5.

2 specification in the form of a simple experiment in magic are paid by a company on district J
in time t: using the formula
Bribe = costsit = Ct (Xit) + St (YJT, Pj) + ijt:
explanation Ct (Xit) is a function of cost effect, related to the characteristics of the company's
specifications. St (YJT, Pj) is a function related to the socio-economic conditions of the district
(YJT) and the composition of the assembly (Pj) in the district j, which may affect the willingness
to offer bribes or press. ijt an unmeasured component of the region, which may affect
corruption in the voting. In the estimation as described below, we will experiment with different
fault structure.
There are about 35% of the company's overall reported bribery zero. By using a Tobit
specification is to be able to treat a zero response to bribery as a matter of censorship. Thus, this
method is one simple approach. In Section 7, we give the results for the other estimators, does
not depend on this assumption for consistency. We also report the results of 2SLS on key
specifications, where the error-clustered robust standard. Calculating formulations (eg, Poisson
and IV version thereof) is not really appropriate. Bribery / cost ratio has some simple bunching
around a percentage integer; but generally the numbers from zero to over 155 sustainable enough
value different ratios in the samples were collected and more than 200 in the sample in 2004.
6. Evidence of econometrics.
Analysis of overtime on the effect of the composition. influence the composition of the
assembly on how corruption changed between 2001 and 2004. Then we switched to a cross-
sectional analysis of the effects of corruption in 1999 the composition of the next assembly in
2004, as well as various examinations durability.
6.1. overtime evidence on the effects of political changes in local corruption
Apart from the effects of the composition of the assembly, in 2001 there were bribes
bureaucracy, while in 2004 plus labor bribes. A decline in each year as in 2001 71% of
companies reported paying a bribe while in 2004 dropped to 67%. Results from both a
significant decrease in the activity of bribery occurred.
6.1.1 The empirical results
In the decisive variable, on all the columns are equally significant change from time to
time. As was the case in 2001 bribes fraction of the cost decreases with the size of the company,
while in 2004 there was no pattern such that the effect is not very visible. religiosity initially
positive but somewhat simpler related to corruption, but the effect is smaller in 2004 resulted in
no impact either.
6.1.1.1. The effect of the composition of the assembly.
The effect of the composition of the assembly are very large. To change the time of bribes
between 2001 and 2004, given the time dummy -23.6, in column 1, the ratio of bribery was
lower in 2004 than in 2001 for all PDIP-Golkar realizable value (for the approximate point, the
turning point is over 100% PDIP -GOLKAR the vote). A key issue is whether any observed time-
varying characteristics that affect differences in bribes between 2001 and 2004 and correlated
with the level of votes in 1999 assembly.

6.1.1.2. Instrument
 At the change of the activity of bribes, there are important factors such as ceteri paribus,
and the absence of correlation with the observed changes in conditions that affect the activity of
bribe city.
Java community there abangan Islam with Muslim students were equally as strong in
religiosity. But there is a difference between the two. At abangan Muslim masi Buddhist and
Hindu cultures adapt. Finally we make coastal variables as covariates and make the instrument
only for villages in the north coast of Java, where students
dominance may be stronger.
A different way to represent a small percentage of Muslims tend
abangan in the district, are, on average, a small part (under 1%) of the population in the
district in which they reported their Java Hindu. For the third, we note that PDIP is partly the
result of the mix of party forced Soeharto era, which included traditional Christian Party