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* THIRD DIVISION.
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ROMERO, J.:
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In the third place, while admittedly, the Central Bank law gives
vast and farreaching powers to the conservator of a bank, it must
be pointed out that such powers must be related to the
(preservation of) the assets of the bank, (the reorganization of)
the management thereof and (the restoration of) its viability.
Such powers, enormous and extensive as they are, cannot extend
to the postfacto repudiation of perfected transactions, otherwise
they would infringe against the nonimpairment clause of the
Constitution. If the legislature itself cannot revoke an existing
valid contract, how can it delegate such nonexistent powers to
the conservator under Section 28A of said law?
Obviously, therefore, Section 28A merely gives the conservator
power to revoke contracts that are, under existing law, deemed to
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Next, petitioner insists that both the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC have no jurisdiction 7
to entertain the complaint of
the private respondent, asserting that the issue was
cognizable by the voluntary arbitrator pursuant to Article
261 of the Labor Code.
Granting that both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
indeed had no jurisdiction over the issue, petitioner cannot
anymore 8plead such procedural flaw under the principle of
estoppel. It appears that in the proceedings before the
Labor Arbiter, it vigorously argued its defense and prayed
9
for alternative
10
relief. In fact, in its position paper and
reply, the issue concerning the Labor Arbiters lack of
jurisdiction11was not raised by the petitioner. Moreover, in
its answer to the memorandum of appeal filed by the
private respondents before the NLRC, petitioner was again
silent regarding the issue of jurisdiction on the part of the
NLRC to decide the appeal. It was only when the decision
of the NLRC was unfavorable that it raised the issue of
jurisdiction.
Petitioner should bear the consequence of its act. It
cannot be allowed to profit from its own omission to the
damage and prejudice of the private respondent. As we 12
declared in Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC:
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16 75 SCRA 77 (1977).
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