February 7, 2017

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno

Supreme Court

Deputy Court Administrator Jenny Lind Delorino

Office of the Court Administrator

RE: A Review of the Falsified, Perjured and Libelous Charges Filed by

Seventy-Four (74) Complainants

A. On Non- Approval of Sick Leave

I am not a doctor, I have no way of knowing if he, Noel Labid is fit to work
due to his numerous absences. I need those certifications because of my
bad experiences with my court staff that I complained about falsifying court
minutes. The medical certificate and clinical abstracts shown to me were
photocopies of them by his mother. The proof is Memorandum of OIC given
to the mother asking her son to submit the original copy of the medical
certificate found on p. 35 of the Decision.

She may cause undue injury to the State if it turned out she presented
falsified medical certificate and clinical abstract that were mere photocopies
when presented to me? Then I can be liable administratively for not
verifying them and requiring them to submit pertinent documents. I think
there was a jurisprudence that I read and cited about requiring certificate of
fitness to work that I submitted to the Honorable Office of the Court
Administrator in one of my pleadings.

I did not see handwritten letter of her son. What if he is still alive today
because his death certificate was not presented to me to verify such a fact.
Therefore, there may be a possibility that as of today, he is alive, he did not
have any sickness because only photocopies were shown to me way back.

As to legal basis, I explained a jurisprudence in Tagalog to the mother thus

she must ensure compliance of the memoranda issued by Officer-in-Charge
prior to the approval of his application for leave of absence to prove good
faith that shielded me from abuse and oppression:

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In RE: Memorandum of Report of Atty. Thelma C. Bahia Against Ms.
Dorothy Salgado A.M. No. 2004-41-SC, January 13, 2005 declares that
the crux of the charge against respondent is her habitual absenteeism.
Although respondent might have had a valid reason for the absences by
presenting uncontroverted medical certificates proving that she suffered an
illness, her failure to exert any effort to inform her office is a contemptuous
behavior that exacts disciplinary action of the Court. Rule XVI, Section 16 of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292 provides:

Sec. 16. All application for sick leave of absence for one full day or more
shall be made on the prescribed form and shall be filed immediately
upon the employees return from such leave. Notice of absence,
however, should be sent to the immediate supervisor and/or to the agency
head. Application for sick leave in excess of five days shall be
accompanied by a proper medical certificate.

Also in Judge Misajon vs. Yglesias et al., A.M. No. P-08-2439, June 25,
2013: Indeed all applications for sick leave for 1 day or more shall be made
in prescribed form and shall be filed immediately upon the employees
return of such leave.

The legal principle of RE: Memorandum of Report of Atty. Thelma C. Bahia

Against Ms. Dorothy Salgado A.M. No. 2004-41-SC, January 13, 2005 and
Judge Misajon vs. Yglesias et al., A.M. No. P-08-2439, June 25, 2013
came from Memorandum Circular No. 41, s. 1998, Section 53 and
Memorandum Circular No. 14, s. 1999, Section 54 mentioned by
complainant in her coached affidavit.

In Memorandum Circular No. 41, s. 1998, Section 53 and Memorandum

Circular No. 14, s. 1999, Section 54 which provide: "2.2. V Application for
Sick Leave All applications for sick leave of absence for one (1) full day or
more shall be made on the prescribed form and shall be filed
immediately upon employee's return from such leave.

The 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court governs the approval of an
application for sick leave by court personnel. Paragraph 2.2.1 Chapter X of
the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerk of Court states:

2.2.1 Application for sick leave - All applications for sick leave of absence
for one (1) full day or more shall be made on the prescribed form and shall
be filed immediately upon the employee's return from such leave.
Notice of absence, however, should be sent to the immediate supervisor,
and/or agency head. Application for sick leave in excess of five (5)
successive days shall be accompanied by a proper medical certificate.

The employee did not return to file his sick leave to me. I must not be
penalized for adhering to jurisprudences, a proof that I am obedient to the
laws and to Your Honors who penned them.

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The rationale for filing in person the sick leave is to prove that sick
employee is alive because if other person does it for him, the possibility of
fraud is not far-fetched. How is this so? For example, the mother
suppressed that his son is already dead, and the Judge was able to sign his
leave with pay submitted by the mother claiming that he is still alive when
he is already dead prejudicial to the Office of the Court Administrator in
granting her reliefs out of it. It would appear that the Judge kept on signing
leave of absence with pay of a dead employee who did not file it in person.
So in lieu of his presence, certification of his fitness to work and other
health-related documents are necessary to protect the interest of the State
and taxpayers especially when public funds are disbursed to it.

Assume that I allowed the mother to file the leave of absence on behalf of
his son with photocopied medical certificate without certificate of fitness to
work and other health related documents, I will be held liable under
Paragraph 2.2.1 Chapter X of the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerk of Court ,
Memorandum Circular No. 41, s. 1998, Section 53 and Memorandum
Circular No. 14, s. 1999, Section 54 for doing it in violation of the mandatory
command: XXX and shall be filed immediately upon the employee's
return from such leave XXX

There were photocopies of his medical certificate and clinical abstract

presented to me by his mother. Why will I be branded as oppressive if I only
expressed the necessity to verify his sickness that is allowed by
jurisprudences please? I should be commended for strictly complying with
the jurisprudences by the Honorable Office of the Court Administrator.

With due respect, if I misconstrued the rules on approval of application for

leave, why I should be penalized? There must be bad faith on my part to
be administratively liable. According to Your Honors, I allegedly misapplied
the ruling of Re: Memorandum Report of Atty. Thelma C. Bahia against
Ms. Dorothy Salgado, AM No. 2004-41-SC, January 13, 2005, then I am
entitled to good faith thus I cannot be considered as abusive and
oppressive in this administrative case.

I followed the Rules and jurisprudences, it is baseless to hold me liable for

Oppression and the violation of the 2002 Revised Manual for the Clerks of
Court.

There are jurisprudences that can be applied by analogy to my court that

securing certificate of fitness to work and related documents is a valid
exercise of a management prerogative.

Both tribunals found that after the respondent presented his medical
certificate to the petitioner to explain his absence, he even went back to his
doctor for a certification that he was already fit to return to work (Pentagon
Steel Corp. vs. CA et al., G.R. No. 174141, June 26, 2009).

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For all we know, Noel Labids sickness render him unfit to work and his
sickness may be contagious so we can notify the Honorable Office of the
Court Administrator. Thus, those documents are necessary, and those are
easy to obtain from the hospital. The refusal of the mother to give the
required documents may prove suppression of an evidence prejudicial to
her.

This administrative matter stemmed from a series of sick leave application

of Castor without any medical certificate. Castor incurred absences on the
following dates: January 10-11, 14-18, 21-25, 28-31, 2013;February 1, 4-8,
11-13, 16, 2013; and March 6-7, 12, 15, 19-22, 2013. Due to his frequent
absences, he was referred to the SC Clinic for medical evaluation to
determine his physical fitness to continue with his duties and
responsibilities (Re: ADMINISTRATIVECHARGE OF MISCONDUCT
RELATIVE TO THE ALLEGED USE OF PROHIBITED DRUG ("Shabu")
OF REYNARD B. CASTOR, Electrician II, Maintenance Division, Office
of Administrative Services, A.M. No. 2013-08-SC, October 8, 2013).

In Opinaldo vs. Ravina, G.R. No. 196573, October 16, 2013:

Jurisprudence is replete with cases recognizing the right of the employer to
have free reign and enjoy sufficient discretion to regulate all aspects of
employment, including the prerogative to instill discipline in its employees
and to impose penalties, including dismissal, upon erring employees. This
is a management prerogative where the free will of management to
conduct its own affairs to achieve its purpose takes form Even labor laws
discourage interference with the exercise of such prerogative and the
Court often declines to interfere in legitimate business decisions of
employers. However, the exercise of management prerogative is not
unlimited. Managerial prerogatives are subject to limitations provided by
law, collective bargaining agreements, and general principles of fair play
and justice. Hence, in the exercise of its management prerogative, an
employer must ensure that the policies, rules and regulations on work-
related activities of the employees must always be fair and reasonable and
the corresponding penalties, when prescribed, commensurate to the
offense involved and to the degree of the infraction. In the case at bar, we
recognize, as did the appellate court, that respondents act of requiring
petitioner to undergo a medical examination and submit a medical
certificate is a valid exercise of management prerogative. This is further
justified in view of the letter-complaint from one of respondents clients,
PAIJR, opining that petitioner was "no longer physically fit to perform his
duties and responsibilities as a company guard because of his health
condition." To be sure, petitioners job as security guard naturally requires
physical and mental fitness under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5487, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 100. While the necessity to prove
ones physical and mental fitness to be a security guard could not be more
emphasized, the question to be settled is whether it is a valid exercise of
respondents management prerogative to prevent petitioners continued
employment with the Agency unless he presents the required medical
certificate. Respondent argues, viz.: Thus, respondents in the exercise of
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their MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE required Complainant to submit a
Medical Certificate to prove that he is "PHYSICALLY AND MENTALLY FIT"
for work as Security Guard. Unfortunately, however, up to the present time,
complainant failed to submit said Medical Examination and Findings giving
him clean bill of health, to respondents. Herein respondents are ready and
willing to accept him as such Security Guard once he could submit said
Medical Examination and Findings. The requirement anent the
presentation of such MEDICAL CERTIFICATE by Complainant to
Respondents is but a Management Measure of ensuring Respondents
including Complainant that Complainant is physically and mentally fit for
continued Employment and will not in any manner pose a danger or, threat
to the respondents properties and lives of their customers and other
employees as well as to the person and life of Complainant himself (The
Coca-Cola Export Corporation v. Gacayan, G.R. No. 149433, December
15, 2010, 638 SCRA 377, 398-399, citing St. Michaels Institute v.
Santos, G.R. No. 145280, December 4, 2001, 371 SCRA 383, 391;
Supreme Steel Corporation v. Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng
Supreme Independent Union (NMS- IND-APL), G.R. No. 185556, March
28, 2011, 646 SCRA 501, 525; Dole Philippines, Inc. v. Pawis ng
Makabayang Obrero (PAMAO-NFL), 443 Phil. 143, 149 (2003); The
Coca-Cola Export Corporation v. Gacayan, supra note 34, at 399). His
mother presented photocopies of medical certificate and clinical abstract to
me.

With respect to the side issues, there was no proof adduced by the mother
that I committed oppression and harassment against her son prior to his
untimely demise without furnishing the trial court a copy of his death
certificate, despite the request from the mother because the courts process
server was asking monetary donations from the trial court thru court staff for
his wake. The death certificate is a proof that will disprove the false and
malicious charge by seventy- four (74) complainants that I caused his death
in ordering him to lift the table despite of his sickness in another related
administrative case.

Moreover, the same utility aide requested me to officiate his marriage, few
days before he went on AWOL for two weeks, this will not happen if I
committed oppression and harassment against him in a complaint filed a
month earlier by seventy-four (74) complainants including the utility aide. If I
was oppressive, he will not ask me to solemnize his marriage after he
signed the false and malicious complaint against me. His invitation to
solemnize his marriage belied that charge of oppression against me. The
time and effort I consumed in explaining the jurisprudence to his mother
belied that charge of oppression against me. I have given him so many
small things that mattered to his financial status. For one personal delivery
of letter to the Office of the Court Administrator, I gave him P500 to P1,000,
and there were so many errands he made for me. It was natural to express
a disappointment about him filing of a false and malicious complaint against
me to his mother. I hope, it must not be construed negatively because there
was nothing illegal to what I said to her mother who must have
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misunderstood what I said. Also, I was misquoted by his mother. There was
no proof that I made those insensitive and unsavory remarks to her.

There is no reason to retaliate to her son. I will perform a legal act despite of
the bad deeds done to me by her son. A Judge must be professional at all
times. It will be illegal on my part to deny approval of sick leave without any
factual basis or legal basis.

Before the solemnization of his marriage in the trial court, courts utility aide
only showed up less than (20) twenty minutes before me for work then he
is gone all day in many days while in supposed attendance in court. When I
inquired about his whereabouts, courts process server answered he was
on errand. When I inquired court utility aide as to his health status because
of the rumors that he is in bad shape, the answer was he is slowly
recovering from his sickness that is unknown to me as to what is his
sickness all about because none of the court employees, including the
utility aide divulged it. With due respect, I do not feign ignorance, there are
many things I do not know and I am not concerned of due to many factors.
For example, one difficult question of law in a case will divert and focus my
mind on it that I as a Judge became forgetful on other matters for weeks or
months. If that is a shortcoming of a Judge, I am very sorry. But our court
was very much undermanned which must be considered as a factor on how
I deal with high stress on administrative matters. Your Honors must be
compassionate and merciful to me. I followed jurisprudences here thus
there is no need to penalize me.

In Marcelo vs. CA, G.R. No. 175201, April 23, 2008: The fundamental
rule in administrative proceedings is that the complainant has the burden of
proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in his complaint.
Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable. The
standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable
ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct
complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even
preponderant. While substantial evidence does not necessarily import
preponderance of evidence as is required in an ordinary civil case, or
evidence beyond reasonable doubt as is required in criminal cases, it
should be enough for a reasonable mind to support a conclusion. There is
none here. The basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence cannot be
disregarded. The mother only alleged without any proof. The mother is not
the proper party to sue me for harassment, oppression, conduct
unbecoming of a judge and gross ignorance of the law committed against
her son who is the alleged offended party in this administrative case under
the existing Revised Rules of Court, laws and jurisprudences. The mothers
accusations are not supported by any proof other than what others were
allegedly told to her who did not submit any proof nor testify before the
investigating Judge. Her allegations were unsubstantiated. Also, I
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expressed my grievance about his son disrespect actions towards me but
my words were misquoted by her. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor
does not constitute substantial evidence (Consolidated Edison Co. vs.
National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv.
Op., p. 131). Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise
cannot be given credence. Hence, when the complainant relies on mere
conjectures and suppositions, and fails to substantiate his allegations, the
administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit (Manalabe vs.
Cabie, A.M. No. P-05-1984, July 6, 2007, 526 SCRA 582, 589; See also
Adajar vs. Develos, A.M. No. P-05-2056, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA
361, 376-377; Ong vs. Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1538, October 22, 2004,
441 SCRA 150, 160; Datuin, Jr. vs. Soriano, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1640,
October 15, 2002, 391 SCRA 1, 5).

The action and allegation of the mother were bizarre because she has all
the time, around two weeks, to secure the requested documents that are
easy to obtain from the hospital, yet she opted to sue me within that period,
from the time of the giving of the Memorandum of OIC until the filing of her
complaint, more or less two weeks, she did not submit any document, not
even the original medical certificate, until now I did not see original copies of
all pertinent documents requested by the court that created a bad
impression that her son has a faked sickness or a faked death.

My cellphone received missed calls and text messages from a certain Noel
Labid who introduced himself as my former utility aide on December 28,
2016, 11:21 a.m. greeting me a Merry Christmas and Happy New Year from
cell number 09978214421. These missed calls and text messages are still
registered and stored respectively on my cellphone to prove them before
the Honorable Office of the Court Administrator.

It is a Falsification under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code in relation

to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, Perjury under Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code and Libel under Article 353 of the Revised Penal
Code to state that in OCA IPI No. 12-2398-MTJ I committed refusal to
perform official functions and oppression for refusing to sign the application
for leave of absence despite the employee having complied with the
requirements, and for doing so in retaliation for the employee's having
joined as signatory of administrative complaint filed against me.

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B. Designating an Officer-in-Charge

I did not violate CSC Memorandum Circular No. 06-05. Seventy (70)
complainants did not give a proof to it. I did not have a willful and deliberate
intention to cause public damage.

All previous Officers-in-Charge have no educational and professional

qualifications to hold such office in the trial court. All our court
personnel before the appointment of the irregularly-appointed branch
clerk of court are not qualified to be an Officer-in-Charge under CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 06-05. Only Clerk Ferdinand Santos has a
masters degree equivalent to a Bachelor of Laws degree, the
minimum educational qualification for the position.

The Honorable Office of the Court Administrator recognized Ferdinand

Santos who has a Masters degree with lengthy public and private
employment records as Officer-in-Charge in its several letters, these may
be part of case records. He attended to an activity like computerization as
Officer-in-Charge sponsored by the Office of the Court Administrator.

The Honorable Office of the Court Administrator did not revoke his
designation, its not anymore my fault. There is no more basis to penalize
me about it.

Basing from the action of the Honorable Office of the Court Administrator,
the 2002 Revised Manual admits exceptions.

Our trial court underwent massive administrative problems. The Officers-in-

Charge who voluntarily left the positions were accused with dishonesty on
court docket records. Such extraordinary event necessitated
extraordinary measure. There was no injury to the State and to the
taxpayers with Officer- in-Charge Ferdinand Santos designation.

Jurisprudences say that the violation of OCA circular must be flagrant and
willful with evident bad faith before I will be held liable. Here, the Honorable
Office of the Court Administrator consented to it by recognizing him as the
courts OIC. Such recognition is my shield against any administrative
liability.

It is a Falsification under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code in

relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, Perjury under Article
183 of the Revised Penal Code and Libel under Article 353 of the Revised
Penal Code to state that I committed Gross ignorance of the law for: (a)
xxx designating an OIC who did not possess the minimum qualifications
for the position and without approval from the Court (OCA IPI No. 11-2399-
MTJ) xxx
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The Honorable Office of the Court Administrator recommended the
dropping of this charge of designating an OIC who did not possess
the minimum qualifications for the position and without approval from
the Court (OCA IPI No. 11-2399-MTJ).

C. Allowing on-the- Job Trainees

I did not violate OCA Circular No. 111-2005. Seventy (70) complainants did
not give proof to it.

There is no proof that I violated any provision of OCA Circular No. 111-
2005.

There was no proof that Ms. Angelica Rosali followed the memorandum that
was not disseminated to the court staff. The draft memorandum did not bear
any signature of all court staff including Ms. Angelica Rosali to prove their
non-receipt of it.

There was no proof that she performed judicial works upon my order. She
was a court observer. Angelica Rosali denied in her affidavit that she
received the memorandum and performed encoding tasks there is no basis
to penalize me for violation of OCA Circular No. 111-2005.

I did not order her to docket decisions and staple the returns. There was no
proof that I ordered her to do those docketing and stapling. Whoever staff
who allowed her to do judicial works must be penalized not me in the
interest of fair play.

There is no proof that Johaya Mababaya, Catherine Sarate and Eduardo

Pangilinan III corrected and made the drafts of the courts Resolutions and
Decisions.

They are not lawyers or law student but students taking up courses not
related to law thus they cannot correct and write draft a trial courts
Resolutions and Decisions.

In Abellanosa v. Judge Delorino, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2106, October 19,

2010: Abellanosa accused Delorino of engaging the services of a certain
Socrates Manarang to draft decisions and/or resolutions for her. Abellanosa
claimed that Manarang was not employed in the RTC of Makati, but
Delorino allowed him to bring home case records for the preparation of
decisions. She said that Manarang was also allowed to stay and work within
the premises of the Makati RTC, Branch 137 and borrow books from its
library. Here, there is no sufficient, clear and convincing evidence to hold
Delorino administratively liable. In the instant case, as found during the
9
investigation, except for Abellanosas allegations, no evidence was
adduced to show that Delorino indeed employed Manarang to draft
decisions for her. During cross-examination, Abellanosa even admitted
that she did not have any personal knowledge thereof and she merely
relied on what Manarang allegedly told her. This alone, will not hold. There
is no evidence to support the accusation of complainants against me other
than their self-serving allegations intended to subject me to penalties.
There are no names and dates of the cases allegedly corrected or drafted
for decisions and resolutions by the students as ordered upon them by me.
There are no words I allegedly uttered to order them cited by seventy
complainants.

There is no proof that I ordered them to perform judicial tasks. I did not
order them to perform judicial or non-judicial tasks in trial court. They were
there as court observers. I did not know that they attested they were
assistant court stenographers because I cannot remember most of the
contents of their affidavit. I have no knowledge with their court observations
when I do not see them most of the time. Thus I must not be penalized for
the allegation that they are assistant court stenographers. They can write
assistant Judges also without my knowledge and consent. I have no
control with what they wrote in their affidavit so no wrongdoing can be
imputed upon me that I deserve a penalty. I did not give them such
designation in trial court. It is not my fault if they put there assistant court
stenographers, I have no personal knowledge about it.

In addition, all the seats were fully occupied by the court staff, it may
explain why I do not see all the court observers most of the time. The
stenographers were located inside a small cubicle at the trial court
separated from the courts chambers and court staffs room, its too small,
around 2 SQM by 2 SQM, without air-conditioner and with foul smell, its
good for two persons only, thus its unlikely that court observers Johaya
Mababaya, Catherine Sarate and Eduardo Pangilinan III, will stay there for
a brief moment in time.

The trial courts premises with broken air-conditioner have so many case
records that its uncomfortable to stay there for few minutes for the court
observation. There is no proof they as court observers opened case
records, there is no purpose for them to open any case record. The
court staff will not allow them to do it.

I allowed them to be court observers because Judge of RTC Pasay allowed

their classmates to be court observers as proven by their affidavit, there is
no ill-motive to agree to their being court observers so the Honorable Office
of the Court Administrators recommendation that this charge must be
dismissed should be upheld by Your Honors.

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Jurisprudences say that the violation of OCA circular must be flagrant and
willful with evident bad faith before I will be held liable. I did not violate the
OCA circular.

Also, there was a Supreme Court circular that I cited to the Honorable Office
of the Court Administrator in 2014 that the OJT was merely directory, that
was the tenor of it, and that is how the Honorable Office of the Court
Administrator should construe it.

It was announced that when paralegals and law students will have to be
trained and deployed to help. They can assist in typologizing the cases and
identify those for dismissal or archiving. They should be trained to prepare
case briefs to make it easy for the judges to decide what cases can be
dismissed moto proprio or archived or mediated in Hustisyeah project of
the Honorable Supreme Court.

By allowing paralegals and law students, OCA Circular No. 111-2005 was
impliedly amended. It admits exceptions contrary to the arguments of
complainants that must be given a retroactive effect to this baseless
administrative charge according to jurisprudences.

It is a Falsification under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code in relation

to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, Perjury under Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code and Libel under Article 353 of the Revised Penal
Code to state that I committed Gross ignorance of the law for: (a) allowing
on-the-job trainees xxx

The Honorable Office of the Court Administrator recommended the

dropping of this charge of allowing on-the-job trainees.

D. Illegal Appointment of Mariejoy Lagman

As to my protest to Mariejoy Lagman, my administrative complaint has a

bearing because the charges against her were serious supported by
documentary proofs, that was my honest belief, prior to the resolution of the
same.

Under Section 34 (b), Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative

Cases in the Civil Service, Mariejoy Lagman has a pending
administrative case. Therefore, she should have been disqualified for
promotion.

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Also, she did not secure court clearances which are essential requisites for
her promotion. Therefore, my protest against her illegal appointment
has factual and legal bases. I should not be penalized with it.

In A.M. No. P-12-3033, the Office of the Court Administrator did not
consider the administrative lapses on Mariejoy Lagmans case:

1. Why did the jurisprudence of this administrative case amend the

rationale of the jurisprudence in Villordon vs. Avila, AM No. P- 2809,
August 10, 2012 and a host of similar cases?

2. Why did the jurisprudence of this administrative case consider falsifying

of the court's official documents like the court's minutes as simple neglect
of duty and not dishonesty and grave misconduct?

3. Why did the jurisprudence of this administrative case contravened with

Section 1, Chapter VIII, AM No. 03-8-02-SC?

4. Why were the several infractions committed in different dates supported

by evidence on record by the herein respondents merited only a penalty
of Reprimand that contravened the law and jurisprudence?

5. Why was there no administrative hearing conducted for the attendance

of all the parties involved and all the signatories in the falsified minutes
committed to establish the charges of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct
not Simple Neglect of Duty to be incorporated in the agenda report of the
Office of the Court Administrator?

6. Why were there no thorough investigation and administrative hearing

conducted to back up the findings of facts by the Office of the Court
Administrator?

7. Why was there a total disregard of the extraneous factors in this

administrative case like the forced settlement and interference of other
four (4) first level judges on July 26, 2010 as well as the interference of
the RTC Executive Judge and RTC Judge of Branch 108, Pasay City
who are co-responsible for the transfer as Clerk to RTC of one of the
respondents despite knowledge of their administrative cases involving
grave offenses if the administrative offenses the respondents committed
are not grave and serious offenses?

8. Why the Office of the Executive Judge forwarded the complaint to the
Office of the Court Administrator if the charges are Simple Neglect of
Duty?

9. Why was this administrative case mentioned in OCA IPI No. 11-2378-
MTJ indorsed on June 7, 2011 filed by Executive Judge Bibiano Colasito
et al. who stated that our court's complaints are baseless against the
respondents thereby they committed perjury?
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10. Why was there a fast appointment of one of the respondents despite
the unresolved administrative case involving grave offenses?

11. Why was there no report of the investigation conducted with the fast
appointment of one of the respondents to prove bias on the part of the
Office of the Court Administrator in this administrative matter that was
copy furnished to our court?

12. Why did the Office of the Court Administrator conclude that the
explanation of one of the respondents on the erroneous entries of the
court's monthly reports to be satisfactorily when there was no proof to
back this up like the detailed reports of the monthly cases and the
correspondent semi-annual inventory supporting such finding?

13. Why did the Office of the Court Administrator fail to act on the motion
to change the case title and motion to re-raffle this administrative case
filed on August 6, 2012 before the promulgation of the Decision in this
administrative case?

The foregoing inquiries disprove the unsubstantiated charges of abuse and

oppression against me in this administrative case.

The branch clerk of court Leilani Tejero-Lopez was irregularly appointed

while clerk Mariejoy Lagman was illegally appointed, they performed their
functions in trial courts, it is too abusive, too harsh and too oppressive
if I will still be penalized for protesting to their irregular appointment
and illegal appointment while those responsible for those irregularity and
illegality are scot-free, as in no administrative liability.

E. On Irregular Appointment of Leilani Tejero- Lopez

I exercised the statutory right of a Judge to question the appointment of an

applicant for a branch clerk of court who did not comply with all the basic
requirements under the laws thus it can be considered as an irregular
appointment. She did not have favorable indorsement from the Judge and
Position Description Form (PDF) listed as among the basic requirements.

The issue is not the lack of importance of favorable recommendation

of Judge, it is the non-compliance of all basic requirements for
application as branch clerk of court. Did she comply with all the basic
requirements? The answer is no. Therefore, her appointment was
irregular.

13
My lack of ill motive in questioning the appointment can be gleaned from the
various letters pertaining to the questioned appointment filed before the
Supreme Court.

I lamented in one of the letters submitted to the Supreme Court that it is

only in the Philippines that an applicant for branch clerk of court, who was
refused personally and in writing several times, and who previously has
withdrawn her application, signed a petition for my transfer with prayer for
my dismissal, more or less a month prior to her appointment, then
criminally charge me more or less prior to her oath-taking before the Office
of the Executive Judge. It is not a Grave Misconduct to lodge a protest to
her.

Likewise, there is nothing on record that I committed insubordination in

writing the questioned letter and subsequent letters thereto because a right
to protest an appointment that is perceived to be irregular is inherent in
every court.

Writing a complaint letter and a protest letter on the irregular appointments

of court employees Mariejoy Lagman and Leilani Tejero - Lopez cannot be
considered as the transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in
character, improper or wrong behavior. It is a legitimate action of a Judge
to bring to the proper authorities the irregularities surrounding their
appointments as provided under The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, CANON 2, SECTION 3. Judges should take or
initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court
personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have
become aware.

The contents of the complaint letter and the protest letter on the irregular
appointments of court employees are privileged communications that are
not actionable when made in good faith. The complainants failed to adduce
any proof that I was impelled with disreputable motive and bad faith in
writing them the protest letters.

My letters are protected by doctrine of privileged communication thus I must

not be penalized for it.

Newell, in his work on The Law of Slander and Libel, 4th ed., uses the
following language:

Absolute Privilege In this class of cases it is considered in the interest of

public welfare that all persons should be allowed to express their
sentiments and speak their minds fully and fearlessly upon all
questions and subjects; and all actions for words so spoken are absolutely
forbidden, even of it be alleged and proved that the words were spoken
falsely, knowingly and with express malice (Section 350, pp. 387388).

14
The allegations of complainant against me are not only falsity, they are
illogical. The false accusations of Grave Threats, Unjust Vexation, Grave
Coercion, Harassment, Conduct Unbecoming of a Public Official and
Abuse of Authority including Oppression, aside that these are mere
allegations without evidence, are belied by complainants own
allegations, to quote:

1. Sinikap kung hindi mauwi sa hindi pagkakaunawaan ang aming pag

uusap at minabuti ko na lang na magpasalamat na binigyan niya ako ng
pagkakataon na makaharap at wala akong ibang layunin kundi iparating
sa kanya na gusto kung gampanan ang itinalagang appointment sa akin
(Complainants Complaint- Affidavit in June, 2011);

2. In fact, I immediately furnished her a copy of my waiver, so that I can

easily move on to the next chapter of my activities (Complainants Letter
in June, 2011);

3. I executed a Waiver/ Notice of withdrawal in connection with my

application for Clerk of Court III. However, after a thorough soul
searching, I came to realize, that this vacant position for Clerk of Court
III is a great opportunity for my career advancement considering that I
had been in service for more than 10 years (Complainants Letter in
May, 2011).

Nowhere in the above statements of complainant showed that I committed

abuses, coercion, harassment and threats including Oppression to her.

Logically, complainant will not insist and persist to apply as Clerk of Court, a
position that requires trust and confidence, in my trial court, despite of
several verbal and written valid refusal to her application that is already
harassment for her to kept pestering me, if I committed abuses, coercion,
harassment and threats including Oppression to her. Evidence, to be
believed, must proceed not only from the mouth of a credible witness but
must be credible in itself as to hurdle the test of conformity with the
knowledge and common experience of mankind (Zapatos v. People of the
Philippines, G.R Nos. 147814-15, September 16, 2003).

The branch clerk of court Leilani Tejero-Lopez was irregularly appointed

while clerk Mariejoy Lagman was illegally appointed, they performed their
functions in trial courts, it is too abusive, too harsh and too oppressive
if I will still be penalized for protesting to their irregular appointment
and illegal appointment while those responsible for those irregularity and
illegality are scot-free, as in no administrative liability.

15
F. Ordering Presentation of Evidence Ex Parte Before OIC who was not
a Member of the Bar

The reception of ex parte evidence by a non-lawyer is allowed under Rule

9, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court to quote:

Sec. 3. Default; declaration of. If the defending party fails to answer within
the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party
with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the
defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render
judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant,
unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence.
Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.

This provision is taken in relation with Administrative Circular No. 35-

2004, Section 21 (e ) as amended that states: FOR RECEPTION OF
EVIDENCE BY THE CLERK OF COURT, FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00)
PESOS that goes to Special Allowance for Judges (SAJ).

The construction of the Revised Rules of Court is liberal as provided by

Section 6 thereof, to quote: Construction. These Rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

Rule 30, Section 9, Revised Rules of Court that states: Sec. 9. Judge to
receive evidence; delegation to clerk of court. The judge of the court where
the case is pending shall personally receive the evidence to be adduced by
the parties. However, in default or ex parte hearings, and in any case where
the parties agree in writing, the court may delegate the reception of
evidence to its clerk of court who is a member of the bar. The clerk of court
shall have no power to rule on objections to any question or to the
admission of exhibits, which objections shall be resolved by the court upon
submission of his report and the transcripts within ten (10) days from
termination of the hearing applies only during trial because the heading of
Rule 30 of the same rules is TRIAL, and the reception of evidence ex
parte in our court is due to failure to file answer by the defendant (s),
there is no trial conducted thus Rule 30, Section 9 of the Revised
Rules of Court is not applicable in the ex parte reception of evidence
in Replevin cases.

Moreover, Rule 30, Section 9 of the same rules applies only to second level
courts not to the first level courts. The bases are:

All branch clerk of courts in the Regional Trial Courts are lawyers; and
Rule 5, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court viz:

16
Section 1. Uniform procedure. The procedure in the Municipal Trial Courts
shall be the same as in the Regional Trial Courts, except (a) where a
particular provision expressly or impliedly applies only to either of said
courts, or (b) in civil cases governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

The provision of Rule 30, Section 9 of the Revised Rules of Court

mentioned of a branch clerk of court who is a lawyer that is definitely
referring to a Regional Trial Court therefore the import is that it will not apply
to branch clerk of court of first level court because its branch clerk of court
need not be a lawyer.

The Supreme Court, particularly all judges were benefited by the lawful
orders in allowing reception of evidence ex parte by an Officer-in-Charge
who is a non- lawyer because the plaintiffs-banks paid the amount of Five
hundred Pesos (P500.00) for each Replevin case augmenting the Special
Allowance for Judges (SAJ). The plaintiffs-banks paid the late unremitted
legal fees pertaining to the reception of evidence ex parte covering the one
year period. What is the bad intention of the four Judges and seventy court
employees in charging me administratively because of the collection of the
unremitted legal fees that will benefit the judiciary, particularly the judges,
including them? Instead of them cooperating and helping me to recover the
unremitted legal fees, they mercilessly subjected me to unfounded and
fabricated administrative cases thereby making my work as a Judge more
difficult and more stressful.

An ex parte reception of evidence by a non-lawyer clerk of court is allowed

under Rule 9, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court and Administrative
Circular No. 35-2004, Section 21 (e ) finds support in Administrative
Circular No. 37-93, to quote:

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 37-93 May 28, 1993

TO: COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX

APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A DISTRICT
COURTS AND SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURTS ALL PRESIDING
JUSTICES/JUDGES AND ALL CLERKS OF COURT OF AFORESAID
COURTS ALL MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION
SERVICE ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES

SUBJECT: AMENDMENT TO MANUAL FOR CLERKS OF COURT

RE: DELEGATION OF RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE IN CASE OF

DEFAULT

17
Section F, 1. of the Manual for Clerks of Court (pp. 75-76) is hereby
amended to read as follows:

In Default Cases. When a defendant is declared in default (for failure to

file answers), or considered as in default (For failure to appear at the pre-
trial), the Court may now authorize the Clerk of Court to receive evidence ex
parte. The contrary doctrine laid down in Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete 1 has
been overruled in Gochangco v. CFI of Negros Occidental. 2

Now, that declaration does not reflect long observed and established judicial
practice with respect to default cases. It is not quite consistent, too, with the
several explicitly authorized instances under the Rules where the function of
receiving evidence and even of making recommendatory findings of facts on
the basis thereof may be delegated to commissioners, inclusive of the Clerk
of Court. These instances are set out in Rule 33, treating of presentation of
evidence before commissioners, etc., in particular situations, such as when
the trial of an issue of fact requires the examination of a long account, or
when the taking of an account is necessary for the information of the court,
or when issues of fact arise otherwise than upon the pleadings or while
carrying a judgment or order into effect; Rules 67 and 69, dealing with
submission of evidence also before commissioners in special civil actions of
eminent domain and partition, respectively; Rule 86 regarding trials of
contested claims in judicial proceedings for the settlement of a decedent's
estate; Rule 136 empowering the clerk of court, when directed by the judge
inter alia to receive evidence relating to the accounts of executors,
administrators, guardians, trustees and receivers, or relative to the
settlement of the estates of the deceased persons, or to guardianships,
trusteeships, or receiverships. In all these instances, the competence of the
clerk of court is assumed. Indeed, there would seem, to be sure, nothing
intrinsically wrong in allowing presentation of evidence ex parte before a
Clerk of Court. Such a procedure certainly does not foreclose relief to the
party adversely affected who, for valid cause and upon appropriate and
seasonable application, may bring about the undoing thereof or the
elimination of prejudice thereby caused to him; and it is, after all, the Court
itself which is duty bound and has the ultimate responsibility to pass upon
the evidence received in this manner, discarding in the process such proofs
as are incompetent and then declare what facts have thereby been
established. In considering and analyzing the evidence preparatory to
rendition of judgment on the merits, it may not unreasonably be assumed
that any serious error in the ex parte presentation of evidence, prejudicial to
any absent party, will be detected and duly remedied by the Court, and/or
may always, in any event; be drawn to its attention by any interested party.
3

For your information and guidance. May 28, 1993.

(Sgd.) ANDRES R. NARVASA Chief Justice

18
Footnotes
1 66 SCRA 453 (1975).
2 L-49396, January 15, 1988 (157 SCRA 200)
3 (Reiterated in Monserrate v. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 153 [1989]);
Heirs of the late Jesus Tan v. Sales, G.R. No. 53546, June 28, 1992; 210
SCRA 303.

As observed by the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro in his ponencia in
Laulan vs. Malpaya, 65 SCRA 494,499-500 No provision of law or
principle of public policy prohibits a court from authorizing its clerk of court
to receive the evidence of a party litigant. After all the reception of evidence
by the clerk of court constitutes but a ministerial task the taking down of
the testimony of the witnesses and the marking of the pieces of
documentary evidence, if any, adduced by the party present. This task of
receiving evidence precludes, on the part of the clerk of court, the exercise
of judicial discretion usually called for when the other party who is present
objects to questions propounded and to the admission of the documentary
evidence preferred (Wack Wack Golf and country Club, Inc. vs. court of
Appeals, 106 Phil. 501). More importantly, the duty to render judgment on
the merits of the case still rests with the judge who is obliged to personally
and directly prepare the decision based upon the evidence reported
(Province of Pang vs. Palisoc, 6 SCRA 299) his observation supported
me that there is no law expressly prohibiting the delegation of reception of
evidence by the first level court to a branch clerk of court or officer-in-
charge.

The cited jurisprudences by the Honorable Office of the Court Administrator

such as Paco vs. Quilala AM No. RTJ-02-1699, October 15, 2003 and
Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan vs. Pornillos AM No. RTJ-09-2183, July 7,
2009, are inapplicable to the facts of our civil cases where the parties have
been declared in default under Rule 9, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court and they were required to pay ex parte reception of evidence fee
under Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, Section 21 (e).

The Office of the Court Administrator upheld our courts requiring the
plaintiffs with pending replevin cases to pay legal fees for transcripts,
pursuant to a judicial prerogative to ensure that court funds were properly
accounted. Thus, the seventy-four complainants cannot infringe upon this
judicial prerogative of ex parte reception of evidence whereby
corresponding legal fees are paid by suing me without them availing of
proper judicial relief for my trial court to act upon (See Fernandez vs.
Versola AM No. CA -04-40, 13 August 2004; Cortes vs. Chico Nazario
Am no. SB 04-11 -J, February 13, 2004; Flores vs. Abesamis AM no.
SC -96-1, July 10, 1997; Flores vs. Adefuin-De La Cruz, AM no. CA-04-
39, October 4, 2004).

19
It is a Falsification under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code in relation
to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, Perjury under Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code and Libel under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code
to state that I am liable for Gross ignorance of the law for: xxx (b) ordering
the presentation of ex parte evidence before the OIC despite his not being a
member of the Bar (OCA IPI No. 11-2378-MTJ) xxx

G. On the Waiver of the Right to Counsel

The trial court informed all accused of the nature of the charges against
them, the causes of accusations against them, the right to be counseled by
public attorney or private attorney regarding their pleas, the waivers of their
right to counsel, the range of allowable penalty attendant upon the entry of
their guilty pleas and their immediate release from jail upon their pleas of
guilty to the charges during their arraignment or re-arraignment in a
language or dialect known to them.

The seventy (70) complainants failed to provide any proof that the
waivers of the right to counsel by the accused were not voluntary,
knowingly and intelligently made.

Rule 115, Section 1 (c) Revised Rules of Court provides: XXX Upon
motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when
it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights
without the assistance of counsel.

The foregoing provision of the Revised Rules of Court is taken in relation to

Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to quote:

Sec. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. Before

arraignment, the court shall inform the accused of his right to counsel and
ask him if he desires to have one. Unless the accused is allowed to
defend himself in person or has employed counsel of his choice, the court
must assign a counsel de officio to defend him.

The following jurisprudence is instructive:

20
 People vs. Serzo Jr.
G.R. No. 118435. June 20, 1997
Penned by Justice Artemio Panganiban

Right to Counsel De Parte Is Not Absolute

Accordingly, an accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to

be represented either by a court-appointed lawyer or by one of his own
choice. While his right to be represented by counsel is immutable, his
option to secure the services of counsel de parte, however, is not
absolute. The court is obliged to balance the privilege to retain a counsel
of choice against the statess and the offended partys equally important
right to speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court may restrict the
accuseds option to retain a counsel de parte if the accused insists on an
attorney he cannot afford, or the chosen counsel is not a member of the
bar, or the attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid reason,
e.g. conflict of interest and the like (Twenty-Fourth Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals
19931994, Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 83, No. 3, March-April 1995,
pp. 1086-1087).

Also, the right to counsel de parte is, like other personal rights,
waivable (2 U.S. vs. Go-Leng, 21 Phil 426, 427-479 (1912); U.S. vs.
Kilayko, 31 Phil 371, 372-373 (1915); People vs. Sim Ben, 98 Phil 138,
139 (1955); and People vs. Holgado) so long as (1) the waiver is not
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs; or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law (Article 6, Civil
Code) and (2) the waiver is unequivocally, knowingly and intelligently made
(People vs. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289, 299, February 11, 1986; and Chavez
vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, 683, August 19, 1968). In Sayson vs.
People, 166 SCRA 680, 690-692, October 28, 1988, this Court held that
the duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio is not mandatory
where the accused has proceeded with the arraignment and the trial
with a counsel of his choice but, when the time for the presentation of the
evidence for the defense was due, he appears by himself alone because of
the inexcusable absence of his counsel. In another case, this Court held
that the right to be heard and to reopen the case (and send it to trial anew)
could not be allowed if doing so would sanction a plainly dilatory tactic and
a reprehensible trifling with the orderly administration of justice (People vs.
Mendez, 28 SCRA 880, 887-889, July 29, 1969). In the present case,
appellant claims that he was not given sufficient time to engage a counsel
de parte, thereby preventing him from presenting evidence in his defense.
In his Brief he adds, but without giving particulars or proof, that allegedly his
counsels de oficio did not exert their utmost efforts in representing him,
thus: x x x The lower court afforded the accused the assistance of counsel
de oficio as early as the arraignment stage but failed to show that utmost
efforts were exerted by said counsel to defend the life and liberty of the
accused. The duty of the court is not ended with such appointment,
however, as it should also see to it that the counsel does his duty by the
21
defendant. Counsel de oficio should not merely make the motions of
defending the accused but exert his utmost efforts as if he were
representing a paying client. The Solicitor General, in his eleven-page
Brief, rebuts this, arguing that appellants actions during the trial showed
instead a lackadaisical stance on his own defense. Appellant had been
given ample time to secure the services of a counsel de parte, but his
subsequent appearances in court without such counsel and his act of
allowing this situation to continue until the presentation of his evidence
betrays his lack of intention to do so. It even appears that he was merely
delaying his own presentation of evidence on purpose to the prejudice of
the offended party, the trial court and the orderly administration of justice.
Furthermore, appellant did not demonstrate in what way the services of his
counsels de oficio were unsatisfactory. He did not cite any instance
substantiating his claim that he was not effectively represented. In short,
he was afforded a chance to be heard by counsel of his own choice, but by
his own neglect or mischief, he effectively waived such right. It taxes the
mind to think that, almost two years since appellant first invoked his right to
be represented by counsel de parte, he still could not find one who would
suit his needs and desires. Neither did he cooperate with his court-named
lawyers. The facts of this case do not constitute a deprivation of
appellants constitutional right to counsel because he was adequately
represented by three court-appointed lawyers: Atty. Lina-ac, Atty.
Antonano and Atty. Garcia. Courts are not required to await indefinitely the
pleasure and convenience of the accused as they are also mandated to
promote the speedy and orderly administration of justice. Nor should they
countenance such an obvious trifling with the rules. Indeed, public policy
requires that the trial continue as scheduled, considering that appellant
was adequately represented by counsels who were not shown to be
negligent, incompetent or otherwise unable to represent him.

This U.S.A. jurisprudence can enrich the Philippine jurisprudence on the

waiver of the right to counsel. There are many similar U.S. jurisprudences.
Right to counsel in Philippine Constitution was copied from Right to
Counsel in U.S. Constitution so U.S. jurisprudences are applicable in our
country:

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 021541
IOWA, PETITIONER v. FELIPE EDGARDO TOVAR
[March 8, 2004]

Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court

The Sixth Amendment safeguards to an accused who faces incarceration

the right to counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process (Maine v.
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
224 (1967). The entry of a guilty plea, whether to a misdemeanor or a

22
felony charge, ranks as a critical stage at which the right to counsel
adheres (Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972); White v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (per curiam). Waiver of the right to
counsel, as of constitutional rights in the criminal process generally, must
be a knowing, intelligent ac[t] done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748
(1970). This case concerns the extent to which a trial judge, before
accepting a guilty plea from an uncounseled defendant, must elaborate
on the right to representation.

Beyond affording the defendant the opportunity to consult with counsel

prior to entry of a plea and to be assisted by counsel at the plea hearing,
must the court, specifically: (1) advise the defendant that waiving the
assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty [entails] the risk
that a viable defense will be overlooked; and (2) admonish the defendant
that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose the opportunity to obtain
an independent opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it
is wise to plead guilty? The Iowa Supreme Court held both warnings
essential to the knowing and intelligent waiver of the Sixth Amendment
right to the assistance of counsel. We hold that neither warning is
mandated by the Sixth Amendment. The constitutional requirement is
satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the
charges against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of
the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty
plea.

XXX XXX XXX

The Sixth Amendment secures to a defendant who faces incarceration the

right to counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process. See, e.g.,
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S., at 170; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S., at
224. A plea hearing qualifies as a critical stage. White v. Maryland, 373
U.S., at 60. Because Tovar received a two-day prison term for his 1996
OWI conviction, he had a right to counsel both at the plea stage and at trial
had he elected to contest the charge. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S., at
34, 37.

A person accused of crime, however, may choose to forgo representation.

While the Constitution does not force a lawyer upon a defendant, Adams
v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942), it does
require that any waiver of the right to counsel be knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent, see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Tovar
contends that his waiver of counsel in November 1996, at his first OWI plea
hearing, was insufficiently informed, and therefore constitutionally invalid.
In particular, he asserts that the trial judge did not elaborate on the value,
at that stage of the case, of an attorneys advice and the dangers of self-
representation in entering a plea.

23
We have described a waiver of counsel as intelligent when the defendant
knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open. Adams,
317 U.S., at 279. We have not, however, prescribed any formula or script to
be read to a defendant who states that he elects to proceed without
counsel. The information a defendant must possess in order to make an
intelligent election, our decisions indicate, will depend on a range of case-
specific factors, including the defendants education or sophistication, the
complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the
proceeding (See Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464).

As to waiver of trial counsel, we have said that before a defendant may be

allowed to proceed pro se, he must be warned specifically of the hazards
ahead. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), is instructive. The
defendant in Faretta resisted counsels aid, preferring to represent himself.
The Court held that he had a constitutional right to self-representation. In
recognizing that right, however, we cautioned: Although a defendant need
not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently
and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of
the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will
establish that he knows what he is doing ....

Later, in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988), we elaborated on the

dangers and disadvantages of self-representation to which Faretta
referred. [A]t trial, we observed, counsel is required to help even the
most gifted layman adhere to the rules of procedure and evidence,
comprehend the subtleties of voir dire, examine and cross-examine
witnesses effectively ... , object to improper prosecution questions, and
much more. Warnings of the pitfalls of proceeding to trial without counsel,
we therefore said, must be rigorous[ly] conveyed. We clarified, however,
that at earlier stages of the criminal process, a less searching or formal
colloquy may suffice.

XXX XXX XXX

The questioned order has attained finality. There must be a judicial relief to
be followed before I will be held liable for Gross Ignorance of the Law.
The right to counsel is a right that is personal to the accused. It is only the
accused, and no one else, not the seventy-four (74) complainants, can
invoke such right to penalize me for Gross Ignorance of the Laws.

Their interference to my court is disallowed under the principle of

judicial courtesy and co-equality of courts, it is a contemptuous act. If
right to counsel is violated, the one who has the right to sue is the accused,
not anyone else on behalf of the accused (Rule 3, Section 2 of the Revised
Rules of Court). None of the accused in the subject criminal cases filed a
Motion for Reconsideration or filed an Appeal with respect to the questioned
lawful orders. None of the accused complained for violation of

24
their right to counsel against my court. Thus, the charge of Gross Ignorance
has no factual and legal bases.

Rule 3, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court states: Parties in interest.

A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

Seventy-four complainants have no direct, personal and substantial interest

to protect as enunciated in Domingo vs. Carague 456 SCRA 450. They
lack the personality to sue out of the questioned lawful orders thus they
have no cause of action against my court (See Evangelista vs. Santiago
457 SCRA 744). In judicial review, an important requirement is that the suit
must be raised by a proper party or there must be a locus standi (Ople vs.
Torres 293 SCRA 141; Joya vs. PCGG 225 SCRA 568;
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines vs.
COMELEC 289 SCRA 337; IBP vs. Zamora GR No. 141284, August 15,
2000). More importantly, none of them were prejudiced by the various lawful
orders including internal memoranda.

The unlawful interference, meddling or encroachment of the various lawful

orders, decisions and final orders including internal memoranda:

1. Violated the principle of judicial stability (Mars vs. Dumara-og 12

SRA 34; Gutierrez vs. CA GR No. 82475, January 28, 1991;
Villamor vs. Salas 203 SCRA 540; Parco vs. CA 111 SCRA 262;
Garcia vs. Aloncel 111 SCRA 178, Sta. Maria vs. Ubay 87 SCRA
179; Gahol vs. Riodique 64 SCRA 494; PICOP vs. IAC 151 SCRA
161; Vide Vlason Enterprises Corp. vs. CA 155 SCRA 186; NEA
vs. Mendoza 138 SCRA 632; Pineda vs. Lantin 6 SCRA 757;
Philippine Pacific Fishing Co. vs. Luna 112 SCRA 604; Paper
Industries Corp. vs. IAC 151 SCRA 161; Republic vs. Judge
Reyes 155 SCRA 313; Almazar vs. Cenzon 161 SCRA 545; PNB
vs. Pineda 197 SCRA 1);

2. Violated the doctrine of immutability of decisions and final orders

(Pena vs. GSIS 502 SCRA 383; Siy vs. NLRC 468 SCRA 154;
Sacdalan vs. CA 428 SCRA 586); and

3. Violated the expanded principle of judicial courtesy ( Ramiscal vs.

Sandiganbayan GR Nos. 172476-99, September 15, 2010; A.M.
No. 07-7-12-SC, December 27, 2007).

25
Foregoing legal principles considered, all the complainants are liable for
contemptuous acts under Rule 71, Section 3 (a, c and d) the Revised Rules
of Court to wit:

RULE 71
CONTEMPT

Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.

After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the
court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official

duties or in his official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or

judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process
of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces
another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the
possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c)Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or

proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of
this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,

obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such

without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the

custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.

But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court

from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him
in custody pending such proceedings.

Do I need to explain all lawful courts orders in detail that all the
complainants submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator? Under the
Revised Rules of Court, all complainants must observe the proper
procedure by filing a judicial remedy to question my official acts as a Judge

26
who issued the subject orders with a presumption of regularity of the
performance of duty.

It is a Falsification under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code in

relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, Perjury under Article
183 of the Revised Penal Code and Libel under Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code to state that I am liable for Gross ignorance of the
law for: xxx (d) authorizing the change of plea by the accused without the
assistance of counsel; xxx

H. Issuance of Show Cause Order

When I was found liable for the alleged non-recusal by the Office of
the Court Administrator, Your Honors affirmed the legality of the
show cause order I issued thus no oppression and gross
misconduct can be attributed against me.

There was no clear abuse of court processes because such issuance of

show cause has a legal basis. It is my honest belief that anything that is
legal cannot be an assumption of the role of a tyrant wielding power with
unbridled breath. I will not issue a show cause order without factual and
legal bases.

Show cause order for contempt is allowed under the Revised Rules of
Court thus it cannot be considered as cruel, severe and excessive use of
authority to qualify as Grave Abuse of Authority and Oppression.

Also, there is no proof presented by seventy four (74)

respondents including the complainants that I was motivated or
premeditated, with obstinate or intentional purpose to do wrong
or inflict harm on them to constitute a Grave Misconduct since
contempt is a valid and lawful legal remedy under our Revised Rules
of Court, specifically referring to Rule 71, Section 3 (a) and (d) of the
Revised Rules of Court as stated in the subject courts order.

In Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled "Restoring Integrity: A

Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College
of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the
Supreme Court", A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, October 19, 2010, the
Honorable Supreme Court issued a show cause order to thirty - seven
(37) respondents composed of an incumbent dean, retired deans and
faculty members of the U.P. College of Law. No one of the respondents
accused
27
the Supreme Court of committing Grave Misconduct, Patent Abuse of
Authority and Oppression upon their receipt of a show cause order.

With due respect, I did not insist on the courts inherent authority to punish
fellow Judges for contempt of court, it was provided by the Revised Rules of
Court. I knew that my issuance of show cause to them has legal basis
although it may appear odd to others because it involved four (4) Judges
and seventy (70) court personnel as respondents. There is no prohibition
to issue a show cause order against them, no matter how many were
they, and notwithstanding they are judicial workers, under the Revised
Rules of Court. It does not say show cause order of contempt cannot
be issued against Judges or court personnel, or it cannot be issued
against four (4) Judges and seventy (70) court personnel.

The bone of contention is, there was a provision of the Revised Rules
of Court that I relied upon in good faith. Without legal and factual
bases, I will not and never issue it against them. Thus the
administrative charges must fail against me. Your Honors must not
penalize me for my faithful adherence and interpretation of the Revised
Rules of Court on Contempt. It Your Honors found it as a misconduct I
should not be faulted with it.

There was no proof that I did it out of retaliation to them. There was
the Revised Rules of Court that I faithfully followed.

The Revised Rules of Court did not provide any exception to issuance of
show cause order as to the respondents thus the findings that I abused
authority to penalize them lacked a legal basis. If I will be penalized, it must
be clear and convincing that my show cause order was baseless,
complainants failed to provide a proof. In fact, they disregarded the show
cause order by them that is sanctionable under the Revised Rules of Court.

Here are the jurisprudences that justified my issuance of the show cause
order: The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts (In Re
Kelly, 35 Phil. 944). It need not be specifically granted by Statute (In Re
Sotto, 82 Phil. 595). It lies at the core of the administration of a judicial
system (Juidice v. Vail, 430 US 327). Indeed, there ought to be no
question that courts have the power by virtue of their very creation to
impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to their
lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and their officers from the
approach and insults of pollution (Re Robinson, 19 Wall 505; Re Terry,
128 US 289; Bessette v. M.B. Conkey Co., 194 US 324; Michaelson v.
US ex rel. Chicago, St. P.M. & O. R. Co., 266 US 42; .Anderson v. Dunn,
6 Wheat 204). The power to punish for contempt essentially exists for the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for
28
the due administration of justice (Perkins v. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil.
271. See Ex parte Hudgings, 249 US 378). The reason behind the power
to punish for contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability
of their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of the courts
would be resting on a very shaky foundation (Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil.
772). In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a
despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court (17 GS, Contempt,
1). The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal
signification a variety of different acts (17 GS, Contempt, 2). The Order
dated December 1, 2011 demands compliance as it has the same force
and effect of law.

In Judge Angeles vs. Sheriff Gernale, A.M. No. P-96-1221, June 19,
1997: Disciplinary proceedings must be distinguished from contempt
proceedings under Rule 71, since they involve different and separate
procedures (Zabala vs. Judge Dictado, A.M. No. RTJ-89-375, March 6,
1990; Balasabas vs. Aquilizan, 106 SCRA 489,1981). The penalty for
one cannot take the place of the other.

Contempt proceeding and administrative proceeding are two separate and

distinct procedures are the following jurisprudences: In People vs. Godoy,
March 29, 1995, G.R. No. 115908-09: Whether or not the Same
Contemptuous Conduct of a Member of the Bar can be the Subject of both a
Contempt Proceeding and an Administrative Disciplinary Action? The
answer is yes. With the foregoing discussion of the appropriate remedies
available to a judge, we feel that this issue with respect to proper remedies
against an erring member or the Bar should consequentially be addressed,
by way of reiteration, since conflicting and erroneous remedies are
sometimes resorted to by aggrieved tribunals or parties. The basic rule here
is that the power to punish for contempt and the power to disbar are
separate and distinct, and that the exercise of one does not exclude the
exercise of the other (In Re Isserman, 87 A. 2d 903). A contempt
proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority of
the court; on the other hand, the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal
with the fitness of the courts officer to continue in that office, to preserve
and protect the court and the public from the official ministrations of persons
unfit or unworthy to hold such office (In re Schofield, 66 A. 2d 675). The
principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to
safeguard the functions of the court and should thus be used sparingly on a
preservative and not, on the vindictive principle (Balasabas vs. Aquilizan,
etc. G.R. No. 51414, July 31, 1981, 106 SCRA 489). The principal purpose
of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme Court is to assure
respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are
responsible for the orderly administration of justice (In re Daly, 171 NW 2d.
818). Moreover, it has been held that the imposition a fine as a penalty in a
contempt proceeding is not considered res judicata to a subsequent charge
for unprofessional conduct (In re Hawke, 63 NE 2d 553). In the same
manner an attorneys conviction for contempt was not collaterally estopped
by reason of a subsequent disbarment proceeding in
29
which the court found in his favor on essentially the same facts leading to
conviction (Howell vs. Tomas, 566 F. 2d 469). It has likewise been the
rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt cannot be considered as a notice to show cause
why he should not be suspended from the practice of law, considering that
they have distinct objects and for each of them a different procedure is
established. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures laid down
under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the
Practice of law are governed by file 138 and 139 thereof. Although
apparently different in legal bases, the authority to punish for contempt and
to discipline lawyers are both inherent in the Supreme Court and are
equally incidents of the courts basic power to oversee the proper
administration of justice and the orderly discharge of judicial functions.

As was succinctly expounded in Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R.

Nos. 79690-79707, October 7, 1988, 166 SCRA 316: There are, in other
words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before
us here: the Courts inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt
power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is
broader than the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be
committed both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court.
Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct
also constitutes professional misconduct which calls into play the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Where the respondent is a
lawyer, however, the Supreme Courts disciplinary authority over lawyers
may come into play whether or not the misconduct with which the
respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to
punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary
authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court
over members of the Bar is but corollary to the courts exclusive power of
admission to the bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an
officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and
responsibilities of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any
act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and
degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional
misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him, and
contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.

In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 (1935): for the same act of filing in
court a pleading with intemperate and offensive statements, the concerned
lawyer was found guilty of contempt and liable administratively. For this
reason, two separate penalties were imposed upon him, a fine (for the
contempt charge) and reprimand (for his failure to observe his lawyerly duty
to give due respect to the Court).

It is basic that disciplinary proceedings against judges do not

complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies and, thus, cannot
be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies. Therefore, the
administrative charges must fail for lack of merit. Complainants essentially
30
questions my orders and resolutions on matters which are purely judicial in
nature since they infringe on my judicial prerogatives. By its nature, judicial
discretion involves the exercise of judgment on the part of the judge. The
Court allows the judge reasonable latitude in the disposition of a case,
allowing him or her to decide based on his or her appreciation of the facts
and understanding of the applicable law on the matter. The judges rulings
may only be questioned through the judicial remedies provided under the
Rules of Court, and are therefore not proper subjects of an administrative
complaint. The remedy of an aggrieved party is to elevate the assailed
decision or order (or resolution) to the higher court for review and
correction. The established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary
proceedings against judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a
substitute for, these judicial remedies. It is only after the available judicial
remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken
with finality that the door to any inquiry into the judges criminal, civil and
administrative liability may be said to have opened or closed.

It is also premature that there were of abuse and misconduct on my part

because I have yet to rule if I find their explanation for the show cause order
is satisfactory. There was a prejudgment by the Your Honors that I will rule
against them in the show cause order. I may not hold them liable for
contempt at all. Thus, there is no reason that I will be made liable for the
issuance of the show cause order. They did not comply with it thus what
injury did they sustain if any for me to be administratively liable on their
charges? The answer is naught please.

Gross misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful

conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of justice
which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination
of the cause. Such conduct is generally motivated by a premeditated,
obstinate or intentional purpose (Donato vs. Asuncion Jr., A.C. No. 4914,
March 3, 2004 citing SPO2 Jose B. Yap vs. Judge Aquilino A.
Inopiquez, Jr. A.M. No. MTJ-02-1431, May 9, 2003, citing Tan Tiac
Chiong vs. Cosico, A.M. No. CA-02-33, July 31 2002; Canson vs.
Garchitorena, SB-99-9-J, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 268; Blacks Law
Dictionary, Fourth Ed. at 832, 1150; Words and Phrases, Vol. 27 at
466).

In all of these charges, it must be shown that there is flagrant unlawful

conduct, intentional purpose, manifest partiality or evident bad faith.
However complainant merely presented her bare allegations. Even the
substance of the orders attached to the instant complaint reveal nothing.
Basic is the rule that in administrative cases, the burden is on the
complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in his (or her)
complaint. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if the other minds equally
reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. Complainant by her mere
31
allegations and failure to substantiate the same with specific incidents or
provision of law or rule that points out a violation thereof, miserably failed to
discharge her burden.

Grave Abuse of Authority has been defined as a misdemeanor committed

by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any
person any bodily harm, imprisonment or other injury; it is an act of cruelty,
severity, or excessive use of authority (Rafael v. Sualog, A.M. No. P-07-
2330, June 12, 2008, 554 SCRA 278, 287; citing Aranda, Jr. v. Alvarez,
A.M. No. P-04-1889, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 162, and Stilgrove
v. Sabas, A.M. No. P-06-2257, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 383, 400).
On the other hand, Oppression has been defined as "an act of cruelty,
severity, unlawful exaction, domination or excessive use of authority"
(Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., 326 Phil. 847, 893 (1996); Golangco vs.
Fung, G.R. No. 147640, October 12, 2006).

No Grave Abuse of Authority and Oppression in the issuance of the

show cause because show cause was provided by the Revised Rules
of Court.

As to the Rules on Disqualification, there must be a process by the

complainants to be followed under the Revised Rules of Court. All the
complainants did not move for my inhibition so that I can properly act upon
it. It is premature to assume that I will not grant their motion for inhibition
Therefore, I did not breach the Code of Judicial Conduct, Section 5, Canon
3 and Section 8, Canon 4 because they did not avail of the judicial remedy.
Before I will be made liable, I must be given the chance to rectify my
mistakes in a judicial proceeding. There is no legal basis to sanction me
on this matter. Again, it is premature to hold me administratively liable
because there must be a court action that must be made by me, and
my refusal to inhibit will give rise to an administrative offense. I will
rule in their favor if they filed a motion for my inhibition. I granted all
motions for inhibition filed in my trial court.

Also a motion for inhibition by complainants presupposes that my show

cause order against them is a valid courts order as provided by the Revised
Rules of Court. The suggestion of recusal and finding me liable for the
alleged non-recusal affirmed the legality of the show cause order I
issued thus no oppression and gross misconduct can be attributed
against me. Thus, when I was relieved from my court, the Acting Judge
can properly act upon their motion for inhibition against me.

The Revised Rules of Court on Contempt did not provide any exception to
the issuance of the show cause order contrary with the recommendation of
the Honorable Office of the Court Administrator. The grounds stated therein
were well-defined. None of the complainants properly raised their objection
to it before my court so I can act properly upon it as mandated by the rules
on procedurals.

32
It is a Falsification under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code in relation
to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, Perjury under Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code and Libel under Article 353 of the Revised Penal
Code to state in OCA IPI No. 11-2378-MTJ and OCA IPI No. 12-2456-MTJ,
I committed grave abuse of authority and abuse of court processes for
issuing the show-cause order against her fellow Judges and court
personnel; and gross misconduct amounting to violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct for not disqualifying myself in acting on the supposedly
contumacious conduct of my fellow Judges and concerned court personnel
in copying the records of my court.

I. Waiver of the Presence of Public Prosecutor During Trial

The presence of a public prosecutor can be waived. Trial can proceed

without a public prosecutor as held in People vs. Arcilla, GR No. 116237,
May 15, 1996; Bravo vs. CA, GR No. L-48772, May 8, 1992; and People
vs. Malinao et al., GR No. L-63735, April 5, 1990.

Anent to the issue of the waiver of the presence of a public prosecutor in a

trial, it was held in People vs. Malinao et al., GR No. L-63735, April 5,
1990, the Supreme Court through its ponente , Justice Carolina Grino-
Aquino held, Neither was the absence of the fiscal at the trial on February
27, 1980, prejudicial to the accused for only Dr. Nicanor L. Tansingco was
presented to testify on his autopsy report on the deceased Manang. Since
no objection was interposed by appellants counsel, Atty. Paulino Cabello,
either to Dr. Tansingcos competency or his post mortem findings (Exh. A),
the doctors testimony was dispensed with (p. 3, tsn, February 27, 1980).
The defense likewise waived the fiscals presence on that date.

In Bravo vs. CA, GR No. L-48772, May 8, 1992: Finally, petitioner

contends that there was no fiscal who was physically present during the
proceedings of the libel cases since the entire evidence for the prosecution
was presented by a private prosecutor who had no express authority from
the fiscal to represent the State, thereby rendering the entire trial invalid as
enunciated in the case of People vs. Beriales, 70 SCRA 361 (1976).
Petitioner is in error.

In People vs. Arcilla, GR No. 116237, May 15, 1996: To be sure,

appellant misappreciates the reason requiring the public prosecutor to
be present in the trial of criminal cases. A crime is an offense against
the State, and hence is prosecuted in the name of the People of the
33
Philippines. For this reason, Section 5 of Rule 110 provides that "all
criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal x x x." Only private
crimes like adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness can be prosecuted at the instance of the offended party.
The presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is
necessary to protect vital state interests at stake in the prosecution of
crimes, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the
bedrock of peace of the people. As the representative of the State, the
public prosecutor has the right and the duty to take all steps to protect the
rights of the People in the trial of an accused. It ought to be self-evident
that the right belongs to the public prosecutor and not to the accused. The
absence of a prosecutor cannot therefore be raised by an accused to
invalidate the testimony of a state witness if he cannot prove
personal prejudice as in the case at bar.

The public prosecutor received the trial courts orders, he or she did not file
any motion to question the waiver of his or her presence during the trial.
Moreover, there was no sufficient justification of his or her absence, his or
her reason for not attending came late to the attention of the trial court. His
or her subsequent attendance to the hearing removed any doubt as to the
invalidity of the proceedings attended by the private prosecutor who
secured written authority to prosecute from the Office of the City Prosecutor
thereafter. The private prosecutor also made a meritorious explanation why
he obtained late the written authority to prosecute, it was not his fault.

The public prosecutor made a manifestation in open court that he or she did
not object to the waiver of his or her presence before the involved litigants
and lawyers.

There was no prejudice to the State, a requirement before my trial court will
be held administratively liable. More importantly, seventy- four (74)
complainants failed to produce proof of bad faith on my part for allowing the
continuation of hearing without a public prosecutor for which notice was
given to the Office of the City Prosecutor informing it that the right to
prosecute can be waived citing People vs. Arcilla, GR No. 116237, May 15,
1996; Bravo vs. CA, GR No. L-48772, May 8, 1992; and People vs. Malinao
et al., GR No. L-63735, April 5, 1990.

Seventy-four (74) complainants have no legal personalities to question the

surreptitiously taken, without permission at all, the order, minutes and
transcript of stenographic notes of a trial court as pieces of evidence for the
charge of gross ignorance of the law and procedure against it because the
Supreme Court held that the filing of an administrative complaint is not a
proper remedy for the correction of actions of a judge perceived to have
gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient judicial remedy
34
exists (Fernandez vs. Versola AM No. CA -04-40, 13 August 2004;
Cortes vs. Chico Nazario Am no. SB 04-11-J, February 13, 2004).

Now the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings

and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory
of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or
extraordinary. Resort to exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as
the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-
requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the
judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative or criminal nature. It is
only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the
appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into
his criminal, civil or administrative liability may said to have opened or
closed (Flores vs. Abesamis AM no. SC -96-1, July 10, 1997).

Moreover, the order, minutes and transcript of stenographic notes dated

March 22, 2011 are the result of the act of this Court in its official capacity.
The acts of a judge in an official capacity are not subject to disciplinary
action even though such acts may be erroneous, provided he acts in good
faith and without malice (Flores vs. Adefuin-De La Cruz, AM no. CA-04-
39, October 4, 2004).

It is a Falsification under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code in relation

to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, Perjury under Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code and Libel under Article 353 of the Revised Penal
Code to state that I am liable for Gross ignorance of the law for: xxx (c)
allowing criminal proceedings to be conducted without the actual
participation of the public prosecutor (A.M. No. MTJ-12-1815) xxx

Thank you.

Judge Eliza B. Yu

35