Trends
2017
Mixed Messages
and Signs of Hope from
Central & Eastern Europe
www.globsec.org
Countries surveyed
Mixed Messages
and Signs of Hope from
Central & Eastern Europe
Methodology
4
Contents
6 Foreword
NATO allies:
16 Will CEE come to help?
30 Credits
Central and Eastern Europe This region has seen it all. Under
increasingly matters and what people communism we have suffered poverty,
think matters too. Before 1989, the deprivation, suppressive governments.
notion of Central Europe, situated This has given us bitter memories,
geographically in the center culturally but also wisdom. We are able to see
in the West and politically in the East, the true worth of the European and
became a kind of a metaphor of Transatlantic project. People of Central
resistance against sovietization. Thus, and Eastern Europe want to be part
for intellectuals such as Milan Kundera, of the EU and NATO and there is no
Vclav Havel, Gyrgy Konrd, Leszek appetite for exit la Brittanique. And
Koakowski, the region was defined here is the second piece of good
by values rather than by geography. news: having lived through the Soviet
As Vaclav Havel indicated in the domination, citizens believe in liberal
Polish Parliament in 1990, we have democracy.
an opportunity to transform Central
This is the main positive message of
Europe from what has been a mainly
the current edition of the GLOBSEC
historical and spiritual phenomenon
Trends. What we see is not always
into a political phenomenon. () We
cheerful or comforting. Some people
can offer the inspiration to consider
are confused because of disinformation
swift and daring solutions.
or conspiracy theories. As elsewhere
Over the last two decades, Central in the world social media has
and Eastern Europe has been evolving emerged as an important means of
in the West European image: from mass communication and this poses
a terra obscura to the successful many challenges. There is a troubling
EU presidencies; from catching- common perception that countries can
up with Europe to acting as one of happily straddle the fence between
its architects; geography no longer the East and the West without taking a
determines our destiny, is not a burden geopolitical stance.
or a curse for the region; from being
What is the lesson to be learned here
an object of history to becoming its
for politicians?
subject; we are no longer content to
simply be members of the Euro-Atlantic First, Central Europe is still a distinctive
community; we increasingly want to entity. John Donnes memorable phrase
shape it. People of the region are fully- No man is an island entire of itself
fledged citizens of Europe. rings more true than ever.
6
We are in the same boat as a region The Czech Republic wants to be in the
geopolitically, economically, militarily. slower lane of EU integration. Polish
After 1989 we have had the same people are traditionally some of the
strategic goals in our foreign policies. most pro-EU citizens. These differences
We are mindful of the lessons history can make us stronger at a European
has taught us in the 20th century: level.
as countries of the region we gain Third, people have a right to demand
independence together, we lose it leadership from politicians, and full
together only to regain it once again disclosure of what it means to be
together. Todays circumstances are NATO or EU member. Citizens need to
not as dramatic as in the past, but feel that their views matter and their
the lesson still holds true: we may be governments can make their voices
strong together or fade into oblivion heard at the international level. We
individually. must not be a passive and reactive
Europe aspires to be united, and we observer of the current developments.
are struggling to make this a reality. Societal trends are crucial in predicting
But, still, by virtue of its bumpy history
long-term political landscapes as
and tradition, Europe has a strong
people elect governments not the other
regional distinction that must not be
way round. The GLOBSEC Trends 2017
discounted. No-one wishes to indulge
provides a rare opportunity to look
in any kind of social engineering, in
into the minds of Central and Eastern
an effort to create an artificial homo
Europeans, and politicians would be
Europaeus, an ahistorical and utopian
wise to pay attention.
figure. We believe that we are stronger
because of our differences, be it
cultural, linguistic or religious. These
domains should forever remain in the
purview of the nation state.
Second, Central and Eastern Europe
is not uniform in its policies, decisions,
choices. We need to translate
differences into strengths. Times of
Soviet Union-imposed standards are
long gone. We are free to differ in our
opinions. Slovakia is in the eurozone.
01
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia
favour a neutral position between West and
East despite being members of both the EU
and NATO.
02
People vs. politicians: in contrast to the
Eurosceptic political rhetoric coming from
some parts of the Central and Eastern
Europe, public support for the EU remains
very high across the region.
03
NATO membership is valued as a security
guarantee in the region, but support for
hosting NATO facilities is lukewarm in 4 out
of 7 countries.
8
04
Bedrock liberal democracy: in 6 out of
7 countries the majority prefers liberal
democracy over a strong autocratic leader.
05
What are media hiding from Poles and
Croats? Two thirds of Poles and Croats do
not believe media provide a true picture of
reality.
06
10 million people in CEE trust fake news
and disinformation websites.
07
Young people are much more prone to trust fake
news than any other age group.
10
Part of the Somewhere Part of the
West in between East
Higher standard of living and Preserve neutrality and sovereignty Historical and cultural links
prosperity
Have the best of both worlds Identity and Slavic heritage
Economic growth
Geographical location West seen as arrogant and
European identity, sense of not treating people of CEE
belonging to the West Complicated history of the region countries as equals
29%
26%
22%
16%
15%
In contrast to the Eurosceptic political
rhetoric coming from some parts of
11%
the CEE region, public support for
the EU remains very high in almost
all countries. A clear majority of the
population views membership of
the EU positively and would vote to 15%
remain in the EU in a referendum.
The only exception is the Czech 10%
Republic, which turned out to be the
biggest Eurosceptic country of the
positive attitude towards the EU. It is
group in all aspects. As such, it is the
clear despite some scepticism (fuelled
only country where less than half of
also by local politicians) that people 14%
the population would vote to stay in
in the CEE value EU membership
the EU membership if there were a
and, if asked, would overwhelmingly 11%
referendum. Yet, when asked about
support their countrys membership
their perception of EU membership,
of the EU. A similar understanding
more people support it than oppose it.
applies to the negative attitudes. As
the percentage of people who think
13%
We are staying! of the EU as neither good nor bad for
their country are relatively high (on
If a referendum on EU membership average 25%), they are distributed
12%
had been held in spring 2017, when the among both camps of those who would
survey was conducted, all countries in vote to stay and those who would leave
the CEE region probably would have the EU. Consequently, in all countries,
remained. In all seven countries, the except Romania, the percentage of 7%
willingness to stay in the European respondents who would vote to leave
Union was proportionally higher than exceed the percentage of those 7%
the percentage expressing a genuinely dissatisfied with EU membership.
12
Biggest Eurosceptics
in the CEE still live
in the Czech Republic
Stay in the EU
EU is a good thing
41%
Czech
35% Republic
70%
Croatia
52%
59%
Slovakia
52%
72%
Bulgaria
61%
79%
Hungary
61%
80%
Poland
78%
80%
Romania
70%
CEE people cherish understand and value the security NATO, the issue of new NATO facilities
guaranteev provided by NATO. As is contentious. In the Czech Republic
NATO security such, NATO membership is perceived and Slovakia, the majority would reject
guarantee to be important for security and safety it while in Bulgaria and Hungary (which
by more than half of the population in already hosts a NATO airbase), the
The perception of NATO in the 7 CEE all the surveyed countries. camp of supporters of installations has
countries varies considerably and a very small lead over the opponents.
also reflects the broader geopolitical The reasons for such antipathy are
affiliation of the population in the
No NATO boots
different in each country. In some,
surveyed countries. Some results on the ground the negative perception stems from
correspond to the views of the the heritage of Soviet occupation
population of the given country towards However, when it comes to the NATO and thus the presence of any foreign
the US (anti-Americanism) while presence and installations in a given troops is seen negatively. In others, it
others reflect 20th century history or country, only a majority in Poland, is the outcome of concerted efforts by
their economic, cultural and religious Romania and Croatia would support domestic and external actors to use
proximity to Russia. Regardless of their hosting such NATO installations NATO facilities to campaign against
perspective on other aspects of NATO on their soil. Even in countries that NATO as such.
membership, people in the region otherwise have strong support for
14
On average 76.7% of people in
CEE consider NATO important for
their safety
91%
87%
81% 81%
75%
66%
56%
Rather or
completely
agree that the
Czech Republic
membership in
NATO is important
Romania
Hungary
Bulgaria
Slovakia
for their safety
Croatia
Poland
Rather or
completely
disagree that
country should
have for more
NATO infrastructure 20% 20%
on its soil, such
as command and
training facilities, 29%
logistical centres etc.
41% 42%
54% 54%
Central Europeans as other research carried out on the Slovakia and Bulgaria are, by a great
same subject by the Pew Research margin, the two weakest links in
would honour their Center shows1, such a high level of the NATO chain in the region. Both
Article 5 obligations support could decrease significantly if countries have a similar low level
a theoretical question is replaced with of support for NATO membership
One element CEE countries have a realistic one. In case Russia attacked and almost the same share of their
in common is solidarity with their a neighbouring NATO ally, the average population (1 in 5) that would vote to
NATO allies. Despite all the regional level of support for military action to leave NATO in a referendum. Despite
differences, the people of the CEE defend the ally was only 48%. this, the camp of NATO supporters is
would help their NATO allies in case of still twice as big (54% in BG, 43% in SK).
an attack. With the notable exception of More people see NATO membership
Bulgaria, in all the other countries more positively, although there are huge
than 50% would honour their countrys regional differences; in some countries, 1
2015 Pew Research Center, June 2015, NATO Publics
blame Russia for Ukrainian Crisis, but Reluctant to
pledge and defend a fellow NATO ally the ratio of NATO supporters to Provide Military Aid, http://www.pewresearch.org/
if attacked. More concretely, 9 in 10 opponents is 2:1 (SK), in others it is 20:1 fact-tank/2016/07/06/support-for-nato-is-widespread-
among-member-nations
Poles, 8 in 10 Romanians and Croats, 7 (PL). More people in all countries would
in 10 Czechs and Hungarians, as well as vote to remain in NATO than to leave in
5 in 10 Slovaks and Bulgarians would a referendum, although great regional
defend their NATO allies. However, differences are present as well.
16
Article 5 in practice: Would you
help to defend your NATO allies
in case of an attack?
18
Supporters with some reservations
(Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary)
70% 68%
76%
80% 79%
86%
90%
37%
42% Bulgaria
37%
56% Croatia
35%
60% Romania
30%
61% Czech Republic
26%
65% Poland
26%
71% Hungary
24%
66% Slovakia
20
Should important matters be
decided by elected MPs or
citizens directly?
Members of Parliament Citizens in referendums
Croatia
Czech Republic
72%
Romania
Poland
Slovakia
65%
61%
60%
Hungary
57%
Bulgaria
51%
46%
47%
38%
37% 37%
33%
30%
24%
42 %
of Poles like Beata Szydo
42 %
of Czechs like Bohuslav Sobotka
33 %
of Slovaks like Robert Fico
45%
42% 42%
33%
22
Angela Merkel perceived more Central Europeans do not have much
negatively than Vladimir Putin sympathies for Donald Trump
In 4 out of the 7 countries, the majority of respondents did The new president of the United States does not receive a
not like Angela Merkel. In the Czech Republic, Hungary, lot of sympathy in the CEE. The majority of people in all the
Slovakia and Bulgaria, Angela Merkel was even perceived analysed countries do not like Donald Trump, with Slovakia,
more negatively than Vladimir Putin. Croatia and the Czech Republic leading the group. In fact,
every seventh Slovak and Croat has negative views of Donald
Trump.
Sympathies of respondents
towards foreign leaders
Widespread
distrust of media
Belief that reality is usually
different than what media try
to tell us is held by:
68% of Poles
63% of Croats
57% of Romanians
Almost 10% of people in the CEE trust and provided by mainstream media. are several Czech organisations
online disinformation outlets as relevant Slovakia, at 53%, had the highest trust actively debunking false information.
sources of information on world affairs. in information provided by mainstream
In Romania, 30% of respondents media of all the analysed countries. Bulgaria has the highest percentage
considered disinformation websites to of undecided people. Over 20% of
be a relevant source of information. In the Czech Republic, most respondents do not know whether they
respondents do not believe that are objectively informed by media on
Only in Hungary and Slovakia did mainstream media provide an accurate world affairs or whether certain issues
the majority of people believe that picture of world affairs. This is an are hidden from ordinary people.
all necessary information is available interesting finding considering there
24
Media: distrust
& disinformation
Respondents consider online Respondents who do not believe
disinformation websites as relevant the mainstream media
source of information
68%
63%
57%
49%
45%
40%
31%
36%
12%
9% 9%
5%
4%
1%
2
Internet Live Stats, Internet Users by Country in 2016. More information available at:
www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users-by-country
3
Eurostat, Internet access and use statisticshouseholds and individuals. More information available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Internet_access_and_use_statistics_-_households_and_
individuals
4
2017 Edelman Trust Barometer, www.edelman.com/trust2017
26
75%
Poland
68%
56%
Croatia
63%
but mistrustful
51%
Romania
Interested
57%
49%
Czech
49% Republic
46%
Hungary
45%
34%
Bulgaria
36%
28
01
Brussels and the future of the EU veiled attempt to veer their audiences
coming from Central and Eastern away from support for the trans-Atlantic
Europe, the overall message is positive. security architecture. Interestingly, such
People of this region overwhelmingly attempts mostly target the weakest
want to remain in the EU and a great links in the NATO chain in the region,
We are all majority would vote to remain if a confirming a coordinated and well-
in the same boat referendum on the EU were to be organised operation.
held. There are certain elements of
The main conclusion of the analysis
EU policies and decision-making
06
of the trends and attitudes of people
processes which draw a lot of criticism,
in the CEE region is that despite their
but most people realise there is no
diversity and differences, the great
realistic alternative to EU membership.
majority of people in this region
The challenge is to predict how much
share the same priorities as their EU
counterparts and NATO allies. They
the current mood would change Liberal democracy still
regard both institutional frameworks
after 2020, when most of the EU has its appeal
funds driving public investment and
to be anchors in a stormy sea of There is not much appetite for
development projects dry up.
uncertainty. strongmen or authoritarian rule in the
CEE, yet people in most countries
02 04
feel they are not represented by their
parliamentarians and desire more
direct decision-making over the course
of their countries. On one hand, it is
a positive signal that people want to
History, culture and NATO security shape their future directly and take
economy shape CEE guarantee more responsibility, but on the other hand, it
geopolitical preferences important than ever is a sign of growing unease with
the political establishment. Such
Because of Russias direct involvement
popular sentiments are already
The historical experience of the 20th in Donbas and the raging civil war in
channelled into support for autocratic
century and turbulent relationship Syria, along with ongoing situation with
or un-democratic political parties, using
of the CEE countries with the Great ISIS, the security situation in the CEE
this desire and promising referendum
Powers explain why many people region has changed dramatically. In
democracy with all its dangers and
in the region prefer not to side, at such circumstances, the importance
challenges.
least consciously, with the West but of NATO as a security guarantee and
prefer a middle geopolitical position. safety has increased and people of the
The consequences of 50 years of
communism and military and economic
region clearly realise this.
07
alliance with the Soviet Union continue
to shape peoples attitudes even
after almost 30 years since the fall 05 Erosion of trust affects
of the Iron Curtain. However, when us too
asked specifically, Central and East
Europeans understand the importance External and internal The global trend of erosion of trust
and benefits of EU and NATO, at least forces pushing some in institutions, government, media,
for now. countries out of NATO NGOs and businesses is taking its toll
in this region as well. People do not
At the same time, some CEE countries believe media, but in search of the
30
GLOBSEC Trends 2017 GLOBSEC Policy Institute 2017