BERNHARD - REVIEW - Methodological Disputes in Comparative Politics

Review: Methodological Disputes in Comparative Politics
Reviewed Work(s): Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards by Henry E.
Brady and David Collier; Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design
in Comparative Politics
(Analytical Perspectives on Politics) by Barbara Geddes; Comparative Historical
Analysis in the Social Sciences
(Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) by James Mahoney and Dietrich
Rueschemeyer; Passion, Craft, and Method in Comparative Politics by Gerardo L. Munck
and Richard Snyder
Review by: Michael Bernhard
Source: Comparative Politics, Vol. 41, No. 4 (July 2009), pp. 495-515
Published by: Comparative Politics, Ph.D. Programs in Political Science, City University of
New York
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Review Article
Methodological Disputes in Comparative Politics
Michael Bernhard
Henry E. Brady and David Collier, eds., Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools,
Shared Standards, Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield, 2004.
Barbara Geddes, Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design
in Comparative Politics (Analytical Perspectives on Politics), Ann Arbor, University of
Michigan Press, 2003.
James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., Comparative Historical Analysis in

the Social Sciences (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics), Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Gerardo L. Munck and Richard Snyder, Passion, Craft, and Method in Comparative
Politics, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007.
Within comparative politics there is a long-standing tension between general theory and
its application to diverse areas of the globe. Yet one can argue that this has been a produc-
tive tension. Good work that is grounded in a firm understanding of history and place
often contributes to the expansion of the theoretical horizons of the discipline as a whole.
One only needs to think of Juan Linz's investigation of the particularities of the regime in
Spain, or Robert Putnam's consideration of the differences between northern and south-
ern Italy, to appreciate how empirical studies grounded in one place can move concepts
such as "authoritarianism" and "social capital" to a central place in the discipline.1
Attempting to extend the reach of established theory to explain a broad range of
cases is precisely what political science should aspire to do. This endeavor can become
problematic when researchers fail to make an intellectually sound case for the applicabil-
ity of established theory to the central problems confronting a region to which the theory
has not yet been applied. Consideration of a new set of cases is most productive when
new observations lead to the reconsideration and the refinement of theory. This is when
the tension between general theory and the particularities of place is most productive.
495
Comparative Politics July 2009
Still, some scholars persist in calling for a universalistic approach to the study of
politics, though recently such claims have been more methodological than theoretical.
The most influential work to propound a "one-size-fits-all" view of social science has
been Designing Social Inquiry by Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sydney Verba
(hereafter KKV).2 Its argument is explicitly methodological. Put simply, KKV argue
that there is one way to make valid scientific inferences in the social sciences, and that
is by using the regression model. The implication is that qualitative researchers should
emulate the logic of quantitative work.
Many political scientists, among them Henry Brady and David Collier, whose re-
cent edited volume is reviewed here, are uncomfortable with the methodological uni-
versalism advocated by KKV, seeing it as epistemologically premature or even mis-
guided. One can value the analytic power of quantitative analysis that uses the regression
model and still take issue with the exclusivist claims KKV make concerning scientific
inference. Increasingly, sophisticated practitioners of the regression model augment
quantitative work with fieldwork. This provides greater certainty that the causal con-
nections tested in regressions are valid through the observation of cases relevant to the
theory. Fieldwork also provides the opportunity to make in-depth observations that
can lead to new ideas and insights grounded in real politics. Moreover, though KKV
have a strong position on how to answer questions, methodological universalism pro-
vides no guidance as to which questions are worth answering. Should the ability to im-
plement a particular strategy of inference be the driving force behind the disciplinary
research agenda?
Given the importance of qualitative research in comparative politics, KKV created
consternation among many in the subfield. They entered into an ongoing discussion on
the nature of inference and the most appropriate methods to use in diverse circum-
stances. Many comparativists hold that there is a hierarchy of inference based on the
types of control that the available data allow one to exercise. At the top of the hierarchy
are experimental methods, followed by statistical methods, and then comparative small-n
methods based on John Stuart Mill's logic.3 Arend Lijphart is a well-known advocate of
this position.4 Others, such as David Collier, have argued that comparative politics
studies problems that place important limitations on the kinds of data that can be col-
lected and on the inferential leverage that can be brought to bear (a degrees of freedom
problem), and thus must rely on Mill's methods.5 Finally, Charles Ragin is prominent
among those who argue that the causal logic used by qualitative researchers is funda-
mentally different from and has certain advantages over the regression model of politi-
cal science.6
Whether one is supportive or skeptical of their argument, KKV have provoked in-
tense methodological introspection and reconsideration of how logical inference is
made in comparative politics. The many rejoinders to their work have helped illuminate
the uses of qualitative analysis and have increased interest in small-n methods, often
through mixed methods research designs that combine large- and small-n analyses.7
496
Michael Bernhard
The four books reviewed here and their receptions are, at least in part, a product of
the sharpened debate over methods prompted by KKV's advocacy of the regression
model. The essays in Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, edited by
James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, draw attention to the accomplishments of
one of the most influential brands of qualitative work in political science and sociology -
macrosocial historical analysis. The book highlights the accumulation of knowledge
generated by this method, discusses the tools that qualitative historical social scientists
employ, and defends its methodological assumptions. As a state-of-the-art overview, the
book fills the same niche for macrosocial historical analysis that KKV's volume,
Analytic Narratives, and Beyond the Cultural Turn, fill for the large-, rational choice,
and postmodern schools of social inquiry.8
Paradigms and Sandcastles by Barbara Geddes is akin to KKV's book in that it ar-
gues a particular view of what constitutes science. While her claims are not as deeply
embedded in method as theirs, Geddes can be seen as a kindred spirit in her strong pref-
erence for the regression model of inference. Unlike KKV, she advocates a strong
agenda for theory building and engages in an extended polemic against many of the
seminal works of the comparative historical school, trying to show the weakness of the-
ory not inspired by rational choice.
Rethinking Social Inquiry, edited by David Collier and Henry Brady, is a direct re-
joinder to KKV's position, explicitly intended to open up methodological space for
qualitative researchers alongside the regression model. Its essential theme is that both
qualitative and quantitative researchers can acknowledge shared standards of inference,
with neither side in the debate holding a monopoly on scientific truth.
Finally, in Passion, Craft, and Method in Comparative Politics, Gerardo L. Munck
and Richard Snyder maintain that the practice of good comparative politics is not just a
question of choosing the correct method. Munck and Snyder conducted structured in-
terviews with fifteen of the most accomplished and visible comparative scholars of the
last fifty years, who comprise a highly diverse group both in terms of their theoretical
inspirations and methodological preferences. These outstanding members of the profes-
sion discuss how great researchers choose compelling research topics, frame research
questions, and set about finding answers. Method is but one critical part of the process.
The interviews suggest that the process of formulating questions worth answering is
complex and draws inspiration from various sources.
Showcasing Comparative Historical Analysis
Comparative historical analysis has been one of the most theoretically fruitful and
methodologically influential strains of research in comparative politics. In Comparative
Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, Mahoney and Rueschemeyer characterize
this method as combining causal analysis with understanding processes over time and
497
using systematic and contextualized comparison (p. 11). Despite the growing impor-
tance of more normal science approaches linked to the regression model, the volume
demonstrates that comparative historical analysis has produced advances in both politi-
cal science and sociology over the last decade and a half, and continues to play an im-
portant role.
Unlike the Geddes and Brady and Collier volumes, the selections in this book are
not explicitly confrontational and do not strongly polemicize with other traditions.
Rather, they demonstrate the continued richness of small-n historical analysis and its
use of state-of-the-art research tools. The showcase quality of the book makes it excep-
tionally useful as a teaching tool both for graduate courses on scope and methods, as
well as for more specialized courses on small-n research.
The first section of the book traces how comparative historical analysis has led to
the accumulation of knowledge in several important areas of social scientific inquiry -
revolution, social policy, and regime change. These are areas in which the method has
yielded strong contributions to theory; and the entries in this section buttress the claim
that such theory remains relevant because researchers have refined it over time in response
to new developments and new data.
Jack Goldstone 's essay on revolutions makes the provocative and insightful obser-
vation that comparative historical analysis engages in a kind of implicit Bayesian analy-
sis.9 Bayesian statistics uses assumptions (often grounded in earlier research) about
how the phenomenon under investigation operates, and then uses expected patterns of
observation to draw inference. Comparative historical analysis engages in a logically
similar exercise in its reliance on pattern tracing and congruence testing to theorize and
falsify. Congruence testing checks to see if causal patterns present in new observations
conform to established theories. Where congruence is not found, researchers engage
anew in pattern tracing of the causal sequence in discordant cases. Identifying distinct
patterns can then be used to synthesize a higher order theory based on the different
paths to the same outcome (p. 51).
James Mahoney's essay expounds on how comparative historical analysis treats
theory falsification, citing as an example numerous studies that provide only "limited
and conditional support" for Barrington Moore's hypotheses about regime type in The
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (p. 145). At the same time, he points out that
Moore's findings sparked an extensive literature - exploring how issues of accumula-
tion of wealth, development, class structure, and the incorporation of subaltern groups
into the polity potentially shape the forms that regimes take - and led to the reformula-
tion of more comprehensive and refined theories. The inspiration provided by Moore
shows why certain works remain classics despite being subjected to prolonged and tren-
chant criticism.
The second section of the book purportedly is devoted to showing that comparative
historical analysis uses a range of analytical tools. However, only the essay by Roger
Gould focuses on a specific tool of research - network analysis. The other essays
498
Michael Bernhard
concentrate on the conceptualization of social processes in temporal or developmental

terms. Paul Pierson, writing on the role of time in social and economic processes, and
Katherine Thelen, exploring issues of institutional innovation and reproduction, sum-
marize important work that has since been published in book-length treatments.10 Both
authors are concerned about the large number of practitioners of the regression model
who fail to take time into account and limit themselves to temporally proximate indica-
tors to determine the correlates of their dependent variable. This is not necessarily an
inherent limitation of the method but perhaps of the imagination of some researchers.
Legacies can be directly incorporated by using count variables, which track the passage
of time, as well as event history techniques and indicators that capture the variable im-
pact of legacies, including stock and flow treatments. This is an area where comparative
historical analysts have thought in creative ways and have inspired researchers using
other approaches.
The last essay in this section, by Ira Katznelson, returns to the structure/agency
dichotomy - how to integrate macrosocial inquiry's strengths in investigating and peri-
odizing large-scale change with microlevel work that uses the preferences of individual
actors as the key explanatory variable. Katznelson supports privileging the preferences
of actors at critical junctures, suggesting that agency overcomes historical constraint
during periods of great ferment. This is an interesting way to think about the tension,
but it also opens a range of thorny questions. What makes one time period a critical
juncture? Are attempts by actors to induce radical change always futile unless they hap-
pen to be at a critical juncture? Does human agency play a role in creating critical junc-
tures? Do actors sometimes miss the opportunities open to them through critical junc-
tures due to self-imposed constraints posed by their own beliefs?
The selections in the final section of the book discuss important methodological
issues raised by the use of comparative historical analysis. Dietrich Rueschemeyer con-
centrates on the utility of one case or a small number of cases for theory generation.
James Mahoney shows that different types of comparison, such as cross-national analy-
sis using nominal or ordinal types of measurement and within-case analysis, yield dif-
ferent means for assessing causal relationships.
Perhaps the most provocative essay is that of Peter Hall on the disjuncture between
ontology and method. Hall broadly defines methodology as "the means that scholars
employ to increase confidence that the inferences they make about the social and polit-
ical world are valid" (p. 373), and ontology as "the fundamental assumptions that
scholars make about the nature of the social and political world and especially about the
nature of causal relationships in that world" (p. 374). Much of our inference is provided
by regressions that are probabilistic in worldview and predicated on strong assump-
tions - for example, that unit homogeneity exists, that important causal variables are in-
corporated and their independence from each other is established, that the causal direc-
tion between the dependent and independent variables is properly specified, and that
the outcome in one observation does not affect others.
499
Yet much of the innovative theory in the subfield calls for more complex kinds of
causation. It has a profoundly deterministic ontology based on the notion of logical ne-
cessity that certain causal factors must be present for an outcome to occur. Many influ-
ential theories maintain that variables are specific to time or region, that certain factors
are only causal in the presence or absence of certain conditions, or that certain causal
variables are inexorably linked to others. Many game theoretic and path dependent
models of political processes see political outcomes as highly contingent upon the con-
ditions in which they are embedded. Such theories do not easily lend themselves to un-
covering universal causal regularities. The nature of these theories is, to some extent, at
odds with the assumptions underlying regression analysis (noted above and further dis-
cussed below).
Hall discusses how the discipline has reacted and coped with the disjuncture be-
tween ontology and methodology. First, some argue that political science needs to move
away from studying big questions holistically and to concentrate on understanding key
social mechanisms that produce big outcomes. Among the advocates of this turn toward
microprocesses are many formal theorists, as well as prominent historicists, including
Charles Tilly. Barbara Geddes takes this position as well. Second, others advocate ex-
panding the scope and sophistication of statistical methods to try to better model the
ontological assumptions of theory. And, as noted above, where regression analysis does
not explain everything, researchers turn to case studies to elucidate and enrich statisti-
cal findings. Third, Charles Ragin favors using more sophisticated methods for testing
necessary and sufficient condition, such as Boolean algebra, as the way out of this dis-
juncture. Finally, some analysts, like those in the constructivist school in international
relations, turn away from positivism and toward understanding the development of
rules and norms bounded by time and place.
Hall advocates comparative historical analysis to bridge the gap between method-
ology and ontology for two reasons. First, it does not represent a broad departure from
the positivist underpinnings of the mainstream of the discipline because variables are
used to uncover causal relationships, though according to deterministic rather than
probabilistic logic. Second, when comparative historical analysis engages in "process
tracing," it has certain advantages over regression analysis, such as the ability to use
multiple observations within cases to test the specific claims of a theory.
Paradigms Lost and Found?
Paradigms and Sand Castles is part of the series, "Analytical Perspectives on Politics,"
devoted to providing an overview of new ideas in the discipline while making "strong
minded prescriptions ... for future work in the field" (p. iv). Geddes takes this chal-
lenge seriously. As with KKV, the target audiences are advanced undergraduates and
beginning graduate students. However, it is more than a textbook as it takes strong
500
Michael Bernhard
positions on the nature of comparative politics and the practice of political science.
Like KKV, Geddes advocates a more "scientific" comparative politics but places for-
mal theory (especially game theory), not just the regression model of inference, at the
center of this enterprise.
The book's title evokes the idea that comparative politics is constantly reshaped as
unanticipated events inspire a perpetual search for explanation. Geddes notes that theo-
ries of authoritarianism and state-guided industrialization have been discarded in the
face of widespread democratization and neoliberal economic reform (though from the
perspective of 2009 this obituary may seem premature). Invoking Kuhn, she argues that
the problem of paradigm meltdown in political science is particularly acute because in-
sufficient attention is paid to research design (pp. 4-5). ! ]
She believes the search for new theory will fail because comparative politics has
resorted to developing theory by induction. While acknowledging that induction can
lead to generalization, correlation, and eventually theory, she feels it mainly generates
"a disorganized mass of information." In noting that relationships derived from the
study of one case often do not hold in others, Geddes complains that insufficient effort
is made to determine whether they do and that historical detail and description of
events have become substitutes for determining cause and effect. "As a result, long-
lived theories all too often fail to emerge from inductive work" (p. 5).
In her indictment of theorizing from induction, Geddes leaves a number of critical
questions unanswered. For instance, if historical induction is the problem, why are there
paradigm shifts in natural sciences that rely on experimental methods? Given that un-
derstanding the political world is based on the observation of real political phenomena
rather than the manipulation of objects in the laboratory, how are researchers to pro-
ceed, at least in the preliminary stages of theorization, if not by induction? How are ax-
iomatic premises for deductive reasoning derived without some observation or stipula-
tion of the immutable properties and nature of humanity? Are there broadly applicable
alternatives to theorization about new political phenomena other than by observing
events and trying to understand the changes that create new outcomes? While deduc-
tion certainly is a more powerful tool for drawing inference, both logics have an essen-
tial role in theorizing.
Geddes makes the provocative argument that there is a more profound crisis in
comparative politics, especially in the study of the "developing" world. With the
demise of the earlier paradigms of modernization and dependency, no new paradigm
has emerged. Instead, she argues that new "approaches" - including historical insti-
tutionalism and rational choice - that pinpoint certain actors or factors as crucial,
and that utilize specific methods to investigate key questions, are now more promi-
nent (p. 21).
Geddes believes that no new paradigm has emerged for several reasons: the shat-
tering of previous paradigms; "the emergence of urgent questions that so far have
seemed inexplicable by the kind of simple, elegant theories on which paradigms rest";
501
and the accumulation of greater quantities of factual knowledge which has made it
harder to produce paradigmatic theories (p. 22). Again, this leaves many critical ques-
tions unanswered. From a Kuhnian perspective, the shattering of old paradigms should
promote rather than obstruct the emergence of new ones. The accumulation of data is
not an impediment to formulating and testing new theories. Does "paradigms lost" sug-
gest that the complexity of human existence has outstripped our ability to understand
politics? Or is the imposition of unitary explanatory frameworks on complex political
life a nineteenth century ambition that requires the unchecked intellectual optimism of
a Spencer or a Marx?
For Geddes the answer to these two last questions is a definitive no. She uses
small-n historical approaches (comparative macrohistorical analysis and historical in-
stitutionalism) as the foil that elucidates her position, claiming that historicist social
science has come to terms with the idea that the age of paradigms is lost, and
. . . [I]n consequence, [it] defend[s] complicated, highly contingent, inelegant explanations

as the only kind likely to reflect accurately the causal complexity of the world. In my judg-
ment, this position is tantamount to giving up on the 'science' in our ambitious name for
ourselves; I do not think we should settle for such a compromise (p. 22).
If the world is as causally complex as historicists believe, why is trying to model

that complexity giving up on science? If historicists are wrong about causal complexity,
how so; and what principles should order our understanding so as to render the world
more intelligible? Geddes' response is that if we do things better methodologically, our
troubles will be reduced. The key for Geddes is to become more scientific, using the ra-
tional choice approach, and to think of human beings as homo economicus (maximizers
of utility) (p. 26). However, this is not really a method or an approach to drawing logi-
cal inference but a road to theorization based on a simplifying assumption about how
human beings behave.
Geddes claims that her work is not intended to proselytize for rational choice, but
rather to show that a more scientific approach to the study of politics is universally de-
sirable. But this rings false as she spends a great deal of time criticizing classic studies
that use small-n historicist methods and inductive theory. She moves beyond KKV's
argument for universalistic scientific inference by posing rational choice theory as the
key to framing research questions.
Geddes' predisposition to rationalist theorization is explicitly linked to three build-
ing blocks of research design: testing the implications of theory rather than theory it-
self, avoiding selection bias, and evaluating evidence. The first element of Geddes'
recipe for successful research design concerns the selection of research questions.
Geddes believes comparative politics needs to continue addressing big questions like
democratization and development, but not holistically. Rather, she claims that large
phenomena involve multifaceted and complex processes that no one theory can fully
502
Michael Bernhard
explain. She proposes limiting theorization and testing to individual parts of the
processes but provides no scientific rationale for proceeding in this fashion:
In contrast to much of the methodological advice given in this book, the suggestions in this
chapter do not derive from the logic of quantitative research. I cannot make a claim that this
research strategy is more "correct" than any other. My argument rests, rather, on the judg-
ment that it is a more effective route to an accumulation of theoretical knowledge. The
proof of the pudding is in the eating, however, and until we have some pudding, we cannot
taste it (pp. 27-28).
The question is whether to privilege testing parts of a theory over testing it directly
a priori. If one can collect and operationalize data for the dependent, the main indepen-
dent, and a likely complement of control variables, in a comprehensive or at least rep-
resentative sample of cases, and thereby directly test a theory, why not do so? Testing
parts of a theory is useful when direct testing is not possible because of limited data or
other prohibitive complications. But second order confirmation should not be the start-
ing point.
The second element of Geddes' strategy for research design is to avoid selection bias.
Choosing cases on the basis of the outcome on the dependent variable can lead one to
misconstrue any characteristic that the cases share as causal (p. 92). She makes a strong
case for avoiding errors of this type and argues that influential small-n cross-national re-
search suffers from such problems.12 This explains why she strongly opposes theorization
on the basis of induction. Still, there is reason to question whether such a blanket prohibi-
tion is warranted - an issue revisited below in the discussion of Brady and Collier.
The third element of Geddes' program for research design revolves around issues
of evidence, in particular the issue of nonconforming cases. She criticizes how practi-
tioners of historicism respond to cases that do not conform to the expectations of the-
ory. The standard practice has been to seek an explanation for why the cases do not con-
form, and then to formulate a more general theory that covers both the conforming and
deviant cases (for example, congruence testing and pattern tracing as discussed above).
Geddes condemns this practice:
After holding out for an admirably long time, they have now reached the point that practi-
tioners of the comparative historical method seem always to reach eventually: the variables
outnumber the cases, and explanation degenerates into description. This degradation occurs
because of the failure to internalize fully the implications of the probabilistic nature of
social science theories. We feel an intuitive need to explain outcomes inconsistent with
theoretical expectations, even though we know that no theory will explain all the variation
that exists in the real world (p. 151).
She takes a strong position on what is essentially an irresolvable dilemma in the

social sciences, regardless of one's perspective and methodological preference. One
503
way to cope with nonconforming cases is to try to incorporate them by modifying the-
ory, as many small-n comparative researchers do. Research that uses large- regression
techniques may not face the same problem with nonconforming cases (as long as there
are not so many as to lead to a non-significant finding). In any large data set there are a
large percentage of cases whose values contradict any finding of statistical signifi-
cance. Probabilistic research of this sort only suggests, all other things being equal, the
factors that make it more likely that a country will have a given outcome. Thus such
studies have an extremely low probability of identifying causal factors that meet stan-
dards of logical necessity or sufficiency. Nonconforming cases in the data set, particu-
larly if they are few and far between, do not necessarily prescribe rejecting hypotheses
because the logic is probabilistic, not deterministic. The two traditions, of small-n and
large- research, confront the problem of nonconforming cases in different ways ac-
cording to their different logics.
In her critique of how small-n historical methods treat nonconforming cases,
Geddes argues that all theory should be probabilistic. I wonder if she has not taken
the logic of large- inference and posited it to be the way the world works, rather than
confronting the divergence between ontology and methodology as framed by Hall.
This is even more unsettling given that rational choice theorists, especially when talk-
ing about the micro foundations of politics or engaging in analytic narratives, do not
characterize the world in probabilistic terms. They use deductive logic and the lan-
guage of cause and effect.13 Probabilistic and deterministic views of the world are
only explanatory frameworks imposed on the world to try to make sense of it. In the
absence of experimental control, is there ever certainty that an occurrence was the di-
rect outcome of a particular cause or whether that cause made the outcome more
likely?
Despite the different ways in which these two varieties of social science deal with
anomalous cases, Geddes stigmatizes small-n historical work as being unfalsifiable.
She says, "If one 'tests' hypotheses on the same cases used to develop them, one will
certainly confirm them. Such research designs do not subject arguments to the possibil-
ity of falsification" (p. 172). These assertions ignore and are contradicted by the atten-
tion paid to congruence testing in the small-n methodological literature. First of all,
small-n practitioners dispute each other's theories based on contesting evidence from
the same case. In Rethinking Social Inquiry, Rogowski argues that the work of Rudolf
Heberle refutes Moore's thesis; and in Comparative Historical Analysis, as previously
noted, Mahoney cites many studies that take issue with Barrington Moore.
Second, theory is modified or discarded based on its applicability to new cases, ge-
ographically or chronologically. This is the point of congruence testing in small-n
methodology. When theory does not seem to apply in a new context, small-n compara-
tivists try to modify the theory to account for new findings. Is there anything unscien-
tific about modifying theory in the face of confounding evidence? Theoretical refine-
ment represents a rejection of the theory in its previous form. In Comparative
504
Michael Bernhard
Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, Goldstone argues that this is congruent with
Imre Lakatos' notion of a scientific research program. If theory cannot be refined, it is
discarded. Just think of the fate of dependency theory since the rise of newly industrial-
izing states in Asia or Latin America. But sometimes theories confronted with con-
founding evidence can be refined by maintaining their core theories and adjusting aux-
iliary theories to incorporate the discordant evidence (p. 51).
Shared Standards for Logical Inference?
Rethinking Social Inquiry is an explicit critical response to KKV's argument for one
logic of valid inference in the social sciences. While the authors praise KKV for their
contribution, the purpose of their essays is to dispute overarching claims about valid
logical inference.
The critique is three pronged. The first part is based on statistical theory. In partic-
ular, Brady and Larry Bartels, well-known quantitative researchers specializing in
American politics, feel that KKV underplay the limitations inherent in the regression
model, especially in establishing causality. The second part addresses the limitations of
some of the methodological principles advocated in universalistic terms by KKV. The
third part is based on the argument that KKV omit or even misunderstand how qualita-
tive research contributes to social science, notably in developing concepts, handling
complex and heterogeneous forms of causality, controlling for differences in context,
and maximizing inferential leverage from a small number of observations. The authors
challenge KKV's assertion that qualitative researchers should become more like their
quantitative brethren, positing instead that maintaining a unique set of qualitative tools
is justified by both statistical theory as well as its distinct logic in drawing inference.
The first prong concerns the assumptions of the standard regression model with re-
gard to causal homogeneity, independence of observations, and conditional indepen-
dence. With regard to the assumption that "all units with the same value of the explana-
tory variables have the same expected value of dependent variable," Collier, Seawright,
and Munck point out that if causal homogeneity does not hold, there is evidently more
than one kind of causality at work in the phenomenon under investigation. And if there
is more than one causal mechanism producing outcomes on the dependent variable, a
regression will estimate an average of the various causal logics in play rather than cap-
ture the essential logic of any of them (pp. 29-30). 14
The essays also challenge the assumption of the independence of observations -
that each observation of a particular variable is unaffected by others. There are statisti-
cal means to gauge the interdependence of observations and methods to control for the
effect of one observation on another. However, not identifying and correcting the prob-
lem can lead to overestimating the variance in the relationship between variables and
thereby producing misleading findings (pp. 30-31).
505
In questioning the last assumption of the regression model, the essays note that as-
serting the conditional independence of assignment and outcome relies on counterfac-
tual reasoning.15 When it is possible to establish experimental control, one can observe
the dependent variable when it is subjected to a "treatment" (t) of something hypothe-
sized to affect it, and when it is absent as in a control group (c). If the dependent vari-
able can be measured, the two values (Yt and Yc) can be compared and the causal im-
pact of the independent variable (Yt - Yc) can be gauged. It is very difficult to establish
experimental control because many questions can only be studied with data collected
through observing real political processes (though experimentation to understand indi-
vidual political behavior is advancing rapidly).16 Since experimental control can rarely
be established, researchers often engage in counterfactual thought experiments, judging
whether a particular outcome would occur in the absence of the "treatment" hypothe-
sized as causal and comparing an event and a non-event. Since there is no such thing as
alternative universes in the mundane lives of political scientists, the regression model re-
lies on multiple observations of processes assumed to be similar (for example, all possi-
ble observations of the phenomenon under study). Logical inference is thus a product of
how politics distributes observations between the treatment and control groups.
The second prong of the book's counterargument is that KKV overstate the univer-
salism of quantitative methodology and undervalue the importance of a diverse set of re-
search tools. Several authors take issue with the principles that increasing the number of
observations improves inferential leverage and that selecting cases based on the depen-
dent variable inherently leads to biased results. The irony of telling small-n researchers
that they should enhance the validity of their results by increasing the number of obser-
vations, essentially giving up the small-n research enterprise, is not lost on these authors.
Collier, Mahoney, and Seawright maintain that increasing the number of cases or obser-
vations will actually sacrifice a portion of the inference drawn from the study. Small-n
qualitative research draws inference not only from cross-case comparisons but from in-
tertemporal comparisons within single cases (pp. 94-98). Whereas cross-case designs
can draw incorrect conclusions from selection bias (similar to a regression on a trun-
cated and biased sample), inferences that examine the causal mechanisms at play in one
case by looking at change over time are not subject to selection bias.
In separate essays, Brady and Bartels point out that unreflective attempts to in-
crease observations can lead to other sorts of problems. Here they draw on Giovanni
Sartori's work on conceptualization and measurement.17 They note that increasing the
number of observations by including in the sample additional observations that are
closely linked to the phenomenon under investigation can lead to concept stretching
(including units in the sample that fall out of the extension of the concept being opera-
tionalized), and thus to the loss of causal homogeneity.
Another of KKV's forceful suggestions is to avoid selection bias on the dependent
variable. Their argument, also made by Geddes, is that if cases exhibiting a positive out-
come on the dependent variable also share similar characteristics on a key independent
506
Michael Bernhard
variable, small-n designs can incorrectly attribute causal significance where large-n
tests will find no correlation whatsoever. Collier, Mahoney, and Seawright point out
that selection based on the dependent variable is not always inappropriate, especially
where there is little knowledge of the phenomenon in question and in-depth work is
necessary even to begin the process of theorization.
Another way the issue of selection bias may mislead researchers is connected to
the issue of causality and the limitations of probabilistic research design. The differ-
ence between necessity and sufficiency in causation is critical. In particular, regression
is not particularly well equipped to detect causal necessity. Brady, Collier, and Seawright
see this as one of the important trade-offs between probabilistic and deterministic re-
search designs (pp. 2 13-16). 18
This is inadvertently demonstrated by Geddes in her discussion of selection bias.
She criticizes those who argue that "newly industrializing countries" (NICs) have exer-
cised strong control over organized labor and wage levels as part of their growth strat-
egy for selecting on the dependent variable. She bases her claim on a regression per-
formed on a large sample of developing countries in which she does not detect a
statistically significant relationship between labor repression and rates of economic
growth.
Geddes' sample includes a large number of countries which have repressive labor
policies but are mired in poverty traps and other low-growth syndromes. In a regression
run on a sample of countries in which there is a subsample indicating a necessary rela-
tionship between the dependent and independent variables (for example, that all NICs
controlled the cost of labor), and in which there are also a large number of countries
with low growth and high labor repression, it is plausible no probabilistic relationship
will be detected. This is because a regression will test if higher levels of labor repres-
sion are correlated with higher levels of growth. If lower wages are a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for growth, labor repression will not always promote growth. Thus
regression analysis will not always detect necessary condition in many samples where
it exists.
Rogowski 's contribution also represents a practical rebuttal of KKV's strictures
against selection bias on the dependent variable. He focuses on how the standard re-
gression model ignores the problem of theoretical anomaly in cases, citing several in-
fluential studies which engage in theory testing using a technique Harry Eckstein called
selection of "most likely cases." These are cases where, given the existing conditions,
an outcome radically different from that predicted by a theory should be observed.
Anomalous cases of this sort are particularly useful in testing and refining theory. One
example is Lijphart's observation that the Netherlands had a stable, well-functioning
democracy despite its reinforcing rather than cross-cutting social cleavages. This obser-
vation not only challenged what many thought was commonplace in a stable democ-
racy, but launched a contending "consociational" explanation of why some democra-
cies are stable. Rogowski also points out that two of the most influential works in
507
comparative political economy, Bates' Markets and States in Tropical Africa and
Katzenstein's Small States in World Markets, focus on a small number of cases where
something of interest occurred - the very kind of selection of dependent variable that
KKV argue hampers logical inference.19
The third prong of the argument builds on the discussion of the limitations of the
regression model and KKV's overarching proscriptions for research. Brady, Collier, and
their collaborators argue that KKV's discussion of the trade-off between qualitative and
quantitative methodologies seriously underplays the potential contributions of qualita-
tive work. They build the case that qualitative methods have unique strengths, can accom-
plish things the standard regression model cannot, and contribute to answering research
questions in ways that complement quantitative research.
Qualitative research has been very influential in comparative politics in generating
concepts. Ragin argues this is a function of how qualitative researchers approach their
questions. Rather than strictly formulating hypotheses and devising tests, qualitative re-
search has a more interactive relationship between theory, concepts, and evidence.
Theory is refined as greater detail of relevant cases becomes apparent and cases which
seem anomalous are integrated, rather than relegated to the error term. Sometimes this
integration brings about refinement in concepts or improvement in theory (pp. 124-28).
According to McKeown, it is precisely the interplay of evidence and theory that makes
qualitative research adept at conceptual refinement. He describes this process as an "it-
erated dialogue among theory, data, and research design" (p. 141). The position of these
authors stands in sharp contrast to Geddes' condemnation of refining theory as a failure
to frame falsifiable hypotheses.
In their critique of the role of concepts and theory in KKV's model of social sci-
ence, Collier, Brady, and Seawright are aware that quantitative and qualitative re-
searchers theorize in different ways. They take strong exception to KKV's contentions
that "the goal is inference" and "the content is method." In contrast, they argue that the-
ory needs to take precedence because it helps make sense of social and political life.
They defend the use of typologies, in stark opposition to KKV, as the means by which
qualitative researchers make sense of a complex world and generate new concepts. In
this sense, KKV seem more concerned with easy operationalization than with under-
standing the phenomenon underlying the measure (pp. 202-03).
Another advantage of qualitative research is that it does not have to rely on increas-
ing the number of cases to increase inferential leverage. McKeown and Munck explore
this in great detail, positing that qualitative and quantitative researchers have diverse
tools to respond to the problem of too many causal variables and not enough observa-
tions. For quantitative researchers, this is a degrees of freedom problem and explains
why KKV advocate increasing the number of observations. In place of increasing the
number of observations, qualitative researchers attempt to establish causality through
in-case analysis. First, they carefully pick cases central to understanding the phenome-
non of interest. The use of typologies is often crucial in narrowing the set of applicable
508
Michael Bernhard
cases. Second, they pay close attention to the contextual disparities of the cases they are
analyzing, working most frequently at a middle or low level of abstraction. These two
steps help to avoid the problems of causal heterogeneity and concept stretching. Third,
they attempt to establish cause on the level of the case through "pattern tracing."
Sydney Tarrow points out that the analogous technique of "process tracing" yields
richer theory, putting qualitative "flesh" on quantitative "bones" when using mixed
methods (p. 176). 20
Brady, Collier, and their collaborators make a strong argument that it is precisely
the close attention paid to individual cases that makes small-n research more likely to
capture important differences in context. By drawing inference from within cases, one
does not have to increase the number of observations and run the risk that concept
stretching will aggregate related but distinct social phenomena into one measure. Close
attention to specifics of causal processes also make it easier to check on their homo-
geneity. Identification and comparison of cases of heterogeneous causation is why
these authors view qualitative work as more adept at coming to terms with differences
in context and incorporating them carefully into research. For this reason, qualitative
research has greater flexibility in addressing nonlinear and conjunctural forms of
causality.
Rethinking Social Inquiry is both a constructive and vigorous response to KKV.
The authors frame their reservations in a respectful tone and do not turn their argu-
ments concerning the merits of qualitative techniques into an attack on the contribu-
tions or utility of quantitative research. The book's strength is its emphasis on the com-
plementarity of diverse tools rather than on the singular superiority of a "one-size-f its-all"
model. The book's call for "shared standards" challenges those who are prepared to ho-
mogenize inquiry through methodological discipline.
What is the Source of Inspiration?
Like the three books reviewed above, Passion, Craft, and Method in Comparative
Politics should be on the list of required reading for graduate students in the subf ield.
Munck and Snyder engage in the exercise, found more often in older disciplines, of
chronicling the intellectual development of the field. Munck and Snyder carried out in-
depth structured discussions with fifteen esteemed political scientists from the postwar
and baby boom generations.21 Some might have chosen a slightly different mix of inter-
viewees, but Munck and Snyder undoubtedly have assembled a cast of scholars who
have profoundly affected the subfield.
The book itself is outstanding in its use of qualitative interview techniques. Munck
and Snyder used a structured questionnaire to converse at length with each of these dis-
tinguished comparativists on a range of subjects, covering their intellectual origins and
motivations, the experience of graduate school, how they conduct research, and their
509
views on the development of the subfield. At the same time, they allowed the conversa-
tions to verge off into interesting tangents that reveal fascinating details about the de-
velopment of comparative politics. One of the more entertaining aspects of the work is
how the personalities of the interviewees come through, even in print. There are a cou-
ple of world-class curmudgeons in the mix, who provide a degree of comic misan-
thropy (when viewed from a distance).
Most interesting is that the luminaries interviewed do not come from one particular
methodological perspective; behavioral, historicist, and rationalist scholarship are all
represented. Some are well known for deploying narrative evidence while others are
strong proponents of statistical inference. Some, such as Adam Przeworski, have
worked in all three traditions over the course of their career. Others, like David Laitin,
advocate a strong melding of the strengths of multiple traditions. Still others are un-
abashed partisans of one approach.
What all of them share is a lifetime of contributions based on their ability to ask
and address large and compelling research questions. And it is this, rather than their de-
votion to any particular method, that distinguishes them from their peers. They also
share some other interesting commonalities. Almost all of them have spent significant
time outside the United States, either because they were born elsewhere or have period-
ically carried out fieldwork.22 Only Huntington seems less committed to fieldwork as
an intrinsic part of research (p. 223). Both Laitin and Bates, the two researchers most
strongly associated with a rationalist framework, seem to have benefited tremendously
from going to the field, challenging the stereotype that those committed to rationalism
and science are not concerned with nuances of time and place. Among those associated
with more historicist and small-n traditions, Stepan, Collier, and Scott have spent a
great deal of time in the field.
One of the most curious stances is held by Przeworski, who believes that, because
comparativists need both methodological training and in-depth area knowledge, it makes
more sense to train foreign rather than American graduate students (pp. 501-02). If we
were to take this contention to a logical extreme, we could perhaps stop teaching com-
parative politics altogether and just leave it to foreigners to study themselves. Stepan,
while seeing the necessity of acquiring both area and methodological skills, is more
practical in his response. He believes that U.S. -born comparativists strongly benefit
from immersion in another culture, and proposes that students postpone graduate study
to live in another country and thereafter enroll in graduate school in order to master the
requisite methodological and theoretical skills (p. 451).
Stepan 's discussion of the centrality of good fieldwork, including his insights into
how to conduct it, make for compelling reading to anyone embarking on fieldwork for
the first time. He makes the fundamental point that fieldwork provides the opportunity
to collect information and to gain insight in a way that is not possible from a distance.
Navigating the mores, culture, and practices of another place, and seeing how the ab-
stract variables used to explain social phenomena actually influence conditions on the
510
Michael Bernhard
ground, make social scientists more adept at observation and more sensitive to the nu-
ances of causality.
Two other commonalities emerge from the interviews. Almost all the luminaries
interviewed spent a substantial amount of time reading political philosophy, especially
in their formative years. Classical works of social theory also get a great deal of mention -
first and foremost Max Weber, but also Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, and some of his
followers (notably, Antonio Gramsci). It seems that exposure to the classics of political
and social theory promotes the framing of important and enduring questions, though
clearly this is not enough in itself. The academic work of many of these scholars seems
to be motivated by solving problems about which they have strong normative con-
cerns, such as poverty (Przeworski, Bates), order (Huntington), powerlessness (Scott),
violence (Moore), and despotism (nearly everybody interviewed). Empirically oriented
university departments that believe political theory is best confined to departments of
philosophy may inadvertently be depriving their graduate students of one of the very
sources of inspiration for scientific study.
Another strong commonality among the majority of these scholars is a commit-
ment to science. Again, the one exception is Huntington, who reserves the term science
for the natural and biological sciences (p. 224). However, the range of responses to the
question of whether they consider themselves scientists reveals subtle differences in
how closely related scholars view the human and natural sciences. Still, there is a
strong consensus on many epistemological issues, including the desirability and feasi-
bility of a general theory of human political behavior, the central role of logical argu-
ment, and the testing of falsifiable claims. There is scarcely a hint of postmodernism
here; these comparativists all seem to be children of the enlightenment.
The questions on the relevance of normative theory and the scientific method high-
light that good comparativists need to be humanists (especially when it comes to for-
mulating relevant and compelling research questions), as well as scientists (especially
in thinking about ways to verify or reject theory). Munck and Snyder's labor helps to
place the discussion of method in a different perspective. Clearly, compared to a gener-
ation ago, comparativists require a broader range of methodological skills. At the same
time, methods training does not guarantee success. Good comparativists still need to
know the abiding questions that have fired human imagination over the centuries and
should have a deep familiarity with place. Some of the most successful comparativists
also have borrowed heavily from other disciplines to advance their understanding of
politics (for example, Przeworski or Bates from economics, Laitin from linguistics,
Almond from public opinion and marketing research, Scott from anthropology, Linz
from sociology, and Moore and Skocpol from history).
When considering why the work of this elite group of comparativists has wide ap-
peal and staying power, one understands that contributions to the discipline are based
on something more than methods training. In that sense, one wonders if the preoccu-
pation with method, whatever side one takes in the debate, does not detract from more
511
important projects, like identifying the meaningful questions of the day. Inspiration is
ultimately more important than technique. Improving methods can yield different an-
swers to old questions but cannot alone create a compelling intellectual agenda for the
discipline. The question of theory at the metalevel is radically different from issues of
hypothesis formation and testing. Both are critical to good science, but concern for the
latter without the former may be far less meaningful. Certainly Munck and Snyder's in-
terviews give the reader an appreciation for a rare species of political scientist and a
sense that the things that make their work inspiring may not, in the end, be teachable or
as easily transferable as methods training.
Conclusions
One reason Hall's essay makes a powerful impression is that it combines a remark
intellectual incisiveness with humility in the face of the daunting task of practicin
cial science. While his approach to the issue of the disjuncture between ontology
methodology is grounded in comparative historical analysis, he acknowledges the v
of a multiplicity of approaches, from rejecting positivism to pioneering new statis
techniques. Given the complexity of the social world and the reality that we have y
uncover a philosopher's stone to universally unravel the mysteries of politics, the
tice of more than one approach is important for the healthy development of the d
pline as a scientific enterprise.
Abandoning other approaches in order to embrace a program of research dict
by method runs the risk of abandoning forms of knowledge that may prove highly
ductive in understanding the political world. If different methods and forms of in
ence yield similar answers to important research questions, we can have greater co
dence in those findings. Where results diverge, careful consideration of how diffe
theories and methods lead to disparate results may provoke just the sort of questio
and reconsidering that will yield a more profound understanding of particular p
lems. Contending methodological and theoretical schools provide each other with
portant checks on how well they are doing. The existence of different research tr
tions allows each one to assess its results by triangulating with the results generate
other varieties of social science. The fact that Durkheim, Marx, and Weber all no
similar phenomena (such as alienation, disenchantment, and anomie) in comin
grips with the birth of modernity in the West has always impressed me that they
onto something central.
Theorization seems to be extrinsic to method. Method is a means to arrive at valid
logical inferences. It does not intrinsically help to generate new or interesting theory; it
only enhances our ability to test. The authors discussed here who would make a partic-
ular methodological perspective central to the discipline do not really have compelling
answers to the question of what makes for innovative theory. KKV stay away from it,
512
Michael Bernhard
raising proscriptions on how to draw correct inference as the central concern of the dis-
cipline. Theory is reduced to testable hypotheses. Geddes adopts the behavioral as-
sumptions of neoclassical microeconomics and says we should proceed from there. She
asks us to assume that when human beings are political, they act as homo economicus,
attempting to maximize utility in all decision-making. Proceeding from this, the impli-
cations of larger theories of politics can be tested. Where, though, do the larger theories
come from?
In the four books, only the historicists as a group embrace macrolevel theorizing
about big questions as practical, though by no means do they have a monopoly on its
successful practice.23 The irony is that those who practice political science with power-
ful statistical tools and who treat their units of observation in a more abstract manner
ask the smaller, more discreet questions, whereas those who get into the nitty-gritty de-
tails of time and place seem more focused on the bigger questions and larger implica-
tions of their findings. The interactive relationship between theory, concept, and evi-
dence, grounded at a less abstract level, allows one to think about how the variables
affect each other in a more concrete, complex, and contingent fashion. Such concrete
explorations of real political phenomena provide the basis for more creative theorizing.
In this regard, I strongly disagree with Geddes; induction, while a potentially weaker
form of inference, is sometimes a better starting point for theorizing than a singular ab-
stract notion of what motivates human behavior. Exceptional cases, new phenomena,
and atypical developments demand explanation; and a keen eye for such contingencies
is critical, no matter the content of one's toolkit. Mixed methods are attracting many
comparativists of the younger generation, equipping them with a range of tools for in-
ference and grounding them in a perspective that promotes the formulation of better re-
search questions.
NOTES
I wish to thank Stephen Hanson, Douglas Lemke, Yitzhak Brudny, as well as the members of
Committee of Comparative Politics, for providing me with thoughtful and detailed comments.
1. Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain," in Erik Allardt and Yrj L
Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology, T
the Westermark Society, vol. 10 (Helsinki: The Academic Bookstore, 1964), pp. 291-341
Putnam (with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti), Making Democracy Work: Civic
Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
2. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sydney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific
Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
3. John Stuart Mill, "Two Systems of Comparison," in Amatai Etzioni and Frederic L. D
Comparative Perspectives: Theories and Methods (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1970
4. Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," American Pol
Review, 65 (September 1971), 682-93.
5. David Collier, "New Perspectives on the Comparative Method," in Dankwart A. Rustow
Paul Erickson, eds., Comparative Political Dynamics (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 3
513
6. Charles Ragin, The Comparative Method (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
7. Evan Lieberman, "Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research,"
American Political Science Review, 99 (September 2005), 435-52.
8. Robert H. Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry R. Weingast,
Analytic Narratives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); and Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt,
eds., Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1999).
9. Bayesian analysis uses prior assumptions about the distribution of observational data to test the proba-
bility that a particular hypothesis is true. Simply speaking, the extent to which observed patterns correspond
to the assumed distribution of observations allows for the testing of such assumptions.
10. Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2004); and Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in
Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
1 1. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution, Third Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1996).
12. Geddes first addressed these issues in her influential article, "How the Cases You Choose Affect the
Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics," Political Analysis, 2 (1990), 131-50.
13. Take the following example: "If one knows who makes institutional choices and how they expect the
various alternatives to affect their interests, then one can predict what choices will be made." Barbara
Geddes, "A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe," Comparative Political
Studies, 28 (July 1995), 239.
14. Douglas Lemke notes that most conflict in Africa is intranational rather than international. Thus using
the state as the unit of analysis may not capture the dominant pattern of conflict there. If this is the case, then
including Africa in the literature on global conflict (the correlates of war, MIDs, etc.) may introduce causal
heterogeneity into the data. "African Lessons for International Relations Research," World Politics, 56
(October 2003), 114-38.
1 5. This notion of causation is widespread. It is not only KKV's notion of causation, but also Weber's and
thus of many qualitatively oriented scholars. See Max Weber, "Objective Possibility and Adequate Causation
in Historical Explanation," in Edward Shils and Henry Finch, eds., The Methodology of the Social Sciences
(Glencoe: Free Press, 1949), pp. 164-88.
16. Donald P. Green and Alan S. Gerber, "Reclaiming the Experimental Tradition in Political Science," in
Helen Milner and Ira Katznelson, eds., State of the Discipline, Vol. Ill (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002),
pp. 805-32.
17. Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," American Political Science
Review, 64 (December 1970), 1033-53.
18. Much of this comes from Jason Seawright's path-breaking work on this topic, "Testing for Necessary
and/or Sufficient Causation: Which Cases are Relevant?" Political Analysis, 10 (May 2002), 178-93.
19. Peter Katzenstein, Small State in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1985); and Robert Bates, States and Markets in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of
Economic Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).
20. Pattern tracing was coined by Alexander George, but similar techniques for understanding cause
within cases have been posed by a number of other authors, including Barton and Lazerfeld (process analy-
sis), Smelser (with-in unit comparison), Campbell (pattern matching), Dessler (causal theory), Sewell (causal
narrative), Hall (systematic process analysis), and Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, and Weingast (analytic nar-
rative). Collier, Mahoney, and Seawright, p. 93.
21. Of the fifteen scholars, three were born before or during WWI (Almond, Moore, and Dahl); seven
were born in the interwar era (Linz, Huntington, Lijphart, O'Donnell, Schmitter, Scott, and Stepan); three
were born during WWII (Przeworski, Collier, and Bates); and two were born in its immediate aftermath
(Laitin and Skocpol).
514
Michael Bernhard
22. Linz, Przeworski, Lijphart, and Schmitter were born in Europe and O'Donnell in Argentina. Only
Schmitter did not live through a period of political strife, though he did come from a family with a strong set
of international political commitments. Almond spent a great deal of time in Germany working for the U.S.
Occupation Military Government. Bates, Collier, Laitin, Scott, and Stepan have spent long periods doing
fieldwork.
23. There is no paucity of scholars who use game theory, large- regression methods, and/or a combina-
tion of the two to pursue big questions. One only need think of the recent work of Daron Acemoglu and
James A. Robinson, Adam Przeworski, or Carles Boix.
515

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Methodological Disputes in Comparative Politics

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