G.R. Nos.

L-37201-02 March 3, 1975

CLEMENTE MAGTOTO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MIGUEL M. MANGUERA, Judge of the Court of First Instance (Branch II) of Occidental
Mindoro, The PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, IGNACIO CALARA, JR., and LOURDES
CALARA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-37424 March 3, 1975

MAXIMO SIMEON, LOUIS MEDNATT, INOCENTES DE LUNA, RUBEN MIRANDA, ALFONSO

BALLESTEROS, RUDOLFO SUAREZ, MANUEL MANALO, ALBERTO GABION, and RAFAEL
BRILL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court of Pasig,
Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. L-38929 March 3, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE ASAALI S. ISNANI, District Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
del Sur, Branch II, VICENTE LONGAKIT, and JAIME DALION, respondents.

Felipe S. Abeleda for petitioner Clemente Magtoto.

Joaquin L. Misa for petitioners Maximo Simeon, et al.

Alan L. Roxas for respondents Ignacio Calara, Jr., et al.

Organo Law Office for respondent Vicente Longakit, et al.

Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Vicente V.
Mendoza for respondent and petitioner People of the Philippines.

FERNANDEZ, J.: +.wph!1

The present cases involve an interpretation of Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution,
which reads: t.hqw

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person

under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
 shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in evidence,

and specifically, the portion thereof which declares inadmissible a confession obtained from
a person under investigation for the commission of an offense who has not been informed of
his right (to remain silent and) to counsel. 1

We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate has and should be given a
prospective and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a
person under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of
his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same had been
obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such
confession is admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same had been
obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17,
1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the
accused the right to be so informed before that date.

Accordingly, We hereby sustain the orders of the respondent Judges in G.R. No.
L-37201-02 2 and G.R. No. L-37424 3 declaring admissible the confessions of the accused in said
cases, and We hereby set aside the order of the respondent Judge challenged in G.R. No. L-
38929 4 which declared inadmissible the confessions of the accused in said case, although they
have not been informed of their right to remain silent and to counsel before they gave the
confessions, because they were given before the effectivity of the New Constitution.

The reasons for these rulings are as follows:

Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution granted, for the first time, to a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to be informed of
such right. And the last sentence thereof which, in effect, means that any confession
obtained in violation of this right shall be inadmissible in evidence, can and should be given
effect only when the right already existed and had been violated. Consequently, because the
confessions of the accused in G.R. Nos. L-37201-02, 37424 and 38929 were taken before the
effectivity of the New Constitution in accordance with the rules then in force, no right had
been violated as to render them inadmissible in evidence although they were not informed of
"their right to remain silent and to counsel," "and to be informed of such right," because, We
repeat, no such right existed at the time.

The argument that the second paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, which was
added by Republic Act No. 1083 enacted in l954, which reads as follows: t.hqw

In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his
detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer
at any time with his attorney or counsel.

impliedly granted to a detained person the right to counsel and to be informed of such right,
is untenable. The only right granted by said paragraph to a detained person was to be
informed of the cause of his detention. But he must make a request for him to be able to
claim the right to communicate and confer with counsel at any time.

The remark of Senator Cuenco, when Republic Act No. 1083 was being discussed in the
Senate, that the bill which became Republic Act No. 1083 provides that the detained person
should be informed of his right to counsel, was only the personal opinion of Senator Cuenco.
We grant that he was, as We personally knew him to be, a learned lawyer and senator. But his
statement could reflect only his personal opinion because if Congress had wanted Republic
Act No. 1083 to grant a detained person a right to counsel and to be informed of such right, it
should have been so worded. Congress did not do so.

As originally worded, Senate Bill No. 50, which became Republic Act No. 1083, provided: "In
every case the person detained shall be allowed, upon his request, to have the services of an
attorney or counsel. In the period of amendment, the phrase "have the services of" was
changed to the present wording "communicate and confer anytime with his." As the Solicitor
General points out in his able memorandum, apparently the purpose was to bring the
provision in harmony with the provision of a complementary measure, Republic Act No. 857
(effective July 16, 1953), which provides:t.hqw

SECTION 1. Any public officer who shall obstruct, prohibit, or otherwise

prevent an attorney entitled to practice in the courts of the Philippines from
visiting and conferring privately with a person arrested, at any hour of the day
or, in urgent cases, of the night, said visit and conference being requested by
the person arrested or by another acting in his behalf, shall be punished by
arresto mayor.

None of these statutes requires that police investigators inform the detained person of his
"right" to counsel. They only allow him to request to be given counsel. It is not for this Court
to add a requirement and carry on where both Congress and the President stopped.

The history behind the new right granted to a detained person by Section 20, Article IV of the
New constitution to counsel and to be informed of said right under pain of a confession taken
in violation thereof being rendered inadmissible in evidence, clearly shows the intention to
give this constitutional guaranty not a retroactive, but a prospective, effect so as to cover
only confessions taken after the effectivity of the New Constitution.

To begin with, Section 29, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, provides: t.hqw

Confession.The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt

of the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him.

And according to Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court:

Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction.An extrajudicial confession

made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti.
Extrajudicial confessions of the accused in a criminal case are universally recognized as
admissible in evidence against him, based on the presumption that no one would declare
anything against himself unless such declarations were true. Accordingly, it has been held
that a confession constitutes an evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong
presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a
crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. (U.S. vs. Delos Santos, 24 Phil. 329, 358).

The fundamental rule is that a confession, to be admissible, must be voluntary. And the first
rule in this connection was that before the confession could be admitted in evidence, the
prosecution must first show to the satisfaction of the Court that the same was freely and
voluntarily made, as provided for in Section 4 of Act 619 of the Philippine Commission (U.S.
vs. Pascual, August 29, 1903, 2 Phil. 458). But with the repeal of said provision of law by the
Administrative Code in 1916, the burden of proof was changed. Now, a confession is
admissible in evidence without previous proof of its voluntariness on the theory that it is
presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved (5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, p. 264; People vs. Dorado, 30 SCRA 53, 57, citing U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308; People vs.
Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64; People v. Singh, 45 Phil. 676; People v. Pereto, 21 SCRA 1469).

And once the accused succeeds in proving that his extrajudicial confession was made
involuntarily, it stands discredited in the eyes of the law and is as a thing which never
existed. It is incompetent as evidence and must be rejected. The defense need not prove that
its contents are false (U.S. vs. Delos Santos, 24 Phil. 329, 358; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 325,
November, 1921). The same rule was followed in People vs. Nishishima. "Involuntary
confessions are uniformly held inadmissible as evidence by some courts on the ground
that a confession so obtained is unreliable, and by some on the ground of humanitarian
principles which abhor all forms of torture or unfairness towards the accused in criminal
proceedings. ... ." (57 Phil. 26, 48, 51; 1932). 4* In the concurring opinion of Justice Butte, he
said: "Apart, from the fact that involuntary confessions will be declared incompetent and are
therefore utterly futile, it is high time to put a stop to these (third degree) practices which are a
blot on our Philippine civilization."

This rule was, however, changed by this court in 1953 in the case of People vs. Delos Santos,
et al., G.R. No. L-4880, citing the rule in Moncado vs. People's Court, et al., 80 Phil 1, and
followed in the case of People vs. Villanueva, et al. (G.R. No. L-7472, January 31, 1956), to the
effect that "a confession to be repudiated, must not only be proved to have been obtained by
force or violence or intimidation, but also that it is false or untrue, for the law rejects the
confession when by force or violence, the accused is compelled against this will to tell a
falsehood, not when by such force and violence is compelled to tell the truth." This ruling
was followed in a number of cases. 5

But the ruling in Moncado vs. People's Court et al., 80 Phil 1, which was the basis of the
leading case of People vs. Delos Santos, supra, was overruled in the case of Stonehill vs.
Diokno (20 SCRA 383, June 19, 1963), holding that evidence illegally obtained is not
admissible in evidence. So, We reverted to the original rule. As stated by this Court, speaking
thru Justice Teehankee in People vs. Urro (44 SCRA 473, April 27, 1972), "involuntary or
coerced confessions obtained by force or intimidation are null and void and are abhorred by
law which proscribes the use of such cruel and inhuman methods to secure a confession."
"A coerced confession stands discredited in the eyes of the law and is as a thing that never
existed." The defense need not prove that its contents are false. Thus, We turned full circle
and returned to the rule originally established in the case of U.S. vs. Delos Santos, 24 Phil.
323 and People vs. Nishishima, 42 Phil. 26. (See also People vs. Imperio, 44 SCRA 75).

It must be noted that all these Philippine cases refer to coerced confessions, whether the
coercion was physical, mental and/or emotional.

In the meantime, the United States Supreme Court decided the following cases: Massiah vs.
United States (377 U.S. 201, 1964), Escobedo vs. Illinois (378 U.S. 478, 1964); and Miranda vs.
Arizona (384 U.S. 436, 1966). In Miranda vs. Arizona, it was held: t.hqw

To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or

otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and
is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is
jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege
*[384 U.S. 479]* and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the
person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be
scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be
warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the
interrogation. After such warning have been given, and such opportunity
afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights
and agree to answer questions or make statement. But unless and until such
warning and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him. (Miranda vs.
Arizona, supra, p. 478)[Emphasis Ours]

When invoked in this jurisdiction, however, the Miranda rule was rejected by this Court. In the
cases of People vs. Jose (37 SCRA 450, February 6, 1971) and People vs. Paras 56 SCRA 248,
March 29, 1974), We rejected the rule that an extrajudicial confession given without the
assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence. This Court in the Jose case(as in the Paras
case), held:
t.hqw

The inadmissibility of his extrajudicial statements is likewise being questioned

by Jose on the other ground that he was not assisted by counsel during the
custodial interrogations. He cites the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Massiah vs. U.S. (377 U.S. 201), Escobedo vs. Illinois (37 U.S.
478) and Miranda vs .Arizona (384 U.S. 436).

The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in point is Article III (Bill of
Rights), Section 1, par. 17 of which provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the
 accused shall ... enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel ... ." While
the said provision is identical to that in the Constitution of the United States, in
this jurisdiction the term criminal prosecutions was interpreted by this Court
in U.S. vs. Beechman, 23 Phil 258 (1912), in connection with a similar provision
in the Philippine Bill of Rights (Section 5 of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902), to
mean proceedings before the trial court from arraignment to rendition of the
judgment. Implementing the said Constitutional provision, We have provided in
Section 1, Rule 115 of the Rules of Court that "In all criminal prosecutions the
defendant shall be entitled ... (b) to be present and defend in person and by
attorney at every state of the proceedings, that is, from the arraignment to the
promulgation of the judgment." The only instances where an accused is
entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he so requests, are during the
second stage of preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and after the
arrest(Rule 113, Section 18). The rule in the United States need not be
unquestioningly adhered to in this jurisdiction, not only because it has no
binding effect here, but also because in interpreting a provision of the
Constitution the meaning attached hereto at the time of the adoption thereof
should be considered. And even there the said rule is not yet quite settled, as
can be deduced from the absence of unanimity in the voting by the members
of the United States Supreme Court in all the three above-cited cases. (People
vs. Jose, supra, at page 472).

The Constitutional Convention at the time it deliberated on Section 20, Article IV of the New
Constitution was aware of the Escobedo and Miranda rule which had been rejected in the
case of Jose. That is the reason why the Miranda-Escobedo rule was expressly included as a
new right granted to a detained person in the present provision of Section 20, Article IV of the
New Constitution.

When Delegate de Guzman (A) submitted the draft of this Section 20, Article IV to the October
26, 1972 meeting of the 17-man committee of the Steering Council, Delegate Leviste (O)
expressly made of record that "we are adopting here the rulings of US Supreme Court in the
Miranda-Escobedo cases." And We cannot agree with the insinuation in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Castro that the Delegates did not know of the existence of the second
paragraph of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

Hence, We repeat, this historical background of Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution,
in Our considered opinion, clearly shows that the new right granted therein to a detained
person to counsel and to be informed of such right under pain of his confession being
declared inadmissible in evidence, has and should be given a prospective and not a
retroactive effect. It did not exist before its incorporation in our New Constitution, as We held
in the Jose and Paras cases, supra.

The authors of the dissenting opinions ignore the historical fact that the constitutional and
legal guarantees as well as the legal precedents that insure that the confession be voluntary,
underwent a slow and tedious development. The constitutional guarantee in question might
indeed have come late in the progress of the law on the matter. But it is only now that it had
come under Section 20 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. That is all that our duty and
power ordain Us to proclaim; We cannot properly do more.

Furthermore, to give a retroactive effect to this constitutional guarantee to counsel would

have a great unsettling effect on the administration of justice in this country. It may lead to
the acquittal of guilty individuals and thus cause injustice to the People and the offended
parties in many criminal cases where confessions were obtained before the effectivity of the
New Constitution and in accordance with the rules then in force although without assistance
of counsel. The Constitutional Convention could not have intended such a a disastrous
consequence in the administration of justice. For if the cause of justice suffers when an
innocent person is convicted, it equally suffers when a guilty one is acquitted.

Even in the United States, the trend is now towards prospectivity. As noted in the
memorandum of the Solicitor General: t.hqw

... That survey indicates that in the early decisions rejecting retroactivity, the
United States Supreme Court did not require "pure prospectivity;" the new
constitutional requirements there were applied to all cases still pending on
direct review at the time they were announced. (See Linkletter vs. Walker, 381
U.S. 618 (1965) (on admissibility of illegally-seized evidence); Tehan vs.
Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966) (on the self-incrimination rule of Griffin vs.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). But the Court began a new course with
Johnson vs. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). It departed from Linkletter and
Tehan and came closer to "pure prospectivity" by refusing to permit cases still
pending on direct review to benefit from the new in-custody interrogation
requirements of Miranda vs. Arizona. As Chief Justice Warren observed
in Jenkins vs. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 (1969), "With Johnson we began
increasing emphasis upon the point at which law enforcement officials relied
upon practices not yet prescribed." "More recently," he continued, "we have
selected the point of initial reliance." That development began with Stovall vs.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (on the line-up requirements of United States vs.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and Gilbert vs. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). These
new rulings were held applicable only in the immediate cases "and all future
cases which involve confrontation for identification purposes conducted in the
absence of counsel after the dates of Wade and Gilbert." The fact that Wade
and Gilbert were thus the only beneficiaries of the new rules was described as
an "unavoidable consequence of the necessity that constitutional
adjudications not stand as mere dictum." In Jenkins vs. Delaware itself, the
Court held that the Miranda requirement did not apply to a re-trial after June
13, 1966 the cut-off point set for the Miranda requirement by Johnson vs.
New Jersey because Jenkins original trial had begun before the cut-off
point.

Thus, the remarkable thing about this development in judge-made law is not
that it is given limited retroactive effort. That is to be expected in the case of
judicial decision as distinguished from legislation. The notable thing is that the
 limited retroactivity given to judge-made law in the beginning by Linkletter vs.
Walker has been abandoned as the Supreme Court in Johnson vs. New Jersey
and in Jenkins vs. Delaware moved toward "pure prospectivity" (pp. 26-28)
(Respondents' memorandum, Feb. 16, 1974).

The provision of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code that: t.hqw

Retroactive effect of penal laws.Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect

insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at
the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced
and the convict is serving the same,

is not applicable to the present cases: First, because of the inclusion We have arrived at that
the constitutional provision in question has a prospective and not a retrospective effect,
based on the reasons We have given; second, because the "penal laws" mentioned in Article
22 of the Revised Penal Code refer to substantive penal laws, while the constitutional
provision in question is basically a procedural rule of evidence involving the incompetency
and inadmissibility of confessions and therefore cannot be included in the term "penal
laws;" 6 and third, because constitutional provisions as a rule should be given a prospective
effect. 7

Even as We rule that the new constitutional right of a detained person to counsel and to be
informed of such right under pain of any confession given by him in violation thereof
declared inadmissible in evidence, to be prospective, and that confessions obtained before
the effectivity of the New Constitution are admissible in evidence against the accused, his
fundamental right to prove that his confession was involuntary still stands. Our present
ruling does not in any way diminish any of his rights before the effectivity of the New
Constitution.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitions for writs of certiorari in G.R. Nos. L-37201-02
and G.R. No. L-37424 are denied and that in G.R. No. L-38929 is granted. As a consequence,
all the confessions involved in said cases are hereby declared admissible in evidence. No
costs.

G.R. No. L-61016 April 26, 1983

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF HORACIO R. MORALES,

JR., petitioner,
vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER and COL. GALILEO
KINTANAR, respondents.

G.R. No. L-61107 April 26, 1983

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ANTONIO C. MONCUPA, JR.
ANTONIO C. MONCUPA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER and COL. GALILEO KINTANAR,
respondents.

Lorenzo M. Taada, Augusto Sanchez, Jejomar Binay and Antonio Quintos for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:

1. The petitions are without merit and are hereby DISMISSED.

2. Petitioners were arrested on April 21, 1982 at about 9:45 a.m. while they were riding
together in a motor vehicle on Laong-Laan Street, Quezon City, by elements of Task Force
Makabansa of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Since their arrest, they have been under
detention. Petitioner Morales filed his petition for habeas corpus with this Court on July 9,
1982, while petitioner Moncupa filed his on July 19, 1982. On July 20, 1982 petitioners,
together with several others, were charged with rebellion (Art. 134, Revised Penal Code)
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Criminal Case No. Q-21091 filed by the City
Fiscal of Quezon City. The trial of the case has yet to be terminated. The continued detention
of petitioners to answer for the offense charged is therefore legal.

3. Petitioners allege that they were arrested without any warrant of arrest; that their
constitutional rights were violated, among them the right to counsel, the right to remain
silent, the right to a speedy and public trial, and the right to bail. They also air the charge that
they were subjected to maltreatment and torture; that they did not have the opportunity to
present their defense before the inquest fiscal and therefore asked this Court to order the
reinvestigation of the charges against them. Acting on such plea, this Court in a
resolution en banc dated July 22, 1982 ordered the City Fiscal of Quezon City to conduct
such reinvestigation and at the same time appointed him "to act as commissioner of this
Court and receive evidence of the charges made by petitioners before this Court of alleged
torture and violation of their constitutional rights, particularly the right to counsel." On
September 28, 1982, the City Fiscal submitted his report on the reinvestigation affirming the
existence of a prima facie case for rebellion against petitioners and several others. And on
February 8, 1983 he submitted to this Court the transcript of the notes taken at the reception
of the evidence on the charges of petitioners.

4. If petitioners had been arrested in a communist country, they would have no rights to
speak of. However, the Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them. 1 We have a Constitution framed by a
constitutional convention and duly ratified by the people. We subscribe to the rule of law. We
believe in human rights and we protect and defend them. Petitioners are entitled to the full
enjoyment of all the rights granted to them by law. And this Court stands as the guarantor of
those rights.

5. Our Constitution provides:

SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any

person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free
will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence. 2

6. After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises
which at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police
headquarters and there questioned and cross-examined not only by one but as many
investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in a strange
and un familiar surrounding, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The
investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and
means that experience and study has taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for
it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional
rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law
in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of Rights seeks
to remedy this imbalance.

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of
the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement
he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means-
by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any
person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or
by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid
unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the
procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.

8. During the period of his detention, he shall have the right to confer with his counsel at any
hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night, alone and privately, in the jail or any other
place of custody. 3

Arrest.

9. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be forthcoming to answer
for the commission of an offense. 4
10. An arrest may be made with or without a warrant.

SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge,
or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. 5

11. Our Constitution clearly defines the persons who may issue a warrant of arrest and limits
them to a "judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law." It also lays
down in unmistakable terms the procedure required before a search warrant or warrant of
arrest may issue.

12. A Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order is a warrant of arrest issued by the President
of the Philippines. 6 Its issuance must therefore comply with the requirements of the Constitution,
in the same manner and to the same extent, as a warrant of arrest issued by a judge issuance
must therefore comply with the requirements of the Constitution, in the same manner and to the
same extent, as a warrant of arrest by a judge.

13. An arrest may also be made without a warrant.

SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant When lawful. A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is

about to commit an offense in his presence;

(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another. 7

14. Care should be exercised in making an arrest without a warrant. Where there is no
justification for the arrest, the public officer could be criminally liable for arbitrary
detention 8 or unlawful arrest 9 or for some other offense.

15. The petitioners claim they were arrested without a warrant. The Memorandum to the
President dated April 21, 1982 from Gen. Fabian C. Ver, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, wherein he reported the arrest of petitioners, the subversive documents
seized from them and the results of the ensuing tactical interrogation, with a
recommendation for the issuance of a Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order, was
approved by the President only on April 23, 1982. Indeed, therefore, petitioners were arrested
without a warrant. However, months before their arrest, petitioners were already under
surveillance on suspicion of committing rebellion. From the results of the said surveillance,
the evidence then at hand, and the documents seized from them at the time of their arrest, it
would appear that they had committed or were actually committing the offense of rebellion.
Their arrest without a warrant for the said offense is therefore clearly justified.

Procedure after Arrest.

16. After a person is arrested either without a warrant or by virtue of a warrant of arrest
issued by a judge or by virtue of a Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order, the proper
complaint or information against him must be filed with the courts of justice within the time
prescribed by law, to wit:

FURTHER AMENDING ARTICLE 125 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS

AMENDED (PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1404)

WHEREAS, the periods within which arrested persons shall be delivered to the
judicial authorities as provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, are on occasions inadequate to enable the government to file within
the said periods the criminal information against persons arrested for certain
crimes against national security and public order.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Republic of

the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, and
in the interest of national security as well as public safety and order, do hereby
decree and order as part of the law of the land the following amendment to
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:

SECTION 1. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby

further amended to read as follows:

ART. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons. -The

penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed
upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person
for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the
proper judicial authorities within the period of: six hours, for
crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their
equivalent; nine hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by
correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and eighteen hours,
for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital
penalties, or their equivalent; Provided, however, That the
President may, in the interest of national security and public
order, authorize by Executive Order longer periods, which in no
case shall exceed 30 days, or for as long as the conspiracy to
 commit the crime against national security and public order
continues or is being implemented, for the delivery of persons
arrested for crimes or offenses against public order as defined
in Title III, Book 11 of this Code, namely: Articles 134, 136, 138,
139, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146 and 147, and for acts in violation of
Republic Act No. 1700 as amended by Presidential Decree No.
885, taking into consideration the gravity of the offense or
offenses, the number of persons arrested, the threat to national
security or to public safety and order, and/or the occurrence of a
public calamity or other emergency situation preventing the
early investigation of the cases and the filing of the
corresponding information before the civil courts.

In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the

cause of his detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to
communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or
counsel, and to be visited by his immediate relatives.

SEC. 2. All acts, executive order, proclamations, Presidential Decrees, General

Orders, Letters of Instruction, rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this decree are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

SEC. 3. Transitory provision.-Pending the preparation and promulgation by the

President of the Executive Order referred to in Section 1 hereof, the detention
of persons arrested for any of the abovementioned offenses against public
order shall continue to be governed by the provisions of General Orders No. 2,
dated September 22, 1972 as amended by General Order Nos. 60 and 62, dated
September 24, 1977 and October 22, 1977, respectively.

SEC 4. This decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila this 9th day of June, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-eight."

17. Failure of the public officer to do so without any valid reason would constitute a violation
of Art. 125, Revised Penal Code, as amended. And the person detained would be entitled to
be released on a writ of habeas corpus, unless he is detained under subsisting process
issued by a competent court. 10

Power of the Courts.

18. The writ of habeas corpus has often been referred to as the great writ of liberty. It is the
most expeditious way of securing the release of one who has been illegally detained. The
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended, but not the writ itself.
19. The Bill of Rights provides:

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.

20. In Lansang vs.Garcia, 42 SCRA 448,473,We said:

In our resolution of October 5, 1972, We stated that 'a majority of the court 'had
'tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of
the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential
Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889A ... and thus determine the constitutional
sufficiency of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article III, sec. 1,
par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par. 2, of the Philippine Constitution ...' Upon
further deliberation, the members of the Court are now unanimous in the
conviction that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual
bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof.

21. We reiterate this doctrine.

22. Furthermore, We hold that under the judicial power of review and by constitutional
mandate, in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and
aspect of petitioner's detention from the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the
moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition. Only after such a scrutiny can the
court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied.

23. The submission that a person may be detained indefinitely without any charges and the
courts cannot inquire into the legality of the restraint goes against the spirit and letter of the
Constitution and does violence to the basic precepts of human rights and a democratic
society.

The Right to Bail.

24. Next to life a man loves his freedom. Some men love their freedom even more than their
life.

25. In all criminal prosecutions the accused is presumed innocent. Because of this
presumption and inasmuch as every man has a natural desire to be free, our Constitution laid
down the right to bail in these words:

SEC. 18. All persons, except those charged with capital offenses when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties. Excessive bail shall not be required. 11

26. Although martial law was terminated on January 17, 1981, by virtue of Proclamation No.
2045 of the President of the Philippines, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus continues
to be suspended in the two autonomous regions in Mindanao and in all other places with
respect to certain offenses, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President/Prime Minister of the

Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do
hereby revoke Proclamation No. 1081 (Proclaiming a State of Martial Law in the
Philippines) and Proclamation No. 1104 (Declaring the Continuation of Martial
Law) and proclaim the termination of the state of martial law throughout the
Philippines; Provided, that the call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion
shall continue to be in force and effect; and Provided that in the two
autonomous regions in Mindanao, upon the request of the residents therein,
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall continue;
and in all other places the suspension of the privilege of the writ shall also
continue with respect to persons at present detained as well as others who
may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other
crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the occasion
therefore, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith. ... (Presidential
Proclamation No. 2045).

27. Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But because the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus remains suspended "with respect to persons at present detained
as well as other who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes
and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the occasion thereof, or incident
thereto, or in connection therewith," the natural consequence is that the right to bail for the
commission of anyone of the said offenses is also suspended. To hold otherwise would
defeat the very purpose of the suspension. Therefore, where the offense for which the
detainee was arrested is anyone of the said offenses he has no right to bail even after the
charges are filed in court.

28. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute
direct attacks on the life of the State.

29. Just as an individual has right to self-defense when his life is endangered, so does the
State. The suspension of the privilege of the writ is to enable the State to hold in preventive
imprisonment pending investigation and trial those persons who plot against it and commit
acts that endanger the State's very existence. For this measure of self-defense to be
effective, the right to bail must also be deemed suspended with respect to these offenses.

30. However, there is a difference between preventive and punitive imprisonment. Where the
filing of charges in court or the trial of such charges already filed becomes protracted
without any justifiable reason, the detention becomes punitive in character and the detainee
regains his right to freedom.
The Charges of Torture.

31. When petitioners charged in their petitions that they had been tortured and maltreated,
the Court decided to appoint the City Fiscal of Quezon City to hear the charges and to receive
the evidence. Not because We are an investigating body. Nor are We a trier of facts. But
because petitioners' charges are material and relevant to the petitions before Us.

32. As mentioned earlier, the Court Commissioner submitted the transcript of the
proceedings held before him. We will not pass upon the merits of the torture charges.
However, they should be filed before the body which has jurisdiction over them as provided
for in Presidential Decrees Nos. 1822, 1822-A and 1850.

33. The present form of our government, to all intents and purposes, merged the executive
and legislative branches into one. Members of parliament are at the same time cabinet
ministers. Under the system of checks and balances ordained by the Constitution, the
judiciary serves as the check and balance to the merged executive and legislative branches.
The judiciary is therefore called upon to express its thoughts on areas outside the traditional
and narrow confines of decision making, with the end in view that together we may explore
the free market of Ideas and arrive at what is best for our country and our people.

34. Our people cry out for a better life. They want more food in their stomachs, roofs over
their heads, health services for themselves and their families, education for their children,
and other necessities that make life worth living. They cannot be denied. They want it and
they want it now. Timely indeed are the thrusts of the KKK and the BLISS programs.

35. However, we cannot lead them to a truly better life, unless we achieve complete peace in
our land; and we cannot have complete peace unless we improve the administration of
justice.

36. It was a wise man who once said: "Tell me how a country's poor receive their justice and I
will tell you how stable its government is." 12

37. Whenever we speak of the administration of justice we refer to four principal areas: the
preservation of peace and order which is the primary task of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the National Integrated Police, both under the Ministry of Defense; the
investigation and prosecution of offenses and the administration of our penal system which
are under the Ministry of Justice; the application and interpretation of laws and the trial and
adjudication of cases which fall under the jurisdiction of the courts; and appearance as
counsel for the government particularly in appealed criminal cases and as counsel for the
Commission on Elections, Securities and Exchange Commission, and others, which is the
responsibility of the Office of the Solicitor General. In everyone of these areas much can be
done to achieve our ultimate goal-that in this fair land of ours, no man, no matter how
humble, no matter how poor shall thirst for justice.

38. Our machinery of justice should be geared towards helping and protecting the poor
among us. Not knowing their rights, not having the means to pay for the services of a lawyer,
possessing no influence whatsoever, they are invariably the victims of injustice. The affluent
can take care of themselves. They are better aware of their rights, they have influence, and
they can engage the services of the best counsel. But the poor can only pray to God and
hope to find relief in the system of justice established by their government.

39. We must open all avenues for complaints and keep them open so that the grievance
procedure may be made more readily available to the masses of our people. Only by knowing
their needs can we give them what they rightfully deserve.

40. It is undeniable that throughout the length and breadth of our land, lawlessness and
disorder have increased and continue to increase to undesirable proportions. It is wishful
thinking to believe otherwise. An efforts must be exerted now to reverse the trend. We cannot
afford any delay. And we should begin by bringing to the bar of justice the culprits in
particular who burned and destroyed public property, and attacked, kidnapped and killed
public functionaries. For the questions may validly be asked: If the government cannot
protect public property, how can it protect private property? If the government cannot
guarantee the safety and lives of its officials, how can it guarantee the safety and lives of
private individuals?

41. The investigation and prosecution of cases should be further improved so that only
meritorious cases shall reach the courts, thus contributing to the unclogging of court
dockets. Many criminal cases initiated by complainants are just harassment suits and should
never have been filed in court. In the process, it is required that all fiscals be appointed in a
permanent capacity. Their security of tenure is the foundation stone of their independence.
Our penal system should be further updated to make more effective the rehabilitation of
criminals. Let us do away with instances of first offenders who serve sentence in order to be
reformed but who come out instead as hardened criminals.

42. And with the judicial revamp just effected under B.P. 129, the trial and decision making
process has been modified and vastly improved to achieve better results. But it must be
remembered that courts which are not filled are as good as no courts at all. Therefore, more
appointments to the existing vacancies should be made.

43. One lesson our people have learned-painfully but well-is that politics and a good
administration of justice-like oil and water-do not mix; that when politics infiltrates the
administration of justice, injustice is often the outcome. In some jurisdictions of the United
States, there are sheriffs (peace officers) and district attorneys (prosecutors) who are elected
by the voters and who run for office as the candidates of a political party. In the Philippines
such a system would never work because in our culture we have values peculiarly our own-
value like "utang na loob", "compadre", "pakikisama", "tayu-tayo", "bigayan", "bata ko",
"amo ko", and the "god- father mentality". Values like these have derailed and may derail the
administration of justice. Political followers commit abuses in the belief that come what may
their political bosses would shield them from punishment. Can you imagine how criminal
cases would be investigated and prosecuted if fiscals (prosecutors) were chosen by
election? How would our laws be enforced if policemen and members of the Armed Forces
were elected by the people? And yet the heads of the Ministries of Justice and Defense and
the Office of the Solicitor General are all active politicians.

44. The burdens of office fall heavily on their shoulders. Perhaps it is time we relieve them of
the additional burdens that being politicians entail. Our Constitution foresaw the need for
heads of ministries who are not active politicians in providing that ". . . . At least a majority of
the Members of the Cabinet who are heads of ministries shall come from the Regional
Representations of the Batasang Pambansa. . . ." 13

45. The campaign against venality in office-malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfesance

should be pursued with renewed vigor. For graft and corruption are like termites gnawing
away the foundation of government. The harm done is sometimes not realized; or even if
realized, under- estimated. In the process let us remember to stress preventive measures to
save public property from loss.

46. The communist threat remains a nagging problem of government. Whether Marxist,
Maoist, Leninist, aided by the New People's Army, rebels, radicals, and lawless elements,
they all have but one aim-one single purpose-one defined objective: to bring down by
violence the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and to forcibly seize political
power in order that they may replace our existing political, social, economic, and legal order
with an entirely new one based on communism.

47. Once before, in the early fifties, communists threatened the established order. They were
driven back by the Armed Forces, mainly because of the support of our people. We must
keep, strengthen and solidify the sympathy, faith, loyalty, and trust in the government of our
brothers in the rural areas. Guns and bullets alone will not do it. We can accomplish this only
by giving them better government. It is a condition sine qua non to achieve success in the
fight against subversion.

48. By and large, the Armed Forces are composed of good and disciplined men. However,
there are those who are not worthy of the uniforms they wear. Not a few have enriched
themselves by abusing the powers of their position. Some are involved in extortion,
smuggling, and kidnapping for ransom. There are others who maintain gambling, drug rings,
and prostitution dens. And still others have committed robbery, rape, murder, and other
offenses. The campaign to rid the organization of such misfits should be carried out with
missionary zeal. For indeed victims of abuse are often alienated from the government.

49. The Filipinos are a God-loving and a God-fearing people. We believe in peace and
freedom. We believe in the family and its strong ties. We can never willingly accept
communism and what it stands for.

50. While the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the
rebels, and the lawless with all the means at its command, it should always be remembered
that whatever action is taken must always be within the framework of our Constitution and
our laws.
51. When the judgment of history is written, as leaders of our people, we shall be asked to
account not only for what we did, not only for what we did not do, but also for what visions
we have today of our tomorrow.

52. What will be our answer?

53. WHEREFORE, as aforestated, the petitions should be, as they are hereby, DISMISSED.
With costs against the petitioners.

54. SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 71208-09 August 30, 1985

SATURNINA GALMAN AND REYNALDO GALMAN, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE MANUEL PAMARAN AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICES
AUGUSTO AMORES AND BIENVENIDO VERA CRUZ OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE
HONORABLE BERNARDO FERNANDEZ, TANODBAYAN, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER, MAJOR
GENERAL PROSPERO OLIVAS, SGT. PABLO MARTINEZ, SGT. TOMAS FERNANDEZ, SGT.
LEONARDO MOJICA SGT. PEPITO TORIO, SGT. PROSPERO BONA AND AlC ANICETO
ACUPIDO, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 71212-13 August 30, 1985

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the TANODBAYAN (OMBUDSMAN), petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER, MAJOR GEN. PROSPERO OLIVAS, SGT.
PABLO MARTINEZ, SGT. TOMAS FERNANDEZ, SGT. LEONARDO MOJICA, SGT. PEPITO
TORIO, SGT. PROSPERO BONA AND AIC ANICETO ACUPIDO, respondents.

CUEVAS, JR., J.:

On August 21, 1983, a crime unparalleled in repercussions and ramifications was committed inside
the premises of the Manila International Airport (MIA) in Pasay City. Former Senator Benigno S.
Aquino, Jr., an opposition stalwart who was returning to the country after a long-sojourn abroad, was
gunned down to death. The assassination rippled shock-waves throughout the entire country which
reverberated beyond the territorial confines of this Republic. The after-shocks stunned the nation
even more as this ramified to all aspects of Philippine political, economic and social life.

To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free, unlimited and
exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the tragedy, 1 P.D. 1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc
Fact Finding Board which later became more popularly known as the Agrava Board. 2 Pursuant to the
powers vested in it by P.D. 1886, the Board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses
appeared and testified and/or produced documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a
subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the Board Among the witnesses who appeared,
testified and produced evidence before the Board were the herein private respondents General Fabian C.
Ver, Major General Prospero Olivas, 3 Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo Mojica,
Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt. Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido. 4

UPON termination of the investigation, two (2) reports were submitted to His Excellency, President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. One, by its Chairman, the Hon. Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava; and another
one, jointly authored by the other members of the Board namely: Hon. Luciano Salazar, Hon.
Amado Dizon, Hon. Dante Santos and Hon. Ernesto Herrera. 'the reports were thereafter referred
and turned over to the TANODBAYAN for appropriate action. After conducting the necessary
preliminary investigation, the TANODBAYAN 5 filed with the SANDIGANBAYAN two (2) Informations for
MURDER-one for the killing of Sen. Benigno S. Aquino which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10010
and another, criminal Case No. 10011, for the killing of Rolando Galman, who was found dead on the
airport tarmac not far from the prostrate body of Sen. Aquino on that same fateful day. In both criminal
cases, private respondents were charged as accessories, along with several principals, and one
accomplice.

Upon arraignment, all the accused, including the herein private ate Respondents pleaded NOT
GUILTY.

In the course of the joint trial of the two (2) aforementioned cases, the Prosecution represented by
the Office of the petition TANODBAYAN, marked and thereafter offered as part of its evidence, the
individual testimonies of private respondents before the Agrava Board. 6 Private respondents, through
their respective counsel objected to the admission of said exhibits. Private respondent Gen. Ver filed a
formal "Motion to Exclude Testimonies of Gen. Fabian C. Ver before the Fact Finding Board as Evidence
against him in the above-entitled cases" 7 contending that its admission will be in derogation of his
constitutional right against self-incrimination and violative of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. He
prayed that his aforesaid testimony be rejected as evidence for the prosecution. Major Gen. Olivas and
the rest of the other private respondents likewise filed separate motions to exclude their respective
individual testimonies invoking the same ground. 8 Petitioner TANODBAYAN opposed said motions
contending that the immunity relied upon by the private respondents in support of their motions to exclude
their respective testimonies, was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their right against
self-incrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board. 9 Respondent SANDIGANBAYAN ordered the
TANODBAYAN and the private respondents to submit their respective memorandum on the issue after
which said motions will be considered submitted for resolution. 10

On May 30, 1985, petitioner having no further witnesses to present and having been required to
make its offer of evidence in writing, respondent SANDIGANBAYAN, without the pending motions for
exclusion being resolved, issued a Resolution directing that by agreement of the parties, the pending
motions for exclusion and the opposition thereto, together with the memorandum in support thereof,
as well as the legal issues and arguments, raised therein are to be considered jointly in the Court's
Resolution on the prosecution's formal offer of exhibits and other documentary evidences. 11 On June
3, 1985, the prosecution made a written "Formal Offer of Evidence" which includes, among others, the
testimonies of private respondents and other evidences produced by them before the Board, all of which
have been previously marked in the course of the trial. 12
All the private respondents objected to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence on the same
ground relied upon by them in their respective motion for exclusion.

On June 13, 1985, respondent SANDIGANBAYAN issued a Resolution, now assailed in these two
(2) petitions, admitting all the evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or
other evidence produced by the private respondents in view of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. 13

Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the said Resolution having been DENIED, they now
come before Us by way of certiorari 14 praying for the amendment and/or setting aside of the challenged
Resolution on the ground that it was issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Private prosecutor below, as counsel for the mother of deceased
Rolando Galman, also filed a separate petition for certiorari 15 on the same ground. Having arisen from the
same factual beginnings and raising practically Identical issues, the two (2) petitioners were consolidated
and will therefore be jointly dealt with and resolved in this Decision.

The crux of the instant controversy is the admissibility in evidence of the testimonies given by the
eight (8) private respondents who did not invoke their rights against self-incrimination before the
Agrava Board.

It is the submission of the prosecution, now represented by the petitioner TANODBAYAN, that said
testimonies are admissible against the private respondents, respectively, because of the latter's
failure to invoke before the Agrava Board the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. Since private
respondents did not invoke said privilege, the immunity did not attach. Petitioners went further by
contending that such failure to claim said constitutional privilege amounts to a waiver thereof. 16 The
private respondents, on the other hand, claim that notwithstanding failure to set up the privilege against
self- incrimination before the Agrava Board, said evidences cannot be used against them as mandated by
Section 5 of the said P.D. 1886. They contend that without the immunity provided for by the second
clause of Section 5, P.D. 1886, the legal compulsion imposed by the first clause of the same Section
would suffer from constitutional infirmity for being violative of the witness' right against self-
incrimination. 17 Thus, the protagonists are locked in horns on the effect and legal significance of failure to
set up the privilege against self-incrimination.

The question presented before Us is a novel one. Heretofore, this Court has not been previously
called upon to rule on issues involving immunity statutes. The relative novelty of the question
coupled with the extraordinary circumstance that had precipitated the same did nothing to ease the
burden of laying down the criteria upon which this Court will henceforth build future jurisprudence on
a heretofore unexplored area of judicial inquiry. In carrying out this monumental task, however, We
shall be guided, as always, by the constitution and existing laws.

The Agrava Board, 18 came into existence in response to a popular public clamor that an impartial and
independent body, instead of any ordinary police agency, be charged with the task of conducting the
investigation. The then early distortions and exaggerations, both in foreign and local media, relative to the
probable motive behind the assassination and the person or persons responsible for or involved in the
assassination hastened its creation and heavily contributed to its early formation. 19

Although referred to and designated as a mere Fact Finding Board, the Board is in truth and in fact,
and to all legal intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only with the function of determining the
facts and circumstances surrounding the killing, but more importantly, the determination of the
person or persons criminally responsible therefor so that they may be brought before the bar of
justice. For indeed, what good will it be to the entire nation and the more than 50 million Filipinos to
know the facts and circumstances of the killing if the culprit or culprits will nevertheless not be dealt
with criminally? This purpose is implicit from Section 12 of the said Presidential Decree, the pertinent
portion of which provides

SECTION 12. The findings of the Board shall be made public. Should the findings
warrant the prosecution of any person, the Board may initiate the filing of proper
complaint with the appropriate got government agency. ... (Emphasis supplied)

The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other similar investigation of its sort, to the
ascertainment and/or determination of the culprit or culprits, their consequent prosecution and
ultimately, their conviction. And as safeguard, the P.D. guarantees "any person called to testify
before the Board the right to counsel at any stage of the proceedings." 20 Considering the foregoing
environmental settings, it cannot be denied that in the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned
to testify will include not merely plain witnesses but also those suspected as authors and co-participants
in the tragic killing. And when suspects are summoned and called to testify and/or produce evidence, the
situation is one where the person testifying or producing evidence is undergoing investigation for the
commission of an offense and not merely in order to shed light on the facts and surrounding
circumstances of the assassination, but more importantly, to determine the character and extent of his
participation therein.

Among this class of witnesses were the herein private respondents, suspects in the said
assassination, all of whom except Generals Ver and Olivas, were detained (under technical arrest) at
the time they were summoned and gave their testimonies before the Agrava Board. This
notwithstanding, Presidential Decree No. 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. They were
compelled to testify or be witnesses against themselves. Section 5 of P.D. 1886 leave them no
choice. They have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if
they failed or refused to do so. 21 The jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars even before
conviction dangled before their very eyes. Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness
against themselves, both of which are sacrosantly enshrined and protected by our fundamental law. 21-
a Both these constitutional rights (to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against
himself) were right away totally foreclosed by P.D. 1886. And yet when they so testified and produced
evidence as ordered, they were not immune from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them.

Of course, it may be argued is not the right to remain silent available only to a person undergoing
custodial interrogation? We find no categorical statement in the constitutional provision on the matter
which reads:

... Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. ... 22 (Emphasis
supplied)

Since the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, we now have a mass of jurisprudence 23 on this specific
portion of the subject provision. In all these cases, it has been categorically declared that a person
detained for the commission of an offense undergoing investigation has a right to be informed of his right
to remain silent, to counsel, and to an admonition that any and all statements to be given by him may be
used against him. Significantly however, there has been no pronouncement in any of these cases nor in
any other that a person similarly undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense, if not
detained, is not entitled to the constitutional admonition mandated by said Section 20, Art. IV of the Bill of
Rights.

The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term "custodial" by having it
inserted between the words "under" and investigation", as in fact the sentence opens with the phrase
"any person " goes to prove that they did not adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda
doctrine. 24 Neither are we impressed by petitioners' contention that the use of the word "confession" in
the last sentence of said Section 20, Article 4 connotes the Idea that it applies only to police investigation,
for although the word "confession" is used, the protection covers not only "confessions" but also
"admissions" made in violation of this section. They are inadmissible against the source of the confession
or admission and against third person. 25

It is true a person in custody undergoing investigation labors under a more formidable ordeal and
graver trying conditions than one who is at liberty while being investigated. But the common
denominator in both which is sought to be avoided is the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the
person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to
prosecute and thereafter convict him. This is the lamentable situation we have at hand.

All the private respondents, except Generals Ver and Olivas, are members of the military contingent
that escorted Sen. Aquino while disembarking from the plane that brought him home to Manila on
that fateful day. Being at the scene of the crime as such, they were among the first line of suspects in
the subject assassination. General Ver on the other hand, being the highest military authority of his
co-petitioners labored under the same suspicion and so with General Olivas, the first designated
investigator of the tragedy, but whom others suspected, felt and believed to have bungled the case.
The papers, especially the foreign media, and rumors from uglywagging tongues, all point to them as
having, in one way or another participated or have something to do, in the alleged conspiracy that
brought about the assassination. Could there still be any doubt then that their being asked to testify,
was to determine whether they were really conspirators and if so, the extent of their participation in
the said conspiracy? It is too taxing upon one's credulity to believe that private respondents' being
called to the witness stand was merely to elicit from them facts and circumstances surrounding the
tragedy, which was already so abundantly supplied by other ordinary witnesses who had testified
earlier. In fact, the records show that Generals Ver and Olivas were among the last witnesses called
by the Agrava Board. The subject matter dealt with and the line of questioning as shown by the
transcript of their testimonies before the Agrava Board, indubitably evinced purposes other than
merely eliciting and determining the so-called surrounding facts and circumstances of the
assassination. In the light of the examination reflected by the record, it is not far-fetched to conclude
that they were called to the stand to determine their probable involvement in the crime being
investigated. Yet they have not been informed or at the very least even warned while so testifying,
even at that particular stage of their testimonies, of their right to remain silent and that any statement
given by them may be used against them. If the investigation was conducted, say by the PC, NBI or
by other police agency, all the herein private respondents could not have been compelled to give any
statement whether incriminatory or exculpatory. Not only that. They are also entitled to be
admonished of their constitutional right to remain silent, to counsel, and be informed that any and all
statements given by them may be used against them. Did they lose their aforesaid constitutional
rights simply because the investigation was by the Agrava Board and not by any police investigator,
officer or agency? True, they continued testifying. May that be construed as a waiver of their rights to
remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against themselves? The answer is yes, if they
have the option to do so. But in the light of the first portion of Section 5 of P.D. 1886 and the
awesome contempt power of the Board to punish any refusal to testify or produce evidence, We are
not persuaded that when they testified, they voluntarily waived their constitutional rights not to be
compelled to be a witness against themselves much less their right to remain silent.

Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of

violence; it may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates
to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his
capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion
'tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant. 26

Similarly, in the case of Louis J. Lefkowitz v. Russel 27 Turley" citing Garrity vs. New Jersey" where
certain police officers summoned to an inquiry being conducted by the Attorney General involving the
fixing of traffic tickets were asked questions following a warning that if they did not answer they would be
removed from office and that anything they said might be used against them in any criminal proceeding,
and the questions were answered, the answers given cannot over their objection be later used in their
prosecutions for conspiracy. The United States Supreme Court went further in holding that:

the protection of the individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment against coerced
statements prohibits use in subsequent proceedings of statements obtained under
threat or removal from office, and that it extends to all, whether they are policemen or
other members of the body politic. 385 US at 500, 17 L Ed. 562. The Court also held
that in the context of threats of removal from office the act of responding to
interrogation was not voluntary and was not an effective waiver of the privilege
against self- incrimination.

To buttress their precarious stand and breathe life into a seemingly hopeless cause, petitioners and
amicus curiae (Ex-Senator Ambrosio Padilla) assert that the "right not to be compelled to be a
witness against himself" applies only in favor of an accused in a criminal case. Hence, it may not be
invoked by any of the herein private respondents before the Agrava Board. The Cabal vs.
Kapunan 28 doctrine militates very heavily against this theory. Said case is not a criminal case as its title
very clearly indicates. It is not People vs. Cabal nor a prosecution for a criminal offense. And yet, when
Cabal refused to take the stand, to be sworn and to testify upon being called as a witness for complainant
Col. Maristela in a forfeiture of illegally acquired assets, this Court sustained Cabal's plea that for him to
be compelled to testify will be in violation of his right against self- incrimination. We did not therein state
that since he is not an accused and the case is not a criminal case, Cabal cannot refuse to take the
witness stand and testify, and that he can invoke his right against self-incrimination only when a question
which tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is profounded to him. Clearly then, it is not the
character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. The privilege has
consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which
punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not. 29 If in a mere forfeiture case
where only property rights were involved, "the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself" is
secured in favor of the defendant, then with more reason it cannot be denied to a person facing
investigation before a Fact Finding Board where his life and liberty, by reason of the statements to be
given by him, hang on the balance. Further enlightenment on the subject can be found in the historical
background of this constitutional provision against self- incrimination. The privilege against self-
incrimination is guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In the Philippines, the
same principle obtains as a direct result of American influence. At first, the provision in our organic laws
were similar to the Constitution of the United States and was as follows:

That no person shall be ... compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against

himself. 30

As now worded, Section 20 of Article IV reads:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said
provision also applicable to cases other than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled
to testify against himself" applies to the herein private respondents notwithstanding that the
proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case

No doubt, the private respondents were not merely denied the afore-discussed sacred constitutional
rights, but also the right to "due process" which is fundamental fairness. 31 Quoting the highly-
respected eminent constitutionalist that once graced this Court, the former Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando, due process

... is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.

Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due
process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the
bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any
official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly, it has been Identified as
freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair
play (Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, 1983, pp. 32-33). It
exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice and judges the act of officialdom of
whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that
reflect (democratic) traditions of legal and political thought." (Frankfurter, Hannah v.
Larche 1960, 363 US 20, at 487). It is not a narrow or '"echnical conception with
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances."(Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy 1961, 367 US 1230) Decisions based on such a clause requiring a 'close
and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society. (Bartkus vs. Illinois,
1959, 359 US 121). Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrases. (Pearson v. McGraw, 1939, 308 US 313).

Our review of the pleadings and their annexes, together with the oral arguments, manifestations and
admissions of both counsel, failed to reveal adherence to and compliance with due process. The
manner in which the testimonies were taken from private respondents fall short of the constitutional
standards both under the DUE PROCESS CLAUSE and under the EXCLUSIONARY RULE in
Section 20, Article IV. In the face of such grave constitutional infirmities, the individual testimonies of
private respondents cannot be admitted against them in ally criminal proceeding. This is true
regardless of absence of claim of constitutional privilege or of the presence of a grant of immunity by
law. Nevertheless, We shall rule on the effect of such absence of claim to the availability to private
respondents of the immunity provided for in Section 5, P.D. 1886 which issue was squarely raised
and extensively discussed in the pleadings and oral arguments of the parties.

Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants "use immunity"; and the
other, which grants what is known as "transactional immunity." The distinction between the two is as
follows: "Use immunity" prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in
connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. On the other hand, "transactional immunity"
grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony
relates." 32 Examining Presidential Decree 1886, more specifically Section 5 thereof, which reads:

SEC. 5. No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing
books, records, correspondence, documents, or other evidence in obedience to a
subpoena issued by the Board on the ground that his testimony or the evidence
required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but
his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in
connection with any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled,
after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce
evidence, except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from
prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying, nor shall he be
exempt from demotion or removal from office. (Emphasis supplied)

it is beyond dispute that said law belongs to the first type of immunity statutes. It grants merely
immunity from use of any statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by
reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do not render the
witness immuned from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self-
incrimination. He is merely saved from the use against him of such statement and nothing more.
Stated otherwise ... he still runs the risk of being prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self-
incrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of due process, demands that private
respondents should have been informed of their rights to remain silent and warned that any and all
statements to be given by them may be used against them. This, they were denied, under the
pretense that they are not entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them.

It is for this reason that we cannot subscribe to the view adopted and urged upon Us by the
petitioners that the right against self-incrimination must be invoked before the Board in order to
prevent use of any given statement against the testifying witness in a subsequent criminal
prosecution. A literal interpretation fashioned upon Us is repugnant to Article IV, Section 20 of the
Constitution, which is the first test of admissibility. It reads:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under

investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him.
Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
(Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision renders inadmissible any confession obtained in violation thereof. As
herein earlier discussed, this exclusionary rule applies not only to confessions but also to
admissions, 33 whether made by a witness in any proceeding or by an accused in a criminal proceeding
or any person under investigation for the commission of an offense. Any interpretation of a statute which
will give it a meaning in conflict with the Constitution must be avoided. So much so that if two or more
constructions or interpretations could possibly be resorted to, then that one which will avoid
unconstitutionality must be adopted even though it may be necessary for this purpose to disregard the
more usual and apparent import of the language used. 34 To save the statute from a declaration of
unconstitutionality it must be given a reasonable construction that will bring it within the fundamental
law. 35 Apparent conflict between two clauses should be harmonized. 36

But a literal application of a requirement of a claim of the privilege against self- incrimination as a
condition sine qua non to the grant of immunity presupposes that from a layman's point of view, he
has the option to refuse to answer questions and therefore, to make such claim. P.D. 1886, however,
forecloses such option of refusal by imposing sanctions upon its exercise, thus:

SEC. 4. The Board may hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and impose
appropriate penalties therefor. A person guilty of .... including ... refusal to be sworn
or to answer as a witness or to subscribe to an affidavit or deposition when lawfully
required to do so may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt by the Board. ...

Such threat of punishment for making a claim of the privilege leaves the witness no choice but to
answer and thereby forfeit the immunity purportedly granted by Sec. 5. The absurdity of such
application is apparent Sec. 5 requires a claim which it, however, forecloses under threat of
contempt proceedings against anyone who makes such claim. But the strong testimonial compulsion
imposed by Section 5 of P.D. 1886 viewed in the light of the sanctions provided in Section 4,infringes
upon the witness' right against self-incrimination. As a rule, such infringement of the constitutional
right renders inoperative the testimonial compulsion, meaning, the witness cannot be compelled to
answer UNLESS a co-extensive protection in the form of IMMUNITY is offered. 37 Hence, under the
oppressive compulsion of P.D. 1886, immunity must in fact be offered to the witness before he can be
required to answer, so as to safeguard his sacred constitutional right. But in this case, the compulsion has
already produced its desired results the private respondents had all testified without offer of immunity.
Their constitutional rights are therefore, in jeopardy. The only way to cure the law of its unconstitutional
effects is to construe it in the manner as if IMMUNITY had in fact been offered. We hold, therefore, that in
view of the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to answer questions under Sec. 4 of P.D.
1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized under Section 5 of the same law. The
applicability of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886 cannot be made to depend on a claim of the privilege
against self-incrimination which the same law practically strips away from the witness.

With the stand we take on the issue before Us, and considering the temper of the times, we run the
risk of being consigned to unpopularity. Conscious as we are of, but undaunted by, the frightening
consequences that hover before Us, we have strictly adhered to the Constitution in upholding the
rule of law finding solace in the view very aptly articulated by that well-known civil libertarian and
admired defender of human rights of this Court, Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, in the case
of People vs. Manalang 38 and we quote:
 I am completely conscious of the need for a balancing of the interests of society with
the rights and freedoms of the individuals. I have advocated the balancing-of-
interests rule in an situations which call for an appraisal of the interplay of conflicting
interests of consequential dimensions. But I reject any proposition that would blindly
uphold the interests of society at the sacrifice of the dignity of any human being.
(Emphasis supplied)

Lest we be misunderstood, let it be known that we are not by this disposition passing upon the guilt
or innocence of the herein private respondents an issue which is before the Sandiganbayan. We are
merely resolving a question of law and the pronouncement herein made applies to all similarly
situated, irrespective of one's rank and status in society.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS and finding the instant petitions without merit,
same are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 112983 March 22, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, and RENE SAGVAMAIJTE (at large), Accused, HECTOR
MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, Accused-Appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

As against a bustling city life, Britisher Horace William Barker, a consultant of the World Bank, and
his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza, chose the peace and quiet of a country home not any near the
metropolis of Manila or its environs, but in the rugged and mountainous terrain of Tuba, Benguet.
Perhaps they thought they were in a veritable paradise, beyond the reach of worldly distractions and
trouble when in the early morning of 27 August 91, in the, sanctity of their own home, Horace was
brutally slain and Teresita badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Sufficient
prima facie evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante, the victimsformer houseboy, as one of the
perpetrators of the That illusion was shattered ghastly crime.

As to Rene's co-conspirator, the, prosecution initially included one Richard Malig y Severino in the
information for robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries 1 filed on 19 November 1991 with
Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Benguet at La Trinidad, Benguet.

Only Richard Malig was arrested On 22 January 1992, prior to the arraignment of Richard Malig, the
prosecution filed a motion to amend the information 2 to implead as co-accused Hector Maqueda
alias Putol because the evaluation Of the evidence subsequently submitted established his complicity in
the crime, and at the hearing of the motion the following day, the Prosecutor further asked that accused
Richard Malig be dropped from the information because further evaluation of the evidence disclosed no
sufficient evidence against him. 3

The motion to drop Malig was granted and warrants for the arrest of accused Salvamante and
Maqueda were issued. Maqueda was subsequently arrested on 4 March 1992, and on 9 April 1992,
he filed an application for bail. 4 He categorically stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a
State witness in the above-entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this
case."

On 22 April 1992, the prosecution filed an Amended Informations 5 with only Salvamante and Maqueda
as the accused. Its accusatory portion reads as follows:

That on or about the 27th Of August, 1991, at Tagadi; Upper Tadiangan Municipality
of Tuba, Province Of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the, above-named accused, Conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding one another, armed with lead pipes, and with intent of gain and
against the will and consent of the owners thereof, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of Spouses TERESITA and WILLIAM
HORACE BARKER and with violence against and intimidation of the persons therein
ransack the place and take and carry away the following articles, to ,it:

[An enumeration and description of the articles follow]

all having a total value of TWO HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
FIFTY PESOS (P204.250.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to, the said Teresita
and William Horace Barker; that on the occasion and by reason of the said robbery;
both accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously repeatedly strike Teresita Barker
and William Horace Barker with lead pipes on the different Parts of their body,
leading to the death of William Horace Barker and inflicting various physical injuries
on the former which required medical attendance for a period of more than thirty (30)
days and have likewise incapacitated her from the performance of her, customary
labor for the same period of time.

Contrary to Law.

Since Rene Salvamante continues to elude arrest and has remained at large, trial proceeded
entered a plea of not guilty on 22 April 1992. 6

In its decision 7 Promulgated on 31 August 1993, the trial Maqueda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with homicide and serious physical Injuries and sentenced him to Suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim, Teresita M, Barker in the amount of P50,000.00 for the
death of William Horace Barker, court found accused Hector P41,681,00 representing actual expenses,
P100,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs."

The prosecution presented as its witnesses Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker, househelps Norie Dacara
and Julieta Villanueva, Mike Tayaban, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr., Francisco Cabotaje, prosecutor
Daniel Zarate, Ray Dean Salvosa, Glen Enriquez, SPO1 Rodolfo Tabadero, and Policarpio Cambod
in its evidence in chief and Fredesminda Castrence and SP03 Armando Molleno on rebuttal.
Accused Hector Maqueda took the witness stand and presented SPO1 Aurelio Sagun, Jr. in his
evidence in chief and Myrna Maqueda Katindig as his sour-rebuttal witness.

The version of the prosecution, as culled from the trial court's detailed and meticulous summary
thereof, is as follows:

Between 10:30 and 11:00 pm. of 26 August 1991, the spouses Horace William Barker and Teresita
Mendoza Barker repaired to their bedroom after Teresita had checked, as washer wont, the main
doors of their house to see if they had been locked and bolted.

At around 6:00 a.m. of the following day, 27 August 1991, Norie Dacara, a househelp of the Barkers
who shared a room with her cousin and fellow househelp, Julieta Villanueva, got up, opened the
door to the garage, went to the lavatory to wash her face, and proceeded to the toilet. When she
opened the door of the toilet and switched. on the light, she saw Rene Salvamante. She knew
Salvamante very well because he and his sister Melanie were the former househelps of the Barkers
whom she and Julieta Villanueva had replaced and because Salvamante had acquainted her on her
chores.

Salvamante suddenly strangled her. While she Was fighting back, Norie happened to turn her face
and she saw a fair-complexioned, tall man with a high-bridged nose at Salvamante's side, whom she
identified at the trial as Maqueda. After she broke free from Salvamante, Norie fled towards the
garage and shouted for help. Salvamante chased her and pulled her back inside the house.

Julieta Villanueva, who was awakened by the shouts of Norie, got out of her bed and upon opening
the door of her room, saw a man clad in maong jacket and short pants with 'his right hand
brandishing a lead pipe standing two meters in front of her. At the trial, She pointed to, accused
Maqueda as the man she saw then. (She got scared and immediately closed the door. Since the
door knob turned as if someone was forcing his way into the room, she held on to it and shouted for
help.

The shouts awakened Teresita Mendoza Barker. She rose from her bed and went out of the room,
leaving behind her husband who was still asleep; She went down the Stairs and proceeded t, the
dining room. She saw Salvamante and a companion who was a complete stranger to her. Suddenly
the two rushed towards her and beat her up with lead pipes. Despite her pleas to get what they want
and not to hurt her, they continued to beat her up until she lost consciousness. At the trial, she
pointed to accused Maqueda as Salvamante's companion.

Salvamante also hit Norie with the lead pipe on her back and at theback of her right hand. She fell
to the concrete floor, and after she had recovered, she ran to-the garage and hid under the car. After
a few seconds, ,he went near the door of the garage and because she could not open it, she called
Julieta. Julieta opened the door and they rushed to their room and closed the door. When they saw
that the door knob was being turned, they braced themselves against the door to prevent anyone
from entering. While locked in their room, they heard the moans of Mrs. Barker and the shouts of Mr.
Barker: "That's enough, that's enough, that's enough." When the noise stopped, Norie and Julieta
heard the sound of water flowing from the toilet and the barking of dogs.
At 7:00 a.m. of that same day, 27 August 1991, Mike Tabayan and Mark Pacio were resting in a
waiting shed beside the Asin road at Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, which is only a kilometer away from
the house of the Barkers. They saw two men approaching them from a curve. When the two men
reached the shed, he and Mark noticed that the taller of the two had an amputated left hand and a
right hand with a missing thumb and index finger. This man was carrying a black bag on his right
shoulder

Speaking in Tagalog, the taller man asked Mike and Mark whether the road they were following
would lead to Naguilian, La Union. Mike replied that it did not. Five minutes later, a passenger
jeepney bound for Baguio City and owned and driven by Ben Lusnong arrived at the waiting shed.
The two men bearded it, Mike again noticed that the taller man had the defects above mentioned
because the latter used his right hand with only three fingers to hold on to the bar of the jeepney as
he bearded it. In the Investigation conducted by the Tuba Police, he identified through a picture the
shorter man as Salvamante, and at the hearing, he pointed to Maqueda as the taller man.

At 9:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991, Norie and Julieta gathered bough courage to leave the room where
they had earlier barricaded themselves and proceed to the kitchen to get the key to the gate of the
garage. In the dining room, they saw the Barkers bathed in their own blood. Norie and Julieta rushed
out of the house and ran to the place of Janet Albon to seek help. After requesting Janet to call the
police, they returned to the Barker's house but did not enter it for fear of what they had seen earlier.
They just stayed near the road.

Soon after, security guards of the Baguio College Foundation (BCF) arrived. A team from the Baguio
City Police Station, headed by Police Officer Policarpio Cambod, and which included Dr. Perfecto
Micu of the City Health Department, also arrived. The team conducted an initial investigation only
because it found out that the scene of the crime was within the jurisdiction of the Tuba Police
Station, which, however, was difficult to get in touch with at that time. Dr. Perfecto Micu found the
body of Mr. Barker inside the Barker house and Cambod prepared a sketch (Exhibit "JJ") showing its
location.' They went around the house and found a lead pipe (Exhibit "AA") at the toilet, a black T-
shirt (Exhibit "CC"), and a green hand towel (Exhibit "DD"). He also discovered another lead pipe
(Exhibit "BB") at the back of the door of the house. He then interviewed the two househelps who
provided him with descriptions of the assailants. The team then left, leaving behind BCF Security
Officer Glen Enriquez and a security guard. Cambod prepared a report of his initial investigation
(Exhibit "KK").

Enriquez conducted his own investigation. At the master's bedroom, he saw several pieces of
jewelry scattered on the floor and an empty inner cabinet. He noticed footprints at the back of the
house, particularly at the riprap wall, and observed that the grass below it was parted as if someone
had passed through and created a trail amidst the grass down toward the Asin road of Tuba,
Benguet. Upon his request, a security guard of the BCF, Edgar Dalit, was sent to the Barker house
to secure the premises. Enriquez then left after Dalit's arrival.

At 5:00 p.m. of that same day, members of the Tuba Police Station arrived at theBarker house to
conduct their investigation. Enriquez, who in the meantime was called by Dalit, returned to the
Barker house.
The lead pipes, black T-shirt, and the green hand towel recovered from the Barker house by the
Baguio City Police were first brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Benguet, and then to the court.

The body of William Horace Barker was taken to the Baguio Funeral Homes at Naguilian Road,
Baguio City, where it was examined by Dr. Francisco P. Cabotaje, MunicipalHealth Officer of Tuba,
Benguet. H, found in it twenty-seven injuries, which could have been caused by a blunt instrument,
determined the cause of death as hemorrhagic shock, and then issued a death certificate (Exhibits
"P," "O," and "R").

The wounded Teresita Barker was brought to the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center
where she was treated and confined for eight days. The attending physician, Dr. Francisco L.
Hernandez, Jr., first saw her at around 11:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991. She was in a comatose state.
Dr. Hernandez found that she sustained multiple lacerations primarily an the left side of the occipital
area, bleeding in the left ear, and bruises on the arm. One of the muscles adjoining her eyes was
paralyzed. She regained consciousness only after two days. Dr. Hernandez opined that Mrs.
Barker's injuries were caused by a blunt instrument, like a lead pipe, and concluded that if her
injuries had been left unattended, she would have died by noontime of 27 August 1991 due to
bleeding or hemorrhagic shock.

On 1 September 1991, a police team from the Tuba Police Station, Benguet, came to the hospital
bed of Mrs. Barker, showed her pictures of several persons, and asked her to identify the persons
who had assaulted her. She pointed to a person who turned out to be Richard Malig. When informed
of the investigation, Dr. Hernandez told the members of the team that it was improper for them to
conduct it without first consulting him since Mrs. Barker had not yet fully recovered consciousness.
Moreover, her eyesight had not yet improved, her visual acuity was impaired, and she had double
vision.

On 3 September 1991, the remains of Mr. Barker were cremated. Mrs. Barker was then discharged
from the hospital and upon getting home, tried to determine the items lost during the robbery. She
requested Glen Enriquez to get back the pieces of jewelry taken by the Tuba PNP (Exhibit "U"). The
Tuba PNP gave them to Enriquez (Exhibit "V"). Mrs. Barker discovered that her Canon camera, radio
cassette recorder (Exhibit "W-3"), and some pieces of jewelry (Exhibit "W-2") were missing. The
aggregate value of the missing items was P204,250.00. She then executed an affidavit on these
missing items (Exhibit "X.).

Mrs. Barker underwent a CT Scan at the St. Luke's Hospital in Quezon City. It was revealed that she
sustained a damaged artery on her left eye which could cause blindness. she then sought treatment
at the St. Luke's Roosevelt Hospital in New York (Exhibit "L") where she underwent an unsuccessful
operation. She likewise received treatment at the New York Medical Center (Exhibit "M").

On 29 November 1991, Ray Dean Salvosa, Executive Vice President of the BCF, ordered Glen
Enriquez to go to Guinyangan, Quezon, to coordinate with the police in determining the,
whereabouts of accused Rene Salvamante. In Guinyangan, Enriquez was able to obtain information
from the barangay captain, Basilio Requeron, that he saw Salvamante together with a certain "Putol"
in September 1991; however, they already left the place.
On 21 December 1991, Enriquez, Melanie Mendoza, and three others went back to Guinyangan to
find out whether Salvamante and "Putol" had returned. Upon being informed by Barangay Captain
Requeron that the two had not, Enriquez requested Requeron to notify him immediately once
Salvamante or "Putol" returned to Guinyangan,

On 4 March 1992, Requeron's daughter called up Enriquez to inform him that Putol," who is none
other than accused Hector Maqueda, had been arrested in Guinyangan. Enriquez and Maj. Rodolfo
Anagaran, Chief of the Tuba Police Station, together with another policeman, Proceeded to
Guinyangan. The Guinyangan Police Station turned over Maqueda to Maj. Anagaran who then
brought Maqueda to the Benguet Provincial Jail.

Before Maj. Anagaran's arrival at Guinyangan, Maqueda had been taken to the. headquarters of the
235th PNP Mobile Force Company at Sta. Maria, Calauag, Quezon. Its commanding officer, Maj.
Virgilio F. Rendon, directed SP03 Armando Molleno to get Maqueda's statement. He did so and
according to him, he informed Maqueda of his rights under the Constitution. Maqueda thereafter
signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit "LL") wherein he narrated his participation in the crime at
the Barker house on 27 August 1991.

On 9 April 1992, while he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit "GG-
6"). He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteeringto be a State witness in the above entitled
case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." Prosecutor Zarate then
had a talk with Maqueda regarding such statement and asked him if he was in the company of
Salvamante on 27 August 1991 in entering the house of the Barkers. After he received an affirmative
answer, Prosecutor Zarate told Maqueda that he would oppose the motion for bail since he,
Maqueda, was the only accused on trial (Exhibit "II").

In the meantime, Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the Office of Prosecutor Zarate and obtained
permission from the latter to talk to Maqueda. Salvosa then led Maqueda toward the balcony.
Maqueda narrated to Salvosa that Salvamante brought him to Baguio City in order to find a job as a
peanut vendor; Salvamante then brought him to the Barker house and it was only when they were at
the vicinity thereof that Salvamante revealed to him that his zeal purpose in going to Baguio City was
to rob the Barkers; he initially objected to the plan, but later on agreed to it; when they were in the
kitchen of the Barker house, one of the househelps was already there; Salvamante hit her with a
lead pipe and she screamed; then Mrs. Barker came down, forcing him, Maqueda, to attack her with
the lead pipe providedhim by Salvamante, After he felled Mrs. Barker, he helped Salvamante in
beating up Mr. Barker who had followed his wife downstairs. the Barkers were already unconscious
on the' floor, Salvamante went upstairs and a few minutes later came down bringing with him a radio
cassette and some pieces of jewelry.

Maqueda further divulged to Salvosa that they then changed clothes, went out of the house, walked
toward the road where they Saw two persons from whom they asked directions, and when a
passenger jeepney stopped and they were informed by the two Persons that it was bound for Baguio
City, he and Salvamante bearded it. They alighted somewhere along Albano Street in Baguio City
and walked until they reached the Philippine Rabbit Bus station where they boarded a bus for
Manila. 8
Accused Hector Maqueda put up the defense of denial and alibi. Hi, testimony is summarized by the
trial court in this wise:

Accused Hector Maqueda denied having anything to do with the crime. He stated
that O" August 27, 1991 he was at the polvoron factory owned by Minda Castrense
located at Lot 1, Block 21 Posadas Bayview Subdivision, Sukat, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila. He was employed as a caretaker Since July 5, 1991 and he worked
continuously there up to August 27, 1991, It was his sister, Myrna Katindig, who
found him the job as caretaker. A, caretaker, it was his duty to supervise the
employees in the factory and whenever his employer was not around, he was in
charge of the sales. He and his 8 co-employees all Sleep inside the factory.

On August 26, 1991, he reported for work although he could not recall what he did
that day. He slept inside the factory that night and on August 27, 1991, he was
teaching the new employees how to make the seasoning for the polvoron.

On December 20, 1991, he went home to Gapas, Guinyangan, Quezon Province as

it was his vacation time from his job at the polvoron factory. He was to be back at
work after New Year's Day in 1992. Upon alighting from the bus at Guinyangan,
Quezon, he saw accused Rene Salvamante. He knows accused Salvamante as they
were childhood playmates, having gone to the same elementary school. He had no
chance to talk to him that day when he saw him and so they just waved to each
other. He again saw accused Salvamante after Christmas day on the road beside
their (Salvamante) house. Salvamante invited him to go to Calauag, Quezon
Province and roam around. He agreed to go as he also wanted to visit his brother,
Jose Maqueda who resided at Sabangdos, Calauag, Quezon. When the two accused
were at Calauag, Salvamante asked Maqueda to accompany him /Salvamante) in
selling a cassette recorder which he said came from Baguio City. Accused Maqueda
knew that Salvamante worked in Baguio as the latter's mother told him about it. They
were able to sell the cassette recorder to Salvamante's aunt. They had their meal
and then went to visit accused Maqueda's brother. After that occasion, he never saw
accused Salvamante again. After his Christmas vacation, he went back to work a the
polvoron factory until February 29, 1992. One of his co-workers Roselyn Merca, who
was a townmate of his asked him to accompany her home as she was hard up in her
work at the factory. Hence, he accompanied Rosely home to Guinyangan, Quezon.
He was supposed to report back for work on March 2, 1992 but he was not able to as
he was arrested by members of the CAGFU at the house of Roselyn Merca when he
brought her home. He was then brought to the Guinyangan municipal jail, then to the
Tuba Police Station, Tuba, Benguet. There he was told to cooperate with the police in
arresting Salvamante so he would not stay long in the Province of Benguet. He was
also told that if he would point to accused Salvamante, he would be freed and he
could also become a state witness: He told them that he could attest to the fact that
he accompanied accused Salvamante in selling the cassette recorder.

On March 5, 1992, he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail at La Trinidad,

Benguet where he has remained under detention up to the present. 9
The prosecution rebutted the testimony of Hector Maqueda by presenting Fredesminda Castience
and SP03 Armando Molleno. Castrence, the owner of the polvoron factory where Maqueda worked,
testified that she started her business only on 30 August 1991 and thus it was impossible for her to
have hired Maqueda on 5 July 1991. SP03 Molleno declared that he informed Maqueda of his
constitutional rights before Maqueda was investigated and that Maqueda voluntarily and freely gave
his Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit "LL"). 10

Although the trial court had doubts on the identification of Maqueda by prosecution witnesses
Teresita Mendoza Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva and thus disregarded their
testimonies on this matter, it decreed a conviction "based on the confession and the proof of corpus
delicti" as well as on circumstantial evidence. It stated thus:

Since we have discarded the positive identification theory of the prosecution

pinpointing accused Maqueda as the culprit, can we still secure a conviction based
on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti as well as on circumstantial
evidence?

In order to establish the guilt of the accused through circumstantia1 evidence, the
following requisites must be present: 1) there must be more than One circumstance;
2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and 3) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt
(People vs. Pajarit, G.R. No. 82770, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 678). There must
be an unbroken chain of circamstances which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the defendant to the exclusion of all Others, as the author of
the crime (People vs. Abuyen, G.R. No. 77285, September 4, 1992, 213 SCRA 569).

The circumstances shown by the prosecution which tend to show the guilt of the
accused are:

1. A physical demonstration to which the accused and his counsel did not offer any
objection shows that despite his being handicapped, accused Maqueda could well
and easily grip a lead pipe and strike a cement post with such force that it produced
a resounding vibration. It is not farfetched then to conclude that accused Maqueda
could have easily beat Mr. Barker to death.

2. His presence within the vicinity of the crime scene right after the incident in the
company of accused Salvamante was testified to by Mike Tabayan, the only
prosecution witness who noticed the defective hands of the accused. As they had to
ask for directions from the witness in the Tagalog dialect shows that they were
strangers to the place

3. Accused Maqueda knows or is familiar with accused Rene Salvamante as they

from the same town. By his own testimony, accused Maqueda has established that
he Salvamante are close friends to the point that they went out together during the
Christmas vacation in 1991 and he even accompanied Salvamante in selling the
black radio cassette recorder.
 4. His Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit "HH") contains this statement that he is willing
and volunteering to be State witness in the above-entitled case, it the accused in
appearing that he is the least guilty along This in effect, supports his extrajudicial
confession trade to the police at Although he claims that he did not his signature
would lean his as he was just told that release from detention, this is a flimsy excuse
which cannot Had he not understood what the motion meant, he could have easily
asked his sister and brother-in-law what it meant seeing that their signatures up
already affixed on the motion.

5. This time, his admission to Prosecutor Zarate that he was at the Barker house that
fateful morning and his even more damaging admission to Ray Dean Salvosa as to
what he actually did can be considered as another circumstance to already bloster
the increasing circumstances against the accused.

6. The accused's defense is alibi. As stated in a long Line of cases, alibi is at best a
weak defense and easy of fabrication (People vs. Martinado, G.R. No. 92020,
October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 712). For alibi to be given credence, it must not only
appear that the accused interposing the same was at some other place but also that
it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission (People vs. Pugal, G.R. No. 90637, October 29, 1992, 215 SCRA 247).
This defense easily crumbles down as Tayaban placed accused Maqueda at vicinity
of the crime scene.

The combination of all these circumstances plus extrajudicial confession produce the
needed proof beyond reasonable doubt that indeed accused Maqueda is guilty of the
crime. 11

The extrajudicial confession referred to is the Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit: "LL") of Maqueda
taken by SP02 Molleno immediately after Maqueda was arrested.

Maqueda seasonably appealed to us his conviction. In his 14-page brief, he pleads that we acquit
him because the trial court committed this lone error:

. . . IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE

DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED. 12

Only three pages of the brief, typed double space, are devoted to his arguments which are anchored
on his alibi that at the time the crime Was committed he was not in Benguet but in Sukat,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, ad the failure of the star witnesses for the Prosecution to identify him. He
alleges that Mrs. Barker, when investigated at the hospital, Pointed to Richard Malig as the
companion of Rene Salvamante, and that when initially investigated, the two housemaids gave a
description of Salvamante's companion that fitted Richard Malig.

We find no merit in this appeal. As hereinafter shown, the defense of alibi is unconvincing.
The accused's arguments which stress the incredibility of the testimonies of Mrs. Barker and the
househelps identifying Maqueda are misdirected and misplaced because the trial court had ruled
that Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker and the two housemaids, Norie Dacara and Julieta Villanueva,
were not able to positively identify Magueda, The trial court based his conviction on his extrajudicial
confession and the proof of corpus delicti, as well as on circumstantial evidence. He should have
focused his attention and arguments on these.

From its ratiocinations, the trial court made a distinction between an extrajudicial confession
the Sinumpaang Salaysay and an extrajudicial admission the, verbal admissions to Prosecutor
Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa. A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to convince us that it is
an extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission. There is a distinction between. the
former and the latter as clearly shown in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which
read as follows:

Sec. 26. Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of party as to a

relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in
evidence against him.

In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is usually applied in

criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment
of his guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. 13 Wharton
distinguishes a confession from an admission as follows:

A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case,

of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused,
direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in connection with proof
of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than
a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in
itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the
ultimate fact of guilt. 14

And under Section 3 of Rule 133, an extrajudicial confession made by the accused is not sufficient
for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.

The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of accused Maqueda although it was taken
without the assistance of counsel because it was of the opinion that since an information had already
benefited in court against him and he was arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the
court, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was not, therefore, taken during custodial investigation. Hence,
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution providing as follows:
 Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

is not applicable, 15 i.e., the police investigation was " no longer within the ambit of a custodial
investigation." It heavily relied on People vs. Ayson 16 where this Court elucidated on the rights of a person
under custodial investigation and the rights of an accused after a case is filed in court. The trial court went
on to state:

At the time of the confession, the accused was already facing charges in court. He
no longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse
to be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such
refusal. And yet, despite his knowing fully well that a case had already been filed in
court, he still confessed when he did not have to do so. 17

The trial court then held that the admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay should not be tested
under the aforequoted Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution, but on the voluntariness of its
execution. Since voluntariness is presumed, Maqueda had the burden of proving otherwise, which
he failed to do and, hence, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was admissible against him.

As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial court
admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to prove the
truth of the admission because such testimony was objected to as hearsay. It said:

In any case, it is settled that when testimony is presented to establish not the truth
but the tenor of the statement or the fact that such statement was made, it is not
hearsay (People vs. Fule, G.R. No. 83027, February 28, 1992, 206 SCRA 652). 18

While we commend the efforts of the trial court to distinguish between the rights of a person under
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and his rights after a criminal complaint or information
had been filed against him, we cannot agree with its sweeping view that after such filing an accused
"no longer Has] the right to remain silent End to counsel but he [has] the right to refuge to be a
witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal." If this were so, then
there would be a hiatus in the criminal justice process where an accused is deprived of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. Such a view
would not only give a very restrictive application to Section 12(1); it would also diminish the said
accused's rights under Section 14(2) Article III of the Constitution,

The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section
12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal
complaint or information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the
commission of an offense." The direct and primary source of this Section 12(1) is the second
paragraph of Section 20, Article II of the 1973 Constitution which reads:
 Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right . . .

The first sentence to which it immediately follows refers to the right against self-incrimination
reading:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

which is now Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The incorporation of the second
paragraph of Section 20 in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 constitution was an acceptance of the
landmark doctrine laid down by the united States Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Arizona. 19 In that
case, the Court explicitly stated that the holding therein "is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is
an application of principles long recognized and applied in other settings." It went on to state its ruling:

Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow but
briefly stated, it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural
safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform
accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning the person
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence
of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of
these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If,
however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes
to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if
the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be
interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have
answered some question or volunteered some statements on his own does not
deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has
consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to a questioned. 20

It may be pointed out though that as formulated in the second paragraph of the aforementioned
Section 20, the word custudial, which was used in Miranda with reference to the investigation, was
excluded. In view thereof, in Galman vs. Pamaran, 21 this Court aptly observed:

The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term
"custodial" by having it inserted between the words "under" and "investigation," as in
fact the sentence opens with the phrase "any person" goes to prove that they did not
adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine.
Clearly then, the second paragraph of Section 20 has even broadened the application of Miranda by
making it applicable to the investigation for the commission of an offense of a person and in
custody. 22 Accordingly, as so formulated, the second paragraph of Section 20 changed the rule adopted
in People vs. Jose 23 that the rights of the accused only begin upon arraignment, Applying the second
paragraph of Section 20, this Court laid down this rule in Morales vs, Enrile: 24

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform
him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any.
He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested
shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses
by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the
presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on
his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid
unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of
the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

Note that the first sentence requires the arresting officer to inform the person to be arrested of the
reason for the arrest and show him "the warrant of arrest, if any." The underscored phrase simply
means that a case had been filed against him in a court of either preliminary or original jurisdiction
and that the court had issued the corresponding warrant of arrest. From the foregoing, it is clear that
the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under the second paragraph of
Section 20 are available to a person at any time before arraignment whenever he is investigated for
the commission of an offense. This paragraph was incorporated into Section 12(1), Article III of the
present Constitution with the following additional safeguards: (a) the counsel must be competent and
independent, preferably of his own choice, (b) if the party cannot afford the services of such counsel,
he must be provided with one, and (c) the rights therein cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.

Then, too, the right to be heard would be a farce if it did not include the right to counsel. 25 Thus,
Section 12(2), Article III of the present Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In People vs. Holgado, 26 this Court emphatically
declared:

One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no
person shall be-held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law",
and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In
criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it
does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or
educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
 because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen
more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the
right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not
enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not
enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that
the court should assign one de officio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant
him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.

It was, therefore, wrong for the trial court to hold that Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution is
strictly limited to custodial investigation and that it does not apply to a person against whom a
criminal complaint or information has already been filed because after its filing he loses his right to
remain silent and to counsel. If we follow the theory of the trial court, then police authorities and
other law enforcement agencies would have a heyday in extracting confessions or admissions from
accused persons after they had been arrested but before they are arraigned because at such stage
the accused persons are supposedly not entitled to the enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and
to counsel.

Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court and the accused is thereafter arrested by
virtue of a warrant of arrest, he must be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the
arresting officer must make a return of the warrant to the issuing judge, 27 and since the court has
already acquired jurisdiction over his person, it would be improper for any public officer Or law
enforcement agency to investigate him in connection with the commission of the offense for which he is
charged. If, nevertheless, he is subjected to such' investigation, then Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution and the jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied with.

The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SP02 Molleno after the former's arrest was taken in
palpable violation of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. As disclosed by a
reading thereof, Maqueda was not even told of any of his constitutional rights under the said section.
The statement was also taken in the absence of counsel. Such uncounselled Sinumpaang
Salaysay is wholly inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution
which reads:

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof

shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean Salvosa
stand on a different footing. These are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of
Rights.. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an
investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the
other admission, it was given to a private person. The provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily
limitations on government, declaring the rights that exist without governmental grant, that may not be
taken away by government and that government has the duty to protect; 28or restriction on the power
of government found "not in the particular specific types of action prohibited, but in the general principle
that keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that governmental power is not unlimited. 29 They are the
fundamental safeguards against aggressions of arbitrary power, 30 or state tyranny and abuse of authority.
In laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, the Constitution
did not govern the relationships between individuals. 31

Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in
evidence against the former Under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In Aballe vs;
People, 32 this Court held that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the
offense may be given in evidence against him and any person, otherwise competent to testify as a
witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he
heard and understood it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral confession; it suffices if he
gives its substance. By analogy, that rule applies to oral extrajudicial admissions.

To be added to Maqueda's extrajudicial admission is his Urgent Motion for Bail wherein he
explicitly .stated that "he is willing and volunteering to be a state witness in the above entitled case, it
appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case."

In the light of his admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa and his willingness to be a
state witness, Maqueda's participation in the commission of the crime charged was established
beyond moral certainty. His defense of alibi was futile because by his own admission he was not
only at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, he also admitted his participation
therein. Even if we disregard his extrajudicial admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Salvosa, his guilt
was, as correctly ruled by the trial court, established beyond doubt by circumstantial evidence. The
following circumstances were duly proved in this case:

(1) He and a companion were seen a kilometer away from the Barker house an hour
after the crime in question was committed there;

(2) Rene Salvamante, who is still at large, was positively identified by Mrs. Barker,
Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva as one of two persons who committed the
crime;

(3) He and co-accused Rene Salvamante are friends;

(4) He and Rene Salvamante were together in Guinyangan, Quezon, and both left
the place sometime in September 1991;

(5) He was arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon, on 4 March 1992; and

(6) He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state witness stating that "he is the least
guilty."

Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

 (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and

(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction

beyond reasonable doubt.

Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can

be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person, i.e. the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis
except that of guilty. 33 We do not hesitate to rule that all the requisites of Section 2, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court are present in this case.

This conclusion having been reached, the defense of alibi put up by the appellant must fail. The trial
court correctly rejected such defense. The rule is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the
requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 34 Through
the unrebutted testimony of Mike Tayaban, which Maqueda does not controvert in his brief, it was
positively established that Maqueda and a companion were seen at 7:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991 at the
waiting shed in Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, a place barely a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers. It
was not then impossible for Maqueda and his companion to have been at the Barker house at the time
the crime was committed. Moreover, Fredisminda Castrence categorically declared that Maqueda started
working in her polvoron factory in Sukat only on 7 October 1991, thereby belying his, testimony that he
started working on 5 July 1991 and continuously until 27 August 1991.

WHEREFORE, in of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision Of
Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court Of Benguet in Criminal Case, No.91-CR-1206 is AFFIRMED in
toto.

Costs against accused-appellant HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL.

SO ORDERED,

G.R. No. L-56291 June 27, 1988

CRISTOPHER GAMBOA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ALFREDO CRUZ, JUDGE of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Br. XXIX, respondent.

Rene V. Sarmiento for petitioner.

PADILLA, J.:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for a temporary restraining order, to annul and set
aside the order dated 23 October 1980 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIX, in
Criminal Case No. 47622, entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff vs. Cristopher Gamboa y
Gonzales, Accused," and to restrain the respondent court from proceeding with the trial of the
aforementioned case.

Petitioner alleges that:

On 19 July 1979, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, he was arrested for vagrancy, without a
warrant of arrest, by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter, petitioner was brought to Precinct 2,
Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy and then detained therein together with several others.

The following day, 20 July 1979, during the lineup of five (5) detainees, including petitioner,
complainant Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, "that one is a companion." After the
Identification, the other detainees were brought back to their cell but petitioner was ordered to stay
on. While the complainant was being interrogated by the police investigator, petitioner was told to sit
down in front of her.

On 23 July 1979, an information for robbery was filed against the petitioner.

On 22 August 1979, petitioner was arraigned. Thereafter, hearings were held. On 2 April 1980, the
prosecution formally offered its evidence and then rested its case.

On 14 July 1980, petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting his defense, manifested in open court
that he was filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to Evidence. On 13 August 1980, petitioner filed
said Motion predicated on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice to, and in the
absence of, his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process.

On 23 October 1980, the respondent court issued the following order (assailed in the petition at bar)
denying the Motion to Acquit:

For resolution is a motion to acquit the accused based on the grounds that the
constitutional rights of the said accused, to counsel and to due process, have been
violated. After considering the allegations and arguments in support of the said
motion in relation to the evidence presented, the Court finds the said motion to be
without merit and, therefore, denies the same.

The hearing of this case for the purpose of presenting the evidence for the accused
is hereby set on November 28, 1980, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.

Hence, the instant petition.

On 3 March 1981, the Court issued a temporary restraining order "effective as of this date and
continuing until otherwise ordered by the court". 1
Petitioner contends that the respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion, in issuing the assailed order. He insists that said order, in denying his Motion To Acquit, is
null and void for being violative of his rights to counsel and to due process. 2

We find no merit in the contentions of petitioner.

To begin with, the instant petition is one for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the respondent judge in issuing the questioned order dated 23
October 1980.

It is basic, however, that for certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical
exercise of power, the very antithesis of judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil
law and common law traditions. 3 To warrant the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari, the
alleged lack of jurisdiction, excess thereof, or abuse of discretion must be so gross or grave, as when
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility,
or the abuse must be so patent as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all, in contemplation of law. 4 This is not the situation in the
case at bar. The respondent court considered petitioner's arguments as well as the prosecution's
evidence against him, and required him to present his evidence.

The rights to counsel and to due process of law are indeed two (2) of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution, whether it be the 1973 or 1987 Constitution. In a democratic society,
like ours, every person is entitled to the full enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

On the right to counsel, Sec. 20, Art. IV of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution, reads:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any person under

investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him.
Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The same guarantee, although worded in a different manner, is included in the 1987 Constitution.
Section 12 (1, 2 & 3), Article III thereof provides:

Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
 (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer
starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the
respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by
counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from
the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.

Any person under investigation must, among other things, be assisted by counsel. The above-cited
provisions of the Constitution are clear. They leave no room for equivocation. Accordingly, in several
cases, this Court has consistently held that no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be
in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and
that, while the right may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the
presence of counsel. 5

As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at least, in this case) was
not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel.
The Solicitor General states:

When petitioner was Identified by the complainant at the police line-up, he had not
been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The police line-up is not a part of the
custodial inquest, hence, he was not yet entitled to counsel. Thus, it was held that
when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory as
when police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail
of the services of his lawyer (Escobedo v. Illinois of the United States Federal
Supreme Court, 378 US 478, 1964). Since petitioner in the course of his
Identification in the police line-up had not yet been held to answer for a criminal
offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel
because the accusatory process had not yet set in. The police could not have
violated petitioner's right to counsel and due process as the confrontation between
the State and him had not begun. In fact, when he was Identified in the police line-up
by complainant he did not give any statement to the police. He was, therefore, not
interrogated at all as he was not facing a criminal charge. Far from what he
professes, the police did not, at that stage, exact a confession to be used against
him. For it was not he but the complainant who was being investigated at that time.
He "was ordered to sit down in front of the complainant while the latter was being
investigated" (par. 3.03, Petition). Petitioner's right to counsel had not accrued. 6

Even under the constitutional guarantees obtaining in the United States, petitioner would have no
cause for claiming a violation of his rights to counsel and due process. In Kirby vs. Illinois, 7 the facts
of the case and the votes of the Justices therein are summarized as fellows:

After arresting the petitioner and a companion and bringing them to a police station,
police officers learned that certain items found in their possession had been stolen in
 a recent robbery. The robbery victim was brought to the police station and
immediately Identified the petitioner and his companion as the robbers. No attorney
was present when the Identification was made, and neither the petitioner nor his
companion had asked for legal assistance or had been advised of any right to the
presence of counsel. Several weeks later, the petitioner and his companion were
indicted for the robbery. At trial in an Illinois state court, the robbery victim testified
that he had seen the petitioner and his companion at the police station, and he
pointed them out in the courtroom and Identified them as the robbers. The petitioner
and his companion were convicted, and the Illinois Appellate Court, First District,
affirmed the petitioner's conviction, holding that the constitutional rule requiring the
exclusion of evidence derived from out-of-court Identification procedures conducted
in the absence of counsel did not apply to pre-indictment Identifications (121 III App
2d 323, 257 NEE 2d 589).

On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, although not agreeing on an opinion,
affirmed. In an opinion by STEWART, J., announcing the judgment of the court and
expressing the view of four members of the court, it was held that the constitutional
right to counsel did not attach until judicial criminal proceedings were initiated, and
that the exclusionary rule relating to out-of-court Identifications in the absence of
counsel did not apply to Identification testimony based upon a police station show-up
which took place before the accused had been indicted or otherwise formally
charged with any criminal offense.

BURGER, Ch. J., concurring, joined in the plurality opinion and expressed his
agreement that the right to counsel did not attach until criminal charges were formally
made against an accused.

POWELL, J., concurred in the result on the ground that the exclusionary rule should
not be extended.

BRENNAN J., joined by DOUGHLAS and MARSHALL, JJ., dissented on the grounds
that although Supreme Court decisions establishing the exclusionary rule happened
to involve post-indictment Identifications, the rationale behind the rule was equally
applicable to the present case.

WHITE, J., dissented on the grounds that Supreme Court decisions establishing the
exclusionary rule governed the present case. 8

Mr. Justice Stewart, expressing his view and that of three other members 9 of the Court, said:

In a line of constitutional cases in this Court stemming back to the Court's landmark
opinion in Powell v. Alabama, 287 US 45, 77 L Ed 158, 53 S Ct 55, 84 ALR 527, it
has been firmly established that a person's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to
counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have
been initiated against him. See Powell v. Alabama, supra; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US
458, 82 L Ed 1461, 58 S Ct 1019, 146 ALR 357; Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 US 52, 7
 L Ed 2d 114, 82 S Ct 157; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335, 9 L Ed 2d 799, 83 S Ct
792, 93 ALR 2d 733; White v. Maryland, 373 US 59, 10 L Ed 2d 193, 83 S Ct 1050;
Messiah v. United States, 377 US 201, 12 L Ed 246, 84 S Ct 1199; United States v.
Wade, 388 US 218, 18 L Ed 2d 1149, 87 S Ct 1926; Gilbert v. California, 388 US 263,
18 L Ed 2d 1178, 87 S Ct 1951; Coleman v. Alabama, 399 US 1, 26 L Ed 2d 387, 90
S Ct. 1999.

This is not to say that a defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to
counsel only at the trial itself. The Powell case makes clear that the right attaches at
the time of arraignment and the Court has recently held that it exists also at the time
of a preliminary hearing. Coleman v. Alabama, supra. But the point is that, while
members of the court have differed as to existence of the right to counsel in the
contexts of some of the above cases, all of those cases have involved points of time
at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings whether by way
of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.
(Emphasis supplied). 10

As may be observed, the 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions go farther and beyond the
guarantee of the right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. For while, under the latter, the right to counsel "attaches only at or after the time that
adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him (the accused)," under the 1973 and
1987 Philippine Constitutions, the right to counsel attaches at the start of investigation against a
respondent and, therefore, even before adversary judicial proceedings against the accused have
begun.

Given the clear constitutional intent in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, to extend to those under
police investigation the right to counsel, this occasion may be better than any to remind police
investigators that, while the Court finds no real need to afford a suspect the services of counsel
during a police line-up, the moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit
admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the
time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the
right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.

On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this
substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a member of the Bar. He was
accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only
that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its
case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. 11 The case at bar is
far from this situation.

In any event, certiorari and prohibition are not the proper remedies against an order denying a
Motion To Acquit. Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that, upon arraignment, the
defendant shall immediately either move to quash the complaint or information or plead thereto, or
do both and that, if the defendant moves to quash, without pleading, and the motion is withdrawn or
overruled, he should immediately plead, which means that trial must proceed. If, after trial on the
merits, judgment is rendered adversely to the movant (in the motion to quash), he can appeal the
judgment and raise the same defenses or objections (earlier raised in his motion to quash) which
would then be subject to review by the appellate court.

An order denying a Motion to Acquit (like an order denying a motion to quash) is interlocutory and
not a final order. It is, therefore, not appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition for
certiorari. Such order of denial may only be reviewed, in the ordinary course of law, by an appeal
from the judgment, after trial. As stated in Collins vs. Wolfe, 12 and reiterated in Mill vs. Yatco, 13 the
accused, after the denial of his motion to quash, should have proceeded with the trial of the case in the
court below, and if final judgment is rendered against him, he could then appeal, and, upon such appeal,
present the questions which he sought to be decided by the appellate court in a petition for certiorari.

In Acharon vs. Purisima, 14 the procedure was well defined, thus:

Moreover, when the motion to quash filed by Acharon to nullify the criminal cases
filed against him was denied by the Municipal Court of General Santos his remedy
was not to file a petition for certiorari but to go to trial without prejudice on his part to
reiterate the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if, after trial on the
merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner
authorized by law. This is the procedure that he should have followed as authorized
by law and precedents. Instead, he took the usual step of filing a writ of certiorari
before the Court of First Instance which in our opinion is unwarranted it being
contrary to the usual course of law. 15

Conformably with the above rulings, whether or not petitioner was, afforded his rights to counsel and
to due process is a question which he could raise, as a defense or objection, upon the trial on the
merits, and, if that defense or objection should fail, he could still raise the same on appeal.

On the other hand, if a defendant does not move to quash the complaint or information before he
pleads, he shall be taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion to quash,
except where the complaint or information does not charge an offense, or the court is without
jurisdiction of the same. 16

Here, petitioner filed a Motion To Acquit only after the prosecution had presented its evidence and
rested its case. Since the exceptions, above-stated, are not applicable, petitioner is deemed to have
waived objections which are grounds for a motion to quash.

Besides, the grounds relied upon by petitioner in his Motion to Acquit are not among the grounds
provided in Sec. 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court for quashing a complaint or information.
Consequently, the lower court did not err in denying petitioner's Motion to Acquit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on 3 March 1981
is LIFTED. The instant case is remanded to the respondent court for further proceedings to afford
the petitioner-accused the opportunity to present evidence on his behalf.

This decision is immediately executory. With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.