Policy Paper

Russias Soft Power and

Strategic Communications

Challenges and
Recommendations

ANA ANDGULADZE
MAY, 2017
INTRODUCTION

Over the last few years the relationship between public diplomacy and elements of relations with
Georgia and the European Union has undergone media. 2
major positive changes. Georgias partnership
with the EU has essentially moved to an import- Policy of strategic and effective communications
ant new phase, one filled with plenty of opportu- is the key factor in elimination of inaccurate in-
nities as well as challenges. formation spread about the EU in Georgia and
generally in the region. The fact that Russias
The Association Agreement signed on June 27, soft power is becoming more powerful in Georgia
2014 in Brussels within the Eastern Partnership and throughout Europe indicates that strategic
Initiative entails creating the Deep and Com- communications are important and necessary.
prehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) between The Russian Federation is utilizing various pro-
Georgia and the EU. The Association Agree- paganda techniques, including exploiting prob-
ments signed by the EU with Georgia, Moldova lems of European integration and derogating the
and Ukraine are also referred to as the new EU and Europe in general in relation to ideologi-
generation of Association Agreements owing to cal and religious matters. Russian propaganda is
the fact that they are the first ones to include targeting not only the EUs eastern neighborhood
the DCFTA chapter. The Association Agreement but also EU member states and membership
serves as a new legal framework for EU-Georgia candidates. As reaction to that development, the
relations and it envisages deepening of cooper- European Council proposed to counter such pro-
ation in almost all priority areas. Most important- paganda by means of strategic communications
ly, under the Agreement and its DCFTA chap- in the EUs agenda in 2015.3
ter Georgia has committed itself to harmonizing
national legislation with the EU legislation in a Support of majority of citizens is important for
number of areas. ensuring that Georgia maintains its European
path and successfully fulfills all relevant commit-
When it comes to a comprehensive document ments that it has undertaken, especially consid-
like the Association Agreement, it is important ering that Georgias northern neighbor has been
to design an accurate and effective communica- actively spreading its propaganda by means of
tions strategy to educate Georgian citizens about Russian TV channels, certain political forces,
benefits of the Agreement. For implementation of NGOs and other organizations. Main purpose of
any reform or policy, effective communication is such propaganda is to thwart Georgias Euro-
the key to success. pean and Euro-Atlantic integration and reinforce
public skepticism towards Georgias official for-
The term strategic communications is hardly new eign policy priorities.
but recently it has been increasingly used in pub-
lic and broadcasting areas. There is no single Purpose of the present policy paper is to analyze
definition of the term but often it is character- Georgias strategic communications policy with-
ized as: a systematic series of sustained and in the context of European integration and Rus-
coherent activities, conducted across strategic, sian propaganda: techniques that Russia uses to
operational and tactical levels that enables un- misinform Georgian and international community,
derstanding of target audiences and, identifies EUs ability to develop effective communication
effective conduits to promote and sustain par- in response to the propaganda and implementa-
ticular types of behavior.1 Strategic communi- tion of Georgias strategic communications poli-
cations for governmental organizations entails cy, which has been recognized as a priority. Main

1 P.Cornish, J.Lindley-French, C.Yorke, Strategic Communications and National Strategy, Chatham House Report, September 2011.
2 European Parliament, EU strategic communications With a view to counteracting propaganda, 2016.
3 European Council meeting (19 and 20 March 2015) Conclusions, Brussels. http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/european-council-conclusions-19-20-march-
2015-en.pdf

1
goal of this document is to develop concrete rec- sion (political, economic, legal), also referred to
ommendations based on analysis, for further de- as Copenhagen Criteria. They are the mandatory
velopment of strategic communications policy. requirements for EU membership.

RUSSIAN NARRATIVE EFFECTIVE Since the day it was founded, EUs enlargement
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION FROM policy has played critical role in spreading and
maintaining democracy, stability, safety and wel-
THE NORTHERN NEIGHBOR
The Color Revolutions in Eastern Europe was
a turning point which affected not only coun-
tries shook by the revolutions but also Europe
and Russia. It was after these revolutions that
Eastern Europe in general and particularly, the
Caucasus Region became a participant of the
Neighborhood Policy initiated by the EU in 2003,
meaning that Europe decided to design a more
serious approach for transitioning its relations
with independent states in the region from simple
cooperation to a more active phase. These rev-
olutions also prompted Moscows political elite to
think that there was a need of decisive changes
in Russias foreign (neighborhood) policy. Con-
sequently, Russia decided to take EUs experi-
enced and successful soft power policy as an
example.
fare throughout the European continent. From
economic point of view, EUs enlargement has
led to creation of the worlds largest and strategi-
cally important market.
NARRATIVES AND METHODS OF RUS-
SIAS SOFT POWER
Unlike the West, Russia uses soft power adapt-
ed and tailored to Russian reality. It is based on
perception of the Western World as Russias en-
emy camp and portrayal of the camp as a threat
to Russias national and foreign interests. This
way, Russia uses its soft power not only as a
tool for promoting Russia and the Eurasian Eco-
nomic Union but also as means for cultivating
anti-Western sentiments, mostly by discrediting
European institutions and values.

WHAT IS SOFT POWER? Resources, narratives and objectives of Russias

soft power are determined and controlled by the
In the field of international relations soft power state. Discussion of the concept at the state level
has been described as the ability to spread and started in 2007, when it 5was reflected in strategic
increase ideological, economic, political and cul- documents of the state. Russias State Security
tural influence through appeal. Often it is referred Strategy 2015 also makes a reference to soft
to as a power of attraction.4 One of the most power.
6

illustrative and important examples of soft power

is EU, which has established itself as a success- Russias narratives for neighboring countries are
ful economic model and the worlds leading pro- similar even though they target countries that are
moter of democratic values since the day it was different in many ways. Often Russia tailors its
founded. narratives based on weaknesses of a country
concerned and exploits populist issues.7 As a re-
EU enlargement policy is the important instru- sult, Russian soft power serves as some sort of
ment that the EU relies on for spreading its val- an ideological instrument that spreads anti-West-
ues, allowing the union to exercise soft power ern propaganda on the one hand and promotes
throughout the world. Under the European leg- the Russian world on the other. The narrative
islation, any European country may apply for of the Russian World encompasses language,
membership if it meets the key criteria for acces- culture, history, shared heritage, economy, reli-

4 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 2004.
5 European Initiative Liberal Academy Tbilisi, Threats of Russian Hard and Soft Power in Georgia, 2016, p.8. http://www.ei-lat.ge/images/doc/politikis%20dokumenti.pdf
6 National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation 2015. https://rg.ru/2015/12/31/nac-bezopasnost-site-dok.html
7 O. Lutsevych, Agents of the Russian World: Proxy Groups in the Contested Neighborhood, Chatham House, 2016.

2
gion and conservative values.8 Russian Ortho-
dox Church plays important role in spreading the
propaganda based on values, portraying Russia
as the defender of traditions and family values
at home as well as in the region.9 These efforts
have an ultimate goal of restoring and reinforcing
Russias regional supremacy.
Russian narrative directed at Eastern European
countries has more components than the fight
to preserve values and traditions. The Eurasian
Economic Union (EAEU) was launched in Janu-
ary 2015, as an alternative regional integration
project to the EU. To broaden the EAEU and
attract new members, Russia uses hard power
in combination with soft power methods (market
economic benefits, visa-free regime with other
member states, etc.).
In addition to promotion of the Russian World,
Russias soft power also focuses on spreading RUSSIAN SOFT POWER IN THE INTER-
strong anti-Western propaganda. Russia uses NATIONAL ARENA
the following techniques for discrediting the West:
Manipulation with traditions and values:
portraying the U.S. and the EU as forces that
oppose Orthodox traditions and values, and de-
scribing globalization as a threat to state identity
(especially for small countries) within this con-
text is the most common method of Russias pro-
paganda. Russia frequently exploits issues like
prospects of legalization of same sex marriage
for countries aspiring to join the EU and instills
the fear of losing traditions and national identi-
ty.10
Discrediting EUs relations with the coun-
try concerned: in addition to the ideological war-
fare, Russias soft power also entails portrayal of
EUs relations with the country concerned in a
negative light. In case of Georgia, this manifests
into a narrative that Georgia has to fulfill com-
plex and unnecessary obligations under the As-
sociation Agreement, while such reforms require
significant administrative and financial resources
but fail to provide any fast and tangible results
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 European Parliament, EU strategic communications With a view to counteracting propaganda, 2016.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
3
for ordinary citizens.11
EU will make a weak ally: portraying
the EU as unreliable, complex and bureaucrat-
ic union can be viewed as the third component
of Russias soft power.12 Current migration cri-
sis, the UKs referendum and the EU as a weak
global actor are all integral parts of Russias nar-
rative. EUs role as a successful global player in
the international arena is debatable indeed con-
sidering that communication of unified and con-
sistent messages to the outside world has been
a struggle for the union of 28 different states.
Russia often exploits challenges of EUs neigh-
borhood policy, its failures and inconsistent ap-
proaches. Addressing this problem requires not
only actions at the level of strategic communi-
cations but also comprehensively reforming the
role of the EU as a foreign actor.
Over the recent years Russia has improved its
soft power tools and has transformed them into
a global network. These tools are evident in Rus-
sias immediate neighborhood and beyond in
EU member and candidate countries. Govern-
ment agencies and local media outlets are no
longer the only tools of Russian propaganda as
it has now grown into a large-scale network of
non-governmental organizations, associations,
political parties, students unions and internation-
al media.
Media appears to be the strongest and the most
effective tool for spreading Russian narrative.
The fact that international media has become an
important part of Russias propaganda suggests
that Russia has modernized and improved its
soft power.
One example is Russia Today (RT) - launched
in 2005 it now serves a classic tool of Russian
soft power. In promoting the Russian World and
spreading the anti-Western propaganda, Russian
media outlets used to target Russian-speaking 2016 the Chamber of Commerce organized a
groups but now RT ensures that these messag- meeting between Vladimir Putin and the chief
es are delivered to international audience. RT executive officers of major French companies in
broadcasts 24 hours a day from its offices in Mos- order to gain their support for lifting the sanctions
cow, London, Washington and New York, in five against Russia.19
different languages.13 Russia spends 190 million
a year to fund the RT programming.14 Sputnik In addition to media outlets, lobbyist groups and
News is another media outlet targeting Russian NGOs, there are valid suspicions that Russia
speaking and international audiences. Founded is funding far right political parties like Frances
in 2014, it broadcasts in more than 30 different Front National20 which received a 9m euro loan
languages, including all languages of the former from a Russian bank in 2014.21 The US has in-
Soviet Republics among which are Georgian as structed its National Intelligence to conduct a re-
well as Abkhazian and Ossetian languages.15 view into Russias clandestine funding of Euro-
pean parties.
Sputnik News has an active presence in social
media. It has Facebook and Twitter accounts in Russian propaganda has travelled outside the
all of the above languages. Sputnik Georgias continent. According to a report released by
Facebook page has 13,831 subscribers and its the U.S. intelligence agencies, Russia meddled
twitter account has 1100 followers.16 in the US election to denigrate Secretary Clin-
ton and harm her electability, and boost Donald
Russian propaganda targets not only its immedi- Trumps chances of winning the election.22 Ac-
ate neighborhood but also the EU and its mem- cording to the report, Russia resorted to different
ber states, as clearly illustrated by media outlets methods, including cyber-attacks, media outlets
like RT and Sputnik News that serve as a plat- funded by the state, paid social media users or
form for reaching international audience. Krem- trolls, etc.23
lin-designed narrative directly aims to intensify
Euroscepticism but not all of Russias disinfor- 2017 is an important year for elections in Europe.
mation efforts succeed. Sputnik news website in The risk of Russian propaganda rises and it will
various Scandinavian languages failed to attract become especially active during the pre-election
enough readers and were closed eventually.17 period. According to the above report released
by the U.S. intelligence agencies, Russia may
Business relations are viewed as another in- resort to similar actions in other countries as
strument of Russias soft power.18 There are well.24
suspicions that Russia may be funding the
French-Russian Chamber of Commerce. These
suspicions are intensified by the fact that in May

13 https://www.rt.com/about-us/
14 Background to Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution, 2017,
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3254237/Russia-Hack-Report.pdf
15 http://sputniknews.com/docs/about/index.html
16 As of January 20, 2017
17 N. MacFARQUHAR, A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories, The New York Times, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/29/world/europe/rus-
sia-sweden-disinformation.html?_r=0
18 The Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, The Bear in Sheeps Clothing, 2016, http://www.martenscentre.eu/sites/default/files/publication-files/russia-gon-
gos_0.pdf
19 Ibid.
20 Russia accused of clandestine funding of European parties as US conducts major review of Vladimir Putins strategy, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world-
news/europe/russia/12103602/America-to-investigate-Russian-meddling-in-EU.html
21 Financement du FN: des hackers russes dvoilent des changes au Kremlin, 2015, http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2015/04/02/fn-des-hackers-russes-de-
voilent-des-echanges-au-kremlin_4608660_4355770.html
22 Background to Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution, 2017.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
4
EUS STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION
EU was slow in designing a response to Russias
active and sometimes aggressive propaganda
and it is safe to say that it is still working on
its response, whereas the active information war
where the EU is the target has demonstrated the
need for coordinated and joint efforts. This has
prompted the EU to develop certain initiatives.
In 2015, the European Council officially recog-
nized the need to counter Russias propaganda.
As a result, the Council invited High Represen-
tative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy Federica Mogherini to pre-
pare an action plan on strategic communication
in cooperation with Member States and EU in-
stitutions.25 The action plan, developed in June
2015, aims to increase EU strategic communi-
cation capacity and represents a strategic vision
about EUs strategic communication towards the
Eastern neighborhood for countering Russian
propaganda. The plan focuses on strengthening
the overall media environment in target countries
and increasing public awareness about Russian
propaganda tools and concrete actions.26
Based on the strategic plan, the focus on EUs
strategic communication is the development of
positive and effective messages regarding EU
policies towards the region. These messages
should allow citizens to easily understand that
political and economic reforms promoted by the
EU can, over time, have a positive impact on
their daily lives.27 The plan also highlights the
need to communicate and promote EU-funded
projects and programs in EUs eastern neighbor-
hood.
In 2015, the East StratCom Task Force was cre-
ated under the European Union External Action
Service (EEAS) with the aim of countering Rus-
sian propaganda. The task force brings together
10 experts of communication whose work focus-
es on the eastern neighborhood. The task force
works to develop individual action plan for coun-
25 European Council meeting (19 and 20 March 2015) Conclusions, Brussels.
26 Action Plan on Strategic Communication Ref. Ares(2015)2608242 - 22/06/2015
27 Ibid.
28 The EEAS Russian-language website: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/index_ru.htm
29 See the information at: http://www.enpi-info.eu
30 http://www.enpi-info.eu/main.php?id_type=2&id=677
31 European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Review of the European Neighborhood Policy, Joint Communication
to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, 18.11.2015.
5
tries and provides assistance to EU Delegations
in these countries to improve their communica-
tion in the region. It publishes Disinformation Re-
view and a Disinformation Digest on a weekly
basis, which provide analysis of individual cas-
es of propaganda and main trends in media. In
view of the importance of Russian language in
countries of Eastern Europe, EEAS launched a
website in Russian, to provide Russian speaking
audience with information about EU-Russia re-
lations and any important news about the EU.28
To raise awareness about cooperation between
the EU and its neighborhood, information portal
about EU neighbors was launched in 2009 under
the leadership of the European Commission.29
In 2015 Open Neighborhood Program compris-
ing of the following three projects began:
Open South to communicate with South-
ern neighbors;
Open East to communicate with Eastern
neighbors;
Media Hub Project to facilitate trainings
for reporters and media representatives in EUs
neighborhood and improve their qualifications.30
Review of the European Neighborhood Policy, a
joint communication by the European Commis-
sion, High Representative of the Union for For-
eign Affairs and Security Policy, was published
in November 2015. Although the document high-
lights the need of cooperation between the EU
and its partners, it does not provide information
about consequences and threats of disinforma-
tion. The document mostly underlines impor-
tance of public diplomacy to increase visibility of
benefits of EUs policy and concrete programs in
the neighborhood. It also focuses on cooperation
with neighboring states in the area of strategic
communications and building their capacity in
this regard.31
Although strategic communications have been
prioritized in EUs foreign policy only recently,
the EU plans to solidify its efforts in the area and
take them to a whole new level. According to a
communication published by the European Com-
mission in May 2016 about Joint Framework on
countering hybrid threats a European Union re-
sponse, strategic communications are viewed as
an important tool for combating hybrid threats.32
Strategic communications are also viewed as
one of the areas where NATO-EU cooperation
should be strengthened, especially considering
the growing number of hybrid threats.
In 2014, NATO Strategic Communications Cen-
ter of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) was
launched in Riga as a tool for implementing NA-
TOs political and military objectives. The Center
for Excellence brings together 23 experts that
specialize in different areas. In addition to pro-
ducing analytical papers and research, Center
also publishes a journal entitled Defense Stra-
tegic Communications two times a year. Activi-
ties carried out in 2015 by the NATO StratCom
COE include a research on how to identify hybrid
threats in a timely manner, a study on Russias
information campaign in Ukraine, a study on so-
cial media as an important instrument of hybrid
wars, etc.33
On June 28, 2016, High Representative of the
European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy Federica Mogherini unveiled EUs global
strategy in foreign policy and security areas. The
strategy identifies EUs foreign policy priorities
and views strategic communications as an im-
portant tool for protecting EUs internal and ex-
ternal security.34 The Global Strategy recogniz-
es the need to improve the consistency of EU
foreign policy and underlines the importance of
rapid rebuttals of disinformation.35
32 European Commission, Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats a European Union response, Joint Communication to The European Parliament and The Council,
Brussels, 6.4.2016
33 http://www.stratcomcoe.org/about-us
34 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Unions Foreign And Security Policy, June 2016. https://eeas.europa.eu/
top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf
35 Ibid.
36 European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties. http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2016-0441+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN
37 Ibid.
38 Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, 2015.
39 The Guardian, Czech Republic claims propaganda war by Russia and sets up counter-effort, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/21/czech-republic-
claims-propaganda-war-by-russia-and-sets-up-counter-effort?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other
Clearly, strategic communications and counter-
ing of propaganda is an important policy issue
for the EU but it needs to intensify its efforts in
this regard. On November 23, 2016, the Europe-
an Parliament adopted a resolution that provides
an extensive account of propaganda actively
spread by third parties, including Russia.36 The
document stresses that this is a major problem
and provides an account of anticipated threats. It
also describes methods that Russia relies on for
actively disseminating propaganda in EU-mem-
ber states as well as in its eastern neighborhood.
The resolution recognizes that information war-
fare is not only an external EU issue but also
an internal one. When analyzing different meth-
ods of Russian propaganda, the resolution notes
that one of its main strategies is to distort and
manipulate interpretation of historical events in
this context, the European Parliament stresses
the need to raise public awareness about Soviet
chronicles, especially in the former members of
the Soviet bloc.37 The Resolution urges the EU
member states to develop a mechanism of co-
ordinated communication. The European Parlia-
ment requests that the competent EU institutions
monitor the sources of financing of anti-Europe-
an propaganda. The Resolution calls for reinforc-
ing the EU Strategic Communication Task Force
by turning it into a fully-fledged unit within EEAS
with adequate budgetary resources.
As to steps made by the EU-member states to
counteract Russian propaganda, certain progress
is evident. For instance, 2015 security strategy of
Czech Republic views hybrid warfare as a na-
tional threat and defines propaganda using tra-
ditional and new media as one of its methods.38
Recently a special unit has been launched at
the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Czech Republic
bringing together twenty experts that will work to
counteract Russias propaganda.39
6
Although recently the EU has begun viewing According to the results of a November 2016 sur-
Russias increasing anti-Western propaganda as vey of public attitudes carried out for the National
a serious threat and has started making steps for Democratic Institute, Georgias aspiration to join
countering the propaganda, clearly EUs strategic the EU is supported by 72% of respondents and
communications policy needs to be improved. In disapproved by 18%.40
the 21st century, when social media is gradu-
ally replacing traditional media and information More Georgians oppose EU membership, con-
is spreading faster than ever, more efforts for sidering that according to results of NDIs April
active and coordinated communication are re- 2014 survey only 11% of respondents disap-
quired from EU member states. Russian propa- proved Georgias aspiration to join the EU.41
ganda is most active and effective in targeting
former Soviet states. Countries where post-So- Based on the results of the November 2016 sur-
viet sentiments remain and people find it diffi- vey of public attitudes, 78% of respondents that
cult to understand institutional arrangement and support EU membership are young people (be-
functions of the EU or NATO provide enabling tween the ages of 18-35), and majority of re-
environment for such anti-Western propaganda. spondents that oppose EU membership (22%)
Therefore, strengthening EUs Eastern Strategic are aged 56 years or older.42
Communications Task Force with proper staffing
and budgetary resources and broadening its ac- 61% of respondents approve the countrys goal
tivities in EUs eastern neighborhood is vital for to join NATO.43 This is 20% lower than the results
Eastern European countries. of November 2013 survey of public attitudes car-
ried out for NDI (81%).44
THE INFLUENCE OF RUSSIAS SOFT
POWER IN GEORGIA Based on the household survey Caucasus Ba-
rometer conducted by the Caucasus Research
and Resource Center (CRRC), in 2013 44% of
Russian communication in Georgia relies on the
respondents viewed Russia as the main enemy
methods described earlier, which include pro-
of the country,45 while in 2015 only 35% of those
motion of the Russian World and spreading of
surveyed responded that Russia is the main en-
anti-Western propaganda. Positive sentiments
emy.46
towards Russia are solidified by appealing to
shared religion and history, romanticizing culture
In addition to international media outlets financed
and portraying Russia as a strategic economic
and owned by Russia, Kremlin designed narra-
ally.
tives are often disseminated by local media in
Georgia. Based on the survey of public attitudes
Georgia is considered one of the most active
carried out for NDI in June 2016, 77% of respon-
pro-Western countries in the post-Soviet space
dents rely on TV as a primary source of informa-
not only as a result of the governments actions
tion. Those who receive news from non-Geor-
but also the fact that majority of Georgian people
gian language media sources47 mostly prefer
support Georgias existing foreign policy. How-
Russian outlets.48 Here we must also note that
ever, different surveys have found that this trend
Russia Today (RT), Russias international media
may change.
outlet, is not very popular in Georgia - only 1% of
respondents said that they watch it.49
40 Survey of Public Attitudes in Georgia: November 2016, NDI, November 2016 https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI_November%202016%20poll_Issues_GEO_
vf.pdf
41 Survey of Public Attitudes in Georgia: April 2014, NDI, April 2014, https://www.ndi.org/files/Georgia_April_2014_Survey_Georgian.pdf
42 Survey of Public Attitudes in Georgia: November 2016, NDI, November 2016
43 Ibid.
44 Survey of Public Attitudes in Georgia: November 2013, NDI, November 2013 https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Georgia-Public-Attitudes-Poll-121813-ENG.pdf
45 CRRC (2013) Caucasus Barometer http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2013ge/MAINENEM/,
46 CRRC (2013) Caucasus Barometer http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2015ge/MAINENEM/
47 Survey of Public Attitudes in Georgia: June 2016, NDI, June 2016 https://www.luminpdf.com/viewer/ADiNSu2zKBypTxmpt/share?sk=a48d3b38-177f-49de-9520-
b5258e5ad92b
48 Out of the selection of non-Georgian channels provide by the survey, respondents top four choices were: Channel One Russia - ORT, RTR, Russia 1, Russia 24.

7
According to the Media Development Foundation Here we must note results of the survey about
(MDF) report, certain Georgian media platforms Knowledge and Attitudes toward the EU in Geor-
use anti-Western rhetoric, especially Obiektivi gia carried out by the European Foundation and
Media Union in 2014-2015,50 as well as online the CRRC in 2015. The survey data shows that
publications (like Sakinformi and Georgia and the share of respondents that perceive the EU
the World) and print media (Asaval-Dasavali, as a threat to Georgian traditions has grown con-
Kviris Kronika and Alia).51 The report also identi- siderably in 2009-2015. The trend is especially
fies different types of anti-Western messages,52 evident in 2013-2015, when there was a 12%
which partially coincide with main components of increase: number of respondents who agreed to
Russian narrative discussed earlier that focuses the statement that EU threatens Georgian tradi-
on propaganda based on shared values, religion tions was 7% in 2013, while in 2015 their share
and ideology, and discrediting Western institu- grew up to 19%.54 Based on the same survey
tions. data, number of respondents who believe that
there will be less respect for Georgian traditions
In addition to a number of media outlets spear- if the country becomes a member of EU has
heading the spread of anti-Western rhetoric, increased since 2013 and has reached 28% in
some political forces focused on changing Geor- 2015 (14% difference).55 In addition, nearly half
gias Euro-Atlantic path as part of their campaign of the respondents surveyed (49%) would like to
as the 2016 parliamentary elections drew near. learn more about the EU,56 especially the youth
For instance, leader of the United Democratic between the ages of 18 and 35 (52%).57 Remark-
Movement Nino Burjanadze pledged to declare ably, among the group of respondents that said
a non-bloc status for Georgia and to amend the they would like to learn more about the EU, 41%
Georgian Constitution accordingly.53 reported that they did not know what the EU
Monitoring Mission (EUMM) does in Georgia.58
Preservation of religion and traditions is a sen-
sitive topic in Georgia. Russian propaganda has Here we must also note what the youth thinks
been targeting it effectively, as the existing situ- about consistency of messages of represen-
ation provides a favorable environment for ex- tatives of the authorities. Based on the Media
ploiting these issues and disseminating false in- Development Foundation youth survey results,
formation. 40.2% of respondents believe that often govern-
ment messages about the Euro-Atlantic integra-
tion are contradictory.59

49 Ibid.
50 Media Development Foundation (MDF), Anti-Western Propaganda, Media Monitoring Report 2014-2015
51 Ibid., p.9.
52 The MDF research identified the following groups of messages of anti-Western propaganda: issues related to values and human rights; interpretation of political pro-
cesses and issues related to institutions non-governmental and international organizations.
53 http://civil.ge/geo/article.php?id=30439
54 http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2016/02/playing-on-traditions-has-russias.html
55 Ibid.
56 CRRC, Knowledge and attitudes toward the EU in Georgia, 2015, http://caucasusbarometer.org/ge/eu2015ge/EUINFMOR/
57 CRRC, Knowledge and attitudes toward the EU in Georgia, 2015: http://caucasusbarometer.org/ge/eu2015ge/EUINFMOR-by-AGEGROUP/
58 http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2016/02/what-population-of-georgia-wants-to.html
59 MDF, Youth Attitudes towards the Process of European Integration, 2015

8
Another survey to measure public attitudes to- vides financial assistance to Georgia, only a few
wards the European integration was conducted of them know about concrete programs funded
within the project OPEN Neighborhood - Com- by the EU (15%). 61
municating for a strong partnership: connecting
with citizens across the Eastern Neighborhood, Have you heard about concrete programs
and it covers the period from April through June funded by the EU in the country?
2016. According to the survey data, 52% of re-
spondents have positive attitudes towards the
EU, while 75% of respondents said that EU-Geor-
gia relations are good and only 4% believes that
the relations are very bad.60 15
How would you evaluate
EU-Georgia relations?

7
9 85
3
4 YES NO
68
9 Source: OPEN Neighbhourhood - Communicating for a
strong partnership: connecting with citizens
across the Eastern Neighborhood, p.16

As to the awareness of Georgians about issues

related to the EU and European integration, the
survey has found that majority of respondents
(69%) are not satisfied with the level of informa-
tion provided by the government.62
VERY GOOD GOOD
BAD VERY BAD
THEY DONT HAVE
The above surveys demonstrate that public sup-
DO NOT KNOW
ANY RELATIONS port for EU membership is unsteady. In addition,
negative sentiments towards Russia have de-
creased. It is also clear that negative sentiments
Source: OPEN Neighbhourhood - Communicating for a towards the EU have grown, mostly owing to the
strong partnership: connecting with citizens fact that the EU is viewed as a threat to Georgian
across the Eastern Neighborhood, .13
traditions. In some cases, people are not aware
of EUs activities in Georgia, even though these
Although the same survey found that majority issues have proven to be topics of great inter-
of respondents (60%) is aware that the EU pro- est. Because systemic implementation of strate-

60 OPEN Neighborhood - Communicating for a strong partnership: connecting with citizens across the Eastern Neighborhood, http://www.enpi-info.eu/files/publications/
EU%20Neighbours%20East_Annual-Survey_GEORGIA_Spring%202016.pdf
61 Ibid.
62 OPEN Neighbhourhood - Communicating for a strong partnership: connecting with citizens across the Eastern Neighborhood, http://enpi-info.eu/files/publications/
EU%20Neighbours%20East_Annual-Survey_GEORGIA_Spring%202016.pdf

9
gic communications policy in Georgia began in The process of improving the system of strategic
2015, it is too early to see any tangible results. communications about European and Euro-Atlan-
However, as Russias propaganda is becoming tic integration issues is still ongoing in Georgia.
stronger, informing public properly and effectively Based on the decision made during the meet-
is essential for the state. ing of Georgias EU Integration Commission on
March 18, 2015, a new entity the department
Above surveys suggest that views about Europe- of strategic communications - was launched un-
an integration vary across different age groups: der the Office of the State Minister on European
youth tend to support Georgias current foreign and Euro-Atlantic Integration in June 2015. The
policy more than people over the age of 50. This main goal of the department is to develop an ac-
must be taken into account in planning of the tion plan for the strategic communications policy
strategic communications policy. In addition, re- on issues related to European and Euro-Atlantic
sults of NDIs June 2016 survey has revealed integration, and coordinate and monitor imple-
that chances of pro-Russian sentiments are mentation of the action plan. The department of
higher among people who receive news from strategic communications operating under the
non-Georgian language media sources.63 Office of the State Minister cooperates with rele-
vant structural entities of EU and NATO.
It should also be considered that the anti-West-
ern propaganda not only portrays the West as a Legal entity of public law, the Information Center
real threat to traditions and values of the coun- on NATO and the EU is responsible for imple-
try but also exploits actual facts to stress EUs menting the national communications strategy
weaknesses (UKs European Union membership and raising public awareness about Georgias
referendum, inconsistent foreign policy, migra- relations with NATO and the EU and benefits of
tion problems, etc.), which is potentially a bigger Georgias Euro-Atlantic integration. The Informa-
threat that may intensify Euroscepticism among tion Center actively cooperates with the Office of
public. Under these circumstances, it is vitally the State Minister. In 2015 they jointly organized
important for the Government of Georgia to im- nearly 400 public meetings in Tbilisi and in the
plement effective strategic communications pol- regions with participation of local population and
icy in close cooperation with the EU, NATO and different target groups.64 Budget of the Informa-
other partners. tion Center has grown from GEL 370 thousand
in 2015 to GEL 565 thousand in 2016. The 2017
GEORGIAS STRATEGIC COMMUNICA- state budget provides a funding of GEL 530 thou-
TIONS POLICY sand for the Information Center.65

In 2015, an inter-agency task force for strategic

Effective implementation of strategic communi-
communications was set up, bringing together
cations policy became a priority in Georgia in
representatives of state agencies, the parliament
2015, and countering Russias anti-Western pro-
and Tbilisi City Hall.66 Its activities are coordinat-
paganda made it to the Governments agenda.
ed by the strategic communications department
The Government considered recommendations
under the Office of the State Minister.67
of the EU and NATO that propaganda should be
viewed as a threat and concrete actions should
Here we must also note changes in the structure
be taken to counter it using adequate tools.
of the political department at the Ministry of For-

63 Survey of Public Attitudes in Georgia: June 2016, NDI, June 2016

64 Minutes of the 55th meeting of Georgias EU Integration Commission, 27 January 2016
65 The Law on the State Budget of Georgia 2017, information about legal entities of public law and non-profit (non-commercial) legal entities: http://mof.ge/images/File/
biujetis-kanoni2017/damtkicebuli/ssipebi-29.11.2016.pdf
66 Minutes of the 53th meeting of Georgias EU Integration Commission, 17 September 2015
67 Resolution of the Government of Georgia N266, dated 16 June 2015, on amendments to the 22 January 2014 Resolution N100 on the approval of the Statute of the
Office of the State Minister on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration and the staff list
https://www.matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/2876628

10
eign Affairs of Georgia and approval of the new The Order of the Minister of Defense of Geor-
Order of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2016 gia on approval of the statute for the strategic
for setting up a bureau of strategic communica- communications and public relations department
tions at the political department. The bureau co- of the Ministry came into effect on September
ordinates activities of Georgias diplomatic mis- 26, 2016. Based on the Order, the department
sions abroad in the field of policy communication of strategic communications established in 2015
and analyzes propaganda against Georgias was combined and integrated with the existing
European and Euro-Atlantic integration.68 At the department of public relations, along with its re-
governmental level issues of strategic communi- sponsibilities. Main goals of the department in-
cation are coordinated by the newly established clude: raising public awareness about Georgias
office of coordination in the public relations de- integration and cooperation with NATO, provid-
partment of the Administration of the Govern- ing information about processes that are taking
ment of Georgia.69 place in the Georgian armed forces, perform-
ing research and analytical activities, etc. Other
It is essential that Georgias strategic securi- functions of the department include developing a
ty documents define threats related to Russias unified communication strategy for the Ministry
propaganda. Previous strategic documents were and monitoring its implementation. The strategic
not putting enough emphasis on threats coming communications bureau has the following three
from Russian soft power, however in the new divisions: strategic communications policy and
documents, these problems are mentioned. Stra- planning division, international relations commu-
tegic Defense Review (SDR) document for 2017- nications division and the information environ-
2020 identifies instruments of Russian soft pow- ment analysis division.73
er as important challenges for national security.
Kremlin is making emphasis on strengthening In April, 2017, the Georgian government adopted
elements of soft power, with the main goal to Communication Strategy on Georgias Member-
weaken state institutions, strengthen pro-Rus- ship to the EU and NATO for 2017-2020.74 Its
sian groups and discredit Georgias western ori- not the first strategic document of its kind as in
ented foreign policy.70 2014 the Government adopted Communication
and Information Strategy in the Sphere of EU
Similar threats are mentioned in the National integration for 2014-2017. Its main objectives
Cyber Security Strategy of the Government of were promoting positive perception among so-
Georgia 2017-2018. Strategy states that cy- ciety towards European integration, which also
ber-attacks organized by the Russian Federation includes avoiding unrealistic expectations and
and other crimes committed by cyber means71 shaping of incorrect stereotypes and attitudes in
is an important threat. The document also fo- the society.75
cuses on Russias information warfare with the
aim of hindering Georgias integration in the Eu- The renewed document outlines Georgias future
ro-Atlantic family and discrediting Euro-Atlantic membership in the EU and NATO as a priori-
values for the Georgian population.72 ty. Unlike its predecessor, which was mainly fo-
cused on communicating European integration,
65 The Law on the State Budget of Georgia 2017, information about legal entities of public law and non-profit (non-commercial) legal entities: http://mof.ge/images/File/
biujetis-kanoni2017/damtkicebuli/ssipebi-29.11.2016.pdf
66 Minutes of the 53th meeting of Georgias EU Integration Commission, 17 September 2015
67 Resolution of the Government of Georgia N266, dated 16 June 2015, on amendments to the 22 January 2014 Resolution N100 on the approval of the Statute of the
Office of the State Minister on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration and the staff list
https://www.matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/2876628
68 Order of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia 01-121, on the approval of statute of the political department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, 24 June
2016 https://www.matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/3318211
69 The Atlantic Council of Georgia, Analysis of the National System of Strategic Communications on Euro-Atlantic Integration, 2016
70 Ministry of Defence of Georgia, Strategic Defense Review (SDR) document for 2017-2020 https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/3646114
71 The National Cyber Security Strategy of Georgia 2017-2018 http://gov.ge/files/469_59439_212523_14.pdf
72 Ibid.
73 Order of the Minister of Defense of Georgia 69 on the Approval of Statute for the Strategic Communications and Public Relations Department, 23 September 2016
https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/3401708
74 Communication Strategy on Georgias Membership to the EU and NATO for 2017-2020
75 Communication and Information Strategy of the Government of Georgia in the sphere of EU Integration for the period of 2014-2017

11
the new strategy combines communication on
NATO as well. Another important change is that
so called information war and propaganda is de-
fined as one of the main threats for the coun-
try: Propagandist and disinformation campaign
of Russian federation intends to weaken public
integrity, discredit western values and decrease
public support for EU and NATO.76 Therefore,
one of the main goals of the strategy is to pre-
vent and decrease influence of anti-Western pro-
paganda on public.77
Television, electronic and print media as well as
different events and personal contacts are all de-
fined as channels of communication. It is worth
to note the importance of social networks in
terms of implementation of strategic communica-
tion. Internet social networks are one of the main
instruments in spreading disinformation and pro-
paganda, therefore they should be actively used
in countering fake news. Strategy also defines
target groups: as inside target group Georgian
population and international target group popu-
lation of the EU and NATO member states.
The parliamentary committee on European in-
tegration is provided in the strategy as an im-
portant monitoring mechanism. Stimulating the
parliament and mobilizing its functions is another
challenge.
In addition, the Government of Georgia annu-
ally develops the Action Plan for implementa-
tion of the Communication Strategy. The Action
Plan 2016 is a list of measures with applicable
timeframe that also provides names of agencies
that are responsible for each particular event,
venues, target groups and sources of funding.
Unlike the 2016 National Action Plan for the Im-
plementation of the Association Agreement be-
tween Georgia, the plan does not provide any in-
dicators for measuring outcomes (outcomes are
currently measured mostly with quantitative indi-
cators).78 However, here we must also note that
because of the particular nature of activities that
are planned, it is difficult to design mechanisms
76 Communication Strategy on Georgias Membership to the EU and NATO for 2017-2020
77 Ibid.
78 The Atlantic Council of Georgia, Analysis of the National System of Strategic Communications on Euro-Atlantic Integration, 2016
for measuring outcomes. Relevant agencies and
stakeholders should work actively to ensure that
effectiveness of fulfillment of the Action Plan for
the Communication Strategy is measured by ad-
equate indicators.
As to availability of information about communi-
cation events, the official website of the Office of
the State Minister for European and Euro-Atlan-
tic Integration provides a communications calen-
dar available to all interested users. Purpose of
the calendar is to ensure effective coordination
of events, increase their visibility and improve
use of resources. Past or upcoming events by
state agencies, diplomatic missions EU-member
states, civil sector and other parties for com-
munication of issues related to European and
Euro-Atlantic integration are all marked on the
calendar. It is unclear whether the calendar pro-
vides a full list of communication activities on
European and Euro-Atlantic integration, as rele-
vant stakeholders are not obligated to mark their
activities on the calendar.
Increasing visibility of EU-funded projects is one
of the important challenges in planning of strate-
gic communications policy. Often people are not
aware of donors of projects that are important for
development of the state. Promotion of these do-
nors will consolidate positive public sentiments
towards the process of European integration. A
documentary produced under the initiative of the
Office of the State Minister about EU assistant
programs deserves recognition. Use of different
types of media outlets is one of the most effec-
tive means for raising public awareness.
Over the last two years, Georgia has made
strides in the field of strategic communications.
The fact that relevant institutional entities, the
strategy and the action plan are all in place sug-
gests that the government of Georgia realizes
existing challenges and is taking adequate mea-
sures to counter these threats. However, surveys
of public attitudes discussed above are indicative
of strengthening of Russias soft power, while the
12
analysis of the strategic communications about tion.
European and Euro-Atlantic integration imple-
mented by the government of Georgia has re- The fact that departments and bureaus for stra-
vealed that certain important problems persist. tegic communications are in place at the insti-
Therefore, in consideration of the internation- tutional level in the Georgian government and
al context and based on the analyses of sur- threats of Russian soft power are mentioned in
vey data, it is clear that strengthening strategic strategic documents, indicate that the govern-
communications policy, designing a strategy that ment recognizes the seriousness of the problem.
responds to existing challenges and improving However, based on different surveys the present
mechanisms for implementation of the strategy policy paper has identified problems that require
remains to be a major challenge for the govern- consistent and strategic approach.
ment of Georgia and relevant institutional entities
of the state bodies. Effective strategic communications policy should
consistently strive to restore/maintain public trust
in the state institutions and in reforms carried out
CONCLUSION within the European integration process, and to
counter Russias propaganda messaging.
During the Cold War, Russia was trying to por-
tray the Soviet Union as an attractive alternative
to the Western capitalism. Today Kremlin-de- RECOMMENDATIONS
signed propaganda is mostly exploiting the an-
ti-Western sentiments.79 In todays reality the in- Correct and effective planning and imple-
formation warfare between Russia and the West mentation of the strategic communications policy
has reached the highest peak in the world history requires in-depth research and analysis of Rus-
after the Cold War. Russias propaganda policy sias propaganda tools and narrative. It is im-
is actively utilizing international TV channels, In- portant to identify tools that are used to spread
ternet sphere, social media and NGOs funded the propaganda, study concrete messages and
by Kremlin, all of which creates strategic instru- methods, and measure their influence on target
ments that target Post-Soviet countries and Rus- audience;
sias neighborhood as well as EU-member states
and the U.S. The Annual Action Plan needs to provide
approaches that are adapted to the Russian pro-
Following the Ukrainian Crises, counteracting paganda. Data from the research and the anal-
hybrid threats and information warfare became ysis referred to in the previous recommendation
part of the Wests agenda. NATO began coun- should be fed into the Action Plan. In order to
tering Soviet propaganda as early as during the ensure effective implementation of the Commu-
Cold War era with the use of relevant institutional nication strategy it is important to elaborate indi-
entities. As to the EU, it started taking actions cators for measuring outcomes of planned activ-
only recently, in 2015. ities;

Support of large majority is necessary to main- Communication about European inte-

tain countrys foreign policy and implement cor-
responding reforms. In consideration of geopo-
litical situation and national political landscape
Georgia direly needs to raise public awareness
by providing accurate and fact-based informa-
gration targeting the older population should
be strengthened based on public opinion sur-
veys results; it is also equally important to raise
awareness of the youth;

79 E. Lucas and P. Pomeranzev, Defending and Ultimately Defeating Russias Disinformation Techniques, Centre for European Policy Analysis, 2016, https://cepa.ecms.
pl/files/?id_plik=2707

13
 Based on public opinion survey results,
it is important to strengthen communication by
means of television channels, including regional
broadcasters (as a primary source of informa-
tion for Georgian audience). In addition to TV
channels it is also important to utilize the Inter-
net and social media for dissemination of posi-
tive messages about European integration in a
simple and easy to understand language. It is
also important to transform a website of relevant
government agency like the Office of the State
Minister into an interactive online platform;
Based on the example of the East Strat-
Com Task Force, the Office of the State Minis-
ter or the Information Center on NATO and the
EU should publish analysis of individual cases
of Russian propaganda, in order to disseminate
verified and accurate information;
The Information Center should strengthen
and intensify its research for analyzing issues
related to European and Euro-Atlantic integration
and studying any important new developments
about these institutions;
Government officials should pay closer at-
tention to coordination of consistent messages
within the context of the European integration
and Russias propaganda; one way to reduce the
risk of spreading inaccurate messages by MPs
is to adequately inform them about the problem.
We recommend setting up an entity for strategic
communications at the parliament of Georgia or
integrating this function with existing institutional
entities;
The parliament should become more ac-
tively engaged in monitoring of implementation
of strategic communications;
It is important to increase visibility of proj-
ects funded by the EU and disseminate appro-
priate information by working closely with the EU
delegation. In this regard we recommend using
media outlets for delivering concrete messages
that are simple and easy to understand;
Education is one of the most important
factors when it comes to counter propaganda
and disinformation campaigns. Therefore govern-
ment should actively cooperate with educational
institutions to provide youth not only fact-based
information, but also to ensure strengthening
their critical thinking. Ex: organizing lectures and
seminars on how to differentiate between true
and fake news, etc.
As civil society can play an important
role in countering the Russian propaganda, the
government should bolster cooperation with
non-governmental organizations about these is-
sues. NGO involvement in development of stra-
tegic documents and implementation of policy
should be intensified;
As Russias propaganda has become
more powerful, relevant entities should pay clos-
er attention to coordinated monitoring of me-
dia environment and its analysis. Media trends
should be defined and analyzed for planning fu-
ture policy steps.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia has
an important role in portraying countrys image
internationally. It is important to identify states
where attitudes towards Georgias potential
membership in EU and NATO are most skeptical
and to strengthen efforts on better communica-
tion in those countries. Conducting surveys on
public attitudes in relevant states would contrib-
ute in effective implementation of strategic com-
munications.
Recently Russian soft power has become
particularly active internationally. It is crucial to
study international experience in countering Rus-
sian propaganda in order to elaborate new and
more effective responses towards anti-Western
propaganda.
14