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IRAQ 2016 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
Note: This report was updated 3/29/17; see Appendix F: Errata for more
information.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Iraq is a constitutional parliamentary republic. The outcome of the 2014

parliamentary elections generally met international standards of free and fair
elections and led to the peaceful transition of power from former prime minister
Nuri al-Maliki to Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.
Civilian authorities were not always able to maintain effective control of all
security forces which include: the regular armed forces and domestic law
enforcement bodies; the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a state-sponsored
umbrella military organization composed of nearly 60, predominantly Shia
components , which report directly to the prime minister; and the Peshmerga--the
Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Governments (KRG) principal military force. Prime
ministerial decrees on February 22 and July 27, as well as a November 26
parliamentary vote, boycotted by most Sunnis, established prime ministerial
authority over the PMF; however at years end the command and control over the
PMF remained inconsistent and ineffective.
Violence continued to divide the country, largely fueled by Daeshs actions.

Violence occurred throughout the year as government forces fought to liberate
territory lost to Daesh, principally in Arab Sunni and some other minority and
mixed areas. Armed clashes between Daesh and government forces caused
civilian hardship. At years end the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs)
declined to 3.03 million from a peak of 3.4 million in March. The decrease in
IDPs was primarily due to Iraqis returning to their homes after those areas were
liberated from Daesh. The country also accommodated approximately 225,000
Syrian refugees, mostly in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR). Although donor
funding increased, the governments response fell short of rapidly rising
humanitarian demands, and displaced populations became destitute, leading some
citizens to seek refuge abroad.
Severe human rights problems were widespread. Sectarian hostility, widespread

corruption, and lack of transparency at all levels of government and society
weakened the governments authority and worsened effective human rights
protections. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), members of the Federal Police, and the
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Peshmerga committed some human rights violations, and there continued to be

reports of PMF killing, torturing, kidnapping, and extorting civilians. Nonetheless,
the terrorist organization Daesh committed the overwhelming majority of serious
human rights abuses, including attacks against: civilians, (particularly Shia but
also Sunnis who opposed Daesh); members of other religious and ethnic
minorities; women; and children. Observers also reported other significant human
rights-related problems: harsh and life-threatening conditions in detention and
prison facilities; arbitrary arrest and lengthy pretrial detention, sometimes
incommunicado; denial of fair public trial; insufficient judicial institutional
capacity; ineffective implementation of civil judicial procedures and remedies;
arbitrary interference with privacy and homes; child soldiers; limits on freedom of
expression, including press freedoms; violence against and harassment of
journalists; undue censorship; social, religious, and political restrictions in
academic and cultural matters; limits on freedoms of peaceful assembly and
association; limits on religious freedom due to violence by extremist groups;
restrictions on freedom of movement; refugee and IDP abuse; both forced IDP
returns and preventing IDPs from returning home; discrimination against and
societal abuse of women and ethnic, religious, and racial minorities, including
exclusion from decision-making roles; trafficking in persons; societal
discrimination and violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and
intersex (LGBTI) persons; seizure of property without due process; and limitations
on worker rights.
The government announced investigations into reports of PMF abuses, but results
of the investigations or convictions were often not publicly available. Information
about government investigations or prosecutions of abuses by officials and
members of the security forces was also often not publicly available. The KRG
High Committee to Evaluate and Respond to International Reports considered
charges of Peshmerga abuse, largely against IDPs, and exculpated them in public
reports and commentaries. Impunity effectively existed for government officials,
security force personnel, including the Peshmerga, and militias.
Terrorists committed the majority of serious human rights abuses. Daesh

members committed acts of violence on a mass scale, including killings through
the use of suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), executions
including shootings and public beheadings, as well as use of chemical weapons.
They also engaged in kidnapping, rape, enslavement, forced marriage, sexual
violence, committing such acts against civilians from a wide variety of religious
and ethnic backgrounds, including Shia, Sunni, Kurds, Christians, Yezidis, and
members of other religious and ethnic groups. Reports of Daesh perpetrating
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016

United States Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
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gender-based violence, recruiting child soldiers, trafficking in persons, and

destroying civilian infrastructure and cultural heritage sites were credible and
common. Secretary Kerry stated on March 17 that in his judgment, Daesh was
responsible for genocide against groups in areas under its control, including
Yezidis, Christians, and Shia Muslims, and was also responsible for crimes against
humanity and ethnic cleansing directed at these same groups and in some cases
also against Sunni Muslims, Kurds, and other minorities.
The government investigated some of Daeshs human rights abuses, and in some
instances, results were publicly available. For example, on August 21, the
Ministry of Justice announced the conviction, sentencing, and execution of 36 men
convicted of involvement in the 2014 Camp Speicher massacre of hundreds of Shia
Air Force recruits after trials international observers criticized as unfair.
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:
a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and other Unlawful or Politically Motivated

Killings
There were numerous reports that Daesh and other terrorist groups, some
government forces, and militias acting outside government orders, had committed
arbitrary or unlawful killings (see section 1.g.). During the year the security
situation remained unstable due to widespread fighting between the ISF and
Daesh, and, to a lesser extent, the Shia PMF and Daesh. During the year the UN
Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) recorded a total of 19,266 civilian casualties:
6,878 killed, and 12,388 wounded. These casualty figures do not include the
civilian casualty figures for Anbar for the months of May, July, August, and
December. The corresponding period in 2015 showed 7,515 killed and 14,855
wounded.
Some security forces were alleged to have committed extrajudicial killings,

although the governments identification and prosecution of specific killers were
rarely made public. Ministry of Interior personnel allegedly tortured detainees to
death, according to reports from human rights organizations. For example,
Amnesty International (AI) reported receiving information that men wearing
military and federal police uniforms unlawfully killed men and boys in a village
north of Fallujah in October and in some cases tortured them beforehand (see
section 1.c.).

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Although officially under the command and control of the prime minister, some
Shia PMF operated independently and with limited government oversight or
accountability. According to multiple nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
more than 643 men and boys were reported missing near Saqlawiyah following the
June liberation of Fallujah after PMF units intercepted them at ad hoc security
screening sites. All 643 reportedly remained missing.
During the year Iraq witnessed frequent unlawful killings by unidentified gunmen
throughout the country. For example, on February 11, a Kurd and a Turkmen Shia
in Salah al-Din Governorate were killed in the center of Tuz Khurmatu in separate
attacks; on April 29, a Sunni man in his 70s was killed in the Maqal area of
Basrah; and on May 17, a local council member was killed outside his home in al-
Amal al-Shaabi neighborhood, northwest Kirkuk.
Terrorist activities continued throughout the year, particularly with Daeshs

attacks on cities. Baghdad was most affected, and was the site of more than half of
the total fatalities. UNAMI reported that Baghdad experienced attacks of IEDs on
a nearly daily basis from January to October. Some attacks targeted government
buildings or checkpoints staffed by security forces, while others targeted civilians.
Daesh reportedly carried out attacks against civilians in Baghdads Shia-majority
neighborhoods. The largest was on July 3, when a coordinated bomb attack in
Baghdads Shia district of Karrada resulted in 292 civilians killed and hundreds
wounded.
During the year authorities discovered several mass graves. On August 30, the
Associated Press reported that analysis of satellite imagery identified a possible
mass grave site at Badoush Prison near Mosul, where more than 600 inmates died.
Approximately 35 mass graves in Sinjar District were found. In May media outlets
reported the discovery of a mass grave in western Mosul containing the remains of
80 Yezidis. A representative from the Yezidi Affairs Council in the IKR reported
these individuals were likely victims of Daesh, and the remains showed signs of
brutal treatment in captivity.
UNAMI reported that IEDs, suicide vests, and vehicle-borne improvised explosive
devices (VBIEDs) caused at least half of all verified casualties during the year.
Media reported that Daesh IEDs infested Ramadi, which was nearly destroyed
during fighting, which began with air strikes in July 2015 and ended with the
capture of the city on February 6. Many civilians could not return to their homes
because of the destruction and the threat of IEDs. UNAMI reported that IEDs
placed in homes in Ramadi killed at least nine people in April. Spillover across the

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porous border from the conflict in Syria continued to destabilize the security
situation in the country. The governments lack of the border with Syria facilitated
Daeshs movement of fighters and materiel into the country.
Ethnic-based fighting escalated in ethnically mixed governorates after liberation

operations. For example, according to a January 31 Human Rights Watch (HRW)
report, following January 11 bombings claimed by Daesh, members of Shia
militias reportedly abducted and killed scores of Sunni residents in Muqdadiya, in
Diyala Governorate, and demolished Sunni homes, stores, and mosques. None of
those responsible within the Shia militias were brought to justice by years end.
Media also widely reported instances when, after Sunni tribes turned against
Daesh and allied with the ISF, Daesh conducted mass executions of tribesmen.
There were significantly fewer reports of killings or other sectarian violence in the
IKR than in the rest of the country. Minority groups reported threats and attacks
targeting their communities in non-IKR areas that the KRG effectively controlled.
On May 3, the IKR press reported several killings for which the families of the
deceased alleged KRG security forces were responsible. On August 13, Wedat
Hussein Ali, a journalist working for ROJ News, was abducted and later found
dead. Media reports indicated his injuries were consistent with torture and quoted
Wedats family as saying the KRG internal security service had previously
questioned him about his ties to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The press
reported that the KRG internal security service temporarily detained several other
journalists.
There were no known developments in other cases of arbitrary or unlawful killings

reported in 2015.
b. Disappearance
Daesh orchestrated most abductions, which focused on members of various ethnic

and religious communities. There was no comprehensive account publicly
available on the extent of the problem of disappeared persons.
In areas it controlled, Daesh engaged in frequent abductions of members of the

security or police forces, ethnic and religious minorities, and other non-Sunni
communities. According to the director general for Yezidis in the KRG Ministry
of Endowments and Religious Affairs, more than 2,900 kidnapped Yezidi men,
women, and children had been rescued from Daesh captivity by years end, while

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another 3,735 Yezidis, mainly women and children, were believed to remain in
Daesh captivity. According to officials from the Turkmen Womens Association,
Daesh militants have kidnapped 500 Turkmen Shia women and children from Tal
Afar and Mosul since June 2014, all of whom remained in captivity at years end.
There were a number of disappearances and kidnappings that appeared to have

been politically motivated. For example, on December 27, the Interior Ministry
reported that unidentified gunmen broke into the home of female journalist and
political activist Afrah Shawqi al-Qaisi in Baghdad and abducted her. Al-Qaisi
regularly criticized the rampant corruption in the country. Prime Minister al-Abadi
ordered the security forces to investigate the kidnapping and to exert the utmost
effort to save her. There were no further developments by years end.
Some militias exploiting the security situation carried out kidnappings, either for
personal gain or for sectarian reasons. On June 22, the council of al-Quarnah
District raised concern about the rise of child abduction, demanding that the
security forces take decisive actions against it.
In December 2015, unknown gunmen kidnapped 27 members of a Qatari hunting

party in the Muthanna Desert. The kidnappers released one Qatari and one non-
Qatari member of the hunting party. There were no further developments in the
case, and the 25 other members of the hunting party remained missing at years
end.
There were no known developments in other cases of disappearances from prior

years.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or

Punishment
Although the constitution expressly prohibits torture in all its forms under all
circumstances, including cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, government
officials as well as local and international human rights organizations documented
instances of government agents committing torture and other abuses. Police
throughout the country continued to use abusive and coerced confessions as
methods of investigation, and courts continued to accept forced confessions as
evidence. Daesh, however, committed the overwhelming majority of such abuses.
As in previous years, abuse and torture occurred during arrest, pretrial detention,
and after conviction. Former prisoners, detainees, and human rights groups

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reported that methods of torture and abuse included: putting victims in stress
positions, beating, including on the soles of feet with plastic and metal rods,
suffocating, burning, removing fingernails, suspending from the ceiling,
overextending spines, denying sufficient water and the use of sanitation facilities,
sexual assault, denying medical treatment, and threatening to rape female relatives
of detainees or kill family members. A number of inmates reported that prison
guards mistreated their families during visits.
International human rights organizations documented credible cases of torture and

abuse in facilities of the Ministry of Interior and to a lesser extent in detention
facilities of the Ministries of Justice and Defense, as well as in facilities of the
KRG. The Human Rights Ministry and the Iraqi High Commission for Human
Rights (IHCHR) noted that torture cases were underreported because many
detainees were afraid to file complaints. HRW reported that widespread torture
and systematic abuses continued in detention facilities and reported several
instances of torture and rape of detainees. For example, according to NGOs, the
men who had been convicted after confessing to taking part in the 2014 Camp
Speicher massacre showed signs of torture. The International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) reported police and investigators continued to rely heavily on
the evidence of secret informants or coerced confessions. Following confession,
the coercion generally ceased.
The IHCHR could not confirm allegations of torture and systematic abuses in
prisons and detention centers in part because the ministry was disbanded and the
commissions last meeting of the year was in May. In February the parliamentary
Human Rights Committee confirmed one case of torture in a Ministry of the
Interior detention center in Baghdad; it was the only case the committee reported.
Abusive interrogation under certain conditions reportedly occurred in some

detention facilities of the KRGs internal security unit, the Asayish, and the
intelligence services of the major political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic
Partys (KDP) Parastin and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistans (PUK) Zanyari.
During monitoring visits to IKR prisons and places of detention between January
2015 and June 2016, UNAMI reported 70 detainees had raised allegations of
torture or other ill treatment during the interrogation phase, or both.
Abuses by terrorist groups were widespread. For example, in March HRW

reported Daesh fighters beat a man in custody every day for 18 days to force him
to confess to selling cigarettes. The report also said witnesses reported 15 female
Daesh guards biting a woman in public as punishment for not covering her face.

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On September 13, Daesh reportedly cut off the feet of seven civilians from Hawija
southwest of Kirkuk for urging residents to take up arms and rise-up against the
organization. Human rights and humanitarian groups reported numerous cases of
rape, forced labor, forced marriage, forced religious conversion, material
deprivation, and battery.
There were no known developments in cases of torture and abusive treatment or

punishment first reported in 2015.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions
Conditions at some prison and detention facilities remained harsh and life
threatening due to overcrowding, abuse, and torture. There were also cases of food
shortages and inadequate access to sanitation facilities and medical care.
Both the government and the KRG operated secret detention facilities during the
year, according to international observers and to the head of the KRG
parliamentary Human Rights Committee. There was no information available to
verify whether--or the extent to which--they remained in use. In May HRW
reported that Daesh had set-up at least three prisons where former prisoners
reported regular floggings and torture.
The Ministry of Justice reported that there were no accommodations for disabled
inmates and the previously announced initiative by the ministry to establish
facilities for disabled detainees had not been implemented by years end.
Physical Conditions: NGOs, such as AI, reported overcrowding in prisons was a

serious problem as the number of detainees increased as a result of the capture of
suspected Daesh members. Detainee conditions and treatment of detainees were
generally poor, according to UNAMIs 2016 report, with overcrowding becoming
a growing problem in most facilities. NGO contacts reported that due to the
closure of prisons after Daeshs 2014 advances, some remaining prisons held
more than twice their designed inmate capacity. Three of the 24 correctional
facilities managed by the Iraqi Corrections Service (ICS)--the only government
entity with legal authority to hold persons after conviction--were not operational
due to the security situation.
Prisons also became overcrowded in the South due an increased incarceration rate
of criminals involved in drugs and kidnapping, and the transfer of 1,000 prisoners
from northern governorates to Basrah. For example, the sole prison in Muthanna

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Governorate should hold no more than 50 prisoners in each cell; however,

observers reported more than 100 persons in one cell. Basrah central prison, with
capacity of 1,100, held more than 2,500 inmates, and Maaqal Prison, with a
capacity of 250, held 500 prisoners. Overcrowding exacerbated corruption among
some police officers and prison administrators in the South, who reportedly took
bribes to reduce or drop charges, cut sentences, or release prisoners early.
Many inmates lacked adequate food, water, exercise facilities, vocational training,
and family visitation. Access to medical care was inconsistent. Some detention
facilities did not have an onsite pharmacy or infirmary, and authorities reported
that existing pharmacies were undersupplied. Moreover, NGO contacts reported a
significant shortage of social workers at prisons. Womens prisons often lacked
adequate child-care facilities for inmates children, whom the law permits to
remain with their mothers until the age of four. Limited infrastructure or aging
physical plants in some facilities worsened marginal sanitation, limited access to
potable water, and led to preparation of poor-quality food.
Authorities separated detainees from convicts in most cases. Prisoners facing

terrorism charges were isolated from the general population and were more likely
to remain in Interior Ministry facilities in harsher conditions.
Although the government held most juvenile pretrial detainees and convicts in
facilities operated by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, international and
local NGOs reported that authorities held some juveniles in Justice Ministry
prisons, Interior Ministry police stations, and other Interior Ministry detention
facilities. Due to a lack of facilities in Maysan Governorate, juvenile offenders and
adults were jointly incarcerated.
On May 3, AI reported that Shia militia units were holding more than 1,000
detainees, including some as young as 15, without charge in horrendous
conditions at makeshift holding centers in Anbar Governorate (see section 1.g.).
Daesh reportedly continued to operate three facilities in areas under its control,
including the Justice Ministrys Badoush Prison in Mosul, and two Interior
Ministry prisons in Ninewa Governorate. The condition of individuals detained in
these facilities was unknown.
Published in its January-June report, UNAMI found overcrowding driven by

terrorism-related detentions, such as in the Anti -Terrorism Directorate facility in
Erbil. According to UNAMI, the KRGs new detention facilities in major cities

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were well maintained, although conditions remained poor in many smaller

detention centers operated by the KRG Ministry of Interior. In some KRG Asayish
detention centers and police-run jails, KRG authorities occasionally held juveniles
in the same cells as adults.
Administration: Although there were credible allegations of mistreatment in both

central government and KRG facilities, especially in pretrial detention, there was
no information indicating that authorities undertook credible investigations into the
allegations, and no prosecutions resulted therefrom (see section 1.c.). According to
the Iraqi Kurdistan Independent Human Rights Commission and IKR
parliamentary Human Rights Committee, instances of torture have occurred in IKR
prisons. UNAMI reported during monitoring visits to prisons and places of
detention in the IKR that 70 detainees raised allegations of torture or other ill-
treatment during their interrogation.
The Ministry of Justice reported that budgetary constraints had significantly

reduced the number of its visits to prisons. There was no information available
about censorship or action on the complaints.
Recordkeeping on prisoners and detainees was generally inadequate. The Ministry

of Justice reported it employed new technology to keep track of prisoners and
detainees. The fully digitalized ministry-wide tracking system keeps track of
judicial records relating to detainees and decreased the likelihood of individuals
being detained past their release date. Moreover, it reduced corruption
opportunities as prison officials could no longer alter prisoners records in
exchange for bribes. Despite these attempts at modernization, however, officials at
the Ministries of Interior, Justice, and Defense, and at the Counterterrorism
Service, indicated each entity maintained its own records, although some facilities
held individuals detained by several entities, making it difficult to account for a
facilitys total population. Additionally, human rights organizations reported that
prison guards or arresting officers released detainees after the detainees paid a
bribe, a practice that further contributed to inaccurate detainee recordkeeping.
International and local human rights groups reported that authorities in numerous
cases denied family visits to detainees and convicts. In many cases guards
allegedly demanded bribes when detainees asked to call their relatives or legal
counsel.
Independent Monitoring: ICS prisons allowed regular visits by independent

nongovernmental observers. The ICRC continued to have its customary access to

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Justice, Interior, Defense, and Labor and Social Affairs Ministry prisons and
detention facilities. Authorities also granted UNAMI access to Justice Ministry
prison and detention facilities in Baghdad. There were reports of institutional
interference in prison visits, and in some cases institutions required advance
notification to wardens and prison officials of visits by outside monitors.
The KRG generally allowed international human rights NGOs and

intergovernmental organizations to visit convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees
but occasionally delayed or denied access to some individuals, usually in cases
involving terrorism. The UNAMI Human Rights Office and ICRC continued to
receive regular access to IKR prisons and detention facilities.
Improvements: The Ministry of Justice reported that during the year it had
installed surveillance cameras in all federal prisons, providing real-time
information to a centralized office responsible for monitoring prisons. The camera
system was meant to act as a deterrent to would-be abusers by allowing the
government to record possible abuses for later investigation.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention
The constitution provides some basic legal safeguards against arbitrary arrest and
detention. Emergency laws give security forces broad discretion over arrest and
detention when the government has declared a national emergency, which
authorities declared in Baghdad on April 30 after protesters breached the
International Zone. During the year there continued to be many reports of arbitrary
arrests and detentions.
The government made minimal progress by years end in improving enforcement

of the rights governing arrest and detentions, despite the encouragement of an
executive order and a reform law. In federal prisons the government reported the
installation and use of video cameras to deter and record abuse.
In 2014 the prime minister issued an executive order to enforce the existing rights
of detainees--a principal concern of Sunnis. The executive order prohibits the
arrest or remand of individuals except by an order issued by a competent judge or
court or in the conditions warranted by the code of criminal procedures. The
authority that enforced the arrest warrant or detention is required within 24 hours
of the detention to register in the governments central electronic and manual
registers the detainees name, place of detention, reason for detention, and legal
article. The Ministry of Justice is then responsible for updating and managing

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these registers. The order requires the Ministries of Defense and Interior and the
National Security Service to establish guidelines and mechanisms for commanders
to register detainees details in this central register. The executive order also
prohibits any entity, other than legally competent authorities, to detain any person.
On August 25, the Council of Representatives (COR) passed the amended amnesty
law. The reformed law permits retrials for detainees convicted on the basis of
forced confessions or from reliance on evidence provided by secret informants.
After bombings on April 4, security forces in the southern governorate of Dhi Qar
arrested persons under the Antiterrorism Law. Local residents alleged that the ISF
used the bombing as an excuse to arrest innocent Sunnis, IDPs, and civil activists.
For example, security forces arrested Mufeed al-Shanoon and Salaam Dlejan, civil
activists in the reform protests from Nassiriyah. By the end of the year, of the
original 31 arrested, authorities released 18 for lack of evidence.
In August the human rights staff of an international organization reported concerns

about government security forces, the PMF, and Peshmerga detention and arrest of
IDPs. With the cooperation of the Ministries of Interior and Justice, the
international organization representative visited IDP detainees, but authorities
prevented the representative from conducting confidential interviews. Numerous
reports of arrests and temporary detention by government forces, the PMF, and
Peshmerga of predominantly Sunni Arab IDPs continued throughout the year.
Prison authorities sometimes delayed the release of inmates who were exonerated
or who had served their complete sentence unless the prison authorities received
bribes. According to NGO contacts, inmates whom the judiciary ordered to be
released continued to face delays from the Interior Ministry or other ministries to
clear their record of other pending charges.
There were many reports of Shia PMF forces detaining Sunnis following the
liberation of Daesh-dominated areas. For example, reports persisted that up to
3,000 prisoners were illegally held by the hard-line militias, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and
the terrorist Kataib Hizballah, advised by members of the Iranian Revolutionary
Guards Quds Force. The prisoners included Sunnis and others suspected of
working with Daesh, and were held in up to five makeshift jails, some for alleged
crimes and some to exchange for ransoms that help fund militia activities.
According to the PMF spokesman, the Justice Ministry appointed a judge who
was, at years end, working his way through 300 reported cases of abuse by militia

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members ranging from alleged prisoner abuse to summary executions. According

to the spokesman, only approximately one-quarter of those accused were
genuine militia members, and the rest were part of volunteer groups receiving no
pay, medical, or survivor benefits from the government.
According to local NGOs and the head of the IKR parliamentary Human Rights
Committee, prisoners held in KRG-administered Asayish prisons sometimes
remained in detention for more than six months without trial. IKR police and
internal security service officers in the IKR arrested protesters and activists critical
of the KRG, and detained them for several days, according to NGO contacts and
local press reporting. For example, Iraqi Kurdistan authorities in the northern city
of Sulaimaniyah arrested 13 teachers on December 1, ahead of a demonstration
over unpaid public-sector salaries.
Prime Minister Abadi said in an interview that some fighters participating in the
battle for Fallujah had committed mistakes. A government spokesperson later
announced the establishment of a human rights committee to investigate alleged
abuses. As of year-end, there were no updates regarding the men and boys who
were missing in Saqlawiyah or concerning the progress of the investigation.
Daesh continued to seize persons in order to silence its critics in the areas it
controlled. In October, Daesh arrested five former imams in Mosul on charges of
sedition, according to local media. During the first week of January, Daesh
abducted five male teachers from around Mosul city for refusing to propagate
Daesh doctrines.
Role of the Police and Security Apparatus
The ISF consists of security forces administratively organized within the Ministries
of Interior and Defense, the PMF, and the Counterterrorism Service. Interior
Ministry responsibilities include domestic law enforcement and maintenance of
order relying on the Federal Police, Provincial Police, Facilities Protection Service,
Civil Defense, and Department of Border Enforcement. Energy police, under the
Ministry of Oil, are responsible for providing critical infrastructure protection.
Conventional military forces under the Defense Ministry are responsible for the
defense of the country, but working with elements of the Interior Ministry, they
often also carry out counterterrorism and internal security operations. The
Counterterrorism Service reports directly to the prime minister and oversees the
Counterterrorism Command, an organization that includes the three brigades of
special operations forces.

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The November 26 PMF law, one and a half pages long, was the latest in a series of
efforts to place the PMF, composed of nearly 60 militia groups, under the ISF
umbrella but reporting to the prime minister in a similar fashion as the
Counterterrorism Service. Details on implementation, mission, and force structure
of the PMF were not finalized as of years end.
The authorities reportedly initiated some investigations of security forces accused

of committing human rights abuses. As in the previous year, the minister of
defense publicly called for holding perpetrators of human rights abuses within the
security forces accountable, but there was little information available on the
outcome of any investigations or of official punishment for human rights
violations. On June 4, the government announced an investigation into
transgressions against civilians and the PMFs killing of IDPs who fled Fallujah
during the more than month-long struggle for its liberation. Authorities did not
make public any findings of investigations by years end, except the PMF
spokesmans reference to a judge working his way through 300 reported cases of
PMF abuse of which, he said, approximately one-quarter pertained to genuine
militia members, while the rest pertained to wannabe groups like the Sunni
Knights of Ninewa.
There were reports of torture and abuse throughout the country in Interior and
Defense Ministry facilities. According to international human rights organizations,
abuse took place primarily during detainee interrogations while in pretrial
detention. The Interior Ministry did not release the number of officers punished
during the year, and there were no known court convictions for abuse.
An NGO in Muthanna Governorate reported that guards on occasion beat prisoners

for talking to outsiders about poor conditions and mistreatment inside the prison.
On September 10, local media reported that authorities arrested and charged five
police officers in the Rania District of Sulaimaniyah Governorate with torturing a
man in their custody.
Problems persisted, including corruption, within the countrys provincial police

forces. The army and federal police recruited and deployed soldiers and police
officers on a nationwide basis. This practice led to complaints from local
communities that members of the army and police were abusive because of ethno-
sectarian differences.

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Security forces made limited efforts to prevent or respond to societal violence.

Although 16 family protection units, located in separate buildings at police stations
around the country, operated under police authority to respond to claims of
domestic violence made by women and children, they lacked sufficient capacity.
The most recent report detailing the units work dated from 2014.
The two main Kurdish political parties, the KDP and PUK, had their own security
apparatuses. Under the federal constitution, the KRG has the right to maintain
regional guard brigades, supported financially by the government but under the
KRGs control. Accordingly, the KRG established a Ministry of Peshmerga
Affairs. There are 14 infantry brigades and two support brigades under the
authority of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, but the PUK and KDP controlled
tens of thousands of additional military personnel.
The KDP had its own internal security unit, the Asayish, and its own intelligence
service, the Parastin. The PUK also maintained its own internal security unit,
known also as the Asayish, and its own intelligence service, the Zanyari. While
the PUK and KDP took some nominal steps to unify their internal and external
security organizations, they remained separate, since political party leaders
effectively controlled these organizations through party channels. The KRG
Independent Human Rights Commission routinely notified the Kurdistan Ministry
of Interior when it received credible reports of police human rights violations.
Local NGOs reported a sense of impunity among KRG security force officials;
local human rights monitors reported an allegation of rape and manslaughter by
mid-ranking officers during the year.
KRG security services detained suspects in areas the regional government

controlled. The poorly defined administrative boundaries between the IKR and the
rest of the country resulted in continuing confusion about the jurisdiction of
security forces and the courts. Daeshs control of parts of these areas exacerbated
this situation.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees
The constitution prohibits unlawful detention and mandates that authorities

submit preliminary documents to a competent judge within 24 hours of arrest, a
period that may extend in most cases to a maximum of 72 hours. For offenses
punishable by death, authorities may legally detain the defendant as long as
necessary to complete the judicial process. According to local media and rights
groups, authorities arrested suspects in security sweeps without a warrant,

IRAQ 16
particularly under the antiterrorism law, and held some detainees for prolonged
periods without charge.
The government arbitrarily detained individuals and often did not inform them
promptly of the nature of the charges against them. The government periodically
released detainees, usually after concluding that it lacked sufficient evidence for
the courts to convict them. Many others remained in detention pending review of
other outstanding charges. The law allows release on bond for criminal (but not
security) detainees. Authorities rarely released detainees on bail. KRG internal
security units held some suspects incommunicado without an arrest warrant and
transported detainees to undisclosed detention facilities.
The law provides for judges to appoint paid counsel for the indigent. Attorneys
appointed to represent detainees frequently complained that insufficient access to
their clients hampered adequate attorney-client consultation. In many cases
detainees were not able to meet their attorneys until their scheduled trial date.
There were reports that defendants did not have access to legal representation
during the investigation phase, appointed lawyers lacked sufficient time to prepare
a defense, and courts failed to investigate claims of torture while in detention. The
Human Rights Ministry, which was dissolved in August 2015, acknowledged the
need for public defenders and judges far exceeded supply, resulting in delayed
trials.
Arbitrary Arrest: Police and military personnel arrested and detained individuals
without judicial approval, although there were no reliable statistics available
regarding the number of such acts or length of detentions. Authorities often failed
to notify family members of the arrest or location of detention, resulting in
incommunicado detention.
Pretrial Detention: The Ministries of Justice, Defense, Interior, and Labor and
Social Affairs are legally entitled to hold pretrial detainees.
Although there were no independently verified statistics concerning the number of

pretrial detainees in government facilities, most individuals in Interior and Defense
Ministry facilities were reportedly pretrial detainees. In February the Ministry of
Justice stated there were approximately 30,000 detainees in the ministrys
correction centers, including 200 foreign detainees. NGOs noted actual detainee
figures could be as high as 50,000. As of October 5, there were an estimated 1,681
pretrial detainees, including 82 women, at various KRG facilities, according to the
KRG Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.

IRAQ 17
Lengthy detentions without due process and without judicial action were a
systemic problem. The lack of judicial review resulted from several factors,
including a large number of detainees, undocumented detentions, slow processing
of criminal investigations, an insufficient number of judges and trained judicial
personnel, authorities inability or reluctance to utilize bail or other conditions of
release, lack of information sharing, bribery, and corruption. Overcrowding of
pretrial detainees remained a problem in many detention facilities. There were
allegations of detention beyond judicial release dates as well as unlawful releases.
According to some observers, authorities held many detainees for months or years
after initial arrest and detention, particularly those detained under the antiterrorism
law. Authorities sometimes held detainees incommunicado, without access to
defense counsel or without formal charge before a judge within the legally
mandated period. Authorities at times detained spouses and other family members
of fugitives, mostly Sunnis wanted on terrorism charges, as proxies to pressure the
fugitives to surrender.
KRG authorities also reportedly held detainees for extensive periods in pretrial
detention. According to local NGOs and the head of the Iraqi Kurdistan
parliamentary Human Rights Committee, prisoners held in regional government-
administered Asayish prisons sometimes remained in detention for more than six
months without trial. According to IKR judicial officials, IKR law permits
extension of pretrial detention of up to six month under court supervision.
Detainees Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: The

constitution grants detainees the right to a prompt judicial determination on the
legality of their detention, and persons arrested or detained may obtain prompt
release and compensation if found to have been unlawfully detained. In practice
individuals faced lengthy detentions without possibility of prompt release,
regardless of guilt. Despite the 2014 executive order and the August 25 reform law
concerning rights of detainees, NGOs widely reported that detainees had limited
ability to challenge the lawfulness of detention before a court and that a bribe was
often necessary in order to gain release. The law does not allow for compensation
if a person was found to have been unlawfully detained.
Amnesty: There were no amnesty cases outside of the routine, religious holiday
amnesties for minor crimes.

IRAQ 18
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, although certain articles of

law restricted judicial independence. The countrys security situation and political
history left the judiciary weak and dependent on other parts of the government.
Additionally, in 2013 the Supreme Court overturned a court order mandating the
separation of the Federal Supreme Court and the Higher Judicial Council, thus
allowing one individual to head both the court, which rules on issues related to
federalism and constitutionality, and the council, which manages and supervises
the court system, including disciplinary matters. Local and international media
claimed the decision was politically motivated and undermined judicial
independence.
There were reports that corruption influenced authorities willingness to respect

court orders. For example, the Integrity Committee of the COR reported that
Interior Ministry and Justice Ministry employees frequently demanded bribes from
detainees to release them even after court orders for their release had been issued,
or after their mandated jail term had expired.
Corruption or intimidation reportedly influenced some judges presiding over

criminal cases at the trial level and on appeal to the Court of Cassation. The
Commission of Integrity routinely investigated judges on corruption charges, but
there were numerous reports that such investigations often were politically
motivated.
Numerous threats and killings by sectarian, tribal, extremist, and criminal elements
impaired judicial independence. Judges, lawyers, and their family members
frequently faced death threats and attacks. Lawyers participated in protests
demanding better protection from the government against threats and violence.
Judges were also vulnerable to intimidation and violence. In January unidentified
gunmen shot and killed an investigating magistrate in Diyala Governorate. In
February the president of the Basrah Court of Appeal survived an assassination
attempt near his house in Kut al-Hijjaj.
The Kurdistan Judicial Council is legally, financially, and administratively

independent from the KRG Ministry of Justice, but the KRG Executive continued
to influence politically sensitive cases.
Trial Procedures

IRAQ 19
The constitution provides all citizens the right to a fair trial--but not necessarily a
public trial--and the right to be present at their trial, with the assistance of free
interpretation through all appeals, if necessary. Observers, including some
government officials, the United Nations, and NGOs reported that trial proceedings
fell short of international standards. Although investigative, trial, and appellate
judges generally sought to enforce the right to a fair trial, defendants insufficient
access to defense attorneys was a serious defect in proceedings. Many defendants
met their lawyers for the first time during the initial hearing and had limited access
to legal counsel during pretrial detention. Trials were public, except in some
national security cases, but some faced undue delays.
Accused persons are innocent until proven guilty under the law, and detainees are
required to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges against them, as well
as the right to a privately retained or court-appointed counsel, at public expense if
needed. Nonetheless, officials routinely failed to inform defendants promptly or in
detail of charges against them. Judges assemble evidence and adjudicate guilt or
innocence. Defendants and their attorneys have access to government-held
evidence relevant to their cases before trial and have the right to confront witnesses
against them and present witnesses and evidence. In many cases, according to AI,
forced confessions served as the only source of evidence without the corroboration
of forensic evidence or independent witness testimony. The law provides the right
to appeal, although there is a statute of limitations for referral; the Court of
Cassation reviews criminal cases on appeal.
KRG officials noted that prosecutors and defense attorneys frequently encountered
obstacles in carrying out their work and that prisoners trials were unnecessarily
delayed for administrative reasons. According to the IKRs Independent Human
Rights Commission, detainees have remained in KRG internal security service
facilities for extended periods even after court orders for their release.
Political Prisoners and Detainees
The government did not consider any incarcerated persons to be political prisoners
or detainees and stated that all individuals in prison had been either convicted or
charged under criminal law or were detained and awaiting trial while under
investigation.
It was difficult to assess claims that there were no political prisoners or detainees
due to the lack of government transparency, prevalence of corruption in arrest
procedures, slow case processing, and inaccessibility to detainees, especially those

IRAQ 20
held in counterterrorism, intelligence, and military facilities. Political opponents of

the government asserted the government imprisoned or sought to imprison persons
for political activities or beliefs under the pretense of criminal charges ranging
from corruption to terrorism and murder.
Niaz Aziz Saleh, who was convicted in 2012 of leaking KDP party information
related to electoral fraud, remained in prison following the completion of his
sentence in 2014, according to the chairman of the IKR Parliamentary Human
Rights Committee.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies
Individuals and organizations may seek civil remedies for, or cessation of, human
rights violations. Administrative remedies also exist, although due to the
overwhelming security focus of the executive branch, coupled with an understaffed
judiciary dependent on the executive, the government did not effectively
implement civil or administrative remedies for human rights violations. In 2014 in
collaboration with the IHCHR, the Higher Judicial Council established special
courts to investigate human rights violations and reports of abuse wherever there is
a court of appeal. On February 3, IHCHR members stated they had referred
approximately 4,000 cases of human rights violations from 2015; however, the
prosecutor dismissed hundreds of cases for lack of evidence or failure to complete
required documents. At years end the courts had not issued any convictions for
human rights violations.
KRG law provides for compensation to persons subject to unlawful arrest or

detention. The KRGs Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs handles
compensation for unlawful arrests or detentions, and its Human Rights
Commission reported that while approximately 8,000 cases (including many
historical cases) received approval for compensation, the government was not able
to pay compensation due to budget constraints.
f. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or

Correspondence
The constitution mandates that authorities may not enter or search homes except
with a judicial order. The constitution also prohibits arbitrary interference with
privacy, but security forces often entered homes without search warrants.

IRAQ 21
According to accounts by family members provided to the UN High Commissioner

for Refugees (UNHCR) Protection Cluster, some government forces and militia
groups continued to force alleged Daesh sympathizers out of their homes in
Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, and Salah al-Din Governorates. For example, in late
October local security forces in Kirkuk allegedly evicted hundreds of households
perceived to be affiliated with Daesh before destroying their homes, although
public statements by local authorities denied government participation in the
forced evictions. Similarly, the Protection Cluster reported that in Diyala
Governorate, local authorities announced in October that more than 6,300 IDP
families residing in and around the city of Khanaquin would be required to depart
their homes and relocate to IDP camps, or return to their areas of origin.
According to the Protection Cluster, the order was in reaction to security concerns
regarding the displaced households possible affiliation with Daesh.
A November 16 HRW report, Marked With An X, alleged that KRG forces,

mostly Peshmerga, destroyed buildings and homes and, in many cases entire
villages, making them uninhabitable. On April 4, the KRG, having been given
access to HRWs evidence and findings prior to the publication of its report, set up
a committee to investigate the allegations of unlawful destruction of property and
movement restrictions on IDPs in territory under KRG control. The committee
proposed that the destruction might have resulted from Daesh IEDs, was part of
collateral damage from fighting or bombing, or was required by the de-mining
process to ensure returning IDPs were not injured by IEDs and booby-traps left
behind by withdrawing Daesh.
According to a November 3 HRW report, fighters of Asaib Ahl al-Haq detained

and beat shepherds, including a boy, from a village near Mosul on suspicion of
Daesh affiliation, then stole about 300 sheep--the villages entire flock.
During the year Daesh fighters entered homes, destroyed or looted private
property, and converted houses into operational bases. Media reported throughout
the year that Daesh opened markets called Spoils of the Nazarenes to sell
electronics, furniture, and other items looted from Christian homes. In January
Christian groups reported that Daesh arranged a market where they sold 400
houses, 19 high-rise buildings, and 167 stores, warehouses, and shops in the Mosul
area belonging to Christians. In September media reported that Daesh terrorists
destroyed more than 17,000 homes in Salah al-Din, according to Governor Raed
al-Jabouri. In September, Daesh reportedly burned approximately 25 homes of
ISF members and government employees around Hit, northwest of Ramadi.

IRAQ 22
g. Abuses in Internal Conflict
Killings: During the year UNAMI recorded a total of 19,266 civilian casualties:
6,878 killed and 12,388 wounded, although how many civilians were intentionally
targeted was not indicated.
According to the United Nations and international human rights organizations,

some Iran-backed Shia militias, nominally under government control, committed
human rights violations. The groups participated in operations against Daesh as
part of the PMF and were implicated in several attacks on Sunni civilians,
reportedly avenging Daesh crimes against the Shia. A few Sunni tribal forces that
had rallied to the government, especially in Anbar Governorate, were also
implicated in revenge killing of Sunni civilians, some of whom may have simply
coexisted with Daesh during Daeshs rule in the area. UNAMI and HRW
reported that members of Shia militias allegedly had abducted and killed scores of
Sunni residents in Muqdadiya, in Diyala Governorate, and demolished Sunni
homes, stores, and seven mosques following January 11 bombings claimed by
Daesh. In early January armed groups targeted Sunni mosques in Babil
Governorate. None of those responsible were brought to justice by year-end.
Daesh was the major human rights violator in the country, responsible for deaths
of many innocent civilians. The United Nations, international human rights
groups, and media reported that Daesh executed hundreds of noncombatants.
These included not only civilians who did not flee their homes in advance of
Daesh advances but also those who attempted to flee Daesh held territory,
captured or surrendered soldiers, police officers, and others associated or who had
been associated with the government. For example, ISF discovered in November
several mass graves containing the bodies of at least 400 former local police
officers near the village of Hammam al-Alil, 19 miles southeast of Mosul. They
appeared to have been killed at the end of October while in Daeshs custody.
Media widely reported instances when, after Sunni tribes turned against Daesh
and allied themselves with the ISF, Daesh conducted mass executions of
tribesmen. For example, HRW reported they interviewed 20 residents in May
from villages in Makhmur District who had fled to an IDP camp. The villagers
said that before government forces retook the area in March, Daesh executed
government security personnel, civilians attempting to flee, and suspected
government informants, while many others went missing.

IRAQ 23
Daesh also reportedly killed and abducted religious leaders who failed to support
the terrorist group. In September, Daesh reportedly shot and killed two imams in
eastern Mosul for not complying with instructions to encourage young men to join
Daesh and fight against the ISF.
Throughout the year Daesh detonated VBIEDs and suicide bombs in public
markets, security checkpoints, and predominantly Shia neighborhoods. For
example, on November 24, a suicide truck bomber killed at least 77 persons,
largely Iranian Shia pilgrims, in the southern city of Hilla.
On April 26, Yezidi religious leaders in Lalish published an open letter to

diplomats and human rights organizations reporting 410 Yezidi men had been
missing for a year after Daesh transported the men to a mosque in the Daesh-
controlled city of Tal Afar.
Abductions: Militias, illegal armed groups, Daesh, and other unknown actors
kidnapped many persons during the year. While in some cases individuals were
kidnapped due to their ethnic or sectarian identity, other individuals were taken for
financial motives. Daesh reportedly detained children in schools, prisons, and
airports, and separated girls from their families to sell them in Daesh-controlled
areas for sexual slavery. Daesh also punished minors in areas under its control.
UNAMI reported that Daesh held approximately 3,500 persons in slavery,

predominantly women and children from the Yezidi community, as well as other
ethnic and religious minorities from the Sinjar District of Ninewa Governorate. On
June 25, according to UNAMI, Daesh moved 42 Yezidi women to Mayadeen in
the Deir ez-Zor Governorate in eastern Syria and sold them to Daesh fighters for
amounts ranging from approximately 500,000 dinars to 2.2 million dinars ($450 to
$2,000) each.
Kidnappings also continued to be a common tactic in tribal conflicts. In January

members of the al-Halaf tribe abducted a man from the Garamsha tribe after the
establishment of a truce between the two tribes failed. A photo of the man, bound
and beaten, went viral on social media; the photo caption described him as a
captive of the war between the two tribes.
Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: Reports from international human

rights groups alleged that government forces and Shia PMF abused prisoners and
detainees, particularly Sunnis (see section 1.a.).

IRAQ 24
Daesh reportedly used torture and other brutal tactics to abuse and punish
individuals connected to the security services and government, as well as those
they considered apostates, such as Yezidis, according to international human rights
organizations. According to a January-June UNAMI report, thousands of women,
particularly those from ethnic and religious communities that Daesh considered
takfiri, or not conforming to their doctrine of Islam, had been subjected to rape,
sexual enslavement, murder, and other forms of physical and sexual violence.
Daesh forces killed civilians who cooperated with the government and anyone
who refused to recognize Daesh and its caliphate, or tried to escape Daesh-
controlled territory. During the first week of January, Daesh abducted five male
teachers near Mosul for refusing to propagate Daesh doctrines. In March media
widely reported that Daesh electrocuted 15 civilians charged with spying for the
government in Baghdad.
Daesh attempted to attack both ISF units and civilian-populated areas with
chemical substances, including chlorine and sulfur mustard gas. They developed a
small number of crude chemical weapons that had a negligible effect on the
battlefield. On March 16 and May 2, respectively, Daesh fired chemical weapons
into the Salah al-Din villages of Taza and Basheer, injuring more than 400
civilians, primarily Turkmen Shia.
Child Soldiers: There were no reports that regular ISF units conscripted or
recruited children to serve in the security services. Some NGOs and an IDP camp
manager reported that, while there was no instruction for children to join fighting,
children continued to be associated with the PMF and militias in conflict areas. In
August, NGOs reported Sunni tribal militias recruiting teenagers aged 15-17 from
the Debaga IDP camp. KRG and independent sources alleged the Yezidi
Resistance Forces and Yezidi Womens Protection Units militias employed Yezidi
minors in paramilitary roles in Sinjar. For example, an HRW December 22 report
documented 29 cases in which two armed groups affiliated with the PKK recruited
Kurdish and Yezidi children, and abducted or seriously abused children who tried
to leave their forces.
Additionally, armed Shia groups, under the banner of the PMF, continued to give
weapons training and military-style physical fitness conditioning to children under
the age of 18 at summer training camps. The government and the statements of
Shia religious leaders expressly forbid children under the age of 18 from serving in
combat; there was evidence on social media, however, of children serving in
combat positions. For example, the official Ideological Guidance page of the

IRAQ 25
PMF website lauded a 14-year-old volunteer from Basrah for fighting alongside his
father in Fallujah. The head of the UN Childrens Fund (UNICEF) Basrah office
said, children from poor neighborhoods in Basrah are leaving school to volunteer
with PMF groups. The head of a Basrah NGO visited PMF units in Salah al-Din,
where she encountered teenage volunteers serving on the front lines. On April 20,
the United Nations verified 12 reported cases of recruitment of children by militias
affiliated with the PMF, all of whom had been killed in combat. According to the
IHCHR, during the year authorities detained 857 juveniles, including 804 on
charges of terrorism, murder, theft, and kidnapping. An international organization
reported that an estimated 30 percent of juveniles in pretrial or post-trial detention
were held on security-related charges.
According to UNAMI, Daesh forcibly recruited children to serve as informants,

checkpoint staff, and suicide bombers. In January international media cited KRG
sources who said Daesh abducted up to 400 Yezidi children and trained them for
combat or as suicide bombers. In March, Daesh moved approximately 25
children from an orphanage in Mosul to a training camp in Tal Afar. The boys,
some as young as eight years, included Yezidis and Turkmen, and were reportedly
trained on weapons use and other combat skills. On September 20, Daesh
released a video that showed children executing prisoners in Mosul.
According to UNICEF, Daesh violations against children included killing and

maiming, recruitment and use as soldiers or suicide bombers, sexual violence,
attacks against schools or hospitals, denial of humanitarian access for children, and
abduction. For example, on August 21, police in Kirkuk cut a suicide vest off a
15-year-old boy wearing it under a Lionel Messi football shirt before he could
carry out a Daesh plan to detonate the vest inside a Shia mosque.
See also the Department of States annual Trafficking in Persons Report at

www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/.
Other Conflict-related Abuse: Active areas of conflict continued to disrupt the

lives of hundreds of thousands of persons throughout the country, particularly in
Baghdad and the IKR, but also in Anbar, Ninewa, Salah al-Din, and Diyala
Governorates.
On October 25, UNAMI warned that expulsions of relatives of suspected Daesh

members were becoming widespread without due process, and that collective
punishment endangered civilian lives and undermined efforts at reconciliation.
For example, media reported in August that police forced relatives of suspected

IRAQ 26
Daesh members to leave 52 houses in Dhuluiya, in Salah al-Din Governorate. On

September 9, international media reported that authorities expelled the families of
more than 200 suspected Daesh members from their homes in Hit, northwest of
Ramadi.
The government, the PMF, and Daesh all established roadblocks that impeded the
flow of humanitarian assistance to communities in need. The KRG--specifically
KDP-run checkpoints--also restricted the transport of food, medicines and medical
supplies, and other goods into Sinjar and Rabia Districts. NGO and diplomatic
contacts stated the measures appeared to be aimed at limiting the influence of the
PKK and their local affiliates, but they claimed unpredictability and the extent of
the restrictions limited IDP returns to these areas.
Reports of Daeshs targeted destruction of civilian infrastructure were common,

including attacks on roads, religious sites, and hospitals.
Daesh continued to attack cultural and religious heritage sites in areas under its
control. On January 21, UNESCO reported Daesh had destroyed the Monastery
of Saint Elijah, which was more than 1,400 years old and the oldest Christian
monastery in Iraq. On April 25, Daesh destroyed Mosuls Clock Tower Church.
UNAMI stated in an October report that Daesh violations against Christians, Faili
(Shia) Kurds, Kakai, Sabaean-Mandean, Shabaks, Shia Arabs, Turkmen, Yezidis
and others appeared to be part of a policy to suppress, permanently expel, or
destroy these communities.
Daesh increasingly used civilians as human shields in combat and targeted civilian
areas with mortars. In May police chief Lieutenant Colonel Aref al-Janabi told
local media that Daesh took civilians, mostly women, children and the elderly,
hostage in Albu Hawi and Hasi villages. He added that Daesh terrorists used
scores of civilians as human shields when tribal fighters, together with security
forces, launched an operation to retake the two besieged villages. In October UN
human rights spokesperson Ravina Shamdasani reported Daesh had forced tens
of thousands of people from their homes in sub-districts around Mosul, and had
forcibly relocated civilians inside the city itself to use them as human shields.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press

IRAQ 27
The constitution broadly provides for the right of free expression that does not
violate public order and morality, express support for the banned Baath party, or
advocate altering the countrys borders through violent means. The main
limitation on individual and media exercise of these rights was self-censorship due
to credible fear of reprisals by the government, political parties, ethnic and
sectarian forces, terrorist and extremist groups, or criminal gangs.
Freedom of Speech and Expression: Despite the constitutional protection for

freedom of expression, government and KRG oversight and censorship interfered
with media operations, at times resulting in closures of media outlets, restrictions
on reporting, and interference with internet service. Individuals were able to
criticize the government publicly or privately, but not without fear of reprisal. On
April 27, the Iraqi Communications and Media Commission closed the Baghdad
offices of al-Jazeera. The stations Baghdad bureau chief reported the government
closed the office because it did not approve of al- Jazeeras editorial policies. The
bureau chief also said unidentified armed men repeatedly threatened the bureau
and its employees.
In April the media provided live coverage of Baghdad demonstrations, including

protesters first breach of the International Zone. When a second breach occurred,
local media were quiet, with no live coverage or commentary. According to
directors of two satellite channels, they received calls from officials telling them
that covering the protests exacerbated the situation and asked them to tone it
down.
Press and Media Freedoms: An active media expressed a variety of views largely
reflecting the owners political viewpoints. The media also self-censored to
comply with government restrictions against violating public order and because of
a fear of reprisal, particularly by nongovernmental forces, but also by political
figures. Media outlets, unable to cover operating costs through advertising
revenue, overwhelmingly relied upon political funding, which diminished their
ability to report unbiased news. Political parties strongly influenced, or controlled
outright, most of the several hundred daily and weekly print media publications, as
well as dozens of radio and television stations.
On July 13, the parliament introduced legislation on freedom of expression and

peaceful demonstrations. NGOs, such as the Iraqi Union for Freedom of
Expression, voiced concern about the legislation, specifically, that the law called
for a one-year minimum prison sentence for insulting a religious symbol or figure,
and required 10 days notice to the government to obtain a permit for a protest.

IRAQ 28
International and local organizations reported arrests and harassment of journalists

as well as closure of media outlets covering politically sensitive topics, including
poor security, corruption, and weak governmental capacity. The deterioration in
the security situation exacerbated harassment of journalists. Government and KRG
security authorities sometimes prevented journalists from reporting citing security
pretexts.
Local and national media extensively covered recurring protests in the South;
however, security forces did not always allow coverage. For example, on February
12, security forces prevented a reporter for al-Baghdadiya TV from passing the
security cordon to cover a demonstration. They told the reporter their security
procedures prevented it.
On April 9, security forces wearing civilian uniforms reportedly attacked a

Kurdistan News Network (KNN) cameraman in an Erbil mosque while the KNN
crew was covering a protest there. As the cameraman attempted to film the
protest, one of the uniformed security force members placed a weapon against the
cameramans head to force him to stop.
In the IKR, government authorities continued to try, convict, and take legal action
against journalists, despite a 2008 law that decriminalizes publication-related
offenses. According to Kurdistan Journalist Syndicate officials, the 2008 law is
the sole basis for prosecution of journalists for publication offense under the
regional counterterrorism law, for public morality violations and other crimes.
While in December 2015 the KRG reopened Nalia Radio and Television (NRT)
offices that it originally closed in October 2015, Gorran-affiliated KNN offices in
Erbil and Dahuk Governorates remained closed because of KRG pressure.
Violence and Harassment: According to a report of the Committee to Protect

Journalists, 10 journalists and media workers were killed during the year. Five
Iraqi journalists were killed covering the war with Daesh, four by unknown
gunmen, and one in a bombing in Baghdad.
Reporting from Daesh-controlled areas was increasingly difficult. Journalists

covering armed clashes involving government, militia, and Daesh forces faced
serious threats to their safety, with several instances of journalists being killed or
injured. Military officials, citing safety considerations, sometimes restricted access

IRAQ 29
of journalists particularly to areas with active fighting, but primarily to outlets not
affiliated with the ruling party.
Media workers often reported they were under pressure from persons and
institutions, including politicians, government officials, security services, tribal
elements, and business leaders, not to publish articles critical of them. Media
workers reported accounts of government or partisan violence, intimidation, death
threats, and harassment. Mohammed al-Jabari, a correspondent for al-Made
Satellite TV in Basrah, said he received a threatening phone call from someone at
the Basrah Intelligence Directorate. He said this person was upset because al-
Jabari reportedly recorded him talking about the deteriorating security situation
with other intelligence officers at the governorate building. Al-Jabari left Basrah
because of the threat.
During his coverage of a local teachers demonstration, one of the security officers
guarding the Basrah governors office verbally harassed and beat al-Sharqiya
News Channel correspondent Mazin al-Tayyar when he asked why the
demonstration coordinator and another protester were arrested.
In April according to the Journalistic Freedoms Observatory, Sarmad al-Qasim, the

editorial manager of the Lex News agency, received death threats for his work
reporting government corruption in Diyala Governorate.
Throughout the IKR there were numerous beatings, detentions, and death threats
against media workers. In some cases the aggressors wore military or police
uniforms. Many attacks targeted independent and former opposition media,
mainly the independent NRT; Payama Television, affiliated with the Kurdistan
Islamic Group; and the KNN Television, affiliated with the Gorran Party.
According to HRW, Wedat Hussein Ali, a Kurdish journalist who security services
had previously interrogated, was abducted and later found dead on August 13 (see
section 1.a.).
Censorship or Content Restrictions: The law prohibits producing, importing,

publishing, or possessing written material, drawings, photographs, or films that
violate public integrity or decency. The penalties include fines and imprisonment.
Fear of violent retaliation for publishing facts or opinions displeasing to political
factions inhibited free expression. Public officials reportedly influenced content
through rewarding positive reporting with bribes, providing money, land, access to
venues, and other benefits to journalists, particularly to members of the pro-

IRAQ 30
government Journalists Syndicate. These restrictions extended to privately owned

Iraqi television stations operating outside of the country.
In 2013 the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament passed the Access to Information Law, to
provide for access to information for journalists, media outlets, and ordinary
citizens. As of September, however, the KRG had not made efforts to implement
the law. Moreover, local government, political parties, and officials, regularly
discriminated against some media outlets regarding access to information based on
party affiliation. For example, in KDP stronghold areas Dahok and Erbil, KDP-
affiliated outlets Rudaw and KTV had access to all KRG departments, while in the
PUK and Gorran stronghold of Sulaimaniyah, PUK-affiliated outlets such as GK
TV and Kurdsat TV received more access to government and party information
than other outlets.
All books published in the country as well as imported books required the Ministry
of Cultures approval and were therefore subject to censorship.
Libel/Slander Laws: The law prohibits defamation and provides penalties of up to

one month in prison or a fine of 50,000 to 250,000 dinars ($45 to $225). Many in
the media complained this provision prevented them from freely practicing their
profession by creating a strong fear of prosecution, although widespread self-
censorship impeded journalistic performance as well. Public officials occasionally
resorted to libel charges under criminal and civil law, which in some cases resulted
in punitive fines on individual media outlets and editors, often for publishing
articles containing allegations of corruption. When cases went to court, the courts
usually sided with the journalist, according to local media-freedom organizations.
Libel is a criminal offense under KRG law as well, and judges may issue arrest
warrants for journalists on this basis.
Nongovernmental Impact: Journalists and family members were targets of

terrorists, religious groups that rejected media independence, criminals, corrupt
officials, and unknown persons or groups wishing to limit the flow of news.
Journalists were harassed, kidnapped for ransom, or killed in deliberate attacks for
reporting information critical of Daesh.
In April an armed group threatened two civil activists in Amara after they
criticized Ammar al-Hakim, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq president and Iraqi
National Alliance chairman, on their Facebook pages. Hasaneen al-Manshad and
Ali al-Dilfi wrote on Facebook that the Islamic parties were not fulfilling the needs

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of Iraqis and had failed to manage the country, in addition to criticizing Hakims
speech. The two activists were at a friends wedding on April 7 when armed men
from the Jihad and Construction Movement forcibly entered and threatened to kill
them. The armed men held them at gunpoint until guests negotiated their release in
return for the activists public apology to Hakim and deleting the offending
Facebook posts.
Internet Freedom
There were overt government restrictions on access to the internet, and there were
credible reports, but no official acknowledgement, that the government monitored
e-mail and internet communications without appropriate legal authority. Despite
restrictions, political figures and activists used the internet to criticize corrupt and
ineffective politicians, mobilize protesters for demonstrations, and campaign for
candidates through social media channels. According to the World Bank,
approximately 17 percent of the population used the internet in 2015, compared
with 5 percent in 2011.
The government acknowledged that it interfered with internet access in some areas
of the country due to the deterioration in the security situation and Daeshs
disruptive use of social media platforms. Representatives from the State Company
for Internet Services reported they had pursued internet gateway projects that
would give them greater control over incoming internet feeds as well as the ability
to restrict internet content, but these projects had stalled. During the year there
were reports that government officials attempted to have pages critical of the
government removed from Facebook and Twitter for communications that the
government considered hate speech, although they did not succeed in doing so.
There were no reports the Ministry of Communications imposed social media

blackouts. Sporadically throughout the year, the government shut down the
internet during school exams, reportedly so students could not cheat. Additionally,
at times the government shut down the internet during protests for a few hours.
Daesh also restricted access to the internet and telephone service in areas under its
control.
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events
Social, religious, and political pressures significantly restricted the exercise of

freedom of choice in academic and cultural matters. In all regions, various groups

IRAQ 32
reportedly sought to control the pursuit of formal education and granting of

academic positions. The countrys universities did not pursue gender-segregation
policies. Daesh continued to limit female education beyond the primary level in
areas that it controlled.
Academic freedoms remained restricted in areas of active conflict and in Daesh-

controlled territory. Following Daeshs 2014 seizure of Mosul, the group began
reshaping education at the elementary, high school, and university levels, including
printing textbooks for elementary school children that glorify violence and Daesh
history. For example, local and international media reported that at Mosul
University, Daesh altered the programs of study to comply with Daesh ideology
in the colleges of law, fine arts, physical education, languages, social sciences, and
archeology. Daesh extremists also targeted libraries, museums, and academic
institutions in violent attacks and abducted students and faculty.
Extremists and armed groups limited cultural expression by targeting artists, poets,
writers, and musicians. For example, Iraqi media continued to report that Daesh
had issued a directive banning all stores in Mosul from selling movies or music
CDs, and had instructed businesses to stock only CDs containing Quranic verses or
religious programs. On February 16, Daesh publicly beheaded 15-year-old
Ayham Hussein of Mosul for listening to western music, according to an HRW
report.
In the IKR, according to local NGOs, senior professorships continued to be easier

to obtain for those with links to the traditional KDP and PUK ruling parties.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of Assembly
The constitution provides for freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration

regulated by law. Regulations require protest organizers to seek permission
seven days in advance of a demonstration and submit detailed information about
the applicants, the reason for the protest, and participants. The regulations prohibit
all slogans, signs, printed materials, or drawings involving sectarianism, racism,
or segregation of citizens. The regulations also prohibit anything that would
violate the constitution or law; encourage violence, hatred, or killing; or prove
insulting to Islam, honor, morals, religion, holy groups, or Iraqi entities in
general. Provincial councils traditionally maintained authority to issue permits.
Authorities generally issued permits in accordance with the regulations.

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In April and May, thousands of protesters took to the streets in response to cleric
Moqtada al-Sadrs call for protests of the governments failure to combat
corruption and provide security. Protesters stormed the International Zone in
Baghdad and overran the Council of Ministers Secretariat and the COR buildings,
before ISF stopped them. Media reported security forces killed four and injured
dozens of demonstrators with tear gas, water cannons, and live fire.
Most protests in the South during the year were accompanied by a heavy security
presence and were peaceful. One notable exception was in Nassiriyah on February
2, when a demonstration turned violent after protesters reached the Dawa Partys
main office. They chanted that Prime Minister Abadi and former prime minister
Maliki were thieves, Irans spies, and corrupt. Masked men with sticks
came out of the office and began to beat the protesters. The police were present
but did not intervene to stop the violence. The Dhi Qar Provincial Council formed
an investigatory committee but did not identify any of the masked men or hold
anyone responsible.
In some cases the government dismissed unauthorized protests or restricted

protests for security reasons.
There were limited reports of violence or official interference in protests in the

IKR. Media reported that on December 1, PUK authorities in the city of
Sulaimaniyah arrested at least 13 teachers before a demonstration over unpaid
public-sector salaries.
Freedom of Association
The constitution provides for the right to form and join associations and political
parties, with some exceptions. The government generally respected this right,
except for the legal prohibitions on groups expressing support for the Baath Party
or Zionist principles. The law stipulates that any person who promotes Zionist
principles, associates with Zionist organizations, assists such organizations through
giving material or moral support, or works in any way towards the realization of
Zionist objectives, is subject to punishment by death. There were no applications
of this law after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime.
On July 30, parliament passed the Banning the Baath, Entities and Racist Parties
and Takfiri and Terrorist Activities Party Law, which observers portrayed as
addressing the injustices of the de-Baathification process. Rather than ending the

IRAQ 34
collective stigmatization of all those associated with the party, however loosely,
the Banning of the Baath Party Law arguably amplified rather than limited de-
Baathification. Notably, while previous de-Baathification processes prevented
individuals from political participation or certain economic benefits, this law
criminalizes the very idea of Baathism, metes out lengthy prison sentences for
those promoting Baathist ideas, and strikes at the heart of basic freedoms of
expression, assembly, and protest, as well as the principle of nondiscrimination.
The law specifically criminalizes Baathists participating in any rallies, sit-ins,
or demonstrations. Given the broad and wide-ranging definitions of Baathist
activities and ideas, its stated application to any entity, party, activity or
approach, political parties, nongovernmental, civil society organizations and
groups of citizens, demonstrating, protesting or simply holding meetings may
violate the law.
Bureaucratic delays continued in the governments NGO registration process. The

slow process impeded development and legal protection of NGOs. NGOs can only
register in Baghdad, and must periodically reregister. The NGO Directorate in the
Council of Ministers Secretariat issued registration certificates to 244 NGOs, from
January to August. The NGO Directorate reported 2,844 registered NGOs.
c. Freedom of Religion
See the Department of States International Religious Freedom Report at

www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.
d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of

Refugees, and Stateless Persons
The constitution provides for freedom of internal movement and foreign travel, but
the government did not consistently respect these rights. IDPs had limited access
to Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Najaf Governorates, and areas controlled by the KRG
throughout the year. As of November approximately one million IDPs and
225,000 refugees were present in the IKR and areas under KRG security control.
In late November hundreds of Sunni Turkmen IDPs from the Tal Afar area were
denied entry into Dahuk, located in the IKR. The governor of Dahuk said he was
concerned there were Daesh elements among these IDPs, whose presence in the
IDP camps in Dahuk among Yezidis might provoke revenge attacks on them.
The government generally cooperated with UNHCR, the International

Organization for Migration (IOM),), and other humanitarian organizations to

IRAQ 35
provide protection and assistance to IDPs, refugees, returning refugees, asylum

seekers, stateless persons, or other vulnerable populations. The government did
not have effective systems to assist all of these individuals, largely due to funding
shortfalls, lack of capacity, and lack of access. The security situation and armed
clashes between the ISF and Daesh throughout the year caused significant
movement of civilians, further complicating the governments coordination of
relief efforts. The IOM estimated that, since the beginning of 2014, the conflict
with Daesh had caused more than 3.4 million individuals to become displaced, at
least one million of whom have returned home. Security considerations in and
near active combat areas, unexploded ordinance, destruction of infrastructure, and
official and unofficial restrictions continued to limit humanitarian access to IDP
communities.
Abuse of Migrants, Refugees, and Stateless Persons: UN agencies, NGOs and the
press reported that sectarian groups, extremists, criminals, and, in some alleged but
unverified cases, government forces attacked and arrested refugees, including
Palestinians, Ahwazis, and Syrian Arabs.
Local NGOs reported that abuse of Syrian refugees--often by other refugees--was

common, including violence against women and children, child marriage, forced
prostitution, and sexual harassment.
A 2011 memorandum of understanding between the government and the United

Nations provided for the closure of Camp Ashraf in Diyala Governorate, and
transfer to Camp Hurriya (in Baghdad) of members of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq
(MeK), an Iranian dissident group. The UNHCR relocation program provided the
means successfully to relocate all MeK members from Iraq to third countries
during the year; the majority of MeK were moved to Albania.
In-country Movement: The law permits security forces to restrict in-country

movement pursuant to a warrant, impose a curfew, cordon off and search an area,
and take other necessary security and military measures in response to security
threats and attacks. There were numerous reports that security forces, including
the ISF and Peshmerga, as well as the PMF, selectively enforced regulations
requiring residency permits to limit entry of persons into liberated areas under their
control. UNAMI and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
received multiple reports that Kirkuk authorities denied Sunni Arab IDPs from
Salah al-Din and Ninewa Governorates access to Kirkuk Governorate.

IRAQ 36
UNAMI reported that in some areas, civilians fleeing conflict zones were
intercepted by armed groups and militia operating in support of the ISF, and were
targeted for threats, intimidation, physical violence, abductions, destruction of
property, and killings. There were a number of reports that IDPs faced hostility
from local government authorities and populations, as well as threats of expulsion.
UNHCR reported that Kirkuk authorities also confiscated identification documents

or served notices of eviction to IDPs from Salah al-Din, Anbar, and Diyala
Governorates, provoking their departure from camps and urban centers. On
September 22, authorities forcibly returned 330 IDP families from Laylan Camp to
a checkpoint along the road to Salah al-Din, according to the Iraq Humanitarian
Protection Cluster. From September 1 to 21, Protection Cluster partners
documented the departure of more than 1,000 IDP families who had been targeted
for expulsion by local authorities. Amnesty International reported that the PMF
Units (predominantly Shia militias) and the Peshmerga forces prevented civilians,
largely Sunni, from returning to their homes after Daesh was pushed out.
The KRG, imposing what it stated were necessary security procedures, restricted
movement across the areas it administered. Authorities required nonresidents of
the IKR to obtain permits that authorized limited stays in the IKR. These permits
were generally renewable. Iraqi citizens from outside the IKR who sought to
obtain residency permits for KRG-controlled areas required sponsorship from a
resident in the region. Citizens (of all ethno-sectarian backgrounds, including
Kurds) crossing into the region from the South were obligated to enter at
checkpoints and undergo personal and vehicle inspection. The government
imposed similar restrictions on IDPs from Ninewa Governorate and the disputed
territories.
KRG authorities applied restrictions more stringently in some areas than in others.
The United Nations and international humanitarian organizations alleged that
practices regarding the entry of IDPs and Iraqi refugees seeking to return were
more or less restrictive depending upon the location of the checkpoint and the
ethno-sectarian background of the displaced individuals. There were also reports
that checkpoints into the IKR were sometimes closed for extended periods, forcing
IDPs to wait to enter the region. Officials prevented individuals whom they
deemed security threats from entering the region. IKR officials generally admitted
minority IDPs into the IKR, although the security checks were occasionally
lengthy. Entry often was more difficult for men, particularly Arab men traveling
without family.

IRAQ 37
Due to military operations aimed at defeating Daesh, ISF, including the PMF and
KRG Peshmerga, increased the number of checkpoints and erected makeshift
roadblocks in many parts of the country (see section 1.g.). In June, following the
liberation of Ramadi and Fallujah from Daesh in Anbar Governorate, thousands of
residents fled those cities for surrounding areas. Most were prevented from
leaving Anbar per an official government order, due to security and ethnocentric
concerns. Some 70,000 individuals fled Fallujah during a three-day period in June
when the Iraqi army secured safe exit routes, overwhelming local and international
assistance efforts and leaving many stranded in the desert for days without aid. At
least 600 IDPs from Fallujah were missing after Shia PMF units held them for
screening. IDPs began returning to Fallujah and outlying areas in September,
although there were credible reports that provincial authorities required some
government workers to return before they were ready to do so. In September, IDPs
in Laylan Camp in Kirkuk were informed that they must return to their areas of
origin. UN agencies confirmed that confiscation of identification documents and
other measures to force IDPs to return home continued.
Daesh restricted freedom of movement, particularly in the West and North (see
section 1.g.). Daesh prevented citizens from leaving the cities of Fallujah,
Ramadi, Mosul, and other places unless those citizens paid bribes to exit, left
family members behind as collateral for their return, or agreed to relinquish
property they owned in those cities. Daesh severely restricted womens freedom
of movement in areas under its control. Patrols checked to make sure women wore
suitable attire and that male relatives or guardians accompanied them outside the
home. There were credible reports that Daesh killed civilians trying to flee,
including in the cities of Hawija, Qayara, and Mosul, when ISF moved to liberate
those areas.
Foreign Travel: The government required exit permits for citizens leaving the
country, but the requirement was not routinely enforced.
Exile: The constitution permits forced exile only of naturalized citizens and only if
a judicial decision establishes that the individual obtained citizenship based on
material falsifications. There were no reported cases of forced exile. After 2003
many former Baath Party members sought refuge in neighboring countries,
choosing self-imposed exile over possible prosecutions under de-Baathification
laws, and later under the Anti-Terrorism Law. In 2011 another wave of prominent
Sunni politicians left the country after the government began arresting Sunnis and
dissidents, by expansively applying Anti-Terrorism Law provisions.

IRAQ 38
Emigration and Repatriation: The government failed to provide travel documents

to hundreds of citizens awaiting deportation from the United States, essentially
rendering these individuals stateless.
Internally Displaced Persons
The constitution and the national policy on displacement address IDP rights, but
few laws specifically do so. The central government, the IKR, and international
organizations, including UN agencies and NGOs, attempted to provide protection
and other assistance to IDPs. Host communities were strained as the number of
IDPs outside of camps increased. In 2014 the United Nations designated the
humanitarian crisis as a Level Three emergency, its highest level, citing the scale,
urgency, and complexity of the situation and has since extended the designation
through February 2017.
Since 2014 the armed conflict has displaced more than 3.4 million persons,
predominantly from Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din Governorates. In July and
August, Salah al-Din Governorate experienced a significant increase in new IDPs
resulting from the positioning of government forces in areas around Mosul in
preparation for the operations for its liberation. From mid-June through mid-
December, nearly 131,000 persons were displaced from Ninewa, Salah al-Din, and
Erbil Governorates. One million IDPs from the 2006-08 sectarian conflict
remained as of 2014, presumed to be included in the total IDP figure nationwide.
Sectarian violence and the advance of Daesh displaced Sunni, Christian, Shia,
Yezidi, Turkmen, Shabak, and Sabaean-Mandean families (see section 1.g.).
While some of the displaced fled to areas outside their districts of origin, lack of
secure corridors and fear of looting made others decide to stay. The government
urged civilians in Mosul to remain in their homes, attempting to limit possible
displacement during the Mosul operations.
The governments focus on military operations to expel Daesh and address IDPs
immediate humanitarian needs, strained official efforts to promote safe, voluntary
return or local integration. This challenge required the government to balance
attempts to assist IDPs while maintaining good relations with host communities,
including addressing their concerns about security threats posed by IDPs. UNHCR
and other international organizations noted there was no national policy on IDP
returns to homes of origin. In September the Ministry of Displacement and
Migration and IKRs Ministry of Interior signed a Memorandum of Understanding
to develop a coordinated approach on IDP returns and other IDP issues. The

IRAQ 39
Ministry of Displacement and Migrations strategy recognized local integration as

a legal option for IDPs; although in practice, new IDPs arriving from Daesh-
controlled areas (the large majority of whom were Sunni Arabs) faced difficulties
being accepted in KRG-controlled areas or in areas held by Shia PMF units. The
government attempted to integrate IDPs into local populations but also encouraged
families to return to their original homes, in some cases before the families were
willing to return.
Government assistance focused on the provision of financial grants, but it made

neither the initial nor the successive payments consistently, particularly with the
downturn in the economy. Faced with the large movements of IDPs across the
country, the government provided food, water, and financial assistance to many but
not all IDPs, including in the IKR. Many IDPs lived in informal settlements where
they did not receive adequate water, sanitation, or other essential services.
According to the IOM, as of November, 17 percent of IDPs lived in shelter
arrangements that did not meet minimal safety or security standards, and
approximately 64 percent resided in private arrangements, including host family
residences, hotels, motels, and rented housing. The government and KRG worked
with the United Nations to expand existing camp infrastructure.
In June nearly 85,000 IDPs from Fallujah and surrounding areas fled military
operations to expel Daesh. The unexpectedly large number of IDPs fleeing in a
short period of time initially overwhelmed assistance efforts. Since June military
shaping operations in villages south of Mosul displaced nearly 131,000 civilians.
Many of them fled to overcrowded IDP camps in Debaga and elsewhere. The
government worked with UN agencies and NGOs to provide food, shelter, health
care, water and sanitation, and other essential services to IDPs in camps and other
informal settlements. The government provided many of the IDPs in the camps
with basic household goods.
All citizens are eligible to receive food under the Public Distribution System
(PDS); however, PDS was implemented sporadically and irregularly. Not all
commodities were distributed each month and not all IDPs were able to access the
PDS in each governorate. Since the price of oil has dropped, the functioning of the
PDS has been even more irregular. Iraqis could only redeem their PDS rations at
their place of residence and within their registered governorate, thus losing access
and entitlement following displacement.
Persons who did not register as IDPs in their current places of residence sometimes
faced limited access to services. Local authorities often determined whether IDPs

IRAQ 40
would have access to local services. Through the provision of legal aid, UNHCR
and other humanitarian actors assisted IDPs in obtaining documentation and
registering with authorities to improve access to services and entitlements. The
IOM reported that some IDPs faced difficulty with registration due to lack of
required documentation and administrative delays.
While humanitarian assistance generally reached IDPs in most of the country,

access to those remaining in Daesh-controlled areas was limited. Humanitarian
personnel continued to attempt to provide assistance in these areas, but security
and movement limitations constrained aid delivery.
Protection of Refugees
Access to Asylum: The law provides for the granting of asylum or refugee status,
and the government established a system, albeit flawed, for providing protection to
refugees. According to UNHCR, there were approximately 267,000 refugees in
the country, most of whom are asylum seekers arriving from Syria, with smaller
numbers from Iran and Turkey. The government generally cooperated with
UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations to provide protection and assistance
to refugees and IDPs in the country.
Refoulement: The government cooperated with UNHCR to prevent the

deportation of refugees. UNHCR relocated refugees at risk of deportation to
refugee camps or attempted to resettle them.
Employment: Refugees and asylum seekers are legally entitled to work in the
private sector. Palestinian refugees, however, faced job insecurity when working
in the public sector due to their ambiguous legal status; the government did not
recognize their refugee status and did not allow them to obtain citizenship. Syrian
refugees were able to obtain and renew residency and work permits both in refugee
camps and in Erbil. Authorities, however, did not allow some Syrian refugees to
continue their employment in refugee camps.
Durable Solutions: Ethnic Kurdish refugees from Syria, Turkey, and Iran in the
IKR generally integrated well, although economic hardship plagued families and
prevented many children, especially Syrians, from enrolling in formal school.
Local integration remained the best and most likely option for the majority of
Iranian Kurds. In September the KRG reported that approximately 60 percent of
Syrian refugees in the IKR lived outside camps. Many worked in Erbil or found
shelter with relatives in the IKR.

IRAQ 41
Stateless Persons
UNHCR estimated that approximately 50,000 stateless persons lived in the

country, many of them Syrian refugees. Many nonrefugee stateless individuals had
previously been citizens and had already begun the process of reacquiring
nationality.
As of 2006, the latest year for which data was available, an estimated 54,500
Bidoun individuals living as nomads in the desert near or in the southern
governorates of Basrah, Dhi Qar, and Qadisiyah remained undocumented and
stateless. Prolonged drought in the southern section of the country forced many
individuals from these communities to migrate to city centers, where most obtained
identification documents and gained access to food rations and other social
benefits. Other communities similarly at risk of statelessness included the
countrys Romani population, the Ahwazi community of Shia Arabs of Iranian
descent, the Bahai religious minority community, inhabitants of the southern
Marshlands, members of the Goyan and Omariya Turkish Kurdish tribes near
Mosul, and nationals of South Sudan, which had not established a diplomatic
presence in the country.
Stateless persons faced discrimination in employment and access to education.

Many stateless persons, particularly Bahai, were not able to register for identity
cards, which prevented them from enrolling in public school, registering marriages,
and gaining access to some government services. Stateless persons also faced
difficulty obtaining public-sector employment and lacked job security.
Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process
The constitution provides citizens the ability to choose their government in free
and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal
suffrage. Despite violence and other past irregularities in the conduct of elections,
citizens generally exercised this right.
Elections and Political Participation
Recent Elections: In 2014 the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC)

conducted elections for both the Iraqi Council of Representatives and the
provincial councils of Erbil, Dahuk, and Sulaimaniyah Governorates. International
and local observers monitored the elections. Despite security concerns, monitors

IRAQ 42
declared the elections credible and free from widespread or systemic fraud. There
were limited reports of abuse or electoral irregularities. IHEC announced
preliminary election results, and the Federal Supreme Court certified the results in
2014.
The loss of civil documentation related to a growing number of IDPs presented a

challenge for future elections. IHEC representatives visited an IDP camp in
Basrah to renew the voter registrations of camp residents but could not do so
because several persons were missing identification documentation. The same lack
of identification documents applied to many IDPs across the country.
In 2015 the IKR established the Kurdistan Independent High Electoral

Commission, which has authority to supervise all elections and referenda within
the IKR, previously under IHEC supervision. There were no elections or referenda
in the IKR during the year.
In 2015 IHEC announced initial approval for a petition by Basrah Governorate

residents to hold a referendum to make the governorate an autonomous region. As
of December the referendum was not yet held because of insufficient funds, as well
as declining political support for the initiative.
Political Parties and Political Participation: Political parties and coalition blocs
tended to organize along either religious or ethnic lines. Membership in some
political parties conferred special privileges and advantages in employment and
education.
The Iraqi Kurdistan Region Parliament (IKP) had not convened since October
2015, when KDP officials and politicians ordered their counterparts in Gorran
Party, including IKP speaker Yousif Mohammed, to leave Erbil and not report to
parliament. KRG security forces subsequently blocked Mohammed from returning
to Erbil. Negotiations among IKR political parties to reactivate parliament
continued sporadically throughout the year.
Participation of Women and Minorities: The constitution mandates that women

must constitute at least 25 percent of parliamentary and provincial council
membership. In the parliamentary elections, 22 women received sufficient votes to
win seats in the 328-seat COR without having to rely on the constitutional quota,
compared with five in 2010. More than 60 additional women were awarded seats
based on the quota, bringing the total number of seats women held to 86. Despite
an increase in the number of female parliamentarians, political discussions often

IRAQ 43
marginalized female members of parliament. There was one woman in the Council
of Ministers.
Of the 328 seats in parliament, the law reserves eight seats for minorities: five for
Christian candidates from Baghdad, Ninewa, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Dahuk; one
Yezidi; one Sabaean-Mandean; and one Shabak.
Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government
The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government
did not implement the law effectively. There were numerous reports of
government corruption during the year. Officials in all parts of the government
often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity, and investigation of corruption
was not free from political influence. Family, tribal, and religious considerations
significantly influenced government decisions at all levels. Bribery, money
laundering, nepotism, and misappropriation of public funds were common.
Corruption: On August 25, the COR used secret ballots to remove Defense
Minister Khaled al-Obaidi from his office, and on September 21, it also removed
Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari. The questioning and subsequent no confidence
votes were reportedly to root out corruption, but media reported that some thought
it was to advance the politically motivated agenda of former prime minister Nuri
al-Maliki.
The Commission of Integrity (COI) refrained from releasing the names of

government officials in its semiannual report. In July the COI published a
semiannual report covering activities from January to June. The commission
investigated 13,226 cases of corruption, adjudicated 7,088 cases, and referred
1,891 cases to courts for trial. Six of the cases referred to the courts involved
ministers, and 99 director general-level officials. The COI reportedly recovered
135.3 billion dinars ($130 million).
There were reports alleging that senior officials involved in bribery schemes held
illicit funds in overseas accounts, making bribery more difficult to detect. In 2015
international media reported that the government launched a corruption
investigation against the former deputy prime minister for energy affairs Baha al-
Araji, accusing him of nine crimes, including property racketeering and financial
corruption. Araji publicly acknowledged owning as many as seven houses, a hotel,
and other properties. He also had 300 guards whose salaries were paid by the state.
In February the COI announced Araji had been referred to the integrity court on

IRAQ 44
charges of corruption, but at years end, no charges or arrest warrants had been
filed against him. In 2015 the judiciary announced it had issued an arrest warrant
for Minister of Trade Milas Muhammad Abdul Karim on corruption charges. The
minister left his post, but the result of the corruption investigation by Iraqi
Kurdistan Independent Human Rights Commission was not made public.
The Central Bank leads the governments efforts to combat money laundering and
terrorist financing. Through the offices of Banking Supervision and Financial
Intelligence, the Central Bank worked with law enforcement agencies and the
judiciary to identify and prosecute illicit financial transactions. The investigatory
capacity of authorities remained extremely limited, although they were successful
in prosecuting money-laundering cases linked to financial transfers to Daesh-
controlled territories. The COI, which prosecutes money-laundering cases linked
to official corruption, suffered from a lack of investigatory capacity. There also
was a lack of political will to prosecute senior officials.
The Council of Ministers Secretariat has an anticorruption advisor, and the COR
has an Integrity Committee. The Joint Anti-Corruption Council reporting to the
Council of Ministers oversees and monitors compliance with the governments
2010-14 anticorruption strategy. The secretary general for the Council of
Ministers led the anticorruption council, which also included the chairperson of the
Federal Board of Supreme Audit, the commissioner of the COI, and representatives
from the offices of the inspectors general (IGs). When the agenda of the
anticorruption council calls for high-level government participation, the Ministry
of Interiors head of economic crimes may attend. Despite the councils mandate,
the public generally regarded it as having little effect due to the scale of official
corruption. The COIs National Strategy to Combat Corruption (2015-19) aims to
increase training and development of staff of the IGs office and COI.
Lack of agreement about institutional roles, insufficient political will, political

influence, poor transparency, and unclear governing legislation and regulatory
processes hampered joint efforts to combat corruption. Although anticorruption
institutions increasingly collaborated with civil society groups, organizing
workshops, surveys, and training courses, the impact of expanded cooperation was
limited. Media and NGOs continued to attempt to expose corruption
independently, although their capacity to do so was limited. Anticorruption, law
enforcement, and judicial officials, as well as members of civil society and media,
faced threats and intimidation in their efforts to combat corrupt practices (see
section 2.a.).

IRAQ 45
Government officials frequently contended that corruption investigations were

highly politicized. In December 2015 the COI formed an investigative and
oversight committee, consisting of the Iraqi High Judicial Council, the Board of
Supreme Audit, and the parliaments integrity committee, and, earlier in the year,
added the public prosecutor. The results of the oversight committees
investigations were not made public. The chairman of the COI investigative
committee said the COI investigated 630 corruption cases from January through
September, resulting in 18 arrest warrants against 18 ministerial-level officials, and
137 arrest warrants for directors general.
On August 11, the UN Development Program and the government signed an

agreement to strengthen the capacity of the government to detect, investigate, and
prosecute high-profile and complex corruption cases.
In August 2015 the prime minister announced, and the COR approved, a series of
reforms designed to eliminate official corruption and to improve public services.
The reforms went into effect in 2015, but implementation was inconsistent. Prime
Minister Abadis plan called for the end of sectarian quotas in determining senior
positions, as well as the establishment of an executive committee to select
ministers, advisors, and directors general based on merit and competence.
The reforms reduced the number of government ministries from 33 to 22.

Although the eliminated ministries lost their official mandate, working-level
employees continued to be paid while the Council of Ministers engaged in
protracted negotiations to merge ministries and reassign employees from
eliminated ministries.
Approximately 500 staff members from the Ministry of Human Rights were
transferred to the Iraq High Commission for Human Rights, whose Board had not
met since May. The reform package authorized a high commission to reopen and
investigate old corruption cases. The government subsequently referred 2,000
corruption cases to the courts for prosecution; however, the vast majority of these
cases dated from 2003 to 2005.
The prime minister also called on the judiciary to appoint expert judges known for
their integrity to investigate and prosecute corruption cases. In 2015 authorities
appointed 34 new judges to courts across the country, and 19 integrity judges to
Baghdad courts. The Baghdad Integrity Court--an investigation court that
specializes in integrity cases--announced it was investigating dozens of corruption
cases involving many government ministries. On March 22, the Integrity Court

IRAQ 46
announced it had adjudicated 611 cases; the results of the court decisions were not
publicly available. The court in Basrah had not issued any opinions by years end.
On July 7, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund approved a

three-year $5.34 billion stand-by arrangement that calls for the government to take
measures through June 2019 to combat corruption.
In March media reported on a corruption scandal involving the Ministry of Oil,

South Oil Company, and Minister of Higher Education Hussein al-Shahristani.
Unaoil, a company based in Monaco, allegedly funneled millions of dollars from
U.S. and European clients to government officials as bribes for government
contracts. No arrests were made by years end.
Widespread and pervasive corruption and lack of government transparency,

including with regard to oil revenue, were major problems in the IKR. According
to the Kurdistan Commission on Public Integrity, corruption in the IKR was
extensive. Weak budgetary oversight and lack of training for personnel further
hindered the commission from fighting corruption effectively. Allegations and
rumors of missing oil revenue were rampant. On October 5, in an effort to
improve its capability to deal with corruption, the KRG signed a master service
agreement with major international accounting firms to conduct an independent
audit of its oil production, marketing, and revenues.
According to local media reports, the KRG made efforts to prosecute corruption
cases. On January 24, the IKR presidency confiscated 251 billion dinars ($276
million) from the ex-wife of the KRG minister of natural resources over allegations
of corruption. On April 13, the head of the Kurdistan Regions Central Bank and
his deputy were arrested on charges of corruption related to an alleged illegal
bond-trading scheme. During the year KRG officials at the director general level
and below were arrested on corruption charges at the Ministry of Martyrs and
Anfal Affairs and Sulaimaniyah Immigration Department.
Financial Disclosure: The law authorizes the COI to obtain annual financial
disclosures from senior public officials, including ministers, governors, and
parliamentarians, and to take legal action for nondisclosure. Penalties range from
fines to imprisonment. A unified system for enforcing annual financial disclosures
did not exist. The COI has no jurisdiction over the IKR, but Kurdish members of
the central government were required to conform to the law. The law obligates the
COI to provide public annual reports on prosecutions, transparency, accountability,
and ethics of public service.

IRAQ 47
The Kurdistan Commission on Public Integrity is responsible for distributing and

collecting financial disclosure forms in the IKR. The commission reported that the
Kurdistan regions president, all members of its parliament, and all cabinet
ministers had submitted financial disclosure reports for 2015. There was no
information available indicating that public officials faced penalties for financial
nondisclosure.
Public Access to Information: The law does not provide public access to
government information. The IKR Information Law expands citizens rights to
request information from the regional government, parliament, and court system,
except in cases of national security or classified information. According to the
IKRs Human Rights Commission, the government had not implemented this law.
Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and

Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
Domestic and international NGOs operated in most cases with little government
interference. Due to the humanitarian crisis, the majority of local NGOs shifted
their focus to providing assistance to IDPs and other communities the conflict has
affected. In some instances these local NGOs worked in coordination with central
government and Kurdistan regional government authorities. A number of NGOs
also investigated and published findings on human rights cases. When NGOs
alleged human rights abuses that concerned government actions or actions of
ethnic or religious groups allied with the government, there were some reports of
government interference.
NGOs faced capacity-related challenges, did not have regular access to

government officials, and did not systematically serve as bulwarks against failures
in governance and human rights abuses. Sustainability of domestic NGOs
remained a key factor hindering the long-term development of the sector. The
government rarely awarded NGOs contracts for services. While the law forbids
NGOs from engaging in political activity, political parties or sects originated,
funded, or substantially influenced many, although not all, domestic NGOs.
Some NGOs in the South alleged government officials interfered and harassed
them, particularly regarding finances. One NGO representative in Dhi Qar said
ISF frequently visited the NGOs office, claiming that they needed to check on
things. The governor of Maysan reportedly tried to control funding for local
NGOs from international organizations. On September 21, the Maysan Provincial

IRAQ 48
Council voted to limit the governors authority over NGOs operating in the
province, according to the provincial councils spokesperson, in order to curb the
governorates interruption of local NGOs work.
Another NGO reported the government refused to register and license its womens
shelters. The government periodically asked the NGO to close them down, even
though government officials unofficially referred women to the shelters. After
each such closure, the shelters would reopen a few days later.
The IKR had an active community of mostly Kurdish NGOs, many with close ties
and funded by the PUK and KDP political parties. Government funding of NGOs
is legally contingent upon whether an NGOs programming goals conform to
already-identified priority areas. The regions NGO Directorate established formal
procedures for awarding funds to NGOs, which included a public description of the
annual budget for NGO funding, priority areas for consideration, deadlines for
proposal submission, establishment of a grant committee, and the criteria for
ranking proposals. During the year local and international NGOs did not report
difficulties registering with the regional government and obtaining permits for their
operations in KRG-administered areas.
Reports indicated that Daesh continued to threaten NGOs and civil society
activists in areas under its control throughout the year.
The United Nations or Other International Bodies: The government and the KRG
sometimes restricted the access of the United Nations and other international
bodies to sensitive locations, including Interior Ministry detention facilities.
Government Human Rights Bodies: In August 2015 the prime minister abolished
the Ministry of Human Rights as part of his reform program to reduce the number
of governmental ministries. Ministry staff and files were transferred to other
ministries, including the Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights (IHCHR),
which had not met since May 2015.
The constitution mandates the creation of an independent IHCHR. The law

governing its operation provides for commissioners with four-year nonrenewable
terms. No less than one-third of the 11 full-time and three reserve commissioners
must be women, and at least one full-time member and one reserve member must
be from a minority community. The law provides that the IHCHR be financially
and administratively independent and have broad authority, including the right to
receive and investigate human rights complaints, conduct unannounced visits to

IRAQ 49
correctional facilities, and review legislation. By the end of the year, the
commissioners had not been selected.
The KRG Human Rights Commission, which began operating in 2013, issues
periodic reports on human rights, trafficking in persons, and religious freedom.
The Commission reported KRG police and security organizations had generally
been receptive to human rights training and responsive to reports of violations. In
February, however, a court convicted the deputy head of the commissions Dahuk
office for interfering with a police investigation; his sentence was suspended.
Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
Women
Rape and Domestic Violence: Domestic violence remained a pervasive problem,

and there was no law prohibiting domestic violence. The law did not always
adequately protect rape victims. The law criminalizes rape (but not spousal rape)
and permits a maximum sentence of life imprisonment if the victim dies. The law
allows authorities to drop a rape case if the perpetrator marries the victim. There
were no reliable estimates of the incidence of rape or information on the
effectiveness of government enforcement of the law. Due to social stigma and
societal and often familial retribution against both the victim and perpetrator,
victims of sexual crimes did not usually report it to authorities or pursue legal
remedies. International organizations reported that family-imposed movement
restrictions, cultural norms, or stigmatization prohibited or discouraged female
victims of sexual crimes from accessing psychosocial support services. Local
NGOs in IDP camps in the IKR reported that some Ministry of Health
professionals were unwilling to treat sexual assault survivors due to cultural norms,
and if they did give care, it was inadequate due to capacity limitations in the
health-care sector.
Humanitarian protection experts assessed that conditions in IDP camps were

highly conducive to sexual exploitation and abuse, which due to existing social and
religious norms, often went unreported.
On September 23, the government signed a joint agreement with UNAMI on the
Prevention and Response to Conflict-related Sexual Violence. The government
committed to working with the Office of the Special Representative and the UN
system to develop and implement an action plan to prevent and respond to conflict-
related sexual violence.

IRAQ 50
Due to continuing Daesh-perpetrated violence, womens status continued to suffer

severe setbacks (see also sections 1.g. and 6). During the year Daesh continued:
to kidnap women and girls; sell, rent, or gift them as forced brides (a euphemism
for forced marriage or sexual slavery) to Daesh fighters and commanders; and
exploit the promise of sexual access in propaganda materials as part of its
recruitment strategy. The Iraq Foundation, a local NGO, reported that Daesh
raped women; victims who refused were beaten until they passed out. According
to an August 8 UN Population Fund report, Daesh continued to sell Yezidi women
and girls on slave markets.
In August the Council of Ministers launched the executive plan to implement UN

Security Council Resolution 1325, which was passed in 2000 and aimed to
increase womens participation in civic life. NGOs reported, however, that
government activity to advance it was minimal. In December the government
established the Department of Womens Empowerment in the Office of the
General Secretary for the Council of Ministers.
There is no law against domestic violence. Local and international NGOs and
media reported that domestic violence often went unreported and unpunished, with
abuses customarily addressed within the family and tribal structure. Harassment of
legal personnel who sought to pursue domestic violence cases under laws
criminalizing assault, as well as a lack of trained police and judicial personnel,
further hampered efforts to bring perpetrators to justice.
Public policy prevents NGOs from maintaining shelters, which severely limited the
number of NGO-run shelters available to victims of gender-based crimes and their
ability to access health care and psychosocial support. The Organization for
Womens Freedom in Iraq (OWFI) recommended legislation to provide a legal
status for womens shelters administered by NGOs. While the government does
not have a law that explicitly prohibits NGO-run shelters, current law allows the
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs to determine if a shelter can remain open.
OWFI reported that many communities viewed the shelters as brothels and asked
the government to close them down. To appease community concerns the ministry
regularly closed shelters, only to allow them to reopen in another location and at a
later date.
The Ministry of Interior maintained 16 family protection units around the country,
which aimed to resolve domestic disputes and establish safe refuges for victims of
sexual or gender-based violence. These units tended to prioritize family

IRAQ 51
reconciliation over victim protection and lacked the capacity to support victims.
Hotline calls went to the male commanders of the units, which did not follow a
regular referral system to provide victims with services, such as legal aid or safe
shelter. Victims of domestic violence in Basrah told UNAMI they feared
approaching the family protection units, because they suspected that police would
immediately inform their families of their testimonies. Shelters for victims of
domestic abuse were limited; the family protection units in most locations did not
operate shelters. Safe houses, which the government and NGOs operated, were
often targets for violence. Minority Rights Group International, an EU-funded
human rights organization, noted that the Ministry of Interior Family Protection
Units, responsible for receiving complaints about domestic violence, recorded a
total of 22,442 cases of family violence across the country between 2010 and
November 2014, the latest date for which statistics were available.
The law in the IKR makes domestic violence, including physical and psychological
abuse, threats of violence, and spousal rape, a crime. The government
implemented the provisions of the law, creating a special police force to investigate
cases of gender-based violence and establish a family reconciliation committee
within the judicial system, but local NGOs reported that these programs were not
effective at combating gender-based violence.
In the IKR, one privately operated shelter and four labor ministry-operated shelters
provided some protection and assistance for female victims of gender-based
violence and human trafficking. Space was limited, and service delivery was poor.
NGOs played a key role in providing services, including legal aid, to victims of
domestic violence, who often received no assistance from the government. Instead
of using legal remedies, authorities frequently attempted to mediate between
women and their families so that the women returned to their homes. Other than
marrying or returning to their families, which often resulted in further
victimization by the family or community, there were few options for women
accommodated at shelters.
According to the KRG Human Rights Commission, there were 7,436 cases of
violence against women, 125 cases of self-immolation, 64 suicides, 54 homicides,
and 124 cases of rape and sexual abuse reported during the year.
Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): The Family Violence Law, which

went into effect in 2011 in the IKR, bans FGM/C, but NGOs reported the practice
persisted, particularly in rural areas. UNAMI reported three women were arrested
and charged with FGM/C this year. In coordination with the KRG High Council of

IRAQ 52
Women Affairs, the KRG Ministry of Planning, and UNICEF, Heartland Alliance
International conducted a FGM/C survey of 5,990 mothers of girls four to 14 years
of age living in the IKR in 2015 and 2016. Among the mothers surveyed, 44.8
percent reported undergoing FGM/C themselves compared with 10.7 percent of
their daughters, with higher rates of FGM/C in Erbil and Sulaimaniyah
Governorates. International human rights organization WADIs, and local
womens rights organization PANAs, interviews indicated 25 percent of women
in the central and southern parts of the country had been subjected to FGM/C.
Other Harmful Traditional Practices: Honor killings remained a serious problem

throughout the country, although perpetrators were rarely punished. Some families
arranged honor killings to appear as suicides. The law permits honor
considerations to mitigate sentences. For example, a provision limits a sentence
for murder to a maximum of three years in prison if a man is on trial for killing his
wife or a female dependent due to suspicion that the victim was committing
adultery.
UNAMI documented several cases of honor killings in Dhi-Qar, Basrah, and

Muthanna. On January 16, authorities in Basrah found the body of a 15-year-old
girl, reportedly an IDP. She had been decapitated, her head wrapped in a hijab,
and thrown into a garbage can.
In March a Basrawi man confessed to the police that he killed his sister because he
suspected she was in a sexual relationship. He was released from prison after 24
hours and never went to trial. In August police arrested a man after he stabbed his
20-year-old daughter to death for dating a fellow student at her university in Dhi
Qar. He claimed that her death was an accident. At years end, the case was in
court; he was not in prison.
There were multiple reports of women in Basrah and Dhi Qar Governorates
committing suicide through self-immolation. Media usually reported these women
killed themselves because of family problems.
Women and girls were at times sexually exploited through so-called temporary
marriages, a practice more common in Shia than in Sunni traditions, under which a
man gives the family of the girl or woman dowry money in exchange for
permission to marry her for a specified period of time. Government officials and
international and local NGOs also reported that the traditional practice of fasliya
--whereby family members, including women and children, are traded to settle
tribal disputes--remained a problem, particularly in southern governorates.

IRAQ 53
A group called The Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice
distributed flyers in Maysan Governorate calling for single women to wear the
abaya, a full-length, loose robe. Those who refused, according to the flyers, were
depraved and unfit for marriage. The flyers also said women should not wear
make-up, smile, or laugh with strangers. The Provincial Council held an urgent
meeting of the security committee in response to the flyers, but the results of this
meeting were not known.
Sexual Harassment: The law prohibits sexual relations outside marriage, including
rape or sexual solicitation that may occur during sexual harassment. The penalties
include fines and imprisonment. The law provides relief from penalties if
unmarried participants marry. No information was available regarding the
effectiveness of government enforcement. The labor law that went into effect in
February prohibits, for the first time, sexual harassment in the workplace. Due to
social conventions and retribution against both the victim and perpetrator of sexual
harassment, victims of sexual harassment usually did not pursue legal remedies.
Because of the unequal social status of women, their fear of telling close relatives,
and their distrust of the criminal justice process, victims rarely filed police
complaints against their offenders. In most areas there were few or no publicly
provided womens shelters, information, support hotlines, and little or no
sensitivity training for police.
UNAMI repeatedly highlighted the need for womens shelters outside the IKR.
Women and girls who were victims of sexual harassment or worst forms of abuse
were often sent to prison or held in police lock-ups for their own protection in the
absence of shelters. Some women, with no alternatives, became homeless.
Reproductive Rights: Couples and individuals have the right to decide the number,
timing, and spacing of their children; manage their reproductive health; and have
access to the information and means to do so, free from discrimination, coercion,
or violence. Due to general insecurity in the country and attendant economic
difficulties, many women nonetheless received inadequate medical care. The
United Nations reported that sexual and reproductive health services, trauma
counselling centers, and reintegration support were severely limited, including in
the IKR, where the majority of returned captives lived, often having suffered
severe trauma at the hands of Daesh. There were no reports of women having
been denied access to contraception or maternal health services because of a
spouse or other family member withholding permission. The Global Justice Center

IRAQ 54
reported in April that Daesh continued to force captive Yezidi women to have
abortions because they viewed sex with a pregnant woman to be forbidden.
Discrimination: Although the constitution forbids discrimination based on gender,

conservative societal standards impeded womens ability to enjoy the same legal
status and rights as men in all aspects of the judicial system. Throughout the
country, women reported increasing social pressure to adhere to conservative
social norms. Daesh continued to impose severe restrictions on womens
movement and dress in areas it controlled, and Daesh patrols were reportedly
routine occurrences. The IHCHR reported cases of Daesh executing women for
not wearing the veil.
In March, UNAMI reported that women constituted 51 percent of the countrys

IDPs. The UN representative for womens affairs in Iraq, Hiba Qaskas, said the
abolition of the Ministry for Womens Affairs posed an additional challenge in
addressing issues of conflict and displacement, especially since the majority of
those displaced were women.
Law and custom generally do not respect freedom of movement for women. For
example, the law prevents a woman from applying for a passport without the
consent of her male guardian or a legal representative. Women could not obtain
the Civil Status Identification Document--required for access to public services,
food assistance, health care, employment, education, and housing--without consent
of a male relative. This restriction affected women in conflict, according to local
NGOs. In Daesh-controlled areas, Daesh forces reportedly forbade women from
leaving their homes unless male relatives escorted them. Daesh also prevented
professional women from returning to work, with the exception of medical workers
and teachers. In August 2015, as part of the prime ministers reform package,
authorities dissolved the Ministry of State for Womens Affairs, which had
functioned primarily as an advisory office without an independent budget. The
former ministry was largely ineffective at solving problems facing women,
according to civil society and international womens rights groups. The NGO
community called for the government to replace the ministry with another
institution. By years end the government had not indicated how another ministry
or institution would cover womens issues or how the institution would be
resourced.
Children

IRAQ 55
Birth Registration: The constitution states that anyone born to at least one citizen
parent is a citizen. Failure to register births resulted in the denial of public services
such as education, food, and health care. Single women and widows often had
problems registering their children. Although in most cases authorities provided
birth certificates after registration of the birth through the Ministries of Health and
Interior, this was reportedly a lengthy and at times complicated process. The
government was generally committed to childrens rights and welfare, although it
denied benefits to noncitizen children. Families of noncitizen children had to pay
for services, such as public schools and health services that were otherwise free.
Education: Primary education is compulsory for citizen children for the first six
years of schooling and until the age of 15 in IKR. Equal access to education for
girls remained a challenge, particularly in rural and unsecure areas. The net overall
completion rate for primary school was 50 percent as of 2013, the latest-year data
available. Children in rural areas faced greater education challenges. The IKR
primary school completion rate was among the highest in the country, with 65
percent of children completing primary school on time. A lack of available
schools, lack of identification documents, limited income with which to purchase
required supplies, and a lack of transportation often prevented IDP children from
attending schools.
The continuing conflict delayed the academic school year as IDPs throughout the
country sheltered in schools. According to a June UNICEF report, 3.5 million
school-aged children were unable to access school or any form of education.
Nearly one in five schools was not functioning due to the conflict. Since 2014
UNICEF verified 135 attacks on educational facilities and personnel, and 797
schools were taken over as shelters for IDPs.
Child Abuse: Violence against children remained a significant problem.

According to a UN-supported study in 2011 (the latest year for available
comprehensive figures), 46 percent of girls between the ages of 10 and 14 were
exposed to family violence. In 2013 the COR amended the social care law to
increase protection for children who were victims of domestic violence. The
amendment also called for protection and care of children in shelters, state houses,
and orphanages. UNICEF reported in June that over the past 30 months, 1,496
children had been abducted and had been forced into fighting or had been sexually
abused.

IRAQ 56
The KRGs Ministries of Labor and Social Affairs, Education, and Culture and
Youth continued to operate a toll-free hotline to report violations against, or seek
advice regarding, childrens rights.
Early and Forced Marriage: The legal minimum age of marriage is 15 with
parental permission and 18 without. The government made few efforts to enforce
the law. Traditional forced marriages of girls as young as age 11 continued,
particularly in rural areas. According to UNICEF, approximately 975,000 girls in
Iraq were married before the age of 15, twice as many as in 1990. Early and forced
marriages, as well as abusive temporary marriages, were more prevalent in Daesh-
controlled areas. UNICEF reported that traditional cultural practices and economic
hardships also motivated IDP and Syrian refugee families to marry girls at a young
age. In December 2015 the KRG Women High Council launched a one-year
education and awareness campaign against child marriage in the IKR.
Local and international NGOs reported that forced divorce--the practice of

husbands or their families threatening to divorce wives they married when the girls
were very young (ages 12 to 16) to pressure the girls family to provide additional
money to the girls husband and his family--also occurred, particularly in the
South. Victims of forced divorce were compelled to leave their husbands and their
husbands families, and social customs regarding family honor often prevented
victims from returning to their own families, leaving some adolescent girls
abandoned.
Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): See information in womens section

above.
Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law prohibits the commercial exploitation of

children, and pornography of any kind, including child pornography. During the
year there were multiple reports of Daesh forces abducting girls and forcing them
into marriage with Daesh fighters (see section 1.g.). Child prostitution was a
problem, and anecdotal evidence suggested the problem was particularly serious
among Syrian refugees in the IKR. Because the age of legal responsibility was
nine years old in the central region and 11 in the IKR, authorities often treated
sexually exploited children as criminals instead of as victims. Penalties for the
commercial exploitation of children range from fines and imprisonment to the
death penalty. No information was available regarding the effectiveness of
government enforcement.

IRAQ 57
Displaced Children: Insecurity and active conflict between government forces and
Daesh caused the displacement of large numbers of children. Due to the conflict
in Syria, many children and single mothers from Syria also took refuge in the IKR
(see section 2.d.).
International Child Abductions: The country is not a party to the 1980 Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. See the
Department of States Annual Report on International Parental Child Abduction at
travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/en/legal/compliance.html.
Anti-Semitism
A small number of Jewish citizens (estimated at less than 100) lived in Baghdad,
and there were unconfirmed reports that small Jewish communities existed in other
parts of the country. There were no reports of anti-Semitic acts. In 2015 the KRG
Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs opened a representative office for
Kurdish Jews, which held the IKRs first Holocaust Remembrance Day on May
10. According to unofficial statistics, there were 430 Jewish families in the IKR.
Trafficking in Persons
See the Department of States Trafficking in Persons Report at

Persons with Disabilities
Although the constitution states the government, through law and regulations,
should care for and rehabilitate persons with disabilities in order to reintegrate
them into society, there are no laws prohibiting discrimination against persons with
physical, sensory, intellectual, or mental disabilities in employment, education, air
travel and other transportation, access to health care, the judicial system, or the
provision of other state services. There were reports that persons with disabilities
continued to experience discrimination due to social stigma. Although the Council
of Ministers issued a decree ordering access for persons with disabilities to
buildings and to educational and work settings, incomplete implementation limited
access. Local NGOs reported many children with disabilities dropped out of
public school due to insufficient physical access to school buildings, a lack of
appropriate learning materials in schools, and a shortage of teachers qualified to
work with children with developmental or intellectual disabilities. NGOs also

IRAQ 58
reported that authorities denied some children with physical disabilities access to
schools.
The minister of labor and social affairs leads a commission for persons with
disabilities, designed to remain independent of the government. The KRG deputy
minister of labor and social affairs leads a similar commission, administered by a
special director within the ministry.
There is a 5 percent public-sector employment quota for persons with disabilities,

but employment discrimination persisted, and observers projected that the quota
was not likely met at years end (see also section 7.d.). Government and KRG
officials reported they had few resources to accommodate persons with disabilities
in prisons, detention centers, and temporary holding facilities. Mental health
support for prisoners with mental disabilities did not exist.
The Ministry of Health provided medical care, benefits, and rehabilitation, when
available, for persons with disabilities, who could also receive benefits from other
agencies, including the Prime Ministers Office. The Ministry of Labor and Social
Affairs operated several institutions for children and young adults with disabilities.
The ministry maintained loans programs for persons with disabilities for vocational
training.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
The countrys population included Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and Shabaks as well as
ethnic and religious minorities, including Chaldeans, Assyrians, Armenian
Orthodox, Syriacs, Yezidis, Sabean-Mandean, Bahai, Kakai, and a very small
number of Jews. The country also had a small Romani community, as well as an
estimated 500,000 citizens of African descent, referred to as Black Iraqis, who
reside primarily in Basrah and the South. In April 2015 the Ministry of Religion in
the IKR officially registered a variant of Zoroastrianism, locally known as
Zaradashti, as a religion.
In October 2015 parliament passed The National Identity Card Law, which came
into effect in February. This law automatically registers minor children as
Muslims if they are born to at least one Muslim parent, or if either parent converts
from another religion to Islam. Additionally, the law does not allow non-Muslims
to self-identify with their ethnic group nor does it allow Muslims to convert to
other religions.

IRAQ 59
In areas under its control, Daesh committed numerous abuses against Yezidis,
Shabaks, Christians, and other minority communities, including execution,
kidnapping, rape, enslavement, forced marriage, forced abortions, expulsion, theft,
forced conversions, and destruction of property. Activists from religious and
ethnic minority communities faced the greatest risk. Other illegal armed groups
also targeted ethnic and religious minority communities (see section 1.g.).
Many of the estimated 500,000 persons of African descent lived in extreme

poverty with high rates of illiteracy and unemployment. Black Iraqis were not
represented in politics and did not hold any high-level government positions.
There were reports of KRG authorities discriminating against minorities, including

Turkmen, Arabs, Yezidis, Shabaks, and Christians, both in the disputed territories
and in the three provinces that officially make up the Kurdistan region.
Although Arabs are the majority in most of the country, they are a minority in
Kirkuk, and Arab residents of the city frequently charged that KRG security forces
targeted Arab communities. Arab residents of Kirkuk alleged that local authorities
used the pretext of terrorist attacks to impose curfews on them and arrest Arabs
who lacked legal resident permits.
Kirkuk citizens, particularly members of the Sunni Arab community, faced

pressure to return to their areas of origin. UNAMI received reports of evictions,
confiscation of identity documents, or notifications to leave Kirkuk throughout the
year. NGOs reported Kirkuk authorities confiscated identification documents of
IDPs from Salah al-Din, Anbar, and Diyala Governorates. As of September local
authorities notified approximately 6,000 families in Laylan Camp and in a dozen
neighborhoods in Kirkuk that they had to return to their areas of origin (see section
2.d.). When confronted by international organizations and the diplomatic
community about forced expulsions of IDPs, Kirkuk authorities denied issuing
such an order. International organizations and NGOs continued to assert that the
government was indirectly pressuring IDPs to leave.
Acts of Violence, Discrimination, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual

Orientation and Gender Identity
Neither hate crime nor antidiscrimination laws exist, and there are no other
criminal justice mechanisms to aid in the prosecution of crimes motivated by bias
against members of the LGBTI community. Despite repeated threats and violence

IRAQ 60
targeting LGBTI individuals, the government failed to identify, arrest, or prosecute

attackers or to protect targeted individuals.
No law specifically prohibits consensual same-sex sexual activity, although the law
prohibits sodomy, irrespective of gender. There was no data on prosecutions for
sodomy.
Authorities relied on public indecency charges or confessions of monetary

exchange (that is for prostitution, which is illegal) to prosecute same-sex sexual
activity. Authorities used the same charges to arrest heterosexual persons involved
in sexual relations with persons other than their spouses.
The law does not address discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender
identity. Societal discrimination in employment, occupation, and housing based on
sexual orientation, gender identity, and unconventional appearance was common.
Information was not available regarding discrimination in access to education or
health care.
Due to stigma, intimidation, and potential harm including violent attacks, LGBTI
organizations did not operate openly, nor were there gay pride marches or gay
rights advocacy events. LGBTI persons often faced abuse and violence from
family and nongovernmental actors. In addition to targeted violence, members of
the LGBTI community remained at risk for honor crimes, since their conduct did
not conform to traditional gender norms. LGBTI rights groups attributed the lack
of publicized cases of attacks to the low profile of members of the LGBTI
community, who altered their public dress and lifestyle to conform to societal
norms. NGOs established shelters for individuals who feared attacks and
continued to accommodate victims. They periodically received threats and
relocated shelters for security reasons. Community activists reported that violence
and intimidation continued.
In July, Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr publicly stated that homosexuals should not be
attacked as they suffered from psychological problems.
Daesh published videos depicting alleged executions of persons accused of

homosexual activity that included stoning and being thrown from buildings. In
July, UNAMI reported a young man had been abducted and killed in Baghdad
because of his sexual orientation. Sources reported the abductors were known
members of armed groups. Some armed groups also started a campaign against

IRAQ 61
homosexual persons in Baghdad, UNAMI reported at least three more LGBTI

persons had disappeared since July.
Other Societal Violence or Discrimination
In July religious leaders, members of parliament, and Baghdad-based judges said

some political parties sanctioned criminal networks seizing Christian property.
Christian groups also reported they had submitted dozens of complaints to the
parliamentary integrity committee, and in August had sent a letter, signed by
Assyrian Member of Parliament Yunadim Kanna, to the prime minister outlining
cases of illegal seizure of Christians real estate in Baghdad. According to
Masarat, a domestic minority rights NGO, most Christians refused to file
complaints due to fear that armed groups might abduct their families. Those who
filed complaints reported police did not conduct thorough investigations.
Section 7. Worker Rights
a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining
The constitution states that citizens have the right to form and join unions and
professional associations. The law does not prohibit antiunion discrimination or
provide reinstatement for workers fired for union activity. In August 2015 the
COR approved a labor law (No. 37 of 2015) that allows workers to select
representatives for collective bargaining, even if they are not members of a union,
and affords workers the right to have more than one union in a workplace. The law
went into effect in February 7. On October 25, the Council of Ministers ratified
International Labor Organization Convention 87 on freedom of association and the
rights to organize, but the COR had not voted on it at years end.
A Saddam Hussein-era law bans all public-sector trade union activity. The law
also considers individuals state-owned enterprises employ (who made up
approximately 10 percent of the workforce) as public-sector employees. Civil
society organizations lobbied for a new trade union law to expand union rights.
Private-sector employees in worksites employing more than 50 workers may form

workers committees--subdivisions of unions with limited rights--but most private-
sector businesses employed fewer than 50 workers.

IRAQ 62
Labor courts have the authority to consider alleged labor law violations and
disputes, but no information was available concerning enforcement of the
applicable law, including whether procedures were prompt or efficient.
Strikers and union leaders reported that government officials threatened and
harassed them during the year. They also asserted that ministries and state-owned
enterprises used fines, demotions, suspension from work, and forced transfers to
punish labor activists and discourage union activity. Unions reported authorities
arrested labor leaders and activists for their activities. Union leaders also cited
corruption within the government as a continuous problem, with government
officials imposing arbitrary fines on workers for such activities as calling for
demonstrations and traveling outside the country on union business without prior
approval.
The law allows for collective bargaining in the private sector, although in practice,
the government authorities sometimes violated private-sector employees
collective bargaining rights. Some unions were able to play a supportive role in
labor disputes, and they had the right to demand government arbitration.
b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The law prohibits all forms of forced or compulsory labor--including slavery,

indebtedness, and trafficking in persons--but the government did not effectively
monitor or enforce the law.
Foreign migrant workers, particularly construction workers, security guards,

cleaners, handymen, and domestic workers, were subjected to forced labor,
confiscation of travel and identity documents, restrictions on movement and
communications, physical abuse, sexual harassment and rape, withholding of
wages, and forced overtime. There were cases of employers withholding travel
documents, stopping payment on contracts, and preventing foreign employees from
leaving the work site.
Women were subjected to involuntary domestic service through forced marriages

and the threat of divorce, and women who fled such marriages or whose husbands
divorced them were vulnerable to further forced labor. Due to the deterioration in
the security situation, female IDPs were increasingly vulnerable to economic
exploitation and discriminatory employment conditions. According to local
sources, Daesh exploited as many as several thousand Yezidi and other minority

IRAQ 63
women and girls sexually and economically and forced men and boys into military
service (see also sections 1.g. and 6).
Also, see the Department of States Trafficking in Persons Report at

c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment
The constitution and law prohibit child labor. The minimum age for employment
is 15. The law limits working hours for persons younger than age 18 to seven
hours a day and prohibits employment in work detrimental to health, safety, or
morals of anyone younger than 18. The labor code does not apply to juveniles
(ages 15 to 18) who work in family-owned businesses producing goods exclusively
for domestic use. Since children employed in family enterprises are exempt from
some protections in the labor code with regard to employment conditions,
anecdotal reports of children performing hazardous work in family-owned
businesses, such as in brick manufacturing and auto repair shops, continued. The
new labor law introduced improvements to child labor regulations, such as
increased fines and penalties for violators of the labor law. The new law abolished
a Saddam-era decree that allowed children as young as 12 to work. The law also
mandates employers--not workers or families--to bear the cost of annual medical
checks for working juveniles (ages 15-18). Children between the ages of 12 and
14 were not required to attend school but were not permitted to work and thus were
vulnerable to the worst forms of child labor. Violators are subject to imprisonment
for a period of 30 days to six months or to a fine ranging from 100,000 dinars to
500,000 dinars ($91 to $455). Qualitative data on child labor practices was
limited, particularly with regard to the worst forms of child labor, a factor that
further limited enforcement of existing legal protections.
Child labor, including in its worst forms, occurred throughout the country. The
inspection service of the labor ministry sought to comply with the law prohibiting
child labor in the private and public sectors. Inspections continued, but due to
capacity constraints as well as the focus on maintaining security and fighting
terrorism, law enforcement personnel and labor inspectors efforts to monitor these
practices were ineffective, and penalties for violations did not serve as a deterrent.
The NGO Iraqi Observatory for Human Rights documented many cases of
displaced children who were forced to migrate with their families from their
homes, and were subsequently forced to work. It also reported the Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs did not maintain accurate statistics about displaced child

IRAQ 64
workers. In July, UNICEF reported an estimated half a million children were in

the labor market, a number which doubled since 1990.
There was no recent survey of the child labor situation in the IKR, but local NGOs
reported that child labor increased due to the influx of Syrian refugees. The IKRs
Labor Ministry operated a 24-hour hotline for reporting labor abuses, including
child labor; the hotline received approximately 200 calls per month.
There were reports that Daesh and other armed groups recruited children to gather
intelligence, staff checkpoints, patrol the streets, and serve as couriers (see section
1.g. and section 6, Children). There was no evidence that the government
purposely recruited children into the armed forces. There were local press reports
of families sending their children to beg in the streets. Local NGOs reported that
organized gangs also recruited children to beg. In September the Labor Ministry
launched a grants program to encourage low-income families to send their children
to school rather than to beg in the streets.
See also the Department of Labors Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at
www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/child-labor/findings.
d. Discrimination with Respect to Employment and Occupation
The constitution provides that all citizens are equal before the law without regard
to gender, sect, opinion, belief, nationality, or origin. The law prohibits
discrimination based on race, sex, religion, social origin, political opinion,
language, or social status, and any forms of sexual harassment in the workplace.
The government was ineffective in enforcing these provisions. The law does not
prohibit discrimination based on disability, age, sexual orientation or gender
identity, HIV-positive status or other communicable diseases.
Discrimination in employment and occupation occurred with respect to women,

foreign workers, and minorities (see section 6). The law gives migrant Arab
workers the same status as citizens but does not provide the same rights for non-
Arab migrant workers, who faced stricter residency and work visa requirements.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
In June the prime minister issued an order to cut senior civil servants salaries by 15
percent due to budget constraints. The COR rejected the order in July. The 2015
pay scale reduced salaries of senior civil servants and increased salaries of civil

IRAQ 65
servants at the low end of the pay scale. The 2015 pay scale offered nonskilled
workers a monthly salary of 170,000 dinars ($155) and 300,000 dinars ($273) for
jobs that required a bachelors degree. The salary also included bonuses for
employees with families and higher education degrees.
The law limits the standard workday to eight hours, with one or more rest periods
totaling 30 minutes to one hour, and the standard workweek to 48 hours. The law
permits up to four hours of overtime work per day and requires premium pay for
overtime work. For industrial work, overtime should not exceed one hour per day.
The government sets occupational health and safety standards. The law states that
for hazardous or exhausting work, employers should reduce daily working hours.
The law provides workers the right to remove themselves from a situation
endangering health and safety without prejudice to their employment but does not
extend this right to civil servants or migrant workers, who together made up the
majority of the countrys workforce.
The Labor Ministry has jurisdiction over labor law, child labor, wages,
occupational safety and health topics, and labor relations. The government did not
enforce regulations governing working conditions. The ministrys occupational
safety and health staff worked throughout the country, but the lack of a law
governing these inspections hindered compliance and enforcement efforts.
The legal and regulatory framework, combined with the countrys high level of
violence and insecurity, high unemployment, large informal sector, and lack of
meaningful work standards, resulted in unacceptable conditions for many workers.
Workplace injuries occurred frequently, especially among manual laborers. A lack
of oversight and monitoring of employment contracts left foreign and migrant
workers vulnerable to exploitative working conditions and abusive treatment.
Little information was available on the total number of foreign workers in the
country, although some observers reported that large groups of migrant workers,
many of them in the country illegally, lived in work camps, sometimes in
substandard conditions. Due to the deterioration in security, and conflict
throughout western and northern Iraq, many foreign workers departed the country,
or their companies or home governments evacuated them. The government also
deported dozens of foreign workers from the South because they lacked proper
immigration documents.
On February 5, a fire in an Erbil hotel massage center resulted in at least 19 deaths.

Press reports quoted the Erbil governor as identifying 15 of the victims as

IRAQ 66
Philippine nationals; the remaining victims were Iraqi and Palestinian. The hotel
reportedly lacked fire extinguishers and fire suppression systems.
In 2015 the Labor Ministry launched an income-generating loan program, with a

budget of 10 billion dinars ($9.1 million), to assist unemployed persons, including
recent college graduates, shopkeepers affected by terrorism, and IDPs. In February
the ministry announced that the microloans had benefitted 43,079 persons since the
start of the program.


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IRAQ 2016 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

Iraq is a constitutional parliamentary republic. The outcome of the 2014

Violence continued to divide the country, largely fueled by Daeshs actions.

Severe human rights problems were widespread. Sectarian hostility, widespread

Peshmerga committed some human rights violations, and there continued to be

Terrorists committed the majority of serious human rights abuses. Daesh

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016

gender-based violence, recruiting child soldiers, trafficking in persons, and

a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and other Unlawful or Politically Motivated

Some security forces were alleged to have committed extrajudicial killings,

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016

Terrorist activities continued throughout the year, particularly with Daeshs

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016

Ethnic-based fighting escalated in ethnically mixed governorates after liberation

There were no known developments in other cases of arbitrary or unlawful killings

Daesh orchestrated most abductions, which focused on members of various ethnic

In areas it controlled, Daesh engaged in frequent abductions of members of the

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016

There were a number of disappearances and kidnappings that appeared to have

In December 2015, unknown gunmen kidnapped 27 members of a Qatari hunting

There were no known developments in other cases of disappearances from prior

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016

International human rights organizations documented credible cases of torture and

Abusive interrogation under certain conditions reportedly occurred in some

Abuses by terrorist groups were widespread. For example, in March HRW

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016

There were no known developments in cases of torture and abusive treatment or

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Physical Conditions: NGOs, such as AI, reported overcrowding in prisons was a

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016

Governorate should hold no more than 50 prisoners in each cell; however,

Authorities separated detainees from convicts in most cases. Prisoners facing

Published in its January-June report, UNAMI found overcrowding driven by

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016

were well maintained, although conditions remained poor in many smaller

Administration: Although there were credible allegations of mistreatment in both

The Ministry of Justice reported that budgetary constraints had significantly

Recordkeeping on prisoners and detainees was generally inadequate. The Ministry

Independent Monitoring: ICS prisons allowed regular visits by independent

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016

The KRG generally allowed international human rights NGOs and

d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention

The government made minimal progress by years end in improving enforcement

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016

In August the human rights staff of an international organization reported concerns

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016

members ranging from alleged prisoner abuse to summary executions. According

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016

The authorities reportedly initiated some investigations of security forces accused

An NGO in Muthanna Governorate reported that guards on occasion beat prisoners

Problems persisted, including corruption, within the countrys provincial police

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016

Security forces made limited efforts to prevent or respond to societal violence.

KRG security services detained suspects in areas the regional government

Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees

The constitution prohibits unlawful detention and mandates that authorities

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016

Although there were no independently verified statistics concerning the number of

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016

Detainees Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: The

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial