Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
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Dean
Candelaria
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6.01
Article
X
Page
3
of
42
Respondents
and
COA
however
countered
by
saying
that
LGUs
are
still
bound
by
the
SSLaw
Since
LGUs
are
subject
only
to
the
power
of
general
supervision
of
the
and
are
still
subject
to
the
scrutiny
of
the
Dept.
of
Budget
and
Management
(DBM)
(Oh
hello
President,
the
Presidents
authority
is
limited
to
seeing
to
it
that
rules
are
there
secretary
Abad.)
Thus,
the
requirement
of
prior
presidential
approval
is
indispensable.
followed
and
laws
are
faithfully
executed.
o The
President
may
only
point
out
that
rules
have
not
been
followed
ISSUE/HELD:
W/N
COA
committed
GADALEJ
in
the
disallowanceYES
o But
the
President
cannot
lay
down
the
rules,
nor
can
he
modify
or
WHEREFORE,
we
GRANT
the
petition.
We
REVERSE
AND
SET
ASIDE
Decision
No.
2006-044
replace
rules
dated
14
July
2006
and
Decision
No.
2008-010
dated
30
January
2008
of
the
Commission
on
o Thus,
the
grant
of
additional
compensation
(like
the
insurance
Audit.
benefits
contemplated
by
the
case)
does
NOT
need
Presidential
approval
for
these
to
be
valid.
RATIO
Lets
take
a
close
look
of
AO
103
first.
(no
longer
importantI
think)
COA
did
not
clearly
establish
that
the
medical
care
benefits
The
main
purpose
of
AO
103
is
to
prevent
dissatisfaction
and
demoralization
given
by
the
government
at
that
time
(under
PD
1519)
were
sufficient
to
cover
the
needs
of
among
government
personnel.
LGU
employees
The
whereas
clauses
provide
that
the
unilateral
and
uncoordinated
grant
of
Under
CSC
Memo
Circular
33,
LGUs
are
encouraged
to
establish
a
medical
productivity
or
incentive
benefits
in
the
past
gave
rise
to
discontentment
check-up
program
for
their
officials
and
employees.
among
government
personnel
This,
however,
was
inadequate
because
of
not-so-good
implementation
Under
the
AO
103,
all
agencies
of
the
government,
including
GOCCs
and
Thus,
the
National
Health
Insurance
Program
was
established
under
RA
7875
LGUs,
are
authorized
to
grant
productivity
incentive
benefits
up
to
the
max
But,
RA
7875
came
after
the
resolution
of
the
Provinces
Sangguniang
amount
of
2k
pesos.
Panlalawigan
on
the
benefits.
However,
and
as
properly
alleged
by
COA,
all
heads
of
government
Nevertheless,
SC
recognized
that
the
insurance
program
under
RA
7875
was
offices/agencies,
including
GOCCs,
and
governing
boards
are
prohibited
from
still
inadequate
and
have
not
reached
certain
geographical
areas
(like
Negros
granting
benefits
and
all
forms
of
allowances
without
prior
approval
via
Occidental).
administrative
order
by
the
Office
of
the
President.
Anyone
who
violates
this
shall
be
liable
under
existing
admin
and
penal
laws.
In
sum,
since
petitioners
grant
and
release
of
the
questioned
disbursement
without
the
Presidents
approval
did
not
violate
the
Presidents
directive
in
AO
103,
the
COA
then
gravely
However,
a
close
reading
of
AO
103
would
show
that
the
Province
did
not
violate
the
abused
its
discretion
in
applying
AO
103
to
disallow
the
premium
payment
for
the
requirement
of
prior
presidential
approval.
hospitalization
and
health
care
insurance
benefits
of
petitioners
officials
and
employees.
Those
that
are
required
to
obtain
presidential
approval
are
government
offices/agencies,
GOCCs
and
governing
boards
The
enumeration
does
not
enumerate
LGUs!
Thus,
the
prior
presidential
approval
provision
is
applicable
only
to:
departments,
bureaus,
offices,
and
GOCCs
under
the
Executive
Branch.
Sec. 6: Alternative Center v Zamora (NO)
o This
is
pursuant
to
the
Constitutional
provision
(Article
VII,
Section
G.R.
No.
144256.
June
8,
2005||
J.
Carpio
Morales
17),
which
provides
that
the
President
shall
have
control
of
all
Petitioners:
ALTERNATIVE
CENTER
FOR
ORGANIZATIONAL
REFORMS
AND
DEVELOPMENT,
INC.
(ACORD),
BALAY
executive
departments,
bureaus,
and
offices.
MINDANAW
FOUNDATION,
INC.
(BMFI);
BARRIOS,
INC.;
CAMARINES
SUR
NGO-PO
DEVELOPMENT
NETWORK,
INC.
(CADENET);
dami
sobra
nag
cut
ako.
Being
an
LGU,
the
Province
is
only
under
the
SUPERVISION
of
the
President.
Respondents:
HON.
RONALDO
ZAMORA,
in
his
capacity
as
Executive
Secretary,
HON.
BENJAMIN
DIOKNO,
in
his
[DOCTRINE
ALERT!]
capacity
as
Secretary,
Department
of
Budget
and
Management,
HON.
LEONOR
MAGTOLIS-BRIONES,
in
her
capacity
as
o Under
Article
X,
section
4
of
the
1987
Consti:
The
President
shall
National
Treasurer,
and
the
COMMISSION
ON
AUDIT
exercise
GENERAL
SUPERVISION
over
local
governments.
o The
power
of
general
supervision
means
the
power
of
a
superior
Summary:
President
Estrada
proposed
the
allotment
of
121B
as
Internal
Revenue
allotment
officer
to
see
to
it
that
subordinates
perform
their
functions
for
LGUs.
When
the
law
was
passed,
the
legislative
set
aside
10B
as
unprogrammed
fund
for
according
to
law.
LGUs
which
will
be
released
only
when
the
conditions
set
under
the
GAA
is
complied
with.
o This
is
distinguished
from
power
of
control,
which
is
the
power
to
The
GAA
requires
that
the
original
revenue
targets
can
be
realized
based
on
the
quarterly
alter/modify/set
aside
what
a
subordinate
officer
had
done
in
the
assessments
made
by
committees
named
in
the
GAA.
Petitioners
are
NGOs
who
question
performance
of
his
duties,
and
to
substitute
the
presidents
the
said
scheme.
The
issue
in
this
case
is
w/n
the
provisions
on
the
unprogramed
funds
judgment
over
that
of
the
subordinate
officer.
violate
Sec.
6
of
the
1987
Constitution.
Yes.
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
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Dean
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6.01
Article
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Page
4
of
42
Whether
or
not
the
allocation
of
10B
as
unprogrammed
violate
the
constitutional
injunction
The
SC
explained
that
the
Constitution
lays
upon
the
executive
the
duty
to
automatically
that
the
just
share
of
local
governments
in
the
national
taxes
or
the
IRA
shall
be
release
the
just
share
of
local
governments
in
the
national
taxes,
so
it
enjoins
the
legislature
automatically
released.
Yes.
not
to
pass
laws
that
might
prevent
the
executive
from
performing
this
duty.
To
hold
that
the
executive
branch
may
disregard
constitutional
provisions
which
define
its
duties,
Held:
provided
it
has
the
backing
of
statute,
is
virtually
to
make
the
Constitution
amendable
by
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
GRANTED.
XXXVII
and
LIV
Special
Provisions
1
and
4
of
the
Year
statute
a
proposition
which
is
patently
absurd.
Since,
under
Article
X,
Section
6
of
the
2000
GAA
are
hereby
declared
unconstitutional
insofar
as
they
set
apart
a
portion
of
the
IRA,
Constitution,
only
the
just
share
of
local
governments
is
qualified
by
the
words
as
in
the
amount
of
P10
Billion,
as
part
of
the
UNPROGRAMMED
FUND.
determined
by
law,
and
not
the
release
thereof,
the
plain
implication
is
that
Congress
is
not
authorized
by
the
Constitution
to
hinder
or
impede
the
automatic
release
of
the
IRA.
While
Ratio:
automatic
release
implies
that
the
just
share
of
the
local
governments
determined
by
law
The
petition
is
impressed
with
public
interest.
should
be
released
to
them
as
a
matter
of
course,
the
GAA
provisions,
on
the
other
hand,
Although
the
effectivity
of
the
Year
2000
GAA
has
ceased,
this
Court
shall
withhold
its
release
pending
an
event
which
is
not
even
certain
of
occurring.
To
rule
that
the
nonetheless
proceed
to
resolve
the
issues
raised
in
the
present
case,
it
being
term
automatic
release
contemplates
such
conditional
release
would
be
to
strip
the
term
impressed
with
public
interest.
automatic
of
all
meaning.
In
Batangas
v.
Romulo,
the
Court
held
that,
the
resolution
of
the
case
had
already
been
overtaken
by
supervening
events
as
the
IRA,
including
the
LGSEF,
for
1999,
Facts:
2000
and
2001,
had
already
been
released
and
the
government
is
now
operating
President
Estrada
(The
Guy
with
a
big
tummy,
similar
to
JTs
but
the
latter
kinda
under
a
new
appropriations
law,
still,
there
is
compelling
reason
for
this
Court
to
looks
more
like
Tinky-Winky)
submitted
the
2000
budget
to
the
congress.
The
resolve
the
substantive
issue
raised
by
the
instant
petition.
Supervening
events,
President
proposed
an
Internal
Revenue
Allotment
(IRA)
in
the
amount
whether
intended
or
accidental,
cannot
prevent
the
Court
from
rendering
a
of
P121,778,000,000
following
the
formula
provided
for
in
Section
284
of
the
Local
decision
if
there
is
a
grave
violation
of
the
Constitution.
(Note
this
exception
to
Government
Code
of
1992.
The
provisions
states
that,
Local
government
units
moot
cases)
shall
have
a
share
in
the
national
internal
revenue
taxes
based
on
the
collection
of
the
third
fiscal
year
preceding
the
current
fiscal
year
as
follows:
xxx
(c)
On
the
The
unprogrammed
fund
violates
Sec.
6
of
Art.
X
of
the
Constitution
third
year
and
thereafter,
forty
percent
(40%).
SECTION
6.
Local
government
units
shall
have
a
just
share,
as
determined
by
law,
The
President
approved
the
bill
which
eventually
became
the
GAA
of
2000.
The
in
the
national
taxes
which
shall
be
automatically
released
to
them.
said
bill
included
a
budget
of
P111,778,000,000
for
LGUs.
Petitioners
argue
that
this
provision
was
violated
when
it
was
made
contingent
to
In
another
part
of
the
GAA,
under
the
heading
UNPROGRAMMED
FUND,
it
is
the
conditions
laid
down
in
the
law.
Respondents
counter
argue
that
the
above
provided
that
an
amount
of
P10,000,000,000
(P10
Billion),
apart
from
constitutional
provision
is
addressed
not
to
the
legislature
but
to
the
executive,
the
P111,778,000,000
mentioned
above,
shall
be
used
to
fund
the
IRA,
which
hence,
the
same
does
not
prevent
the
legislature
from
imposing
conditions
upon
amount
shall
be
released
only
when
the
original
revenue
targets
submitted
by
the
the
release
of
the
IRA.
Respondent
cited
the
discourse
between
Comm.
Nolledo
President
to
Congress
can
be
realized
based
on
a
quarterly
assessment
by
and
Davide
on
the
provision.
committees
which
the
GAA
specifies.
The
Supreme
Court
clarified
that
although
Commissioners
Davide
and
Nolledo
held
On
August
22,
2000,
a
number
of
NGOs,
along
with
three
barangay
officials
filed
different
views
with
regard
to
the
proper
wording
of
the
constitutional
provision,
with
this
Court
the
petition
at
bar,
for
Certiorari,
Prohibition
and
Mandamus
With
they
shared
a
common
assumption
that
the
entity
which
would
execute
the
Application
for
TRO,
against
Executive
Secretary
Ronaldo
Zamora
assailing
the
automatic
release
of
internal
revenue
was
the
executive
department.
Davide
Constitutionality
of
the
mentioned
allocations.
referred
to
the
national
government
as
the
entity
that
collects
and
remits
internal
Petitioners
argue
that
the
programmed
fund,
which
will
be
released
only
upon
revenue.
Similarly,
Nolledo
alluded
to
the
Budget
Officer,
who
is
clearly
under
the
fulfillment
of
the
conditions
set
in
the
law,
violates
local
autonomy
because
it
executive
branch.
(See
full
text
for
full
discourse)
withheld
10B
from
LGUs,
it
effectively
amended
the
Local
Government
Code,
and
Respondents
thus
infer
that
the
subject
constitutional
provision
merely
prevents
they
violate
the
Constitutional
provision
on
local
autonomy.
the
executive
branch
of
the
government
from
unilaterally
withholding
the
IRA,
but
not
the
legislature
from
authorizing
the
executive
branch
to
withhold
the
Issue:
same.
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
Poli
Law
Review
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Dean
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6.01
Article
X
Page
5
of
42
As
the
Constitution
lays
upon
the
executive
the
duty
to
automatically
release
the
In
Pimentel
v.
Aguirre,
the
court
had
to
occasion
to
rule
on
an
executive
act
which
just
share
of
local
governments
in
the
national
taxes,
so
it
enjoins
the
legislature
withheld
the
release
of
the
IRA
pending
an
assessment
very
similar
to
the
one
not
to
pass
laws
that
might
prevent
the
executive
from
performing
this
duty.
To
provided
in
the
GAA.
SC
ruled
that
such
withholding
contravened
the
hold
that
the
executive
branch
may
disregard
constitutional
provisions
which
constitutional
mandate
of
an
automatic
release.
define
its
duties,
provided
it
has
the
backing
of
statute,
is
virtually
to
make
the
Article
X,
Section
6
of
the
Constitution
the
same
provision
relied
upon
Constitution
amendable
by
statute
a
proposition
which
is
patently
absurd.
in
Pimentel
enjoins
both
the
legislative
and
executive
branches
of
If
indeed
the
framers
intended
to
allow
the
enactment
of
statutes
making
the
government.
Hence,
as
in
Pimentel,
under
the
same
constitutional
provision,
the
release
of
IRA
conditional
instead
of
automatic,
then
Article
X,
Section
6
of
the
legislative
is
barred
from
withholding
the
release
of
the
IRA.
Constitution
would
have
been
worded
differently.
Release
is
different
from
the
just
share
as
determined
by
law.
Procedural
matters
(Just
in
Case)
Since,
under
Article
X,
Section
6
of
the
Constitution,
only
the
just
share
of
local
Respondents
assail
the
petition
because
it
was
filed
by
cause-oriented
governments
is
qualified
by
the
words
as
determined
by
law,
and
not
the
release
organizations,
so
they
claim
that
the
verification
was
not
signed
by
the
people
thereof,
the
plain
implication
is
that
Congress
is
not
authorized
by
the
Constitution
which
it
seeks
to
represent.
Hence,
it
must
be
treated
as
an
unsigned
pleading.
SC
to
hinder
or
impede
the
automatic
release
of
the
IRA.
said
that
there
were
those
individuals
who
are
part
of
the
Orgs
who
validly
signed.
In
Batangas
v.
Romulo,
the
petitioner
therein
challenged
the
constitutionality
of
Respondents
likewise
assail
the
standing
of
the
petitioners.
SC
said
that
the
GAA
certain
provisos
of
the
GAAs
for
FY
1999,
2000,
and
2001
which
set
up
the
Local
provisions
being
challenged
were
not
to
be
implemented
solely
by
the
committees
Government
Service
Equalization
Fund
(LGSEF).
The
LGSEF
was
a
portion
of
the
specifically
mentioned
therein,
for
they
being
in
the
nature
of
appropriations
IRA
which
was
to
be
released
only
upon
a
finding
of
the
Oversight
Committee
on
provisions,
they
were
also
to
be
implemented
by
the
executive
branch,
particularly
Devolution
that
the
LGU
concerned
had
complied
with
the
guidelines
issued
by
the
Department
of
Budget
and
Management
(DBM)
and
the
National
said
committee.
This
Court
measured
the
challenged
legislative
acts
against
Article
Treasurer.
The
task
of
the
committees
related
merely
to
the
conduct
of
the
X,
Section
6
and
declared
them
unconstitutional
a
ruling
which
presupposes
that
quarterly
assessment
required
in
the
provisions,
and
not
in
the
actual
release
of
the
legislature,
like
the
executive,
is
mandated
by
said
constitutional
provision
to
the
IRA
which
is
the
duty
of
the
executive.
Since
the
present
controversy
centers
ensure
that
the
just
share
of
local
governments
in
the
national
taxes
are
on
the
proper
manner
of
releasing
the
IRA,
the
impleaded
respondents
are
the
automatically
released.
proper
parties
to
this
suit.
Petitioners
cited
several
laws
and
IRRs
to
support
their
contention
that
the
said
proscription
by
the
Constitution
applies
only
to
the
executive
branch.
SC
said
that,
[w]hile
statutes
and
implementing
rules
are
entitled
to
great
weight
in
Sec 8
constitutional
construction
as
indicators
of
contemporaneous
interpretation,
such
1. Borja v Comelec (RR)
interpretation
is
not
necessarily
binding
or
conclusive
on
the
courts.
GR
No.
133495
|
9/3/1998
|
MENDOZA,
J.
In
Tanada
v.
Cuenco,
the
Court
held
that
the
reason
is
that
the
application
of
the
Petitioner/s:
BENJAMIN
BORJA,
JR.
doctrine
of
contemporaneous
construction
is
more
restricted
as
applied
to
the
Respondent/s:
COMELEC
and
JOSE
CAPCO
interpretation
of
constitutional
provisions
than
when
applied
to
statutory
provisions,
and
that
except
as
to
matters
committed
by
the
constitution
itself
to
SUMMARY:
This
case
explains
the
meaning
of
the
three-term
limit
on
local
elective
officials.
the
discretion
of
some
other
department,
contemporaneous
or
practical
The
then
incumbent
mayor,
Cesar
Borja,
died.
Thus,
Jose
Capco,
who
was
then
vice
mayor,
construction
is
not
necessarily
binding
upon
the
courts,
even
in
a
doubtful
served
the
unexpired
portion
of
the
formers
term.
He
ran
and
was
re-elected
mayor
in
both
the
1992
and
1995
elections.
He
again
filed
a
candidacy
for
mayor
for
the
1998
elections
but
case.
Hence,
if
in
the
judgment
of
the
court,
such
construction
is
erroneous
and
Benjamin
Borja,
Jr.,
also
a
candidate,
sought
for
his
disqualification
on
the
theory
that
the
its
further
application
is
not
made
imperative
by
any
paramount
considerations
of
first
time
he
served
as
mayor
(when
Cesar
Borja
died)
should
be
counted,
and
thus,
he
has
public
policy,
it
may
be
rejected.
already
served
3
consecutive
terms
in
the
contemplation
of
Art.
X,
Sec.
8
of
the
Consti
and
While
automatic
release
implies
that
the
just
share
of
the
local
governments
Sec.
43(b)
of
the
LGC.
The
Court
ruled
that
for
service
to
be
counted
as
one
term
for
the
determined
by
law
should
be
released
to
them
as
a
matter
of
course,
the
GAA
purpose
of
the
3-term
limit,
2
essential
elements
are
reqd:
(1)
the
official
must
have
been
provisions,
on
the
other
hand,
withhold
its
release
pending
an
event
which
is
not
elected
to
the
position
3
consecutive
times,
and
(2)
he
must
have
served
three
full
terms.
A
even
certain
of
occurring.
To
rule
that
the
term
automatic
release
contemplates
consideration
of
the
proceedings
of
the
ConComm
give
rise
to
two
concepts:
(1)
service
of
such
conditional
release
would
be
to
strip
the
term
automatic
of
all
meaning.
term
and
(2)
election.
Service
of
term
derived
from
the
concern
about
the
accumulation
of
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power
as
a
result
of
a
prolonged
stay
in
office;
Election
derived
from
the
concern
that
the
time
shall
not
be
considered
as
an
interruption
in
the
continuity
of
service
for
the
right
of
the
people
to
choose
those
whom
they
wish
to
govern
them
be
preserved.
full
term
for
which
the
elective
official
concerned
was
elected.
Furthermore,
records
of
the
ConComm
show
that
in
discussing
term
limits,
what
they
had
in
Policies
taken
into
consideration:
mind
was
those
who
are
serving
by
virtue
of
reelection.
A
textual
analysis
supports
this
o To
prevent
the
establishment
of
political
dynasties
conclusion
as
well
because
Art.
X,
Sec.
8
speaks
of:
the
term
of
office
of
elective
local
o Enhancing
the
freedom
of
choice
of
the
people
officials
and
bars
such
official[s]
from
serving
for
more
than
three
consecutive
terms.
To
consider,
therefore,
only
stay
in
office
regardless
of
how
the
official
concerned
The
second
sentence
speaks
about
the
full
term
for
which
he
has
been
elected.
To
came
to
that
office
whether
by
election
or
by
succession
by
operation
of
law
recapitulate,
the
term
limit
for
elective
local
officials
must
be
taken
to
refer
to
the
right
to
would
be
to
disregard
one
of
the
purposes
of
the
constitutional
provision
in
be
elected
as
well
as
the
right
to
serve
in
the
same
elective
position.
question.
The
members
of
the
Constitutional
Commission
were
as
much
concerned
with
FACTS
preserving
the
freedom
of
choice
of
the
people
as
they
were
with
preventing
the
Jan.
18,
1988:
Private
respondent
Jose
T.
Capco,
Jr.
was
elected
vice-mayor
of
monopolization
of
political
power.
Pateros
for
a
term
ending
June
30,
1992.
o Thus,
they
rejected
the
proposal
of
Com.
arcia
that
after
serving
three
Sept.
2,
1989:
he
became
mayor,
by
operation
of
law,
upon
the
death
of
the
consecutive
terms
or
nine
years
there
should
be
no
further
reelection
for
incumbent,
Cesar
Borja.
local
and
legislative
officials.
May
92
&
95
elections:
ran
again
for
mayor,
won
both
times.
o Com.
Monsod
emphasized
on
recognizing
peoples
power
to
choose.
He
filed
a
COC
for
the
May
98
elections
but
this
was
contested
by
Benjamin
U.
o Com.
Ople
agrees
with
Monsod:
Borja,
Jr.,
who
was
also
a
candidate
for
mayor,
on
the
theory
that
the
latter
would
" The
principle
involved
is
really
whether
this
Commission
shall
have
already
served
as
mayor
for
three
consecutive
terms
by
June
30,
1998
and
impose
a
temporary
or
a
perpetual
disqualification
on
those
would
therefore
be
ineligible
to
serve
for
another
term
after
that.
who
have
served
their
terms
in
accordance
with
the
limits
on
nd
2
Div.
of
COMELEC
ruled
that
Capco
is
disqualified.
consecutive
service
as
decided
by
the
Constitutional
On
MR,
the
COMELEC
en
banc,
voting
5-2,
reversed
the
decision
and
declared
Commission.
Capco
eligible
" The
Commission
achieves
its
purpose
in
establishing
!
In
both
the
Constitution
and
the
Local
Government
Code,
the
three-term
safeguards
against
the
excessive
accumulation
of
power
as
a
limitation
refers
to
the
term
of
office
for
which
the
local
official
was
elected.
It
result
of
consecutive
terms.
made
no
reference
to
succession
to
an
office
to
which
he
was
not
elected.
" We
want
to
prevent
future
situations
where,
as
a
result
of
(Note:
the
election
took
place
and
Capco
received
over
16500++
votes
while
Borja
continuous
service
and
frequent
reelections,
officials
from
the
only
received
7700++
votes)
President
down
to
the
municipal
mayor
tend
to
develop
a
proprietary
interest
in
their
position
and
to
accumulate
those
ISSUE:
powers
and
perquisites
that
permit
them
to
stay
on
indefinitely
WN
service
of
the
unexpired
term
is
counted
in
computing
the
three
consecutive
terms
in
Sec.
or
to
transfer
these
posts
to
members
of
their
families
in
a
8,
Art.
X
NO
subsequent
election.
" If
we
want
to
use
the
coarser
term,
under
a
perpetual
HELD:
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
DISMISSED.
disqualification,
I
have
a
feeling
that
we
are
taking
away
too
much
from
the
people,
whereas
we
should
be
giving
as
much
RATIO:
to
the
people
as
we
can
in
terms
of
their
own
freedom
of
choice.
Article
X,
8
of
the
Constitution
provides:
The
term
of
office
of
elective
local
o This
concern
was
echoed
by
other
commissioners,
too.
officials,
except
barangay
officials,
which
shall
be
determined
by
law,
shall
be
three
Two
ideas
thus
emerge
from
a
consideration
of
the
proceedings
of
the
years
and
no
such
official
shall
serve
for
more
than
three
consecutive
Constitutional
Commission.
terms.
Voluntary
renunciation
of
the
office
for
any
length
of
time
shall
not
be
o The
first
is
the
notion
of
service
of
term,
derived
from
the
concern
about
considered
as
an
interruption
in
the
continuity
of
his
service
for
the
full
term
for
the
accumulation
of
power
as
a
result
of
a
prolonged
stay
in
office.
which
he
was
elected.
o The
second
is
the
idea
of
election,
derived
from
the
concern
that
the
This
provision
is
restated
in
43(b)
of
the
Local
Government
Code
(R.A.
No.
7160):
right
of
the
people
to
choose
those
whom
they
wish
to
govern
them
be
No
local
elective
official
shall
serve
for
more
than
three
(3)
consecutive
terms
in
preserved.
the
same
position.
Voluntary
renunciation
of
the
office
for
any
length
of
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Indeed,
a
fundamental
tenet
of
representative
democracy
is
that
the
people
o This
is
not
so
in
the
case
of
the
vice-mayor.
Under
the
local
Government
should
be
allowed
to
choose
whom
they
please
to
govern
them.
Code,
he
is
the
presiding
officer
of
the
sanggunian
and
he
appoints
all
Not
only
historical
examination
but
textual
analysis
as
well
supports
this
ruling.
officials
and
employees
of
such
local
assembly.
He
has
distinct
powers
o The
first
sentence
speaks
of
the
term
of
office
of
elective
local
officials
and
functions,
succession
to
mayorship
in
the
event
of
vacancy
therein
and
bars
such
official[s]
from
serving
for
more
than
three
consecutive
being
only
one
of
them.
terms.
o The
second
sentence,
in
explaining
when
an
elective
local
official
may
be
To
recapitulate,
the
term
limit
for
elective
local
officials
must
be
taken
to
refer
to
deemed
to
have
served
his
full
term
of
office,
states
that
voluntary
the
right
to
be
elected
as
well
as
the
right
to
serve
in
the
same
elective
position.
renunciation
of
the
office
for
any
length
of
time
shall
not
be
considered
Consequently,
it
is
not
enough
that
an
individual
has
served
three
consecutive
as
an
interruption
in
the
continuity
of
his
service
for
the
full
term
for
terms
in
an
elective
local
office,
he
must
also
have
been
elected
to
the
same
which
he
was
elected.
The
term
served
must
therefore
be
one
for
position
for
the
same
number
of
times
before
the
disqualification
can
apply.
which
[the
official
concerned]
was
elected.
To
illustrate
consider
these
three
scenarios:
The
purpose
of
this
provision
is
to
prevent
a
circumvention
of
the
limitation
on
the
o A
is
VM,
becomes
M
because
of
the
former
Ms
death.
6
months
later,
he
number
of
terms
an
elective
official
may
serve.
resigns
and
thereafter,
runs
and
gets
re-elected
twice.
Can/cant
run
Conversely,
if
he
is
not
serving
a
term
for
which
he
was
elected
because
he
is
anymore?
simply
continuing
the
service
of
the
official
he
succeeds,
such
official
cannot
be
" CAN.
considered
to
have
fully
served
the
term
now
withstanding
his
voluntary
" only
completing
the
service
of
the
term
for
which
the
deceased
renunciation
of
office
prior
to
its
expiration.
and
not
he
was
elected.
Reference
to
Fr.
Bs
Art.
VI,
Sec.
7
commentary:
if
one
is
elected
Representative
" Also,
his
resignation
=
interruption.
to
serve
the
unexpired
term
of
another,
that
unexpired
term,
no
matter
how
short,
" Eitherway,
he
didnt
serve
for
a
full
term.
will
be
considered
one
term
for
the
purpose
of
computing
the
number
of
o B
is
elected
M.
Twice
suspended
for
misconduct
for
a
total
of
1
year.
successive
terms
allowed.
Twice
re-elected
after.
Can/cant
run
anymore?
o So,
why
the
difference?
" CAN.
o The
vice-mayor
succeeds
to
the
mayorship
by
operation
of
law.
" He
only
served
2
full
consecutive
terms.
o The
Representative
is
elected
to
fill
the
vacancy.
In
a
real
sense,
o C
is
VM
who
becomes
M
by
succession.
Twice
re-elected.
Can/cant
run
therefore,
such
Representative
serves
a
term
for
which
he
was
elected.
anymore?
Petitioner
also
cites
Art.
VII,
4
and
contends
that
by
analogy,
vice-mayor
should
" CAN.
likewise
be
considered
to
have
served
a
full
term
as
mayor
if
he
succeeds
to
the
" He
was
not
elected
to
the
office
of
the
mayor
in
the
first
term
latters
office
and
serves
for
the
remainder
of
the
term.
but
simply
found
himself
thrust
into
it
by
operation
of
law.
The
framers
of
the
Constitution
included
such
a
provision
because,
without
it,
the
Vice-President,
who
simply
steps
into
the
Presidency
by
succession
would
be
qualified
to
run
for
President
even
if
he
has
occupied
that
office
for
more
than
four
years.
o The
absence
of
a
similar
provision
in
Art.
X,
8
on
elective
local
officials
2. Adormeo v Comelec (KF)
throws
in
bold
relief
the
difference
between
the
two
cases.
Petitioner:
Raymundo
M.
Adormeo
o It
underscores
the
constitutional
intent
to
cover
only
the
terms
of
Respondents:
COMELEC
and
Ramon
Y.
Talaga,
Jr.
office
to
which
one
may
have
been
elected
for
purpose
of
the
three- G.R.
No.
147927
|
February
4,
2002
|
Quisumbing,
J.
term
limit
on
local
elective
officials,
disregarding
for
this
purpose
service
by
automatic
succession.
SUMMARY:
Adormeo
and
Talaga
filed
their
COCs
for
Lucena
City
Mayor.
Adormeo
filed
a
Another
reason
for
the
distinction:
petition
to
deny
due
course
to
or
cancel
COC
of
Talaga
because
he
was
elected
and
served
as
o Vice-President
is
elected
primarily
to
succeed
the
President
in
the
event
mayor
for
3
consecutive
terms
(1992,
1995,
2000
when
he
won
the
recall
election,
serving
of
the
latters
death,
permanent
disability,
removal
or
the
unexpired
term
of
Tagarao).
Talaga
averred
that
he
was
defeated
by
Tagarao
on
1998,
resignation.
While
he
may
be
appointed
to
the
cabinet,
his
becoming
so
thus,
NOT
3
consecutive
terms.
is
entirely
dependent
on
the
good
graces
of
the
President.
In
running
for
ISSUE:
WON
he
served
3
consecutive
terms?
NO
Vice-President,
he
may
thus
be
said
to
also
seek
the
Presidency.
SC:
Victory
in
the
2000
recall
elections
is
NOT
counted
as
1
full
term,
thus,
it
interrupted
the
continuity
of
service
of
Talaga.
It
is
not
enough
that
an
individual
has
served
3
consecutive
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terms
in
an
elective
local
office,
he
must
also
have
been
elected
to
the
same
position
for
the
same
number
of
times
before
the
disqualification
can
apply.
For
nearly
2
years
he
was
a
RATIO:
private
citizen.
The
continuity
of
his
mayorship
was
disrupted
by
his
defeat
in
the
1998
Adormeo:
The
unexpired
portion
of
the
term
of
office
he
served
after
winning
a
recall
elections.
Further,
victory
in
the
recall
election
NOT
a
violation
of
Sec
8,
Art
X,
as
voluntary
election
is
considered
a
full
term.
To
interpret
otherwise,
Talaga
Jr.
would
be
serving
4
1
resignation.
consecutive
terms
of
10
years,
in
violation
of
Sec
8,
Art
X
and
Sec.
43
of
the
LGC
Talaga
Jr.:
Term
is
NOT
consecutive, during
Tagaraos
incumbency,
he
was
a
private
citizen
FACTS:
Adormeo
and
Talaga,
Jr.
are
the
only
candidates
who
filed
their
certificates
of
Issue
at
hand
was
already
answered
in
Borja
v.
COMELEC:
To
recapitulate,
the
term
limit
for
candidacy
for
mayor
of
Lucena
City
in
the
May
14,
2001
elections.
Talaga
was
the
elective
local
officials
must
be
taken
to
refer
to
the
right
to
be
elected
as
well
as
the
right
to
incumbent
mayor.
serve
in
the
same
elective
position.
Talaga,
Jr.
was
elected
mayor
in
May
1992.
He
served
the
full
term.
Again,
he
was
Consequently,
it
is
not
enough
that
an
individual
has
served
3
consecutive
terms
in
re-elected
in
1995-1998.
In
the
election
of
1998,
he
lost
to
Bernard
G.
Tagarao.
In
an
elective
local
office,
he
must
also
have
been
elected
to
the
same
position
for
the
recall
election
of
May
12,
2000,
he
again
won
and
served
the
unexpired
term
the
same
number
of
times
before
the
disqualification
can
apply.
This
point
can
be
of
Tagarao
until
June
30,
2001.
made
clearer
by
considering
the
following
case
or
situation:
3/2/2001:
Adormeo
filed
a
petition
with
the
Office
of
the
Provincial
Election
o Case
No.
2.
Suppose
B
is
elected
mayor
and,
during
his
first
term,
he
is
Supervisor,
Lucena
City
a
Petition
to
Deny
Due
Course
to
or
Cancel
Certificate
of
twice
suspended
for
misconduct
for
a
total
of
1
year.
If
he
is
twice
Candidacy
and/or
Disqualification
of
Talaga,
Jr.
because
he
was
elected
and
reelected
after
that,
can
he
run
for
one
more
term
in
the
next
election?
served
as
city
mayor
for
3
consecutive
terms
(1992,
1995,
2000
when
he
won
the
Yes,
because
he
has
served
only
two
full
terms
successively.
recall
election,
serving
the
unexpired
term
of
Tagarao)
which
is
a
violation
under
o To
consider
C
as
eligible
for
reelection
would
be
in
accord
with
the
Sec.
8,
Art.
X
understanding
of
the
Constitutional
Commission
that
while
the
people
Talaga,
Jr:
NOT
3
consecutive
terms,
he
was
defeated
on
1998
by
Tagarao.
Because
should
be
protected
from
the
evils
that
a
monopoly
of
political
power
of
this,
his
years
as
mayor
was
interrupted.
His
service
from
May
12,
may
bring
about,
care
should
be
taken
that
their
freedom
of
choice
is
not
2001
until
June
30,
2001
for
13
months
and
18
days
was
not
a
full
term,
in
the
unduly
curtailed.
contemplation
of
the
law
and
the
Constitution.
o Cites
Lonzanida
v.
Comelec:
2
conditions
to
apply
disqualification
under
Lonzanida
v.
COMELEC:
This
Court
held
that
the
2
conditions
for
the
application
of
the
Sec
8,
Art
X
(a)
that
the
official
concerned
has
been
elected
for
three
disqualification
must
concur:
a)
that
the
official
concerned
has
been
elected
for
3
consecutive
terms
in
the
same
local
government
post,
and
(b)
that
he
consecutive
terms
in
the
same
local
government
post
and
2)
that
he
has
fully
served
3
has
fully
served
3
consecutive
terms.
consecutive
terms.
ST
4/20/2001:
COMELEC
1
Division:
Disqualified
Talaga
Jr.
for
the
position
of
city
Accordingly,
COMELECs
ruling
should
be
upheld.
For
nearly
2
years
he
was
a
private
mayor
and
his
COC
was
withdrawn/cancelled.
citizen.
The
continuity
of
his
mayorship
was
disrupted
by
his
defeat
in
the
1998
elections.
Talaga,
Jr.
filed
an
MR:
3
consecutive
terms
means
9
continuous
years.
Tagaraos
tenure
from
1998
to
2000
could
not
be
considered
as
a
continuation
of
his
To
bolster
his
case,
Adormeo
adverts
to
the
comment
of
Fr.
Joaquin
Bernas,
stating
that
in
mayorship.
The
recall
election
was
not
a
regular
election,
but
a
separate
special
interpreting
said
provision
that
if
one
is
elected
representative
to
serve
the
unexpired
term
election
specifically
to
remove
incompetent
local
officials.
of
another,
that
unexpired,
no
matter
how
short,
will
be
considered
one
term
for
the
Adormeo
filed
an
Opposition:
Serving
the
unexpired
term
of
office
is
considered
as
purpose
of
computing
the
number
of
successive
terms
allowed.
As
pointed
out
by
the
1
term.
The
provision
speaks
of
term
not
tenure.
COMELEC
EB,
Fr.
Bernas
comment
is
pertinent
only
to
members
of
the
House
of
Rep.
Unlike
st
COMELEC
EB:
reversed
1
Division:
NOT
3
consecutive
years
because
he
did
not
local
government
officials,
there
is
no
recall
election
provided
for
members
of
Congress.
win
in
the
1998
elections,
he
was
only
a
winner
of
a
recall
election,
victory
in
the
recall
election
was
not
considered
a
term
of
office,
his
loss
in
the
1998
elections
is
Victory
in
the
recall
election
NOT
a
violation
of
Sec
8,
Art
X,
as
voluntary
resignation,
considered
an
interruption
in
the
continuity
of
his
service
as
mayor
Lonzanida
v.
COMELEC:
The
second
sentence
of
the
constitutional
provision
under
scrutiny
states,
Voluntary
renunciation
of
office
for
any
length
of
time
shall
not
be
considered
as
an
ISSUE:
WON
Talaga
had
already
served
3
consecutive
terms
in
that
office
NO
interruption
in
the
continuity
of
service
for
the
full
term
for
which
he
was
elected.
The
clear
intent
of
the
framers
of
the
constitution
to
bar
any
attempt
to
circumvent
the
three-
HELD:
WHEREFORE,
the
instant
petition
is
hereby
DISMISSED.
The
resolution
of
public
1
respondent
Commission
on
Elections
dated
May
9,
2001,
in
Comelec
SPA
No.
01-055
is
Term
of
Office:
(b)
No
local
elective
official
shall
serve
for
more
than
three
(3)
consecutive
terms
in
the
same
position.
Voluntary
renunciation
of
the
office
for
any
length
of
time
shall
not
be
considered
as
an
interruption
in
the
AFFIRMED.
Costs
against
petitioner.
So
Ordered.
continuity
of
service
for
the
full
term
for
which
the
elective
official
concerned
was
elected.
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
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Page
9
of
42
term
limit
by
a
voluntary
renunciation
of
office
and
at
the
same
time
respect
the
peoples
Socrates
also
claims
that
the
PRA
members
had
no
authority
to
adopt
the
Recall
choice
and
grant
their
elected
official
full
service
of
a
term
is
evident
in
this
Resolution
on
July
2,
2002
because
a
majority
of
PRA
members
were
seeking
a
new
provision.
Voluntary
renunciation
of
a
term
does
not
cancel
the
renounced
term
in
the
electoral
mandate
in
the
barangay
elections
scheduled
on
July
15,
2002.
This
computation
of
the
three
term
limit;
conversely,
involuntary
severance
from
office
for
any
argument
deserves
scant
consideration
considering
that
when
the
PRA
members
length
of
time
short
of
the
full
term
provided
by
law
amounts
to
an
interruption
of
adopted
the
Recall
Resolution
their
terms
of
office
had
not
yet
expired.
They
were
continuity
of
service.
The
petitioner
vacated
his
post
a
few
months
before
the
next
mayoral
all
de
jure
sangguniang
barangay
members
with
no
legal
disqualification
to
elections,
not
by
voluntary
renunciation
but
in
compliance
with
the
legal
process
of
writ
of
participate
in
the
recall
assembly
under
Section
70
of
the
Local
Government
Code.
execution
issued
by
the
COMELEC
to
that
effect.
Such
involuntary
severance
from
office
is
Socrates
bewails
that
the
manner
private
respondents
conducted
the
PRA
an
interruption
of
continuity
of
service
and
thus,
the
petitioner
did
not
fully
serve
the
1995- proceedings
violated
his
constitutional
right
to
information
on
matters
of
public
1998
mayoral
term
concern.
Socrates,
however,
admits
receiving
notice
of
the
PRA
meeting
and
of
even
sending
his
representative
and
counsel
who
were
present
during
the
entire
PRA
proceedings.
Proponents
of
the
recall
election
submitted
to
the
COMELEC
the
Recall
Resolution,
minutes
of
the
PRA
proceedings,
the
journal
of
the
PRA
3. Socrates v Comelec (CP) assembly,
attendance
sheets,
notices
sent
to
PRA
members,
and
authenticated
master
list
of
barangay
officials
in
Puerto
Princesa.
Socrates
had
the
right
to
SUMMARY:
There
was
a
recall
resolution
issued
by
COMELEC.
The
issue
in
this
case
are:
examine
and
copy
all
these
public
records
in
the
official
custody
of
the
whether
the
recall
resolution
was
valid;
whether
Hagedorn
can
run
(violation
of
the
three
COMELEC.
Socrates,
however,
does
not
claim
that
the
COMELEC
denied
him
this
consecutive
full
terms).
The
recall
resolution
was
valid.
Hagedorn
can
run.
In
the
case
of
right.
There
is
no
legal
basis
in
Socrates
claim
that
respondents
violated
his
Hagedorn,
his
candidacy
in
the
recall
election
on
September
24,
2002
is
not
an
immediate
constitutional
right
to
information
on
matters
of
public
concern.
re-election
after
his
third
consecutive
term
which
ended
on
June
30,
2001.
The
immediate
Thus,
we
rule
that
the
COMELEC
did
not
commit
grave
abuse
of
discretion
in
re-election
that
the
Constitution
barred
Hagedorn
from
seeking
referred
to
the
regular
upholding
the
validity
of
the
Recall
Resolution
and
in
scheduling
the
recall
election
elections
in
2001.
on
September
24,
2002.
Hagedorn
was
qualified
to
run.
FACTS
The
three-term
limit
rule
for
elective
local
officials
is
found
in
Section
8,
Article
X
of
528
members
of
the
then
incumbent
barangay
officials
of
the
Puerto
Princesa
the
Constitution,
which
states:
convened
themselves
into
a
Preparatory
Recall
Assembly
(PRA).
The
PRA
was
" Section
8.
The
term
of
office
of
elective
local
officials,
except
barangay
convened
to
initiate
the
recall
of
Victorino
Dennis
M.
Socrates
(Socrates
for
officials,
which
shall
be
determined
by
law,
shall
be
three
years
and
no
brevity)
who
assumed
office
as
Puerto
Princesas
mayor
on
June
30,
2001.
such
official
shall
serve
for
more
than
three
consecutive
terms.
COMELEC
gave
due
course
to
the
Recall
Resolution
against
Mayor
Socrates
of
the
Voluntary
renunciation
of
the
office
for
any
length
of
time
shall
not
be
City
of
Puerto
Princesa,
and
scheduled
the
recall
election
on
September
7,
2002.
considered
as
an
interruption
in
the
continuity
of
his
service
for
the
full
On
August
23,
2002,
Hagedorn
filed
his
COC
for
mayor
in
the
recall
election.
term
for
which
he
was
elected.
Different
petitioners
filed
their
respective
petitions,
which
were
consolidated
This
three-term
limit
rule
is
reiterated
in
Section
43
(b)
of
RA
No.
7160,
otherwise
seeking
the
disqualification
of
Hagedorn
to
run
for
the
recall
election
and
the
known
as
the
Local
Government
Code,
which
provides:
cancellation
of
his
COC
on
the
ground
that
the
latter
is
disqualified
from
running
" Section
43.
Term
of
Office.
(a)
x
x
x
for
a
fourth
consecutive
term,
having
been
elected
and
having
served
as
mayor
of
(b)
No
local
elective
official
shall
serve
for
more
than
three
(3)
the
city
for
three
(3)
consecutive
full
terms
in
1992,
1995
and
1998
immediately
consecutive
terms
in
the
same
position.
Voluntary
renunciation
of
the
prior
to
the
instant
recall
election
for
the
same
post.
office
for
any
length
of
time
shall
not
be
considered
as
an
interruption
in
COMELECs
First
Division
dismissed
in
a
resolution
the
petitioner
for
lack
of
merit.
the
continuity
of
service
for
the
full
term
for
which
the
elective
official
And
COMELEC
declared
Hagedorn
qualified
to
run
in
the
recall
election.
was
elected.
The
first
part
provides
that
an
elective
local
official
cannot
serve
for
more
than
ISSUE
three
consecutive
terms.
The
clear
intent
is
that
only
consecutive
terms
count
in
Whether
the
recall
resolution
was
valid
-
YES
determining
the
three-term
limit
rule.
The
second
part
states
that
voluntary
Whether
one
who
has
been
elected
and
served
for
3
consecutive
full
terms
is
renunciation
of
office
for
any
length
of
time
does
not
interrupt
the
continuity
of
qualified
to
run
for
mayor
in
the
recall
election
-
YES
service.
The
clear
intent
is
that
involuntary
severance
from
office
for
any
length
of
RULING
time
interrupts
continuity
of
service
and
prevents
the
service
before
and
after
the
The
recall
resolution
was
valid.
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
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6.01
Article
X
Page
10
of
42
interruption
from
being
joined
together
to
form
a
continuous
service
or
1. GR:
COMELEC
has
no
jurisdiction
over
post-election
controversies
(ie
na.elec
na
si
consecutive
terms.
Latasa).
BUT,
SC
can
waive
procedure
when
interests
need
it.
Like
in
this
case
na
After
three
consecutive
terms,
an
elective
local
official
cannot
seek
immediate
re- sobrang
novel
ang
issue
election
for
a
fourth
term.
The
prohibited
election
refers
to
the
next
regular
2. Latasa
cannot
run
for
City
Mayor.
Why?
election
for
the
same
office
following
the
end
of
the
third
consecutive
term.
Any
a. He
has
served
3
terms.
The
argument
that
the
conversion
was
an
subsequent
election,
like
a
recall
election,
is
no
longer
covered
by
the
prohibition
involuntary
relinquishment
of
his
office,
so
he
didnt
serve
it
fully
daw
for
two
reasons.
First,
a
subsequent
election
like
a
recall
election
is
no
longer
an
(look
at
doctrine,
requisites
for
DQ).
This
holds
no
water.
Hello,
he
was
immediate
re-election
after
three
consecutive
terms.
Second,
the
intervening
made
the
acting
mayor
na
man
so
he
served
that
term.
period
constitutes
an
involuntary
interruption
in
the
continuity
of
service.
b. Also,
there
was
no
break
AT
ALL.
1992-2001.
Even
with
the
conversion,
Based
from
the
deliberations
of
a
Constitutional
Commission,
what
the
he
was
in
hold-over
capacity.
So
served
that
term.
nd
Constitution
prohibits
is
an
immediate
re-election
for
a
fourth
term
following
three
3. Sunga
cant
be
mayor
you
must
get
PLURALITY
of
votes.
2
highest
lang
siya
so
consecutive
terms.
The
Constitution,
however,
does
not
prohibit
a
subsequent
re- totes
not
entitled.
Further,
may
succession
na
man
of
office,
so
si
VICE-MAYOR
na
election
for
a
fourth
term
as
long
as
the
re-election
is
not
immediately
after
the
lang
mag.take
over.
end
of
the
third
consecutive
term.
A
recall
election
mid-way
in
the
term
following
the
third
consecutive
term
is
a
subsequent
election
but
not
an
immediate
re- FACTS:
election
after
the
third
term.
Certiorari
Rule
65,
questioning
the
resolution
of
COMELEC
en
banc
denying
the
MR
Neither
does
the
Constitution
prohibit
one
barred
from
seeking
immediate
re- of
Latasa
in
his
case
with
Sunga.
The
assailed
Resolution
denied
due
course
to
the
election
to
run
in
any
other
subsequent
election
involving
the
same
term
of
office.
certificate
of
candidacy
of
petitioner
Arsenio
A.
Latasa,
declaring
him
disqualified
What
the
Constitution
prohibits
is
a
consecutive
fourth
term.
to
run
for
mayor
of
Digos
City,
Davao
del
Sur
Province
in
the
May
14,
2001
In
the
case
of
Hagedorn,
his
candidacy
in
the
recall
election
on
September
24,
2002
elections,
ordering
that
all
votes
cast
in
his
favor
shall
not
be
counted,
and
if
he
is
not
an
immediate
re-election
after
his
third
consecutive
term
which
ended
on
has
been
proclaimed
winner,
declaring
said
proclamation
null
and
void.
June
30,
2001.
The
immediate
re-election
that
the
Constitution
barred
Hagedorn
Latasa
was
the
Mayor
of
Municipality
of
Digos,
winning
the
1992,
1995,
and
1998
from
seeking
referred
to
the
regular
elections
in
2001.
elections.
Digos
was
converted
into
a
component
city
and
Latasa,
pursuant
to
Section
53,
Article
IX
of
the
Charter,
petitioner
was
mandated
to
serve
in
a
hold-
over
capacity
as
mayor
of
the
new
City
of
Digos.
Hence,
he
took
his
oath
as
the
city
mayor.
On
February
28,
2001,
petitioner
filed
his
certificate
of
candidacy
for
city
mayor
for
4. Latasa v Comelec (RC) the
May
14,
2001
elections.
He
stated
therein
that
he
is
eligible
therefor,
and
G.R.
No.
154829
|
Dec.
10,
2003
|
AZCUA,
J.
likewise
disclosed
that
he
had
already
served
for
three
consecutive
terms
as
mayor
Petitioner:
Arsenio
A.
Latasa
of
the
Municipality
of
Digos
and
is
now
running
for
the
first
time
for
the
position
of
Respondent:
Commission
on
Elections,
Romeo
Sunga
city
mayor.
On
March
1,
2001,
private
respondent
Romeo
M.
Sunga,
also
a
candidate
for
city
DOCTRINE:
An
elective
local
official,
therefore,
is
not
barred
from
running
again
in
for
same
mayor
in
the
said
elections,
filed
before
the
COMELEC
a
Petition
to
Deny
Due
local
government
post,
unless
two
conditions
concur:
1.)
that
the
official
concerned
has
Course,
Cancel
Certificate
of
Candidacy
and/
or
For
Disqualification against
been
elected
for
three
consecutive
terms
to
the
same
local
government
post,
and
2.)
that
he
petitioner
Latasa.
Respondent
Sunga
alleged
therein
that
petitioner
falsely
has
fully
served
three
consecutive
terms.
represented
in
his
certificate
of
candidacy
that
he
is
eligible
to
run
as
mayor
of
Digos
City
since
petitioner
had
already
been
elected
and
served
for
three
SUMMARY:
Latasa
was
the
Municipal
Mayor
of
Digos,
serving
3
consecutive
terms
(1992- consecutive
terms
as
mayor
from
1992
to
2001.
1995,
95-98,
98-2001).
It
was
converted
into
a
COMPONENT
CITY.
Latasa
then
ran
again
for
COMELEC
cancelled
Latasas
certificate
of
candidacy.
MR
was
filed
and
was
the
CITY
mayorship
in
2001.
Sunga
was
another
candidate.
He
sought
to
disqualify
Latasa
unresolved
until
the
2001
elections.
because
of
the
3
term
rule.
Latasa
was
DQd.
However
Latasa
filed
an
MR
while
that
was
Latasa
won
the
2001
elections
and
was
sworn
in
as
Mayor.
pending
he
got
elected.
Then
COMELEC
en
banc
ruled
on
the
MR,
saying
DQ
nga
siya.
Hence
2002,
MR
was
denied.
this
petition.
NOTE:
In
Latasas
certification
there
was
a
statement:
I
am
eligible
to
run
blahblah
tapos
may
FOOTNOTE:
Having
served
three
(3)
term[s]
as
municipal
Court
held
that:
mayor
and
now
running
for
the
first
time
as
city
mayor.
So
kahit
si
Latasa
may
doubts.
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
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Review
|
Dean
Candelaria
Compilation
6.01
Article
X
Page
11
of
42
Article
X
of
the
Constitution
mandates
that
no
province,
city,
municipality,
or
ISSUES:
barangay
may
be
created,
divided,
merged,
abolished,
or
its
boundary
substantially
W/N
COMELEC
has
jurisdiction?
YES
altered,
without
the
approval
by
a
majority
of
the
votes
cast
in
a
plebiscite
in
the
W/N
Latasa
was
qualified
to
run
as
city
mayor
after
serving
3
terms
as
municipal
mayor?
NO
political
units
directly
affected.
W/N
Sunga
gets
the
seat?
NO
It
must
be
noted
that
Municipality
and
City
of
Digos
is
the
EXACT
same
thing
it
just
met
the
revenue
requirements
(stated
in
FOOTNOTE
of
this
digest)
HELD:
So
SC
said
that
LATASA
already
served
the
3
consecutive
terms
so
he
couldnt
run
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
DISMISSED.
No
pronouncement
as
to
costs.
na
SC
cited
the
following
cases
to
illustrate
this
(first
bullet
is
case
cited,
below
it
is
the
comparison
made
to
the
case
now):
RATIO:
o Lonzanida
v.
COMELEC, petitioner
was
elected
and
served
two
COMELEC
Jurisdiction
YES
consecutive
terms
as
mayor
from
1988
to
1995.
He
then
ran
again
for
Mamba-Perez
v.
COMELEC that
after
an
elective
official
has
been
proclaimed
as
the
same
position
in
the
May
1995
elections,
won
and
discharged
his
winner
of
the
elections,
the
COMELEC
has
no
jurisdiction
to
pass
upon
his
duties
as
mayor.
However,
his
opponent
contested
his
proclamation
and
qualifications.
An
opposing
partys
remedies
after
proclamation
would
be
to
file
a
filed
an
election
protest
before
the
Regional
Trial
Court,
which
ruled
that
petition
for
quo
warranto
within
ten
days
after
the
proclamation.
there
was
a
failure
of
elections
and
declared
the
position
of
mayor
o Time
and
again,
this
Court
has
held
that
rules
of
procedure
are
only
tools
vacant.
The
COMELEC
affirmed
this
ruling
and
petitioner
acceded
to
the
designed
to
facilitate
the
attainment
of
justice,
such
that
when
rigid
order
to
vacate
the
post.
During
the
May
1998
elections,
petitioner
application
of
the
rules
tend
to
frustrate
rather
than
promote
substantial
therein
again
filed
his
certificate
of
candidacy
for
mayor.
A
petition
to
justice,
this
Court
is
empowered
to
suspend
their
operation.
We
will
not
disqualify
him
was
filed
on
the
ground
that
he
had
already
served
three
hesitate
to
set
aside
technicalities
in
favor
of
what
is
fair
and
just.
consecutive
terms.
This
Court
ruled,
however,
that
petitioner
therein
cannot
be
considered
as
having
been
duly
elected
to
the
post
in
the
May
LATASAs
eligibility
as
CITY
mayor
NO
1995
elections,
and
that
said
petitioner
did
not
fully
serve
the
1995-1998
The
framers
of
the
Constitution,
by
including
this
exception,
wanted
to
establish
mayoral
term
by
reason
of
involuntary
relinquishment
of
office.
some
safeguards
against
the
excessive
accumulation
of
power
as
a
result
of
" In
the
present
case,
petitioner
Latasa
was,
without
a
doubt,
consecutive
terms.
duly
elected
as
mayor
in
the
May
1998
elections.
Can
he
then
An
elective
local
official,
therefore,
is
not
barred
from
running
again
in
for
same
be
construed
as
having
involuntarily
relinquished
his
office
by
local
government
post,
unless
two
conditions
concur:
1.)
that
the
official
reason
of
the
conversion
of
Digos
from
municipality
to
concerned
has
been
elected
for
three
consecutive
terms
to
the
same
local
city?
This
Court
believes
that
he
did
involuntarily
relinquish
his
government
post,
and
2.)
that
he
has
fully
served
three
consecutive
terms.
office
as
municipal
mayor
since
the
said
office
has
been
2
Substantial
differences
do
exist
between
a
municipality
and
a
city .
For
one,
there
deemed
abolished
due
to
the
conversion.
However,
the
very
is
a
material
change
in
the
political
and
economic
rights
of
the
local
government
instant
he
vacated
his
office
as
municipal
mayor,
he
also
unit
when
it
is
converted
from
a
municipality
to
a
city
and
undoubtedly,
these
assumed
office
as
city
mayor.
Unlike
in
Lonzanida,
where
changes
affect
the
people
as
well.
It
is
precisely
for
this
reason
why
Section
10,
petitioner
therein,
for
even
just
a
short
period
of
time,
stepped
down
from
office,
petitioner
Latasa
never
ceased
from
acting
2
as
chief
executive
of
the
local
government
unit.
He
never
SECTION
450.
Requisites
for
Creation.
-
(a)
A
municipality
or
a
cluster
of
barangays
may
be
converted
into
a
ceased
from
discharging
his
duties
and
responsibilities
as
chief
component
city
it
has
an
average
annual
income,
as
certified
by
the
Department
of
Finance,
of
at
least
Twenty
million
pesos
(20,000,000.00)
for
the
last
two
(2)
consecutive
years
based
on
1991
constant
prices,
and
if
it
has
either
of
the
executive
of
Digos.
following
requisites:
o In
Adormeo
v.
COMELEC, this
Court
was
confronted
with
the
issue
of
(i)
a
contiguous
territory
of
at
least
one
hundred
(100)
square
kilometers,
as
certified
by
the
Land
Management
whether
or
not
an
assumption
to
office
through
a
recall
election
should
Bureau;
or,
(ii)
a
population
of
not
less
than
one
hundred
fifty
thousand
(150,000)
inhabitants,
as
certified
by
the
National
be
considered
as
one
term
in
applying
the
three-term
limit
rule.
Private
Statistics
Office.
respondent,
in
that
case,
was
elected
and
served
for
two
consecutive
Provided,
That,
the
creation
thereof
shall
not
reduce
the
land
area,
population,
and
income
of
the
original
unit
or
units
terms
as
mayor.
He
then
ran
for
his
third
term
in
the
May
1998
elections,
at
the
time
of
said
creation
to
less
than
the
minimum
requirements
prescribed
herein.
but
lost
to
his
opponent.
In
June
1998,
his
opponent
faced
recall
(b)
The
territorial
jurisdiction
of
a
newly-created
city
shall
be
properly
identified
by
metes
and
bounds.
The
requirement
on
land
are
shall
not
apply
where
the
city
proposed
to
be
created
is
composed
of
one
(1)
or
more
proceedings
and
in
the
recall
elections
of
May
2000,
private
respondent
island.
The
territory
need
not
be
contiguous
if
it
comprises
two
(2)
or
more
islands.
won
and
served
for
the
unexpired
term.
(c)
The
average
annual
income
shall
include
the
income
accruing
to
the
general
fund,
exclusive
of
special
funds,
transfers,
and
non-recurring
income.
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
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Law
Review
|
Dean
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Compilation
6.01
Article
X
Page
12
of
42
" For
the
May
2001
elections,
private
respondent
filed
his
the
framers
when
they
wrote
this
exception.
Should
he
be
allowed
another
three
certificate
of
candidacy
for
the
office
of
mayor.
This
was
consecutive
terms
as
mayor
of
the
City
of
Digos,
petitioner
would
then
be
possibly
questioned
on
the
ground
that
he
had
already
served
as
mayor
holding
office
as
chief
executive
over
the
same
territorial
jurisdiction
and
for
three
consecutive
terms.
This
Court
held
therein
that
inhabitants
for
a
total
of
eighteenconsecutive
years.
This
is
the
very
scenario
private
respondent
cannot
be
construed
as
having
been
sought
to
be
avoided
by
the
Constitution,
if
not
abhorred
by
it.
elected
and
served
for
three
consecutive
terms.
His
loss
in
the
In
Labo
v
COMELEC
that
the
disqualification
of
a
winning
candidate
does
not
May
1998
elections
was
considered
by
this
Court
as
an
necessarily
entitle
the
candidate
with
the
highest
number
of
votes
to
proclamation
interruption
in
the
continuity
of
his
service
as
mayor.
For
as
the
winner
of
the
elections.
As
an
obiter,
the
Court
merely
mentioned
that
the
nearly
two
years,
private
respondent
therein
lived
as
a
private
rule
would
have
been
different
if
the
electorate,
fully
aware
in
fact
and
in
law
of
a
citizen.
The
same,
however,
cannot
be
said
of
petitioner
candidates
disqualification
so
as
to
bring
such
awareness
within
the
realm
of
Latasa
in
the
present
case.
notoriety,
would
nonetheless
cast
their
votes
in
favor
of
the
ineligible
o Socrates
v.
COMELEC,
the
principal
issue
was
whether
or
not
private
candidate.
In
such
case,
the
electorate
may
be
said
to
have
waived
the
validity
and
respondent
Edward
M.
Hagedorn
was
qualified
to
run
during
the
recall
efficacy
of
their
votes
by
notoriously
misapplying
their
franchise
or
throwing
away
elections.
Therein
respondent
Hagedorn
had
already
served
for
three
their
votes,
in
which
case,
the
eligible
candidate
obtaining
the
next
higher
number
consecutive
terms
as
mayor
from
1992
until
2001
and
did
not
run
in
the
of
votes
may
be
deemed
elected.
The
same,
however,
cannot
be
said
of
the
immediately
following
regular
elections.
On
July
2,
2002,
the
barangay
present
case.
officials
of
Puerto
Princesa
convened
themselves
into
a
Preparatory
This
Court
has
consistently
ruled
that
the
fact
that
a
plurality
or
a
majority
of
the
Recall
Assembly
to
initiate
the
recall
of
the
incumbent
mayor,
Victorino
votes
are
cast
for
an
ineligible
candidate
at
a
popular
election,
or
that
a
candidate
Dennis
M.
Socrates.
On
August
23,
2002,
respondent
Hagedorn
filed
his
is
later
declared
to
be
disqualified
to
hold
office,
does
not
entitle
the
candidate
certificate
of
candidacy
for
mayor
in
the
recall
election.
A
petition
for
his
who
garnered
the
second
highest
number
of
votes
to
be
declared
elected.
The
disqualification
was
filed
on
the
ground
that
he
cannot
run
for
the
said
same
merely
results
in
making
the
winning
candidates
election
a
nullity.
post
during
the
recall
elections
for
he
was
disqualified
from
running
for
a
fourth
consecutive
term.
This
Court,
however,
ruled
in
favor
of
respondent
Hagedorn,
holding
that
the
principle
behind
the
three-term
limit
rule
is
to
prevent
consecutiveness
of
the
service
of
terms,
and
that
5. Ong v Alegre (RC)
there
was
in
his
case
a
break
in
such
consecutiveness
after
the
end
of
his
third
term
and
before
the
recall
election.
ONG
v.
ALEGRE
(RC
for
CG)
This
Court
reiterates
that
the
framers
of
the
Constitution
specifically
included
an
G.R.
No.
163295
and
163354|
Jan
23,
2006
|
GARCIA,
J.
exception
to
the
peoples
freedom
to
choose
those
who
will
govern
them
in
order
to
avoid
the
evil
of
a
single
person
accumulating
excessive
power
over
a
particular
Petitioner:
Francis
and
Rommel
G.
Ong
territorial
jurisdiction
as
a
result
of
a
prolonged
stay
in
the
same
office.
To
allow
Respondent:
Joseph
Stanley
Alegre
and
COMELEC
petitioner
Latasa
to
vie
for
the
position
of
city
mayor
after
having
served
for
three
consecutive
terms
as
a
municipal
mayor
would
obviously
defeat
the
very
intent
of
DOCTRINE:
the
framers
when
they
wrote
this
exception.
Should
he
be
allowed
another
three
Assumption
into
office
and
serving
the
term
counts
as
service
of
full
term.
In
relation
to
consecutive
terms
as
mayor
of
the
City
of
Digos,
petitioner
would
then
be
possibly
the
doctrine
that:
An
elective
local
official,
therefore,
is
not
barred
from
running
again
in
for
holding
office
as
chief
executive
over
the
same
territorial
jurisdiction
and
same
local
government
post,
unless
two
conditions
concur:
1.)
that
the
official
concerned
inhabitants
for
a
total
of
eighteenconsecutive
years.
This
is
the
very
scenario
has
been
elected
for
three
consecutive
terms
to
the
same
local
government
post,
and
2.)
sought
to
be
avoided
by
the
Constitution,
if
not
abhorred
by
it.
that
he
has
fully
served
three
consecutive
terms.
nd
SUNGA
should
be
Mayor,
since
he
garnered
2
highest
number
NO
SUMMARY:
Francis
Ong
and
Alegre
are
political
rivals.
In
1998-2001
term,
Francis
won.
But
it
was
This
Court
reiterates
that
the
framers
of
the
Constitution
specifically
included
an
found
after
the
term
that
Alegre
won.
Francis
was
re-elected
in
2001-2004.
So
now,
in
the
exception
to
the
peoples
freedom
to
choose
those
who
will
govern
them
in
order
2004
elections,
Alegre
claims
Francis
served
3
consecutive
terms.
COMELEC
said
yes,
so
to
avoid
the
evil
of
a
single
person
accumulating
excessive
power
over
a
particular
cancelled.
Rommel,
Francis
brother
then
substituted
him
but
he
was
likewise
DQd
territorial
jurisdiction
as
a
result
of
a
prolonged
stay
in
the
same
office.
To
allow
because
of
late
filing.
So
now,
brothers
Ong
question
w/n
COMELEC
committed
GADALEJ
is
petitioner
Latasa
to
vie
for
the
position
of
city
mayor
after
having
served
for
three
cancelling
their
certificates
of
candidacies.
The
issue
boils
down
to
W/N
Francis
served
the
consecutive
terms
as
a
municipal
mayor
would
obviously
defeat
the
very
intent
of
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of
42
full
term
for
1998-2001,
which
dqd
him.
His
contention
is
that
it
was
Alegre
who
had
legally
the
1998
mayoralty
election
coupled
by
his
assumption
of
office
and
his
won
the
1998-2001
term,
so
he
hadnt
completed
the
term.
SC
said,
tanga!
You
were
mayor
continuous
exercise
of
the
functions
thereof
from
start
to
finish
of
the
term,
for
1998-2001.
Francis
served
all
three
years.
It
would
ridiculous
to
say
that
it
had
been
should
legally
be
taken
as
service
for
a
full
term
in
contemplation
of
the
three-
interrupted.
The
decision
in
favor
of
Alegre
came
in
2001
after
Francis
had
served
from
term
rule.
1998-2001.
So
yeah
In
Lonzanida
v
COMELEC,
petitioner
Lonzanida
was
elected
and
served
for
two
consecutive
terms
as
mayor
of
San
Antonio,
Zambales
prior
to
the
May
8,
1995
FACTS:
elections.
He
then
ran
again
for
the
same
position
in
the
May
1995
elections,
won
2
petitions,
first,
Rule
65
questioning
granting
of
MR
by
COMELEC
en
banc
and
and
discharged
his
duties
as
Mayor.
However,
his
opponent
contested
his
then
the
other
is
an
injunction
to
prevent
the
implementation
of
such
MR/Ruling
proclamation
and
filed
an
election
protest
before
the
RTC
of
Zambales,
which,
in
a
Francis
Ong
and
Alegre
were
candidates
for
the
2004
elections,
running
as
mayor
decision
dated
January
9,
1997,
ruled
that
there
was
a
failure
of
elections
and
for
San
Vicente,
Camarines
Norte.
Francis
was
the
incumbent
mayor.
declared
the
position
vacant.
The
COMELEC
affirmed
this
ruling
and
petitioner
Alegre
wanted
to
DQ
Francis
because
three-consecutive
term
rule,
Francis
having,
Lonzanida
acceded
to
the
order
to
vacate
the
post.
Lonzanida
assumed
the
office
according
to
Alegre,
ran
in
the
May
1995,
May
1998,
and
May
2001
mayoralty
and
performed
his
duties
up
to
March
1998
only.
Now,
during
the
May
1998
elections
and
have
assumed
office
as
mayor
and
discharged
the
duties
thereof
for
elections,
Lonzanida
again
ran
for
mayor
of
the
same
town.
A
petition
to
three
(3)
consecutive
full
terms
corresponding
to
those
elections.
disqualify,
under
the
three-term
rule,
was
filed
and
was
eventually
granted.
There,
This
isnt
the
first
time
they
met
to
digress,
the
two
ran
against
each
other
in
the
Court
held
that
Lonzanida
cannot
be
considered
as
having
been
duly
elected
to
1998,
Francis
won.
But
in
2001
(after
Francis
had
served
the
98-2001
full
term)
the
post
in
the
May
1995
election,
and
that
he
did
not
fully
serve
the
1995-1998
COMELEC
declared
Alegre
the
winner
pala
of
the
1998
election.
(bagal
nila)
mayoralty
term
by
reason
of
involuntary
relinquishment
of
office.
As
the
Court
Back
to
the
2004
elections
COMELEC
said
that
the
1998-2001
term
shouldnt
be
pointedly
observed,
Lonzanida
cannot
be
deemed
to
have
served
the
May
1995
counted
because
si
Alegre
yung
legally
elected
mayor.
On
MR,
Alegre
won
so
DQ
to
1998
term
because
he
was
ordered
to
vacate
[and
in
fact
vacated]
his
na
si
Francis
on
May
7,
2004.
post
before
the
expiration
of
the
term.
May
8
(next
day),
Rommel,
Franciss
brother,
filed
his
certificate
of
candidacy,
well
The
difference
between
the
case
at
bench
and
Lonzanida
is
at
once
apparent.
For
after
the
actual
deadline,
as
a
substitute
for
his
bro
under
the
Nacionalista
Party.
one,
in
Lonzanida,
the
result
of
the
mayoralty
election
was
declared
a
nullity
for
May
9
(a
day
before
the
may10
elections),
Alegre
filed
another
petition
for
the
stated
reason
of
failure
of
election,
and,
as
a
consequence
thereof,
the
cancellation
against
Rommel,
which
was
granted
so
the
canvassers
didnt
count
proclamation
of
Lonzanida
as
mayor-elect
was
nullified,
followed
by
an
order
for
Rommels
votes.
SO
ALEGRE
WON
the
2004
elections.
Hence
the
two
petitions.
him
to
vacate
the
office
of
mayor.
For
another,
Lonzanida
did
not
fully
serve
the
1995-1998
mayoral
term,
there
being
an
involuntary
severance
from
office
as
a
ISSUE:
result
of
legal
processes.
In
fine,
there
was
an
effective
interruption
of
the
W/N
COMELEC
committed
GADALEJ?
NO
continuity
of
service.
Everything
hinges
on
the
issue
of
W/N
Francis
served
the
1998-2001
term?
YES
On
the
other
hand,
the
failure-of-election
factor
does
not
obtain
in
the
present
case.
But
more
importantly,
here,
there
was
actually
no
interruption
or
break
in
HELD:
the
continuity
of
Francis
service
respecting
the
1998-2001
term.
Unlike
In
any
event,
with
the
hard
reality
that
the
May
10,
2004
elections
were
already
pass,
Lonzanida,
Francis
was
never
unseated
during
the
term
in
question;
he
never
Rommel
Ongs
petition
in
G.R.
No.
163354
is
already
moot
and
academic.
ceased
discharging
his
duties
and
responsibilities
as
mayor
of
San
Vicente,
WHEREFORE,
the
instant
petitions
are
DISMISSED
and
the
assailed
en
banc
Resolution
Camarines
Norte
for
the
entire
period
covering
the
1998-2001
term.
dated
May
7,
2004
of
the
COMELEC,
in
SPA
No.
04-048
AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
It
is
true
that
the
RTC-Daet,
Camarines
Norte
ruled
that
it
was
Francis
opponent
6. Dizon v Comelec (RL)
(Alegre)
who
won
in
the
1998
mayoralty
race
and,
therefore,
was
the
legally
G.R.
No.
182088
|
January
30,
2009
|
CARPIO,
J
elected
mayor
of
San
Vicente.
However,
that
disposition,
it
must
be
stressed,
was
Petitioner:
ROBERTO
L.
DIZON
without
practical
and
legal
use
and
value,
having
been
promulgated
after
the
term
Respondents:
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS
and
MARINO
P.
MORALES
of
the
contested
office
has
expired.
Petitioner
Francis
contention
that
he
was
only
a
presumptive
winner
in
the
1998
mayoralty
derby
as
his
proclamation
was
SUMMARY:
Dizon
filed
a
petition
for
certiorari
and
prohibition,
with
prayer
for
the
issuance
under
protest
did
not
make
him
less
than
a
duly
elected
mayor.
His
proclamation
of
a
temporary
restraining
order
and
writ
of
preliminary
injunction
seeking
the
reversal
of
nd
by
the
Municipal
Board
of
Canvassers
of
San
Vicente
as
the
duly
elected
mayor
in
the
Resolutions
of
the
COMELEC
2
Division,
affirmed
by
the
COMELEC
En
Banc
in
relation
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of
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to
his
petition
to
disqualify
and/or
to
cancel
Marino
P.
Morales
(Morales)
certificate
of
covered
under
the
aforementioned
provision,
the
instant
petition
failed
to
allege
candidacy.
Dizon
alleged
that
if
Morales
were
to
be
allowed
to
run
for
the
position
of
Mayor
any
material
misrepresentation
in
his
Certificate
of
Candidacy.
th nd st
of
Mabalacat,
Pampanga,
the
2007
elections
would
have
already
been
his
5
term,
in
The
COMELEC
2
Division
ruled
that
he
was
Mayor
from
1995-1998
(1
term),
nd
violation
of
the
three-term
limit.
He
alleged
that
Morales
was
proclaimed
as
Mayor
in
1995,
1998-2001
(2
term)
notwithstanding
the
decision
of
the
RTC
because
he
was
able
1998,
2001
and
2004
and
had
fully
served
all
terms.
The
COMELEC
Division
and
En
Banc
to
exercise
the
powers
and
enjoy
the
position
of
mayor
as
caretaker
or
de
facto
rd
ruled
in
a
similar
manner.
They
based
their
Resolutions
on
a
decision
of
the
SC
in
the
Rivera
officer
until
June
2001,
and
on
2001-2003
(3
term).
case
involving
Morales
wherein
he
filed
for
a
COC
for
the
2004
elections
but
was
o The
SC
already
held
that
he
had
violated
the
three-term
limit
under
th
subsequently
held
to
have
violated
the
term
limits
as
it
was
already
his
4
term.
The
SC
Section
43
of
the
LGC.
He
was
not
considered
as
a
candidate
in
the
2004
affirmed
the
decision
of
COMELEC.
For
purposes
of
determining
the
resulting
disqualification
Elections.
Hence,
his
failure
to
qualify
for
the
2004
elections
is
a
gap
and
brought
about
by
the
three-term
limit,
it
is
not
enough
that
an
individual
has
served
three
allows
him
to
run
again
for
the
same
position
in
the
May
14,
2007
consecutive
terms
in
an
elective
local
office,
he
must
also
have
been
elected
to
the
same
Elections.
nd
position
for
the
same
number
of
times.
The
Rivera
ruling
served
as
Morales
involuntary
The
COMELEC
En
Banc
AFFIRMED
the
ruling
of
the
2
Division.
severance
from
office
with
respect
to
the
2004-2007
term.
Involuntary
severance
from
o The
COC
for
the
May
2004
Elections
was
cancelled.
As
a
result,
office
for
any
length
of
time
short
of
the
full
term
provided
by
law
amounts
to
an
respondent
was
not
only
disqualified
but
was
also
not
considered
a
interruption
of
continuity
of
service.
Such
decision
was
effectively
immediately
which
led
candidate
in
the
May
2004
elections.
Morales
to
relinquish
his
position
and
for
the
vice-mayor
to
assume
the
office
from
May
o The
three-term
limit
does
not
apply
whenever
there
is
an
involuntary
2007
to
June
2007.
The
assumption,
no
matter
how
short
it
may
seem
to
Dizon,
interrupted
break.
Morales
continuity
of
service.
Thus,
Morales
did
not
hold
office
for
the
full
term
of
1
July
" The
Constitution
does
not
require
that
the
interruption
or
2004
to
30
June
2007.
This
serves
a
gap
for
the
three-term
limit.
Hence,
the
SC
said
that
hiatus
to
be
a
full
term
of
three
years.
st
Morales
joining
the
May
2007
election
is
again
his
1
term.
" What
the
law
requires
is
for
an
interruption,
break
or
a
rest
period
from
a
candidates
term
of
office
"for
any
length
of
FACTS:
time."
Roberto
L.
Dizon
is
a
resident
and
taxpayer
of
the
Municipality
of
Mabalacat,
" Latsa
v.
Comelec:
the
law
contemplates
a
rest
period
during
Pampanga.
which
the
local
elective
official
steps
down
from
office
and
Marino
P.
Morales
is
the
incumbent
Mayor
of
the
Municipality
of
Mabalacat,
ceases
to
exercise
power
or
authority
over
the
inhabitants
of
Pampanga.
the
territorial
jurisdiction
of
a
particular
local
government
unit.
Dizon
alleges
Morales
was
proclaimed
as
the
municipal
mayor
of
Mabalacat,
o The
three-term
limit
is
not
applicable
in
the
instant
case
for
lack
of
the
Pampanga
during
the
1995,
1998,
2001
and
2004
elections
and
has
fully
served
the
two
conditions:
1)
respondent
was
not
the
duly-elected
mayor
of
same.
Morales
filed
his
Certificate
of
Candidacy
on
March
28,
2007
again
for
the
Mabalacat
in
2004
primordially
because
he
was
not
even
considered
a
same
position
and
same
municipality.
candidate;
and
2)
he
has
failed
to
serve
the
entire
duration
of
the
term
Dizon
argues
that
Morales
is
no
longer
eligible
and
qualified
to
run
for
the
same
of
office
because
he
has
already
relinquished
the
disputed
office
on
May
position
for
the
May
14,
2007
elections
under
Section
43
of
the
LGC
which
states
16,
2007
which
is
more
than
a
month
prior
to
the
end
of
his
supposed
that
no
local
elective
official
is
allowed
to
serve
for
more
than
3
consecutive
terms
term.
for
the
same
position.
Dizon
submits
that
the
factual
findings
made
in
the
Rivera
case
should
still
be
Morales
asserts
that
he
is
eligible
and
qualified
to
do
so
because
he
was
not
applied
in
the
present
case
because
Morales
had,
except
for
one
month
and
14
elected
for
the
said
position
in
the
1998
elections.
days,
served
the
full
term
of
2004-2007.
Morales
assumption
of
the
mayoralty
o He
avers
that
the
Commission
en
banc
in
Atty.
Rivera
III
and
De
Guzman
position
on
1
July
2007
makes
the
2007-2010
term
Morales
fifth
term
in
office.
vs.
Mayor
Morales,
affirmed
the
decision
of
the
RTC
which
declared
Dizon
raises
the
following
grounds
before
this
Court:
Anthony
Dee
as
the
duly
elected
Mayor
of
Mabalacat
in
the
1998
elections.
ISSUE:
W/N
Morales
violated
the
three-year
term
limit
when
he
won
as
Mayor
in
the
2007
His
term
then
should
be
reckoned
from
2001
or
when
he
was
proclaimed
as
Mayor
ElectionNO.
of
Mabalacat,
and
that
his
election
in
2004
is
only
for
his
second
term.
Hence,
the
three
term
rule
provided
under
the
Local
Government
Code
is
not
applicable
to
HELD:
The
petition
has
no
merit.
him.
WHEREFORE,
we
DISMISS
the
petition.
We
AFFIRM
the
Resolution
of
the
Commission
on
Elections
En
Banc
dated
14
February
2008
as
well
as
the
Resolution
of
the
Commission
on
Elections
Second
Division
dated
27
July
2007.
Further,
he
argues
that
the
grounds
stated
in
the
instant
petition
are
not
covered
under
Section
78
of
the
Omnibus
Election
Code.
He
contends
that
even
if
it
is
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42
RATIO:
o Morales
cannot
be
deemed
to
have
served
the
full
term
of
2004-2007
Article
X,
Section
8
of
the
1987
Constitution
reads:
because
he
was
ordered
to
vacate
his
post
before
the
expiration
of
the
o The
term
of
office
of
elective
local
officials,
except
barangay
officials,
term.
which
shall
be
determined
by
law,
shall
be
three
years
and
no
such
o Morales
occupancy
of
the
position
of
mayor
of
Mabalacat
from
1
July
official
shall
serve
for
more
than
three
consecutive
terms.
Voluntary
2004
to
16
May
2007
cannot
be
counted
as
a
term
for
purposes
of
renunciation
of
the
office
for
any
length
of
time
shall
not
be
considered
computing
the
three-term
limit.
as
an
interruption
in
the
continuity
of
his
service
for
the
full
term
for
o Indeed,
the
period
from
17
May
2007
to
30
June
2007
served
as
a
gap
for
which
he
was
elected.
purposes
of
the
three-term
limit
rule.
Section
43(b)
of
the
LGC
restated
the
above
provision.
Dizon
alleges
that
Morales
"was
able
to
serve
his
fourth
term
as
mayor
through
For
purposes
of
determining
the
resulting
disqualification
brought
about
by
the
lengthy
litigations.
x
x
x
In
other
words,
he
was
violating
the
rule
on
three-term
three-term
limit,
it
is
not
enough
that
an
individual
has
served
three
consecutive
limit
with
impunity
by
the
sheer
length
of
litigation
and
profit
from
it
even
more
by
terms
in
an
elective
local
office,
he
must
also
have
been
elected
to
the
same
raising
the
technicalities
arising
therefrom."
position
for
the
same
number
of
times.
o The
SC
replied
by
citing
the
Lonzanida
v.
COMELEC
case,
which
states
There
should
be
a
concurrence
of
two
conditions
for
the
application
of
the
that:
disqualification:
" The
delay
in
resolving
the
election
protest,
despite
it
taking
o (1)
that
the
official
concerned
has
been
elected
for
three
consecutive
about
three
years
to
finish,
cannot
be
imputed
to
the
terms
in
the
same
local
government
post
and
petitioner.
o (2)
that
he
has
fully
served
three
consecutive
terms.
" There
is
no
specific
allegation
nor
proof
that
the
delay
was
due
In
the
Rivera
case,
the
SC
found
that
Morales
was
elected
as
mayor
of
Mabalacat
to
any
political
maneuvering
on
his
part
to
prolong
his
stay
in
for
four
consecutive
terms:
1
July
1995
to
30
June
1998,
1
July
1998
to
30
June
office.
2001,
1
July
2001
to
30
June
2004,
and
1
July
2004
to
30
June
2007.
" Moreover,
protestant
Alvez,
was
not
without
legal
recourse
to
o However,
he
was
disqualified
in
the
May
2004
elections
because
of
the
move
for
the
early
resolution
of
the
election
protest
while
it
three-term
limit.
was
pending
before
the
RTC
or
to
file
a
motion
for
the
o Although
the
trial
court
previously
ruled
that
Morales
proclamation
for
execution
of
the
RTCs
decision
declaring
the
position
of
mayor
the
1998-2001
term
was
void,
there
was
no
interruption
of
the
vacant
and
ordering
the
vice-mayor
to
assume
office
while
the
continuity
of
Morales
service
with
respect
to
the
1998-2001
term
appeal
was
pending
with
the
COMELEC.
because
the
trial
courts
ruling
was
promulgated
only
on
4
July
2001,
or
" Such
delay
which
is
not
here
shown
to
have
been
intentionally
after
the
expiry
of
the
1998-2001
term.
sought
by
the
petitioner
to
prolong
his
stay
in
office
cannot
Such
ruling
served
as
Morales
involuntary
severance
from
office
with
respect
to
serve
as
basis
to
bar
his
right
to
be
elected
and
to
serve
his
the
2004-2007
term.
chosen
local
government
post
in
the
succeeding
mayoral
o Involuntary
severance
from
office
for
any
length
of
time
short
of
the
election.
full
term
provided
by
law
amounts
to
an
interruption
of
continuity
of
service.
o Such
decision
was
effectively
immediately
which
led
Morales
to
relinquish
his
position
and
for
the
vice-mayor
to
assume
the
office
from
7. Bolos v Comelec (MT)
May
2007
to
June
2007.
G.R.
No.
184082
March
17,
2009
o Such
assumption,
no
matter
how
short
it
may
seem
to
Dizon,
Petitioner:
NICASIO
BOLOS,
JR.
interrupted
Morales
continuity
of
service.
vs.
Responents:
THE
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS
and
REY
ANGELES
CINCONIEGUE
o Thus,
Morales
did
not
hold
office
for
the
full
term
of
1
July
2004
to
30
June
2007.
Summary:
For
three
consecutive
terms,
petitioner
was
elected
to
the
position
of
Punong
The
SC
conceded
that
Morales
occupied
the
position
of
mayor
of
Mabalacat
for
Barangay
of
Barangay
Biking,
Dauis,
Bohol
in
the
Barangay
Elections
held
in
1994,
1997
and
the
following
periods:
1
July
1995
to
30
June
1998,
1
July
1998
to
30
June
2001,
1
2002.
In
May
2004,
while
sitting
as
the
incumbent
Punong
Barangay
of
Barangay
Biking,
July
2001
to
30
June
2004,
and
1
July
2004
to
16
May
2007.
petitioner
ran
for
Municipal
Councilor
of
Dauis,
Bohol
and
won.
He
assumed
office
as
However,
because
of
his
disqualification,
Morales
was
not
the
duly
elected
mayor
Municipal
Councilor
on
July
1,
2004,
leaving
his
post
as
Punong
Barangay.
He
served
the
full
for
the
2004-2007
term.
term
of
the
Sangguniang
Bayan
position,
which
was
until
June
30,
2007.
Issue
is
Whether
or
Neither
did
Morales
hold
the
position
of
mayor
of
Mabalacat
for
the
full
term.
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
Poli
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16
of
42
not
there
was
voluntary
renunciation
of
the
Office
of
Punong
Barangay
by
petitioner
when
involuntary
renunciation,
petitioners
service
is
deemed
to
have
been
interrupted;
he
assumed
office
as
Municipal
Councilor
so
that
he
is
deemed
to
have
fully
served
his
third
hence,
he
is
not
barred
from
running
for
another
term.
term
as
Punong
Barangay,
warranting
his
disqualification
from
running
for
the
same
position
In
a
Resolution dated
March
4,
2008,
the
First
Division
of
the
COMELEC
ruled
that
in
the
October
29,
2007
Barangay
and
Sangguniang
Kabataan
Elections.
YES.
After
three
petitioners
relinquishment
of
the
office
of
Punong
Barangay
of
Biking,
Dauis,
consecutive
terms,
an
elective
local
official
cannot
seek
immediate
reelection
for
a
fourth
Bohol,
as
a
consequence
of
his
assumption
of
office
as
Sangguniang
term.
The
prohibited
election
refers
to
the
next
regular
election
for
the
same
office
following
Bayanmember
of
Dauis,
Bohol,
on
July
1,
2004,
was
a
voluntary
renunciation
of
the
the
end
of
the
third
consecutive
term.
Indeed,
petitioner
was
serving
his
third
term
Office
of
Punong
Barangay.
as
Punong
Barangay
when
he
ran
for
Sangguniang
Bayan
member
and,
upon
winning,
Petitioners
motion
for
reconsideration
was
denied
by
the
COMELEC
en
banc
in
a
assumed
the
position
of
Sangguniang
Bayan
member,
thus,
voluntarily
relinquishing
his
Resolution dated
August
7,
2008.
office
as
Punong
Barangay
which
the
Court
deems
as
a
voluntary
renunciation
of
said
office.
Issue:
Whether
or
not
there
was
voluntary
renunciation
of
the
Office
of
Punong
Barangay
by
petitioner
when
he
assumed
office
as
Municipal
Councilor
so
that
he
is
deemed
to
have
fully
Facts:
served
his
third
term
as
Punong
Barangay,
warranting
his
disqualification
from
running
for
This
is
a
petition
for
certiorari,
under
Rule
65
of
the
Rules
of
Court,
alleging
that
the
same
position
in
the
October
29,
2007
Barangay
and
Sangguniang
Kabataan
Elections.
the
Commission
on
Elections
(COMELEC)
committed
grave
abuse
of
discretion
YES.
amounting
to
lack
or
excess
of
jurisdiction
in
issuing
the
Resolutions
promulgated
Ratio:
on
March
4,
2008
and
August
7,
2008
holding
that
petitioner
Nicasio
Bolos,
Jr.
is
The
three-term
limit
for
elective
local
officials
is
contained
in
Section
8,
Article
X
of
disqualified
as
a
candidate
for
the
position
of
Punong
Barangay
of
Barangay
Biking,
the
Constitution,
which
provides:
Dauis,
Bohol
in
the
October
29,
2007
Barangay
and
Sangguniang
Sec.
8.
The
term
of
office
of
elective
local
officials,
except
barangay
officials,
which
shall
be
Kabataan
Elections
on
the
ground
that
he
has
served
the
three-term
limit
provided
determined
by
law,
shall
be
three
years,
and
no
such
official
shall
serve
for
more
than
three
in
the
Constitution
and
Republic
Act
(R.A.)
No.
7160,
otherwise
known
as
the
Local
consecutive
terms.
Voluntary
renunciation
of
the
office
for
any
length
of
time
shall
not
be
Government
Code
of
1991.
considered
as
an
interruption
in
the
continuity
of
his
service
for
the
full
term
for
which
he
For
three
consecutive
terms,
petitioner
was
elected
to
the
position
of
Punong
was
elected.
Barangay
of
Barangay
Biking,
Dauis,
Bohol
in
the
Barangay
Elections
held
in
1994,
David
v.
Commission
on
Elections elucidates
that
the
Constitution
did
not
expressly
1997
and
2002.
prohibit
Congress
from
fixing
any
term
of
office
for
barangay
officials,
thereby
In
May
2004,
while
sitting
as
the
incumbent
Punong
Barangay
of
Barangay
Biking,
leaving
to
the
law
makers
full
discretion
to
fix
such
term
in
accordance
with
the
petitioner
ran
for
Municipal
Councilor
of
Dauis,
Bohol
and
won.
He
assumed
office
exigencies
of
public
service.
The
discussions
in
the
Constitutional
Commission
as
Municipal
Councilor
on
July
1,
2004,
leaving
his
post
as
Punong
Barangay.
He
showed
that
the
term
of
office
of
barangay
officials
would
be
"[a]s
may
be
served
the
full
term
of
the
Sangguniang
Bayan
position,
which
was
until
June
30,
determined
by
law,"
and
more
precisely,
"[a]s
provided
for
in
the
Local
2007.
Government
Code." Section
43(b)
of
the
Local
Government
Code
provides
Thereafter,
petitioner
filed
his
Certificate
of
Candidacy
for
Punong
Barangay
of
that
barangay
officials
are
covered
by
the
three-term
limit,
while
Section
Barangay
Biking,
Dauis,
Bohol
in
the
October
29,
2007
Barangay
and
Sangguniang
43(c)
thereof
states
that
the
term
of
office
of
barangay
officials
shall
be
five
(5)
Kabataan
Elections.
years.
The
cited
provisions
read,
thus:
Respondent
Rey
Angeles
Cinconiegue,
the
incumbent
Punong
Barangay
and
Sec.
43.
Term
of
Office.
x
x
x
candidate
for
the
same
office,
filed
before
the
COMELEC
a
petition
for
the
(b)
No
local
elective
official
shall
serve
for
more
than
three
(3)
consecutive
terms
in
the
same
disqualification
of
petitioner
as
candidate
on
the
ground
that
he
had
already
position.
Voluntary
renunciation
of
the
office
for
any
length
of
time
shall
not
be
considered
served
the
three-term
limit.
Hence,
petitioner
is
no
longer
allowed
to
run
for
the
as
an
interruption
in
the
continuity
of
service
for
the
full
term
for
which
the
elective
official
same
position
in
accordance
with
Section
8,
Article
X
of
the
Constitution
and
concerned
was
elected.
Section
43
(b)
of
R.A.
No.
7160.
(c)
The
term
of
barangay
officials
and
members
of
the
sangguniang
kabataan
shall
be
for
five
The
issue
before
the
COMELEC
was
whether
or
not
petitioners
election,
(5)
years,
which
shall
begin
after
the
regular
election
of
barangay
officials
on
the
second
assumption
and
discharge
of
the
functions
of
the
Office
of
Sangguniang
Monday
of
May
1997:
Provided,
That
the
sangguniang
kabataan
members
who
were
elected
Bayan
member
can
be
considered
as
voluntary
renunciation
of
his
office
as
Punong
in
the
May
1996
elections
shall
serve
until
the
next
regular
election
of
barangay
officials.
Barangay
of
Barangay
Biking,
Dauis,
Bohol
which
will
render
unbroken
the
Socrates
v.
Commission
on
Elections held
that
the
rule
on
the
three-term
limit,
continuity
of
his
service
as
Punong
Barangay
for
the
full
term
of
office,
that
is,
embodied
in
the
Constitution
and
the
Local
Government
Code,
has
two
parts:
The
from
2004
to
2007.
If
it
is
considered
a
voluntary
renunciation,
petitioner
will
be
first
part
provides
that
an
elective
local
official
cannot
serve
for
more
than
three
deemed
to
have
served
three
consecutive
terms
and
shall
be
disqualified
to
run
for
consecutive
terms.
The
clear
intent
is
that
only
consecutive
terms
count
in
the
same
position
in
the
October
29,
2007
elections.
But
if
it
is
considered
as
an
determining
the
three-term
limit
rule.
The
second
part
states
that
voluntary
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
Poli
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Page
17
of
42
renunciation
of
office
for
any
length
of
time
does
not
interrupt
the
continuity
of
he
won
and
assumed
office
as
Sangguniang
Bayan
member
of
Dauis,
Bohol,
which
service.
The
clear
intent
is
that
involuntary
severance
from
office
for
any
length
of
is
deemed
a
voluntary
renunciation
of
the
Office
of
Punong
Barangay.
time
interrupts
continuity
of
service
and
prevents
the
service
before
and
after
the
In
fine,
the
COMELEC
did
not
commit
grave
abuse
of
discretion
amounting
to
lack
interruption
from
being
joined
together
to
form
a
continuous
service
or
or
excess
of
jurisdiction
in
issuing
the
Resolutions
dated
March
4,
2008
and
August
consecutive
terms.
7,
2008,
disqualifying
petitioner
from
being
a
candidate
for
Punong
Barangayin
the
After
three
consecutive
terms,
an
elective
local
official
cannot
seek
immediate
October
29,
2007
Barangay
and
Sangguniang
Kabataan
Elections.
reelection
for
a
fourth
term.
The
prohibited
election
refers
to
the
next
regular
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
DISMISSED.
The
COMELEC
Resolutions
dated
March
4,
2008
and
election
for
the
same
office
following
the
end
of
the
third
consecutive
term.
August
7,
2008
are
hereby
AFFIRMED.
No
pronouncement
as
to
costs.
In
Lonzanida
v.
Commission
on
Elections, the
Court
stated
that
the
second
part
of
SO
ORDERED.
the
rule
on
the
three-term
limit
shows
the
clear
intent
of
the
framers
of
the
Constitution
to
bar
any
attempt
to
circumvent
the
three-term
limit
by
a
voluntary
renunciation
of
office
and
at
the
same
time
respect
the
peoples
choice
and
grant
their
elected
official
full
service
of
a
term.
The
Court
held
that
two
conditions
for
8. Aldovino v Comelec (JM)
the
application
of
the
disqualification
must
concur:
(1)
that
the
official
concerned
G.R.
184836
|
December
23,2009
has
been
elected
for
three
consecutive
terms
in
the
same
government
post;
and
Brion,
J.
(2)
that
he
has
fully
served
three
consecutive
terms.
Petitioners:
Simon
B.
Aldovino,
Jr.,
Danilo
B.
Faller
and
Ferdinand
Talabong
Respondents:
Commission
on
Elections
and
Wilfredo
Asilo
In
this
case,
it
is
undisputed
that
petitioner
was
elected
as
Punong
Barangay
for
Sorry
for
the
long
digest.
Didnt
want
to
leave
out
anything.
Ill
update
this
later
on.
I
made
the
summary
long
and
three
consecutive
terms,
satisfying
the
first
condition
for
disqualification.
detailed
so
that
you
can
recite
on
the
concepts
in
a
more
detailed
manner.
What
is
to
be
determined
is
whether
petitioner
is
deemed
to
have
voluntarily
renounced
his
position
as
Punong
Barangayduring
his
third
term
when
he
ran
for
SUMMARY:
and
won
as
Sangguniang
Bayan
member
and
assumed
said
office.
FACTS:
The
respondent
Commission
on
Elections
(COMELEC)
ruled
that
preventive
The
Court
agrees
with
the
COMELEC
that
there
was
voluntary
renunciation
by
suspension
is
an
effective
interruption
because
it
renders
the
suspended
public
official
petitioner
of
his
position
as
Punong
Barangay.
unable
to
provide
complete
service
for
the
full
term;
thus,
such
term
should
not
be
counted
The
COMELEC
correctly
held:
It
is
our
finding
that
Nicasio
Bolos,
Jr.s
for
the
purpose
of
the
three-term
limit
rule.
The
present
petition
seeks
to
annul
and
set
relinquishment
of
the
office
of
Punong
Barangay
of
Biking,
Dauis,
Bohol,
as
a
aside
this
COMELEC
ruling
for
having
been
issued
with
grave
abuse
of
discretion
amounting
consequence
of
his
assumption
to
office
as
Sangguniang
Bayan
member
of
Dauis,
to
lack
or
excess
of
jurisdiction.
Asilo
was
elected
councilor
of
Lucena
City
for
three
Bohol,
on
July
1,
2004,
is
a
voluntary
renunciation.
consecutive
terms:
for
the
1998-2001,
2001-2004,
and
2004-2007
terms,
respectively.
In
As
conceded
even
by
him,
respondent
(petitioner
herein)
had
already
completed
September
2005
or
during
his
2004-2007
term
of
office,
the
Sandiganbayan
preventively
two
consecutive
terms
of
office
when
he
ran
for
a
third
term
in
the
Barangay
suspended
him
for
90
days
in
relation
with
a
criminal
case
he
then
faced.
The
SC,
Elections
of
2002.
When
he
filed
his
certificate
of
candidacy
for
the
Office
of
subsequently
lifted
the
Sandiganbayans
suspension
order;
hence,
he
resumed
performing
Sangguniang
Bayan
of
Dauis,
Bohol,
in
the
May
10,
2004
[elections],
he
was
not
the
functions
of
his
office
and
finished
his
term.
In
the
2007
election,
Asilo
filed
his
deemed
resigned.
Nonetheless,
all
the
acts
attending
his
pursuit
of
his
election
as
certificate
of
candidacy
for
the
same
position.
The
petitioners
sought
to
deny
due
course
to
municipal
councilor
point
out
to
an
intent
and
readiness
to
give
up
his
post
as
Asilos
certificate
of
candidacy
or
to
cancel
it
on
the
ground
that
he
had
been
elected
and
Punong
Barangay
once
elected
to
the
higher
elective
office,
for
it
was
very
unlikely
had
served
for
three
terms;
his
candidacy
for
a
fourth
term
therefore
violated
the
three-
that
respondent
had
filed
his
Certificate
of
Candidacy
for
the
Sangguniang
Bayan
term
limit
rule
under
Section
8,
Article
X
of
the
Constitution
and
Section
43(b)
of
RA
7160.
post,
campaigned
and
exhorted
the
municipal
electorate
to
vote
for
him
as
such
and
then
after
being
elected
and
proclaimed,
return
to
his
former
position.
He
The
COMELECs
Second
Division
ruled
against
the
petitioners
and
in
Asilos
favour
in
its
knew
that
his
election
as
municipal
councilor
would
entail
abandonment
of
the
Resolution
of
November
28,
2007.
It
reasoned
out
that
the
three-term
limit
rule
did
not
position
he
held,
and
he
intended
to
forego
of
it.
Abandonment,
like
resignation,
is
apply,
as
Asilo
failed
to
render
complete
service
for
the
2004-2007
term
because
of
the
voluntary.
suspension
the
Sandiganbayan
had
ordered.
Indeed,
petitioner
was
serving
his
third
term
as
Punong
Barangay
when
he
ran
for
Sangguniang
Bayan
member
and,
upon
winning,
assumed
the
position
ISSUE:
Whether
preventive
suspension
of
an
elected
local
official
is
an
interruption
of
the
of
Sangguniang
Bayan
member,
thus,
voluntarily
relinquishing
his
office
as
Punong
three-term
limit
rule;
and
.
Whether
preventive
suspension
is
considered
involuntary
Barangay
which
the
Court
deems
as
a
voluntary
renunciation
of
said
office.
renunciation
as
contemplated
in
Section
43(b)
of
RA
7160
In
this
case,
petitioner
did
not
fill
in
or
succeed
to
a
vacancy
by
operation
of
law.
He
instead
relinquished
his
office
asPunong
Barangay
during
his
third
term
when
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6.01
Article
X
Page
18
of
42
HELD:
NO.
Petition
is
meritorious.
As
worded,
the
constitutional
provision
fixes
the
term
of
a
exercising
the
functions
and
prerogatives
of
the
office
within
the
suspension
period.The
best
local
elective
office
and
limits
an
elective
officials
stay
in
office
to
no
more
than
three
indicator
of
the
suspended
officials
continuity
in
office
is
the
absence
of
a
permanent
consecutive
terms.
This
is
the
first
branch
of
the
rule
embodied
in
Section
8,
Article
X.
replacement
and
the
lack
of
the
authority
to
appoint
one
since
no
vacancy
exists.
Significantly,
this
provision
refers
to
a
"term"
as
a
period
of
time
three
years
during
which
an
official
has
title
to
office
and
can
serve
To
allow
a
preventively
suspended
elective
official
to
run
for
a
fourth
and
prohibited
term
is
The
word
"term"
in
a
legal
sense
means
a
fixed
and
definite
period
of
time
which
the
law
to
close
our
eyes
to
this
reality
and
to
allow
a
constitutional
violation
through
sophistry
by
describes
that
an
officer
may
hold
an
office.
equating
the
temporary
inability
to
discharge
the
functions
of
office
with
the
interruption
of
term
that
the
constitutional
provision
contemplates.
Asilos
2004-2007
term
was
not
interrupted
by
the
Sandiganbayan-imposed
preventive
suspension
in
2005,
as
preventive
suspension
does
not
interrupt
an
elective
officials
term.
Preventive
suspension,
because
it
is
imposed
by
operation
of
law,
does
not
involve
a
Thus,
the
COMELEC
refused
to
apply
the
legal
command
of
Section
8,
Article
X
of
the
voluntary
act
on
the
part
of
the
suspended
official,
except
in
the
indirect
sense
that
he
may
Constitution
when
it
granted
due
course
to
Asilos
certificate
of
candidacy
for
a
prohibited
have
voluntarily
committed
the
act
that
became
the
basis
of
the
charge
against
him.
From
fourth
term.
By
so
refusing,
the
COMELEC
effectively
committed
grave
abuse
of
discretion
this
perspective,
preventive
suspension
does
not
have
the
element
of
voluntariness
that
amounting
to
lack
or
excess
of
jurisdiction;
its
action
was
a
refusal
to
perform
a
positive
duty
voluntary
renunciation
embodies.
Neither
does
it
contain
the
element
of
renunciation
or
loss
required
by
no
less
than
the
Constitution
and
was
one
undertaken
outside
the
of
title
to
office
as
it
merely
involves
the
temporary
incapacity
to
perform
the
service
that
an
contemplation
of
law.
elective
office
demands.
Preventive
suspension
is
an
Interim
remedial
measure
to
address
the
situation
of
an
official
Voluntary
renunciation,
while
involving
loss
of
office
and
the
total
incapacity
to
render
who
has
been
charged
administratively
or
criminally,
where
the
evidence
preliminarily
service,
is
disallowed
by
the
Constitution
as
an
effective
interruption
of
a
term.
It
is
indicates
the
likelihood
of
or
potential
for
eventual
guilt
or
liability.
Officials
under
prev
therefore
not
allowed
as
a
mode
of
circumventing
the
three-term
limit
rule.
suspension
are
barred
from
performing
functions
of
his
office
and
does
not
receive
salary
BUT
does
not
vacate
and
lose
title
to
his
office.
Loss
of
office
only
results
upon
a
finding
of
Preventive
suspension,
by
its
nature,
does
not
involve
an
effective
interruption
of
a
term
guilt
or
liability.
The
official
is
reinstated
to
the
exercise
of
his
position
as
soon
as
the
prev
and
should
therefore
not
be
a
reason
to
avoid
the
three-term
limitation.
It
can
pose
as
a
suspension
is
lifted.
Thus,
while
there
is
temporary
incapacity,
no
position
is
vacated.
This
threat,
however,
if
we
shall
disregard
its
nature
and
consider
it
an
effective
interruption
of
is
what
happened
to
Asilo.
a
term.
Let
it
be
noted
that
a
preventive
suspension
is
easier
to
undertake
than
voluntary
renunciation,
as
it
does
not
require
relinquishment
or
loss
of
office
even
for
the
briefest
Term
limitation
and
preventive
suspension
are
two
vastly
different
aspects
of
an
elective
time.
It
merely
requires
an
easily
fabricated
administrative
charge
that
can
be
dismissed
officials
service
in
office
and
they
do
not
overlap.
soon
after
a
preventive
suspension
has
been
imposed.
In
this
sense,
recognizing
Preventive
suspension
involves
protection
of
the
service
and
of
the
people
being
preventive
suspension
as
an
effective
interruption
of
a
term
can
serve
as
a
circumvention
served,
and
prevents
the
office
holder
from
temporarily
exercising
the
power
of
his
more
potent
than
the
voluntary.
office.
Term
limitation,
on
the
other
hand,
is
triggered
after
an
elective
official
has
served
his
FACTS:
three
terms
in
office
without
any
break.
Its
companion
concept
interruption
of
a
term
Asilo
was
elected
councilor
of
Lucena
City
for
three
consecutive
terms
(1998-2001,
2001-
on
the
other
hand,
requires
loss
of
title
to
office.
2004,
2004-2007).
If
preventive
suspension
and
term
limitation
or
interruption
have
any
commonality
at
all,
this
common
point
may
be
with
respect
to
the
discontinuity
of
service
that
may
The
InterruptionIn
September
2005,
during
his
last
term,
the
Sandiganbayan
preventively
occur
in
both.
But
even
on
this
point,
they
merely
run
parallel
to
each
other
and
never
suspended
him
for
90
days
in
relation
with
a
criminal
case.
The
Supreme
Court
however
intersect;
preventive
suspension,
by
its
nature,
is
a
temporary
incapacity
to
render
subsequently
lifted
the
Sandiganbayans
order
and
he
resumed
performing
the
functions
of
serviceduring
an
unbroken
term;
in
the
context
of
term
limitation,
interruption
of
his
office
and
finished
his
term.
service
occurs
after
there
has
been
abreak
in
the
term.
In
the
2007
election,
he
filed
his
certificate
of
candidacy
for
the
same
position.
The
PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION
and
the
THREE
TERM
LIMIT
petitioners
in
this
case
sought
to
deny
due
course
to
Asilos
certificate
of
candidacy
or
to
Strict
adherence
to
the
intent
of
the
three-term
limit
rule
demands
that
preventive
cancel
it
on
the
ground
that
he
had
been
elected
and
had
served
for
three
terms.
His
suspension
should
not
be
considered
an
interruption
that
allows
an
elective
officials
stay
in
candidacy
for
a
fourth
term
would
therefore
violate
the
three-term
limit
under
Section
8,
office
beyond
three
terms.
A
preventive
suspension
cannot
simply
be
a
term
interruption
Article
X
and
Section
43
(b)
of
R.A.
7160
(Local
Gov
Code)
because
the
suspended
official
continues
to
stay
in
office
although
he
is
barred
from
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6.01
Article
X
Page
19
of
42
COMELECs
rulingthe
Second
Division
of
COMELEC
ruled
against
petitioners
and
in
favor
of
The
LIMITATION
under
the
first
branch
of
the
provision
is
expressed
in
the
negative
and
is
a
Asilo.
It
reasoned
that
the
three-term
limit
rule
did
not
apply
because
Asilo
failed
to
render
clear
command
suggesting
the
existence
of
an
inflexible
rule.
While
it
gives
no
exact
complete
service
for
the
2004-2007
term
due
to
the
Sandiganbayan
suspension
order.
The
indication
of
what
to
"serve.
.
.
three
consecutive
terms"
exactly
connotes,
the
meaning
is
COMELEC
en
banc
refused
to
reconsider
the
ruling
of
the
Second
Division,
hence
this
clear
reference
is
to
the
term,
not
to
the
service
that
a
public
official
may
petition.
render.1awphi1
In
other
words,
the
limitation
refers
to
the
term.
ISSUES
The
second
branch
of
Sec
8
relates
to
the
provisions
express
initiative
to
prevent
any
1. Whether
preventive
suspension
of
an
elected
local
official
is
an
interruption
of
the
circumvention
of
the
limitation
through
voluntary
severance
of
ties
with
the
public
office;
it
three-term
limit
rule;
expressly
states
that
voluntary
renunciation
of
office
"shall
not
be
considered
as
an
2. Whether
preventive
suspension
is
considered
involuntary
renunciation
as
interruption
in
the
continuity
of
his
service
for
the
full
term
for
which
he
was
elected."
This
contemplated
in
Section
43(b)
or
RA
7160
declaration
complements
the
term
limitation
mandated
by
the
first
branch.
HELD:
A
notable
feature
of
the
second
branch
is
that
it
does
not
textually
state
that
voluntary
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
we
GRANT
the
petition
and
accordingly
NULLIFY
the
renunciation
is
the
only
actual
interruption
of
service
that
does
not
affect
"continuity
of
assailed
COMELEC
rulings.
The
private
respondent
Wilfredo
F.
Asilo
is
declared
service
for
a
full
term"
for
purposes
of
the
three-term
limit
rule.
It
is
a
pure
declaratory
DISQUALIFIED
to
run,
and
perforce
to
serve,
as
Councilor
of
Lucena
City
for
a
prohibited
statement
of
what
does
not
serve
as
an
interruption
of
service
for
a
full
term,
but
the
phrase
fourth
term.
Costs
against
private
respondent
Asilo.
"voluntary
renunciation,"
by
itself,
is
not
without
significance
in
determining
constitutional
intent.
RATIO:
The
word
"renunciation"
carries
the
dictionary
meaning
of
abandonment.
To
renounce
is
Note:
The
present
case
is
not
the
first
time
the
court
ruled
on
the
three-term
limit
but
it
is
the
to
give
up,
abandon,
decline,
or
resign.
It
is
an
act
that
emanates
from
its
author,
as
first
on
the
effect
of
preventive
suspension
on
the
continuity
of
an
elective
officials
term.
The
contrasted
to
an
act
that
operates
from
the
outside.
Read
with
the
definition
of
a
"term"
in
case
of
Borja
v.
COMELEC
did
mention
preventive
suspension
as
an
example
of
interruption
mind,
renunciation,
as
mentioned
under
the
second
branch
of
the
constitutional
provision,
BUT
doctrinally,
Borja
is
not
a
controlling
ruling.
It
DID
NOT
deal
with
preventive
suspension.
cannot
but
mean
an
act
that
results
in
cutting
short
the
term,
i.e.,
the
loss
of
title
to
office.
It
dealt
with
the
application
of
the
three-term
rule
on
the
term
that
an
elective
official
The
descriptive
word
"voluntary"
linked
together
with
"renunciation"
signifies
an
act
of
acquired
by
succession.
surrender
based
on
the
surenderees
own
freely
exercised
will;
in
other
words,
a
loss
of
title
to
office
by
conscious
choice.
In
the
context
of
the
three-term
limit
rule,
such
loss
of
title
is
Three
Term
Limit
Rule
not
considered
an
interruption
because
it
is
presumed
to
be
purposely
sought
to
avoid
the
The
first
branch
of
Section
8
of
Article
X
fixes
the
term
of
a
local
elective
office
and
limits
an
application
of
the
term
limitation.
elective
officials
stay
in
office
to
not
more
than
three
consecutive
terms.
The
provision
refers
to
TERM
as
a
period
of
timethree
yearsduring
which
an
official
has
Relevant
Jurisprudence
(This
is
a
long
read,
GO
straight
to
the
SUMMARY
of
RULES
if
you
title
to
office
and
can
serve.
need
to
a
quick
review)
Appari
v.
Court
of
Appeals:
The
word
"term"
in
a
legal
sense
means
a
fixed
and
Lonzanida
v.
COMELEC--
whether
the
disqualification
on
the
basis
of
the
three-term
limit
definite
period
of
time
which
the
law
describes
that
an
officer
may
hold
an
applies
if
the
election
of
the
public
official
(to
be
strictly
accurate,
the
proclamation
as
office.
According
to
Mechem,
the
term
of
office
is
the
period
during
which
an
winner
of
the
public
official)
for
his
supposedly
third
term
had
been
declared
invalid
in
a
final
office
may
be
held.
Upon
expiration
of
the
officers
term,
unless
he
is
authorized
and
executory
judgment.
The
SC
ruled
that
the
two
requisites
for
the
application
of
the
by
law
to
holdover,
his
rights,
duties
and
authority
as
a
public
officer
must
ipso
disqualification
(viz.,
1.
that
the
official
concerned
has
been
elected
for
three
consecutive
facto
cease.
In
the
law
of
public
officers,
the
most
and
natural
frequent
method
by
terms
in
the
same
local
government
post;
and
2.
that
he
has
fully
served
three
consecutive
which
a
public
officer
ceases
to
be
such
is
by
the
expiration
of
the
terms
for
which
terms)
were
not
present.
The
clear
intent
of
the
framers
of
the
constitution
to
bar
any
he
was
elected
or
appointed.
attempt
to
circumvent
the
three-term
limit
by
a
voluntary
renunciation
of
office
and
at
the
Gaminde
v.
COA:
Term
is
the
time
during
which
the
officer
may
claim
to
hold
office
same
time
respect
the
peoples
choice
and
grant
their
elected
official
full
service
of
a
term
is
as
of
right,
and
fixes
the
interval
after
which
the
several
incumbents
shall
succeed
evident
in
this
provision.
Voluntary
renunciation
of
a
term
does
not
cancel
the
renounced
one
another.
term
in
the
computation
of
the
three
term
limit;
conversely,
involuntary
severance
from
office
for
any
length
of
time
short
of
the
full
term
provided
by
law
amounts
to
an
interruption
of
continuity
of
service.
The
petitioner
vacated
his
post
a
few
months
before
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the
next
mayoral
elections,
not
by
voluntary
renunciation
but
in
compliance
with
the
legal
Socrates
v.
COMELEC--
also
tackled
recall
vis--vis
the
three-term
limit
disqualification.
process
of
writ
of
execution
issued
by
the
COMELEC
to
that
effect.
Such
involuntary
Edward
Hagedorn
served
three
full
terms
as
mayor.
As
he
was
disqualified
to
run
for
a
fourth
severance
from
office
is
an
interruption
of
continuity
of
service
and
thus,
the
petitioner
term,
he
did
not
participate
in
the
election
that
immediately
followed
his
third
term.
In
this
did
not
fully
serve
the
1995-1998
mayoral
term.
election,
the
petitioner
Victorino
Dennis
M.
Socrates
was
elected
mayor.
Less
than
1
years
after
Mayor
Socrates
assumed
the
functions
of
the
office,
recall
proceedings
were
initiated
THE
RULING
IS
CLEAR:
It
is
severance
from
office,
or
to
be
exact,
loss
of
title,
that
against
him,
leading
to
the
call
for
a
recall
election.
Hagedorn
filed
his
certificate
of
renders
the
three-term
limit
rule
inapplicable.
candidacy
for
mayor
in
the
recall
election,
but
Socrates
sought
his
disqualification
on
the
ground
that
he
(Hagedorn)
had
fully
served
three
terms
prior
to
the
recall
election
and
was
Ong
v.
Alegre
and
Rivera
v.
Comelecalso
involved
the
issue
of
whether
there
had
been
a
therefore
disqualified
to
run
because
of
the
three-term
limit
rule.
completed
term
for
purposes
of
the
three
term
limit.
BUT
in
these
cases,
the
FINAL
JUDGMENT
of
the
electoral
contest
came
AFTER
the
term
of
the
contested
office
had
The
Court
ruled
in
favor
of
Hagedorn
stating
that
After
three
consecutive
terms,
an
elective
expired.
Thus,
the
elective
officials
in
this
case
were
never
really
unseated.
local
official
cannot
seek
immediate
reelection
for
a
fourth
term.
The
prohibited
election
In
Ong,
despite
the
ruling
that
Ong
was
never
entitled
to
office,
the
Court
held
that
refers
to
the
next
regular
election
for
the
same
office
following
the
end
of
the
third
there
was
nevertheless
an
election
and
service
for
a
full
term
in
contemplation
of
the
consecutive
term.
Any
subsequent
election,
like
a
recall
election,
is
no
longer
covered
by
the
three-term
rule
because
prohibition
for
two
reasons.
First,
a
subsequent
election
like
a
recall
election
is
no
longer
an
1. The
final
decision
that
the
third-termer
lost
the
election
was
without
practical
immediate
reelection
after
three
consecutive
terms.
Second,
the
intervening
period
and
legal
value
because
it
was
promulgated
after
the
term
of
the
contested
constitutes
an
involuntary
interruption
in
the
continuity
of
service.
office
had
expired.
When
the
framers
of
the
Constitution
debated
on
the
term
limit
of
elective
local
officials,
the
2. The
official
assumed
and
continuously
exercised
the
functions
of
the
office
question
asked
was
whether
there
would
be
no
further
election
after
three
terms,
or
from
the
start
to
the
end
of
the
term
whether
there
would
be
"no
immediate
reelection"
after
three
terms.
The
Court
said
that
it
would
be
absurd
if
the
official
who
was
validly
elected
(the
winner
of
the
election
protest;
the
one
who
opposed
Ong)
would
be
considered,
under
the
Clearly,
what
the
Constitution
prohibits
is
an
immediate
reelection
for
a
fourth
term
three
term
rule,
to
have
served
the
term
by
virtue
of
a
meaningless
electoral
protest
following
three
consecutive
terms.
The
Constitution,
however,
does
not
prohibit
a
ruling
(dahil
it
was
promulgated
nung
expired
na
yung
term).
subsequent
reelection
for
a
fourth
term
as
long
as
the
reelection
is
not
immediately
after
In
Riverathe
Court
rejected
the
theory
that
the
official
who
finally
lost
the
election
the
end
of
the
third
consecutive
term.
A
recall
election
mid-way
in
the
term
following
the
contest
was
merely
a
"caretaker
of
the
office"
or
a
mere
"de
facto
officer."
The
Court
third
consecutive
term
is
a
subsequent
election
but
not
an
immediate
reelection
after
the
obeserved
that
Section
8,
Article
X
of
the
Constitution
is
violated
and
its
purpose
third
term.
defeated
when
an
official
fully
served
in
the
same
position
for
three
consecutive
terms.
Neither
does
the
Constitution
prohibit
one
barred
from
seeking
immediate
reelection
to
run
Whether
as
"caretaker"
or
"de
facto"
officer,
he
exercised
the
powers
and
enjoyed
the
in
any
other
subsequent
election
involving
the
same
term
of
office.
What
the
Constitution
perquisites
of
the
office
that
enabled
him
"to
stay
on
indefinitely."
prohibits
is
a
consecutive
fourth
term.
Ong
and
Rivera
are
important
rulings
for
purposes
of
the
three-term
limitation
because
of
Latasa
v.
COMELEC--
whether
a
municipal
mayor
who
had
fully
served
for
three
consecutive
what
they
directly
imply.
Although
the
election
requisite
was
not
actually
present,
the
Court
terms
could
run
as
city
mayor
in
light
of
the
intervening
conversion
of
the
municipality
into
a
still
gave
full
effect
to
the
three-term
limitation
because
of
the
constitutional
intent
to
city.
During
the
third
term,
the
municipality
was
converted
into
a
city;
the
cityhood
charter
strictly
limit
elective
officials
to
service
for
three
terms.
By
so
ruling,
the
Court
signalled
how
provided
that
the
elective
officials
of
the
municipality
shall,
in
a
holdover
capacity,
continue
zealously
it
guards
the
three-term
limit
rule.
Effectively,
these
cases
teach
us
to
strictly
to
exercise
their
powers
and
functions
until
elections
were
held
for
the
new
city
officials.
The
interpret
the
term
limitation
rule
in
favor
of
limitation
rather
than
its
exception.
Court
ruled
that
the
conversion
of
the
municipality
into
a
city
did
not
convert
the
office
of
the
municipal
mayor
into
a
local
government
post
different
from
the
office
of
the
city
mayor
Adormeo
v.
COMELEC--
dealt
with
the
effect
of
recall
on
the
three-term
limit
the
territorial
jurisdiction
of
the
city
was
the
same
as
that
of
the
municipality;
the
disqualification.
The
case
presented
the
question
of
whether
the
disqualification
applies
if
inhabitants
were
the
same
group
of
voters
who
elected
the
municipal
mayor
for
3
the
official
lost
in
the
regular
election
for
the
supposed
third
term,
but
was
elected
in
a
recall
consecutive
terms;
and
they
were
the
same
inhabitants
over
whom
the
municipal
mayor
election
covering
that
term.
The
Court
upheld
the
COMELECs
ruling
that
the
official
was
not
held
power
and
authority
as
their
chief
executive
for
nine
years.
elected
for
three
(3)
consecutive
terms.
The
Court
reasoned
out
that
for
nearly
two
years,
Montebon
v.
COMELEC--
the
highest-ranking
municipal
councilor
succeeded
to
the
position
the
official
was
a
private
citizen;
hence,
the
continuity
of
his
mayorship
was
disrupted
by
his
of
vice-mayor
by
operation
of
law.
The
question
posed
when
he
subsequently
ran
for
defeat
in
the
election
for
the
third
term.
councilor
was
whether
his
assumption
as
vice-mayor
was
an
interruption
of
his
term
as
councilor
that
would
place
him
outside
the
operation
of
the
three-term
limit
rule.
We
ruled
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that
an
interruption
had
intervened
so
that
he
could
again
run
as
councilor.
This
result
Interim
remedial
measure
to
address
the
situation
of
an
official
who
has
been
charged
seemingly
deviates
from
the
results
in
the
cases
heretofore
discussed
since
the
elective
administratively
or
criminally,
where
the
evidence
preliminarily
indicates
the
likelihood
official
continued
to
hold
public
office
and
did
not
become
a
private
citizen
during
the
of
or
potential
for
eventual
guilt
or
liability.
interim.
The
common
thread
that
identifies
Montebon
with
the
rest,
however,
is
that
the
Officials
under
prev
suspension
are
barred
from
performing
functions
of
his
office
and
elective
official
vacated
the
office
of
councilor
and
assumed
the
higher
post
of
vice-mayor
by
does
not
receive
salary
BUT
does
not
vacate
and
lose
title
to
his
office.
Loss
of
office
operation
of
law.
Thus,
for
a
time
he
ceased
to
be
councilor
an
interruption
that
effectively
only
results
upon
a
finding
of
guilt
or
liability.
The
official
is
reinstated
to
the
exercise
placed
him
outside
the
ambit
of
the
three-term
limit
rule.
of
his
position
as
soon
as
the
prev
suspension
is
lifted.
Thus,
while
there
is
temporary
incapacity,
no
position
is
vacated.
This
is
what
happened
to
Asilo.
SUMMARY
OF
RULES:
Term
limitation
and
preventive
suspension
are
two
vastly
different
aspects
of
an
The
"interruption"
of
a
term
exempting
an
elective
official
from
the
three-term
limit
rule
is
elective
officials
service
in
office
and
they
do
not
overlap.
one
that
involves
no
less
than
the
involuntary
loss
of
title
to
office.
The
elective
official
must
o Preventive
suspension
involves
protection
of
the
service
and
of
the
people
have
involuntarily
left
his
office
for
a
length
of
time,
however
short,
for
an
effective
being
served,
and
prevents
the
office
holder
from
temporarily
exercising
the
interruption
to
occur.
This
has
to
be
the
case
if
the
thrust
of
Section
8,
Article
X
and
its
strict
power
of
his
office.
intent
are
to
be
faithfully
served,
i.e.,
to
limit
an
elective
officials
continuous
stay
in
office
to
o Term
limitation,
on
the
other
hand,
is
triggered
after
an
elective
official
has
no
more
than
three
consecutive
terms,
using
"voluntary
renunciation"
as
an
example
and
served
his
three
terms
in
office
without
any
break.
Its
companion
concept
standard
of
what
does
not
constitute
an
interruption.
interruption
of
a
term
on
the
other
hand,
requires
loss
of
title
to
office.
Thus,
based
on
this
standard,
loss
of
office
by
operation
of
law,
being
involuntary,
is
an
If
preventive
suspension
and
term
limitation
or
interruption
have
any
commonality
at
effective
interruption
of
service
within
a
term,
as
held
in
Montebon.
On
the
other
hand,
all,
this
common
point
may
be
with
respect
to
the
discontinuity
of
service
that
may
temporary
inability
or
disqualification
to
exercise
the
functions
of
an
elective
post,
even
if
occur
in
both.
But
even
on
this
point,
they
merely
run
parallel
to
each
other
and
never
involuntary,
should
not
be
considered
an
effective
interruption
of
a
term
because
it
does
not
intersect;
preventive
suspension,
by
its
nature,
is
a
temporary
incapacity
to
render
involve
the
loss
of
title
to
office
or
at
least
an
effective
break
from
holding
office;
the
office
serviceduring
an
unbroken
term;
in
the
context
of
term
limitation,
interruption
of
holder,
while
retaining
title,
is
simply
barred
from
exercising
the
functions
of
his
office
for
a
service
occurs
after
there
has
been
abreak
in
the
term.
reason
provided
by
law.
An
interruption
occurs
when
the
term
is
broken
because
the
office
holder
lost
the
right
to
PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION
and
the
THREE
TERM
LIMIT
hold
on
to
his
office,
and
cannot
be
equated
with
the
failure
to
render
service.
The
latter
Strict
adherence
to
the
intent
of
the
three-term
limit
rule
demands
that
preventive
occurs
during
an
office
holders
term
when
he
retains
title
to
the
office
but
cannot
exercise
suspension
should
not
be
considered
an
interruption
that
allows
an
elective
officials
stay
in
his
functions
for
reasons
established
by
law.
Of
course,
the
term
"failure
to
serve"
cannot
be
office
beyond
three
terms.
A
preventive
suspension
cannot
simply
be
a
term
interruption
used
once
the
right
to
office
is
lost;
without
the
right
to
hold
office
or
to
serve,
then
no
because
the
suspended
official
continues
to
stay
in
office
although
he
is
barred
from
service
can
be
rendered
so
that
none
is
really
lost.
exercising
the
functions
and
prerogatives
of
the
office
within
the
suspension
period.The
best
To
put
it
differently
although
at
the
risk
of
repetition,
Section
8,
Article
X
both
by
structure
indicator
of
the
suspended
officials
continuity
in
office
is
the
absence
of
a
permanent
and
substance
fixes
an
elective
officials
term
of
office
and
limits
his
stay
in
office
to
three
replacement
and
the
lack
of
the
authority
to
appoint
one
since
no
vacancy
exists.
consecutive
terms
as
an
inflexible
rule
that
is
stressed,
no
less,
by
citing
voluntary
renunciation
as
an
example
of
a
circumvention.
The
provision
should
be
read
in
the
context
To
allow
a
preventively
suspended
elective
official
to
run
for
a
fourth
and
prohibited
term
is
of
interruption
of
term,
not
in
the
context
of
interrupting
the
full
continuity
of
the
exercise
of
to
close
our
eyes
to
this
reality
and
to
allow
a
constitutional
violation
through
sophistry
by
the
powers
of
the
elective
position.
The
"voluntary
renunciation"
it
speaks
of
refers
only
to
equating
the
temporary
inability
to
discharge
the
functions
of
office
with
the
interruption
of
the
elective
officials
voluntary
relinquishment
of
office
and
loss
of
title
to
this
office.
It
does
term
that
the
constitutional
provision
contemplates.
not
speak
of
the
temporary
"cessation
of
the
exercise
of
power
or
authority"
that
may
occur
for
various
reasons,
with
preventive
suspension
being
only
one
of
them.
To
quote
Latasa
v.
Preventive
suspension,
because
it
is
imposed
by
operation
of
law,
does
not
involve
a
Comelec:
voluntary
act
on
the
part
of
the
suspended
official,
except
in
the
indirect
sense
that
he
may
Indeed,
the
law
contemplates
a
rest
period
during
which
the
local
elective
official
steps
have
voluntarily
committed
the
act
that
became
the
basis
of
the
charge
against
him.
From
down
from
office
and
ceases
to
exercise
power
or
authority
over
the
inhabitants
of
the
this
perspective,
preventive
suspension
does
not
have
the
element
of
voluntariness
that
territorial
jurisdiction
of
a
particular
local
government
unit.
voluntary
renunciation
embodies.
Neither
does
it
contain
the
element
of
renunciation
or
loss
of
title
to
office
as
it
merely
involves
the
temporary
incapacity
to
perform
the
service
that
an
NATURE
OF
PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION
(IMPORTANT!!!)
elective
office
demands.
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6.01
Article
X
Page
22
of
42
Voluntary
renunciation,
while
involving
loss
of
office
and
the
total
incapacity
to
render
The
law
as
well
granted
the
President
the
power
to
appoint
officers-in-charge
service,
is
disallowed
by
the
Constitution
as
an
effective
interruption
of
a
term.
It
is
(OICs)
for
the
Office
of
the
Regional
Governor,
the
Regional
Vice-Governor,
and
the
therefore
not
allowed
as
a
mode
of
circumventing
the
three-term
limit
rule.
Members
of
the
Regional
Legislative
Assembly,
who
shall
perform
the
functions
pertaining
to
the
said
offices
until
the
officials
duly
elected
in
the
May
2013
Preventive
suspension,
by
its
nature,
does
not
involve
an
effective
interruption
of
a
term
elections
shall
have
qualified
and
assumed
office.
and
should
therefore
not
be
a
reason
to
avoid
the
three-term
limitation.
It
can
pose
as
a
On
September
13,
2011,
the
Court
issued
a
temporary
restraining
order
enjoining
threat,
however,
if
we
shall
disregard
its
nature
and
consider
it
an
effective
interruption
of
the
implementation
of
RA
No.
10153
and
ordering
the
incumbent
elective
officials
a
term.
Let
it
be
noted
that
a
preventive
suspension
is
easier
to
undertake
than
voluntary
of
ARMM
to
continue
to
perform
their
functions
should
these
cases
not
be
decided
renunciation,
as
it
does
not
require
relinquishment
or
loss
of
office
even
for
the
briefest
by
the
end
of
their
term
on
September
30,
2011.
time.
It
merely
requires
an
easily
fabricated
administrative
charge
that
can
be
dismissed
Some
history
on
the
ARMM
relevant
to
the
case:
soon
after
a
preventive
suspension
has
been
imposed.
In
this
sense,
recognizing
o On
August
1,
1989
or
two
years
after
the
effectivity
of
the
1987
preventive
suspension
as
an
effective
interruption
of
a
term
can
serve
as
a
circumvention
Constitution,
Congress
acted
through
Republic
Act
(RA)
No.
6734
entitled
more
potent
than
the
voluntary
renunciation
that
the
Constitution
expressly
disallows
as
An
Act
Providing
for
an
Organic
Act
for
the
Autonomous
Region
in
an
interruption.
Muslim
Mindanao.
A
plebiscite
was
held
on
November
6,
1990
as
required
by
Section
18(2),
Article
X
of
RA
No.
6734,
thus
fully
establishing
the
Autonomous
Region
of
Muslim
Mindanao
(ARMM).
The
initially
assenting
provinces
were
Lanao
del
Sur,
Maguindanao,
Sulu
and
Tawi-
9. Datu Michael Abas Kida v Senate (KL) tawi.
RA
No.
6734
scheduled
the
first
regular
elections
for
the
regional
G.R.
No.
196271
|
02/28/2012
|
Brion,
J.
officials
of
the
ARMM
on
a
date
not
earlier
than
60
days
nor
later
than
Petitioners:
DATU
MICHAEL
ABAS
KIDA,
90
days
after
its
ratification.
in
his
personal
capacity,
and
in
representation
of
MAGUINDANAO
FEDERATION
OF
AUTONOMOUS
IRRIGATORS
o RA
No.
9054
(entitled
An
Act
to
Strengthen
and
Expand
the
Organic
Act
ASSOCIATION,
INC.,
HADJI
MUHMINA
J.
USMAN,
JOHN
ANTHONY
L.
LIM,
JAMILON
T.
ODIN,
ASRIN
TIMBOL
JAIYARI,
MUJIB
M.
KALANG,
ALIH
AL-SAIDI
J.
SAPI-E,
KESSAR
DAMSIE
ABDIL,
and
BASSAM
ALUH
SAUPI
for
the
Autonomous
Region
in
Muslim
Mindanao,
Amending
for
the
Respondents:
SENATE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
represented
by
its
President
JUAN
PONCE
ENRILE,
HOUSE
OF
Purpose
Republic
Act
No.
6734,
entitled
An
Act
Providing
for
the
REPRESENTATIVES,
thru
SPEAKER
FELICIANO
BELMONTE,
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS,
thru
its
Chairman,
SIXTO
Autonomous
Region
in
Muslim
Mindanao,
as
Amended)
was
the
next
BRILLANTES,
JR.,
PAQUITO
OCHOA,
JR.,
Office
of
the
President
Executive
Secretary,
FLORENCIO
ABAD,
JR.,
Secretary
of
legislative
act
passed.
This
law
provided
further
refinement
in
the
basic
Budget,
and
ROBERTO
TAN,
Treasurer
of
the
Philippines,
ARMM
structure
first
defined
in
the
original
organic
act,
and
reset
the
regular
elections
for
the
ARMM
regional
officials
to
the
second
Monday
SUMMARY:
The
case
involves
RA
10153
which
reset
the
ARMM
elections
from
August
8,
of
September
2001.
2011
to
May
2013.
It
also
granted
the
President
appointive
powers
for
constitutional
o Congress
passed
the
next
law
affecting
ARMM
RA
No.
9140
-
on
June
elective
local
officials
in
the
ARMM.
The
case
discusses
the
constitutionality
of
such
law.
The
22,
2001.
This
law
reset
the
first
regular
elections
originally
scheduled
SC
upheld
the
law
in
toto.
Relevant
to
our
topic,
the
case
emphasized
that
Section
8
of
under
RA
No.
9054,
to
November
26,
2001.
It
likewise
set
the
plebiscite
Article
X
grants
a
3-year
term
to
elective
local
officials
which
cannot
be
extended
nor
to
ratify
RA
No.
9054
to
not
later
than
August
15,
2001.
shortened.
The
holdover
option
is
not
legal
since
it
would
extend
the
3-year
term
and
the
o RA
No.
9054
was
ratified
in
a
plebiscite
held
on
August
14,
2001.
The
COMELEC
special
election
shall
shorten
the
term.
Plebiscite
requirement
in
RA
9054
province
of
Basilan
and
Marawi
City
voted
to
join
ARMM
on
the
same
overbroad
since
a
plebiscite
is
only
required
for
amendments
to,
or
revisions
of,
the
Organic
date.
Act
constitutionally-essential
to
the
creation
of
autonomous
regions
i.e.,
those
aspects
o RA
No.
9333
was
subsequently
passed
by
Congress
to
reset
the
ARMM
specifically
mentioned
in
the
Constitution
which
Congress
must
provide
for
in
the
Organic
nd
regional
elections
to
the
2
Monday
of
August
2005,
and
on
the
same
Act.
date
every
3
years
thereafter.
Unlike
RA
No.
6734
and
RA
No.
9054,
RA
No.
9333
was
not
ratified
in
a
plebiscite.
FACTS
(from
the
2010
main
decision):
o Pursuant
to
RA
No.
9333,
the
next
ARMM
regional
elections
should
have
On
June
30,
2011,
Republic
Act
(RA)
No.
10153,
entitled
An
Act
Providing
for
the
been
held
on
August
8,
2011.
COMELEC
had
begun
preparations
for
Synchronization
of
the
Elections
in
the
Autonomous
Region
in
Muslim
Mindanao
these
elections
and
had
accepted
certificates
of
candidacies
for
the
(ARMM)
with
the
National
and
Local
Elections
and
for
Other
Purposes
was
th various
regional
offices
to
be
elected.
But
on
June
30,
2011,
RA
No.
enacted.
The
law
reset
the
ARMM
elections
from
the
8
of
August
2011,
to
the
10153
was
enacted,
resetting
the
ARMM
elections
to
May
2013,
to
second
Monday
of
May
2013
and
every
three
(3)
years
thereafter,
to
coincide
with
coincide
with
the
regular
national
and
local
elections
of
the
country.
the
countrys
regular
national
and
local
elections.
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
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6.01
Article
X
Page
23
of
42
ISSUES:
which
Congress
must
provide
for
in
the
Organic
Act
require
ratification
through
a
(a)
Does
the
Constitution
mandate
the
synchronization
of
ARMM
regional
elections
with
plebiscite.
national
and
local
elections?
YES.
(b)
Does
RA
No.
10153
amend
RA
No.
9054?
If
so,
does
RA
No.
10153
have
to
comply
with
Section
18,
Article
X
of
the
Constitution
states
that
the
plebiscite
is
required
only
for
the
the
supermajority
vote
and
plebiscite
requirements?
NO
to
all
3.
creation
of
autonomous
regions
and
for
determining
which
provinces,
cities
and
geographic
(c)
Is
the
holdover
provision
in
RA
No.
9054
constitutional?
NO.
areas
will
be
included
in
the
autonomous
regions.
While
the
settled
rule
is
that
amendments
(d)
Does
the
COMELEC
have
the
power
to
call
for
special
elections
in
ARMM?
NO.
to
the
Organic
Act
have
to
comply
with
the
plebiscite
requirement
in
order
to
become
(e)
Does
granting
the
President
the
power
to
appoint
OICs
violate
the
elective
and
effective,
questions
on
the
extent
of
the
matters
requiring
ratification
may
unavoidably
arise
representative
nature
of
ARMM
regional
legislative
and
executive
offices?
NO.
because
of
the
seemingly
general
terms
of
the
Constitution
and
the
obvious
absurdity
that
(f)
Does
the
appointment
power
granted
to
the
President
exceed
the
Presidents
supervisory
would
result
if
a
plebiscite
were
to
be
required
for
every
statutory
amendment.
powers
over
autonomous
regions?
NO.
While
we
agree
with
the
petitioners
underlying
premise
that
sovereignty
ultimately
resides
RATIO:
with
the
people,
we
disagree
that
this
legal
reality
necessitates
compliance
with
the
(a.)
The
Court
was
unanimous
in
holding
that
the
Constitution
mandates
the
synchronization
plebiscite
requirement
for
all
amendments
to
RA
No.
9054.
For
if
we
were
to
go
by
the
of
national
and
local
elections.
While
the
Constitution
does
not
expressly
instruct
Congress
petitioners
interpretation
of
Section
18,
Article
X
of
the
Constitution
that
all
amendments
to
synchronize
the
national
and
local
elections,
the
intention
can
be
inferred
from
the
to
the
Organic
Act
have
to
undergo
the
plebiscite
requirement
before
becoming
effective,
following
provisions
of
the
Transitory
Provisions
(Article
XVIII)
of
the
Constitution.
this
would
lead
to
impractical
and
illogical
results
hampering
the
ARMMs
progress
by
impeding
Congress
from
enacting
laws
that
timely
address
problems
as
they
arise
in
the
The
framers
of
the
Constitution
could
not
have
expressed
their
objective
more
clearly
region,
as
well
as
weighing
down
the
ARMM
government
with
the
costs
that
unavoidably
there
was
to
be
a
single
election
in
1992
for
all
elective
officials
from
the
President
down
follow
the
holding
of
a
plebiscite.
to
the
municipal
officials.
Significantly,
the
framers
were
even
willing
to
temporarily
lengthen
or
shorten
the
terms
of
elective
officials
in
order
to
meet
this
objective,
(c.)
The
clear
wording
of
Section
8,
Article
X
of
the
Constitution
expresses
the
intent
of
the
highlighting
the
importance
of
this
constitutional
mandate.
framers
of
the
Constitution
to
categorically
set
a
limitation
on
the
period
within
which
all
That
the
ARMM
elections
were
not
expressly
mentioned
in
the
Transitory
Provisions
of
the
elective
local
officials
can
occupy
their
offices.
We
have
already
established
that
elective
Constitution
on
synchronization
cannot
be
interpreted
to
mean
that
the
ARMM
elections
are
ARMM
officials
are
also
local
officials;
they
are,
thus,
bound
by
the
three-year
term
limit
not
covered
by
the
constitutional
mandate
of
synchronization.
We
have
to
consider
that
the
prescribed
by
the
Constitution.
It,
therefore,
becomes
irrelevant
that
the
Constitution
does
ARMM,
as
we
now
know
it,
had
not
yet
been
officially
organized
at
the
time
the
Constitution
not
expressly
prohibit
elective
officials
from
acting
in
a
holdover
capacity.
Short
of
amending
was
enacted
and
ratified
by
the
people.
the
Constitution,
Congress
has
no
authority
to
extend
the
three-year
term
limit
by
inserting
a
holdover
provision
in
RA
No.
9054.
Thus,
the
term
of
three
years
for
local
(b.)
A
thorough
reading
of
RA
No.
9054
reveals
that
it
fixes
the
schedule
for
only
officials
should
stay
at
three
(3)
years,
as
fixed
by
the
Constitution,
and
cannot
be
extended
the
first
ARMM
elections;
it
does
not
provide
the
date
for
the
succeeding
regular
ARMM
by
holdover
by
Congress.
elections.
In
providing
for
the
date
of
the
regular
ARMM
elections,
RA
No.
9333
and
RA
No.
10153
clearly
do
not
amend
RA
No.
9054
since
these
laws
do
not
change
or
revise
any
Admittedly,
we
have,
in
the
past,
recognized
the
validity
of
holdover
provisions
in
various
provision
in
RA
No.
9054.
In
fixing
the
date
of
the
ARMM
elections
subsequent
to
the
first
laws.
One
significant
difference
between
the
present
case
and
these
past
cases
is
that
while
election,
RA
No.
9333
and
RA
No.
10153
merely
filled
the
gap
left
in
RA
No.
9054.
these
past
cases
all
refer
to
elective
barangay
or
sangguniang
kabataan
officials
whose
terms
of
office
are
not
explicitly
provided
for
in
the
Constitution,
the
present
Since
RA
No.
10153
does
not
amend,
but
merely
fills
in
the
gap
in
RA
No.
9054,
there
is
no
case
refers
to
local
elective
officials
-
the
ARMM
Governor,
the
ARMM
Vice
Governor,
and
need
for
RA
No.
10153
to
comply
with
the
amendment
requirements
set
forth
in
Article
XVII
the
members
of
the
Regional
Legislative
Assembly
-
whose
terms
fall
within
the
three-year
of
RA
No.
9054.
term
limit
set
by
Section
8,
Article
X
of
the
Constitution.
Plebiscite
requirement
in
RA
No.
9054
overbroad
(important
for
Sec.
18
Art.
X)
Even
assuming
that
a
holdover
is
constitutionally
permissible,
and
there
had
been
statutory
Section
18,
Article
X
of
the
Constitution
provides
that
[t]he
creation
of
the
autonomous
basis
for
it
(namely
Section
7,
Article
VII
of
RA
No.
9054),
the
rule
of
holdover
can
only
apply
region
shall
be
effective
when
approved
by
majority
of
the
votes
cast
by
the
constituent
as
an
available
option
where
no
express
or
implied
legislative
intent
to
the
contrary
exists;
units
in
a
plebiscite
called
for
the
purpose[.]
We
interpreted
this
to
mean
that
only
it
cannot
apply
where
such
contrary
intent
is
evident.
amendments
to,
or
revisions
of,
the
Organic
Act
constitutionally-essential
to
the
creation
of
autonomous
regions
i.e.,
those
aspects
specifically
mentioned
in
the
Constitution
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
Poli
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Review
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Dean
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6.01
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X
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24
of
42
Congress,
in
passing
RA
No.
10153
and
removing
the
holdover
option,
has
made
it
clear
that
Facts:
it
wants
to
suppress
the
holdover
rule
expressed
in
RA
No.
9054.
Congress,
in
the
exercise
of
BP
Blg.
885
was
passed
which
provided
for
the
creation
of
the
new
Province
of
Negros
del
its
plenary
legislative
powers,
has
clearly
acted
within
its
discretion
when
it
deleted
the
Norte.
The
new
province
was
carved
out
of
the
already
existing
province
of
Negros
holdover
option,
and
this
Court
has
no
authority
to
question
the
wisdom
of
this
decision,
Occidental.
Negros
del
Norte
was
formed
out
of
the
northern
part
of
the
province
of
Negros
absent
any
evidence
of
unconstitutionality
or
grave
abuse
of
discretion.
It
is
for
the
Occidental.
The
same
law
provided
that
the
plebiscite
shall
be
conducted
in
the
proposed
legislature
and
the
executive,
and
not
this
Court,
to
decide
how
to
fill
the
vacancies
in
the
new
province
only.
ARMM
regional
government
which
arise
from
the
legislature
complying
with
the
Petitioners
filed
a
petition
for
prohibition
on
December
23,
1985
for
the
purpose
of
stopping
constitutional
mandate
of
synchronization.
COMELEC
from
conducting
the
plebiscite.
Petitioners
allege
that
such
law
is
unconstitutional
and
does
not
conform
to
the
provisions
of
(d.)
More
importantly,
RA
No.
10153
has
already
fixed
the
date
for
the
next
ARMM
elections
the
Local
Government
Code
regarding
the
requisites
for
creation
of
new
provinces.
On
the
and
the
COMELEC
has
no
authority
to
set
a
different
election
date.
Even
assuming
that
the
one
hand,
the
Constitution
provides
in
Article
XI,
Sec.
3
(which
is
now
Art.
X,
Sec.
10)
that
COMELEC
has
the
authority
to
hold
special
elections,
and
this
Court
can
compel
the
No
province,
city,
municipality
or
barrio
may
be
created,
divided,
merged,
abolished,
or
its
COMELEC
to
do
so,
there
is
still
the
problem
of
having
to
shorten
the
terms
of
the
newly
boundary
substantially
altered,
except
in
accordance
with
the
criteria
established
in
the
local
elected
officials
in
order
to
synchronize
the
ARMM
elections
with
the
May
2013
national
government
code,
and
subject
to
the
approval
by
a
majority
of
the
votes
in
a
plebiscite
in
the
and
local
elections.
Obviously,
neither
the
Court
nor
the
COMELEC
has
the
authority
to
do
unit
or
units
affected.
this,
amounting
as
it
does
to
an
amendment
of
Section
8,
Article
X
of
the
Constitution,
On
the
other
hand,
according
to
Sec.
197
of
the
LGC,
a
province
may
be
created
if
it
has
a
which
limits
the
term
of
local
officials
to
three
years.
territory
of
at
least
three
thousand
five
hundred
square
kilometers,
a
population
of
at
least
five
hundred
thousand
persons,
an
average
estimated
annual
income,
as
certified
by
the
Issues
(e)
and
(f)
have
been
discussed
in
previous
topics.
Ministry
of
Finance,
of
not
less
than
ten
million
pesos
for
the
last
three
consecutive
years,
and
its
creation
shall
not
reduce
the
population
and
income
of
the
mother
province
or
provinces
at
the
time
of
said
creation
to
less
than
the
minimum
requirements
under
this
Sec. 10 section.
The
territory
need
not
be
contiguous
if
it
comprises
two
or
more
islands.
1. Tan v Comelec (QN) Due
to
the
Christmas
holidays
when
the
Court
was
in
recess,
the
plebiscite
pushed
through
G.R.
No.
73155
July
11,
1986
on
January
3,
1986
despite
the
pendency
of
the
case
because
no
TRO
was
issued.
Petitioners
PATRICIO
TAN,
FELIX
FERRER,
JUAN
M.
HAGAD,
SERGIO
HILADO,
VIRGILIO
GASTON,
CONCHITA
MINAYA,
TERESITA
thereafter
supplemented
their
petition
and
still
prayed
that
a
writ
of
prohibition
be
issued
ESTACIO,
DESIDERIO
DEFERIA,
ROMEO
GAMBOA,
ALBERTO
LACSON,
FE
HOFILENA,
EMILY
JISON,
NIEVES
LOPEZ
AND
against
the
COMELEC
to
desist
from
issuing
official
proclamation
of
the
results
of
the
CECILIA
MAGSAYSAY,
petitioners,
plebiscite.
They
alleged
that
there
was
still
serious
issues
with
the
plebiscite
conducted.
For
vs.
THE
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS
and
THE
PROVINCIAL
TREASURER
OF
NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL,
respondents.
one
thing,
the
plebiscite
was
only
confined
to
the
inhabitants
of
the
territory
which
would
Alampay,
J.
cover
Negros
del
Norte.
The
other
residents
of
Negros
Occidental
were
not
included.
On
the
part
of
the
respondents,
the
Solicitor
General
argued
that
the
law
should
be
given
Summary:
A
new
law
was
passed
which
created
the
province
of
Negros
del
Norte
which
was
the
presumption
of
legality.
The
SolGen
furthermore
argued
that
there
was
no
irregularity
carved
out
of
the
northern
part
of
Negros
Occidental.
Such
law
provided
that
the
plebiscite
with
the
plebiscite
held
because
the
areas
of
Negros
Occidental
which
would
not
form
part
was
to
be
held
in
the
area
of
the
newly
proposed
Negros
del
Norte,
without
taking
the
votes
of
Negros
del
Norte
do
not
fall
within
the
meaning
and
scope
of
the
term
unit
or
units
of
the
other
areas
in
the
Negros
Occidental.
The
SC
ruled
that
such
law
and
the
creation
of
affected
as
provided
for
in
the
Constitution.
It
invoked
the
case
of
Paredes
v.
Executive
Negros
del
Norte
is
unconstitutional.
The
plebiscite
which
was
held
was
also
declared
to
be
Secretary.
Such
case
held
that
when
a
barangay
is
to
be
separated
from
the
municipality
in
null
and
void.
The
Constitution
provides
that
no
new
local
government
unit
shall
be
created
order
to
form
a
new
municipality,
the
plebiscite
need
not
be
held
in
the
entire
municipality.
without
the
conduct
of
a
plebiscite
in
the
area
or
areas
affected.
Such
phrase
shall
be
The
SolGen
also
moved
that
the
case
be
dismissed
because
the
issue
was
already
moot
since
construed
to
mean
that
the
plebiscite
should
be
conducted
in
the
areas
where
the
new
the
plebiscite
already
approved
the
creation
of
the
new
province
(164,734
in
favor,
30,400
province
will
be
as
well
as
in
the
province
from
which
such
new
province
will
be
carved
out
against).
from.
The
case
of
Paredes
v.
Executive
Secretary
as
invoked
by
respondents
was
abandoned
Issues:
WON
the
creation
of
Negros
del
Norte
is
valid
!
NO
by
the
Court
for
being
contrary
to
the
Constitution.
Further,
the
Court
also
held
that
the
Held/Ratio:
WHEREFORE,
Batas
Pambansa
Blg.
885
is
hereby
declared
unconstitutional.
The
territory
requirement
in
the
LGC
only
refers
to
the
land
area
and
does
not
include
the
proclamation
of
the
new
province
of
Negros
del
Norte,
as
well
as
the
appointment
of
the
territorial
waters
of
the
proposed
province.
The
area
of
the
proposed
Negros
del
Norte
officials
thereof
are
also
declared
null
and
void.
failed
to
reach
the
minimum
of
3,500
square
kilometers
of
territory
as
provided
for
in
the
LGC.
THE
PHRASE
UNIT
OR
UNITS
AFFECTED
SHOULD
BE
CONSTRUED
IN
ITS
GENERAL
SENSE.
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The
boundaries
of
the
existing
province
of
Negros
Occidental
would
be
Such
measures
were
based
on
data
by
the
National
Census
and
Statistics
Office.
substantially
altered
by
the
division
of
its
existing
boundaries
in
order
that
there
can
be
created
the
proposed
new
province
of
Negros
del
Norte.
The
two
political
units
of
Negros
del
Norte
and
Negros
Occidental
would
indeed
be
affected
by
the
creation
of
the
new
political
units.
2. League of Cities v Comelec (CA)
G.R.
No.
176951,
1777499,
17806
|
February
15,
2011
|
Justice
Bersamin
o They
will
be
affected
in
terms
of
a
change
in
the
borders,
change
in
the
Petitioners:
(In
all
3
petitions)
League
of
Cities
of
the
Philippines;
City
of
Calbayog
land
area,
and
a
change
in
the
economy
of
the
province.
(Seven
out
of
15
Respondents:
Comelec
+
many
municipalities
and
provinces
sugar
mills
in
Negros
Occidental
are
located
in
the
territory
of
Negros
del
Norte.)
Summary:
These
are
the
last
two
cases
concerning
the
16
Cityhood
Laws
converting
16
The
alleged
good
intentions
(of
promoting
autonomy
of
local
governments)
cannot
municipalities
into
component
cities.
After
twice
reversing
itself,
the
SC
finally
ruled
that
the
prevail
and
overrule
the
cardinal
precept
that
what
our
Constitution
categorically
laws
are
constitutional.
When
RA
9009
was
passed
increasing
the
income
threshold
for
directs
to
be
done
or
imposes
as
a
requirement
must
first
be
observed,
respected
conversion
to
component
cities
from
PhP
20M
to
PhP
100M,
Congress
made
an
exemption
and
complied
with.
(PNoy
should
read
that
sentence.)
that
those
who
have
pending
conversion
bills
are
exempt
from
the
new
requirement.
This
The
Constitution
explicitly
provides
that
the
plebiscite
should
be
conducted
in
the
created
a
substantial
distinction,
thus
it
did
not
violate
the
EPC.
Substantial
distinction
lies
in
unit
or
units
affected.
the
capacity
&
viability
of
the
16
municipalities
to
become
component
cities
of
their
o As
such,
the
plebiscite
should
have
been
conducted
in
the
entire
respective
provinces
(they
are
economic
hubs,
etc.).
Also,
the
imposition
of
the
income
province
of
Negros
Occidental,
not
just
the
proposed
Negros
del
Norte.
requirement
of
P100
million
from
local
sources
under
R.A.
No.
9009
was
arbitrary.
When
the
The
law
creating
Negros
del
Norte
is
indeed
unconstitutional
insofar
as
it
provides
sponsor
of
the
law
chose
the
specific
figure
of
P100
million,
no
research
or
empirical
data
that
the
plebiscite
should
be
conducted
only
in
the
new
territory
of
Negros
del
buttressed
the
figure.
As
regards
the
procedural
propriety
of
the
numerous
MRs,
the
Court
Norte
and
not
in
Negros
Occidental.
said
that
when
a
motion
for
leave
and
allowed
by
Court,
it
is
not
a
prohibited
pleading
The
plebiscite
held
on
January
3
is
null
and
void.
However,
a
new
plebiscite
cannot
anymore.
Principle
of
immutabiity
and
res
judicata
wont
apply
since
case
was
not
final
then
be
conducted
because
there
is
no
legal
basis
to
do
so.
yet.
In
the
final
MR,
the
SC
basically
reiterated
what
was
in
the
earlier
Resolution.
The
creation
of
the
province
of
Negros
del
Norte
is
thus
without
any
legal
basis
and
must
be
erased.
Facts:
Consolidated
petitions
for
prohibition
filed
by
the
League
of
Cities
of
the
Philippines
THE
CASE
OF
PAREDES
V.
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
IS
NOT
AVAILING
IN
THIS
CASE
(LCP),
City
of
Iloilo,
City
of
Calbayog,
and
Jerry
P.
Treas,
assailing
the
constitutionality
The
ruling
rendered
in
said
case
was
based
on
a
claimed
prerogative
of
the
Court
of
the
16
laws,
each
converting
the
municipality
covered
thereby
into
a
component
city
then
to
exercise
its
discretion
on
the
matter.
It
did
not
interpret
the
Constitution.
(Cityhood
Laws),
and
seeking
to
enjoin
the
COMELEC
from
conducting
plebiscites
The
said
case
should
not
be
taken
as
a
doctrinal
or
compelling
precedent.
The
case
pursuant
to
the
subject
laws.
itself
mentioned
that
when
a
municipality
is
to
be
formed
out
of
barangays
to
be
First
SC
Decision
(November
2008)
declared
unconsti
the
Cityhood
Laws.
MR
and
separated
from
the
mother
municipality,
all
the
voters
therein
are
affected.
second
MR
both
denied.
But
in
another
Decision
(December
2009),
the
SC
reversed
What
is
applicable
is
the
case
of
Lopez
v.
COMELEC
where
it
was
held
that
it
was
itself.
MR
granted
(2nd
reversal,
Aug.
24,
2010
Resolution)
constitutionally
infirm
when
not
all
the
residents
of
Bulacan
and
Rizal
were
Considering
that
the
Court
En
Banc
has
twice
changed
its
position
on
the
included
in
a
referendum
which
asked
if
the
people
were
willing
to
give
up
some
constitutionality
of
the
16
Cityhood
Laws,
and
the
novelty
of
the
issues
involved,
SC
towns
in
the
said
provinces
to
Metro
Manila.
decides
to
hear
this
new
MR
of
the
Aug.
24
Resolution
The
case
of
Paredes
v.
Executive
Secretary
was
explicitly
abandoned
by
the
Court
for
being
contrary
to
the
Constitution.
Issue:
W/N
the
Cityhood
Laws
are
constitutional
!
YES!
(reversed
again!)
Held:
WHEREFORE,
the
MR
of
the
"Resolution"
is
GRANTED.
The
Resolution
dated
August
24,
THE
PROVINCE
OF
NEGROS
DEL
NORTE
FAILED
TO
COMPLY
WITH
THE
LAND
AREA
REQUIREMENT
IN
THE
LGC.
2010
is
REVERSED
and
SET
ASIDE.
The
Cityhood
LawsRepublic
Acts
Nos.
9389,
etc.are
Territory
as
used
in
the
LGC
refers
to
land
area
and
excludes
the
waters.
declared
CONSTITUTIONAL.
o There
would
have
been
no
need
for
the
legislators
to
use
the
adjective
contiguous
if
they
had
intended
the
term
territory
to
embrace
not
Ratio:
only
land
area
but
also
territorial
waters.
The
16
Cityhood
Bills
dont
violate
Art.
X,
Sec.
10
of
the
Constitution.
The
proposed
new
province
of
Negros
del
Norte
would
only
cover
a
total
land
area
The
tenor
of
the
previous
ponencias
is
that
the
exemption
clauses
in
the
16
Cityhood
of
2,765.4
square
kilometers.
Provinces
are
required
to
have
at
least
3,500
square
Laws
are
unconstitutional
because
they
are
not
written
in
the
Local
Government
Code
kilometers.
(LGC),
as
amended
by
RA
9009,
particularly
!
Sec.
450.
Requisites
for
Creation.
a)
A
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municipality
or
cluster
of
barangays
may
be
converted
into
a
component
city
if
it
has
a
communities
and
make
them
more
effective
partners
in
the
attainment
of
national
locally
generated
annual
income,
as
certified
by
the
DoF,
of
at
least
P100,000,000.00
for
goals.
Toward
this
end,
the
State
shall
provide
for
a
more
responsive
&
accountable
at
least
2
consecutive
years
based
on
2000
constant
prices,
and
if
it
has
either
of
the
ff
local
government
structure
instituted
through
a
system
of
decentralization
whereby
requisites:
LGUs
shall
be
given
more
powers,
authority,
responsibilities
&
resources.
o (c)
The
average
annual
income
shall
include
the
income
accruing
to
the
general
Indeed,
substantial
distinction
lies
in
the
capacity
and
viability
of
respondent
fund,
exclusive
of
special
funds,
transfers,
&
non-recurring
income.
municipalities
to
become
component
cities
of
their
respective
provinces.
Congress,
by
Prior
to
the
amendment,
LGC
required
only
an
average
annual
income
of
at
least
P20M
enacting
the
Cityhood
Laws,
recognized
this
capacity
and
viability
of
respondent
for
the
last
2
consecutive
years,
based
on
1991
constant
prices.
municipalities
to
become
the
States
partners
in
accelerating
economic
growth
and
Rationale
for
the
enactment
of
R.A.
9009
(sponsorship
speech
of
Senator
Pimentel)
!
development
in
the
provincial
regions,
which
is
the
very
thrust
of
the
LGC,
manifested
to
avert
the
mad
rush
of
municipalities
converting
to
cities,
by
increasing
the
income
by
the
pendency
of
their
cityhood
bills
during
the
11th
Congress
and
their
relentless
reqt
to
100M,
which
should
be
all
locally-sourced.
Before,
city-aspirants
include
the
pursuit
for
cityhood
up
to
the
present.
Internal
Revenue
Allotment
(funds
that
came
from
the
national
govt)
in
the
previous
As
to
the
petitioners
feared
reduction
in
IRA
because
of
the
16
muncs
conversion
into
P20M
amount.
cities
!
To
be
sure,
petitioners
are
entitled
to
a
"just
share,"
not
a
specific
amount.
But
While
R.A.
9009
was
being
deliberated
upon,
Congress
was
well
aware
of
the
pendency
the
feared
reduction
proved
to
be
false
when,
after
the
implementation
of
the
Cityhood
of
conversion
bills
of
several
municipalities,
including
those
covered
by
the
Cityhood
Laws,
their
respective
shares
increased,
not
decreased.
(SC
provided
a
table)
Laws,
desiring
to
become
component
cities
which
qualified
under
the
P20
million
What
these
petitioner
cities
were
stating
as
a
reduction
of
their
respective
IRA
shares
income
requirement
of
the
old
Sec.
450,
LGC.
was
based
on
a
computation
of
what
they
would
receive
if
respondent
municipalities
Based
on
the
delibs,
Congress
intended
that
those
with
pending
cityhood
bills
during
were
not
to
become
component
cities
at
all.
Of
course,
that
would
mean
a
bigger
the
11th
Congress
would
not
be
covered
by
the
new
and
higher
income
requirement
amount
to
which
they
have
staked
their
claim.
After
considering
these,
it
all
boils
down
of
P100M
imposed
by
R.A.
9009.
to
money
and
how
much
more
they
would
receive
if
respondent
municipalities
remain
Even
without
this
exception,
these
municipalities
have
proven
themselves
viable
and
as
municipalities
and
not
share
in
the
23%
fixed
IRA
from
the
national
government
for
capable
to
become
component
cities
of
their
respective
provinces.
They
were
centers
cities.
of
trade
and
commerce,
points
of
convergence
of
transportation,
rich
havens
of
agricultural,
mineral,
and
other
natural
resources,
and
flourishing
tourism
spots.
(All
16
MR
AGAIN!!!
(April
12,
2011)
were
described)
Facts:
The
League
of
Cities
filed
an
MR
of
the
previous
decision.
They
contend
that
SC
can
no
Without
doubt,
the
LGC
is
a
creation
of
Congress.
Congress
has
the
power
to
alter
or
longer
modify
its
judgment
since
its
final
&
executory
(res
judicata).
On
the
merits,
same
modify
it
as
it
did
when
it
enacted
R.A.
No.
9009.
But
it
is
also
true
that,
in
effect,
the
issues.
EPC
and
right
of
LGUs
to
a
just
share
in
the
national
taxes.
Cityhood
Laws
amended
R.A.
9009
through
the
exemption
clauses
found
therein.
Since
the
Cityhood
Laws
explicitly
exempted
the
municipalities
from
the
amendatory
R.A.
Issue:
W/N
the
earlier
Resolution
should
be
reversed.
NO!
9009,
such
Cityhood
Laws
are,
therefore,
also
amendments
to
the
LGC
itself.
Held:
WHEREFORE,
the
Ad
Cautelam
MR
is
denied
with
finality.
The
Cityhood
Laws
dont
violate
Sec.
6,
Art.
X
and
the
EPC
Ratio:
Earlier
ruling
said
EPC
was
violated
and
that
Sec.
6,
Art.
X
was
violated
because
the
On
propriety
of
the
many
MRs
Cityhood
Laws
infringed
on
the
"just
share"
that
other
LGUs
shall
receive
from
the
LCP
assails
the
jurisdiction
of
the
SC
in
promulgating
the
earlier
Resolution,
claiming
national
taxes
(IRA)
to
be
automatically
released
to
them.
that
its
final
&
executory.
Contended
that
the
SC
violated
rules
of
procedure,
the
Upon
more
profound
reflection
and
deliberation,
we
NOW
declare
that
there
was
valid
principles
of
res
judicata
and
immutability
of
final
judgments.
classification,
and
the
Cityhood
Laws
do
not
violate
the
EPC.
SC
!
We
disagree.
As
a
rule,
a
second
MR
is
a
prohibited
pleading.
Thus,
a
decision
EPC
provides
a
valid
classification.
Here,
theres
a
substantial
distinction!
becomes
final
and
executory
after
15
days
from
receipt
of
the
denial
of
the
first
MR.
Verily,
the
determination
of
the
existence
of
substantial
distinction
with
respect
to
However,
when
a
motion
for
leave
to
file
and
admit
a
second
MR
is
granted
by
the
respondent
municipalities
does
not
simply
lie
on
the
mere
pendency
of
their
cityhood
Court,
the
Court
therefore
allows
its
filing.
In
such
a
case,
the
second
MR
is
no
longer
a
bills
during
the
11th
Congress.
The
existence
of
substantial
distinction
with
respect
to
prohibited
pleading.
respondent
municipalities
covered
by
the
Cityhood
Laws
is
measured
by
the
purpose
of
The
actions
taken
herein
were
made
by
the
Court
en
banc
strictly
in
accordance
with
the
law,
not
by
R.A.
9009,
but
by
the
very
purpose
of
the
LGC,
as
provided
in
its
Section
the
Rules
of
Court
and
its
internal
procedures.
There
has
been
no
irregularity
attending
2
(a)
!
Declaration
of
Policy.(a)
It
is
hereby
declared
the
policy
of
the
State
that
the
or
tainting
the
proceedings.
Also,
the
Court
has
frequently
disencumbered
itself
under
territorial
and
political
subdivisions
of
the
State
shall
enjoy
genuine
and
meaningful
extraordinary
circumstances
from
the
shackles
of
technicality
in
order
to
render
just
local
autonomy
to
enable
them
to
attain
their
fullest
development
as
self-reliant
and
equitable
relief.
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
Poli
Law
Review
|
Dean
Candelaria
Compilation
6.01
Article
X
Page
27
of
42
On
whether
the
principle
of
immutability
of
judgments
and
bar
by
res
judicata
apply
LCP
!
argues
that
there
exists
no
issue
with
respect
to
the
cityhood
of
its
member
herein,
suffice
it
to
state
that
the
succession
of
the
events
recounted
herein
indicates
cities,
considering
that
they
became
cities
in
full
compliance
with
the
criteria
for
that
the
controversy
about
the
16
Cityhood
Laws
has
not
yet
been
resolved
with
conversion
at
the
time
of
their
creation.
finality.
As
such,
the
operation
of
the
principle
of
immutability
of
judgments
and
res
SC
!
Argument
too
sweeping.
What
we
pointed
out
was
that
the
previous
income
judicata
did
not
yet
come
into
play.
requirement
of
P20
million
was
definitely
not
insufficient
to
provide
the
essential
government
facilities,
services,
and
special
functions
vis--vis
the
population
of
a
16
Cityhood
Laws
were
exempted
from
coverage
of
RA
9009
component
city.
We
also
stressed
that
the
increased
income
requirement
of
P100
LCP
!
Reiterate
that
the
Cityhood
Laws
violate
Sec.
6
&
Sec.
10
of
Art.
X
of
Consti,
the
million
was
not
the
only
conclusive
indicator
for
any
municipality
to
survive
and
remain
EPC,
&
the
right
of
LGUs
to
a
just
share
in
the
national
taxes.
viable
as
a
component
city.
SC
!
NO!
Congress
clearly
intended
that
the
LGUs
covered
by
the
Cityhood
Laws
be
Undoubtedly,
the
imposition
of
the
income
requirement
of
P100
million
from
local
exempted
from
the
coverage
of
R.A.
No.
9009.
sources
under
R.A.
No.
9009
was
arbitrary.
When
the
sponsor
of
the
law
chose
the
specific
figure
of
P100
million,
no
research
or
empirical
data
buttressed
the
figure.
Nor
The
conversion
bills
of
the
respondents
were
all
unanimously
and
favorably
voted
upon
was
there
proof
that
the
proposal
took
into
account
the
after-effects
that
were
likely
to
by
the
Members
of
the
House
and
the
Senate.
This
shows
that
the
exemption
clauses
arise.
ultimately
incorporated
in
the
Cityhood
Laws
are
but
the
express
articulations
of
the
clear
legislative
intent
to
exempt
the
respondents,
without
exception,
from
the
No
violation
of
right
to
share
under
the
IRA
coverage
of
R.A.
No.
9009.
LCP
!
Cityhood
Laws
violated
their
right
to
a
just
share
in
the
national
taxes
SC
!
NO!
The
share
of
LGUs
is
a
matter
of
percentage
under
Sec
285
of
the
LGC,
not
a
PhP
100M
income
requirement
is
arbitrary.
specific
amount.
Specifically,
the
share
of
the
cities
is
23%,
determined
on
the
basis
of
LCP
!
Contend
that
the
new
income
requirement
of
P100M
from
locally
generated
population
(50%),
land
area
(25%),
and
equal
sharing
(25%).
This
share
is
also
sources
is
not
arbitrary
because
it
is
not
difficult
to
comply
with;
that
there
are
several
dependent
on
the
number
of
existing
cities,
such
that
when
the
number
of
cities
municipalities
that
have
already
complied
with
the
requirement
and
have,
in
fact,
been
increases,
then
more
will
divide
and
share
the
allocation
for
cities.
converted
into
cities
(Sta.
Rosa,
Navotas,
San
Juan,
Dasmarias,
Bian)
However,
we
have
to
note
that
the
allocation
by
the
National
Government
is
not
a
SC
!
The
contention
of
LCP
does
not
persuade.
As
indicated
in
the
earlier
Resolution
constant,
and
can
either
increase
or
decrease.
With
every
newly
converted
city
59
existing
cities
had
failed
as
of
2006
to
post
an
average
annual
income
of
P100m
becoming
entitled
to
share
the
allocation
for
cities,
the
percentage
of
IRA
entitlement
based
on
the
figures
by
the
Bureau
of
Local
Government.
The
large
number
of
existing
of
each
city
will
decrease,
although
the
actual
amount
received
may
be
more
than
that
cities,
virtually
50%
of
them,
still
unable
to
comply
with
the
P100
million
threshold
received
in
the
preceding
year.
That
is
a
necessary
consequence
of
Section
285
and
income
five
years
after
R.A.
No.
9009
took
effect
renders
it
fallacious
and
probably
Section
286
of
the
LGC.
unwarranted
for
the
petitioners
to
claim
that
the
P100m
income
requirement
is
not
The
Cityhood
Laws
are
not
violative
of
the
Constitution
and
the
LGC.
The
respondents
difficult
to
comply
with.
are
thus
also
entitled
to
their
just
share
in
the
IRA
allocation
for
cities.
They
have
Based
on
delibs
in
the
Senate
as
to
why
a
municipality
wants
to
convert
into
a
city
!
demonstrated
their
viability
as
component
cities
of
their
respective
provinces
and
are
Once
converted
into
a
city,
the
municipality
will
have
roughly
more
than
three
times
developing
continuously,
albeit
slowly,
because
they
had
previously
to
share
the
IRA
the
share
that
it
would
be
receiving
over
the
internal
revenue
allotment
than
it
would
with
about
1,500
municipalities.
With
their
conversion
into
component
cities,
they
will
have
if
it
were
to
remain
a
municipality.
have
to
share
with
only
around
120
cities.
The
municipalities
cited
by
LCP
as
having
generated
the
threshold
income
of
P100m
from
local
sources,
including
those
already
converted
into
cities,
are
either
in
Metro
Manila
or
in
provinces
close
to
Metro
Manila.
In
comparison,
the
municipalities
covered
by
the
Cityhood
Laws
are
spread
out
in
the
different
provinces
of
the
Philippines,
including
the
Cordillera
and
Mindanao
regions.
This
reality
underscores
the
danger
the
Sec. 11: MMDA v Garin (HQ)
enactment
of
R.A.
No.
9009
sought
to
prevent,
i.e.,
that
"the
metropolis-located
local
Petitioner:
Metropolitan
Manila
Development
Authority
governments
would
have
more
priority
in
terms
of
funding
because
they
would
have
Respondent:
Dante
Garin
more
qualifications
to
become
a
city
compared
to
the
far-flung
areas.
There
should
also
be
no
question
that
the
LGUs
covered
by
the
Cityhood
Laws
belong
to
SUMMARY:
Garins
(a
lawyer)
drivers
license
was
confiscated
since
he
parked
illegally
along
a
class
of
their
own.
They
have
proven
themselves
viable
and
capable
to
become
Binondo
and
in
lieu
of
his
license,
he
was
given
a
traffic
violation
receipt
which
was
valid
as
component
cities
of
their
respective
provinces.
They
are
and
have
been
centers
of
trade
temporary
license.
He
wrote
a
letter
to
MMDA
Chair
Oreta
requesting
the
return
of
his
and
commerce,
transpo,
tourism,
etc
license,
no
reply
was
received
so
Garin
filed
a
complaint
before
RTC.
Basically,
the
case
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
Poli
Law
Review
|
Dean
Candelaria
Compilation
6.01
Article
X
Page
28
of
42
revolves
around
the
validity
of
Sec
5(f)
of
RA
7924
(Act
Creating
MMDA)
on
the
grounds
of
the
undue
delegation,
violation
of
due
process
etc.
Specifically,
Garin
said
that
there
was
no
MMDA
filed
a
petition
before
SC
and
said
that
Memo
Circular
is
valid
(since
it
was
validly
IRR
to
implement
Sec
5(f)
and
that
in
effect
gave
MMDA
unbridled
discretion
to
deprive
passed
in
the
presence
of
a
quorum)
and
Garin
(or
the
drivers
in
general)
was
not
deprived
erring
motorists
of
their
licenses.
MMDA
said
there
was
an
IRR
which
is
the
MMDA
Memo
of
the
opportunity
to
be
heard
because
under
the
rules,
he
can
appeal
and
the
judiciary
Circular
TT-95-001
and
there
was
no
violation
of
Garins
due
process
since
he
can
appeal
retains
the
power
to
determine
the
validity
of
confiscation.
MMDA
,
to
bolster
its
argument,
naman
and
has
other
remedies
etc.
Garin
said
the
Memo
Circular
is
invalid
because
there
points
out
that
under
the
terms
of
confiscation,
the
licensee
has
3
options:
1)
voluntarily
pay
was
no
quorum
when
it
was
passed.
RTC
ruled
in
favor
of
Garin.
Actually,
this
case
has
been
the
imposable
fines
2)
protest
the
apprehension
by
filing
protest
with
the
MMDA
rendered
moot
since
new
MMDA
Chair
Bayani
Fernando
implemented
MMDA
Memo
Adjudication
committee
or
3)
request
the
referral
of
the
TVR
to
the
Public
Prosecutors
Circular
04
which
makes
use
of
the
Metropolitan
Traffic
Ticket
and
sabi
sa
circular
MMDA
office.
can
no
longer
confiscate
drivers
license.
While
this
is
pending,
MMDA
Chair
Bayani
Fernando
implemented
Memo
Circular
04
But
the
Court
made
some
pronouncements
since
the
case/situation
may
happen
again
when
outlining
the
procedures
for
the
use
of
Metropolitan
Traffic
Ticket.
So
basically,
erring
MMDA
issues
another
circular
similar
to
the
previous
one
that
authorizes
the
confiscation
of
motorists
are
issued
MTT
which
can
be
paid
at
any
Metrobank
branch.
Traffic
enforcers
can
drivers
license.
SC
held
that
the
MMDA
is
not
vested
with
police
power.
If
you
examine
RA
no
longer
confiscate
drivers
license.
7294,
you
can
see
that
MMDAs
powers
are
limited
to
administration,
coordination,
implementation
etc.
There
is
no
syllable
in
RA
7924
that
grants
the
MMDA
police
power,
ISSUE:
W/N
MMDA
Memo
Circular
TT-95-001
is
valid?
Na-moot.
let
alone
legislative
power.
There
is
no
provision
in
RA
7924
that
empowers
the
MMDA
or
its
Council
to
"enact
ordinances,
approve
resolutions
and
appropriate
funds
for
the
So
the
Court
answered
this
issue:
WON
MMDA,
through
Sec.
5(f)
of
Rep.
Act
No.
7924
could
general
welfare"
of
the
inhabitants
of
Metro
Manila.
All
of
its
functions
are
administrative
validly
exercise
police
power?
NO
in
nature.
Therefore,
insofar
as
Sec.
5(f)
of
RA
7924
is
understood
by
the
lower
court
and
by
the
petitioner
to
grant
the
MMDA
the
power
to
confiscate
and
suspend
or
revoke
drivers
HELD:
Petition
Dismissed.
licenses
without
need
of
any
other
legislative
enactment,
such
is
an
unauthorized
exercise
RATIO:
of
police
power.
(Note:
MMDA
is
not
precluded
naman
from
confiscating
drivers
licenses
as
As
can
be
gleaned
from
above,
may
supervening
events
na
so
the
case
of
Garin
was
long
as
there
is
a
traffic
law
or
regulation
enacted
by
the
legislature
or
LGU.
MMDA
is
only
rendered
moot
and
academic
BUT
since
MMDA
is
not
precluded
from
re-implementing
the
allowed
to
enforce
such
law
but
not
to
enact
ordinances
by
itself.)
previous
scheme
(or
similar
to
it)
that
would
entail
confiscating
drivers
license,
the
Court
deemed
it
proper
to
make
the
following
statements:
FACTS:
MMDA
confiscated
Garins
drivers
license
for
parking
illegally
along
Binondo
and
was
issued
1. License
to
operate
a
motor
vehicle
is
a
privilege
that
the
state
may
withhold
in
a
traffic
violation
receipt
(TVR)
as
a
temporary
drivers
license
for
7
days.
In
the
TVR,
Garin
the
exercise
of
its
police
power
was
directed
to
report
to
MMDA
Traffic
Ops
after
48
hrs
from
date
of
apprehension.
Basically,
it
is
a
privilege
like
license
to
operate
cockpit,
timber
licensing
Moreover,
it
was
stated
that
criminal
case
shall
be
filed
for
failure
to
redeem
after
30
days.
agreements
or
legislative
franchise
to
operate
electric
plant.
Cited
many
cases
but
Before
expiration
of
the
TVR,
Garin
wrote
a
letter
to
MMDA
Chair
Oreta
requesting
the
the
bottomline
is
that
it
is
the
legislature,
in
the
exercise
of
police
power,
which
return
of
his
license.
Since
Garin
did
not
receive
any
reply,
he
filed
a
complaint
before
the
has
the
power
of
and
responsibility
to
regulate
how
and
by
whom
motor
vehicles
court.
Basically
he
assailed
the
validity
of
Sec
5(f)
of
RA
7924
(An
Act
Creating
the
MMDA).
may
be
operated
on
the
state
highways
He
said
it
constituted
an
undue
delegation
of
legislative
power
since
it
allows
MMDA
to
fix
and
impose
unspecified
(therefore
unlimited)
fines
and
other
penalties.
Moreover,
Garin
2. MMDA
is
not
vested
with
police
power
(IMPORTANT)
argued
that
absent
any
IRR
such
provision
grants
MMDA
unbridled
discretion
to
deprive
RA
7924
does
not
grant
the
MMDA
with
police
power
and
that
ALL
ITS
erring
motorists
of
their
licenses,
pre-empting
judicial
determination
of
the
validity
of
the
FUNCTIONS
ARE
ADMINISTRATIVE
IN
NATURE
deprivation
and
thereby
violating
due
process
clause.
MMDA,
on
its
part,
said
that
Sec
5(f)
of
Cited
MMDA
v.
Bel
Air
Case:
(mini
digest)
MMDA
claimed
that
it
had
RA
7924
has
IRR
which
is
MMDA
Memo
Circular
TT-95-001.
So
Garin
now
questioned
the
authority
to
open
subdivision
street
owned
by
BelAir
to
public
traffic
validity
of
such
circular.
because
MMDA
is
an
agent
of
the
state
endowed
with
police
power
in
the
delivery
of
basic
services
in
Metro
Manila.
It
argued
that
no
RTC:
Held
that
MMDA
Memo
Circular
TT-95-001
is
void
since
it
was
created
during
a
meeting
ordinance
was
needed
to
open
the
Neptune
Street
to
the
public.
SC
held
of
the
Metro
Manila
Council
wherein
there
was
no
quorum.
It
also
held
that
the
summary
that
MMDA
is
not
a
LGU
or
public
corp
endowed
with
legislative
power
confiscation
of
drivers
license
constituted
an
unlawful
deprivation
of
property
right
(later,
therefore
it
has
no
power
to
enact
ordinances
for
the
welfare
of
the
SC
said
it
is
not
a
property
right
but
a
mere
privilege)
without
due
process
of
law.
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
Poli
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Review
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Dean
Candelaria
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Article
X
Page
29
of
42
community.
So
absent
an
ordinance,
MMDAs
order
to
open
a
street
is
The
contested
clause
in
Sec.
5(f)
states
that
the
petitioner
shall
install
invalid
and
administer
a
single
ticketing
system,
fix,
impose
and
collect
fines
and
Police
Power
Defined:
The
power
vested
by
the
Constitution
in
the
penalties
for
all
kinds
of
violations
of
traffic
rules
and
regulations,
legislature
to
make,
ordain,
and
establish
all
manner
of
wholesome
and
whether
moving
or
nonmoving
in
nature,
and
confiscate
and
suspend
or
reasonable
laws,
statutes
and
ordinances,
either
with
penalties
or
revoke
drivers
licenses
in
the
enforcement
of
such
traffic
laws
and
without,
not
repugnant
to
the
Constitution,
as
they
shall
judge
to
be
for
regulations
the
good
and
welfare
of
the
commonwealth,
and
for
the
subjects
of
the
Where
there
is
a
traffic
law
or
regulation
validly
enacted
by
the
same.
legislature
or
those
agencies
to
whom
legislative
powers
have
been
(Police
power)
Having
been
lodged
primarily
in
the
National
Legislature,
delegated
(the
City
of
Manila
in
this
case),
MMDA
is
not
precluded
it
cannot
be
exercised
by
any
group
or
body
of
individuals
not
possessing
and
in
fact
is
duty-bound
to
confiscate
and
suspend
or
revoke
drivers
legislative
power.
But
it
can
be
delegated
to
LGUs
etc.
(just
remember
licenses
in
the
exercise
of
its
mandate
of
transport
and
traffic
undue
delegation
cases)
management,
as
well
as
the
administration
and
implementation
of
all
Metropolitan
or
Metro
Manila
is
a
body
composed
of
several
local
traffic
enforcement
operations,
traffic
engineering
services
and
traffic
government
units.
With
the
passage
of
RA
7924
Metropolitan
Manila
education
programs
was
declared
as
a
"special
development
and
administrative
region"
and
This
is
consistent
with
our
ruling
in
Bel-Air
that
the
MMDA
is
a
the
administration
of
"metro-wide"
basic
services
affecting
the
region
development
authority
created
for
the
purpose
of
laying
down
policies
placed
under
"a
development
authority"
referred
to
as
the
MMDA.
and
coordinating
with
the
various
national
government
agencies,
So
MMDAs
powers
are
limited
to
formulation,
coordination,
peoples
organizations,
non-governmental
organizations
and
the
private
implementation,
management,
setting
policies,
administration
etc.
sector,
which
may
enforce,
but
not
enact,
ordinances.
There
is
no
syllable
in
RA
7924
that
grants
the
MMDA
police
power,
let
Some
drama:
A
last
word.
The
MMDA
was
intended
to
coordinate
alone
legislative
power.
There
is
no
provision
in
RA
7924
that
services
with
metro-wide
impact
that
transcend
local
political
empowers
the
MMDA
or
its
Council
to
"enact
ordinances,
approve
boundaries
or
would
entail
huge
expenditures
if
provided
by
the
resolutions
and
appropriate
funds
for
the
general
welfare"
of
the
individual
LGUs,
especially
with
regard
to
transport
and
traffic
inhabitants
of
Metro
Manila.
management
and
we
are
aware
of
the
valiant
efforts
of
the
petitioner
to
The
MMDA
is,
as
termed
in
the
charter
itself,
a
"development
authority."
untangle
the
increasingly
traffic-snarled
roads
of
Metro
Manila.
But
It
is
an
agency
created
for
the
purpose
of
laying
down
policies
and
these
laudable
intentions
are
limited
by
the
MMDAs
enabling
law,
which
coordinating
with
the
various
national
government
agencies,
people's
we
can
but
interpret,
and
petitioner
must
be
reminded
that
its
efforts
in
organizations,
non-governmental
organizations
and
the
private
sector
this
respect
must
be
authorized
by
a
valid
law,
or
ordinance,
or
for
the
efficient
and
expeditious
delivery
of
basic
services
in
the
vast
regulation
arising
from
a
legitimate
source.
metropolitan
area.
All
its
functions
are
administrative
in
nature.
Clearly,
the
MMDA
is
not
a
political
unit
of
government.
The
power
delegated
to
the
MMDA
is
that
given
to
the
Metro
Manila
Council
to
promulgate
administrative
rules
and
regulations
in
the
implementation
of
the
MMDAs
functions.
There
is
no
grant
of
authority
to
enact
ordinances
and
regulations
for
the
general
welfare
of
the
inhabitants
of
Sec. 16: Ampatuan v Puno (RK)
the
metropolis.
DATU
ZALDY
UY
AMPATUAN,
ANSARUDDIN
ADIONG,
REGIE
SAHALI-GENERALE
versus
Therefore,
insofar
as
Sec.
5(f)
of
RA
7924
is
understood
by
the
lower
HON.
RONALDO
PUNO,
in
his
capacity
as
Secretary
of
the
Department
of
Interior
and
Local
Government
and
alter-ego
court
and
by
the
petitioner
to
grant
the
MMDA
the
power
to
confiscate
of
President
Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo,
and
anyone
acting
in
his
stead
and
on
behalf
of
the
President
of
the
Philippines,
and
suspend
or
revoke
drivers
licenses
without
need
of
any
other
ARMED
FORCES
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
(AFP),
or
any
of
their
units
operating
in
the
Autonomous
Region
in
Muslim
legislative
enactment,
such
is
an
unauthorized
exercise
of
police
power.
Mindanao
(ARMM),
and
PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL
POLICE,
or
any
of
their
units
operating
in
ARMM
G.R.
No.
190259
|
June
7,
2011
ABAD,
J
(yay!).:
3. Sec
5
(f)
grants
MMDA
with
the
duty
to
enforce
existing
traffic
rules
and
regulations
(Important
yung
naka-bold)
Summary:
PGMA
issued
Proclamation
1946
placing
Maguindanao,
Sultan
Kudarat,
and
Enumerates
the
Functions
and
Powers
of
the
Metro
Manila
Cotabato
under
a
state
of
emergency
and
calling
out
the
PNP
and
AFP
to
prevent
and
Development
Authority.
suppress
lawless
violence
therein.
Later
AO
273
and
AO
237-A
were
issued
delegating
supervision
of
ARMM
from
the
President
to
the
DILG.
Petitioners
question
the
issuances
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
Poli
Law
Review
|
Dean
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6.01
Article
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30
of
42
because
(1)
it
violates
ARMM
autonomy;
(2)
there
was
improper
exercise
of
Emergency
o The
proclamation
and
AOs
did
not
provide
for
exercise
of
emergency
powers.
Powers;
(3)
there
were
no
factual
bases
for
such
issuances.
SC
dismissed
the
petition.
(1)
It
did
not
violate
autonomy
of
ARMM
since
the
President
merely
delegated
her
powers
to
Issue(s):
facilitate
the
investigations.
The
DILG
Secretary
did
not
take
over
control
of
the
powers
of
1. (!)WON
Proclamation
1946
and
the
AOs
violate
the
principle
of
local
autonomy
the
ARMM.
After
law
enforcement
agents
took
respondent
Governor
of
ARMM
into
custody
(Article
X)
for
alleged
complicity
in
the
Maguindanao
massacre,
the
ARMM
Vice-Governor,
petitioner
2. WON
PGMA
invalidly
exercised
emergency
powers
when
she
called
out
the
AFP
Ansaruddin
Adiong,
assumed
the
vacated
post
on
December
10,
2009
pursuant
to
the
rule
and
PNP
to
prevent
and
suppress
all
incidents
of
lawless
violence.
on
succession
found
in
Article
VII,
Section
12,
of
RA
9054.
In
turn,
Acting
Governor
Adiong
3. WON
PGMA
had
factual
bases
for
her
actions
named
the
then
Speaker
of
the
ARMM
Regional
Assembly,
petitioner
Sahali-Generale,
Acting
Held:
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
DISMISSED
for
lack
of
merit.
ARMM
Vice-Governor.
In
short,
the
DILG
Secretary
did
not
take
over
the
administration
or
Ratio:
operations
of
the
ARMM.
1.
Local
Autonomy
Facts:
The
claim
of
petitioners
that
the
subject
proclamation
and
administrative
orders
violate
the
After
the
Maguindanao
massacre,
PGMA,
on
24
November
2009,
issued
Proclamation
principle
of
local
autonomy
is
anchored
on
the
allegation
that,
through
them,
the
President
1946
placing
the
Maguindanao,
Sultan
Kudarat,
and
Cotabato
under
a
state
of
authorized
the
DILG
Secretary
to
take
over
the
operations
of
the
ARMM
and
assume
direct
emergency.
The
AFP
and
the
PNP
were
directed
to
undertake
such
measures,
as
governmental
powers
over
the
region.
allowed
by
the
Constitution
and
Law,
to
prevent
and
suppress
lawless
violence
in
the
said
places.
Court
disagrees:
On
27
November
2009,
PGMA
issued
Administrative
Order
273
(AO
273)
The
DILG
Secretary
did
not
take
over
control
of
the
powers
of
the
ARMM.
After
law
transferring
supervision
of
the
ARMM
from
the
Office
of
the
President
to
the
DILG.
enforcement
agents
took
respondent
Governor
of
ARMM
into
custody
for
alleged
complicity
Later,
Administrative
Order
273-A
(AO273-A)
amended
AO
273
due
to
issues
raised
in
the
Maguindanao
massacre,
the
ARMM
Vice-Governor,
petitioner
Ansaruddin
Adiong,
over
the
terminology
(the
use
of
transferring)
used
and
was
replaced
by
delegating
assumed
the
vacated
post
on
December
10,
2009
pursuant
to
the
rule
on
succession
found
under
the
amending
AO.
in
Article
VII,
Section
12,
of
RA
9054.
In
turn,
Acting
Governor
Adiong
named
the
then
Claiming
encroachment
of
ARMMs
autonomy,
petitioners
who
are
(were)
ARMM
Speaker
of
the
ARMM
Regional
Assembly,
petitioner
Sahali-Generale,
Acting
ARMM
Vice-
officials
filed
a
petition
for
prohibition.
Governor.
In
short,
the
DILG
Secretary
did
not
take
over
the
administration
or
operations
of
o AUTONOMY:
That
Proclamation
1946
and
AOs
empowered
DILG
secretary
to
the
ARMM.
take
over
ARMMs
operations
and
seize
regional
power,
in
violation
of
the
principle
of
autonomy
under
RA
9054
(Expanded
ARMM
Act)
and
the
(VERBATIM
FROM
CASE,
NOTHING
MORE)
Constitution.
o CONTROL:
That
the
President
gave
the
DILG
Secretary
the
power
to
exercise,
not
merely
administrative
supervision,
but
control
over
the
ARMM
since
the
2.
Emergency
Powers
latter
could
suspend
ARMM
officials
and
replace
them.
The
deployment
is
not
by
itself
an
exercise
of
emergency
powers
as
understood
under
o EMERGENCY
POWERS:
That
the
President
had
no
factual
basis
for
declaring
a
Section
23
(2),
Article
VI
of
the
Constitution,
which
provides:
state
of
emergency,
especially
in
the
Province
of
Sultan
Kudarat
and
the
City
of
Cotabato,
where
no
critical
violent
incidents
occurred.
Hence,
the
SECTION
23.
x
x
x
(2)
In
times
of
war
or
other
deployment
of
troops
and
taking
over
ARMM
constitutes
invalid
exercise
of
national
emergency,
the
Congress
may,
by
law,
authorize
the
emergency
power
President,
for
a
limited
period
and
subject
to
such
restrictions
as
o PRAYER:
That
Proclamation
1946,
AO
273
&
AO
273-A
are
unconstitutional;
it
may
prescribe,
to
exercise
powers
necessary
and
proper
to
enjoin
the
DILG,
PNP,
and
AFP
from
implementing
them
carry
out
a
declared
national
policy.
Unless
sooner
withdrawn
by
OSGs
Comment:
resolution
of
the
Congress,
such
powers
shall
cease
upon
the
o Did
not
deprive
ARMM
of
autonomyrestored
peace
and
order
next
adjournment
thereof.
o Issued
the
proclamation
pursuant
to
calling
out
power
as
Commander-in-
ChiefShe
had
the
wisdom
to
call
out
based
on
intel
reports
The
President
did
not
proclaim
a
national
emergency,
only
a
state
of
emergency
in
the
three
o There
was
proper
delegation
of
supervisory
power
to
the
DILGno
blanket
places
mentioned.
And
she
did
not
act
pursuant
to
any
law
enacted
by
Congress
that
authority
to
replace
and
suspend
officials;
delegation
was
for
facilitation
of
authorized
her
to
exercise
extraordinary
powers.
The
calling
out
of
the
armed
forces
to
investigation
prevent
or
suppress
lawless
violence
in
such
places
is
a
power
that
the
Constitution
directly
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vests
in
the
President.
She
did
not
need
a
congressional
authority
to
exercise
the
same.
suppress
lawless
violence
there
have
clearly
no
factual
bases,
the
Court
must
respect
the
Presidents
actions.
3.
Factual
Bases
The
Presidents
call
on
the
armed
forces
to
prevent
or
suppress
lawless
violence
springs
from
Sec. 18-19
the
power
vested
in
her
under
Section
18, Article
VII
of
the
Constitution,
which
provides
that
1. Abbas v Comelec (VG)
the
President
shall
be
the
Commander-in-Chief
of
all
armed
forces
of
the
Philippines
and
consolidated
with
Mama-o
v.
Carague
whenever
it
becomes
necessary,
he
may
call
out
such
armed
forces
to
prevent
or
suppress
G.R.
No.
89651
November
10,
1989
|
CORTES,
J.:
lawless
violence,
invasion
or
rebellion.
x
x
x
Summary:
The
Tripoli
agreement,
signed
in
1976
provided
for
the
establishment
of
While
it
is
true
that
the
Court
may
inquire
into
the
factual
bases
for
the
Presidents
exercise
autonomy
in
southern
Philippines.
Later
the
1987
Constitution
provided
for
the
creation
of
of
the
above
power,
it
would
generally
defer
to
her
judgment
on
the
matter.
As
the
Court
autonomous
regions
in
Muslim
Mindanao
and
the
cordilleras.
Pursuant
to
the
Constitution,
acknowledged
in
Integrated
Bar
of
the
Philippines
v.
Hon.
Zamora,
it
is
clearly
to
the
RA
6734
was
passed.
The
implementation
of
RA
6734
which
provides
for
the
creation
of
President
that
the
Constitution
entrusts
the
determination
of
the
need
for
calling
out
the
autonomous
region
of
Muslim
Mindanao
is
scheduled
to
cover
plebiscite
in
13
provinces
and
armed
forces
to
prevent
and
suppress
lawless
violence.
Unless
it
is
shown
that
such
9
cities
in
Mindanao
and
Palawan.
Abbas
and
Mama-o
filed
their
respective
petitions
to
determination
was
attended
by
grave
abuse
of
discretion,
the
Court
will
accord
respect
to
enjoin
COMELEC
from
conducting
plebiscite
and
declaring
RA
6734
unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
the
Presidents
judgment.
Here,
petitioners
failed
to
show
that
the
declaration
of
a
state
of
WON
certain
provisions
of
R.A.
No.
6734
conflict
with
the
Tripoli
Agreement
No;
WON
R.A.
emergency
in
the
Provinces
of
Maguindanao,
Sultan
Kudarat
and
Cotabato
City,
as
well
as
6734,
or
parts
thereof,
violates
the
Constitution
No
the
Presidents
exercise
of
the
calling
out
power
had
no
factual
basis.
They
simply
alleged
that,
since
not
all
areas
under
the
ARMM
were
placed
under
a
state
of
emergency,
it
follows
1. There
should
be
no
conflict
as
the
creation
of
the
autonomous
region
in
Muslim
that
the
take
over
of
the
entire
ARMM
by
the
DILG
Secretary
had
no
basis
too.
Mindanao
is
stated
in
the
Constitution.
Any
conflict
between
the
provisions
of
R.A.
No.
6734
and
the
provisions
of
the
Tripoli
Agreement
will
not
have
the
effect
of
enjoining
But,
apart
from
the
fact
that
there
was
no
such
take
over
to
begin
with,
the
OSG
also
clearly
the
implementation
of
the
Organic
Act.
Assuming
that
the
Tripoli
Agreement
is
a
explained
the
factual
bases
for
the
Presidents
decision
to
call
out
the
armed
forces.
(1)
binding
treaty
or
international
agreement,
it
would
then
constitute
part
of
the
law
of
Ampatuans
and
Mangudadatu
are
prominent
families
in
Maguindanao
with
arsenal
of
armed
the
land.
But
as
internal
law,
it
would
not
be
superior
to
R.A.
No.
6734,
an
enactment
followers.
(2)PNP
and
AFP
had
to
prepare
for
any
retaliatory
actions
from
the
Magudadatu
of
the
Congress
of
the
Philippines,
rather
it
would
be
in
the
same
class
as
the
clan.
(3)
Ampatuan
has
approx.
2,400
people
with
2,000
firearms;
Mangudadatus
have
1,800
personnel
with
about
200
firearms;
(4)
Both
clans
have
Special
Civilian
Auziliary
Army
of
2. RA
6734
is
constitutional.
about
500
for
Ampatuans
and
300
for
Mangudadatus;
(5)
Armed
clashes
between
the
two
A. The
creation
of
the
region
is
not
unconditional.
The
creation
of
the
autonomous
region
warring
clans
and
their
armed
supporters
could
happen;
(6)
intel
reports
suggest
a
possible
shall
take
effect
only
when
approved
by
a
majority
of
the
votes
cast
by
the
constituent
involvement
of
Rebel
Armed
Groups
(RAGs).
units
in
a
plebiscite,
and
only
those
provinces
and
cities
where
a
majority
vote
in
favor
of
the
Organic
Act
shall
be
included
in
the
autonomous
region.
In
other
words,
the
imminence
of
violence
and
anarchy
at
the
time
the
President
issued
B. RA
6734
does
not
expand
the
scope
of
the
autonomous
region
nor
is
violative
of
the
Proclamation
1946
was
too
grave
to
ignore
and
she
had
to
act
to
prevent
further
bloodshed
EPC.
and
hostilities
in
the
places
mentioned.
Progress
reports
also
indicated
that
there
was
- First,
the
Constitution
lays
down
the
standards
by
which
Congress
shall
determine
movement
in
these
places
of
both
high-powered
firearms
and
armed
men
sympathetic
to
which
areas
should
constitute
the
autonomous
region
which
guides
the
legislature.
the
two
clans.
Thus,
to
pacify
the
peoples
fears
and
stabilize
the
situation,
the
President
had
Any
review
of
this
ascertainment
would
have
to
go
into
the
wisdom
of
the
law.
to
take
preventive
action.
She
called
out
the
armed
forces
to
control
the
proliferation
of
This
the
Court
cannot
do
without
doing
violence
to
the
separation
of
governmental
loose
firearms
and
dismantle
the
armed
groups
that
continuously
threatened
the
peace
and
powers.
security
in
the
affected
places.
- Second,
equal
protection
permits
of
reasonable
classification.
C. On
the
conflict
of
Islamic
law
v.
Man
made
law.
No
actual
controversy
between
real
Notably,
the
present
administration
of
President
Benigno
Aquino
III
has
not
withdrawn
litigants
exists.
the
declaration
of
a
state
of
emergency
under
Proclamation
1946.
D. On
the
merging
of
Regions.
There
is
no
conflict
between
the
power
of
the
President
to
merge
administrative
regions
with
the
constitutional
provision
requiring
a
plebiscite
in
Since
petitioners
are
not
able
to
demonstrate
that
the
proclamation
of
state
of
the
merger
of
local
government
units
because
the
requirement
of
a
plebiscite
in
a
emergency
in
the
subject
places
and
the
calling
out
of
the
armed
forces
to
prevent
or
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merger
expressly
applies
only
to
provinces,
cities,
municipalities
or
barangays,
not
to
The
creation
of
the
autonomous
region
shall
be
effective
when
approved
by
administrative
regions.
majority
of
the
votes
cast
by
the
constituent
units
in
a
plebiscite
called
for
the
E. On
oversight
Committee:
The
creation
of
the
autonomous
region
hinges
only
on
the
purpose,
provided
that
only
the
provinces,
cities,
and
geographic
areas
voting
result
of
the
plebiscite.
The
questioned
provisions
in
R.A.
No.
6734
requiring
an
favorably
in
such
plebiscite
shall
be
included
in
the
autonomous
region.
oversight
Committee
to
supervise
the
transfer
do
not
provide
for
a
different
date
of
Sec.
19
The
first
Congress
elected
under
this
Constitution
shall,
within
eighteen
effectivity.
months
from
the
time
of
organization
of
both
Houses,
pass
the
organic
acts
for
the
autonomous
regions
in
Muslim
Mindanao
and
the
Cordilleras.
FACTS
Sec.
20.
Within
its
territorial
jurisdiction
and
subject
to
the
provisions
of
this
" The
present
controversy
relates
to
the
plebiscite
in
thirteen
(13)
provinces
and
nine
(9)
Constitution
and
national
laws,
the
organic
act
of
autonomous
regions
shall
cities
in
Mindanao
and
Palawan,
scheduled
for
November
19,
1989,
in
implementation
provide
for
legislative
powers
over:
of
Republic
Act
No.
6734,
entitled
"An
Act
Providing
for
an
Organic
Act
for
the
(1)
Administrative
organization;
Autonomous
Region
in
Muslim
Mindanao."
(2)
Creation
of
sources
of
revenues;
" These
consolidated
petitions
pray
that
the
Court:
(1)
enjoin
the
Commission
on
(3)
Ancestral
domain
and
natural
resources;
Elections
(COMELEC)
from
conducting
the
plebiscite
and
the
Secretary
of
Budget
and
(4)
Personal,
family,
and
property
relations;
Management
from
releasing
funds
to
the
COMELEC
for
that
purpose;
and
(2)
declare
(5)
Regional
urban
and
rural
planning
development;
R.A.
No.
6734,
or
parts
thereof,
unconstitutional
.
(6)
Economic,
social
and
tourism
development;
" The
Tripoli
Agreement,
more
specifically,
the
Agreement
Between
the
government
of
(7)
Educational
policies;
the
Republic
of
the
Philippines
of
the
Philippines
and
Moro
National
Liberation
Front
(8)
Preservation
and
development
of
the
cultural
heritage;
and
(MNLF)
with
the
Participation
of
the
Quadripartie
Ministerial
Commission
Members
of
(9)
Such
other
matters
as
may
be
authorized
by
law
for
the
promotion
of
the
the
Islamic
Conference
and
the
Secretary
General
of
the
Organization
of
Islamic
general
welfare
of
the
people
of
the
region.
Conference"
took
effect
on
December
23,
1976.
Sec.
21.
The
preservation
of
peace
and
order
within
the
regions
shall
be
the
- It
provided
for
"[t]he
establishment
of
Autonomy
in
the
southern
Philippines
responsibility
of
the
local
police
agencies
which
shall
be
organized,
maintained,
within
the
realm
of
the
sovereignty
and
territorial
integrity
of
the
Republic
of
the
supervised,
and
utilized
in
accordance
with
applicable
laws.
The
defense
and
Philippines"
and
enumerated
the
thirteen
(13)
provinces
comprising
the
"areas
of
security
of
the
region
shall
be
the
responsibility
of
the
National
Government.
autonomy."
" Pursuant
to
the
constitutional
mandate,
R.A.
No.
6734
was
enacted
and
signed
into
law
" In
1987,
a
new
Constitution
was
ratified,
which
the
for
the
first
time
provided
for
on
August
1,
1989.
regional
autonomy,
Article
X,
section
15
of
the
charter
provides
that
"[t]here
shall
be
created
autonomous
regions
in
Muslim
Mindanao
and
in
the
Cordilleras
consisting
of
ISSUES
provinces,
cities,
municipalities,
and
geographical
areas
sharing
common
and
distinctive
1. WON
certain
provisions
of
R.A.
No.
6734
conflict
with
the
Tripoli
Agreement
No
historical
and
cultural
heritage,
economic
and
social
structures,
and
other
relevant
2. WON
R.A.
6734,
or
parts
thereof,
violates
the
Constitution
-
No
characteristics
within
the
framework
of
this
Constitution
and
the
national
sovereignty
as
well
as
territorial
integrity
of
the
Republic
of
the
Philippines."
HELD:
WHEREFORE,
the
petitions
are
DISMISSED
for
lack
of
merit.
" To
effectuate
this
mandate,
the
Constitution
further
provides:
Sec.
16.
The
President
shall
exercise
general
supervision
over
autonomous
regions
RATIO
to
ensure
that
the
laws
are
faithfully
executed.
1. There
should
be
no
conflict
as
the
creation
of
the
autonomous
region
in
Muslim
Sec.
17.
All
powers,
functions,
and
responsibilities
not
granted
by
this
Constitution
Mindanao
is
stated
in
the
Constitution
or
by
law
to
the
autonomous
regions
shall
be
vested
in
the
National
Government.
- Petitioners
assume
that
the
Tripoli
Agreement
is
part
of
the
law
of
the
land,
being
a
Sec.
18.
The
Congress
shall
enact
an
organic
act
for
each
autonomous
region
with
binding
international
agreement.
the
assistance
and
participation
of
the
regional
consultative
commission
composed
- But
the
Solicitor
General
asserts
that
the
Tripoli
Agreement
is
neither
a
binding
treaty,
of
representatives
appointed
by
the
President
from
a
list
of
nominees
from
not
having
been
entered
into
by
the
Republic
of
the
Philippines
with
a
sovereign
state
multisectoral
bodies.
The
organic
act
shall
define
the
basic
structure
of
and
ratified
according
to
the
provisions
of
the
1973
or
1987
Constitutions,
nor
a
binding
government
for
the
region
consisting
of
the
executive
and
representative
of
the
international
agreement.
constituent
political
units.
The
organic
acts
shall
likewise
provide
for
special
courts
with
personal,
family,
and
property
law
jurisdiction
consistent
with
the
provisions
" The
SC
finds
does
not
find
it
necessary
nor
determinative
of
the
case
to
rule
on
the
of
this
Constitution
and
national
laws.
nature
of
the
Tripoli
Agreement
and
its
binding
effect
on
the
Philippine
Government
whether
under
public
international
or
internal
Philippine
law.
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
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Page
33
of
42
" In
the
first
place,
it
is
now
the
Constitution
itself
that
provides
for
the
creation
of
an
inclusion
in
the
Autonomous
Region
shall
remain
the
existing
administrative
autonomous
region
in
Muslim
Mindanao.
determination,
merge
the
existing
regions.
- The
standard
for
any
inquiry
into
the
validity
of
R.A.
No.
6734
would
therefore
be
" Thus,
under
the
Constitution
and
R.A.
No
6734,
the
creation
of
the
autonomous
region
what
is
so
provided
in
the
Constitution.
shall
take
effect
only
when
approved
by
a
majority
of
the
votes
cast
by
the
- Thus,
any
conflict
between
the
provisions
of
R.A.
No.
6734
and
the
provisions
of
constituent
units
in
a
plebiscite,
and
only
those
provinces
and
cities
where
a
majority
the
Tripoli
Agreement
will
not
have
the
effect
of
enjoining
the
implementation
of
vote
in
favor
of
the
Organic
Act
shall
be
included
in
the
autonomous
region.
the
Organic
Act.
Assuming
for
the
sake
of
argument
that
the
Tripoli
Agreement
is
a
" The
provinces
and
cities
wherein
such
a
majority
is
not
attained
shall
not
be
included
binding
treaty
or
international
agreement,
it
would
then
constitute
part
of
the
law
in
the
autonomous
region.
It
may
be
that
even
if
an
autonomous
region
is
created,
not
of
the
land.
But
as
internal
law
it
would
not
be
superior
to
R.A.
No.
6734,
an
all
of
the
thirteen
(13)
provinces
and
nine
(9)
cities
mentioned
in
Article
II,
section
1
(2)
enactment
of
the
Congress
of
the
Philippines,
rather
it
would
be
in
the
same
class
of
R.A.
No.
6734
shall
be
included
therein.
The
single
plebiscite
contemplated
by
the
as
the
latter
[SALONGA,
citing
Head
Money
Cases,
112
U.S.
580
(1884)
and
Foster
Constitution
and
R.A.
No.
6734
will
therefore
be
determinative
of
(1)
whether
there
v.
Nelson,
2
Pet.
253
(1829)].
shall
be
an
autonomous
region
in
Muslim
Mindanao
and
(2)
which
provinces
and
cities,
- Thus,
if
at
all,
R.A.
No.
6734
would
be
amendatory
of
the
Tripoli
Agreement,
being
among
those
enumerated
in
R.A.
No.
6734,
shall
compromise
it.
[See
III
RECORD
OF
THE
a
subsequent
law.
Only
a
determination
by
this
Court
that
R.A.
No.
6734
CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSION
482-492
(1986)].
contravened
the
Constitution
would
result
in
the
granting
of
the
reliefs
sought.
Meaning
of
majority
2. RA
6734
is
constitutional.
" As
provided
in
the
Constitution,
the
creation
of
the
Autonomous
region
in
Muslim
" Abbas
argues
that
R.A.
No.
6734
unconditionally
creates
an
autonomous
region
in
Mindanao
is
made
effective
upon
the
approval
"by
majority
of
the
votes
cast
by
the
Mindanao,
contrary
to
the
aforequoted
provisions
of
the
Constitution
on
the
constituent
units
in
a
plebiscite
called
for
the
purpose"
[Art.
X,
sec.
18].
autonomous
region
which
make
the
creation
of
such
region
dependent
upon
the
" The
question
has
been
raised
as
to
what
this
majority
means.
Does
it
refer
to
a
outcome
of
the
plebiscite.
majority
of
the
total
votes
cast
in
the
plebiscite
in
all
the
constituent
units,
or
a
- In
support
of
his
argument,
petitioner
cites
Article
II,
section
1(1)
of
R.A.
No.
6734
majority
in
each
of
the
constituent
units,
or
both?
which
declares
that
"[t]here
is
hereby
created
the
Autonomous
Region
in
Muslim
" In
Article
XVIII,
section
27,
it
is
provided
that
"[t]his
Constitution
shall
take
effect
Mindanao,
to
be
composed
of
provinces
and
cities
voting
favorably
in
the
immediately
upon
its
ratification
by
a
majority
of
the
votes
cast
in
a
plebiscite
held
for
plebiscite
called
for
the
purpose,
in
accordance
with
Section
18,
Article
X
of
the
the
purpose
...
Comparing
this
with
the
provision
on
the
creation
of
the
autonomous
Constitution."
region,
which
reads:
- The
tenor
of
the
above
provision
makes
the
creation
of
an
autonomous
region
The
creation
of
the
autonomous
region
shall
be
effective
when
approved
absolute,
such
that
even
if
only
two
provinces
vote
in
favor
of
autonomy,
an
by
majority
of
the
votes
cast
by
the
constituent
units
in
a
plebiscite
autonomous
region
would
still
be
created
composed
of
the
two
provinces
where
called
for
the
purpose,
provided
that
only
provinces,
cities
and
the
favorable
votes
were
obtained.
geographic
areas
voting
favorably
in
such
plebiscite
shall
be
included
in
SC:
the
autonomous
region.
[Art.
X,
sec,
18,
para,
2].
1. The
questioned
provision
itself
in
R.A.
No.
6734
refers
to
Section
18,
Article
X
of
" It
will
readily
be
seen
that
the
creation
of
the
autonomous
region
is
made
to
depend,
the
Constitution
which
sets
forth
the
conditions
necessary
for
the
creation
of
the
not
on
the
total
majority
vote
in
the
plebiscite,
but
on
the
will
of
the
majority
in
each
autonomous
region.
The
reference
to
the
constitutional
provision
clearly
indicates
of
the
constituent
units
and
the
proviso
underscores
this.
that
the
creation
of
the
autonomous
region
shall
take
place
only
in
accord
with
the
" For
if
the
intention
of
the
framers
of
the
Constitution
was
to
get
the
majority
of
the
constitutional
requirements.
totality
of
the
votes
cast,
they
could
have
simply
adopted
the
same
phraseology
as
that
2. There
is
a
specific
provision
in
the
Transitory
Provisions
(Article
XIX)
of
the
Organic
used
for
the
ratification
of
the
Constitution,
i.e.
"the
creation
of
the
autonomous
region
Act,
which
incorporates
substantially
the
same
requirements
embodied
in
the
shall
be
effective
when
approved
by
a
majority
of
the
votes
cast
in
a
plebiscite
called
for
Constitution
and
fills
in
the
details,
thus:
the
purpose."
SEC.
13.
The
creation
of
the
Autonomous
Region
in
Muslim
Mindanao
shall
take
" It
is
thus
clear
that
what
is
required
by
the
Constitution
is
a
simple
majority
of
votes
effect
when
approved
by
a
majority
of
the
votes
cast
by
the
constituent
units
approving
the
organic
Act
in
individual
constituent
units
and
not
a
double
majority
of
provided
in
paragraph
(2)
of
Sec.
1
of
Article
II
of
this
Act
in
a
plebiscite
which
shall
the
votes
in
all
constituent
units
put
together,
as
well
as
in
the
individual
constituent
be
held
not
earlier
than
ninety
(90)
days
or
later
than
one
hundred
twenty
(120)
units.
days
after
the
approval
of
this
Act:
Provided,
That
only
the
provinces
and
cities
voting
favorably
in
such
plebiscite
shall
be
included
in
the
Autonomous
Region
in
" Mama-o,
on
the
other
hand,
maintains
that
only
those
areas
which,
to
his
view,
share
Muslim
Mindanao.
The
provinces
and
cities
which
in
the
plebiscite
do
not
vote
for
common
and
distinctive
historical
and
cultural
heritage,
economic
and
social
structures,
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
Poli
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Review
|
Dean
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Compilation
6.01
Article
X
Page
34
of
42
and
other
relevant
characteristics
should
be
properly
included
within
the
coverage
of
- The
objection
centers
on
a
provision
in
the
Organic
Act
which
mandates
that
the
autonomous
region.
should
there
be
any
conflict
between
the
Muslim
Code
[P.D.
No.
1083]
and
the
- He
insists
that
R.A.
No.
6734
is
unconstitutional
because
only
the
provinces
of
Tribal
Code
(still
be
enacted)
on
the
one
hand,
and
the
national
law
on
the
other
Basilan,
Sulu,
Tawi-Tawi,
Lanao
del
Sur,
Lanao
del
Norte
and
Maguindanao
and
the
hand,
the
Shari'ah
courts
created
under
the
same
Act
should
apply
national
law.
cities
of
Marawi
and
Cotabato,
and
not
all
of
the
thirteen
(13)
provinces
and
nine
" Islamic
law
v.
Man
made
law.
Petitioners
maintain
that
the
islamic
law
(Shari'ah)
is
(9)
cities
included
in
the
Organic
Act,
possess
such
concurrence
in
historical
and
derived
from
the
Koran,
which
makes
it
part
of
divine
law.
Thus
it
may
not
be
subjected
cultural
heritage
and
other
relevant
characteristics.
to
any
"man-made"
national
law.
- By
including
areas
which
do
not
strictly
share
the
same
characteristic
as
the
others,
SC:
As
enshrined
in
the
Constitution,
judicial
power
includes
the
duty
to
settle
actual
the
Congress
has
expanded
the
scope
of
the
autonomous
region
which
the
controversies
involving
rights
which
are
legally
demandable
and
enforceable.
constitution
itself
has
prescribed
to
be
limited.
- In
the
present
case,
no
actual
controversy
between
real
litigants
exists.
There
are
" After
assailing
the
inclusion
of
non-Muslim
areas
in
the
Organic
Act
for
lack
of
basis,
no
conflicting
claims
involving
the
application
of
national
law
resulting
in
an
Mama-o
would
then
adopt
the
extreme
view
that
other
non-Muslim
areas
in
Mindanao
alleged
violation
of
religious
freedom.
should
likewise
be
covered.
- The
Court
in
this
case
may
not
be
called
upon
to
resolve
what
is
merely
a
- He
argues
that
since
the
Organic
Act
covers
several
non-Muslim
areas,
its
scope
perceived
potential
conflict
between
the
provisions
the
Muslim
Code
and
national
should
be
further
broadened
to
include
the
rest
of
the
non-Muslim
areas
in
law.
Mindanao
in
order
for
the
other
non-Muslim
areas
denies
said
areas
equal
" Merging
of
Regions.
They
also
question
the
constitionality
of
Article
XIX,
section
13
of
protection
of
the
law,
and
therefore
is
violative
of
the
Constitution.
R.A.
No.
6734
which,
among
others,
states:
.
.
.
Provided,
That
only
the
provinces
and
cities
voting
favorably
in
such
plebiscite
shall
be
included
in
the
Autonomous
Region
in
Muslim
SC
disagrees:
Mindanao.
The
provinces
and
cities
which
in
the
plebiscite
do
not
vote
" First,
the
Constitution
lays
down
the
standards
by
which
Congress
shall
determine
for
inclusion
in
the
Autonomous
Region
shall
remain
in
the
existing
which
areas
should
constitute
the
autonomous
region.
administrative
regions:Provided,
however,
that
the
President
may,
by
- Guided
by
these
constitutional
criteria,
the
ascertainment
by
Congress
of
the
areas
administrative
determination,
merge
the
existing
regions.
that
share
common
attributes
is
within
the
exclusive
realm
of
the
legislature's
- According
to
petitioners,
said
provision
grants
the
President
the
power
to
merge
discretion.
regions,
a
power
which
is
not
conferred
by
the
Constitution
upon
the
President.
- Any
review
of
this
ascertainment
would
have
to
go
into
the
wisdom
of
the
law.
That
the
President
may
choose
to
merge
existing
regions
pursuant
to
the
Organic
This
the
Court
cannot
do
without
doing
violence
to
the
separation
of
governmental
Act
is
challenged
as
being
in
conflict
with
Article
X,
Section
10
of
the
Constitution
powers.
which
provides:
" Second,
any
determination
by
Congress
of
what
areas
in
Mindanao
should
compromise
No
province,
city,
municipality,
or
barangay
may
be
created,
divided,
the
autonomous
region,
taking
into
account
shared
historical
and
cultural
heritage,
merged,
abolished,
or
its
boundary
substantially
altered,
except
in
economic
and
social
structures,
and
other
relevant
characteristics,
would
necessarily
accordance
with
the
criteria
established
in
the
local
government
code
carry
with
it
the
exclusion
of
other
areas.
and
subject
to
approval
by
a
majority
of
the
votes
cast
in
a
plebiscite
in
- Again,
the
areas
should
be
covered
by
the
organic
act
for
the
autonomous
region
the
political
units
directly
affected.
constitutes
a
recognized
legislative
prerogative,
whose
wisdom
may
not
be
SC:
R.A.
No.
6734
refers
to
the
merger
of
administrative
regions,
i.e.
Regions
I
to
XII
and
the
inquired
into
by
this
Court.
National
Capital
Region,
which
are
mere
groupings
of
contiguous
provinces
for
- Moreover,
equal
protection
permits
of
reasonable
classification.
administrative
purposes
[Integrated
Reorganization
Plan
(1972),
which
was
made
as
part
of
- In
Dumlao
v.
Commission
on
Elections
G.R.
No.
52245,
January
22,
1980,
95
SCRA
the
law
of
the
land
by
Pres.
dec.
No.
1,
Pres.
Dec.
No.
742].
392],
the
Court
ruled
that
once
class
may
be
treated
differently
from
another
- Administrative
regions
are
not
territorial
and
political
subdivisions
like
provinces,
where
the
groupings
are
based
on
reasonable
and
real
distinctions.
The
guarantee
cities,
municipalities
and
barangays.
of
equal
protection
is
thus
not
infringed
in
this
case,
the
classification
having
been
- While
the
power
to
merge
administrative
regions
is
not
expressly
provided
for
in
made
by
Congress
on
the
basis
of
substantial
distinctions
as
set
forth
by
the
the
Constitution,
it
is
a
power
which
has
traditionally
been
lodged
with
the
Constitution
itself.
President
to
facilitate
the
exercise
of
the
power
of
general
supervision
over
local
governments.
C. Both
petitions
also
question
the
validity
of
R.A.
No.
6734
on
the
ground
that
it
violates
- There
is
no
conflict
between
the
power
of
the
President
to
merge
administrative
the
constitutional
guarantee
on
free
exercise
of
religion
[Art.
III,
sec.
5].
regions
with
the
constitutional
provision
requiring
a
plebiscite
in
the
merger
of
local
government
units
because
the
requirement
of
a
plebiscite
in
a
merger
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
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Dean
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6.01
Article
X
Page
35
of
42
expressly
applies
only
to
provinces,
cities,
municipalities
or
barangays,
not
to
Summary:
A
plebiscite
was
held
pursuant
to
the
constitution
of
the
Cordillera
Autonomous
administrative
regions.
Region.
Only
one
province,
Ifugao,
said
that
they
wanted
to
be
a
part
of
the
CAR.
COMELEC
" Oversight
Committee:
They
also
question
the
validity
of
the
provisions
in
the
Organic
tried
to
constitute
it
based
on
the
fact
that
Ifugao
said
yes,
essentially
making
Ifugao
=
CAR.
Act
which
create
an
Oversight
Committee
to
supervise
the
transfer
to
the
autonomous
SC
said
this
was
not
allowed,
based
on
the
law
constituting
the
CAR.
Art.
X,
Sec.
18,
and
the
region
of
the
powers,
appropriations,
and
properties
vested
upon
the
regional
Abbas
case
are
here
by
way
of
contrast.
That
ruling,
in
interpreting
the
Consti
provision,
government
by
the
organic
Act
[Art.
XIX,
Secs.
3
and
4].
determined
which
provinces
or
bodies
would
constitute
the
new
autonomous
region.
This
- Said
provisions
mandate
that
the
transfer
of
certain
national
government
offices
case
deals
with
the
situation
where
only
one
province
said
yes,
thus
making
the
new
AR
and
their
properties
to
the
regional
government
shall
be
made
pursuant
to
a
composed
of
only
one
province.
This
situation,
as
discussed
below,
will
not
fly.
schedule
prescribed
by
the
Oversight
Committee,
and
that
such
transfer
should
be
accomplished
within
six
(6)
years
from
the
organization
of
the
regional
The
question
raised
in
this
petition
is
whether
or
not
the
province
of
Ifugao,
being
the
only
government.
province
which
voted
favorably
for
the
creation
of
the
Cordillera
Autonomous
Region
can,
- Petitioners
-
unconstitutional
because
while
the
Constitution
states
that
the
alone,
legally
and
validly
constitute
such
Region.
creation
of
the
autonomous
region
shall
take
effect
upon
approval
in
a
plebiscite,
FACTS
the
requirement
of
organizing
an
Oversight
committee
tasked
with
supervising
the
On
January
30,
1990,
the
people
of
the
provinces
of
Benguet,
Mountain
Province,
transfer
of
powers
and
properties
to
the
regional
government
would
in
effect
Ifugao,
Abra
and
Kalinga-Apayao
and
the
city
of
Baguio
cast
their
votes
in
a
plebiscite
delay
the
creation
of
the
autonomous
region.
held
pursuant
to
Republic
Act
No.
6766
entitled
"An
Act
Providing
for
an
Organic
Act
for
SC:
Under
the
constitution,
the
creation
of
the
autonomous
region
hinges
only
on
the
result
the
Cordillera
Autonomous
Region."
of
the
plebiscite.
If
the
Organic
Act
is
approved
by
majority
of
the
votes
cast
by
constituent
The
official
Commission
on
Elections
(COMELEC)
results
of
the
plebiscite
showed
that
units
in
the
scheduled
plebiscite,
the
creation
of
the
autonomous
region
immediately
takes
the
creation
of
the
Region
was
approved
by
a
majority
of
5,889
votes
in
only
the
Ifugao
effect.
Province
and
was
overwhelmingly
rejected
by
148,676
votes
in
the
rest
of
the
provinces
- The
questioned
provisions
in
R.A.
No.
6734
requiring
an
oversight
Committee
to
and
city
above-mentioned.
supervise
the
transfer
do
not
provide
for
a
different
date
of
effectivity.
Much
less
Consequently,
the
COMELEC,
on
February
14,
1990,
issued
Resolution
No.
2259
stating
would
the
organization
of
the
Oversight
Committee
cause
an
impediment
to
the
that
the
Organic
Act
for
the
Region
has
been
approved
and/or
ratified
by
majority
of
operation
of
the
Organic
Act,
for
such
is
evidently
aimed
at
effecting
a
smooth
the
votes
cast
only
in
the
province
of
Ifugao.
transition
period
for
the
regional
government.
o On
the
same
date,
the
Secretary
of
Justice
issued
a
memorandum
for
the
- Every
law
has
in
its
favor
the
presumption
of
constitutionality
President
reiterating
the
COMELEC
resolution
and
provided
"
Considering
the
proviso
in
Sec.
13(A)
that
only
the
provinces
and
city
voting
favorably
shall
be
included
in
the
CAR,
the
province
of
Ifugao
being
the
only
province
which
voted
favorably
then,
2. Ordillos v Comelec (LC) alone,
legally
and
validly
constitutes
the
CAR."
Dec.
4,
1990
GR
93054
As
a
result
of
this,
on
March
8,
1990,
Congress
enacted
Republic
Act
No.
6861
setting
Lots
of
Petitioners
and
Respondents:
What
you
need
to
know:
Petitioners
question
the
constitution
of
the
CAR
from
the
elections
in
the
Cordillera
Autonomous
Region
of
Ifugao
on
the
first
Monday
of
one
province.
Respondents,
including
COMELEC
and
the
Secretary
of
Justice,
are
for
it.
(pasting
full
list
below
just
in
March
1991.:
nad
case)
Cordillera
Regional
Assembly
Member
ALEXANDER
P.
ORDILLO,
(Banaue),
Ifugao
Provincial
Board
Member
CORAZON
Even
before
this
resolution,
the
Executive
Secretary
on
February
5,
1990
issued
a
MONTINIG,
(Mayoyao),
Former
Vice-Mayor
MARTIN
UDAN
(Banaue),
Municipal
Councilors
MARTIN
GANO,
(Lagawe),
Memorandum
granting
authority
to
wind
up
the
affairs
of
the
Cordillera
Executive
and
TEODORO
HEWE,
(Hingyon),
Barangay
Councilman
PEDRO
W.
DULAG
(Lamut);
Aguinaldo
residents
SANDY
B.
Board
and
the
Cordillera
Regional
Assembly
created
under
Executive
Order
No.
220.
CHANGIWAN,
and
DONATO
TIMAGO;
Lamut
resident
REY
ANTONIO;
Kiangan
residents
ORLANDO
PUGUON,
and
REYNAND
DULDULAO;
Lagawe
residents
TOMAS
KIMAYONG,
GREGORIO
DANGO,
GEORGE
B.
BAYWONG,
and
VICENTE
(This
is
what
the
CAR
is
replacing).
LUNAG;
Hingyon
residents
PABLO
M.
DULNUAN
and
CONSTANCIO
GANO;
Mayoyao
residents
PEDRO
M.
BAOANG,
On
March
9,
1990,
the
petitioner
filed
a
petition
with
COMELEC
to
declare
the
non-
LEONARDO
IGADNA,
and
MAXIMO
IGADNA;
and
Banaue
residents
PUMA-A
CULHI,
LATAYON
BUTTIG,
MIGUEL
ratification
of
the
Organic
Act
for
the
Region.
PUMELBAN,
ANDRES
ORDILLO,
FEDERICO
MARIANO,
SANDY
BINOMNGA,
GABRIEL
LIMMANG,
ROMEO
TONGALI,
o The
COMELEC
merely
noted
said
petition.
RUBEN
BAHATAN,
MHOMDY
GABRIEL,
and
NADRES
GHAMANG,
Petitioners,
vs.
THE
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS;
The
Honorable
FRANKLIN
M.
DRILON,
Secretary
of
Justice;
Hon.
CATALINO
MACARAIG,
Executive
Secretary;
The
Cabinet
On
March
30,
1990,
the
President
issued
Administrative
Order
No.
160
declaring
among
Officer
for
Regional
Development;
Hon.
GUILLERMO
CARAGUE,
Secretary
of
Budget
and
Management;
and
Hon.
others
that
the
Cordillera
Executive
Board
and
Cordillera
Regional
Assembly
and
all
ROSALINA
S.
CAJUCOM,
OIC,
National
Treasurer,
Respondents.
the
offices
created
under
Executive
Order
No.
220
were
abolished
in
view
of
the
GUTIERREZ,
JR.,
J.:
ratification
of
the
Organic
Act.-
nad
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6.01
Article
X
Page
36
of
42
The
petitioners
maintain
that
there
can
be
no
valid
Cordillera
Autonomous
Region
in
o Aside
from
the
1987
Constitution,
a
reading
of
the
provisions
of
Republic
Act
only
one
province
as
the
Constitution
and
Republic
Act
No.
6766
require
that
the
said
No.
6766
strengthens
the
petitioner's
position
that
the
Region
cannot
be
Region
be
composed
of
more
than
one
constituent
unit.
constituted
from
only
one
province.
ISSUES:
o Article
III,
Sections
1
and
2
of
the
Statute
provide
that
the
Cordillera
Autonomous
Region
is
to
be
administered
by
the
Cordillera
government
The
petitioners,
then,
pray
that
the
Court:
consisting
of
the
Regional
Government
and
local
government
units.
It
o declare
null
and
void
COMELEC
resolution
No.
2259,
the
memorandum
of
the
further
provides
that:
Secretary
of
Justice,
the
memorandum
of
the
Executive
Secretary,
" SECTION
2.
The
Regional
Government
shall
exercise
powers
and
Administrative
Order
No.
160,
and
Republic
Act
No.
6861
and
prohibit
and
functions
necessary
for
the
proper
governance
and
development
of
restrain
the
respondents
from
implementing
the
same
and
spending
public
all
provinces,
cities,
municipalities,
and
barangay
or
ili
within
the
funds
for
the
purpose
and
Autonomous
Region
.
.
."
o declare
Executive
Order
No.
220
constituting
the
Cordillera
Executive
Board
" From
these
sections,
it
can
be
gleaned
that
Congress
never
intended
that
a
single
and
the
Cordillera
Regional
Assembly
and
other
offices
to
be
still
in
force
and
province
may
constitute
the
autonomous
region.
effect
until
another
organic
law
for
the
Autonomous
Region
shall
have
been
o Otherwise,
we
would
be
faced
with
the
absurd
situation
of
having
two
sets
of
enacted
by
Congress
and
the
same
is
duly
ratified
by
the
voters
in
the
officials,
a
set
of
provincial
officials
and
another
set
of
regional
officials
constituent
units.
exercising
their
executive
and
legislative
powers
over
exactly
the
same
small
Essentially
Can
Ifugao,
as
a
single
province,
constitute
the
CAR
by
itself?
NO.
area.
o Article
V,
Sections
1
and
4
of
Republic
Act
6766
vest
the
legislative
power
in
RATIO
the
Cordillera
Assembly
whose
members
shall
be
elected
from
regional
This
petition
is
meritorious.
assembly
districts
apportioned
among
provinces
and
the
cities
composing
the
" The
sole
province
of
Ifugao
cannot
validly
constitute
the
Cordillera
Autonomous
Region.
Autonomous
Region.
chanrobles
virtual
law
library
" It
is
explicit
in
Article
X,
Section
15
of
the
1987
Constitution
that:
o If
we
follow
the
respondent's
position,
the
members
of
such
Cordillera
o "Section
15.
There
shall
be
created
autonomous
regions
in
Muslim
Mindanao
Assembly
shall
then
be
elected
only
from
the
province
of
Ifugao
creating
an
and
in
the
Cordillera
consisting
of
provinces,
cities,
municipalities
and
awkward
predicament
of
having
two
legislative
bodies
the
Cordillera
geographical
areas
sharing
common
and
distinctive
historical
and
cultural
Assembly
and
the
Sangguniang
Panlalawigan
exercising
their
legislative
heritage,
economic
and
social
structures,
and
other
relevant
characteristics
powers
over
the
province
of
Ifugao.
within
the
framework
of
this
Constitution
and
the
national
sovereignty
as
well
o
And
since
Ifugao
is
one
of
the
smallest
provinces
in
the
Philippines,
as
territorial
integrity
of
the
Republic
of
the
Philippines."
population-wise,
it
would
have
too
many
government
officials
for
so
few
" The
keywords
provinces,
cities,
municipalities
and
geographical
areas
connote
that
people.:-cralaw
"region"
is
to
be
made
up
of
more
than
one
constituent
unit.
" Article
XII,
Section
10
of
the
law
(not
the
Constitution,
take
note)
creates
a
Regional
o The
term
"region"
used
in
its
ordinary
sense
means
two
or
more
provinces.
Planning
and
Development
Board
composed
of
the
Cordillera
Governor,
all
the
o This
is
supported
by
the
fact
that
the
thirteen
regions
into
which
the
provincial
governors
and
city
mayors
or
their
representatives,
two
members
of
the
Philippines
is
divided
for
administrative
purposes
are
groupings
of
contiguous
Cordillera
Assembly,
and
members
representing
the
private
sector.
provinces.
o he
Board
has
a
counterpart
in
the
provincial
level
called
the
Provincial
" Ifugao
is
a
province
by
itself.
Planning
and
Development
Coordinator.
o To
become
part
of
a
region,
it
must
join
other
provinces,
cities,
o The
Board's
functions
are
almost
similar
to
those
of
the
Provincial
municipalities,
and
geographical
areas.
Coordinator's
o It
joins
other
units
because
of
their
common
and
distinctive
historical
and
" If
it
takes
only
one
person
in
the
provincial
level
to
perform
such
cultural
heritage,
economic
and
social
structures
and
other
relevant
functions
while
on
the
other
hand
it
takes
an
entire
Board
to
characteristics.
perform
almost
the
same
tasks
in
the
regional
level,
it
could
only
o The
Constitutional
requirements
are
not
present
in
this
case.-
nad
mean
that
a
larger
area
must
be
covered
at
the
regional
level.
The
" The
well-established
rule
in
statutory
construction
that
the
language
of
the
respondent's
theory
of
the
Autonomous
Region
being
made
up
of
Constitution,
as
much
as
possible,
should
be
understood
in
the
sense
it
has
in
common
a
single
province
must,
therefore,
fail.
use
and
that
the
words
used
in
constitutional
provisions
are
to
be
given
their
ordinary
" Further,
Article
XXI,
Section
13
(B)
(c)
allotting
the
huge
amount
of
Ten
Million
Pesos
meaning
except
where
technical
terms
are
employed,
must
then,
be
applied
in
this
(P10,000,000.00)
to
the
Regional
Government
for
its
initial
organizational
requirements
case.
cannot
be
construed
as
funding
only
a
lone
and
small
province.
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
Poli
Law
Review
|
Dean
Candelaria
Compilation
6.01
Article
X
Page
37
of
42
" These
sections
of
Republic
Act
No.
6766
show
that
a
one
province
Cordillera
of
Ifugao
being
the
only
province
which
voted
favorably
can,
Autonomous
Region
was
never
contemplated
by
the
law
creating
it.
alone,
legally
and
validly
constitute
the
CAR."
" The
province
of
Ifugao
makes
up
only
11%
of
the
total
population
of
the
areas
" The
plebiscites
mandated
by
the
Constitution
and
Republic
Act
No.
6766
for
the
enumerated
in
Article
I,
Section
2
(b)
of
Republic
Act
No.
6766
which
include
Benguet,
Cordillera
and
Republic
Act
No.
6734
for
the
Autonomous
Region
in
Muslim
Mindanao
Mountain
Province,
Abra,
Kalinga-Apayao
and
Baguio
City,
are
supposed
to
determine
whether
and
which
o It
has
the
second
smallest
number
of
inhabitants
from
among
the
provinces
o whether
there
shall
be
an
autonomous
region
in
the
Cordillera
and
in
Muslim
and
city
above
mentioned.
Mindanao
and
o The
Cordillera
population
is
distributed
in
round
figures
as
follows:
Abra,
o which
provinces
and
cities,
among
those
enumerated
in
the
two
Republic
185,000;
Benguet,
486,000;
Ifugao,
149,000;
Kalinga-Apayao,
214,000;
Acts,
shall
comprise
said
Autonomous
Regions.
(See
III,
Record
of
the
Mountain
Province,
116,000;
and
Baguio
City,
183,000;
Total
population
of
Constitutional
Commission,
487-492
[1986]).
these
five
provinces
and
one
city;
1,332,000
according
to
the
1990
Census
" The
Abbas
case
established
the
rule
to
follow
on
which
provinces
and
cities
shall
" SC
goes
on
to
enumerate
sections
of
the
law
which
are
inconsistent
and
incompatible
comprise
the
autonomous
region
in
Muslim
Mindanao
which
is,
consequently,
the
with
the
idea
of
having
a
sole
province
compose
the
CAR.
same
rule
to
follow
with
regard
to
the
autonomous
region
in
the
Cordillera.
o Section
16
of
Article
V
calls
for
a
Regional
Commission
on
Appointments
with
o However,
there
is
nothing
in
the
Abbas
decision
which
deals
with
the
issue
the
Speaker
as
Chairman
and
are
(6)
members
coming
from
different
on
whether
an
autonomous
region,
in
either
Muslim
Mindanao
or
Cordillera
provinces
and
cities
in
the
Region.
could
exist
despite
the
fact
that
only
one
province
or
one
city
is
to
" Under
the
respondents'
view,
the
Commission
would
have
a
constitute
it.
Chairman
and
only
one
member.
It
would
never
have
a
quorum.
o And
as
the
SC
has
already
discussed,
it
CANNOT
exist
with
only
one
province.
o Section
3
of
Article
VI
calls
for
cabinet
members,
as
far
as
practicable,
to
come
" Stated
in
another
way,
the
issue
in
this
case
is
whether
the
sole
province
of
Ifugao
can
from
various
provinces
and
cities
of
the
Region.
validly
and
legally
constitute
the
Cordillera
Autonomous
Region.
o Section
1
of
Article
VII
creates
a
system
of
tribal
courts
for
the
various
o The
issue
is
not
whether
the
province
of
Ifugao
is
to
be
included
in
the
indigenous
cultural
communities
of
the
Region.
Cordillera
Autonomous
Region.
o Section
9
of
Article
XV
requires
the
development
of
a
common
regional
" WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
hereby
GRANTED.
Resolution
No.
2259
of
the
Commission
language
based
upon
the
various
languages
and
dialects
in
the
region
which
on
Elections,
insofar
as
it
upholds
the
creation
of
an
autonomous
region,
the
February
regional
language
in
turn
is
expected
to
enrich
the
national
language.
14,
1990
memorandum
of
the
Secretary
of
Justice,
the
February
5,
1990
" The
entirety
of
Republic
Act
No.
6766
creating
the
Cordillera
Autonomous
Region
is
memorandum
of
the
Executive
Secretary,
Administrative
Order
No.
160,
and
Republic
infused
with
provisions
which
rule
against
the
sole
province
of
Ifugao
constituting
the
Act
No.
6861
are
declared
null
and
void
while
Executive
Order
No.
220
is
declared
to
be
Region.:-cralaw
still
in
force
and
effect
until
properly
repealed
or
amended.
o To
contemplate
the
situation
envisioned
by
the
respondent
would
not
only
violate
the
letter
and
intent
of
the
Constitution
and
Republic
Act
No.
6766
but
would
also
be
impractical
and
illogical.
" Our
decision
in
Abbas,
et
al.
v.
COMELEC,
is
not
applicable
in
the
case
at
bar.
3. Badua v CBA (JG)
o The
Abbas
case
laid
down
the
rate
on
the
meaning
of
majority
in
the
phrase
February
14,
1991
|
J.
Grino-Aquino
"by
majority
of
the
votes
cast
by
the
constituent
units
called
for
the
Petitioner:
SPOUSES
LEONOR
and
ROSA
BADUA
purpose"
found
in
the
Constitution,
Article
X,
Section
18.
It
stated:
Respondents:
CORDILLERA
BODONG
ADMINISTRATION,
CORDILLERA
PEOPLE'S
LIBERATION
ARMY,
MANUEL
TAO-IL,
" what
is
required
by
the
Constitution
is
simple
majority
of
votes
AMOGAO-EN
KISSIP,
DALALO
ILLIQUES,
JUANITO
GAYYED,
PEDRO
CABANTO,
VICENTE
DAYEM
and
DAVID
QUEMA
approving
the
Organic
Act
in
individual
constituent
units
and
not
a
double
majority
of
the
votes
in
all
constituent
units
put
together,
RECIT-READY:
This
case
involves
a
land
dispute
between
petitioner-spouses
Badua
and
as
well
as
in
the
individual
constituent
units."
private
respondent
David
Quema.
The
land
in
dispute
is
a
farm
land
in
Lucaga,
Lumaba,
o The
Secretary
of
Justice
relied
on
this
when
he
said
that
Villaviciosa,
Abra.
Both
parties
alleged
that
they
are
owners
of
the
two
parcels
of
land.
" the
creation
of
the
Cordillera
Autonomous
Region
(CAR)
as
Quema
was
prevented
by
Badua
from
cultivating
the
land,
prompting
Quema
to
file
a
case
in
mandated
by
R.A.
No.
6766
became
effective
upon
its
approval
by
the
tribal
court
of
the
Maeng
Tribe.
The
said
tribal
court
decided
to
give
the
land
to
Quema.
the
majority
of
the
votes
cast
in
the
province
of
Ifugao.
However,
the
spouses
Badua
did
not
immediately
vacate
the
land.
The
spouses
received
" And
considering
the
proviso
in
Section
13
(a)
that
only
the
provinces
several
warning
orders
from
the
tribe,
causing
them
so
much
fear.
So
they
filed
this
petition
and
city
voting
favorably
shall
be
included
in
the
CAR,
the
province
for
certiorari
and
prohibition
with
the
SC
and
alleged
that
the
tribal
court
had
no
jurisdiction
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over
the
land
dispute.
For
their
part,
respondents
contend
that
the
Supreme
Court
has
no
The
Baduas
likewise
allege
that
they
were
denied
due
process
or
formal
hearing
jurisdiction
over
the
tribal
courts
because
they
are
not
a
part
of
the
judicial
system.
and
that
the
tribal
court
has
no
jurisdiction
over
the
petitioners
nor
over
the
ISSUE:
Whether
the
tribal
court
of
the
Cordillera
Bodong
Administration
had
jurisdiction
over
private
respondent
as
neither
of
them
are
members
of
the
Maeng
Tribe.
the
land
dispute
NO
In
their
Comment,
respondents
alleged
that:
It
must
be
remembered
that
the
creation
of
the
Cordillera
Administrative
Region
was
o The
Maeng
Tribe
is
a
cultural
minority
group
of
Tingguians
inhabiting
the
rejected
by
all
the
provinces
of
the
Cordillera
region,
except
Ifugao
province.
Hence,
the
interior
mountain
town
of
Villaviciosa,
Abra.
Cordillera
Bodong
Administration
as
well
as
the
indigenous
and
special
courts
do
not
legally
o The
tribe
is
a
part
of
the
Cordillera
Bodong
Association
or
Administration
exist.
Such
tribal
courts
are
not
a
part
of
the
Philippine
judicial
system
which
consists
of
the
whose
military
arm
is
the
Cordillera
People's
Liberation
Army.
Supreme
Court
and
the
lower
courts
which
have
been
established
by
law
(Sec.
1,
Art.
VIII,
o The
tribal
court,
or
council
of
elders,
is
composed
of
prominent
and
1987
Constitution).
Thus,
they
do
not
possess
judicial
power
and
cannot
render
any
valid
and
respected
residents
in
the
locality.
executory
decision.
The
decision
by
the
Maeng
Tribal
court
is
annulled
for
lack
of
o It
decides
and
settles
all
kinds
of
disputes
more
speedily
than
the
regular
jurisdiction.
courts,
without
the
intervention
of
lawyers.
Respondents
further
contend
that
the
Supreme
Court
has
no
jurisdiction
over
the
FACTS:
tribal
courts
because
they
are
not
a
part
of
the
judicial
system.
The
petitioners,
spouses
Badua,
allegedly
own
a
farm
land
in
Lucaga,
Lumaba,
Villaviciosa,
Abra.
ISSUE:
Whether
a
tribal
court
of
the
Cordillera
Bodong
Administration
can
render
a
valid
and
In
July
1989,
they
were
forcibly
ejected
from
the
land
by
virtue
of
a
"decision"
of
executory
decision
in
a
land
dispute
-
NO
the
Cordillera
Bodong
Administration
in
"David
Quema
vs.
Leonor
Badua."
The
factual
background,
according
to
the
undated
decision,
is:
HELD:
Petition
GRANTED.
The
decision
rendered
on
February
18,
1989
by
the
Maeng
Tribal
o In
1966,
Quema,
as
the
owner
of
two
parcels
of
land
in
Lucaga,
Lumaba,
Court
in
"David
Quema
vs.
the
Leonor
Badua,"
is
hereby
annulled
for
lack
of
jurisdiction.
Villaviciosa,
Abra,
mortgaged
said
parcels
of
land
for
P6,000
to
Dra.
Erotida
Valera.
RATIO:
o He
was
able
to
redeem
the
land
twenty-two
(22)
years
later
and
In
Cordillera
Regional
Assembly
Member
Alexander
P.
Ordillo,
et
al.
vs.
The
allegedly
paid
the
redemption
price
of
P10,000
to
the
mortgagee's
heir,
Commission
on
Elections,
et
al.,
the
Court
en
banc,
found
that
in
the
plebiscite
that
Jessie
Macaraeg.
was
held
on
January
23,
1990
pursuant
to
Republic
Act
6766,
the
creation
of
the
o On
the
other
hand,
Rosa
Badua,
alleged
that
the
land
was
sold
to
her
by
Cordillera
Autonomous
Region
was
rejected
by
all
the
provinces
and
city
of
the
Dra.
Erotida
Valera
when
she
was
still
alive.
Cordillera
region,
except
Ifugao
province,
hence,
the
Cordillera
Autonomous
o However,
Rosa
could
not
produce
the
deed
of
sale
because
it
is
allegedly
Region
did
not
come
to
be.
in
the
possession
of
Vice-Governor
Benesa.
o Resolution
No.
2259
of
the
Commission
on
Elections,
insofar
as
it
o Because
Quema
was
prevented
by
Rosa
Badua
from
cultivating
the
land,
upholds
the
creation
of
an
autonomous
region,
the
February
14,
1990
Quema
filed
a
case
in
the
tribal
court
of
the
Maeng
Tribe.
memorandum
of
the
Secretary
of
Justice,
the
February
5,
1990
o The
said
tribal
court
decided
to
give
the
land
to
Quema.
memorandum
of
the
Executive
Secretary,
Administrative
Order
No.
160,
However,
Leonor
and
Rosa
Badua
did
not
immediately
vacate
the
land.
and
Republic
Act
No.
6861
are
declared
null
and
void
while
Executive
They
received
several
warning
orders
from
the
tribe.
Order
No.
220
is
declared
to
be
still
in
force
and
effect
until
properly
Fearful
for
his
life,
Leonor
Badua
went
into
hiding.
repealed
or
amended.
In
September
1989,
his
wife,
Rosa,
was
arrested
by
the
Cordillera
People's
As
a
logical
consequence
of
that
judicial
declaration,
the
Cordillera
Bodong
Liberation
Army
and
detained
for
two
days.
Administration
created
under
Section
13
of
Executive
Order
No.
220,
the
Thereafter,
the
Baduas
filed
this
petition
"for
Special
and
Extraordinary
Reliefs"
indigenous
and
special
courts
for
the
indigenous
cultural
communities
of
the
(which
may
be
treated
as
a
petition
for
certiorari
and
prohibition)
praying
that:
Cordillera
region
(Sec.
1,
Art.
VII,
Rep.
Act
6766),
and
the
Cordillera
People's
o (1)
a
writ
of
preliminary
injunction
be
issued
to
stop
the
respondents
Liberation
Army
as
a
regional
police
force
or
a
regional
command
of
the
Armed
from
enforcing
the
decision
of
the
tribal
court;
Forces
of
the
Philippines
(Secs.
2
and
4,
Article
XVIII
of
R.A.
6766),
do
not
legally
o (2)
the
respondents
be
prohibited
from
usurping
judicial
power
and
exist.
hearing
cases;
and
Since
the
Cordillera
Autonomous
Region
did
not
come
into
legal
existence,
the
o (3)
the
legal
personality
of
the
Cordillera
Bodong
Administration
and
Maeng
Tribal
Court
was
not
constituted
into
an
indigenous
or
special
court
under
Cordillera
People's
Liberation
Army
be
clarified.
R.A.
No.
6766.
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Page
39
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42
o Hence,
the
Maeng
Tribal
Court
is
an
ordinary
tribal
court
existing
under
IPRA:
it
lays
down
the
prevailing
procedure
for
the
delineation
and
recognition
of
the
customs
and
traditions
of
an
indigenous
cultural
community.
ancestral
domains.
The
MOA-ADs
manner
of
delineating
the
ancestral
domain
of
Such
tribal
courts
are
not
a
part
of
the
Philippine
judicial
system
which
consists
of
the
Bangsamoro
people
is
a
clear
departure
from
that
procedure.
the
Supreme
Court
and
the
lower
courts
which
have
been
established
by
law
(Sec.
IL:
the
MOA-AD
seems
to
grant
to
the
BJE
the
right
to
external
self-determination,
1,
Art.
VIII,
1987
Constitution).
which
meand
basically
a
severance
from
its
parents
state
some
indications
of
this
They
do
not
possess
judicial
power.
are
conferment
of
treaty
making
powers.
Like
the
pangkats
or
conciliation
panels
created
by
P.D.
No.
1508
in
the
barangays,
The
MOA-AD
seems
to
promise
an
amendment
to
the
Consti
(termed
legal
they
are
advisory
and
conciliatory
bodies
whose
principal
objective
is
to
bring
framework)
in
order
to
conform
to
whats
given
in
this
agreement.
The
President
together
the
parties
to
a
dispute
and
persuade
them
to
make
peace,
settle,
and
cannot
sign
an
agreement
promising
amendments
to
the
Consti
compromise.
An
amicable
settlement,
compromise,
and
arbitration
award
rendered
by
Petitioners:
a
pangkat,
if
not
seasonably
repudiated,
has
the
force
and
effect
of
a
final
Province
of
North
Cotabato,
City
Government
of
Zamboanga,
City
of
Iligan,
Provincial
judgment
of
a
court
(Sec.
11,
P.D.
1508),
but
it
can
be
enforced
only
through
the
Government
of
Zamboanga
del
Norteall
represented
by
their
elected
local
officals
(i.e.
local
city
or
municipal
court
to
which
the
secretary
of
the
Lupon
transmits
the
mayor,
governor,
etc.)
compromise
settlement
or
arbitration
award
upon
expiration
of
the
period
to
Ernesto
Maceda,
Jejomar
Binay,
Aquilino
Pimentel
III
annul
or
repudiate
it
(Sec.
14,
P.D.
1508).
Various
intervenerscities,
provinces,
elected
officials,
organizations
Similarly,
the
decisions
of
a
tribal
court
based
on
compromise
or
arbitration,
as
provided
in
P.D.
1508,
may
be
enforced
or
set
aside,
in
and
through
the
regular
Respondents:
courts
today.
Government
of
the
Republic
of
the
Philippines
(GRP)
Peace
Panel
on
Ancestral
Domain,
represented
by
SEC.
RODOLFO
GARCIA,
ATTY.
LEAH
ARMAMENTO,
ATTY.
SEDFREY
CANDELARIA,
MARK
RYAN
SULLIVAN
and/or
GEN.
HERMOGENES
ESPERON,
JR.
(the
latter
being
the
Presidential
Adviser
for
the
Peace
process
of
PAPP)
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