Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Lawyers should maintain, at all times, "a high standard

of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform
their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in
accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code [of Professional
Responsibility]."
Members of the bar took their oath to conduct themselves "according to the best of
[their] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
[their] clients[,]" and to "delay no man for money or malice[.
These mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients
considering the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship. 57 Clients entrust their
causeslife, liberty, and propertyto their lawyers, certain that this confidence
would not be abused. (JUN B. LUNA VS ATTY. DWIGHT M. GALARRITA, July 07,
2015)

Same; Same; Special Power of Attorney; The Rules of Court thus requires
lawyers to secure special authority from their clients when entering into a
compromise agreement that dispenses with litigation: 23. Authority of attorneys to
bind clients. - Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any
agreement in relation thereto made in writing and in taking appeals, and in all
matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special
authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge
of a client's claim but the full amount in cash. (JUN B. LUNA VS ATTY. DWIGHT M.
GALARRITA, July 07, 2015)

Same; Same; Members of the bar must always conduct themselves in a way that
promotes "public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Even though
complainant Luna effectively abandoned the issue on respondent Atty. Galarrita's
lack of authority to compromise the civil case when he demanded the payment of
the settlement proceeds, this does not erase his acts of abusing the trust and
confidence reposed in him by complainant Luna. (JUN B. LUNA VS ATTY. DWIGHT
M. GALARRITA, July 07, 2015)

Same; Same; In several cases, we have disciplined lawyers who failed or refused
to remit amounts received for and on behalf of their clients. "The penalty for
violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility usually ranges from
suspension for six months, to suspension for one year, or two years, and even
disbarment, depending on the circumstances of each case. (JUN B. LUNA VS ATTY.
DWIGHT M. GALARRITA, July 07, 2015)

Same; Same; Later jurisprudence clarified that this rule excluding civil liability
determination from disciplinary proceedings "remains applicable only to claimed
liabilities which are purely civil in nature for instance, when the claim involves
moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct
[from] and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement."This court has
thus ordered in administrative proceedings the return of amounts representing legal
fees.
This court has also ordered restitution as concomitant relief in administrative
proceedings when respondent's civil liability was already established: Although the
Court renders this decision in an administrative proceeding primarily to exact the
ethical responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Court's silence about
the respondent lawyer's legal obligation to restitute the complainant will be both
unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical misconduct concerning the
client's funds or property should be required to still litigate in another
proceeding what the administrative proceeding has already established as
the respondent's liability. That has been the reason why the Court has required
restitution of the amount involved as a concomitant relief in the cited cases
of Mortem v. Pagatpatan, supra, Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, supra, Small v. Banares,
supra. (JUN B. LUNA VS ATTY. DWIGHT M. GALARRITA, July 07, 2015)

Same; Attorneys Lien; Elements required for full recognition of attorney's lien
are: "(1) lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client's funds,
documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees." Respondent
Atty. Galarrita must prove the existence of all these elements. However, this is not
the main issue in this disbarment case against him, and the validity of his retaining
lien defense was not established. Counter evidence even exists such as respondent
Atty. Galarrita's Letter dated August 12, 2003 waiving any compensation for his
services in the foreclosure case. 103 Complainant Luna also raises respondent Atty.
Galarrita's negligence in handling the case, and lack of supporting receipts for the
incurred expenses respondent Atty. Galarrita seeks to reimburse. (JUN B. LUNA
VS ATTY. DWIGHT M. GALARRITA, July 07, 2015)

Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Human Resource Management

Officers; Simple Neglect of Duty; Words and Phrases; simple neglect of duty,
defined as "the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task or
to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference - Under Item XIV (14) (a) of
Revised A.C. No. 50-2001, "[f]or appointment by promotion, the performance rating
of the appointee for the last rating period prior to the effectivity date of the
appointment should be at least very satisfactory" a requirement which Andres is
aware of. Nonetheless, he failed to meticulously check Puertos qualifications and
indicate in the list of lacking requirements, the absence of Puertos PR form. While
applications "with incomplete form or lacking requirement/s shall still be included in
the list to be submitted to the SPB-LC with a notation as to the lacking form or
requirement/s,"3 subject to subsequent accomplishment/submission as the SPB-LC
may require, Andres likewise erroneously reported Puertos performance rating as
"Very Satisfactory" instead of "Satisfactory," which eventually led to the latters
promotion from Clerk III to Sheriff IV, albeit disqualified.1wphi1From the foregoing
circumstances, Andres was clearly remiss and negligent in performing his assigned
tasks as a processor-in-charge, and is guilty of simple neglect of duty, defined as
"the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task or to
discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference. (ATTY. CARIDAD A. P
ABELLO, CHIEF OF OFFICE, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES- OFFICE
OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR (OAS-OCA), ON NEGLECT OF DUTY OF
FERDINAND F. ANDRES, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT OFFICER III,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (RTC)-PERSONNEL DIVISION, OAS-OCA, THE
PROCESSOR-IN-CHARGE OF APPOINTMENT AND THE ALLEGED ERRONEOUS
RECORDING, ERASURE, AND ALTERATION OF THE PERFORMANCE RATING
ON THE RECORD BOOK., A.M. NO. 2014-07-SCJULY 8, 2015)

Same; Same; Section 1, Canon IV of A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC,35 otherwise known as

the "Code of Conduct for Court Personnel," mandates that "[c]ourt personnel shall
at all times perform official duties properly and with diligence. x x x." The Court has
repeatedly emphasized that the "[j]udicial machinery can only function if every
employee performs his task with the highest degree of professionalism. Court
personnel are obligated to perform their duties properly and with diligence. Any task
given to an employee of the judiciary, however menial it may be, must be done in
the most prompt and diligent way." 36 Andres attribution of the mistake to human
error37 and his alleged heavy workload at the time 38 cannot be given credence
because a heavy workload is not a compelling reason to justify failure to perform
ones duties properly. Otherwise, every government employee charged with
negligence and dereliction of duty would always proffer a similar excuse to escape
punishment, to the prejudice of the government service. 39 Truth be told, it is
incumbent upon every government employee to adapt all reasonable means to
cope with the heavy workload, for the occupation demands no less than full and
uncomplaining dedication to the public service. (ATTY. CARIDAD A. P ABELLO,
CHIEF OF OFFICE, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES- OFFICE OF THE
COURT ADMINISTRATOR (OAS-OCA), ON NEGLECT OF DUTY OF FERDINAND
F. ANDRES, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT OFFICER III, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT (RTC)-PERSONNEL DIVISION, OAS-OCA, THE PROCESSOR-IN-CHARGE
OF APPOINTMENT AND THE ALLEGED ERRONEOUS RECORDING, ERASURE,
AND ALTERATION OF THE PERFORMANCE RATING ON THE RECORD BOOK.,
A.M. NO. 2014-07-SCJULY 8, 2015)

Same; Same; Penalties; Mitigating Circumstances ; the disciplining authority,

the Court in this case, is granted the discretion to consider mitigating
circumstances in the imposition of the final penalty. These factors range, among
others, from the erring individuals admission of guilt, remorse, length of service, or
high performance rating. - Under Section 46 (D) (1), Rule 10 of Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 1101502 dated November 8, 2011, otherwise
known as the "Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service" (RRACCS),
simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense, punishable by suspension of one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense. 40 This notwithstanding,
the disciplining authority, the Court in this case, is granted the discretion to
consider mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the final penalty. These
factors range, among others, from the erring individuals admission of guilt,
remorse, length of service, or high performance rating. (ATTY. CARIDAD A. P
ABELLO, CHIEF OF OFFICE, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES- OFFICE
OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR (OAS-OCA), ON NEGLECT OF DUTY OF
FERDINAND F. ANDRES, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT OFFICER III,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (RTC)-PERSONNEL DIVISION, OAS-OCA, THE
PROCESSOR-IN-CHARGE OF APPOINTMENT AND THE ALLEGED ERRONEOUS
RECORDING, ERASURE, AND ALTERATION OF THE PERFORMANCE RATING
ON THE RECORD BOOK., A.M. NO. 2014-07-SCJULY 8, 2015)
Remedial Law; Evidence; Burden of Proof; The burden of proof to establish the
averments of the complaint by preponderance of evidence pertained to the
petitioners as the plaintiffs. - The burden of proof to establish the averments of the
complaint by preponderance of evidence pertained to the petitioners as the
plaintiffs. In that regard, we have discoursed on preponderance of evidence in
Amoroso v. Alegre, Jr., 32 thusly: "Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit,
and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of
the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last
analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to
the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. If
plaintiff claims a right granted or created by law, he must prove his claim by
competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not
upon the weakness of that of his opponent. (ALEJANDRA ARADO HEIRS vs.
ANACLETO ALCORAN and ELENETTESUNJACO, G.R. No. 163362,July 8, 2015)

Tariff and Customs Code; Section 3602, Tarrif and Customs Code; various
prohibited fraudulent practices, like the entry of imported or exported articles by
means of any false or fraudulent invoice, statement or practice; the entry of goods
at less than the true weight or measure; or the filing of any false or fraudulent entry
for the payment of drawback or refund of duties.30The following specific acts are
punishable under Section 3602:

1. Making or attempting to make any entry of imported or exported article by

means of any false or fraudulent invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, or
paper;

2. Making or attempting to make any entry of imported or exported article by

means of any false statement, written or verbal;

3. Making or attempting to make any entry of imported or exported article by

means of any false or fraudulent practice whatsoever;

4. Knowingly effects any entry of goods, wares or merchandise, at less than

true weight or measures thereof;

5. Knowingly effects any entry of goods, wares or merchandise upon a false

classification as to quality or value;

6. Knowingly effects any entry of goods, wares or merchandise by the

payment of less than the amount legally due;

7. Knowingly and willfully files any false or fraudulent entry or claim for the
payment of drawback or refund of duties upon the exportation of
merchandise;

8. Knowingly and willfully makes or files any affidavit abstract, record,

certificate or other document, with a view to securing the payment to himself
or others of any drawback, allowance, or refund of duties on the exportation
 of merchandise, greater than that legally due thereon. (ALVIN MERCADO
VS.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 167510, JULY 8, 2015)

Criminal Law; Accomplices; Under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, an

accomplice is one who, without being a principal either by direct participation, or by
inducement, or by indispensable cooperation, cooperates in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts - Under Article 18 of the Revised Penal
Code, an accomplice is one who, without being a principal either by direct
participation, or by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation, cooperates in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. It would violate the
constitutional right of the petitioner to be informed of the charge brought against
him if he were held criminally responsible for Saganay's act or omission on the basis
that Saganay had been his agent in the transaction. In other words, the importer or
consignee should not be held criminally liable for any underdeclaration or
misdeclaration made by the broker unless either a conspiracy between them had
been alleged and proved, or the Prosecution sufficiently established that the
importer had knowledge of and actively participated in the underdeclaration or
misdeclaration. Indeed, to allow the act or omission of Saganay to bind the
petitioner would be unacceptable under the principle of res inter alias
acta embodied in Section 28,40Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. (ALVIN MERCADO
VS.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 167510, JULY 8, 2015)

Tariff and Customs Code; Even assuming that the petitioner was involved in the
preparation of the import documents, a clear showing of his intent to falsify the
same in order to avoid the payment of duties and taxes would still be wanting. -
Even assuming that the petitioner was involved in the preparation of the import
documents, a clear showing of his intent to falsify the same in order to avoid the
payment of duties and taxes would still be wanting. The Customs officials
themselves testified that the declarations made in the import documents largely
depended on the description of the goods made by the exporter or shipper from a
foreign country. (ALVIN MERCADO VS.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO.
167510, JULY 8, 2015)

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Dismissal of Actions; Failure to State Cause

of Action; Lack of Cause of Action; Failure to state a cause of action and lack of
cause of action are distinct grounds to dismiss a particular action - Failure to state a
cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to dismiss a
particular action. The former refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the
pleading, while the latter to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action.
Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages
of the proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court,
while dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the
questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or
evidence presented by the plaintiff. (WESTMONT BANK vs. FUNAI PHILIPPINES
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 175733, July 8, 2015, G.R. No. 175733)

Same; Same; Cause of Action; A complaint states a cause of action if

it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3) essential elements of a cause of
action - A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of
the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action namely: (a) a right in favor of
the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b)
an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If the
allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of these elements, the
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action. (WESTMONT BANK vs. FUNAI PHILIPPINES
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 175733, July 8, 2015, G.R. No. 175733)

Same; Same;Dismissal of Actions; while the facts alleged in the complaint are
hypothetically admitted by the defendant, who moves to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of failure to state a cause of action, it must, nevertheless, be
remembered that the hypothetical admission extends only to the relevant and
material facts well pleaded in the complaint, as well as inferences fairly deductible
therefrom. - It bears to stress that while the facts alleged in the complaint are
hypothetically admitted by the defendant, who moves to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of failure to state a cause of action, it must, nevertheless, be
remembered that the hypothetical admission extends only to the relevant
and material facts well pleaded in the complaint, as well as inferences
fairly deductible therefrom Verily, the filing of the motion to dismiss assailing the
sufficiency of the complaint "does not admit the truth of mere epithets of fraud; nor
allegations of legal conclusions; nor an erroneous statement of law; nor mere
inferences or conclusions from facts not stated; nor mere conclusions of law; nor
allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice; nor matters of
evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant matter; nor scandalous matter inserted
merely to insult the opposing party; nor to legally impossible facts; nor to facts
which appear unfounded by a record incorporated in the pleading, or by a document
referred to; nor to general averments contradicted by more specific averments.
(WESTMONT BANK vs. FUNAI PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, G.R. No. 175733,
July 8, 2015, G.R. No. 175733)

Attorneys Fees; possess the power to reduce the amount of attorneys fees
whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, if the same is iniquitous or
unconscionable. - Anent the award of attorneys fees, it is relevant to note that the
stipulations on attorneys fees contained in the PNs constitute what is known as a
penal clause. The award of attorneys fees by the CA, therefore, is not in the nature
of an indemnity but rather a penalty in the form of liquidated damages in
accordance with the contract between Westmont and the original defendants. "Such
a stipulation has been upheld by [the] Court as binding between the parties so long
as it does not contravene the law, morals, public order or public
policy."Nevertheless, the courts possess the power to reduce the amount of
attorneys fees whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, if the same is
iniquitous or unconscionable.Thus, in Trade & Investment Devt. Corp. of the Phils.
v. Roblett Industrial Construction Corp., the Court equitably reduced the amount of
attorneys fees to be paid since interests (and penalties) had ballooned to thrice as
much as the principal debt. In the present case, interest alone runs to more than
thrice the principal amount of the loan obligation. In real terms, therefore,
attorneys fees at the stipulated rate of 20% of the total amount due of over
P42,000,000.00, or about P8,400,000.00, is manifestly exorbitant. Hence, the Court
concurs with the CA that the amount of attorneys fees should be equitably reduced
to five percent (5%) of the principal debt, which the Court finds reasonable under
the premises. (WESTMONT BANK vs. FUNAI PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, G.R.
No. 175733, July 8, 2015, G.R. No. 175733)

Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Sherrifs; in serving the courts writs and
processes and in implementing the orders of the court, sheriffs cannot afford to err
without affecting the efficiency of the process of the administration of justice. - It is
well-settled that a sheriff performs a sensitive role in the dispensation of justice. He
is duty-bound to know the basic rules in the implementation of a writ of execution
and be vigilant in the exercise of that authority. While sheriffs have the ministerial
duty to implement writs of execution promptly, they are bound to discharge their
duties with prudence, caution, and attention which careful men usually exercise in
the management of their affairs. Sheriffs, as officers of the court upon whom the
execution of a judgment depends, must be circumspect and proper in their
behavior. Anything less is unacceptable because in serving the courts writs and
processes and in implementing the orders of the court, sheriffs cannot afford to err
without affecting the efficiency of the process of the administration of justice.
(WESTMONT BANK vs. FUNAI PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, G.R. No. 175733,
July 8, 2015, G.R. No. 175733)

Same; Same; Same; Injunction; Settled is the rule that where a party has actual
notice, no matter how acquired, of an injunction clearly informing him from what he
must abstain, he is "legally bound from that time to desist from what he is
restrained and inhibited from doing, and will be punished for a violation thereof,
even though it may not have served, or may have been served on him defectively. -
he Court does not find credence in Sheriff Cacheros insistence that while he may
have "gotten wind" of the TRO through a cellular phone call, he was not bound
thereby unless an official copy of the TRO was duly served upon him. Settled is the
rule that where a party has actual notice, no matter how acquired, of an injunction
clearly informing him from what he must abstain, he is "legally bound from that
time to desist from what he is restrained and inhibited from doing, and will
be punished for a violation thereof, even though it may not have served, or may
have been served on him defectively. (WESTMONT BANK vs. FUNAI PHILIPPINES
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 175733, July 8, 2015, G.R. No. 175733)

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Three ways of committing

Forum Shopping - Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) by filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis
pendentia); (2) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with
the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground
for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) by filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action but with different prayers, or by splitting of causes of action (where
the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). (ENRICO S.
EULOGIO AND NATIVIDAD V. EULOGIO v. PATERNO C. BELL, SR.G.R. No.
186322, July 08, 2015)
Same; Same; Same; The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment through means
other than by appeal or certiorari. - The essence of forum shopping is the filing of
multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment through means other than by appeal or certiorari. Forum shopping does
not apply to cases that arise from an initiatory or original action that has been
elevated by way of appeal or certiorari to higher or appellate courts or authorities.
This is so because the issues in the appellate courts necessarily differ from those in
the lower court, and the appealed cases are but a continuation of the original case
and treated as only one case. (ENRICO S. EULOGIO AND NATIVIDAD V.
EULOGIO v. PATERNO C. BELL, SR.G.R. No. 186322, July 08, 2015)

Same; Same; Judgements; Res Judicata; Res judicata (meaning, a "matter

adjudged") is a fundamental principle of law that precludes parties from re-litigating
issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. - Res
judicata (meaning, a "matter adjudged") is a fundamental principle of law that
precludes parties from re-litigating issues actually litigated and determined by a
prior and final judgment. Under the 1997 Rules of Court, there are two aspects
of res judicata, namely: bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment.
(ENRICO S. EULOGIO AND NATIVIDAD V. EULOGIO v. PATERNO C. BELL,
SR.G.R. No. 186322, July 08, 2015)

Same; Same; Res Judicata; Bar by Prior Judgement; There is "bar by prior
judgment" when, as between the first case in which the judgment has been
rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is an identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action. - There is "bar by prior judgment"
when, as between the first case in which the judgment has been rendered and the
second case that is sought to be barred, there is an identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case
constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. The judgment or decree on the
merits of the court of competent jurisdiction concludes the litigation between the
parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit
involving the same cause of action before the same or any other tribunal. (ENRICO
S. EULOGIO AND NATIVIDAD V. EULOGIO v. PATERNO C. BELL, SR.G.R. No.
186322, July 08, 2015)

Same; Same; Same; Conclusiveness of Judgements; there is "conclusiveness

of judgment" where there is an identity of parties in the first and second cases, but
no identity of causes of action. - there is "conclusiveness of judgment" where there
is an identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of
action. Under this rule, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters
actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein. Stated differently, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a
competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled
by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their
privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two
actions is the same. (ENRICO S. EULOGIO AND NATIVIDAD V. EULOGIO
v. PATERNO C. BELL, SR.G.R. No. 186322, July 08, 2015)

Same; Same; Same; Causes of Action; The test to determine whether the
causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain
both actions, or whether there is an identity of the facts essential to the
maintenance of the two actions. - The settled rule, however, is that identity of
causes of action does not mean absolute identity. Otherwise, a party could easily
escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action or the relief
sought.35 The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to
ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is
an identity of the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If
the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the
same, and a judgment in the first case would be a bar to the subsequent action.
Hence, a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method
of presenting the case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same
cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or their
privies. (ENRICO S. EULOGIO AND NATIVIDAD V. EULOGIO v. PATERNO C.
BELL, SR.G.R. No. 186322, July 08, 2015)

Civil Law; Family Home; The family home cannot be seized by creditors except in
special cases. - It has been said that the family home is a real right that is
gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. The great controlling purpose and
policy of the Constitution is the protection or the preservation of the homestead -
the dwelling place. A houseless, homeless population is a burden upon the energy,
industry, and morals of the community to which it belongs. No greater calamity, not
tainted with crime, can befall a family than to be expelled from the roof under which
it has been gathered and sheltered. The family home cannot be seized by creditors
except in special cases. (ENRICO S. EULOGIO AND NATIVIDAD V. EULOGIO
v. PATERNO C. BELL, SR.G.R. No. 186322, July 08, 2015)

Same; Same; The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to
be exempt, however, are determined by the exemption statute. - The nature and
character of the property that debtors may claim to be exempt, however, are
determined by the exemption statute. The exemption is limited to the particular
kind of property or the specific articles prescribed by the statute; the exemption
cannot exceed the statutory limit.
Articles 155 and 160 of the Family Code specify the exceptions mentioned in Article
153, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ARTICLE 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(1) For nonpayment of taxes;

(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;

(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution; and

(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and
others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the
building. (ENRICO S. EULOGIO AND NATIVIDAD V. EULOGIO v. PATERNO C.
BELL, SR.G.R. No. 186322, July 08, 2015)

Same; Same; Execution of Judgements; the exemption of the family home from
execution, forced sale or attachment is limited to P300,000 in urban areas and
P200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values are adjusted by law. - the
exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or attachment is limited
to P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum
values are adjusted by law. If it is shown, though, that those amounts do not match
the present value of the peso because of currency fluctuations, the amount of
exemption shall be based on the value that is most favorable to the constitution of a
family home. Any amount in excess of those limits can be applied to the payment of
any of the obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160.

Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons

constituting it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment provided the following conditions obtain: (a)
the actual value of the property at the time of its constitution has been determined
to fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement does not
result in an increase in its value exceeding the statutory limit. 45 Otherwise, the
family home can be the subject of a forced sale, and any amount above the
statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160.

Certainly, the humane considerations for which the law surrounds the family home
with immunities from levy do not include the intent to enable debtors to thwart the
just claims of their creditors. (ENRICO S. EULOGIO AND NATIVIDAD V. EULOGIO
v. PATERNO C. BELL, SR.G.R. No. 186322, July 08, 2015)

Same; Same; Execution Sale; To warrant the execution sale of respondents'

family home under Article 160, petitioners needed to establish these facts: (1) there
was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary
improvements on the property introduced by the persons constituting the family
home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value
exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157. - To warrant the execution sale
of respondents' family home under Article 160, petitioners needed to establish
these facts: (1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted
from voluntary improvements on the property introduced by the persons
constituting the family home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the
increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157.

During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was alleged - much less
proven - by petitioners. The sole evidence presented was the Deed of Sale, but the
trial court had already determined with finality that the contract was null, and that
the actual transaction was an equitable mortgage. Evidently, when petitioners and
Spouses Bell executed the Deed of Sale in 1990, the price stated therein was not
the actual value of the property in dispute. (ENRICO S. EULOGIO AND
NATIVIDAD V. EULOGIO v. PATERNO C. BELL, SR.G.R. No. 186322, July 08,
2015)

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Venue ; A mere procedural lapse in the venue
where petitioner filed its Memorandum of Appeal is not fatal to its cause. -
Petitioner's contentions are well-taken. A mere procedural lapse in the venue where
petitioner filed its Memorandum of Appeal is not fatal to its cause. This is especially
so in light of how respondent estopped herself in failing to raise the issue of
jurisdiction while petitioner's appeal was pending before the National Labor
Relations Commission. Respondent is bound by her inaction and cannot belatedly
invoke this issue on certiorari before the Court of Appeals. (FAR EAST BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY, v. LILIA S. CHUA, G.R. No. 187491, July 08, 2015)

Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Laches; Although the issue of jurisdiction may be

raised at any stage of the proceedings as the same is conferred by law, it is
nonetheless settled that a party may be barred from raising it on ground of laches
or estoppel." - In a long line of cases, this court has held that "[a]lthough the issue
of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings as the same is
conferred by law, it is nonetheless settled that a party may be barred from raising it
on ground of laches or estoppel." The rule is stated in La'O v. Republic of the
Philippines and the Government Service Insurance System:
While it is true that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings since it is conferred by law, it is nevertheless settled
that a party may be barred from raising it on the ground of estoppel. After
voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits,
it is improper and too late for the losing party to question the jurisdiction of the
court. A party who has invoked the jurisdiction of a court over a particular matter to
secure affirmative relief cannot be permitted to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape liability. (FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, v. LILIA
S. CHUA, G.R. No. 187491, July 08, 2015)
Same; Same; Judicial Power; Courts derive their authority from the
Constitution's recognition that they shall be the sole and exclusive investees of
judicial power. - Courts derive their authority from the Constitution's recognition
that they shall be the sole and exclusive investees of judicial power. This, even as
the Constitution leaves to the legislature the authority to establish lower courts, as
well as "to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts[,]"47 except of this court. Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution
provides that "[t]he judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. (FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, v. LILIA S. CHUA, G.R. No. 187491, July 08, 2015)

Administrative Agencies; It is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency

has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are
necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. - For their part, administrative agencies
are statutory constructs. Thus, they are limited by the statutes which created them
and which spelled out their powers and functions. "It is a fundamental rule that an
administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law
and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof[.]" Administrative
agencies may exercise quasi-judicial powers, but only to the extent warranted by
administrative action. They may not exercise judicial functions. This is illustrated
in Philex Mining Corporation v. Zaldivia, et al. which distinguished between judicial
questions and "questions of fact." 50 It is only the latter questions of fact. (FAR
EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, v. LILIA S. CHUA, G.R. No. 187491, July
08, 2015)

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; there is no basis for distinguishing

between courts and quasi-judicial agencies with respect to the effects of a party's
failure to timely assail errors in jurisdiction. - Nevertheless, there is no basis for
distinguishing between courts and quasi-judicial agencies with respect to the effects
of a party's failure to timely assail errors in jurisdiction. These effects have nothing
to do with the distinction between the competencies of courts and quasi-judicial
agencies as spelled out by the Constitution and statutes.

In a long line of cases, this court has held the rule on estoppel vis-a-vis jurisdiction,
as initially articulated in 1968 in Tijam to be equally applicable to cases involving
the National Labor Relations Commission (and its related agencies). (FAR EAST
BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, v. LILIA S. CHUA, G.R. No. 187491, July 08,
2015)
Same; Same; Appeals; The place where appeals must be filed is governed by a
distinct provision (i.e., Section 4) and is thus a matter that is different from the
requisites for perfecting appeals. - This conclusion, however, fails to consider that
the error committed by petitioner pertains to the place for filing appeals and not the
requisites for perfecting an appeal which Rule VI, Section 3 enumerates. The place
where appeals must be filed is governed by a distinct provision (i.e., Section 4) and
is thus a matter that is different from the requisites for perfecting appeals. Per
Section 3, only the following are necessary in order that petitioner may perfect its
appeal:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) Filing within the applicable reglementary period as provided by Section
1;60redarclaw

(2) That the appeal was under oath;

(3) That the appeal fee must have been paid;

(4) That the appeal bond must have been posted;

(5) A memorandum of appeal which states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

a. the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support of the

appeal;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

b. the relief sought; and

c. a statement of the date when the assailed decision was received; and

(6) Proof of service of the appeal on the adverse party. (FAR EAST BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY, v. LILIA S. CHUA, G.R. No. 187491, July 08, 2015)

Taxation; Although the power to tax is inherent in the State, the same is not true
for LGUs because although the mandate to impose taxes granted to LGUs is
categorical and long established in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the same is not
all encompassing as it is subject to limitations as explicitly stated in Section 5,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution. - At the outset, it must be emphasized that
although the power to tax is inherent in the State, the same is not true for LGUs
because although the mandate to impose taxes granted to LGUs is categorical and
long established in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the same is not all
encompassing as it is subject to limitations as explicitly stated in Section 5, Article X
of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:
SECTION 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own
sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines
and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
governments. In the consolidated cases of City of Manila, et al. v. Hon. Colet and
Malaysian Airline system; Maersk-Filipinas, Inc., et al. v. City of Manila, et al,;
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. City Council of Manila, et al; William Lines, Inc., et al.
v. Regional Trial Court of Manila, et al.; PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v.
Hon. Nabong, et al.; Maersk-Filipinas, Inc., et al. v. City of Manila, et al, and with
Intervenors William Lines, Inc., et al; Cosco Container Lines and HEUNG-A Shipping
Co., Ltd., et al. v. City of Manila; Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. Regional Trial Court of Manila,
et al; Association of International Shipping Lines, Inc. v. City of Manila, et al;
Dongnama Shipping Co., Ltd., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 12 this Court
expounded that the LGUs' power to tax is subject to the limitations set forth under
Section 133 of the LGC. (BATANGAS CITY, MARIA TERESA GERON, IN HER
CAPACITY AS CITY TREASURER OF BATANGAS CITY AND TEODULFO A.
DEGUITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CITY LEGAL OFFICER OF BATANGAS CITY v.
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, G.R. No. 187631, July 08,
2015)

Same; Business Taxes; although petroleum products are subject to excise tax,
the same is specifically excluded from the broad power granted to LGUs under
Section 143(h) of the LGC to impose business taxes. - Section 133(h) clearly
specifies the two kinds of taxes which cannot be imposed by LGUs: (1) excise taxes
on articles enumerated under the NIRC, as amended; and (2) taxes, fees or charges
on petroleum products.

Indisputably, the power of LGUs to impose business taxes derives from Section
14314 of the LGC. However, the same is subject to the explicit

statutory impediment provided for under Section 133(h) of the same Code which
prohibits LGUs from imposing "taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products." It
can, therefore, be deduced that although petroleum products are subject to excise
tax, the same is specifically excluded from the broad power granted to LGUs under
Section 143(h) of the LGC to impose business taxes. (BATANGAS CITY, MARIA
TERESA GERON, IN HER CAPACITY AS CITY TREASURER OF BATANGAS CITY
AND TEODULFO A. DEGUITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CITY LEGAL OFFICER OF
BATANGAS CITY v. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, G.R. No.
187631, July 08, 2015)

Same; Petroleum Products; Strictly speaking, as long as the subject matter of

the taxing powers of the LGUs is the petroleum products per se or even the activity
or privilege related to the petroleum products, such as manufacturing and
distribution of said products, it is covered by the said limitation and thus, no levy
can be imposed. (BATANGAS CITY, MARIA TERESA GERON, IN HER CAPACITY
AS CITY TREASURER OF BATANGAS CITY AND TEODULFO A. DEGUITO, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS CITY LEGAL OFFICER OF BATANGAS CITY v. PILIPINAS
SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, G.R. No. 187631, July 08, 2015)

Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Temporary restraining orders;

Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that a temporary restraining order
may be issued only if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by verified
application that great or irreparable injury would be inflicted on the applicant be-
fore the writ of preliminary injunction could be heard. - Section 5. Preliminary
injunction not granted without notice; exception. - No preliminary injunction shall be
granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be
enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by verified application
that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can
be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was
made, may issue a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of
twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except
as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said
party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction
should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the
preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding
order.

However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of
extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury,
the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single sala
court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-
two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of
the next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be
served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge
before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine
whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for
preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of
the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original
seventy-two hours provide herein.

In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved
within the said period, the temporary restraining order is deemed, automatically
vacated. The effectivity of a temporary restraining order is not extendible without
need of any judicial declaration to that effect and no court shall have authority to
extend or renew the same on the same ground for which it was issued.

However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof, the temporary

restraining order shall be effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party or
person sought to be enjoined. A restraining order issued by the Supreme Court or a
member thereof shall be effective until further orders. (SPOUSES ROGELIO v.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 190134, July 08, 2015)

Same; Same ; Preliminary Injunction; the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary

injunction in a pending case rests on the sound discretion of the court taking
cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards
that end involves findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive
determination. - Worth noting also is the fact that the grant or denial of a writ of
preliminary injunction in a pending case rests on the sound discretion of the court
taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence
towards that end involves findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive
determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive
matters must not be interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of
discretion.12chanrobleslaw

Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a

capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in
contemplation of law. (SPOUSES ROGELIO v. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, G.R. No. 190134, July 08, 2015)
Criminal Law; Rape; Elements of - The elements necessary to sustain a conviction
of rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that
said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force, threat or intimidation, or (b)
when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or ( c) when the
victim is under 12 years of age or is demented. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
VINCENT GARRIDO y ELORDE, G.R. No. 191258, July 8, 2015)

Same; Same; In the case of Rape; a review begins with the reality that rape is a
very serious accusation that is painful to make; at the same time, it is a charge that
is not hard to lay against another by one with malice in her mind. - In the case of
rape, a review begins with the reality that rape is a very serious accusation that is
painful to make; at the same time, it is a charge that is not hard to lay against
another by one with malice in her mind. Because of the private nature of the crime
that justifies the acceptance of the lone testimony of a credible victim to convict, it
is not easy for the accused, although innocent, to disprove his guilt. 24 We are
mindful that the lone testimony of the rape victim is sufficient to sustain conviction.
However, the probative value of the victim's testimony should be measured against
the evidence for the defense and must be carefully evaluated. 25 Thus, the court has
the duty to scrutinize with caution the testimony of the victim to rule a conviction.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VINCENT GARRIDO y ELORDE, G.R. No.
191258, July 8, 2015)

Same; Same; Guiding Principles in reviewing rape cases; Jurisprudence lay down
the following guidelines in evaluating the testimony of the victim. First, while an
accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult
for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; Second, in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved,
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and
lastly, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the
defense. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VINCENT GARRIDO y
ELORDE, G.R. No. 191258, July 8, 2015)

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; The findings of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses are generally accorded great respect and
even finality on appeal. - As repeatedly held by this Court, the findings of the trial
court regarding the credibility of witnesses are generally accorded great respect and
even finality on appeal. However, this principle does not preclude a reevaluation of
the evidence to determine whether material facts or circumstances have been
overlooked or misinterpreted by the trial court. It is the prosecution's duty to
present the necessary evidence to prove conviction beyond reasonable doubt to
convince and satisfy the conscience of those who are to act in judgment. Upon the
prosecution's failure to meet this test, acquittal becomes the constitutional duty of
the Court, lest its mind be tortured with the thought that it has imprisoned an
innocent man for the rest of his life. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VINCENT
GARRIDO y ELORDE, G.R. No. 191258, July 8, 2015)
Civil Law; Contracts; Interpretation of Contracts; It is a cardinal rule in the
interpretation of a contract that if its terms are clear and leave no doubt on the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall
control. - The contract of indemnity is the law between the parties. It is a cardinal
rule in the interpretation of a contract that if its terms are clear and leave no doubt
on the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall
control. The CA aptly found provisions in the contract that could not exonerate
petitioners from their liability. (EJERCITO v. ORIENTAL ASSURANCE,
G.R. No. 192099, July 08, 2015)

Same; Same; Contracts of Adhesion; the Court has consistently held that
contracts of adhesion are not invalid per se and that their binding effects have been
upheld on numerous occasions. - With regard to the contention that the Deed of
Indemnity is a contract of adhesion, the Court has consistently held that contracts
of adhesion are not invalid per se and that their binding effects have been upheld
on numerous occasions. 10 The pretension that petitioners did not consent to the
renewal of the bond is belied by the fact that the terms of the contract which they
voluntarily entered into contained a clause granting authority to the Company to
grant or consent to the renewal of the bond. Having entered into the contract with
full knowledge of its terms and conditions, petitioners are estopped from asserting
that they did so under the ignorance of the legal effect of the contract or the
undertaking. (EJERCITO v. ORIENTALASSURANCE, G.R. No. 192099, July 08,
2015)

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; The existence and availability of the
right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for
the latter remedy is the unavailability of appeal. - At the outset, the Court agrees
with petitioners contention that the RTC Order denying his motion for the issuance
of a writ of possession is in the nature of a final order, as it left nothing else to be
resolved thereafter. Proceeding from this premise, petitioners proper remedy was,
thus, to appeal the RTC Order. It is settled that the proper remedy to obtain a
reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is appeal. 11 This hold
true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or
grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision,
order or resolution.12 The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits
the resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter remedy is the
unavailability of appeal.13 Thus, it was wrong for petitioner to immediately resort to
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari when he could have appealed the assailed
RTC Order. While it is true that the availability of an appeal does not foreclose
recourse to a special civil action of certiorari in cases where appeal is not adequate,
equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient, 14 petitioner failed to demonstrate that
these instances are present in the instant case. (Nuque VS AQUINO, G.R. No.
193058, July 8, 2015)
Same; Civil Actions; Certiorari; Motion for Reconsideration ; In any case,
even granting that petitioners resort to a certiorari petition is proper, the Court
finds no error on the part of the CA in dismissing his petition on the ground that he
failed to move for the reconsideration of the assailed RTC Order prior to filing his
certiorari petition; Exemptions - In any case, even granting that petitioners resort
to a certiorari petition is proper, the Court finds no error on the part of the CA in
dismissing his petition on the ground that he failed to move for the reconsideration
of the assailed RTC Order prior to filing his certiorari petition.

Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1, Petitioner for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, or

resolution subject thereof copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in
the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. 15

Aside from the remedy of appeal discussed above, our jurisprudence is replete with
cases holding that the plain and adequate remedy referred to in the foregoing rule
is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order or resolution, the filing of which
is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari. 16 It is
true that there are exceptions to the above rule, to wit: (a) where the order is a
patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the
lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c)
where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the action perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of
due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case,
relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial
court improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack
of due process; (h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner
had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or
public interest is involved.17 However, an examination of the petition for certiorari
filed with the CA would reveal that petitioner failed to demonstrate that the case
falls under any of the above exceptions. Neither was he able to show any other
sufficient justification for dispensing with the requirement of filing a motion for
reconsideration. (Nuque VS AQUINO, G.R. No. 193058, July 8, 2015)
Same; Same; Same; It must be emphasized that a writ of certiorari is a
prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the
exercise of judicial discretion.- It must be emphasized that a writ of certiorari is a
prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the
exercise of judicial discretion. 18 Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply
for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law
and the Rules.19 Petitioner may not arrogate to himself the determination of whether
a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. 20 To dispense with the requirement
of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner must show a concrete, compelling,
and valid reason for doing so, which petitioner failed to do. (Nuque VS AQUINO,
G.R. No. 193058, July 8, 2015)

Procedural Rules and Technicalities; It is true that litigation is not a game of

technicalities, but it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. - It is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, but
it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. 28 In
the present case, the procedural shortcut taken by petitioner finds no justification
either in law or in jurisprudence. It is fatal to his cause of action. (Nuque VS
AQUINO, G.R. No. 193058, July 8, 2015)

Civil Law; Interest Rates; Article 1956 of the Civil Code, which requires interest
to be stipulated in writing - Article 1956 of the Civil Code, which requires interest
to be stipulated in writing for it to be due. 17 The Court of Appeals noted that while
the acknowledgement receipt showed that interest was to be charged, no particular
interest rate was specified.18 Thus, at the time respondents were making interest
payments of 2.5% per month, these interest payments were invalid for not being
properly stipulated by the parties. As to the loan's not having earned interest in the
concept of actual or compensatory damages, the Court of Appeals, citing Eusebio-
Calderon v. People,19 noted that interest in the concept of actual or compensatory
damages accrues only from the time that demand (whether judicial or extrajudicial)
is made. It reasoned that since respondents received petitioners' demand letter only
on July 12, 2002, any interest in the concept of actual or compensatory damages
due should be reckoned only from then. Thus, the payments for the 2.5% monthly
interest made after the perfection of the loan in 1999 but before the demand was
made in 2002 were invalid. (ABELLA vs. ABELLA, G.R. No. 195166, July 08,
2015)
Same; Same; The Supreme Courts intervening Decision in Nacar v. Gallery Frames
recognized that the legal rate of interest has been reduced to 6% per annum - Our
intervening Decision in Nacar v. Gallery Frames41 recognized that the legal rate of
interest has been reduced to 6% per annum:
Recently, however, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB), in its
Resolution No. 796 dated May 16, 2013, approved the amendment of Section 2 of
Circular No. 905, Series of 1982 and, accordingly, issued Circular No. 799, Series of
2013, effective July 1, 2013, the pertinent portion of which reads:
The Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 796 dated 16 May 2013, approved the
following revisions governing the rate of interest in the absence of stipulation in
loan contracts, thereby amending Section 2 of Circular No. 905, Series of 1982:
Section 1. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or
credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of an express contract as
to such rate of interest, shall be six percent (6%) per annum.

Section 2. In view of the above, Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of Regulations for
Banks and Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of Regulations for
Non-Bank Financial Institutions are hereby amended accordingly. (ABELLA vs.
ABELLA, G.R. No. 195166, July 08, 2015)

Statutory Construction; It is a basic precept in legal interpretation and

construction that a rule or provision that treats a subject with specificity prevails
over a rule or provision that treats a subject in general terms. - It is a basic precept
in legal interpretation and construction that a rule or provision that treats a subject
with specificity prevails over a rule or provision that treats a subject in general
terms.

The rule spelled out in Security Bank and Spouses Toring is anchored on Article
1956 of the Civil Code and specifically governs simple loans or mutuum. Mutuum is
a type of nominate contract that is specifically recognized by the Civil Code and for
which the Civil Code provides a specific set of governing rules: Articles 1953 to
1961. In contrast, Article 11371 is among the Civil Code provisions generally dealing
with contracts. As this case particularly involves a simple loan, the specific rule
spelled out in Security Bank and Spouses Toring finds preferential application as
against Article 1371. (ABELLA vs. ABELLA, G.R. No. 195166, July 08, 2015)

Remedial Law; Evidence; Parol Evidence Rule; The issue of admitting parol
evidence is a matter that is proper to the trial, not the appellate, stage of a case. -
The issue of admitting parol evidence is a matter that is proper to the trial, not the
appellate, stage of a case. Petitioners raised the issue of applying the exceptions to
the Parol Evidence Rule only in the Reply they filed before this court. This is the last
pleading that either of the parties has filed in the entire string of proceedings
culminating in this Decision. It is, therefore, too late for petitioners to harp on this
rule. In any case, what is at issue is not admission of evidence per se, but the
appreciation given to the evidence adduced by the parties. In the Petition they filed
before this court, petitioners themselves acknowledged that checks supposedly
attesting to payment of monthly interest at the rate of 2.5% were admitted by the
trial court (and marked as Exhibits "2," "3," "4," "5," "6," "7," and "8"). 49 What
petitioners have an issue with is not the admission of these pieces of evidence but
how these have not been appreciated in a manner consistent with the conclusions
they advance. (ABELLA vs. ABELLA, G.R. No. 195166, July 08, 2015)

Civil Law; Interest Rates; The imposition of an unconscionable interest rate is

void ab initio for being "contrary to morals, and the law. - The imposition of an
unconscionable interest rate is void ab initio for being "contrary to morals, and the
law."edarclaw
In determining whether the rate of interest is unconscionable, the mechanical
application of pre-established floors would be wanting. The lowest rates that have
previously been considered unconscionable need not be an impenetrable minimum.
What is more crucial is a consideration of the parties' contexts. Moreover, interest
rates must be appreciated in light of the fundamental nature of interest as
compensation to the creditor for money lent to another, which he or she could
otherwise have used for his or her own purposes at the time it was lent. It is not the
default vehicle for predatory gain. As such, interest need only be reasonable. It
ought not be a supine mechanism for the creditor's unjust enrichment at the
expense of another. (ABELLA vs. ABELLA, G.R. No. 195166, July 08, 2015)
Same; Same; Compoiunded Interest; Apart from respondents' liability for
conventional interest at the rate of 12% per annum, outstanding conventional
interest if any is due from respondentsshall itself earn legal interest from the
time judicial demand was made by petitioners, i.e., on July 31, 2002, when they filed
their Complaint. This is consistent with Article 2212 of the Civil Code, which
Art. 2212. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded, although the obligation may be silent upon this point.
So, too, Nacar states that "the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the
time it is judicially demanded."

Consistent with Nacar, as well as with our ruling in Rivera v. Spouses Chua,54 the
interest due on conventional interest shall be at the rate of 12% per annum from
July 31, 2002 to June 30, 2013. Thereafter, or starting July 1, 2013, this shall be at
the rate of 6% per annum. (ABELLA vs. ABELLA, G.R. No. 195166, July 08,
2015)

Same; Same; Nacar provides that "[w]hen an obligation, not constituting a loan or
forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded
may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum." 67 This
applies to obligations arising from quasi-contracts such as solutio indebiti. (ABELLA
vs. ABELLA, G.R. No. 195166, July 08, 2015)

Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies, Injunction; The purpose of injunction is

to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties
before their claims can be thoroughly studied and educated. Its sole aim is to
preserve the status quo until the merits of the case is heard fully. - A writ of
preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and preservative remedies for
the protection of substantive rights and interests.1wphi1 An application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO may be granted upon the
filing of a verified application showing facts entitling the applicant to the relief
demanded.14 The purpose of injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous
irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly
studied and educated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of
the case is heard fully.15
The status quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which
precedes a controversy. 16 The status quo should be that existing at the time of the
filing of the case. A preliminary injunction should not establish new relations
between the parties, but merely maintain or re-establish the pre-existing
relationship between them. (DULNUAN VS METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, G..R. No. 196864, July 8, 2015)

Same; Same; Same; to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show
that (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is
directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is
material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage. - to be entitled to the
injunctive writ, petitioners must show that (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable
right to be protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to be
enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable
damage.17

As such, a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of
an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action.
The requisites of a valid injunction are the existence of the right and its actual or
threatened violations. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be
protected and the violation against the right must be shown. (DULNUAN VS
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, G..R. No. 196864, July 8,
2015)

Same; Special Civil Actions; Forclosure of Mortgage; The non-expiration of

the period of redemption shall not preclude the purchaser from taking possession of
the property provided that the necessary is posted. - It is an established rule that
the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the possession of the
property and can demand that he be placed in possession of the same either during
(with bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of the redemption period
therefor.20 The non-expiration of the period of redemption shall not preclude the
purchaser from taking possession of the property provided that the necessary is
posted. The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the
redemption period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section
721 of Act No. 3135, as amended. In the case at bar, Metrobank manifested its
willingness to post a bond but its application for the issuance of the writ of
possession was unjustly denied by the RTC. (DULNUAN VS METROPOLITAN BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, G..R. No. 196864, July 8, 2015)
Same; Same; Same; Writ of Possession; the pendency of the principal action.
The requisites of a valid injunction are the existence of the right and its actual or
threatened violations. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be
protected and the violation against the right must be shown. - The pendency of the
action assailing the validity of the mortgage should not bar the issuance of the writ
of possession.1wphi1 A pending action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure
does not stay the issuance of a writ of possession. 22 Regardless of the pendency of
such suit, the purchaser remains entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice,
of course, to the eventual outcome of the pending annulment case. Emphatic to the
point is the ruling of the Court in Spouses Fortaleza v. Spouses Lapitan: 23

Lastly, we agree with the CA that any question regarding the regularity and validity
of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be raised as a justification for opposing
the petition for the issuance of the writ of possession. The said issues may be raised
and determined only after the issuance of the writ of possession. Indeed, "[t]he
judge with whom an application for writ of possession is filed need not look into the
validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure." The writ issues as a
matter of course. "The rationale for the rule is to allow the purchaser to have
possession of the foreclosed property without delay, such possession being founded
on the right of ownership. (DULNUAN VS METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, G..R. No. 196864, July 8, 2015)

Grave Abuse of Discretion; Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of

preliminary injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an arbitrary despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or to act
at all in contemplation of law.- Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of
preliminary injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an arbitrary despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or to act
at all in contemplation of law. 26 The burden is thus on petitioner to show in his
application that there is meritorious ground for the issuance of TRO in his
favor.27 When the complainants right is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a
clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive writ is improper. 28 Herein,
the Spouses Dulnuan failed to show that they have clear and unmistakable right to
the issuance of writ in question. (DULNUAN VS METROPOLITAN BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY, G..R. No. 196864, July 8, 2015)

Remedial Law; Evidence; Judicial Admissions; It is settled that statements

made in the pleadings in the course of judicial proceedings are considered judicial
admissions. - The Court notes that while petitioners impute error upon the CA in
declaring Pastor's illness as osteoarthritis, it is extant on the records that they
themselves, in the numerous pleadings they filed before the labor tribunals,
consistently referred to his diagnosed ailment as osteoarthritis. It was only after the
CA rendered its assailed Decision that petitioners contradicted this and now claim
that Pastor's illness is actually spinal disc degeneration which, according to them, is
a completely different illness from osteoarthritis. Suffice it to state, however, that
petitioners cannot now take a contrary view as to Pastor's actual illness in view of
their previous admission that he was suffering from osteoarthritis. It is settled that
statements made in the pleadings in the course of judicial proceedings are
considered judicial admissions. 30 Judicial admissions cannot be controverted by the
party making the admissions.31 They are conclusive and legally binding as against
the pleader who cannot subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent
with what was pleaded. (CENTENNIAL TRANSMARINE vs QUIAMBAO, G.R. No.
198096, July 08, 2015)

Osteoarthrtis; When discs degenerate, the vertebral bodies become closer

together and this increased bone on bone friction causes the wearing away of
protective cartilage and results in the condition known as osteoarthritis. - At any
rate, in medical parlance, spinal disc degeneration/desiccation and osteoarthritis
can be taken as the same. Degenerative disc disease is a spinal condition caused by
the breakdown of the intervertebral discs which results in the loss of flexibility and
ability to cushion the spine.33 When discs degenerate, the vertebral bodies become
closer together and this increased bone on bone friction causes the wearing away of
protective cartilage and results in the condition known as osteoarthritis. 34 The
degenerating discs place excessive stress on the joints of the spine and the
supporting ligaments, which, overtime, can lead to the formation of
osteoarthritis.35 Osteoarthritis is a stage of degenerative disc disease.
(CENTENNIAL TRANSMARINE vs QUIAMBAO, G.R. No. 198096, July 08,
2015)

Labor Law; Seafarers; Disability Benefits; a seaman's entitlement to disability

benefits, is governed, not only by medical findings, but by law (the Labor Code) and
by contract (the POEA-SEC and the parties' CBA). - a seaman's entitlement to
disability benefits, is governed, not only by medical findings, but by law (the Labor
Code) and by contract (the POEA-SEC and the parties' CBA). 42 Here, the POEA-SEC,
as provided under Department Order No. 4, series of 2000 of the Department of
Labor and Employment, which contains the Standard Terms and Conditions
Governing The Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels,
governs the employment contract between Pastor and petitioners. Section 20(B),
paragraph 6 thereof reads:

Section 20 (B) - COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or
illness during the term of his contract are as follows:

xxxx
6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either
injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule
of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of this Contract. Computation of his benefits
arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and rules of
compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.
(CENTENNIAL TRANSMARINE vs QUIAMBAO, G.R. No. 198096, July 08,
2015)

Same; Same; Same; Work Related Illness; Compensable Illness; Two

elements must concur for an injury or illness to be compensable. First, that the
injury or illness must be work-related; and second, that the work-related injury or
illness must have [arisen] during the term of the seafarer's employment contract. -
two elements must concur for an injury or illness to be compensable. First, that the
injury or illness must be work-related; and second, that the work-related injury or
illness must have [arisen] during the term of the seafarer's employment
contract."43 For disability to be compensable under Section 20(B) of the 2000 POEA-
SEC, it must be the result of a work-related injury or a work-related illness, which
are defined as "injury(ies) resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the
course of employment" and as "any sickness resulting to disability or death as a
result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the
conditions set therein satisfied. (CENTENNIAL TRANSMARINE vs QUIAMBAO,
G.R. No. 198096, July 08, 2015)

Same; Same; Permanent Total Disability; The Supreme Court pronounced

in Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., et al. 46 that a temporary total
disability becomes permanent when so declared by the company-designated
physician within the period allowed, or upon expiration of the maximum 240-day
medical treatment period in case of absence of a declaration of fitness or
permanent disability. - the company-designated physician must arrive at a definite
assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability within the
period of 120 days, which was further extended to 240 days. The Court pronounced
in Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., et al. 46 that a temporary total
disability becomes permanent when so declared by the company-designated
physician within the period allowed, or upon expiration of the maximum 240-day
medical treatment period in case of absence of a declaration of fitness or
permanent disability. (CENTENNIAL TRANSMARINE vs QUIAMBAO, G.R. No.
198096, July 08, 2015)

Corporations; Separate Legal Entity; Questions of Facts; Issues such as

whether the separate and distinct personality of a corporation was used for
fraudulent ends, or whether the evidence warrants a piercing of the corporate veil,
involve questions of fact - Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are generally "final and conclusive,
and cannot be reviewed on appeal by [this court], provided they are borne out by
the record or based on substantial evidence." Issues such as whether the separate
and distinct personality of a corporation was used for fraudulent ends, or whether
the evidence warrants a piercing of the corporate veil, involve questions of fact.
Jurisprudence established exceptions from the general rule against a factual review
by this court. These exceptions include cases when the judgment appears to be
based on a "patent misappreciation of facts. (PIONEER INSURANCE SURETY
CORPORATION vs. MORNING STAR TRAVEL & TOURS, INC., G.R. No. 198436,
July 8, 2015)

Same; Separate Legal Personality; A separate corporate personality shields

corporate officers acting in good faith and within their scope of authority from
personal liability except for situations enumerated by law and jurisprudence - A
separate corporate personality shields corporate officers acting in good faith and
within their scope of authority from personal liability except for situations
enumerated by law and jurisprudence,64 thus:

Personal liability of a corporate director, trustee or officer along (although not

necessarily) with the corporation may so validly attach, as a rule, only when

1. He assents (a) to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or (b) for bad
faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or (c) for conflict of interest,
resulting in damages to the corporation, its stockholders or other persons;

2. He consents to the issuance of watered stocks or who, having knowledge

thereof, does not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written
objection thereto;

3. He agrees to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the

corporation; or

4. He is made, by a specific provision of law, to personally answer for his

corporate action. (PIONEER INSURANCE SURETY CORPORATION vs.
MORNING STAR TRAVEL & TOURS, INC., G.R. No. 198436, July 8,
2015)

Bad Faith; Words and Phrases; Bad faith "imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, not simply bad judgment or
negligence."67 "[I]t means breach of a known duty through some motive or interest
or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. - Bad faith "imports a dishonest purpose
or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, not simply bad judgment
or negligence."67 "[I]t means breach of a known duty through some motive or
interest or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. (PIONEER INSURANCE
SURETY CORPORATION vs. MORNING STAR TRAVEL & TOURS, INC., G.R. No.
198436, July 8, 2015)

Mercantile Law; Corporations; Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity;

Piercing the corporate veil in order to hold corporate officers personally liable for
the corporations debts requires that "the bad faith or wrongdoing of the
director must be established clearly and convincingly [as] [b]ad faith is never
presumed. - Piercing the corporate veil in order to hold corporate officers personally
liable for the corporations debts requires that "the bad faith or wrongdoing of the
director must be established clearly and convincingly [as] [b]ad faith is never
presumed. (PIONEER INSURANCE SURETY CORPORATION vs. MORNING STAR
TRAVEL & TOURS, INC., G.R. No. 198436, July 8, 2015)

Same; Same; Same;. - The Supreme Court has held that the "existence of
interlocking directors, corporate officers and shareholders is not enough
justification to pierce the veil of corporate fiction in the absence of fraud or other
public policy considerations - This court has held that the "existence of interlocking
directors, corporate officers and shareholders is not enough justification to pierce
the veil of corporate fiction in the absence of fraud or other public policy
considerations. (PIONEER INSURANCE SURETY CORPORATION vs. MORNING
STAR TRAVEL & TOURS, INC., G.R. No. 198436, July 8, 2015)

Same; Same; Same; The Supreme court has held that "compliance with the
recognized modes of acquisition of jurisdiction cannot be dispensed with even in
piercing the veil of corporate fiction. - This court has held that "compliance with the
recognized modes of acquisition of jurisdiction cannot be dispensed with even in
piercing the veil of corporate fiction. This court has held that "compliance with the
recognized modes of acquisition of jurisdiction cannot be dispensed with even in
piercing the veil of corporate fiction[.]" 90 Morning Star Tour Planners, Inc. is not a
party in this case. It would offend due process rights if what petitioner ultimately
seeks in its allegation is to hold Morning Star Tour Planners, Inc. responsible for
respondent Morning Stars liability. (PIONEER INSURANCE SURETY
CORPORATION vs. MORNING STAR TRAVEL & TOURS, INC., G.R. No. 198436,
July 8, 2015)

Civil Law; Property; Regalian Doctrine; Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of
the public domain belong to the State. The classification and reclassification of such
lands are the prerogative of the Executive Department. The President may at any
time transfer these public lands from one class to another. - Under the Regalian
doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The classification and
reclassification of such lands are the prerogative of the Executive Department. The
President may at any time transfer these public lands from one class to another. 22

While in 1955 the President through Presidential Proclamation No. 209 declared
particular lands in Baguio City as alienable and disposable, they may have been re-
classified by the President thereafter. This is precisely the reason why an applicant
for registration of title based on an executive proclamation is required to present
evidence on the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for, such as
a certificate of land classification status from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), which only the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer23 (CENRO) and the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Officer24 (PENRO) are authorized to issue under DENR Administrative Order No.
38,25 series of 1990 (DAO 38). (REPUBLIC VS DAYAOEN, G.R. No. 200773, July
8, 2015)

Same; Land Registration; the Applicable Law; Section 14(1) of Presidential

Decree No. 1529. - requires that the property sought to be registered is alienable
and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed; 30 one way
of establishing this material fact is through the DENR certificate of land
classification status which is presumed to be the most recent appraisal of the status
and character of the property.

Civil Law; Estoppel; There are three kinds of estoppels, to wit: (1) estoppel in
pais; (2) estoppel by deed; and (3) estoppel by laches. - There are three kinds of
estoppels, to wit: (1) estoppel in pais; (2) estoppel by deed; and (3) estoppel by
laches. Under the first kind, a person is considered in estoppel if by his conduct,
representations, admissions or silence when he ought to speak out, whether
intentionally or through culpable negligence, "causes another to believe certain
facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, as a
consequence of which he would be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the
existence of such facts." Under estoppel by deed, a party to a deed and his privies
are precluded from denying any material fact stated in the deed as against the
other party and his privies. Under estoppel by laches, an equitable estoppel, a
person who has failed or neglected to assert a right for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time is presumed to have abandoned or otherwise declined to
assert such right and cannot later on seek to enforce the same, to the prejudice of
the other party, who has no notice or knowledge that the former would assert such
rights and whose condition has so changed that the latter cannot, without injury or
prejudice, be restored to his former state. (GO VS. BANKO SENTRAL NG
PILIPINAS, G.R. No. 202262, July 08, 2015)

Grave Abuse of Discretion; The term grave abuse of discretion connoted

whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as was equivalent to excess, or lack
of jurisdiction - The term grave abuse of discretion connoted whimsical and
capricious exercise of judgment as was equivalent to excess, or lack of
jurisdiction.18 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power was exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.19 In light of this understanding of
the term grave abuse of discretion, the CA did not err in dismissing the petition
for certiorari because the petitioners did not show how the RTC could have been
guilty of gravely abusing its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for
allowing the execution of the properties designated as security for an obligation
contracted since 1998. (GO VS. BANKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, G.R. No.
202262, July 08, 2015)

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgements; Res Judicata; Res

judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment - Res judicata literally means "a
matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled
by judgment."83 Paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
state the doctrine of res judicata. (DY VS YU, G.R. No. 202632, July 08, 2015 )

Same; Same; Same; Same; For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a
subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment or
order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (c) it
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
parties; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. - res judicata comprehends two
concepts: (1) bar by former judgment, and (2) conclusiveness of judgment.

"For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) the
judgment or order must be on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (d) there must be
between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action. When there is no identity of causes of action, but only an identity
of issues, there exists res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment.
Although it does not have the same effect as res judicata in the form of bar by
former judgment which prohibits the prosecution of a second action upon the same
claim, demand, or cause of action, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment bars the
relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same
parties on a different claim or cause of action. . (DY VS YU, G.R. No. 202632, July
08, 2015 )

Same; Same; Same; Same; The res judicata doctrine applies only when a
judgment on the merits is finally rendered on the first complaint. - Material to this
discourse is the doctrine's second element, which evokes that the res
judicata doctrine applies only when a judgment on the merits is finally rendered on
the first complaint. The term "merits" has been defined as a matter of substance in
law, as distinguished from matter of form; it refers to the real or substantial grounds
of action or defense as contrasted with some technical or collateral matter raised in
the course of the suit.85 Thus, a judgment on the merits presupposes that trial has
been conducted, evidence presented, and issues sufficiently heard and passed
upon. It is a judgment rendered after a determination of which party is right, as
distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal technical
point.86 Stated differently, a judgment is "on the merits" when it amounts to a legal
declaration of the respective rights and duties of the parties, based upon the
disclosed facts and upon which the right of recovery depends, irrespective of formal,
technical or dilatory objectives or contentions. . (DY VS YU, G.R. No. 202632,
July 08, 2015 )

Same; Same; Forum Shopping; Words and Phrases; Forum shopping is the act
of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by
some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in
one court, then in another.- Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively
availed of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by
some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in
one court, then in another. 91redarclaw
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most
important factor to ask is whether the element of litis pendentia is present, or
whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.
Otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or
more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and
reliefs sought.92 If a situation of litis pendentia or res judicata arises by virtue of a
party's commencement of a judicial remedy identical to one which already exists
(either pending or already resolved), then a forum shopping infraction is committed.
. (DY VS YU, G.R. No. 202632, July 08, 2015 )

Same; Same: Litis Pendentia; As opposed to res judicata which was already
hereinabove explained, litis pendentia refers to a situation where two actions are
pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of
them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. - As opposed to res judicata which was
already hereinabove explained, litis pendentia refers to a situation where two
actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that
one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy against
multiplicity of suits.93 The requirements of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of
parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b)
the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. .
(DY VS YU, G.R. No. 202632, July 08, 2015 )

Same; Same; Forum Shopping; Under the last sentence of Section 5, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court, "[i]f the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful
and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal
with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions. - With the elements of litis pendentia attendant hereto as
caused by Rosario's institution of the Annulment Case while the Reconveyance Case
was pending, the conclusion is that forum shopping was committed.

Under the last sentence of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, "[i]f the acts of
the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the
same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute
direct contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. . (DY VS YU, G.R.
No. 202632, July 08, 2015 )

Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; When the issue of credibility of witnesses

is concerned, this Court adheres to these jurisprudentially established guidelines: -
oticeably, the appellants arguments primarily hinge on the issue of AAAs
credibility. Settled is the rule that when the issue of credibility of witnesses is
concerned, this Court adheres to these jurisprudentially established guidelines: (1) it
gives the highest respect to the trial courts evaluation of the testimony of the
witnesses because of its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a
witness on the stand, and from its vantage point, is also in the best position to
determine the truthfulness of witnesses; (2) in the absence of any substantial
reason that would justify the reversal of the trial courts assessments and
conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower courts findings,
particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of
the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded; and (3) the rule is
even more stringently applied if the Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court.
(PEOPLE VS GERASMIO, G.R. No. 207098, July 08, 2015)

Criminal Law; Rape; Elements of; AAAs trustworthy account proved all the
elements of rape as defined under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
(1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was
accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under 12 years of age. 26 The
appellant in this case had sexual intercourse with AAA, which he accomplished
through force, that is, with the use of a knife he threatened to kill AAA to make her
succumb to his bestiality. Indubitably, the appellant committed the crime of rape
against AAA. (PEOPLE VS GERASMIO, G.R. No. 207098, July 08, 2015)

Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Discrepancies and inconsistencies in the

testimony of a witness referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon
the central fact of the crime, do not impair her credibility. - Regarding the alleged
inconsistencies, improbabilities and contradictions in AAAs testimony pointed out
by the appellant, this Court finds them all inconsequential as they refer to trivial
matters that have nothing to do with the essential fact of the commission of rape,
that is, carnal knowledge through force or intimidation. Further, discrepancies and
inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness referring to minor details, and not in
actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair her credibility. If
at all, they serve as proof that the witness is not coached or rehearsed. (PEOPLE
VS GERASMIO, G.R. No. 207098, July 08, 2015)

Criminal Law; Rape; As long as the elements of rape are present and proven by
the prosecution, the accused could be adjudged guilty thereof notwithstanding the
attendance of other matters that are completely irrelevant to the crime.- Here, even
though the result of AAAs physical examination conducted in September 2002
showed that she was already five and a half months pregnant at that time, it does
not necessarily follow that the appellant could not have authored the 28 August
2002 rape against her. Contrary to appellants view, AAAs pregnancy is immaterial
to the issue since pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of
rape. So, whether the child whom the rape victim bore was fathered by the
accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is important and
decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latters
will or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful
manner. As long as the elements of rape are present and proven by the
prosecution, the accused could be adjudged guilty thereof notwithstanding the
attendance of other matters that are completely irrelevant to the crime. (PEOPLE
VS GERASMIO, G.R. No. 207098, July 08, 2015)

Same; Same; Victims of a heinous crime, such as rape, cannot be expected to act
within reason or in accordance with societys expectations. - Victims of a heinous
crime, such as rape, cannot be expected to act within reason or in accordance with
societys expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a standard rational reaction to
an irrational experience, especially from a young victim. One cannot be expected to
act as usual in an unfamiliar situation as it is impossible to predict the workings of a
human mind placed under emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there
is a standard reaction or behavior among victims of the crime of rape since each of
them had to cope with different circumstances. (PEOPLE VS GERASMIO, G.R. No.
207098, July 08, 2015)

Same; Same; Delay in Reporting Rape; As to AAAs delay in reporting the rape
incident until BBB noticed the changes in her physical appearance, the same can be
attributed to her tender age and to the threat made upon her person by the
appellant. - As to AAAs delay in reporting the rape incident until BBB noticed the
changes in her physical appearance, the same can be attributed to her tender age
and to the threat made upon her person by the appellant. Even if the appellant was
not always around, the fact that he is her uncle and he lives nearby is more than
enough to cause fear on AAA since he could make good of his threat at anytime. As
aptly held by the Court of Appeals, AAAs failure to report the rape incident is not an
indication of fabricated charges. If she did not become pregnant she would not
have revealed the humiliating, painful experience she suffered in the hands of
someone whom she may have regarded as a father. (PEOPLE VS GERASMIO, G.R.
No. 207098, July 08, 2015)

Same; Same; No woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an

examination of her private parts and submit herself to public humiliation and
scrutiny via an open trial, if her sordid tale was not true and her sole motivation was
not to have the culprit apprehended and punished. - as this Court has pronounced
in Rondina v. People,35 ill motives become inconsequential if there is an affirmative
and credible declaration from the rape victim, which clearly establishes the liability
of the accused. In this case, AAA categorically identified the appellant as her
ravisher. Her account of the incident was given credence by both lower courts to
which this Court conforms. Thus, the appellants flimsy allegation of ill motive is
immaterial. Besides, no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and submit herself to public humiliation and
scrutiny via an open trial, if her sordid tale was not true and her sole motivation was
not to have the culprit apprehended and punished. (PEOPLE VS GERASMIO, G.R.
No. 207098, July 08, 2015)

Same; Same; By declaring that the appellant inserted his penis into her vagina,
the victim said all that was necessary to prove rape. Also, it is well settled that
medical findings of injuries in the victim's genitalia are not essential to convict the
appellant of rape. Hymenal lacerations are not an element of rape. What is
essential is that there was penetration, however slight, of the labia minora, which
circumstance was proven beyond doubt in this case by the testimony of AAA. 37
Moreover, Dr. Faciol clarified that after 8 to 10 days from the time the victim was
raped there would no longer be any indication or manifestation of rape on the
victims vagina.38 This would precisely explain the lack of any injury on AAAs
genitalia. (PEOPLE VS GERASMIO, G.R. No. 207098, July 08, 2015)

Same; Alibi; Denial; Both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses that
cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness
that the accused committed the crime. - Now, in comparison to AAAs positive and
categorical testimony and her positive identification of the appellant as her rapist,
the appellant could only muster denial and alibi as his defenses. As this Court has
oft pronounced, both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses that cannot
prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the
accused committed the crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony, which has
a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is
generally held to prevail. Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the
appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed
and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically
present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission.39 In the case at bench, the appellant miserably failed to prove that he
was not at the scene of the crime on 28 August 2002. (PEOPLE VS GERASMIO,
G.R. No. 207098, July 08, 2015)

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; To justify the grant of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court
or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. - it must
be stressed that to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari,
petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely
abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes
judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack
of jurisdiction. To be considered "grave," discretion must be exercised in a despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation oflaw. 33redarclaw
In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when,
inter alia, its findings and the conclusions reached thereby are not supported by
substantial evidence,34 "or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (DACLES VS. MILLENIUM
ERECTORS CORPORATION AND/OR RAGAS TIU,
G.R. No. 209822, July 08, 2015)

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Foreclosure of Mortgage; Extra

Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage; Special Power to Sell; In the extrajudicial
foreclosure of property subject of a real estate mortgage, Act No. 3135 (An Act to
Regulate the Sale of Property Under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real
Estate Mortgages) is quite explicit and definite about the special power to sell the
property being required to be either inserted in or attached to the deed of
mortgage. - In the extrajudicial foreclosure of property subject of a real estate
mortgage, Act No. 3135 (An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property Under Special
Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages) is quite explicit and
definite about the special power to sell the property being required to be either
inserted in or attached to the deed of mortgage. Section 1 of Act No. 3135 provides:

Section 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted in or attached

to any real estate mortgage hereafter made as security for the payment of
money or the fulfillment of any other obligation, the provisions of the following
section shall govern as to the manner in which the sale and redemption shall be
effected, whether or not provision for the same is made in the power.

Accordingly, to enable the extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM of the petitioners, the
special power to sell should have been either inserted in the REM itself or embodied
in a separate instrument attached to the REM. But it is not disputed that no special
power to sell was either inserted in the REM or attached to the REM. Hence, the
respondent spouses as the foreclosing mortgagees could not initiate the
extrajudicial foreclosure, but must resort to judicial foreclosure pursuant to the
procedure set forth in Rule 68 of the Rules of Court. The omission of the special
power to sell the property subject of the mortgage was fatal to the validity and
efficacy of the extrajudicial foreclosure, and warranted the invalidation of the entire
proceedings conducted by the sheriff. (BAYSA VS. PLANTILLA, G.R. No.
159271, July 13, 2015)

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering that, pursuant to Article 1878,
(5), of the Civil Code, a special power of attorney was necessary for entering "into
any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired
either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration," the written authority must be a
special power of attorney to sell. - The requirement for the special power or
authority to sell finds support in the civil law. To begin with, because the sale of the
property by virtue of the extrajudicial foreclosure would be made through the sheriff
by the respondent spouses as the mortgagees acting as the agents of the
petitioners as the mortgagors-owners, there must be a written authority from the
latter in favor of the former as their agents; otherwise, the sale would be
void.15 And, secondly, considering that, pursuant to Article 1878, (5), of the Civil
Code, a special power of attorney was necessary for entering "into any contract by
which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously
or for a valuable consideration," the written authority must be a special power of
attorney to sell.16 Contrary to the CA's opinion, therefore, the power or authority to
sell by virtue of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM could not be necessarily
implied from the text of paragraph 13, supra, expressing the petitioners' agreement
to the extrajudicial foreclosure. (BAYSA VS. PLANTILLA, G.R. No. 159271, July
13, 2015)

Same; Same; Same; Redemption; There is no right of redemption to speak of if

the foreclosure was void. Having found and declared the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the REM and the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property of the petitioner void
for want of the special power to sell, we deem it unnecessary to consider and
determine the final issue on whether or not the petitioners had lost their right to
redeem. In other words, there is no right of redemption to speak of if the foreclosure
was void. (BAYSA VS. PLANTILLA, G.R. No. 159271, July 13, 2015)

Bank and Banking; Doctrine of Apparent Authority; In Prudential Bank,

wherein we particularly applied the doctrine of apparent authority to banks, we
stressed that the "[a]pplication of these principles is especially necessary because
banks have a fiduciary relationship with the public and their stability depends on
the confidence of the people in their honesty and efficiency. - In Prudential Bank,
wherein we particularly applied the doctrine of apparent authority to banks, we
stressed that the "[a]pplication of these principles is especially necessary because
banks have a fiduciary relationship with the public and their stability depends on
the confidence of the people in their honesty and efficiency. Such faith will be
eroded where banks do not exercise strict care in the selection and supervision of
its employees, resulting in prejudice to their depositors."

A bank is liable to innocent third persons where representation is made in the

course of its normal business by an agent like Mercado as Branch Manager, even
though such agent is abusing his authority. Clearly, persons dealing with Mercado
could not be blamed for believing that he was authorized to transact business for
and on behalf of the bank. (GAMES AND GARMENTS DEVELOPERS, INC v.
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 181426, July 13, 2015)

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Sharia Appellate Courts; The

Shari'a Appellate Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari of decisions of the Shari'a District Courts. - Under Republic Act No. 9054,
An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, amending for the purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled, "An
Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended", the
Shari'a Appellate Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari of decisions of the Shari'a District Courts. In Villagracia v. Fifth (5th)
Sharia District Court. (LOMONDOT vs. HON. RASAD G BALINDONG, G.R. No.
192463, July 13, 2015)
Same; Same; Judgements; Execution of Judgements; It is settled that there
are recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of a final and
immutable judgment, and one of which is a supervening event. - It is settled that
there are recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of a final and
immutable judgment, and one of which is a supervening event.

In Abrigo v. Flores,33 we said:

We deem it highly relevant to point out that a supervening event is an exception to

the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment rule, only if it
directly affects the matter already litigated and settled, or substantially changes the
rights or relations of the parties therein as to render the execution unjust,
impossible or inequitable. A supervening event consists of facts that transpire after
the judgment became final and executory, or of new circumstances that develop
after the judgment attained finality, including matters that the parties were not
aware of prior to or during the trial because such matters were not yet in existence
at that time. In that event, the interested party may properly seek the stay of
execution or the quashal of the writ of execution, or he may move the court to
modify or alter the judgment in order to harmonize it with justice and the
supervening event. The party who alleges a supervening event to stay the
execution should necessarily establish the facts by competent evidence; otherwise,
it would become all too easy to frustrate the conclusive effects of a final and
immutable judgment.34 In this case, the matter of whether respondents' houses
intruded petitioners' land is the issue in the recovery of possession complaint filed
by petitioners in the SDC which was already ruled upon, thus cannot be considered
a supervening event that would stay the execution of a final and immutable
judgment. To allow a survey as ordered by the SDC to determine whether
respondents' houses are within petitioners' land is tantamount to modifying a
decision which had already attained finality. (LOMONDOT vs. HON. RASAD G
BALINDONG, G.R. No. 192463, July 13, 2015)

Same; Same; Same; Same; A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but
an empty victory for the prevailing party.- We find that the SDC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for the issuance a writ of
demolition. The issuance of a special order of demolition would certainly be the
necessary and logical consequence of the execution of the final and immutable
decision.35 Section 10(d) of Rule 39, Rules of Court provides:Section 10. Execution of
judgments for specific act. (d) Removal of improvements on property subject of
execution. - when the property subject of the execution contains improvements
constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not
destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the
court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the
former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the
court.Notably, this case was decided in 2005 and its execution has already been
delayed for years now. It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of
the suit and is the life of law. 36 A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but
an empty victory for the prevailing party. (LOMONDOT vs. HON. RASAD G
BALINDONG, G.R. No. 192463, July 13, 2015)

Remedial Law; Evidence; Object Evidence; assuming arguendo that the

accused-appellants out of court identification was defective, her subsequent
identification in court cured any flaw that may have initially attended it. - In this
case, both the RTC and the CA found Corpuz to be a credible witness who had
categorically testified that she saw the face of the ransom taker, and that he was
actually the accused-appellant.

The fact that Corpuz failed to declare in her Sinumpaang Salaysay that the ransom
taker was sporting a dimple was not fatal to her testimony because she was able to
positively and categorically identify accused-appellant during the police line-up and
in open court.

Even accused-appellants insinuation that Corpuz could have been influenced by the
police during the line-up cannot be given weight in the face of his positive
identification as the ransom taker. On this point, we agree with the observation of
the CA that "assuming arguendo that the accused-appellants out of court
identification was defective, her subsequent identification in court cured any flaw
that may have initially attended it. We emphasize that the inadmissibility of a
police line-up identification x x x should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of
an independent in-court identification.(PEOPLE VS. OCTA, G.R. No. 195196,July
13, 2015)

Criminal; Kidnapping for Ransom; Ransom; Words and Phrases; Ransom is

money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured
person or persons; or payment that releases from captivity. - the CA is correct in its
observation that at the time accused-appellant received the ransom money, the
crime of kidnapping was still continuing, since both victims were still being illegally
detained by the kidnappers. 33While his receipt of the ransom money was not a
material element of the crime, it was nevertheless part of the grand plan and was in
fact the main reason for kidnapping the victims. 34 Ransom is money, price or
consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person or
persons; or payment that releases from captivity. 35Without ransom money, the
freedom of the detained victims cannot be achieved. The positive identification of
accused-appellant constitutes direct, and not merely circumstantial, evidence.

Accused-appellant's contention that he was convicted based only on circumstantial

evidence deserves scant consideration. We agree with the conclusion of the CA that
"[Corpuz] testified that she gave the ransom money to accused-appellant, and as
the trial court declared, his act of receiving the ransom money is sufficient
conspiratorial act in the commission of the kidnapping for ransom. The positive
identification of the accused-appellant then constitutes direct evidence, and not
merely circumstantial evidence. .(PEOPLE VS. OCTA, G.R. No. 195196,July 13,
2015)

Remedial Law; Evidence; The positive identification of accused-appellant

constitutes direct, and not merely circumstantial, evidence.- Accused-appellant's
contention that he was convicted based only on circumstantial evidence deserves
scant consideration. We agree with the conclusion of the CA that "[Corpuz] testified
that she gave the ransom money to accused-appellant, and as the trial court
declared, his act of receiving the ransom money is sufficient conspiratorial act in the
commission of the kidnapping for ransom. The positive identification of the accused-
appellant then constitutes direct evidence, and not merely circumstantial
evidence. .(PEOPLE VS. OCTA, G.R. No. 195196,July 13, 2015)

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Question of Law and

Question of Fact Distinguished. - The OSG argues that the issues raised by Chua
involve questions of fact which are not within the province of the present petition for
review on certiorari. The Court, however upon perusal of the petition, finds that the
issues raised and the arguments advanced by Chua in support thereof, concern
questions of law. "Jurisprudence dictates that there is a question of law when the
doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts or
circumstances; on the other hand, there is a question of fact when the issue raised
on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test for
determining whether the supposed error was one of law or fact is not the
appellation given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing
court can resolve the issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case,
it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact. In other words, where there is no
dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions drawn from
these facts are correct is a question of law. However, if the question posed requires
a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of
surrounding circumstances and their relationship to each other, the issue is factual
(CHUA VS PEOPLE, G.R. No. 196853, July 13, 2015)

Same; Same; Same; the rule that factual findings of the lower courts are not
proper subject of certiorari petition admits of exceptions.- Nevertheless, assuming
that the questions posed before this Court are indeed factual, the rule that factual
findings of the lower courts are not proper subject of certiorari petition admits of
exceptions. One of these exceptions is when the lower courts failed to appreciate
certain facts and circumstances which, if taken into account, would materially affect
the result of the case. The Court finds the said exception applicable in the instant
case. Clearly, the petition deserves the consideration of this Court. (CHUA VS
PEOPLE, G.R. No. 196853, July 13, 2015)

Criminal Law; Bouncing Checks Law; Elements of - In order to successfully

hold an accused liable for violation of BP 22, the following essential elements must
be present: "(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the
time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the bank to stop payment." 33 "Of the three (3) elements, the second element is the
hardest to prove as it involves a state of mind. Thus, Section 2 of BP 22 creates a
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which, however, arises only
after it is proved that the issuer had received a written notice of dishonor and that
within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to
make arrangements for its payment. (CHUA VS PEOPLE, G.R. No. 196853, July
13, 2015)

Same; Same; Notice of Dishonor; t]he prosecution must also prove actual
receipt of [the notice of dishonor] because the fact of service provided for in the law
is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the accused. - Similarly in the
present case, there is no way to ascertain when the five-day period under Section
22 of BP 22 would start and end since there is no showing when Chua actually
received the demand letter dated November 30, 1993. The MeTC cannot simply
presume that the date of the demand letter was likewise the date of Chuas receipt
thereof. There is simply no such presumption provided in our rules on evidence. In
addition, from the inception of this case Chua has consistently denied having
received subject demand letter. He maintains that the paper used for the purported
demand letter was still blank when presented to him for signature and that he
signed the same for another purpose. Given Chuas denial, it behooved upon the
prosecution to present proof of his actual receipt of the November 30, 1993 demand
letter. However, all that the prosecution did was to present it without, however,
adducing any evidence as to the date of Chuas actual receipt thereof. It must be
stressed that [t]he prosecution must also prove actual receipt of [the notice of
dishonor] because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from
receipt of such notice of dishonor by the accused." 37 "The burden of proving notice
rests upon the party asserting its existence. Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence
is sufficient to prove notice. In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof
required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for B.P. Blg. 22 cases, there
should be clear proof of notice" 38 which the Court finds wanting in this case. (CHUA
VS PEOPLE, G.R. No. 196853, July 13, 2015)

Remedial Law; Evidence; Newly Discovered Evidence; Under the Rules of

Court, the requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was
discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted,
will probably change the judgment. - Under the Rules of Court, the requisites for
newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) such
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable
diligence; and (c) it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching,
and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment. (CHUA
VS PEOPLE, G.R. No. 196853, July 13, 2015)

Criminal Law; Bouncing Checks Law; Notice of Dishonor; Checks can only be
dishonored after they have been issued and presented for payment. - It may not be
amiss to add at this point that out of the 54 cases for violation of BP 22 filed against
Chua, 22 involve checks issued on November 30, 1993 or thereafter. Hence, the
lower courts grievously erred in convicting Chua for those 22 cases on the basis of a
purported demand letter written and sent to Chua prior to the issuance of said 22
checks. Checks can only be dishonored after they have been issued and presented
for payment. Before that, dishonor cannot take place. Thus, a demand letter that
precedes the issuance of checks cannot constitute as sufficient notice of dishonor
within the contemplation of BP 22. It is likewise significant to note that aside from
the absence of a date, the signature of Chua appearing on the questioned
November 30, 1993 demand letter is not accompanied by any word or phrase
indicating that he affixed his signature thereon to signify his receipt thereof. Indeed,
"conviction must rest upon the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not
on the weakness of the evidence for the defense." 45 In view of the foregoing, the
Court cannot accord the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 any weight and
credence. Consequently, it cannot be used to support Chuas guilt of the offenses
charged. (CHUA VS PEOPLE, G.R. No. 196853, July 13, 2015)

Same; Civil Liability; An acquittal based on lack of proof beyond reasonable

doubt does not preclude the award of civil damages - Chuas acquittal, however,
does not entail the extinguishment of his civil liability for the dishonored
checks.46 "An acquittal based on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
preclude the award of civil damages." 47 For this reason, Chua must be directed to
testitute See the total amount of the face value of all the checks subject of the case
with legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum reckoned from the time the said
checks became due and demandable up to June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from
July 1, 2013 until fully paid. (CHUA VS PEOPLE, G.R. No. 196853, July 13, 2015)

Labor Law; Appeals; Surety Bond; In case of a surety bond, the applicable
Section 6, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC requires that
the same should be accompanied by original and certified true copies - In case of a
surety bond, the applicable Section 6, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC requires that the same should be accompanied by original
and certified true copies of the following:

a) a joint declaration under oath by the employer, his counsel and the bonding
company, attesting that the bond posted is genuine, and shall be in effect until
final disposition of the case;

b) an indemnity agreement between the employer-appellant and bonding

company;

c) proof of security deposit or collateral securing the bond; provided, that a check
shall not be considered as an acceptable security;

d) a certificate of authority from the Insurance Commission;

e) certificate of registration from the Securities Exchange Commission;

f) certificate of authority to transact surety business from the Office of the
President;

g) certificate of accreditation and authority from the Supreme Court; and

h) notarized board resolution or secretary's certificate from the bonding company

showing its authorized signatories and their specimen signatures.

Here, petitioners did not submit any proof of security deposit or collateral securing
the bond. They themselves admit this in their Petition by stating that they no longer
attached a separate document of security deposit or collateral securing the bond
because Mapfre did not find it necessary to require them to give a security deposit
and/or collateral. According to them, Mapfre finds it sufficient that the Indemnity
Agreement attached to the Memorandum of Appeal was signed by petitioner Bravo,
the president of petitioner U-Bix, in his personal capacity. (U-Bix Corporation vs.
Hollero, G.R. No. 199660, July 13, 2015)

Procedural Rules and Technicalities; parties are not at a liberty to choose which
rule of technicality to comply with or not. - It must be noted that right from the
start, petitioners were well represented by counsel who is presumed to know the
explicit requirement under the aforementioned Section 6 that a surety bond should
be accompanied by a proof of security deposit or collateral. Hence, petitioners
cannot reason out that they were not able to submit the same because Mapfre did
not require them to give such a deposit or collateral. What appears here instead is
that while petitioners seem to be aware of the said requirement, they risked
dispensing with the same and chose to stand by the alleged word of Mapfre that
they need not submit any proof of security deposit or collateral. It is well to remind
petitioners that parties are not at a liberty to choose which rule of technicality to
comply with or not. To stress, "[t]he requirements for perfecting an appeal must, as
a rule, be strictly followed. Such requirements are considered indispensable
interdictions against needless delay and are necessary for the orderly discharge of
the judicial business. (U-Bix Corporation vs. Hollero, G.R. No. 199660, July 13,
2015)

Labor Law; Appeals; Surety Bond; the intention in requiring a security deposit
or collateral to secure the bond, apart from the indemnity agreement between the
employer-appellant and the bonding company, is to further ensure recovery by the
employee of the judgment award should the same be affirmed, in any and all
eventualities. - petitioners are clutching at straws in impressing upon this Court that
petitioner Bravo, in signing the Indemnity Agreement in his personal capacity, has
already bound himself to be jointly and severally liable with Mapfre for the monetary
award and this has the effect of securing the bond. Suffice it to say that "[t]he
obvious purpose of an appeal bond is to ensure, during the period of appeal, against
any occurrence that would defeat or diminish recovery by the aggrieved employees
under the judgment if subsequently affirmed." 42 To the Court's mind, the intention in
requiring a security deposit or collateral to secure the bond, apart from the
indemnity agreement between the employer-appellant and the bonding company, is
to further ensure recovery by the employee of the judgment award should the same
be affirmed, in any and all eventualities. This is also in keeping with the purpose of
the bond requirement which is to "discourage employers from using the appeal to
delay, or even evade, their obligation to satisfy their employee's possible just and
lawful claims."43 Besides, it is an ail-too familiar rule in statutory construction that
when a rule is clear and unambiguous, interpretation need not be resorted
to.44 Since Section 6, Rule VI of the 2005 NLRC Rules of Procedure requires that a
surety bond should be accompanied by both an indemnity agreement and proof of
security deposit or collateral securing the bond, among others, that two must be
presented. The submission of one cannot be considered sufficient as to dispense
with the other. No resort to any interpretation is necessary, there is only room for
application. (U-Bix Corporation vs. Hollero, G.R. No. 199660, July 13, 2015)

Same;
Same;It is a settled rule that "the perfection of an appeal in the manner and
within the period prescribed by law is, not only mandatory, but jurisdictional, and
failure to conform to the rules will render the judgment sought to be reviewed final
and unappealable. - It is a settled rule that "the perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period prescribed by law is, not only mandatory, but
jurisdictional, and failure to conform to the rules will render the judgment sought to
be reviewed final and unappealable." 46 As can be gleaned from the foregoing,
petitioners failed to perfect their appeal in the manner prescribed by the rules.
Hence and as correctly ruled by the NLRC and affirmed by the CA, the April 16, 2010
Order of Labor Arbiter Flores approving the recomputation of the money award and
ordering the issuance of a writ of execution has already attained finality and this
warranted the dismissal of petitioners' appeal therefrom before the NLRC.

Liberal Interpretation; the policy of liberal interpretation is qualified by the

requirement that there must be exceptional circumstances to allow the relaxation
of the rules. - It must be emphasized, however, that "the policy of liberal
interpretation is qualified by the requirement that there must be exceptional
circumstances to allow the relaxation of the rules. Absent exceptional
circumstances, [the Court adheres] to the rule that certain procedural precepts
must remain inviolable x x x."48 After all, an "appeal is not a constitutional right, but
a mere statutory privilege. Thus, parties who seek to avail themselves of it must
comply with the statutes or rules allowing it." 49 The Court adheres to the strict
interpretation of the rule in this case in the absence of exceptional circumstance or
compelling reason to depart from the same. (U-Bix Corporation vs. Hollero, G.R.
No. 199660, July 13, 2015)
Attorneys; Suspension; Practice of Law; guidelines be observed in the matter
of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law - We had laid
down guidelines in Maniago v. De Dios,

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED that the following guidelines

be observed in the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the
practice of law:

1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the

practice of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty;

2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately

executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a
motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the
decision final and executory;

3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a

Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant,
stating therein that he or she has desisted from the practice of law and has
not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;

4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of

the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has
pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared
as counsel;

5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondents

compliance with the order of suspension;

6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under
oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or
disbarment, as may be warranted. (IBANA-ANDRADE VS. PAITA MOYA,
A.C. No. 8313,July 14, 2015)

Same; Same; we had already stated the standard for discipline upon erring
lawyers who continue practicing despite being suspended by the Court - This case is
not without precedent.18 Previously, we had already stated the standard for
discipline upon erring lawyers who continue practicing despite being suspended by
the Court, viz: Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience
to any lawful order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds

therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.

In Molina v. Atty. Magat, this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R. Magat from
the practice of law for six months for practicing his profession despite this court's
previous order of suspension.1wphi1 We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga
for holding his position as Regional Director despite lack of authority to practice law.
(IBANA-ANDRADE VS. PAITA MOYA, A.C. No. 8313,July 14, 2015)

Administrative Proceedings; Burden of Proof; It is well settled that in

administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that respondents committed the
acts complained of rests on the complainant. - It is well settled that in
administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that respondents committed the
acts complained of rests on the complainant. In the instant case, we find the
allegations of spurious judgment and the failure to promulgate judgment to be
bereft of factual or legal basis. It is not enough that complainant made an allegation
of fraud; there should be a clear and convincing evidence to prove it. Extrinsic
evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in
addition to the palpable error that may be inferred from the decision or order itself.
(RE: COMPLAINT DATED JANUARY 28, 2015 OF CATHERINE DAMAYO,
REPRESENTED BY HER MOTHER, VENIRANDA DAMAYO, AGAINST HON.
MARILYN LAGURA-YAP, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE, COURT OF APPEALS-VISAYAS,
CEBU CITY, CEBU, A.M. No. CA-15-53-J [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 15-230-CA-
J], July 14, 2015)

Administrative Law; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Good Faith and
absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient
defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. - It
should be emphasized that as a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject
to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. He cannot be subjected
to liability - civil, criminal or administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter
how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. In such a case, the remedy of the
aggrieved party is not to file an administrative complaint against the judge but to
elevate the error to the higher court for review and correction. The Court has to be
shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice
before the latter can be branded with the stigma of being biased and partial. Thus,
not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties
renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate
intent to do an injustice. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with
ignorance of the law can find refuge. (RE: COMPLAINT DATED JANUARY 28,
2015 OF CATHERINE DAMAYO, REPRESENTED BY HER MOTHER, VENIRANDA
DAMAYO, AGAINST HON. MARILYN LAGURA-YAP, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE, COURT
OF APPEALS-VISAYAS, CEBU CITY, CEBU, A.M. No. CA-15-53-J [Formerly OCA
I.P.I. No. 15-230-CA-J], July 14, 2015)
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgements; Promulgation of
Judgements; Section 6 authorizes the promulgation of judgment in absentia in
view of respondent's failure to appear despite notice. - It is, likewise, shown that the
trial court sent out notice to the complainant for the promulgation of the judgment
on October 10, 2011; however, despite notice, complainant failed to appear at the
promulgation on November 24, 2011. Thus, the trial court proceeded with the
promulgation by recording the dispositive portion in the criminal docket of the court,
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, to
Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated by reading it
in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered.
However, if the conviction is for a light offense the judgment may be pronounced in
the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside
the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

x x x x

In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation

of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording
the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his
last known address or thru his counsel. (Emphasis ours)

Indeed, Section 6 as above-quoted authorizes the promulgation of judgment in

absentia in view of respondent's failure to appear despite notice. It bears stressing
that the rule authorizing promulgation in absentia is intended to obviate the
situation where the judicial process could be subverted by the accused jumping bail
to frustrate the promulgation of judgment. (RE: COMPLAINT DATED JANUARY 28,
2015 OF CATHERINE DAMAYO, REPRESENTED BY HER MOTHER, VENIRANDA
DAMAYO, AGAINST HON. MARILYN LAGURA-YAP, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE, COURT
OF APPEALS-VISAYAS, CEBU CITY, CEBU, A.M. No. CA-15-53-J [Formerly OCA
I.P.I. No. 15-230-CA-J], July 14, 2015)

Administrative Law; Judges; Court Personnel; This Court will not hesitate to
protect Judges or court personnel against any groundless accusation that trifles
with judicial processes when an administrative charge against them has no basis
whatsoever in fact or in law. - This Court will not hesitate to protect Judges or court
personnel against any groundless accusation that trifles with judicial processes
when an administrative charge against them has no basis whatsoever in fact or in
law. This Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon all
employees of the judiciary, but neither will it hesitate to shield them from
unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly
administration of justice. (RE: COMPLAINT DATED JANUARY 28, 2015 OF
CATHERINE DAMAYO, REPRESENTED BY HER MOTHER, VENIRANDA
DAMAYO, AGAINST HON. MARILYN LAGURA-YAP, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE, COURT
OF APPEALS-VISAYAS, CEBU CITY, CEBU, A.M. No. CA-15-53-J [Formerly OCA
I.P.I. No. 15-230-CA-J], July 14, 2015)
Administrative Law; Court personnel; Clerks of Court; In the Office of the
Court Administrator v. Acampado,20 the Court declared that any shortages in the
amounts to be remitted and the delay in the actual remittance thereof constitute
gross neglect of duty for which the clerk of court shall be held administratively
liable. - In the Office of the Court Administrator v. Acampado,20 the Court declared
that any shortages in the amounts to be remitted and the delay in the actual
remittance thereof constitute gross neglect of duty for which the clerk of court shall
be held administratively liable. Moreover, in the Office of the Court Administrator v.
Melchor, Jr.,21 it was held that delayed remittance of cash collections constitutes
gross neglect of duty because this omission deprives the court of interest that could
have been earned if the amounts were deposited in the authorized depository bank.
This was also reiterated in the fairly recent case of Office of the Court Administrator
v. Mrs. Aurora T. Zuniga.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Here, Guan's shortages with respect to the JDF in the total amount of P49,609.10
and to the SAJT totaling to P5,824.00 were both due to unreported and undeposited
collections. In other words, Guan's transgressions did not merely consist of delay in
the remittance of his collections but to his total failure to deposit the same as well.
This is a clear case of gross neglect of duty. As held, "[g]ross neglect is such neglect
which, from the gravity of the case or the frequency of instances, becomes so
serious in its character as to endanger or threaten the public welfare." 23 In this case,
the frequency of the instances alone, i.e., for two separate periods of accountability,
Guan was both found to have incurred shortages with respect to the JDF and SAJF
due to unreported and undeposited collections, makes respondent's neglect of duty
so serious in its character as to threaten the public welfare. (OFFICE OF THE
COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. JOEBERT C. GUAN, FORMER
CLERK OF COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, BULAN, SORSOGON,
Respondent. A.M. No. P-07-2293 (Formerly A.M. No. 06-12-411-MTC), July
15, 2015)

Same; Gross Neglect of Duty; Penalties; Uniform Rules on Administrative

Cases in the Civil Service; Gross neglect of duty is classified as a grave offense
and punishable by dismissal even if for the first offense pursuant to Section 52(A)
(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.-
Gross neglect of duty is classified as a grave offense and punishable by dismissal
even if for the first offense pursuant to Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service." 26 While Guan had already been
dropped from the rolls for being absent without official leave (AWOL) in A.M. No. 06-
5-171-MTC, he still remains administratively liable, although the penalty of dismissal
cannot be imposed upon him. Nevertheless, "[a] fine can be imposed, instead, and
its amount is subject to the sound discretion of the Court. Section 56 (e) of Rule IV
of the Revised Uniform Rules provides that fine as a penalty shall be in an amount
not exceeding the salary for six months had the respondent not resigned [or been
dropped from the rolls] the rate for which is that obtaining at the time of his
resignation. The fine shall be deducted from any accrued leave credits, with the
respondent being personally liable for any deficiency that should be directly payable
to this Court. He is [also] further declared disqualified from any future government
service. (OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. JOEBERT
C. GUAN, FORMER CLERK OF COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, BULAN,
SORSOGON, Respondent. A.M. No. P-07-2293 (Formerly A.M. No. 06-12-
411-MTC), July 15, 2015)

Same; Same; Clerks of Court; any shortages in the amounts, shall make the clerk
of court administratively liable. - As a final note, "Clerks of Court are the custodians
of the courts 'funds and revenues, records, properties, and premises.' They are
'liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment' of those entrusted to them.
Any shortages in the amounts to be remitted and the delay in the actual remittance
'constitute gross neglect of duty for which the clerk of court shall be held
administratively liable. (OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR,
Complainant, v. JOEBERT C. GUAN, FORMER CLERK OF COURT, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT, BULAN, SORSOGON, Respondent. A.M. No. P-07-2293
(Formerly A.M. No. 06-12-411-MTC), July 15, 2015)

Criminal Law; Tarrif and Customs Code; Seizure and Forfeiture; Smuggling;
under Section 2530 (a) and (k)33 of the TCCP, the forfeiture of a vehicle, vessel or
aircraft is anchored on its being used unlawfully in the transport of contraband or
smuggled articles into or from any Philippine port. - under Section 2530 (a) and
(k)33 of the TCCP, the forfeiture of a vehicle, vessel or aircraft is anchored on its
being used unlawfully in the transport of contraband or smuggled articles into or
from any Philippine port. Consequently, the determination of the legality of the
forfeiture of the M/V Don Martin was necessarily contingent on whether the customs
authorities had validly and properly seized the shipment of 6,500 sacks of rice on
account of the rice being smuggled. Given this logical correlation, the CTA could not
be divested of its jurisdiction to determine the legality of the forfeiture of the rice.
(M/V "DON MARTIN" VOY 047 v. HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, G.R. No.
160206, July 15, 2015)

Taxation; Courts; Courts of Tax Appeals ; the CTA is a highly specialized body
specifically created for the purpose of reviewing tax cases; hence, its findings of
fact are to be accorded utmost respect. - t is true that the CTA is a highly
specialized body specifically created for the purpose of reviewing tax cases; hence,
its findings of fact are to be accorded utmost respect. 35 Indeed, the factual findings
of the CTA, when supported by substantial evidence, are not to be disturbed on
appeal unless there is a showing that the CTA committed gross error or abuse in the
appreciation of facts. (M/V "DON MARTIN" VOY 047 v. HON. SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, G.R. No. 160206, July 15, 2015)

Criminal Law; Tarrif and Customs Code; Seizure and Forfeiture; Smuggling;
To warrant forfeiture, Section 2530(a) and (f) of the TCCP requires that the
importation must have been unlawful or prohibited. - To warrant forfeiture, Section
2530(a) and (f) of the TCCP requires that the importation must have been unlawful
or prohibited. According to Section 3601 of the TCCP: "[a]ny person who shall
fraudulently import or bring into the Philippines, or assist in so doing, any article,
contrary to law, or shall receive, conceal, buy, sell, or in any manner facilitate the
transportation, concealment, or sale of such article after importation, knowing the
same to have been imported contrary to law, shall be guilty of smuggling. (M/V
"DON MARTIN" VOY 047 v. HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, G.R. No. 160206,
July 15, 2015)
Same; Same; Same; A craft engaged in the coastwise and interisland trade was
one that carried passengers and/or merchandise for hire between ports and places
in the Philippine Islands - A craft engaged in the coastwise and interisland trade was
one that carried passengers and/or merchandise for hire between ports and places
in the Philippine Islands51 Under Section 902 of the TCCP, the right to engage in the
Philippine coastwise trade was limited to vessels carrying a certificate of Philippine
registry,52 like the M/V Don Martin.53 To legally engage in coastwise trade, the vessel
owner must further submit other documents, like the bill of lading and coastwise
manifest,54 documents that were also presented by the petitioners during the
forfeiture proceedings.55 In the absence of any showing by the respondents that the
vessel was licensed to engage in trade with foreign countries and was not limited to
coastwise trade, the inference that the shipment of the 6,500 sacks of rice was
transported only between Philippine ports and not imported from a foreign country
became fully warranted. (M/V "DON MARTIN" VOY 047 v. HON. SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, G.R. No. 160206, July 15, 2015)

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgements; Stare Decisis ; the doctrine

of stare decisis, which dictates that when a court has reached a conclusion in one
case, it should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the
same, even though the parties may be different - Following the doctrine of stare
decisis, which dictates that when a court has reached a conclusion in one case, it
should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even
though the parties may be different, 40 we find that respondent is not liable for DST
as the transfer of real properties from the absorbed corporations to respondent was
pursuant to a merger. And having complied with the provisions of Sections
204(C)41 and 22942 of the NIRC, we agree with the CTA that respondent is entitled to
a refund of the DST it erroneously paid on various dates between October 31, 2001
to November 15, 2001 in the total amount of P14,140,980.00. (COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. LA TONDEA DISTILLERS, INC. (LTDI [NOW
GINEBRA SAN MIGUEL], G.R. No. 175188, July 15, 2015)

Taxation; Tax Laws must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in
favor of the taxpayer. - In closing, we must stress that taxes must not be imposed
beyond what the law expressly and clearly declares as tax laws must be construed
strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. (COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. LA TONDEA DISTILLERS, INC. (LTDI [NOW
GINEBRA SAN MIGUEL], G.R. No. 175188, July 15, 2015)

Attorneys; As a rule where a party appears by attorney in an action or proceeding

in a court of record, all notices or orders required to be given therein must be given
to the attorney of record. - As a rule where a party appears by attorney in an action
or proceeding in a court of record, all notices or orders required to be given therein
must be given to the attorney of record. Accordingly, notices to counsel should be
properly sent to his address of record, and, unless the counsel files a notice o f
change of address, his official address remains to be that his address of Record.
(MENDOZA vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (EIGHT DIVISION), G.R.
No. 182814 July 15, 2015)

Same; Petitioners' counsel cannot hide behind the security guard's negligence to
shield her even professional negligence in an effort to seek reversal of a decision
that has long attained finality.- Evidently, petitioners' counsel was wanting on this
respect. Not only did petitioners' counsel fail to device a system for the prompt and
efficient receipt of mails intended for her, she also failed to ensure that she could be
notified of the decision as soon as possible. As a practicing lawyer, petitioners'
counsel should have been more circumspect in monitoring official communications
intended for her so as to avoid situations like this, where a mail matter was
inexplicably lost after delivery thereby running the risk of losing a client's case on
technicality. Petitioners' counsel cannot hide behind the security guard's negligence
to shield her even professional negligence in an effort to seek reversal of a decision
that has long attained finality. It bears stressing that a decision had become final
and executory without any party perfecting an appeal or filing a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period. It was only months after its finality
that questions assailing the Decision were raised.

Neither can petitioners exempt themselves or their properties from the operation of
a final and executory judgment by harping on their counsel's negligence.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that clients are bound by the actions
of their counsel in the conduct of their case. If it were otherwise, and a lawyer's
mistake or negligence was admitted as a reason for the opening of the case, there
would be no end to litigation so long as counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or
experienced or learned.20 The only exception to the general rule is when the
counsel's actuations are gross or palpable, resulting in serious injustice to client,
that courts should accord relief to the party. 21 Indeed, if the error or negligence of
the counsel did not result in the deprivation of due process to the client, nullification
of the decision grounded on grave abuse of discretion is not warranted. 22 The
instant case does not fall within the exception since petitioners were duly given
their day in court. (MENDOZA vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (EIGHT
DIVISION), G.R. No. 182814 July 15, 2015)

Same; every counsel has the implied authority to do all acts which are necessary or,
at least, incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his
client. - it is a well-settled principle in this jurisdiction that a client is bound by the
action of his counsel in the conduct of the case and cannot be heard to complain
that the result might have been different had he proceeded differently. 23 Every
counsel has the implied authority to do all acts which are necessary or, at least,
incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his client.
And, any act performed by counsel within the scope of his general and implied
authority is, in the eyes of law, regarded as the act of the client himself and
consequently, the mistake or negligence of the client's counsel may result in the
rendition of unfavorable judgment against him. 24 To rule otherwise would result to a
situation that every defeated party, in order to salvage his case, would just have to
claim neglect or mistake on the part of his counsel as a ground for reversing an
adverse judgment. There would be no end to litigation if this were allowed as every
shortcoming of counsel could be the subject of challenge of his client through
another counsel who, if he is also found wanting, would likewise be disowned by the
same client through another counsel, and so on ad infinitum. This would render
court proceedings indefinite, tentative and subject to reopening at any time by the
mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. (MENDOZA vs.THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS (EIGHT DIVISION), G.R. No. 182814 July 15, 2015)

Same; It is the client's duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time to time in
order to be informed of the progress and developments of his case; hence, .to
merely rely on the bare reassurance of his lawyer that everything is being taken
care of is not enough. - Truly, a litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status
of his case,. for no prudent party leaves the fate of his case entirely in the hands of
his lawyer.1wphi1 It is the client's duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time
to time in order to be informed of the progress and developments of his case;
hence, .to merely rely on the bare reassurance of his lawyer that everything is being
taken care of is not enough.27 Where the party failed to act with prudence and
diligence, its plea that it was not accorded the right to due process cannot elicit this
court's approval or even sympathy. (MENDOZA vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS (EIGHT DIVISION), G.R. No. 182814 July 15, 2015)

Judgements; Finality of Judgements;Just as a losing party has the right to file

an appeal within the' prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right
to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of
the judgment, which is the "life of the law. - Litigation must end and terminate
sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of
justice that once a judgment has become final the issue or the cause involved
therein should be laid to rest. This doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on
fundamental consideration of public policy and sound practice. In fact, nothing is
more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of
fact and law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made
by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. 29 Just as a losing party
has the right to file an appeal within the' prescribed period, the winning party has
the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the
execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the "life of the law." 30 To
frustrate it by dilatory scheme on the part of the losing party is to frustrate all
efforts, time and expenditure of the courts. It is in the best interest of justice that
this court write finis to this litigation. (MENDOZA vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS (EIGHT DIVISION), G.R. No. 182814 July 15, 2015)

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Sandiganbayan; The creation of the

Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution. 1 -
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the
1973 Constitution.18 By virtue of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486. 19 The decree was later amended by P.D.
No. 1606,20Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, 21 P.D. No. 1860,22 and P.D. No.
1861.23
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided
for in Section 4, Article XI thereof. 24 Aside from Executive Order Nos. 1425 and 14-
a,26 and R.A. 7080,27 which expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No.
1606 was further modified by R.A. No. 7975, 28 R.A. No. 8249,29 and just this year,
R.A. No. 10660 (DUNCANO vs.HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd DIVISION), G.R.
No. 191894, July 15, 2015)

Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; those that fall within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive branch with
Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A)
(1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades - those that fall within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive branch with
Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A)
(1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades. 31 While the first part of Section 4 (A)
covers only officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its
second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not
be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. (DUNCANO vs.HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd DIVISION), G.R. No. 191894, July 15, 2015)

Same; Same; Same; Same; The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan
to devote its time and expertise to big-time cases involving the so-called "big
fishes" in the government rather than those accused who are of limited means who
stand trial for "petty crimes," the so-called "small fry," which, in turn, helps the
court decongest its dockets. - The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to
devote its time and expertise to big-time cases involving the so-called "big fishes" in
the government rather than those accused who are of limited means who stand trial
for "petty crimes," the so-called "small fry," which, in turn, helps the court
decongest its dockets.3

Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated
by the law.36 In this category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 37 The specific inclusion
constitutes an exception to the general qualification relating to "officials of the
executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989. (DUNCANO vs.HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd DIVISION), G.R. No.
191894, July 15, 2015)