Int J Philos Relig (2007) 62:103114

DOI 10.1007/s11153-007-9135-8

Reason and revelation: Kant and the problem

of authority

Phil Enns

Received: 6 April 2007 / Accepted: 26 June 2007 / Published online: 3 August 2007
Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Abstract This paper explores the significance of authority for Kants understanding of the
relationship between reason and revelation. Beginning with the separation of the faculties
of Theology and Philosophy in Conflict, it will be shown that Kant sees a clear distinction
between the authority of reason and that of revelation. However, when one turns to Reli-
gion, it is also clear that Kant sees an important, perhaps necessary, relationship between
the two. Drawing on a variety of texts, in particular those concerning the public and private
use of reason, this paper then explores the relationship between the authority of reason and
that of revelation. From this discussion, several conclusions will be drawn regarding Kants
understanding of the relationship between reason and revelation, namely that while distinct,
the two are not necessarily in conflict and that, ultimately, the proper functioning of public
reason must include some reference to revelation.

Keywords Kant Reason Revelation Authority Public Private Hope

In an article written to answer the question What is Enlightenment?, Immanuel Kant begins
with the following:
Enlightenment is the human beings emergence from his self-incurred minority. Minor-
ity is inability to make use of ones own understanding without direction from another.
... Have courage to make use of your own understanding! is thus the motto of enlight-
enment (Kant 1996, p. 17).
What is unusual about Kants description is the dependence of the emergence of enlighten-
ment on the question of authority. To be under the authority of another is to be unenlightened,
regardless of what is before ones understanding. However, in Religion Within the Limits of
Reason Alone, Kant posits a duty for all human beings to form a universal republic based on

P. Enns (B)
MCC Indonesia, J1. Merbabu No. 3, Salatiga, 50724, Indonesia
e-mail: phil.enns@gmail.com

P. Enns
Universitas Islam Negri, Jogjakarta, Indonesia

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laws of virtue, and that such a duty will require the idea of a higher moral Being through
whose universal dispensation the forces of separate individuals, insufficient in themselves,
are united for a common end (Kant 1960, p. 89). Apart from the moral law, moral com-
munity requires the authoritative revelation of a Lawgiver who coordinates moral activity in
the world. While enlightenment requires the authority of reason, the functioning of moral
community requires the authority of revelation. The problem, then, is how to reconcile, on
the one hand, the authority of reason with the motto Have courage to make use of your own
understanding!, and, on the other hand, the authority of revelation which imposes the will
of the divine on our understanding. This paper will explore the relationship between reason
and revelation and suggest how Kant reconciles the two different kinds of authority.

1 Dividing the faculties

In The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant divides the faculties of the university in two, with
the higher faculties including theology, law and medicine and the lower faculty, philoso-
phy, where this covers history, geography, natural sciences as well as pure mathematics and
philosophy. The criterion for this distinction is that of authority. The higher faculties serve
the interests of government providing spiritual guidance, civil order and healthy citizens,
therefore having their authority by virtue of government (Kant 1979, p. 33). This authority
is executed through the use of texts, which are comprised of teachings and statutes: biblical
theologians use the Bible, law professors the law of the land and medical professors medical
regulations.
The lower faculty is the rank in the university that occupies itself with teachings which
are not adopted as directives by order of a superior (p. 43). Unlike the higher faculties,
which rely on the authority of government, the lower faculty relies solely on the power to
judge autonomously, that is, on reason (p. 43). Philosophy has the specific task of testing the
truth of any teaching. This task is twofold. First, philosophy is to keep watch on the higher
faculties. The philosophy faculty can never lay aside its arms in the face of the danger that
threatens the truth entrusted to its protection, because the higher faculties will never give
up their desire to rule (p. 55). According to Kant, theologians, lawyers and doctors are
continually tempted to move beyond teaching the rules and regulations of their discipline,
to teaching people about their duties and moral responsibilities. Preachers try to draw moral
lessons from the Bible, politicians move to legislate character and doctors attempt to give
prescriptions for living a healthy life. It is the task of the philosophy faculty to point out
abuses of reason and restrain the higher faculties. The second task of the philosophy fac-
ulty is to move government away from its exercise of absolute authority towards freedom
under the authority of reason (p. 59). Ultimately, the goal of all governments ought to be
a constitution where there is a harmony between the natural rights of human beings and
the legislation of laws (pp.163165). While government is able to function through the use
of absolute authority, this use of authority keeps citizens unenlightened and dependent on
others for thinking. However, if, under the guidance of the philosophy faculty, government
functioned and legislated according to reason, society could be more enlightened.
What of the authority of revelation? The teachings of the Bible are taught not simply
as being of historical interest but as having divine authority. In Conflict, Kant provides two
responses to this question. First, as taught by Biblical theologians, revelation can only be a
feeling that accompanies the Bible (p. 35). Biblical theologians can teach as if the doctrines
of the church have a divine authority, but they cannot speculate as to the nature and character
of this divinity without trespassing into the domain of the philosopher. The second response

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is to distinguish between the biblical theologian and the rational theologian, where the former
is concerned with ecclesiastical faith and the latter with religious faith.
A rational theologian ... is one versed in reason with regard to religious faith, which is
based on inner laws that can be developed from every mans own reason. The very con-
cept of religion shows that it can never be based on decrees (no matter how high their
source); for religion is not the sum of certain teachings regarded as divine revelations
(that is called theology), but the sum of all our duties regarded as divine commands ...
(p. 61).
The rational theologian addresses the aspects of religious faith that do not depend on par-
ticular doctrines or beliefs, but rather those teachings which, according to reason, could be
adopted by any person as duties commanded by a divine law-giver. For the biblical theolo-
gian, the authority of revelation accompanies particular teachings as a feeling, while for the
rational theologian, the authority of revelation augments what is given by reason with the
imprimatur of the divine. In both cases, revelation does not bring content but an authority
distinct from that of temporal powers or reason.
In Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant expands on this account of revela-
tion. Kant begins by distinguishing between faiths, which are based on special revelation
and, therefore, historically particular, and religion, which is based on reason and therefore
universal (Kant 1960, pp. 9899). In the case of faiths, doctrines and beliefs that are his-
torically particular, and, therefore, do not appear obligatory, come to be taken as obligatory
when understood as revelation of Gods will (p. 95). While these beliefs will have authority
by virtue of special revelation, this authority cannot extend beyond those who hold those par-
ticular beliefs, and so is not binding for all people. In contrast, religion is comprised solely
of a rational faith grounded in a pure moral law written on our hearts, and, therefore, can be
believed in by everyone (pp. 9495). While the moral law is available to any person, an indi-
vidual person cannot bring about a society made up of people working together according to
this law. For this reason, the idea of an ethical society, an idea distinct from the moral law, is
required (p. 89). However, the idea of a higher moral Being will be required to give authority
to this union of separate individuals (p. 89). Reason shows the need for the coordination of
action in pursuing the highest moral good, but what is revealed to rational faith is that such a
coordination of action is the will of a higher moral Being. In short, revelation within rational
faith gives authority to the coordinated pursuit of the highest moral good. Again, we see that
for Kant revelation does not provide content but rather gives authority. In the case of faiths,
revelation gives authority to historically particular doctrines and beliefs, while for religion,
revelation gives authority to the idea of the universal coordination of ethical action.
Kant, however, is not particularly clear on the relationship between faiths and religion. On
one analogy, Kant takes faiths to be the vehicle or means for the development and promotion
of religion (p. 95, 97). Elsewhere, he takes religion to be the core or essence of faiths, hidden
and waiting to be uncovered (p. 102, 112, 126n). This lack of clarity has led to a variety of
interpretations. Allen Wood, in Kants Moral Religion, argues that, for Kant, rational faith
must be set free from faiths (Wood 1970, p. 195). Picking up on Kants distinction in Lec-
tures on Philosophical Theology between outer and inner revelation, Wood argues, nothing
can possibly be a genuine revelation of a morally perfect God unless it can be brought into
harmony with inner and rational revelation (p. 206). On Woods interpretation, faiths must
come to the realization that they are, properly, to be in the service of rational religion. How-
ever, at least three points argue against this interpretation. First, Kant makes clear that a
rational religion is an ideal that can never be attained (Kant 1960, pp. 9192, 113). Indi-
viduals have a duty to pursue a rational religion as if it was attainable, but such a religion

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remains an ideal of reason. Second, as an ideal of reason, rational religion must be grounded
in experience and, therefore, have some empirical, historical form. Faiths may be the means
for the development and promotion of religion, but this is a necessary means, and without
it, there could be no understanding of rational religion. Finally, as noted above, for Kant,
revelation does not provide content and so it is nonsensical to claim that there could be a
religious faith distinct from historical faiths. It is, therefore, a mistake to interpret Kant, as
Wood does, as looking forward to a time within history when historical faiths could be solely
at the service of rational religion. Instead, it is more accurate to claim that, for Kant, all faiths
contain elements of rational religion, and that these elements are means for evaluating and
critiquing beliefs and doctrines. Returning to the relationship of reason and revelation, we
can now see that the role of the rational theologian is not one set off from particular historical
religions, but rather found within these religions, continually providing a critical voice of
reason. As will be noted below, this is not the only voice of reason within religion, but it is
the means by which particular faiths are held to the universal standards of reason.
John Hare, in his article Kant on the Rational Instability of Atheism, turns Woods argu-
ment around to claim that, for Kant, belief in the existence of God is rationally required for
the moral agent (Hare 2006, p. 71). For Hare, Kant argues that the moral agent will begin
with rational faith, where the existence of a higher moral Being is a hypothesis, but when it
comes to acting, practical reason requires a theistic belief in the existence of such a Being
(p. 72). However, this confuses the authority of reason, which commands us to obey, and the
authority of revelation, which stamps the imprimatur of the divine will on particular beliefs.
The footnote in Religion concerning the personification of Ideas is crucial for understanding
the difference between reason and revelation. Hare is correct that, for Kant, reason requires
the idea of the existence of a higher moral Being, however, as Kant makes clear, the relation-
ship between this idea and any particular belief regarding a higher moral Being is analogical,
and so it is illegitimate to claim that what belongs to any particular belief in God also belongs
to the Idea of reason regarding the existence of a higher moral Being (Kant 1960, p. 58n).
According to the schematism of analogy, it is necessary for the purposes of explanation
that Ideas of reason draw on analogies from experience for intelligibility. Practical reason
requires the belief in the existence of a higher moral Being, and this requirement is ren-
dered intelligible through faiths which hold beliefs regarding God. The authority of reason
commands obedience, and the authority of revelation imposes the imprimatur of Gods will
on particular beliefs. However, this relationship is analogical, and so while understanding
requires particular beliefs in the existence of God, these beliefs cannot add to the rational
belief in the existence of a higher moral Being. Hare makes precisely this mistake when he
draws on theistic beliefs in order help the moral life (Hare 2006, p. 72). In holding theistic
beliefs, one may be adhering to the moral life, but to claim that holding those beliefs adds to
our understanding of the moral life is to violate, in Kants terms, the schematism of analogy.
Beliefs that fall under the authority of revelation cannot add to the knowledge that falls under
the authority of reason.

2 Private and public reason

To this point, in discussing the relationship between reason and revelation, the focus has
largely been on revelation. However, the discussion so far may leave the impression that
maintaining a strong distinction between reason and revelation implies the absence of reason
within ecclesiastical faith. This is far from true for Kant, and so an examination of Kants
account of reason is necessary.

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As was shown above, according to Kant, the inner laws that ground religion are laws that
could be arrived at by anyone through reason. It is this universalizing quality of reason that
Kant, in What is Enlightenment, uses to distinguish between public and private reason.
At first glance, the relationship between the individuals use of reason and universalizabil-
ity seems problematic in that it appears not to distinguish between an individuals use of
reason (i.e. what is my moral duty?) and the use of reason by a group (i.e. what is the best
way of ordering society?). However, this is a problem only if one assumes the criterion for
distinguishing between uses of reason is number. For Kant, the criterion is not number but
freedom.
For this enlightenment, however, nothing is required but freedom, and indeed the least
harmful of anything that could even be called freedom, namely, freedom to make public
use of ones reason in all matters (Kant 1996, p. 18).
To reason in freedom is to reason publicly, even if one is alone and never articulates ones
thoughts, because a conclusion arrived at without interference from outside authority is a con-
clusion anyone could likewise reach. Public reasoning, therefore, is reasoning done without
constraints imposed by coercion or other forms of authority, thereby ensuring the universality
of reason.
What of the private use of reason? Any use of reason that is restricted by an outside author-
ity is private. Kant gives the example of an individual who holds a public office. As long as
that individual is acting according to the rules and regulations of that office and directed by
the government, they are acting unfreely and, therefore, employing a private use of reason.
At first this appears counter-intuitive since we would expect the actions of a public official
to be public, yet if one accepts that reasoning aims for universalizability, the restrictions
that come with the office and interests of government make the actions of the official less
than completely free. That is, one would not expect the decisions made by the official to be
decisions made by any person. In the case of the clergyman, the issue is also one of authority.
The clergyman is bound to teaching the doctrines of the church and giving the arguments of
the church, and, therefore, exercises a private use of reason.
Thus the use that an appointed teacher makes of his reason before his congregation is
merely a private use; for a congregation, however large a gathering it may be, is still
only a domestic gathering; and with respect to it he, as a priest, is not and cannot be
free, since he is carrying out anothers commission (p. 19).
No matter how large the congregation, no matter how many adherents belong to the religion,
as long as there are authoritative teachings and bodies of authority, there will be the private
use of reason. This does not mean that the clergyman cannot engage in public reasoning, but
this could only happen if the clergyman is addressing the world.
The private use of reason is still a use of reason, and so Kant allows for the role of reason
within ecclesiastical faith. What, then, is the relationship between the public and private use
of reason? Do we have here two different kinds of reason? I would like to suggest that, for our
purposes, we can use the above account of Kants distinction between religion and faiths to
give us guidance in distinguishing between the public and private use of reason. The public
use of reason, as with religion, is an ideal that requires an empirical form for the purposes
of understanding. The private use of reason, as with faiths, is the historical schematization
of this ideal. Reason, in its private use, has a critical function, constantly evaluating and
critiquing beliefs. Just as Kant shows us how different faiths vary in the degrees to which
they instantiate religion, we can also discern degrees of the use of reason that vary from more
private to more public. The preacher presupposes particular religious beliefs, but because

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these beliefs are shared, can also draw conclusions that ought to hold for all those who hold
those beliefs. The public official is constrained by the interests of government, but because of
the diversity of citizens must also make decisions that would be agreed to by as many of those
citizens as possible. We can, therefore, see in the preacher a greater use of private reason but
more public use of reason in the case of the public official. Freedom is the criterion by which
Kant distinguishes between the public and private use of reason, but there can be no absolute
instances of either usage. Therefore, as with the relationship between religion and faiths, in
describing the relationship between public and private use of reason, it is essential that we
distinguish between the two while acknowledging the necessary relationship between the
two.
From the above, then, we find that, for Kant, reason has three distinctive qualities. First,
it aims for universalizability.
It seems that we usually call someone limited (of a narrow mind as opposed to a broad
mind) if his talents are insufficient for a use of any magnitude. But we are talking here
not about the power of cognition, but about the way of thinking putting this power to
a purposive use; and this, no matter how slight may be the range and the degree of a
persons natural endowments, still indicates a man with a broadened way of thinking if
he overrides the private subjective conditions of his judgment ... and reflects on his own
judgment from a universal standpoint (which he can determine only by transferring
himself to the standpoint of others) (Kant 1987, p. 161).
The use of reason, therefore, is not a matter of natural abilities but a procedure for thinking
that requires the individual to consider what other people could do.1 What distinguishes reli-
gion from ecclesiastical faiths is that as a rational faith it draws on the moral law available to
all people. The same is true of the public use of reason which operates under the condition
of freedom from constraints and coercion. While universalizability is an ideal, nevertheless
it remains an identifying feature of reason, even when that reason is operating alongside
revelation.
The second quality of reason is that of being purely formal. It might be argued that a
particular way of acting, whether revealed or not, might be the best way for all people (or for
anyone) to act, so that reason authorizes a specific way of life. It is true that not all people are
Christians, but perhaps they ought to be. Could, and perhaps should, reason not lead people
to be Christian? Kant rejects this with two objections. First, if the touchstone of reason is
whether a universal law could be willed, then no single group of people can presume to limit
the freedom of others by imposing a set of teachings and beliefs (Kant 1996, p. 20). In other
words, the legislation of the teachings of a particular religion would represent a restriction on
freedom and, therefore, not an act of reason. This leads to the second objection, that reason
can never have a fixed content but is purely formal. As was noted above, the task of philoso-
phy is to test the truth of any teaching. Reason, therefore, has a negative role as a critical tool
which guards against error (Kant 1997, A709/B737). It cannot tell us what specific beliefs
we ought to hold but only warn us against what we ought not to believe. Any attempt to give
direction or content to reason is to limit reason.

1 The requirement of the universal standpoint is not to determine what other people actually do but rather
what any person would think ought to be done. This goes beyond what comes to be known as the categorical
imperative, one formulation being from the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals I ought never to act
except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law. In the Critique
of Judgment, what Kant adds to the categorical imperative is the requirement that this universal law could be
willed by any person instead of just myself.

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The third characteristic of reason is that reason presents laws demanding obedience.
Practical reason, the working out of ones moral duties, moves thought from the question,
What can I know?, to the question, What should I do? (A805/B833). Moral reasoning does
not lead to optional or possible actions, but duty. Reason, therefore, does not give particular
moral duties, but rather that we have a duty to be moral.
But I hear from all sides the cry: Do not argue! The officer says: Do not argue but drill!
The tax official: Do not argue but pay! The clergyman: Do not argue but believe! Only
one ruler in the world says: Argue as much as you will and about whatever you will,
but obey (Kant 1996, p. 18)!
If, under the condition of freedom and after the consideration of whether a principle of action
could be accepted by another, one can arrive at a moral maxim, then that maxim must be
obeyed. Reason does not provide the content of the moral maxim but rather brings with it
the authority of a commandment so that it is as if the maxim is a law.
With increased freedom and the application of reason to all aspects of life, according to
Kant, the result is not first and foremost increased knowledge or better theoretical under-
standing of the world, though this will surely follow, but the increased likelihood of a moral
society.
[The state of having freedom and duties] thus establishes the condition whereby war
(the source of all evil and corruption of morals) is deterred; and, at least negatively,
progress toward the better is assured humanity in spite of all its infirmity, for it is at
least left undisturbed in its advance (Kant 1979, p. 155).
Where reason is allowed to flourish, freed from coercion and constraints, there will be the
freedom to question and test various claims to truth. This critical task of reason, however, is
not done according to self-interest, but must always take into consideration the standpoint
of others. The exercise of reason is, therefore, always a matter of communication. I cannot
know the standpoint of the other unless I have first heard what the other has to say. This
communicative quality is safeguarded by reasons purely formal character, so that no partic-
ular teaching or establishment can claim the exclusive authority of reason. Reason, therefore,
stands in opposition to any form of aggression that would restrict freedom, and in particular,
the freedom of communication.2 Where reason is respected, where there is freedom and
people fulfill their moral duties, Kant is certain enlightenment and peace will follow.

3 The hope of Kant

Yet, is Kant justified in his optimism regarding the future enlightenment and peacefulness of
the human race? He makes clear that this future is not preordained, that it is promised only
indefinitely and as a contingent event (Kant 1979, p. 159). The question of progress and
history in Kant is an interesting one, however the more pressing question is whether Kants
account of reason, and in particular its authority, is sufficient to justify this optimism. Kant
claims that reason unites itself in addressing three questions: What can I know?, What
should I do? and What may I hope? (Kant 1997, A805/B833). This last question may at
first seem odd, but if reason is to make authoritative claims regarding what should be done,
whether this be an individuals duty or the constitution of a state, the question of hope is
fundamental.

2 For more on the relationship of reason and communication, see ONeill (1986)

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In Religion, Kant claims that because all human beings are free, a rational choice to be
obedient to the moral law can be made without any need of incentives or the idea of God
(Kant 1960, p. 3). Incentives to be obedient are not necessary since the authority of reason,
which shows us what we ought to do, is in and of itself sufficiently compelling. However,
Kant immediately qualifies this by saying that if a need for incentives does actually exist, it
is mans own fault (p. 3). All men could have sufficient incentive if (as they should) they
adhered solely to the dictation of pure reason in the law (p. 6n). If people acted according
to the freedom of reason, it would be clear that ones duty is obedience to the moral law. Yet,
Kant recognizes that there is a lack or failure on the part of people being obedient so that
happiness, which should result from the moral law, is not realized. Therefore, an omnipo-
tent moral Being must be postulated as ruler of the world, under whose care this [balance
of obedience and happiness] occurs (p. 7n). Religion is necessary for people to feel that, in
the end, obedience to the moral law will produce the highest good and, therefore, happiness.
However, in what sense is religious belief necessary? Is it a form of therapy, comforting
people that good will triumph in the end, or is it necessary for the very operation of the moral
law?
Two problems with reason lead Kant to religious beliefs, namely, the problem of evil and
the teleological problem. As noted above, reason authoritatively shows us what we ought to
do and that we ought to obey as if obeying a command. However, it is obvious that people
not only do not obey but they often do what they should not do. Kant argues that what is
meant by a person being by nature good or evil is that the person has posited, through an act
of freedom, as a ground either good or evil for every decision (p. 6). A person who is evil
has a grounding principle of evil that then conditions all their actions. Kant then makes a
distinction between a predisposition in human beings, which is towards good, and a propen-
sity, which is towards evil. A propensity is distinguished from a predisposition by the fact
that although it can indeed be innate, it ought not to be represented merely thus (p. 24). In
relation to the moral law, there exists in all human beings a predisposition towards the good
and a propensity towards disobedience, where the former is properly innate while the latter is
not. The responsibility for the propensity to evil must remain with the individual since human
beings are ultimately free. This leaves Kant in the difficult position of having to argue that
human beings are essentially inclined to do good and yet freely choose to do evil. Confronted
with this aporia of evil, Kant turns to religion and, specifically, the biblical narrative of the
Fall. In this narrative, man is represented as having fallen into evil only through seduction,
and hence as being not basically corrupt.... For man, therefore, who despite a corrupted heart
yet possesses a good will, there remains hope of a return to the good from which he has
strayed (p. 39). What the story of the Fall tells us is that evil is not innate and, therefore,
there is hope.
Kant dismisses the possibility of the account of the Fall being historical, but it is not clear
what role Kant takes it to play. The story cannot be strictly analogical, used solely for the
purposes of rendering intelligible the concept of the good will,3 since Kant justifies hope on
its basis. That is, according to Kant, we can have hope because the story represents humanity
as being only seduced rather than essentially corrupted. This does not mean that the story
does not contribute to the intelligibility of the good will since Kant takes the story as a
means for better understanding how we can be moral. However, the story is also a means for
convincing us that we ought to be moral. If the story of the Fall gives us hope that we can
be moral, it likewise imposes on us the obligation to be moral. That is, in assuring us that
3 For more on this use of analogy see Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone and the schematism of
analogy.

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human beings have not been essentially corrupted, the story of the Fall also assures us that
we are still essentially good, and, therefore, obliged to obey. This obligation is not the duty
of reason, which tells us what we ought to do, but rather that we can and, therefore, must do
what we ought to do. In other words, the authority of hope, that we can obey, is added to the
authority of reason, that we must obey.
This authority of hope surfaces again in The Critique of Judgment when Kant is faced
with the problem of the teleological character of the moral law. To require obedience from all
human beings, reason presupposes that there are final purposes towards which the moral law
aims, and that, through freedom, we can make progress towards those ends. The problem is
that the causality at work in morality is not identical to the causality at work in the world. Put
differently, it is one thing to know ones duty but another thing to be able to act in the world
so as to fulfill that duty. Kant concludes that if we are to believe that we can successfully act
on our moral responsibilities, there must be some agent who ensures this.
Hence in order to set ourselves a final purpose in conformity with the moral law, we
must assume a moral cause of the world (an author of the world); and to the extent that
setting ourselves a final purpose is necessary, to that extent (i.e. to the same degree and
on the same ground) it is also necessary that we assume a moral cause of the world: in
other words, that there is a God (Kant 1987, p. 340).
Here again we see hope at work. In order for us to have the hope of being able to act morally,
we must hold that there is a God who is a moral cause in the world. As with the story of the
Fall, Kant warns against taking to be objectively valid that which is meant to be subjectively
valid. Yet, Kant is not entirely consistent here. He gives the example of a righteous person
who reveres the moral law but does not believe that there is a God (p. 342). This person
will occasionally find that their efforts succeed but can never expect the harmonization of
their efforts with nature. Therefore, the disappointment of life will lead to the rejection of
the moral law. Now, if the belief in God as moral author of the world were only subjectively
valid, it is difficult to see how the belief in God would be an improvement. This righteous
person could benefit from the belief in God only if there were some kind of objective validity
as well. According to Kant, the belief in a God who harmonizes morality and the world is
not merely a useful means of making intelligible the relationship of the moral law and nature
but is key to bringing about moral activity. Having the hope that God is a moral agent in
the world makes possible following through on ones moral duties. If one believes that God
guarantees the coordination of moral activity and nature, then one can hold before ones eyes
the purposiveness of the moral law.

4 Revelation and reason

I would like to propose that the above description of hope is in fact an instance of the activity
of revelation. In answer to the question What can we hope?, revelation assures us that we
can obey the moral law and that this obedience is an effective force in the world. Further-
more, I would like to argue that revelation operates at the limits of reason. Two limit points
of reason where the operation of revelation is necessary have already been noted. First, if
human beings are free and regularly freely choose not to obey, reason cannot establish why
we ought to obey its command. This is not a question of incentives, as if the threat of hell or
promise of heaven is needed. Kant is correct that the use of incentives can only corrupt our
obedience. The problem lies in the fact that if reason is to give a reason for itself it begs the
question and if it draws on something outside itself, it diminishes its own authority. However,

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if we were to hold that human beings were created in order to be obedient and can be obedi-
ent, then the authority of reason would remain undiminished and it would be justified. This
belief could not be arrived at by reason since it lies beyond experience, yet it would have a
degree of objective validity since it renders intelligible the purposiveness of human activity.
It would have subjective validity, that is, authority, because it would necessarily place all
human beings under the imperative to be obedient. Therefore, at the limits of reason where
reason is required to justify itself, revelation proves significant.
Second, if human beings are to be obedient, reason cannot establish how moral activity
is possible in the world. Kant rightly recognizes that to be moral, one must assume both that
one can successfully complete moral acts and that the world as a whole is oriented towards
moral improvement. Yet, this conclusion cannot be arrived at through reason insofar as it
requires a belief in a moral author of the world. Reason requires that one be obedient but it
cannot account for how this obedience is practically possible. However, if we were to hold
that there was a moral author who guaranteed the harmonization of moral activity and natural
causes, and that this author was God, the possibility of obedience could be accounted for.
Again, reason could not arrive at this conclusion but the idea of a moral author would have a
degree of objective validity since it makes intelligible the purposiveness of the world. There
would also be the subjective validity of being obliged to act morally in a world that is morally
purposeful. At the limits of reason where reason must account for its own activity, revelation
proves significant.
Having found that revelation is significant for the use of reason, there is a temptation to
make too much of the relation between reason and revelation. Michel Despland, in Kant on
History and Religion, rightly notes that, for Kant, historical revelation is advantageous for the
use of reason (Despland 1973, p. 221). However, Despland sees in Religion a development in
Kants thought regarding reason such that revelation takes on the role of educator of reason
(p. 222). Before Religion, Kant seems to have the concept of an absolute reason which can
judge what in history is true or false according to final unchanging rational norms (p. 222).
On this account, revelation merely gives historical form to what could be known through
reason, and what is true of ecclesiastical faith is what accords with the norms of reason. This
position would be that adopted by Wood as seen above. Yet, Despland sees in Religion a
development.
Reason is never finished and complete; it grows in its capacity to deal rationally with
more and more aspects of the world, and it grows under a divine education which
orients it to its own true goal (p. 223).
On this account, Kant comes to realize that reason is dependent on historical contingencies
for both its identity and its operation (p. 225). According to Despland, this divine educa-
tion of reason includes the importance of a good society for the individuals good will,
the role of the person of Jesus Christ in overcoming evil, the divine intervention in his-
tory for establishing the foundation of the true church in history, the common goal of the
faculties of theology and philosophy, and the truth of the Bible and Christianity validated
through their ability to liberate people from the evil principle. However, given what has been
shown above, it can be seen that Despland makes two fundamental mistakes. First, Despland
ignores Kants warning regarding the schematism of analogy and holds that from the his-
torical form of Christianity we can determine knowledge regarding supersensible qualities.
Kant refers to this as anthropomorphism. We cannot draw from historical examples truths
regarding ideas of reason. Second, Despland imputes to reason particular content when we
have demonstrated that reason is purely formal, functioning only to critique and demand
obedience. For the purposes of intelligibility, reason necessarily takes on historical form,

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and is dependent on historical contingencies, but we should never confuse the schemata with
that which is represented. Despland has, therefore, fundamentally misread Kant, both in the
writings before Religion and in Religion itself, and draws too close a relationship between
reason and revelation.
A similar error can be found in Chris Firestones article Making Sense Out of Tradition
when he claims, Kant opens the door for the possibility of revelation adding to human under-
standing (Firestone 2006, p. 150). Firestone rightly notes that Kant allows for revelation as
a means of introducing to human beings truths that might only have been learnt at a later
time, so that a particular religion might be, at the same time, both a natural and revealed
religion (Kant 1960, pp. 143144). However, Firestone draws a mistaken conclusion when
he claims that revelation might then possibly add to human understanding. Kant specifically
addresses this possibility when he discusses the distinction between a natural religion, which
once established is available to any person through reason, and learned religion, which is
available only to those who have been taught.
This distinction is very important: for no inference regarding a religions qualification
or disqualification to be the universal religion of mankind can be drawn merely from
its origin, whereas such an inference is possible from its capacity or incapacity for
general dissemination, and it is this capacity which constitutes the essential character
of that religion which ought to be binding upon every man (p. 143).
It may be that the appearance of a particular truth was occasioned by a revelation, but when
it comes to determining that it is a truth, only its universalizability matters. It is, therefore,
wrong to claim, as Firestone does, that revelation might add to human understanding, since
the claim elides the very strong distinction Kant makes between revelation and reason. Kant
may not envision an infinite gap between the natural and the learned, as Firestone claims,
but Kant clearly envisions a qualitative gap between the two. To bridge this gap by claiming
that revelation might add to human understanding is to reverse the schematism of analogy
and commit the fallacy of anthropomorphism. Both Despland and Firestone correctly recog-
nize in Kant an openness to the possibility of a relationship between reason and revelation,
however, both give in to the temptation to elide the qualitative distinction Kant insists exists
between reason and revelation.

5 Conclusion

I would like to now draw some conclusions regarding the manner in which reason and rev-
elation relate to each other. First, there can be no fundamental conflict between reason and
revelation. To believe that there is a God who harmonizes moral activity and natural causes
is to necessarily hold that there is an essential harmonization of reason and revelation. Every
faith brings together varying degrees of reason and revelation as a means of promoting moral
community. This does not mean that there wont be error or difficulties in understanding, only
that these failings are not basic. There may be conflict between the theology and philosophy
faculties, but this conflict lies in the ongoing critical task of determining the historical form of
moral community, rather than in their nature. Second, reason and revelation are distinct from
each other. Kant is right in insisting that the operation of the theology faculty remain distinct
from that of the philosophy faculty. When people are talking religiously, they are engaging
in, to use Kants terms, a private use of reason that must be distinguished from the public use
of reason. From this two corollary conclusions can be derived. Reason can make neither a
positive nor negative judgment regarding that which belongs exclusively to revelation. Kant

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makes clear that reason does not allow us to say whether there is or is not, in fact, a moral
Lawgiver who harmonizes moral activity with the natural world, but only that what is given
by revelation is possible. The philosophy faculty may object when theologians make claims
that extend beyond what is appropriate for religion, but it is inappropriate for philosophers
to make judgments regarding the doctrinal teachings within ecclesiastical faiths. Likewise,
revelation can make neither a positive nor negative judgment regarding that which belongs
exclusively to reason. Revelation cannot tell us what is true or false about the world. The
activities of revelation and reason must, therefore, be kept distinct, maintaining Kants qual-
itative distinction between the two. Third, while revelation and reason are distinct, Kant sees
the two kinds of authority working harmoniously together in the formation and development
of moral community. Reason calls for obedience, and operates critically in evaluating claims
for obedience. Revelation provides the idea that the coordination of human obedience has
the imprimatur of the divine will and, therefore, moral community is not only possible but
commanded. What we see, then, in Kant is that this harmonious relationship between reason
and revelation is crucial for any hope of moral improvement in the public sphere.

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