Pablico vs.

Villapando

Facts:

An administrative complaint was filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan against
then Mayor Alejandro Villapando of San Vicente, Palawan for abuse of authority and culpable
violation of the Constitution for entering into a consultancy agreement with Orlando Tiape, a
defeated mayoralty candidate. Complainants argue that this amounted to appointment to a
government position within the prohibited one-year period under Article IX-B, Sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution.

In his answer, Villapando invoked Opinion No. 106, s. 1992, of the Department of Justice dated
August 21, 1992, stating that the appointment of a defeated candidate within one year from the
election as a consultant does not constitute an appointment to a government office or position as
prohibited by the Constitution.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found respondent guilty and imposed on him the penalty of
dismissal from service. The Office of the President affirmed the decision. Vice-mayor Pablico
took his oath as municipal mayor in place of Villapando.

The Court of Appeals declared the decisions of the SP and OP void, and ordered Pablico to
vacate the office.

Issue:

May local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President validly impose the penalty of
dismissal from service on erring elective local officials?

Held:

Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:

Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. An elective local official may be disciplined,
suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:
x x x x x x
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order
of the proper court.
It is clear from the last paragraph of the aforecited provision that the penalty of dismissal from
service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a court of law. Thus, in
Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al., we held that [t]he Office of the President is without any
power to remove elected officials, since such power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as
expressly provided for in the last paragraph of the aforequoted Section 60.

Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code, however, adds that (b) An elective local official may be removed from office on the
grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article [The grounds enumerated in Section 60,
Local Government Code of 1991] by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority
whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other. The disciplining authority
referred to pertains to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of the
President.

As held in Salalima, this grant to the disciplining authority of the power to remove elective
local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules
and Regulations. No rule or regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, such
as the Local Government Code. Implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law that
they implement, for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute
is a nullity. (Pablico vs. Villapando, G.R. No. 147870. July 31, 2002)

HON. TOMAS JOSON III VS CA [G.R. No. 160652, February 13, 2006] FACTS:
8 members of the SP filed an administrative case against Mayor Vargas, alleging that the latter
submitted to the provincial budget officer 2 falsified documents, appropriation No. 1 & Resolution No.
2. Mayor Vargas countered a complaint for annulment of falsified minutes of session & appropriation
ordinance w/damages against the SB members in the RTC. Then, Mayor Vargas also filed w/ the SP a
motion to suspend proceedings due to a prejudicial question of the case he filed in the RTC. W/O
resolving the motion the SP issued an order recommending to the Gov., that Mayor Vargas be
preventively suspended. Later, the SP eventually denied the motion to suspend filed by Mayor Vargas.
The latter appealed his denied motion to the Office of the President. However, Gov. Joson issued an
order putting him under preventive suspension. The Office of the President reversed and lifted the
order of preventive suspension. Unsatisfied, Gov. Joson filed an MR to the Office of the President, the
latter granted the Gov.s MR, thus the order of preventive suspension was reinstated.

ISSUE: WON the preventive suspension is proper. (NECESSITY OF THE SUSPENSION ORDER)

RULING: Under Section 63 of the Local Government Code, preventive suspension may be imposed (a)
after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the
offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. Issues are
considered joined when the complaint has been answered and there are no longer any substantial
preliminary issues that remain to be threshed out. In its Order dated 22 April 2003, the Office of the
President stated that the facts of the case do not warrant a conclusion that issues are deemed joined.
Furthermore, the Office of the President found no basis for the issuance of the preventive suspension.
The Office of the President explained: In the administrative case, it appears that petitioner did not file,
so far, an answer to the complaint thus the issues could not have been considered joined. What she
did was to file a Motion To Suspend Proceedings And/Or Motion To Dismiss which was treated by the
sanggunian as her answer. However, nothing in the records can be inferred that the petitioner intended
the said motion to be her answer. In fact, when the motion was denied on March 17, 2003 through SP
Resolution No. 105-s-2003, she immediately appealed the said Resolution to this Office. In fine, no
inference can be had that the motion filed was considered her answer otherwise, petitioner could have
stated so therein. Finally, even assuming that petitioners motion was already her answer and
therefore, the issues have been joined, it is observed that the grounds cited by the sanggunian in
recommending the assailed preventive suspension are general statements mere verbatim
reproduction of the provision of law, unsupported by any factual and substantial evidence. There is no
showing that the evidence of guilt is strong, with both parties charging each other with falsification of
documents. In fact, that is the subject of Civil Case No. 4442. Moreover, it cannot be said that the
continuance in office of respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence. The recitals in SP Resolution No. 105 s. 2003 are
unconvincing. xxx...xxx...xxx... It would thus appear that the grounds cited by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for recommending the preventive suspension of Mayor Vargas were just general
statements unsupported by any evidence. This is contrary to the requisites for a preventive suspension
which require that evidence of guilt must be strong and that given the gravity of the offense, there is
great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose
a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. The haste in issuing the
resolution recommending the preventive suspension of Mayor Vargas is unreasonable considering the
gravity of the effects of such suspension. Suspension from office of an elective official would deprive
the electorate of the services of the person they have voted into office. As held in Ganzon v. Court of
Appeals: The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions x x x because it is out
of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have
held, is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause (sic) of the investigation with
his influence and authority over possible witnesses" or to keep him off "the records and other
evidence." It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an
erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it cannot exceed sixty days, which is to say that
it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say
that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.

Malinao vs Reyes
Posted on October 3, 2012

VIRGINIA MALINAO vs. HON. LUISITO REYES, in his capacity as Governor of the
Province of Marinduque, SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF MARINDUQUE and
WILFREDO RED, in his capacity as Mayor of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque
G.R. No. 117618
March 29, 1996

FACTS:
Malinao filed an administrative case against Mayor Red for abuse of authority and denial of due
process with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque. On August 12, 1994, members of
the Sanggunian, by a vote of 5 to 3, found Red guilty, vote signed only by presiding chairman.
On September 5, the Sanggunian, voting 7 to 2, acquitted Red of the charges against him. This
vote was embodied in a Decision which was signed by all the members. Malinao argued that the
First Sanggunian decision had already become final and executory for failure of Red to appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the second Decision is valid.

HELD:
Yes, the second decision of acquittal is valid. In any case, this issue is already moot and
academic as a result of the expiration of Reds term during which the act complained of was
allegedly committed, and further proceedings are barred by his reelection. [Sec 66(b) LGC].
Reelection abates any administrative disciplinary proceedings against the local elective official.
[Under Sec. 66 (b) of the LGC, the penalty of suspension cannot exceed the unexpired term of
the official and any administrative disciplinary proceeding against said official is abated if in the
meantime he is re-elected because such re-election is a condonation of whatever misconduct he
might have committed during his previous term. In order to render a decision in an
administrative case involving elected local officials, the decision of the Sanggunian must be in
writing, stating clearly the facts and the reasons for such a decision.
MALINAO VS REYES [255 SCRA 616] Reelection abates any administrative disciplinary proceedings
against the local elective official. Petitioners basic contention is that inasmuch as the Decision of
September 5, 1994 had become final and executory, for failure of respondent Mayor to appeal, it was
beyond the power of the Sanggunian to render another decision on October 21, 1994 which in effect
reversed the first decision. These contentions are without merit. What petitioner claims to be the
September 5, 1994 Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan bore the signature of only one
member (Rodrigo V. Sotto) who signed the Decision as Presiding Chairman, Blue Ribbon Committee,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Neither may the so-called Decision prepared by Sanggunian Member
Rodrigo V. Sotto on September 5, 1994 be regarded as the decision of the Sanggunian for lack of the
signatures of the requisite majority. At all events, this case is now moot and academic as a result of the
expiration of respondents term during which the act complained of was allegedly committed, and
further proceedings against respondent Mayor are barred by his reelection on May 8, 1995. Pursuant to
66(b) of the Code, the penalty of suspension cannot exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or
a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense. On the other hand, any administrative
disciplinary proceeding against respondent is abated if in the meantime he is reelected, because his
reelection results in a condonation of whatever misconduct he might have committed during his
previous term.

SALALIMA VS GUINGONA [257 SCRA 55] The liabilities of the Sanggunian members who were
reelected are condoned without prejudice to appropriate civil or criminal cases. Section 66(b) of R.A.
No. 7160 expressly provides: SEC. 66. Form and Notice of Decision. - x x x (b) The penalty of
suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for
every administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so
suspended as long as he meets the qualifications for the office. This provision sets the limits to the
penalty of suspension, viz., it should not exceed six months or the unexpired portion of the term of
office of the respondent for every administrative offense.[1] An administrative offense means every act
or conduct or omission which amounts to, or constitutes, any of the grounds for disciplinary action.
Assuming then that the findings and conclusions of the Office of the President in each of the subject
four administrative cases arc correct, it committed no grave abuse of discretion in imposing the
penalty of suspension, although the aggregate thereof exceeded six months and the unexpired portion
of the petitioners term of office. The fact remains that the suspension imposed for each administrative
offense did not exceed six months and there was an express provision that the successive service of
the suspension should not exceed the unexpired portion of the term of office of the petitioners. Their
term of office expired at noon of 30 June 1995.[2] And this Court is not prepared to rule that the
suspension amounted to the petitioners removal from office.*3+ The petitioners cannot be
administratively liable. This is so because public officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term. The Court should never remove a public
officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people
of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed
that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregard or forgave his faults
or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or
misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people. So are the liabilities, if any, of petitioner
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Albay, who signed Resolution No. 129 authorizing
petitioner Salalima to enter into the retainer contract in question and who were reelected in the 1992
elections. This is, however, without prejudice to the institution of appropriate civil and criminal cases
as may be warranted by the attendant circumstances.

SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF DON MARIANO MARCOS V. MARTINEZ [G.R. No. 170626, March 3,
2008] FACTS: Petitioner Sangguniang Barangay is the legislative body of Barangay Don Mariano
Marcos, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, a local government unit created, organized and existing as such
under pertinent laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Martinez is the incumbent Punong
Barangay of the said local government unit. On November 2004, Martinez was administratively
charged with Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by petitioner through the filing of a verified
complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan as the disciplining authority over elective barangay officials
pursuant to Section 61 of Rep. Act No. 7160. Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Bayan an Amended
Administrative Complaint against Martinez on 6 December 2004 for Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office
and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision
which imposed upon Martinez the penalty of removal from office. The trial court issued an Order
declaring the Decision of the Sangguniang Bayan and the Memorandum of Mayor Bagasao void. It
maintained that the proper courts, and not the petitioner, are empowered to remove an elective local
official from office, in accordance with Section 60 of the Local Government Code. After MR, appeal by
Certiorari straight to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez, an elective local official, from
office.

HELD: The pertinent legal provisions and cases decided by this Court firmly establish that the
Sangguniang Bayan is not empowered to do so. Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred
upon the courts the power to remove elective local officials from office: Section 60.Grounds for
Disciplinary Actions. An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office
on any of the following grounds: xxx xxx xxx An elective local official may be removed from office on
the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court. In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., the Court en
banc categorically ruled that the Office of the President is without any power to remove elected
officials, since the power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last
paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Petitioner contends that administrative cases
involving elective barangay officials may be filed with, heard and decided by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, which can, thereafter, impose a penalty of removal from
office. It further claims that the courts are merely tasked with issuing the order of removal, after the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan finds that a penalty of removal is warranted. But, the
rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official from office is
intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the disciplining authority.
Vesting the local legislative body with the power to decide whether or not a local chief executive may
be removed from office, and only relegating to the courts a mandatory duty to implement the decision,
would still not free the resolution of the case from the capriciousness or partisanship of the disciplining
authority. Moreover, such an arrangement clearly demotes the courts to nothing more than an
implementing arm of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang Bayan. This would be an
unmistakable breach of the doctrine on separation of powers, thus placing the courts under the orders
of the legislative bodies of local governments. The courts would be stripped of their power of review,
and their discretion in imposing the extreme penalty of removal from office is thus left to be exercised
by political factions which stand to benefit from the removal from office of the local elective official
concerned, the very evil which Congress sought to avoid when it enacted Section 60 of the Local
Government Code. Congress clearly meant that the removal of an elective local official be done only
after a trial before the appropriate court, where court rules of procedure and evidence can ensure
impartiality and fairness and protect against political maneuverings. Elevating the removal of an
elective local official from office from an administrative case to a court case may be justified by the
fact that such removal not only punishes the official concerned but also, in effect, deprives the
electorate of the services of the official for whom they voted. The most extreme penalty that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective barangay official is
suspension; if it deems that the removal of the official from service is warranted, then it can resolve
that the proper charges be filed in court.

MALONZO VS ZAMORA [323 SCRA 875] The law does not require the completion of the updating or
adoption of the internal rules of procedures before the Sanggunian could act on any other matter like
the enactment of an ordinance; There is nothing in the law, which prohibits that the 3 readings of a
proposed ordinance be held in just one session day.

DE LOS REYES VS SANDIGANBAYAN [281 SCRA 631] The approval of an ordinance where the LCE
affixes his signature is not a purely ministerial act. He in fact has veto power. In an effort to exonerate
himself from the charge, petitioner argues that the deliberations undertaken and the consequent
passage of Resolution No. 57-S-92 are legislative in nature. He adds that as local chief executive, he
has neither the official custody of nor the duty to prepare said resolution; hence, he could not have
taken advantage of his official position in committing the crime of falsification as defined and punished
under Article 171 6 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner would like to impress upon this Court that the
final step in the approval of an ordinance or resolution, where the local chief executive affixes his
signature, is purely a ministerial act. This view is erroneous. Article 109(b) of the Local Government
Code outlines the veto power of the Local Chief Executive which provides: Art. 109 (b). The local chief
executive, except the punong barangay shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an
appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or resolution adopting a local development plan and public
investment program or an ordinance directing the payment of money or creating liability. . . . . Contrary
to petitioner's belief, the grant of the veto power confers authority beyond the simple mechanical act
of signing an ordinance or resolution, as a requisite to its enforceability. Such power accords the local
chief executive the discretion to sustain a resolution or ordinance in the first instance or to veto it and
return it with his objections to the Sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same. The
Sanggunian concerned, however, may override the veto by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members
thereby making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes. It is clear,
therefore, that the concurrence of a local chief executive in the enactment of an ordinance or
resolution requires, not only a flourish of the pen, but the application of judgment after meticulous
analysis and intelligence as well. The minutes of the session reveal that petitioner attended the
session of the Sangguniang Bayan on July 27, 1992. It is evident, therefore, that petitioner approved
the subject resolution knowing fully well that "the subject matter treated therein was neither taken up
and discussed nor passed upon by the Sangguniang Bayan during the legislative session." The
Sandiganbayan is directed to set the criminal case for arraignment and trial.

PUBLIC CORPORATION / PUBLIC OFFICERS

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS; SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN; MAJORITY OF ALL

THE MEMBERS REQUIRED TO CONSTITUTE QUORUM

MANUEL ZAMORA VS. GOV. JOSE CABALLERO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 147767. January 14, 2002

Facts: Manuel Zamora, a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of

Compostela Valley, filed before the RTC a petition to invalidate all acts
executed and resolutions issued by the Sanggunian during its sessions held
on February 8 and 26, 2001 for lack of quorum. Said sessions noted the
resignation letter of Board Member Sotto, declared the entire province under
a state of calamity and approved the Governor to enter into the contract with
the Allado Company. Zamora, the petitioner, argued that the Sanggunian,
during its February 26 session, conducted official business without a quorum
since only 7 out of the 14 members were present. He further questioned the
February 8 sessions validity arguing that only 7 members were present and
the failure to provide written notice to all members at least 24 hours before
the holding of the special session. Respondents argued that Board Member
Sotto was in the United States during such sessions and that the actual
number of Board Members in the country was only 13 which, they claimed,
should be the basis for the determination of a quorum. Such petition raised
by Zamora was dismissed by the RTC but reversed and granted by the
Supreme Court.

Issues: 1) Whether or not Section 53 (a) of the LGC provides and specifies
applicable rule regarding the determination of a quorum.

2) Whether or not Sanggunian Members who are abroad should not be

included in the counting of the entire Sangguniang body.

3) Whether or not the approved decisions during the sessions, alleged to be

without quorum, is deemed to be valid.

Held: Section 53 (a) of the LGC states that : A majority of all members of the
Sanggunian who have been elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum
to transact official business. Quorum is defined as the number of members
of a body which, when legally assembled, will enable the body to transact its
proper business or that number which makes a lawful body and gives it
power to pass upon a law or ordinance or do any valid act. When required to
constitute a quorum, majority means the number greater than half or more
than half of the total.
As further stated, it requires the majority of ALL members of the Sanggunian.
Quorum should, thus, be based on the total number of members regardless
of whether or not a member is said to be abroad.
Therefore, in cases where decisions have been made during sessions
deemed to have not met the required quorum, such sessions and decisions
shall be considered void.

Social Justice Society v. Atienza

May 23, 2016

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS ) et al. vs.

HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila

G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007

Facts

Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila reclassified the area
from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed to
cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of
the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals
of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation.

However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum
of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that the scaling down of
the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option. In the MOU, the oil
companies were required to remove 28 tanks starting with the LPG spheres and to commence
work for the creation of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. In
exchange, the City Mayor and the DOE will enable the oil companies to continuously operate
within the limited area resulting from joint operations and the scale down program. The
Sangguniang Panlungosod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.

Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.

Issue
Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
removal of the Pandacan Terminals.

Ruling

Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because the Local
Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the governance of the city. One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the
chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not
been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his
ministerial duty to do so.

In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the
ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It might seriously hinder the
transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not
judicially been declared unconstitutional.

PART IX DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS AGUINALDO DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO AN APPOINTED

OFFICIAL WHO COMMITTED MISCONDUCT WHILE IN HIS APPOINTIVE OFFICE AND WHO WAS LATER ON
ELECTED INTO OFFICE (because it should be REELECTION) Aguinaldo doctrine applies only to
administrative case for misconduct, so the official may still be held criminally or civilly liable for the
same act. AGUINALDO VS SANTOS [212 SCRA 768] An administrative, not criminal, case for
disloyalty to the Republic only requires substantial evidence. The rule is that a public official cannot be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his reelection to office
operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefore. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending
petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup. Petitioner is not being prosecuted
here criminally under Art. 137 of the RPC on disloyalty but administratively with the end in view of
removing him from office for acts of disloyalty to the Republic where the quantum of proof required is
only substantial evidence and not proof beyond reasonable doubt.

PABLICO VS VILLAPANDO [G.R. No. 147870, July 31, 2002] The power to remove erring elective local
officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Art. 124(b) of the IRR of the LGC,
insofar as it vests power on the disciplining authority to remove from office erring elective local
officials, is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Sec. 60 of the LGC. The pertinent portion
of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides: Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary
Actions. An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the
following grounds: x x x x x x x x x An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds
enumerated above by order of the proper court. It is clear from the last paragraph of the aforecited
provision that the penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may be
decreed only by a court of law. Thus, in Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al., we held that *t+he Office
of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since such power is exclusively
vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of the aforequoted Section
60. Verily, the clear legislative intent to make the subject power of removal a judicial prerogative is
patent from the deliberations in the Senate. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove
erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (b),
Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, insofar as it vests
power on the disciplining authority to remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for
being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The law on
suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the
authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good
faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through
the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice
or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to
suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping
the power to remove.

GAMBOA VS AGUIRRE [310 SCRA 867] A vice-governor who is concurrently an acting governor is
actually a quasi-governor. For the purpose of exercising his legislative prerogatives and powers, he is
deemed a non member of the SP for the time being. A Vice-Governor who is concurrently an Acting
Governor is actually a quasi-Governor. This means, that for purposes of exercising his legislative
prerogatives and powers, he is deemed as a non-member of the SP for the time being.
Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the duties of
the latter office, since the nature of the duties of the provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to
discharge them. 19 Such is not only consistent with but also appears to be the clear rationale of the
new Code wherein the policy of performing dual functions in both offices has already been abandoned.
To repeat, the creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a corresponding
temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of
such temporary vacancy. This event constitutes an "inability" on the part of the regular presiding
officer (Vice Governor) to preside during the SP sessions, which thus calls for the operation of the
remedy set in Article 49(b) of the Local Government Code concerning the election of a temporary
presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting Governor's (Vice Governor) powers as presiding officer of
the SP is suspended so long as he is in such capacity. Under Section 49(b), "(i)n the event of the
inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at the sanggunian session, the members present and
constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer."

Navarro and Tamayo vs CA [GR 141307; March 28, 2001]

Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011

(Local Government, Permanent vacancies in the Sanggunian, Section 45 (b) of the Local
Government Code)

Facts: With the death of the Mayor Calimlim, a vacancy was created in the Office of the Mayor
so by operation of law, he was succeeded by Aquino the then Vice-Mayor. Petitioner Tamayo,
the highest ranking member of the Sangguniang Bayan was elevated to the position of the Vice
Mayor pursuant to the same law.

Since vacancy occurred in the Sangguniang Bayan by the elevation of the petitioner, Governor
Agbayani appointed herein petitioner Navarro as Member of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Aquino belonged to the political party Lakas NUCD-KAMPI, while both Navarro and Tamayo
belonged to REFORMA-LM political party.

Private respondents seek to nullify the appointment of petitioner Navarro arguing that it was the
former vice-mayor, succeeding to the position of the mayor, who created the permament vacancy
in the Sanggunian Bayan because under the law he was also a member of the Sanggunian. Thus,
the appointee must come from said former vice-mayors political party.

Petitioners, on the other hand, contended that it was the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who was
the highest ranking member of the Sanggunian Bayan, to the office of the Vice-Mayor which
resulted in a permanent vacancy. The person to be appointed to the position vacated by him
should come from the same political party affiliation as that of petitioner Tamayo.

However, the CA concluded that it was the appointment of the 8th councilor, to the number 7
position which created the last vacancy; therefore, the person to be appointed to the vacant
position should come from the same political party to which the latter belonged, which was
Lakas-NUCD KAMPI.

Issue: WON the elevation of the highest ranking member of the Sanggunian to the position of
vice-mayor created the last vacancy in the Sanggunian Bayan.

Held: Yes. Under Sec 44 of the LGC, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective official fills a
higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his
office.

Sec 45 (b) of the same law provides that only the nominee of the political party under which
the Sanggunian member concerned has been elected and whose elevation to the position next
higher in rank created the last vacancy in the Sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner herein
provided. The appointee shall come from the political party as that of the Sanggunian member
who caused the vacancy

The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a
permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by
the people in the election.

With the elevation of the petitioner, who belonged to REFORMA-LM, to the position of vice-
mayor, a vacancy occurred in the Sanggunian that whould be filled up with someone who should
belong to the political party of petitioner Tamayo. Otherwise, REFORMA-LMs representation
would be diminished.

Bunye vs Escareal
Posted on October 1, 2012

R No. 110216

September 10, 1993

Facts:
The above-named accused, all public officers of the Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila,
were charged of enacting Kapasiyahan Bilang 45 in order to allegedly take possession and take
over its operation and management of the New Public Market in Alabang, Muntinlupa starting
August 19, 1988 despite the valid and subsisting lease contract for a term o0f 25 years between
the Municipality of Muntinlupa and the Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod and Mga Magtitinda ng
Bagong Pamilihan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (Kilusang Magtitinda). COA Chairman Domingo and
MMC Governor Cruz also warned that appropriate legal steps be taken by the MMC toward the
rescission of the contractto protect the interests of the Government, and to evaluate
thoroughly and study further the case to preclude possible damages of financial liabilities which
the Court may adjudge against that municipality as an offshoot of the case.

The forcible take-over allegedly caused undue injury to the aforesaid Cooperative members, and
gave the Municipal Government, and in effect, the herein accused, unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of their official functions.

On the motion of the Public Prosecutor, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution suspending them
pendent lite from public office pursuant to Sec.13 of RA 3019.

Petitioners Municipal Mayor, Vice Mayor and Councilors question the resolution suspending
them from office for 90 days pending their trial for violation of Sec.3(3) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.

Issue:

WON the preventive suspension is unjustified or unnecessary and its implementation will sow
havoc and confusion in the government of the Municipality of Muntinlupa, to the shattering of
the peace and order thereat?

Held:

Sec.13 of RA No. 3019 as amended, provides that the accused public officials shall be
suspended from office while the criminal prosecution is pending in court.

In Gonzaga vs Sandiganbayan, 201 SCRA 417, 422, 426, the SC ruled that such preventive
suspension is mandatory. Preventive suspension n is not a penalty. In fact, suspension under
Sec.13 of RA 3019 is mandatory once the validity of the information is determined (People vs
CA, 135 SCRA 372).

The Sandiganbayan clearly did not abuse its discretion when it ordered the preventive suspension
of the petitioners.
The Solicitor General correctly replied that it is not for the petitioners to say that their admissions
are all the evidence that the prosecution will need to hold up its case against them. The
prosecution must be given the opportunity to gather and prepare the facts for trial under
conditions which would ensure non-intervention and non-interference for 90 straight days from
petitioners camp (p.13, Solicitor Generals comment).

The petitioners fear that the municipal government of Muntinlupa will be paralyzed for 90 days
when they are preventively suspended is remote. There will still remain 8 councilors who can
meet as the Sangguniang Bayan. The President or his alter ego, the Secretary of the Interior
Local Government, will surely know how to deal with the problem of filling up the temporarily
vacant positions of Mayor, Vice Mayor, and 6 councilors in accordance with the provisions of the
LGC, RA 7160 (Samad vs COMELEC, et al., GR No. 107854; Samad vs Executive Secretary, et
al., GR No. 108642, July 16, 1993).

. Diu v. CA 251 SCRA 472 Facts : Patricia Pagba owed spouses Diu a debt
worth P7,862.55 incurred in 1988. The spouses Diu brought the matter to the
barangay chairman for resolution; however Pagba twice failed to appear. The
barangay chairman thus gave the go signal for Dius to file their case with
the MTC.
The MTC ruled in favor of Pagba. The RTC reversed deciding the case on the
merits. The CA however ruled once more for Pagba agreeing with the latter
that there was no substantial compliance with the procedure outlined in
Katarungang Barangay Law because of the failure by the barangay chairman
to constitute a pangkat to resolve the parties differences.

Was the CA correct in its contention?

Held : No. Even though there was a failure to constitute a pangkat should the
barangay chairman, by himself fail to resolve the parties differences still is
not denied that the parties met the office of the barangay chairman for
possible settlement. The efforts of the barangay chairman, however proved
futile as no agreement was reached. Although no pangkat was formed, the
SC believes that there was substantial compliance with the law. From the
foregoing facts, it is undeniable that there was substantial compliance with
presidential decree No. 1508 which does not require strict technical
compliance with its procedural requirements. Under the factual antecedents,
it cannot be said that the failure of the parties to appear before the pangkat
caused any prejudice to the case for private respondents considering that
they already refused conciliation before the barangay chairman. To indulge
the Pagbas in their stratagem will not only result in a circuitous procedure
but will necessarily entail undue and further delay injustice. This is inevitable
if this court should dismiss the complaint and require the parties to meet
before the pangkat, only to bring the case all over again through the
hierarchy of courts and ultimately back to us for decision on the merits.
Obviously, this is the game plan of the Pagbas. For, when the Pagbas
appealed to respondent court, they did not at all assail the propriety or
correctness of judgment of the RTC holding them liable to petitioners for the
sum of money involved. Such primary substantive issue, therefore, has been
laid to rest, but private respondents would wish to keep the case alive merely
on a conjured procedural issue invoking their supposed right to confrontation
before the pangkat.

EMMANUEL PELAEZ vs. AUDITOR GENERAL [G.R. No. L-23825. December 24, 1965] FACTS: From
September 4 to October 29, 1964, the President of the Philippines issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to
121, 124 and 126 to 129. These orders created thirty-three (33) municipalities pursuant to Section 68
of the Revised Administrative Code, insofar as it grants the President the power to create
municipalities. Thereafter, Vice-President Pelaez instituted a special civil action for a writ of prohibition
with preliminary injunction to stop the Auditor General from disbursing funds to said municipalities,
alleging that the executive orders are null and void on the ground that said Section 68 has been
impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 or the Barrio Charter Act. Since January 1, 1960, when
Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios can no longer be created or their boundaries altered
nor their names changed except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board upon
petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and the recommendation of the council of the
municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated. It is argued that since the
creation of barrios is a legislative act, the creation of municipalities must also require a legislative
enactment. The Executive Orders are, likewise, challenged for they constitute an undue delegation of
legislative power. The Auditor General argues that the present action is premature and that not all
proper parties, referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in question, have been
impleaded. ISSUES:
1. Is the President empowered to create a municipality?
2. Is Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code an undue delegation of legislative power?

RULING: RA 2370, being a statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio, it also
implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several
barrios. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.
With respect to the issue on undue delegation of powers by the legislature, the Supreme Court held
that although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of
the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself. In other words, it must
set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. And the law
must (b) fix a standard. The limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In the case at bar, Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of
the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried
PUBLIC CORPORATION CASE DIGESTS || USC LAW BATCH 2013 Page | 3
out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the
evil effects above referred to. Since the creation of municipalities is not an administrative
function, it is essentially and eminently legislative in character. The question whether or not
public interest demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. It is purely a legislative question.
The President cannot invoke its power of control or the right to interfere on the acts of the officers of
the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of
such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments
are concerned. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or
its officers act within the scope of their authority. What he has is a mere power of supervision over the
local government units. As a consequence, the alleged power of the President to create municipal
corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of
control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. Clearly, therefore, the
Executive Orders promulgated by him creating municipalities are ultra vires and therefore, void.
 MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, CITY OF PASIG, respondent
G.R. No. 128663. September 10, 1999

Facts:

On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be
segregated from its mother Barangays and converted into a separate one, the City Council of
Pasig passed and approved an ordinance, creating Barangay Karangalan scheduling the plebiscite
on the creation of said barangay on June 22, 1996. Upon learning of the ordinance, the
Municipality of Cainta filed a petition on June 19, 1996 to the Commission on Elections to
suspend or cancel the scheduled plebiscite. According to the Municipality of Cainta, the
proposed barangay involve areas included in the pending case before the RTC Antipolo Rizal, Br.
74 for settlement of boundary dispute, hence the plebiscite should be suspended or cancelled
until after the said case shall have been finally decided by the court.

Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued another ordinance,
creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997.
Again the Municipality of Cainta filed another petition on March 12, 1997 to suspend or cancel
the plebiscite on the same ground as for the proposed creation of Barangay Karangalan.

The COMELEC ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in
abeyance until the boundary dispute is settled because it presents a prejudicial question which
must first be decided. The City of Pasig filed the petition (G.R. No. 125646) to the Supreme
Court, arguing that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil and
criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case.

In the case of Barangay Napico, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for being moot because
the plebiscite was already held and the creation ratified and approved by the residents. Hence,
the Municipality of Cainta filed a petition (G.R. No. 128663) to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and
Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the
two local governments.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that the pending civil case on boundary dispute presents a prejudicial
question which must first be decided before the creation of the proposed barangays. While the
City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil and
criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case, still
in the interest of good order, the Court can suspend action on one case pending the final outcome
of another case closely interrelated or linked to the first.

The decision on whose territorial jurisdiction the areas fall has material bearing to the creation of
the proposed Barangays. A requisite for the creation of a barangay is properly identified
territorial jurisdiction for these define the limits of the exercise of the governmental powers of
the LGU. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires (beyond the legal capacity). Moreover,
considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more prudent to hold in
abeyance the conduct of the same until the resolution of the boundary dispute.

In the case of Barangay Napico, the Court does not agree that the petition of the Municipality of
Cainta has been rendered moot and academic because the plebiscite was already held. The issues
raised are still pending and must first be resolved.
Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in
abeyance; and the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 ratifying the creation of Barangay Napico
should be annulled and set aside, and any plebiscite thereto is hold in abeyance pending final
resolution of the boundary dispute.