I.

Theory of the Case: It is our position that such sale was not consummated

II. Our version of the facts of the case

A. In a nutshell, Mr. Geronimo sold the spouses one-bedroom condominium unit to Mr. Pascual.
(Testimony of plaintiff and defendant)
B. The condominium was bought by Mr. Geronimo on 2001 when he was single. (Statement of
plaintiff)
C. Spouses Geronimo were married on year 2006. (Testimony of Plaintiff)
D. Spouses Geronimo have been living in the property ever since they were married
E. Sometime in January 2009, Ms. Geronimo disclosed to Mr. Pascual of the formers plan to
acquire a house because theyre expecting a baby.
F. Ms. Geronimo negotiated the sale of the one-bedroom condominium unit in April, 2009 because
spouses Geronimo have found a house. Mr. Pascual said he was interested in buying the property
and would call the spouses once the deed of sale and the managers check were ready.
G. In June 2009, Mr. Pascual met with Mr. Geronimo to consummate the sale. Upon the signing of
the deed of sale by Mr. Geronimo, Mr. Pascual handed the managers check worth 2 million
pesos. It must be noted that Ms. Geromino did not sign the deed of sale because she was in the
United States to deliver her child with Mr. Pascual.
H. Before Ms. Geronimo was able to return, the Certificate of Title was already transferred in the
name of Mr. Pascual.
I. Ms. Geronimo returned to the Philippines on September, 2009 claims that she was not interested
in the selling of the property. Despite her offer to bring back Mr. Pascuals money, Mr. Pascual
rejected the return of his money because he claims that the sale has been consummated.
J. Ms. Geronimo now goes before the court to annul the sale of the spouses one bedroom
condominium claiming that it was consummated without her consent.

III. Nature of the property

A. The one-bedroom condominium in this case is considered to be part of the absolute community
property of spouses Geronimo
B. The property was bought in 2001, by Mr. Geronimo when he was still single.
C. Vacated by Sps. Geronimo when they found a house fit for their growing family.
D. Mr. Pascual started to gain interest in the said condominium, when Sps. Geronimo told him that
they were planning to buy a house. In reply, Mr. Pascual said that he would love to buy the said
condominium unit once Sps. Geronimo will decide to sell it
E. Mr. Pascual also wanted to purchase the condominium, because he was getting married and he
wanted the condominium to be the conjugal home
F. Mr. Pascuals statement: He was able to get the title from Mr. Geronimo, and the title was named
under Mr. Geronimo. Mr. Pascual was already able to transfer the title to his name

IV. Main arguments (limit to three at most)

Sale was not consummated:

a.) The provisions of the Family Code should not be prejudiced by the provisions on
Obligations and Contracts by the Civil Code with respect to the giving of consent in the
contract.

b.) Family Code requires the written consent of the spouse if the administrator will
dispose the property.

c.) Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa requires the written consent of the wife in order for there to
be a valid disposition. Like Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa, although the spouses were aware
of the transactions, they did not give their written consent.
 d.) The selling of the condominium is not necessary to answer for conjugal liabilities.
Hence Abalos v. Makatangay will not apply and there's no reason for the husband to sell
it alone.

V. Legal basis and Jurisprudence

With respect to the governing law, it is an established principle in statutory construction

that a specific law prevails over a general law.

With respect to the governing regime between the spouses, the provisions of Article 71 of
the Family Code provides: The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the
regime of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains, or any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is void, the system of
absolute community of property as established in this Code shall govern.

With respect to the nature of the property, the provision of the provisions of Article 91 of
the Family Code provides: Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage
settlements, the community property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses
at the time of the marriage or acquired thereafter.

With respect to the disposition of conjugal property, the relevant provisions of law are the
Family Code and Jurisprudence.

The provision of Article 96 of the Family Code provides: The administration and enjoyment of
the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy,
which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority
of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization
by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

Moreover, the doctrine in Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa, G.R. No. 147978, January 23, 2002,
374 SCRA 4981 is applicable in this case:

The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in
appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void.

The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell
to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur.

Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. Even
granting that respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject
properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity.
Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell.
Respondent Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal
properties. However, being merely aware of a transaction is not consent.

1 Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa, G.R. No. 147978 (January 23, 2002)

The issue in the case at hand is whether or not the sale of the conjugal property of spouses
Geronimo to Mr. Pascual was consummated even without a formal written consent from Mrs.
Geronimo. It is our position that the sale was not consummated because the law requires the
formal written consent of one spouse in disposing a conjugal property given that the other spouse
is absent or incapacitated.

Application

In the case at hand, we must begin with the premise that the provisions of the Family
Code should not be prejudiced by the provisions of the Civil Code with respect to Obligations
and Contracts because the property involved is conjugal in nature.

It is clear that the nature of the one-bedroom condominium is conjugal. Mr. Geronimo
acquired the property on 2001 when he was single. Spouses Geronimo was eventually married
on 2006. The presumption is that the governing property regime between them is the Absolute
Community of Property under Article 75 of the Family Code 2 because this regime is the default
mode provided by the Code in the absence of a marriage settlement. Moreover, the nature of the
property is conjugal because under the regime of Absolute Community, the community property
shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the marriage or acquired
thereafter. This applies to the one-bedroom condominium even if Mr. Geronimo bought it when
he was single.

Since the nature of the property is conjugal, the disposition of the property requires the
consent of both spouses; and given that one is absent, the law requires the written consent of the
other spouse to dispose of the said property. The requirement of the disposition of the property as
indicated in Article 96 of the Family Code necessitates that Ms. Geronimo provides her written
consent in this case because her husbands power with respect to their property is limited to
being an administrator when she left for the States. In Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa, the Supreme
Court ruled that the law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as
administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the
disposition is void. The same doctrine applies in the case at hand because although Ms.
Geronimo was the one who negotiated and offered the sale of their property, the formal requisite
of written consent required by the Family Code and the appropriate case where the spouse was in
another country was not met.

Lastly, the exception provided by jurisprudence that a spouse could sell a conjugal
property even without the consent of the other spouse would not apply in the case at hand. The
Supreme Court provided in Tinitigan v. Tinitigan, Sr., that the husband may sell property
belonging to the conjugal partnership even without the consent of the wife if the sale is
necessary to answer for a big conjugal liability which might endanger the familys economic
standing. This is one instance where the wifes consent is not required and, impliedly, no judicial
intervention is necessary. We argue that the said case could not be applied to the case at hand
because there was nothing in the records which would establish that such sale was necessary to
answer for a big conjugal liability.

Conclusion

To conclude, the provisions of the Family Code should not be prejudiced by the provisions on
Obligations and Contracts by the Civil Code with respect to the giving of consent in the
contract. The Family Code requires the written consent of the spouse if the administrator will
dispose the property. Moreover, Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa requires the written consent of the
wife in order for there to be a valid disposition. Like Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa, although the
spouses were aware of the transactions, they did not give their written consent. Lastly, the selling

2 The Civil Code of the Philippines, Republic Act No. 386, Article 75 (Rex Bookstore 2011) (Philippines).
of the condominium is not necessary to answer for conjugal liabilities. Hence Abalos v.
Makatangay will not apply and there's no reason for the husband to sell it alone. Therefore, we
conclude that there was no consummated sale because the effect of non-compliance with Article
96 of the Family Code would render the disposition or sale void.