the way in which he affects the rele-
vance systems of other members. In
so doing, he would be recognizing
himself as member as well as theor-
ist, object as well as subject, and
would carry to its logical conclusion
his insight that subject and object
are not separated in the everyday
world.
-
.- - ....
For Schutz to develop his thought
in the suggested direction, he would
have to address himself to problems
which, within sociology, are classi-
fied under the heading of sociology of
knowledge. It would then follow that,
as a member /scientist, Schutz would
be forced to explore the relationship
between social science and dominant
institutions.
In fact, Schutz had no love of, and
little regard for, the sociology of
knowledge as the following quote in-
dicates(1964:121):
... wehave a so-called soci-
ology of knowledge. Yet, with
very few exceptions, the disci-
pline thus misnamed has approa-
ched the problem of the social
distribution of knowledge merely
from the angle of the ideological
foundation of truth in its depen-
 dence upon social and, especial-
ly, economic conditions....
Insofar the sociology of knowledge
as
is not within the social sci-
unique
ences, it is not unlikely that unimagi-
native and mechanical practitioners
have failed to make full use of its po-
tential. Even so, it is staggering that
a social scientist of Schutzs stature
could remain unconcerned with the in-
fluence that social and material exist-
ence may have upon consciousness.
Only a theoretical stance which confi-
dently assumes that, in all epochs,
humans may best be conceptualized as
individuated members rather than as
beings whose social relations shape
.and define their identity could be .so
comfortable in not developing the im-
plications of its own conclusion. 4 To
paraphrase a remark that Trotsky
made in a different context (1970:180),
Schutz doesnt recognize the sociology
of knowledge, but the sociology of
knowledge does not permit him to es-
cape from its net.
CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE
EVERYDAY WORLD
In view of the above critique the
reader may question exactly what
Schutz can contribute to Marxist
theory and, in particular, an under-
standing of class consciousness. It is
important then to recognize what
Schutz has and has not done. He has
not located the member in a relational
context, placed the member historical-
ly, or relativized the subject/object
distinction. What he has done is to
theoretically depict, with great precis-
ion and insight, the way in which the
modern member who accepts the assum-
ptions of Schutz (i, e. , an unquestioned
facticity of the world of the here and
now; anindividuated, as opposed to re-
lational, self-definition; an acceptance
of the subject/object cleavage wherein
actions and events are interpreted sub-
jectively or objectively in proportion to
their immediacy) views his everyday
world.
32
Interpreted in this manner, the work
of Schutz is rich with insight into the
dynamic of ideological hegemony and
false class consciousness as well as
insight into the dynamic of rapid and
far-reaching shifts in consciousness.
In the ensuing discussion it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that the ubiquitous
&dquo;member&dquo; does not represent all mem-
bers of modern society nor any &dquo;real&dquo;
member but an &dquo;ideal type, &dquo; as sug-
gested in the previous paragraph.
In that context, Schutzs member
possesses certain clear and specific
characteristics. He is confident that
he is an individual, whose distinguish-
ing traits are more important than
those traits which he shares in common
with other humans. This prized unique-
ness is a function of his biographical
history which has been filled with pri-
vate and public experiences, all of
which he has subjectively interpreted
(and subjectively reinterpreted) to
form the basis for his collection of typi-
fications which Schutz calls his &dquo;stock
of knowledge at hand. &dquo; Although the
subjectivity of personal experience is
primary, Schutzs member moves con-
tinually within a social world. In this
social world, the problem of intersub-
jectivity never formally arises. In
Schutzs words (1971:316), &dquo;I take it
for granted until counter -evidence is
offered--and assume my fellow men do
the same - -that the differences originat-
ing in our private systems of relevances
can be disregarded for the purpose at
hand . &dquo;
As the previous quote implies, each
member has a (dynamic) system of rele-
vances which help define his interests
and activities. Some of these rele-
vances are imposed and some are intrin-
sic; most frequently they are hopeless-
ly intertwined. In any event, the dif-
ferentiating factor is not in the nature
of the relevance but in how the member
subjectively defines it {e, g. , despite
the fact that a members nationality is
not initially a matter of choice, the
member may yet regard it as an intrin-
sic relevance).
Practical action is the fundamental
focus for the member. Consequently,
the zones of relevance (for Schutzs
member) tend to be defined by the ex-
tent to which practical action is immedi-
ately effective. Areas in which the in-
dividual member can be partially domi-
nant are zones of primary relevance.
Areas which seem totally beyond in-
fluence are &dquo;absolutely irrelevant&dquo;
(Schutz, 1964:124-125). Stated another
way, the member described by Schutz
defines himself in an individuated and
subjective manner. He is then consis-
tent when he define s area s in which he
!can be a subject as relevant and areas
in which he is an object as irrelevant.
Having traced, in general, the
de s cription of Schutzs member, that
typification can help us to understand
(1) the basis of social stability; and
(2) under what circumstances the con-
sciousness and, indeed, the self-defi-
nition of the member may be trans -
posed.
In the first
place, it is clear that
the tendency of the member to focus
upon immediate and personal concerns
at the expense of larger structural/
historical processes is, itself, a force
which has the effect of stabilizing a
given set of institutional arrangements.
So long as the member does not see
practical action as having practical
effects upon such institutional ar-
rangements (and consequently upon
immediate and personal concerns),
the whole concept of practicality serves
to reinforce the individuated definition
of self. Those who are concerned with
the transformation of social institutions
are seen as abstract and utopian. In
the immediacy of the everyday world,
one can detect a major aspect of the
self-reinforcing dynamic of political
sectarianism. In the first place,
social, political and economic realities
themselves appear fixed and immutable.
In Lukacs words (1971:14), &dquo;the phe-
nomona of
capitalist society appear as
supra-historical e s sence s . &dquo; Secondly
and moreover, in the practical, every-
day world those who attempt to tackle
&dquo;supra-historical essences&dquo; appear as
disequilibrated cranks whose dizziness
leads tliem to attempt to halt the ro-
tation of the earth. Needless to say,
the tendency of political sectarians to
respond to such a stereotype with dog-
matism and self-rightousness does not
bolster their case within the everyday
world.
Of course such stereotypes by no
means emerge from a vacuum. As
Schutz indicates, the member oper-
ates on the assumption that he would
act and react similarly to others if he
were in their circumstances until or
unless he has reason to question that
assumption. In modern societies,
entire institutions (e. g. , education,
mass media) have as a major focus
the proce s s of belief and opinion for-
mation. Since it is in the intere st of
rulers and revolutionaries to have the
aforementioned idealization applied to
themselves and questioned in the case
of their antagonist, their differential
access to such institutions makes their
competition for the sympathy of the
member in the everyday world a mis -
match which reinforces the basis of
social order (cf. , Sallach, 1971).
Finally, as Schutz notes, there is
a social distribution of knowledge
which influences the members con-
struction of reality and, consequently,
his practical actions. Thus, in
Schutzs words (1964:129-130), the
man on the street takes imposed rele-
vances into account &dquo;merely as ele-
ments of the situation to be defined or
as data or conditions for his course of
action. They are simply given and it
does not pay to understand their origin
or structure, &dquo; whereas the expert is
at home only with the problems which
are pre -established within his field.
Midway between these two extremes
is &dquo;the well-informed citizen&dquo; who
is neither indifferent to the structure
of relevance nor delimited by a single
system of relevances, but isopen to a
33
number of sources of socially derived
knowledge.
Implicit in this one can de-
typology
tect three sourcesof social stability. 5
First, the expert circumscribes his
system of relevances to such an extent
that he lacks the contextual scope which
would allow him to reassess the system
of relevances itself. In this regard,
Gamson (1968:5 2) comments that an ef-
fective elite strategy for minimizing
discontent is to break up larger issues
into a series of smaller (and more
technical) ones which discourage the
process of generalization. Second,
the well-informed citizen implicitly
relies on the intersubjective ideali-
zation (Schutz, 1964:131) which (as
has been noted previously), given the
differential access to ideological in-
stitutions, ensures existing authori-
ties and institutions a considerable
advantage over their radical challen-
gers. Finally, the man on the street,
as Schutz makes clear in the above
quote, focuses on practical affairs in
which the probability of effective action
is maximized and attempts only to e-
vade, as much as possible, the nega-
tive consequences of imposed rele-
vances.
It need only be added that such
&dquo;types&dquo; are not randomly created but
are closely related to indicators of
class structure. Converse finds
that only two-and-a-half per cent of
the population pos se s se s a relatively
thorough grasp of ideologie s and
their contexts and that &dquo;levels of
conceptualization&dquo; are undergirded
by &dquo;very strong differences in edu-
cation&dquo; (Converse, 1964:224). Mann
synthesizes a number of relevant
studies and concludes that the evi-
dence suggests that &dquo;only those actu-
ally sharing in societal power need
develop (internally) consistent values&dquo;
(1970:435) and, further, that working
class compliance with the political
order is based upon a lack of consen-
sus and a lack of internal consistency
.which prevents that class from trans-
34
lating its experience s into a political
framework !t Undoubtedly, the social
reality fr om which such conclusions
are derived is the same as that which
leads Birnbaum (1971:386) to conclude
that &dquo;American society lacks the ide-
ological resources to make a correct
estimate of its historical situation. &dquo;
THE DYNAMIC OF CLASS
.
CONSCIOUSNESS
The difficulty with evidence such
as the preceding is that it is static and
unyielding in nature. It seems to imply
that the situation described is deeply
rooted and subject to gradual transfor-
mation at best. Yet such an interpre-
tation would be inadequate to explain
the rapid shifts in consciousness, in-
terpretations, and actions which occur
in periods of social upheaval. It is a
major strength of Schutzs social theory
that it is capable of incorporating such
dynamic phenomena.
Schutz recognizes and always treats
member interpretations and member
definitions of imposed relevances as
shifting, dynamic, and fluid. He does
not view the members zones of rele-
vance asfixed but, rather, as continu-
ally emergent and ever volatile, al-
ways subject to transformation as a
result of changed circumstances which
force the member to reinterpret speci-
fic relevances as well as the system
of relevance s itself. In Schutzs
words (1964:131), &dquo;What is today rela-
tively irrelevant may be imposed to-
morrow as a primary relevance... &dquo;
Schutz feels that such a possibility
exists be.cause the world of everyday
life (complete with social facts and
institutions) &dquo;is imposed on us&dquo; and
we tend to &dquo;take for granted what
others believe beyond question&dquo;
(Schutz, 1964:157). However, this
important source of social continuity
must be interpreted in the context of
one important caveat:
All this presupposes our faith
that things will continue to be
what they have been so far and
 that what our experience of
them has taught us will also
stand the test in the future.
(Schutz, 1964:157)
Of course it is precisely in periods
of social dislocation that ones experi-
ence does not &dquo;stand the test of the
future&dquo; and in which the member may
become open to new and radical inter-
pretations. More concretely, it is
during periods of major (social, politi-
cal, economic) institutional crisis that
the accepted realities of the everyday
world become subverted and the trans-
formation of class consciousness (and
societal institutions) becomes a possi-
bility. To say that such transformation
becomes a possibility does not mean
that any specific form of consciousness
(or member interpretation) becomes
inevitable. Lukacs (1971:79) expresses
this thought most clearly when he says,
&dquo;The objective theory of class con-
sciousness is the theory of its objective
possibility. &dquo; When the members faith
in the taken-for-granted is shaken, it
opens the possibility of a radical reinter-
pretation of the social mileau; but it
does not insure the form that reinter-
pretation will take. This insight goe s
far to explain the fact that social cri-
ses engender not only radical movemen-
ts but also religious revivals and rnove-
ments of the right. Accordingly,
Schutzs emphasis upon the dynamic
process of member interpretation is
appropriate not only to stable situations
but chaotic ones as well. An under -.
standing of cataclysmic times requiress
the dynamic analysis contained in
Schutzs theoretical orientation.
On the other hand, Schutzs individu-
ated view of the societal member also
distorts our understanding of rapid
shifts in social consciousness. Socie-
tal crises do not occur on an individual
basis. Social disruptions affect large
number s of member s simultaneously.
Wars and depressions, for example,
have similar consequences for entire
classes of societal members. Thus it
becomes important to examine, specif-
ically and histor ically, the way in
which groups and classes share con-
sequences, the way in which prior in-
terpretive schemes increase the like-
lihood that a given group or class will
respond in a collective manner. To
begin ones analysis with the individu-
ated member predisposes one to un-
derestimate both the shared experi-
ence of the crisis and the possibility
of a collective re sponse .
The latter possibility illustrates
one final difficulty in applying the
theory of Schutz to concrete instances
35
of.historical crisis and change. Such
periods serve to undermine the as sump-
tions present in the world of everyday
life, to encourage the reinterpretation
of specific relevances, and (historical-
ly) to give rise to collective, class-
conscious attempts to intervene in the
crisis and to influence its consequenc-
es. Schutz, however, does not ex-
plore the significance of these develop-
ments. For Schutz, the members
attempt to reinterpret and analyze the
taken-for -granted and to intervene in
the operation of imposed relevances
means that the member transforms
the relationship between himself and
the imposed relevances that he con-
fronts. The practical task of changing
societal institutions means that: 1) the
member is no longer atomized, for,
if he is to have a chance at success,
he is forced to join with other members
whose interests he shares; 2) the mem-
ber must view societal institutions not
as &dquo;imposed relevances&dquo; which form
part of the objective (reified) para-
meters of the everyday world but as
human-created historical formations
which must be under stood concretely
to be changed (including an understand-
ing of the humans who subjectively ad-
minister such institutions); and, con-
sequently, 3) the member is required
to learn that his &dquo;individuated&dquo; world
is not totally subjective (but has been
partially formed by objective proces-
ses) nor are institutional imposed rel-
evances totally objective (but may be
influenced or changed by the members
conscious intervention).
Thus, member response to an insti-
tutional crisis may require that mem-
ber to break down the artificial distinc-
tion between a subjective member and
an objective social environment and
the way in which societal members are
both subjects and objects, both control-
lers and controlled. 6
Previously, it was suggested that
Schutzs theoretical orientation accur-
ately depicted the modern societal
member who shares Schutzs assump-
36
tions about social reality and about
himself. During periods of institu-
tional crisis, the member may come
to reject the assumption that his unique
individualism is more significant than
his class affiliation; and he may reject
as well an ahistorical and reified view
of the world. Insofar as this process
occurs, it illustrates that Schutzs
member is historically specific.
Though we meet this member with
great regularity, we must recall the
fact that Schutz ignored: the &dquo;rnem-
ber&dquo; is created by specific historical
circumstances. As human members
change these socio-historical circum-
stances, they change themselves, the
social structure, the circumstances
in which new humans will come to
consciousness and, ultimately, the
everyday world. 7
NOTES
*This is modification of a paper presented to the
a
1972 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological
Association in New Orleans.
1. Three examples of existentialists who have attemp-
ted to reconcile their philosophy with Marxism are
Sartre (1960), Merleau-Ponty (1955), and Tran
(1970); two overviews of the dialogue are provided
by Aron (1970) and Novack (1966).
2. For example, the famous eleventh thesis proclaims:
"The philosophers have only interpreted the world
differently; the point, however, is to change it. "
(Marx and Engels, 1947:199).
3. Schutz considers an objective definition to be a
"
"conceptual construct of the outsider. (1965:255)
4. The tendency on the part of Schutz to attribute sub-
jectivity to the individuated member and mechani-
cal objectivity to the imposed relevance parallels
a tendency described by Lukacs (1971:335, 77),
"The capitalist process of reification both over-
individualizes man and objectifies him mechanical-
ly.... In the one case, consciousness becomes
a completely passive observer moving in obedience
to laws which it can never control. In the other,
it regards itself as a power which is capable of its
own subjective volition to master the essentially
"
meaningless notion of objects.
5. Although their theoretical and methodological as-
sumptions are at wide variance, Schutzs typology
closely parallels the conclusions which Converse
(1964) draws from his empirical examination of
the belief systems of mass publics.
6. Marxs view of such a relativization is captured
by his statement, "Man make their own history,
but they do not make it just as they please; they
do not make it under circumstances chosen by
themselves, but under circumstances directly
encountered, given and transmitted from the
past." (Marx, 1963:15).
 Mann, Michael
7. Because this discussion is primarily concerned with 1970 "The Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracy."
the theoretical, with Schutzs analysis of conscious- American Sociological Review 35 Uune) :423-
ness and the everyday world, it omits much con- 439.
crete analysis of this transformation process, e. g. , Marcuse, Herbert
the role of the political party. Two recent and 1960 Reason and Revolution. Boston: Beacon
stimulating articles on the latter are provided by Marx, Karl
Harman (1971) and Taft (1972). 1963 The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.
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37